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INDIA

IN THE WORLD

SOMEONE, SOMEWHERE NEEDS ELECTRICAL CONSULTANTS


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Highly skilled Indian engineers and AEI personnel work shoulder to shoulder at Bhopal, busy making switchgear, transformers, capacitors and traction motors for India's power projects and industry. Of five projected factory blocks three are operating;



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The tiger didn't like it...

...when they cleared away his jungle! At Bhopal, much attention is paid to welfare schemes for workers. A town has arisen on what was very recently thick jungle. There are neighbourhoods, laid out with an eye to space, light and utility. They house executives, clerical staff and workers. The



statistics on welfare read impressively. Over seven thousand homes have been built, 13 hostels, a 75-bed hospital, three dispensaries, three clubs and two auditoriums, including the Assembly Hall of the Training

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What would you do with 3,000 points of view?

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40 years is a responsible age

The Bhopal project is one of the more recent associations between the Government of India and AEI. In India, AEI's activities date back about forty years and include contributions to the Jogindernagar power project (Punjab's first), the Bhakra Dam power project (Punjab's latest and India's largest), the steel works at Durgapur and the 720 mile oil pipeline in Assam. AEI has been manufacturing electrical equipment in India for over twenty years and a wide range of products is now serving the needs of industry and the home.



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56

INDIA IN THE WORLD

a symposium on the
fundamentals of our foreign policy in a
changed international situation

symposium participants

THE PROBLEM

A statement which seeks to present the
alternatives before India

SELF-PRESERVATION

H. M. Patel, former member of the Indian Civil
Service who held leading positions in the
Government of India

RE-ALIGNMENT OF NON-ALIGNMENT

V. K. Narasimhan, Deputy Editor of 'The Hindu',
Madras

A NEW IMAGE

N. J. Nanporia, Editor of 'The Times of India',
Bombay

LIVING WITH PROBLEMS

Sisir Gupta, Research Secretary of The Indian
Council of World Affairs, New Delhi

A VACUUM TO FILL

Rasheeduddin Khan, Head of the Department of
Political Science, Osmania University, Hyderabad

ASSESS THE NATIONAL INTEREST

Romesh Thapar, Editor of 'Seminar'

SPINSTER ON THE SHELF

Seminarist, a student of India's foreign policies

BOOKS

Reviewed by **Karunakar Gupta**, **J. M. Kaul**, **Gargi Dutt**,
Bimla Prasad, **H. S. Narendra Kumar** and **S. M.**

FURTHER READING

A select and relevant bibliography prepared
by **L. C. Kumar**

COMMUNICATIONS

From **C. Rajagopalachari** (Madras) and **Benoy Vohra**
(Lucknow)

COVER

Designed by **Dilip Chowdhury**

The problem

THERE are some in India, including the leaders of the government, who will deny that we are witnessing a crisis in India's foreign policy. They will readily acknowledge that China's 'perfidy' has brought about new compulsions for India in her foreign relations. They will also agree that India is not non-aligned so far as China is concerned. But they would like to treat the China problem as an isolated, albeit formidable, problem of our foreign relations. So far as the rest of the world is concerned, our foreign policy remains valid and useful, according to their way of thinking.

There is a second school of thought in the country which sees a crisis in our foreign policy, but traces it to the Chinese invasion again. According to this view, everything that India does in the world and every aspect of her foreign policy has to take note of the challenge from China. And to the extent that the government claims that nothing but its China policy has changed, it is failing to face realities. The crisis exists because our foreign policy has not

been geared full-scale to the needs of meeting the threat from China.

In both of these formulations, there is an exaggerated emphasis on China and the confrontation with her. There is an over-estimation of the importance of the fact that China will continue to be a major factor in India's foreign relations in the years to come. It is still possible, however, to say that there is a crisis in India's foreign policy as a whole and that this crisis arises out of the systemic changes occurring in world politics rather than out of the fact of China's attack along the Himalayas. In fact, the attack on India by China is but one of the indicators of the change the world political system has undergone. Even if China had not invaded India, this country would still be compelled to take a second look at her foreign policy in the light of the emerging realities of a vastly different world.

The foreign policy of India was enunciated on the assumption of a particular kind of world

political system, namely, the division of the world into two blocs dominated by the United States and the Soviet Union. What is more, the two blocs had attained a broad balance in their military power. They had also a broad commitment to peace. If world peace was still a major concern of the nations of the world, it was so because of the possibility of war breaking out due to mistakes and fears. In other words, if only human frailties could be adequately curbed, peace in the world would be ensured. India decided in this context to remain non-aligned, to persuade similarly placed countries to adopt a policy of non-alignment, and to make its voice felt individually and collectively in the cause of world peace.

This was a none-too-difficult task. The propaganda from the two blocs notwithstanding, the aligned nations were as much in search of peace as the non-aligned. There had of course been periods when this or that bloc looked somewhat aggressive but, by and large, each bloc developed a mechanism within its bloc system which curbed war-like tendencies. The two big powers, particularly, struggled hard and successfully to limit the role of the armed forces in the formulation of their world policies. Thus, the non-aligned were by no means struggling against the blocs as such and, despite the Dulleses of the post-war world, their role was widely appreciated even in the aligned world.

The crisis in the foreign policies of the non-aligned countries arises precisely because world peace is no longer a debatable issue and because the two super powers have discovered ways and means of avoiding a power confrontation and of skirting a physical conflict even if such a confrontation occurs. The second important element in the situation which has brought about the crisis is that, with the super powers neutralising each other's massive military muscle, the blocs have virtually disintegrated. The most clear indication of this disintegration is the Sino-Soviet conflict, but the crisis in Franco-American relations essentially is a species of the same genus. What makes the quarrel in the communist world look intense and bitter is the language of world communism. The language of the western world is different, but the content of the present crisis in the NATO is qualitatively the same.

The crisis for countries such as India in this situation arises out of the fact that as the blocs disintegrate, the world returns to a multi-power system where four or five nations, instead of two, will evolve a new balance. This would mean a renewed emphasis on the traditional criterion of national greatness in international politics, namely, power. Since the non-aligned countries—even India—never possessed the power to back up the status which they enjoy-

ed in world politics, there is a sudden prospect of the cutting down of that status.

The third element in the new situation is that as the larger problems of war and peace between the United States and the Soviet Union recede in importance, the smaller issues concerning relations between other countries now rise to the surface as the big problems of the world. World peace today is threatened not by the USSR and the U.S.A. but by India and China, by Malaysia and Indonesia, by Pakistan and Afghanistan, by Morocco and Algeria, by Kenya and Somaliland, by the U.A.R. and Israel. In fact, in the physical conflicts of today's world, the non-aligned are more involved than the aligned.

It is to the advantage of some non-aligned countries such as Indonesia, Ghana, etc., that in pursuing these local conflicts they have the initiative and are on the offensive. In fact, *pari passu* with their non-alignment, many of these countries had evolved a positive plank of foreign policy in terms of either the explanation of their own borders or the consolidation of their region. It is here that India has an added problem, for in the conflicts with her neighbours, she is at the receiving end of these pressures and alarms. Both China and Pakistan demand Indian territory. India has no demands on any one. Secondly, India is opposed to regional integration because China wants it. So, unlike some other non-aligned countries, India has no positive plank to back up the purely negative policy of non-alignment. For a long time, India's usefulness in the issues of war and peace was the positive aspect of her foreign policy. Today, we are no more needed in our role of a post office.

This general crisis in the policy of non-alignment, which is of particular significance for India, makes a conference of the non-aligned nations just for its own sake somewhat redundant. If the newly-projected non-aligned conference aims to discover a new approach to the world, it is of course useful—but whether such a large gathering as the one planned is of any use needs to be discussed. It will of course serve certain limited purposes for India as well as for the other participants. Apart from anything else, such large international conferences serve a domestic agit-prop need for most of the participating governments. But whether such a conference can spell out a new line for the so called 'uncommitted world' is a big question mark not easy to answer in the affirmative.

Shorn of facile slogans and familiar phrases, the foreign policy of India has to take note of the changing world and evolve a new approach to the defence of our national interests. It is not difficult to state the various objectives which India can pursue in the years to come.

The first and the simplest is to accept the hard fact of India's weakness, reconcile with a

subdued role in foreign affairs and wait until the country has attained a minimum level of power to make its presence felt in the world. Without exacerbating the situations with China and Pakistan and without surrendering any national rights, India could play a game of wait and see—and gain, through the lapse of time, the capacity to deal with the situations in different terms. This would imply a degree of withdrawal for India from the world scene, leaving the role of major actors to others.

Such a policy to be meaningful must be accompanied by vigorous internal efforts to build up economic resources and national power. To the extent that a five or six-power world will make it more difficult for new powers to enter the power-system, it would be to India's interest to try to prevent a total collapse of the present bloc system until she herself is one of the claimants to a new kind of status in a different world system. This policy would undoubtedly entail a degree of loss of status and prestige for some time, but this would have to be accepted as realistic and inevitable.

A second line of action is for India to accept the validity of the Chinese claim that one of the major issues of the world today is the inequality among nations, the division between the developed and the underdeveloped with which coincides the division between the coloured and the white, the overpopulated and the under-populated. India belongs to the under-developed, over-populated, coloured world and she could throw her full weight behind the struggles of this world. It would mean in the first place an acceptance of China as the elder brother and a settlement of our Himalayan frontier more or less on the basis suggested by Peking.

If China, due to her national chauvinistic aspirations, fails to play the role of the leader of the so called 'oppressed' nations of the world, India should be prepared to undertake that role and incur the displeasure of the affluent or semi-affluent world. There are indications already that China intends to do nothing really to carry forward that struggle and that her real aspiration is to substitute a new system of world politics for the existing one where China is among the four or five big powers which rule the roost. Yet, for such a struggle to be meaningful, India and China must be on the same side and the logic must be accepted fully of the possible impact on India's relations with the great powers.

The third policy pattern would be to identify India fully with the cause of Soviet-American rapprochement and to organise the whole or at least a part of the non-aligned world as the moral supporters of this rapprochement and collaboration. This would mean India playing a

role not merely as an area of agreement between America and the Soviet Union but as a projection of the two super powers against new contenders for a world status such as China. The policy can be meaningful only if the Soviet-American rapprochement is conceived not merely as amity in the so called 'nuclear club' or as a mechanism for retaining the predominance of the two great powers in the world, but as an answer to some of the basic issues in the world as stated earlier. Such a policy can, therefore, be more than negative. It can on the one hand serve the useful purpose of seeking the big powers' rapprochement and at the same time head to make that rapprochement more relevant to the developing countries of the world.

A fourth stand is for India to seek to create a new force in the world composed of such non-aligned countries as herself, Yugoslavia, Sweden, and Austria and such aligned countries as Canada and Poland, and such other countries on the fringe of the cold-war as Brazil and Mexico. Here the primary objective would be to strive for the expansion of the activities of the United Nations and the curtailment of national sovereignty through the growth of a more effective world organisation. There are many countries in the world which do not have any aspirations to becoming great powers, which are content with their boundaries and want to be left in peace to attend to other tasks. Both among the aligned and the non-aligned, there are a number of nations who would fall into this category.

The pursuit of such a policy would require not only a declaration but a genuine and permanent renouncement of any ambition which India may have of emerging as a power factor. It is not easy, of course, to conceive of a more effective United Nations, but it is worthwhile to strive for it. Only those countries which have neither power aspirations nor territorial demands, but want to be left in peace and are ready to defend anyone, can play this role. Such a policy will of course conform to the Gandhian traditions in India but it will still not be easy to convince the nations of the world, particularly our neighbours, that India is harmless, passive and international in its outlook.

It is possible to produce more arguments in favour of these suggested alternatives and it is almost certain that the ideological predilections of a person will determine which alternative will be preferred. It is also true that the alternatives are not so clear-cut, that there are other complex factors to be taken into account. Finally, this list certainly does not exhaust all the possible alternatives. However, we have to start thinking of the various alternatives for India because while we protest that nothing has changed in our foreign policy, the world refuses to believe us if only because the world itself has changed.

Self-preservation

H. M. PATEL

WHAT has been India's foreign policy since independence? An attempt to answer this deceptively simple question may enable us to understand our present predicament. It appeared to us desirable in the circumstances that obtained during the early years of our independence not to ally ourselves with any country formally. To begin with, we called this a policy of neutrality. Later, we decided in favour of calling it a policy of non-alignment. We were to be friends with everybody and enemies of no one.

As things have turned out, we find ourselves today on anything but non-aligned terms with our immediate neighbours. With two

of them, China and Pakistan, we are definitely not non-aligned. The two other neighbours, Burma and Ceylon, by their treatment of both Indians who are Indian citizens, and Indians who are their citizens, make it difficult for us to maintain relations which can be termed as cordial even by a stretch of the imagination.

For a time our immense population and our geographical situation gave us a certain position of importance in world affairs. We had also inherited an enviable military tradition, and our military forces were believed to be, for their size, an extremely well-trained, well-equipped and power-

ful military force. The Chinese attack pricked this bubble and made us and everyone else realise how very ill-prepared we were, how ill-informed and how amazingly inefficient. It was inevitable that whatever went by the name of foreign policy until the date of the Chinese attack should thereafter require to be radically revised.

Policy of Drift

For historical reasons, foreign affairs have never greatly interested our people in the past, and we continue very largely to be indifferent to them. This may well be one of the major reasons for the immaturity of our foreign policy. That, in the main, it has been a policy of drift and lacking in serious purpose cannot be gainsaid. Even today, despite the Chinese reverse, the emergency having receded, we have once again slid back into complacency and drift. Now, we not only do not appear to have a clear-cut foreign policy, but have signally failed sufficiently to strengthen ourselves militarily, so as to make possible the adoption of an independent foreign policy of any significance.

What is foreign policy? Let us clear our minds on what it is not. It is not a mystique. It is not an end in itself. It is not the shifts and changes to which a country resorts to gain for itself some temporary advantage or some escape out of an immediate embarrassment.

Perhaps it is wise to talk of foreign policy in this negative manner. In politically mature systems, the enunciation of foreign policy is put off by governments until it cannot be avoided. It is the subject of students of political science and international affairs. Ministers of State and diplomats are singularly inappreciative of scholarly efforts to reduce to a policy or a pattern the many acts through which their foreign policy finds expression.

A country's foreign policy is not an end but a means to an end. What the end is depends naturally on the country's government and its objectives. But there are

certain basic considerations which all governments are supposed to keep in mind both in formulating and in implementing their foreign policies.

In the first place, any international involvement which is likely to hinder the pursuit of determined objectives must be avoided if it can be done without destroying a favourable image of one's country. Secondly, every care must be taken to prevent a power imbalance in the region which will provide the opportunity and provoke men to attempt decisions by the force of arms. Thirdly, a consistent effort has to be exerted to foster and maintain a favourable image of one's country abroad, bearing in mind that international forums of discussions are prompt in registering failure in this field. Fourthly, the luxury of indulging in emotional outbursts and petulant demonstrations of displeasure is not for nations which lack the military strength to back them — and even for those who have it, it may prove a costly indulgence. Personal feelings are to be subordinated to national interest and, the more one is hurt and outraged, the more necessary it is to appreciate that one's message has not been successfully communicated.

Other Considerations

There are some additional considerations which economically backward countries need specially to keep in mind. Since they need assistance in order to raise their standard of living and there is in the more industrially advanced countries every willingness to help them, it is practical commonsense that they should show some concern for fostering the best relations with those countries and their governments. There is little point in planning for attaining a sustained, self-generating economy in twenty-five years, if the foreign policy pursued during these years is such as to hinder sound and rapid economic growth. To convey the conviction to the peoples in the advanced countries that the aid extended by their governments is effectively utilized is more relevant to the objective of planning than to indulge in poli-

tical gestures which antagonize opinion abroad.

India had a further need for adopting a discreet foreign policy which was both effective and unobtrusive, when in 1947 she attained political independence. With all her neighbours she had outstanding problems which only a firm government at New Delhi, which knew its own mind, could settle. With Pakistan in particular she faced a situation, aggravated by the running sore of Kashmir, but present even without it, wherein every obvious move India made for Asian leadership would be obstructed by Pakistani anxiety to establish parity. China, achieving two years later what China had never had for long centuries — a strong central government — offered a more serious threat to national security and the integrity of India's territories, the reality of which was established when she overran Tibet and established her foothold in the Himalayas.

The Assets

The Government of India, succeeding to a truncated inheritance from the British, who exercised political control over united India, Ceylon, Burma and the Himalayan States and held the dominant political position in Tibet, had a difficult but by no means impossible task. Its one essential need was decision, firmness and good judgment. The government was not without valuable assets even if it failed to value them properly.

India was a member of the British Commonwealth and with other members shared common interests and purposes. She was part of the democratic world with the abundant goodwill of the democracies and with access to the resources of the advanced countries. She was an original member of the United Nations, with equal responsibility for devising plans, programmes and procedures to tide over the difficult transition period from colony to nationhood for the rising peoples of Asia and Africa, and for checking totalitarian trends.

An unspectacular but constructive field of work within India and

abroad had opened up. India was not only the first unit in the British empire to become independent; its freedom presaged the rise of nationhood of British colonies in Asia and Africa and even, in fact, the crumbling of colonialism. The implications of this were far-reaching and, as the event has proved, they were beyond the understanding of Indian statesmen of the time.

The first non-British people to receive parliamentary government and democratic institutions, the first underdeveloped country, again, to have the opportunity of developing industrially under the 'economics of affluence', and to enjoy with all this the exhilaration of freedom, the responsibility for building wisely for the future, India could have had profound meaning for the whole world. It could have been made to offer the promise of political stability, individual liberty and steady economic growth, of orderly progress and co-operative enterprise. It would have certainly helped to bring into being a better world rather than succumbing to the meretricious concepts of non-alignment, idealized communism and anti-colonialism.

Fascination for Non-alignment

Nothing exposes the antiquated thinking of much that goes into the making of our foreign policy better than the fascination which these concepts hold for the Prime Minister, who also holds the External Affairs portfolio, and his advisers. For, it is only by considering the capitalist countries as they were nearly fifty years ago and the then unrealised utopia of communism, that a country professing itself to be democratic can seriously commend non-alignment. What has been amply demonstrated during this period is that communism relies on violence both to establish itself and to keep itself in power. Even when it exploits or perverts democratic institutions, it leans heavily on intimidation, violence and misrepresentation.

Since non-alignment has been elevated to a first principle,

higher than non-violence or truth, or, as Prime Minister Nehru has told us, the country's independence, it is desirable to take a closer look at it. It is a claim to the right to judge while professing to be anxious not to judge. An inevitable consequence of this claim is a basis in favour of the less admirable, the less commendable, and the harsher system. There can be no more pathetic illusion than that which seeks to distinguish between the 'truly non-aligned' and the 'non-aligned'. For with non-alignment, truth is the first casualty.

It cannot be otherwise. We have only to look at India's record in international politics to see this and then measure the bitterness it has resulted in. We have only to plumb the depths of our own dismay when we feel that the United States of America or Britain places us on the same level as Pakistan. Is it unreasonable to believe that the implied suggestion in our non-alignment of ignoring differences between the democratic States and the communist States is deeply resented by the democracies—the more so when in our procrustean zeal we seize every opportunity to denounce the democracies for their shortcomings and engage ourselves in confusing world opinion, as far as we are capable of doing this, about the glaring mis-deeds of the communists? But this, as I have remarked, is the inevitable consequence of 'non-alignment'.

Dangerous Causes

We have been playing with dangerous causes and with the illusion of greatness thus created, we have allowed ourselves to be misled by our own propaganda. We have shown ourselves incapable of distinguishing between tried friends and deceptive enemies. We have in several directions extended ourselves beyond our strength. Flattered by the goodwill of foreign statesmen whose anxiety to prevent conditions from deteriorating, and the assumption that words will not hide the basic reality from Indian leaders, have made them over-indulgent, we

have failed to utilise opportunities to foster better relations with our immediate neighbours and to enhance the goodwill of the democracies.

We have misused the prestige, far beyond our potential for good or mischief, accorded to us by the nations to promote procedures detrimental to a durable peace and a final political settlement in many Asian regions, dividing peoples in compartments crystallized by 'cease-fire' lines. Mistaking bad manners for independence, we have set an example to the new nations. Failing to make our intentions clear, we have attributed base motives to those nations which differed from us.

China and Kashmir

Our China policy, our attitude over Kashmir and our propensity to form opinions at second-hand reveal the world of illusion in which our foreign policy-makers live. Year after year we expended our energies in persuading the democracies that China was a big power which could not be ignored. On the spot here, we showed little appreciation of the implications of this fact. We covered up for China over Tibet and looked upon any correct appraisal of the Tibetan problem as an embarrassment to a beautiful friendship. We disguised the pressures communist China was putting on us and hindered the forming of a clear world opinion. We justified our acquiescence on the ground that it conformed with traditional British policy although Britain in India had never to reckon with a strong, centrally organised China. Our deliberate playing down of the Chinese menace prevented genuine friends of India and communist critics of aggressive policies from devising long-term plans for holding back the Chinese, and we still continue to do this.

Over Kashmir, the Government of India vacillated from a policy of settling with Pakistan and that of ignoring outside opinion but proceeding with integration. Our latest performance at the United Nations, greatly lauded as the

assertion of 'firmness', is a piece of egregious folly. We have thrown away the advantage of legality which we had all along and declared our readiness to go back on our commitments. Hitherto, it had been India's consistent case that she adhered to the United Nations resolutions, but that Pakistan had been obstructive. Now we have given notice that we no longer hold ourselves bound by the United Nations decisions, thereby giving an impression that we were brought before the United Nations which is certainly not the case.

Within Kashmir, we pursued policies which are calculated to give us the worst of both the worlds. The kind of administration which the Government of India has felt it necessary to uphold, is a heavy burden on the people of that State and one that casts a dark shadow on India. It is no credit to India that the Kashmir Government, which has the confidence of the Indian Government, should be charged with being oppressive and corrupt. The impression widely prevails in Kashmir that the Kashmir ministers perpetuate their power by playing on the fears of the Union Government, that without them the Kashmiris would opt for Pakistan.

Little count is taken in New Delhi of this, or of the obvious inference that at the Security Council, India, which had carried the Kashmir case there, is relying less on the rightness of her cause and more on the Soviet exercise of its veto. This is a curious sequel to sixteen years of 'non-alignment'. The lesson that stand-offishness and a confidence that constant reiteration of our views end in abject dependence on others, has yet to be learnt.

Reluctance for Clarity

It is said that we are face to face today with a crisis in our foreign policy. What we are in fact up against is a reluctance to think clearly and objectively. Self-preservation must be the first and basic principle of any country's foreign policy. Whatever our attitude in life or our ideology, there can be no departure from that

basic consideration. And if self-preservation is the basic criterion for judging the soundness of a policy, it follows also that it is only if we are able to stand on our own legs and to fight for our independence that we can expect others to be ready to stand by our side.

The mere fact that in our independence may be rooted the safety and independence of other countries cannot guarantee peace and independence to us. We have so to conduct ourselves that there remains no shadow of doubt in any one's mind that come what may, we shall stand no nonsense if our independence and our territorial integrity is threatened. All our thinking and planning must inevitably be geared to ensure this one single indivisible objective.

Strengthen Ourselves

Thus, while there is nothing inherently wrong in the suggestion which is now being made that we should be prepared to resume direct talks between China and ourselves, it is important not to forget that there can be no satisfactory negotiations between two unequal powers. Negotiations can only be satisfactory when they are between equals, or when circumstances make it incumbent upon the more powerful to be anxious to arrive at a satisfactory conclusion. It is doubtful if India can today talk on equal terms with China, and if that be so, it may be just as well not to show any undue anxiety for the resumption of talks, and to concentrate meantime all our efforts on strengthening ourselves economically and militarily.

Let there be honesty enough to admit that the mere proclamation of an emergency is not enough: we have to conduct ourselves also as if we believed and realised that there was an emergency, that the enemy was still in our territory and at our gates. It is clear enough what our foreign policy ought to be: the Chinese have not been idle, either on our borders or in the diplomatic field, during the last fifteen months.

Re-alignment of non-alignment

V. K. NARASIMHAN

IS India's foreign policy in a crisis as a result of all that has happened since the Chinese attack in 1962? Should we make some fundamental shifts in our policy or can we persist in the basic policies we have hitherto pursued, with such modifications as are necessitated by the new and ever-present threat on our northern borders?

The alternatives posed in the opening article set out fairly the different lines which we may pursue according to our interpretations of the world situation and India's own interests. But these alternatives are by no means exclusive. For instance, the third alternative of working for a rapprochement between the two power blocs in the interests of world peace as well as of developing countries like India would not, in my view, be opposed to the fourth alternative of utilising the consensus among countries which desire to keep out of power alignments as a force for building

up the United Nations as an effective instrument for safeguarding world peace and the peaceful settlement of international disputes.

The conception of a world divided into two antithetical power systems, each of which is more or less integrated within itself both ideologically and militarily, may have been true to a very limited extent four or five years ago, but it is certainly not true today considering, on the one hand, the attitudes of countries like France to the NATO alliance and the desire to pursue policies not always in harmony with those of the leader of the western bloc, the United States, and, at the other end, the growing rift between the Soviet Union and China and the gradual assertion of a shift from satellite status noticeable in many of the East European communist countries.

The basic facts, of course, in purely military terms, are that the world is dominated by the

two nuclear giants, the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R., and any move towards a closer understanding between them on basic world problems will certainly transform the international scene. There are periodical hopes of such understanding, which are equally regularly blasted by some incident or other. The only hopeful sign since the signing of the agreement on the ban of nuclear tests is that both the big powers, realising the utterly annihilating character of nuclear war, are both equally anxious to avert it.

Non-alignment

So far as India is concerned, the internal changes within the two power blocs, even if they tend towards the creation of multiple power groupings, would not necessarily call for a change in the policy of non-alignment. Our policy, in so far as it has a long-term objective, must be viewed as one which is based on the hope that, some time or other, faith in military alliances will be replaced by faith in an international agency capable of ensuring both national security and international peace.

In the past three years, we in India have had direct experience of what it means to arm a nation with modern weapons. Nothing would be a more grievous tragedy for countries recently liberated from colonial rule and which have a terrible backlog of poverty to clear than involvement in an arms race which must inevitably cripple the resources available for development.

The supreme merit of the policy of non-alignment as we had practised it from the advent of independence right up to the attack by China, is that it helped us, by and large, to maintain friendly relations with countries belonging to both the power blocs and to receive economic aid for our development programmes from them. The cynical suggestion that non-alignment as practised by us was a clever move to make the best of both worlds without any commitment on our part to one or the other group is not fair to

our policy-makers because it was not quite easy for us in the earlier years to convince countries belonging to either of the blocs about the genuineness of our non-alignment and our sincere desire to maintain friendly relations with both the blocs without regard to the ideological affiliations.

In fact, most of our problems in relation to the United States during the Dulles period arose from the fact that our non-alignment was interpreted in Washington as being more an alignment leaning towards the Soviet bloc. On the Soviet side also, there was considerable suspicion about our ideological neutralism and it was long after American aid started coming in on a large scale that the Soviets realised the genuineness of our non-alignment and decided to participate in our development plans in a big way.

The Dividends

Non-alignment as a policy must be regarded as having paid quite substantial dividends in terms both of aid for our development from countries belonging to both the blocs and also in helping to keep our defence budget down to the minimum possible. Those who criticised the policy after the Chinese attack on the ground that this attack would not have taken place if, like Pakistan, we had had a full-fledged military alliance with the United States, do not appreciate the real motives behind the non-alignment policy nor the gains from it which we have realised right up to the Chinese attack and even thereafter. Whether we should have taken all the earlier Chinese professions of friendship on trust and whether we should not have awakened to the danger that the Chinese presented to our northern borders after their incursion into Tibet, and even more clearly after their stealthy occupation of Aksai Chin, are arguable.

If basically our relations with other countries are to be determined in terms of our national interests and security and not on the basis of the social systems or

the ideology obtaining in those countries, it is difficult to see how our earlier approaches to China, including the now-discredited phase of 'bhai-bhaism', were inherently wrong. After all, the Five Principles to which Chou En-lai committed himself in the Indo-Chinese agreement of 1954 and which were subsequently endorsed in the Indo-Soviet agreement, are principles which are enshrined in the U.N. Charter and are obviously the basis on which relations between any two friendly countries should be governed.

In so far as the Indian Government was able to persuade communist countries, which were presumed to be committed to programmes of promoting subversion and revolutions abroad, to accept the principles of co-existence, non-interference in the internal affairs of another country and non-aggression, there was undoubtedly some gain. In 1962, India could denounce the Chinese attack in strong terms and expose Peking as a perfidious and undependable country just because we could point to the cynical manner in which the Chinese communists had violated their *Pancha Shila* agreement with us.

India's Strength

Developments since the Chinese attack have forced us, on the one hand, to have a closer look at our defence measures, and, on the other, at our foreign policy. The fact that the western democratic countries, primarily Britain and the U.S.A., readily responded to our request for help in the crisis which confronted us, undoubtedly testifies to their readiness to come to our aid in the event of any real and serious threat to our integrity and freedom even though they have no prior military commitments. This stems primarily from the fact that India is too large a country, in terms of area and population, and occupies too important and strategic a place in Asia, to be allowed to come under the influence or control of a foreign expansionist power, and the West will be ready

to come to the help of any Indian national government which wants to resist such an attack.

The Price

This, of course, does not mean that we can take their intervention for granted and allow our own defences to be neglected. There is a price to be paid for the assurance of western aid in the event of any renewed threat from China. That price is not so much in terms of a surrender of our freedom in regard to foreign policy or a prior commitment to make common cause with the West in any conflict in which they may be involved with the Soviet Union or others, but an assurance that on vital international issues we will not adopt any stand which is diametrically opposed to that of the West. I do not know whether it would be wrong, judging purely from India's interests, to give such an assurance, making it clear at the same time that this does not mean our being committed to accepting the western line with regard to minor issues, whether they relate to Laos or Malaysia or Cyprus or Congo or some other area of tension.

The question immediately arises whether an assurance of this kind would not make a breach in our policy of non-alignment as pursued hitherto and whether it would not also mean serving notice on the Soviet Union that we have made our choice as between the West and the Soviet bloc if ever the differences between the two blocs come to a head. Personally, I feel that we ought to make it clear to the Soviet Union that we would regard it as an infinite tragedy if relations between the West and the Soviet bloc worsened to such a degree that an armed conflict between them became inevitable. The assurance to the West would be a quid-pro-quo for the purely defensive guarantee which we would receive from the western countries without any implication of alignment with the West on an ideological basis.

It might be ideal if countries like India—which would include practically all the newly freed

countries of Asia and Africa which are both economically and militarily in an even weaker position than India—could have an international guarantee of their frontiers underscored by the big powers. Such a guarantee need not mean that genuine border disputes should not be discussed or settled by means of negotiation and in the ultimate resort by international adjudication. The Indian Prime Minister has already proposed to Peking that the India-China border dispute may be referred to the International Court of Justice.

There is no need to feel that a guarantee of such a kind, given and received within the framework of the United Nations, will derogate from our sovereignty. All countries, in fact, must strive for the day when their security is basically achieved within the framework of an international system. The Indian Constitution envisages in the chapter devoted to the Basic Principles of State Policy, the pursuit by the Indian Government of a policy of co-operation with all nations and the acceptance of international adjudication for the settlement of international disputes.

Collective Strength

Such a policy obviously implies that as a nation we abandon the aspiration to any big power status or even to any leadership of the non-aligned States or any other bloc of States, based on military or economic strength. Such leadership that may come our way will be derived only from the moral influence we can wield among the nations. This would appear to make India a passive victim of pressures from outside, particularly from Pakistan and China. But implicit in the policy which is advocated here is the reliance on the collective strength of other countries to resist these pressures and our willingness to submit ourselves to the jurisdiction of the U.N. for the settlement of the disputes with Pakistan or China or any other country.

The merit of such a policy, unambitious and unspectacular as

it may seem, lies in the relief it will give to our defence budget and the scope and freedom it will provide for concentrating on the major internal economic and social problems on which we ought really to concentrate if we are to give a better deal to our long-suffering people.

Making A Start

We have to recognise that in the building up of a genuine and effective international system, which will put more teeth into the United Nations and greater authority in its important organs such as the Security Council and the International Court of Justice, someone has to make a start with a real offer to surrender a part of its sovereignty and also make it clear that it accepts the obligations as well as the limitations of being part of an international system.

India, which has no territorial ambitions and which is not either militarily or otherwise in a position to seek big power status for a long time to come, and which in the immediate future stands to gain by the maximum of international economic aid and the minimum of defence expenditure, is perhaps best fitted to make this move. Whatever tarnishing of her moral escutcheon she may have suffered because of the military action against Goa, has certainly been counter-balanced by the consistent support she has given to the U.N. in various operations from the Suez to the Congo. At least some of the non-aligned nations like Yugoslavia, Sweden and Austria will gladly follow India's example and if the big power guarantees of protection against aggression and the forcible change of frontiers are available to other countries in Asia and Africa, many of them would gladly subscribe to the same policy.

It is in this context that Nikita Khrushchov's recent statement opposing any change in the frontiers of countries by force is to be welcomed. If all the leading countries which are members of the United Nations could be

signatories to a declaration adjuring the renunciation of force for the settlement of border disputes and agreeing to the settlement of such disputes by international arbitration, we shall be well on the way to removing one major cause of tension between countries.

So far as the immediate problem of China is concerned, the policy which has been outlined above should ensure, firstly, that there is not likely to be a recurrence of a Chinese attack. Such internal defence measures as we have already taken and which are proposed to be taken, coupled with the assurance from friendly countries, should act as a deterrent on the Chinese.

As regards the settlement of the dispute relating to Ladakh, the proposals of the Colombo powers envisage the restoration of the status-quo-ante as the precondition for the resumption of negotiations. The Chinese sooner or later may be persuaded to accept this basis as the necessary condition for ending the stalemate. So long as the dispute is not settled by mutual agreement, India's charge that Communist China has illegally occupied a part of our territory will remain and the taint of aggression will attach to her, whatever her propaganda efforts may be in Africa and Asia to convince the neutral countries that she is in the right.

Diplomatic Weakness

The intensive efforts made by the Chinese to put themselves right with various African countries and with some of the Asian countries suggest that even the cynical rulers of Peking have respect for international opinion and wish to cultivate it. If India has not been able to win more friends among the Afro-Asian countries to support her case against China, it signifies not so much the success of Chinese diplomacy as the weakness and inadequacy of our own diplomacy.

Whatever foreign policy we may pursue, it is clear from the

events of the last few years that our intelligence system, as well as our diplomatic and other efforts to project a proper image of India and a correct understanding of India's attitudes and actions, have been feeble and ineffective in several cases. If the policy of modified non-alignment outlined in this article is to be successfully pursued, our diplomatic and publicity set-up has to be very much more efficient and informed.

Pakistan

In all this discussion so far, I have not dealt with the problem of Pakistan, our most difficult and unfriendly neighbour. The Pakistan problem is so much a product of past history and the present internal situation in that country that there is no simple or quick solution to it. It is a great tragedy that India, despite her deep faith in secularism and her devotion to democratic and progressive ideals, has not been able to influence the thinking in the leading democratic countries in her favour and against Pakistan, whose policies are obviously derived from a narrow communalism and a repudiation of democratic principles and respect for religious minorities. A vigorous presentation of the colossal experiment India is making, with fairly significant success so far, in the building up of a multi-lingual, multi-religious, multi-racial society on a democratic basis, with a devotion to social democratic countries should go far towards winning friends at all levels for India.

I found in my travels in Europe and in the United States, a readiness to appreciate Indian policies, even in quarters which had developed a prejudice against India largely because of the way the British and the American press has presented India and Jawaharlal Nehru's policies in the past, when they were shown to be grounded not purely in India's narrow selfish interests but in basic democratic principles and faith in a genuine international order.

KP 3855

A new image

N. J. NANPORIA

IS New Delhi still non-aligned? If it is not, is China responsible? Is non-alignment as valid as it used to be? These are questions to which no easy answer is available but they do, undeniably, need to be asked if only because the impression persists that Indian foreign policy is very much adrift. The unmistakable symptoms are indecisiveness, a seeming absence of any sense of purpose, an inability to assess situations within a given framework and a tendency to seek refuge in doing nothing. These, in turn, reflect what is possibly at the heart of the current disenchantment—an almost complete collapse of confidence in the non-alignment policy. In this sense there is certainly a 'crisis' in foreign policy but it is a crisis that is unnecessary and, therefore, need never have been.

Such terms as 'crisis', 'national security', 'Chinese aggression' and 'NEFA debacle' and all that they

imply have exaggerated the picture out of all proportion and it is, consequently, necessary to scale it down to something approximating to the truth. The principles of a foreign policy, if they are well-conceived and derive from some basic and irrefutable facts, are not usually changed overnight. It is seldom that an entire policy is thrown overboard simply because the tactics by which it was conducted have failed to yield the expected result. A policy, therefore, is not something which is to be switched on or switched off according to the mood or the failure or success of the moment.

It is perhaps particularly helpful to emphasise this at a time when those who support non-alignment are apologetic and there is at best a rather shamefaced advocacy of a policy which, in the opinion of many, survives only in name. There is in this an excessively tragic view of all that has hap-

pened—the border dispute, the reverses in NEFA, the difficulties of a settlement and an increasing dependence on the West. There is also an assumption, often unspoken, that non-alignment lies shattered and beyond repair. This is a belief, demoralising in its consequences, that is shared as much by the so-called supporters as by the critics of the non-alignment policy.

A situation in which no one believes in what he is saying and in the position he has nominally adopted and the unexpressed conviction is that the worst has happened, is a most unhappy one and hardly justifies the view that all is as it was before. There has been a change and new compulsions are at work but the consequences are not and need not be as tragic as they have been made out to be.

Fancy Definitions

Non-alignment has been given many fancy definitions, not least of all by those who pretend to believe in it, and the fancier they are the less helpful they have been. It is essentially nothing more than a rejection of military alliances, a response to situations in the light of a national interest unqualified by previous commitments and, by implication, a declaration of faith in the principle that Asian problems can most easily be solved without the interference of the major non-Asian powers. Among the things non-alignment is not are a moral force, a policy which rejects the use of military power, refuses commitment of any kind, and a third voice which owes its validity to the fact that a first and second voice exist.

New Delhi itself has been guilty of representing non-alignment in these impossible terms in relation to which neither Goa nor the defence of Indian territory against China can be justified. Hence the ridiculously apologetic way in which the Goa action and the Indian posture in regard to China are defended when these require no defence whatsoever and are fully consistent with a non-align-

ment which is properly defined according to its own true nature.

The point surely is that non-alignment has the right, equally with any other policy, to protect and further its interests if necessary with force and that, as a corollary, it is capable of being positive, constructive and forward-looking. It is free to decide, to act, to initiate and to respond as much as, if not, indeed, more than, any so-called committed power. Yet—and this is where the failure has surely occurred—it was reduced into a moralistic mumbo-jumbo whose spokesmen preached endlessly to an increasingly irritated world, foolishly and self-righteously recoiled from the very suggestion of the use of force, and falsely represented a cowardly avoidance of commitment as an outstanding virtue.

Such was the image that was projected abroad over the years of what may be called the Menon-Nehru phase of the non-alignment policy, an unnecessary and unrealistic image which later caused embarrassment and difficulties over Goa and the border dispute. It was an image which among other things, had a disastrous effect on China's attitude towards India and therefore on Peking's handling of the border dispute. It was asserted and apparently believed that non-alignment could not use force even in self-defence without invalidating itself and that it could not, for the same reason, seek and receive aid from the western powers.

The Deception

This was a deception that died hard but by the time it finally died the damage had been caused—not New Delhi alone but Peking also had been irrevocably misled. Torn between the supposed alternatives of settling with China or receiving aid from the West, New Delhi would, the Chinese thought, opt for the first and when it did not the bewilderment in Peking was equalled only by a totally misplaced sense of guilt in New Delhi.

The convenient and unconvincing fiction was then invented that although non-alignment, as it had

been conceived in the Menon-Nehru period, remained unchanged New Delhi was 'aligned' in relation to communist China. This is a meaningless absurdity since it appears to justify the proposition that whenever India is involved in any kind of a difference, conflict, political or military, non-alignment is immediately aside. It also fails to explain why New Delhi has necessarily been 'aligned' simply because it has chosen to defend itself against external aggression.

Validity of Non-alignment

The implication of all these considerations surely is that New Delhi's error in misrepresenting non-alignment as something it was not and thereby creating a false and misleading image of it, is most definitely not invalidated as a policy. A policy can be defined in general terms and principles but its effectiveness can be tested only through its application to specific situations.

When Krishna Menon on behalf of India tirelessly concerned himself with the East-West confrontation and India achieved a certain prominence in the corridors of the United Nations was anything really accomplished? A capable by legal legerdemain, to shape resolutions so innocuous as to be acceptable to both East and the West is not by any means the essence of a lively forward-looking non-alignment.

Such preoccupation with the East-West problems, flattering though it may have been in terms of the limelight in which India's representatives could bask, did not, as is commonly supposed, add substantially to the nation's prestige in world affairs. This, again, was very evident during the Goa action when the so-called prestige had supposedly been acquired not to protect New Delhi from international criticism.

Meanwhile the China policy of this period displayed a similar unreality, assuming with incredible naivete a degree of Chinese friendship which never existed. Disillusionment has caused a swing to the other extreme, questioning non-alignment, of

ing to assess the border dispute in its true character, and of failing equally to calculate the consequences of an increasing military dependence on the West.

Such a swing from representing the Chinese as fellow-Asians, sadly misunderstood by the entire world and the victims of American 'imperialism', to representing them as cunning and undependable devils who will not be content until they have conquered South-East Asia, is possible only because policy has not been evolved within a specific framework. There is, consequently, a tendency by New Delhi to react *ad hoc* from one point to another, responding to the initiative of others without reference to any basic attitude with which policy can be maintained on an even keel.

A more calculated perspective would have enabled us to see that the principles of non-alignment are not only valid but are even more valid than ever before. The problem now is of re-defining them in more positive terms and adopting tactics more in keeping with the image of a policy whose justification does not spring solely from the East-West confrontation. This confrontation is no longer as compelling as it used to be and the picture of an irreconcilable relationship between two dominating and clearly defined blocs has been considerably modified. It hardly follows that non-alignment is, consequently, so much less meaningful.

Increasing Tempo

The mutual realisation by the United States and the Soviet Union that they cannot afford a nuclear war and the built-in restraints which their policies and military systems have acquired have not appreciably diminished the tempo of their competitive relationship. Disarmament, Berlin, the future of the two Germanys, nuclear control, European security, South-East Asia and the newly emerged independent African States are all areas of potential conflict short of the devastating nuclear war which both Moscow and Washington have apparently rejected. If the danger of nuclear

war has reduced the tempo of the cold war this tempo is likely to increase when the danger is removed.

The role of non-alignment, particularly in ensuring that cold war rivalries in their new form do not hinder peaceful development in Asia, surely contains considerable promise for the future. It is in relation to China and South-East Asia that non-alignment of the Menon-Nehru brand was particularly inadequate. In our excessive concern with the East-West conflict and the flattering assumption that the cause of world peace was being served by sponsoring resolutions at the United Nations the possibilities of a forward-looking non-alignment policy in South-East Asia were completely overlooked. New Delhi has helped and can continue to help to create the kind of climate in which an East-West *rapprochement* can be brought about but it should be acknowledged that the role of Indian non-alignment at this level of world affairs has been and will remain marginal.

The Compulsions

It is arguable to what extent the Nehru-Menon brand of non-alignment contributed towards the easing of world tensions and, more specifically, towards the current thaw in Soviet-U.S. relations. Not modesty alone should impel New Delhi to conclude that many factors other than Indian policy have loosened the rigidities of bloc confrontation — certain compulsions within the Soviet Union following de-Stalinisation, the increasingly intolerable burden of a high level of armaments, the equally increasing dangers of nuclear devastation, and the fact and reality of nuclear parity between the two blocs.

It would be unreal and misleading to suppose that non-alignment was in any way responsible for these developments, helpful though it no doubt was in generating an atmosphere of restraint during the period of dangerous U.S.-Soviet brinkmanship. Any reappraisal of foreign policy must, therefore, include a consideration

of where precisely non-alignment can express itself to some purpose consistently with the national interest. It is because the answer is so obviously South-East Asia that the China aspect of New Delhi's foreign policy appears to be and, indeed, is so decisive.

The Importance of China

Chinese aggression alone certainly does not explain or justify a policy reappraisal in a world where the patterns of powers are so rapidly changing. But it is this aggression that exposed the inadequacies of the non-alignment policy as it had been conducted during the *bhai-bhai* period. The loosening of bloc rigidities, France's recognition of China, the Sino-Soviet ideological conflict and the proportionately new emphasis on national rather than aligned interests have undeniably tended to emphasise the increasing relevance of China in world affairs. And India, geographically placed as she is, as an Asian neighbour of a country the reality of whose impact cannot be denied, must inevitably have a policy in which China is central.

There is no question here of recognising Peking as an 'elder brother' or of entering into a competitive relationship with it in South-East Asia. French recognition of Peking, America's increasing difficulties in Viet Nam, the new forces at work in favour of Viet Nameese unification and the controversy over Malaysia are all, in their various ways, responses to the challenge of the Chinese presence. They are collectively more relevant to New Delhi's foreign policy than any resolution can be in the United Nations.

It is in this context that, despite the diminishing intensity of the cold war, Indian non-alignment can have much to contribute. Its objectives must be, as they have always been, even if rather ineffectively, to promote disengagement, to reduce or remove the western presence, to encourage neutralist unification and to create the conditions in which the problems of South-East Asia can be resolved with a minimum of big

power interference. These are, moreover, precisely the means by which, on a basis of mutual respect, Chinese communist influence can be contained.

Price of Dependence

Together they represent an opportunity that has already been ignored for too long with a consequent neglect of South-East Asia which has sadly tarnished India's image in this part of the world. What is surely now required is a new image of the non-alignment policy more positive and more constructive and, therefore, to that extent more acceptable to Afro-Asian opinion as an alternative not only to what China has to offer but to the aggressive containment policy which the West will introduce in South-East Asia if it is allowed to do so. A new image is, however, not possible if, as a result of the border dispute, India accepts a position of increasing dependence on the West.

Dependence in the sense that in a serious crisis India will have no choice but to rely on western generosity is undeniable. It is already a fact and, as is generally agreed now, is perfectly compatible with non-alignment. Dependence, however, carried beyond this point of obvious necessity and arising from a faulty assessment of the Chinese threat is quite another thing and cannot be lightly undertaken. The supposition that military aid can be asked for and received without 'strings' is entirely without foundation and the relations that have developed between New Delhi and the western powers since the Chinese invasion of NEFA involve much that is unspoken and implied.

The VOA proposals, the joint exercises, the Seventh Fleet affair and even the western attitude in the Kashmir dispute are a reflection of an undefined assumption that Indian non-alignment has been conditioned to the point where New Delhi is, in all but name, closely associated with the western presence in South-East Asia. The fact that this is undec-

clared and that nominally Indian policy is still non-aligned has not prevented either the West or the Afro-Asian powers from drawing the appropriate conclusions.

Are such conclusions justified? Much of the evidence suggests that they are but it is difficult to believe that a situation so entirely contrary to everything Nehru has stood for in world affairs has been overlooked by the Prime Minister. The VOA was an example of how New Delhi can withdraw from an impossible and invidious position when it realises the need to do so and it is probable that Nehru hopes gradually to reverse the present trend towards what appears to be a closer association with the West. The point here, of course, is whether such a reversal can be successfully managed even by a leader of Nehru's stature. Unspoken commitments and assumptions can be as compelling and embarrassing as those which are not and a country rather excessively conditioned to the military aspects of the border problem may not take kindly or easily to the prospect of a negotiated political settlement.

The Reasonable Policy

Yet the attempt must be made, and that soon, before the non-alignment image is irrevocably damaged and India unwittingly becomes, as many within it would wish it to be, an essential part of the containment policy against communist China. A more reasonable and therefore realistic assessment of the border dispute, in the light of China's probable motives, and of the manner in which the affair developed into an artificial crisis would enable us to scale down the extent of Indian dependence on the West in proportion to the degree of the Chinese 'threat'. The argument that India must prepare for the worst since the Chinese cannot be trusted is irrational and meaningless since this is precisely what India cannot afford to do.

Even if war were considered a permissible means of conducting India's relations with China, which it most certainly is not, unlimited

American generosity will never be enough to reduce or compensate for the discrepancy between China's military power and that of India. There can, therefore, be no question of preparing for the 'worst' in which case the only alternative is to build up a strictly minimum unavoidable level of military power, to consider the problem solely as a border dispute which it is, to deprecate any inflation of it into a 'confrontation', and to reject the supposition that India and China are irrevocably committed to mutually hostile attitudes. Only thus can New Delhi-Peking relations be gradually nursed back into a meaningful context without the illusions and naivete of the past. Only thus also can the assumptions implicit in U.S. policy in South-East Asia be shown to be what they are.

The Alternative

The alternative will be for Indian policy, such as it is, to be increasingly subordinated to what has developed into the overriding consideration of U.S. aid. So much so that the rapidly pervasive U.S. presence in South-East Asia with incalculable consequences, for example, in Viet Nam, has been accepted without comment and its implications have apparently not been closely scrutinised. Neither the presence of the Seventh Fleet in the Indian Ocean nor the possibility of massive U.S. intervention in Viet Nam as the situation deteriorates from day to day has awakened any protest or interest in New Delhi, presumably in the incredible belief that American aid to India has given Washington an unrestricted passport to South-East Asia.

The 'crisis' in New Delhi's foreign policy can be resolved only when New Delhi decides whether it should or should not connive at this gradual sea-change in the South-East Asian situation. If it does non-alignment will be dead, not even having had its day. If it does not this should be made quite clear before it is too late so that non-alignment can be reinterpreted and reaffirmed in the context of South-East Asia today.

Living with problems

SISIR GUPTA

THE foreign policy speeches of Prime Minister Nehru in the immediate post-Independence years contain many frank and useful discussions of the basic considerations which ought to govern India's foreign policy. When, in 1949-50, India succeeded in evolving a viable foreign policy for that period, such statements became unnecessary, because the period of groping was over. Today, when we are in a sense back to another phase of groping for a foreign policy, it will be good to remind ourselves of some of the propositions of Jawaharlal Nehru.

It is necessary before reiterating the bases on which our foreign policy must be evolved to state that the fact of India being faced with a crisis of foreign policy at the end of 17 years of freedom is no reflection on those who formulated her foreign policy or those who administered it. It may in fact be wrong to talk of our being back to the situation of 1947-48, for, India's role in the world and India's foreign policy have got to take note of what we did in all these years, and this period is by no means like a happy dream which has ended. What is more important to remember is that there is hardly any country in the world which has an unbroken chain of successes in foreign policy or which has been able to evolve a policy and cling on to it for decades and decades.

The predominant mood of despondency in many Indian circles about the state of our foreign

relations is understandable and even useful, but if the assumption behind it is that all other countries in the world are doing well while we alone are suffering, it would be a very wrong view of events. For example, it was only a few years back when the United States was losing on almost all fronts and a whole presidential campaign was conducted on the basis of an assumed failure of the United States in foreign affairs. France, which now appears to be on the top of the world, was the sick man of Europe for many many years and who can be sure that France's present greatness can be sustained for long. Likewise, few Indians have so far taken note of the tremendous crisis in which the foreign policy of the Soviet Union is today.

It is of course not proper to draw any analogy between India and the Soviet Union because the fact of the Soviet Union's power cannot be ignored. But it is perhaps true to say that in the world after Cuba and NEFA, India and the Soviet Union are among the nations which are on the defensive. Yet few, except the China enthusiasts, would regard the Soviet Union's role or potentiality as curbed because the bigness of the Soviet Union in terms of size, economic and industrial growth, and military power remains. It will be ridiculous to assume that the Soviet discomfiture in world politics can be anything but very temporary.

It is here that one point repeatedly made by Nehru in his early speeches needs to be reiterated

today. Notwithstanding the weakness of our power position (and certainly we produce more steel and have a larger army now than in 1947), we continue to remain the second largest country in the world in terms of population. When one deals with India, one deals with as many people as there are in Africa and Latin America combined. Secondly, we have a strategic position in Asia which makes us important, whether one is thinking of West Asia or Southeast Asia or even East Asia, not to speak of South Asia. Thirdly, with all our failures, we remain one of the few developing countries which has attained a relatively higher level of stability in our domestic affairs. It is patently stupid for any one to fear that the whole world can unite to ignore us or isolate us just as it was extremely naive to hope that China was or could be isolated.

The Basic Factor

Any rethinking on Indian foreign policy must take note of this basic factor in international politics, that we are not likely to be ignored by others. This is not to deny what has been said many times earlier that we had in a way over-extended ourselves for some years and the status which we enjoyed as one of the leading nations of the world was to some extent built on insecure foundations. If there is one lesson of the recent events for us, it is that there is no short cut to international status, that even if for a while others court us or admire us for our role as a post-office, that cannot be a permanent phenomenon. This, however, has another lesson which is equally important to remember: in 1962-63, we have witnessed an assertion by some countries such as China and France of their nuisance value and, in the ultimate analysis, there is a limit to which the nuisance value of a country can be made the basis of its foreign relations.

What has been said above underlines a basic proposition which needs to be stressed in India over and over again: the most significant element in India's role in the world will be what India does with

herself. If in this huge country of more than 450 million half-starved, half-naked people, we are able to bring about a reasonable degree of cohesion and sense of unity, if we are able to tackle our vital problem of modernisation and attain a reasonably high rate of economic growth, if we are able to generate and manage new social conflicts in a manner conducive to social change, not all the pressures in the world would be able to curb our international role.

No Proper Perspective

It is only if we continue to give the impression of being a loose, amorphous entity, something like an Austro-Hungarian empire in the south of Asia, that we are likely to be slighted. In international politics, there is hardly any scope for evoking the pity of other nations. It is instructive to remember that when a weak, amorphous China was the victim of an unprovoked aggression by a strong and powerful Japan, the Anglo-Saxon pragmatists of those days were making out a case for Japan and even justifying the independence of Manchukuo. The present Indian tendency to be overwhelmed by the evidence piled up by British scholarship in favour of China is not only a measure of the provinciality of the Indian elite to London (even the Congress Party's *Economic Review* has described one Roderick Macfarquhar as a leading sinologist in the world), but also a measure of our inability to view foreign opinions in proper perspective.

When two other countries are quarrelling, it is natural for a third country to ask them to make it up. We have done it in many cases to others; Britain has done it to the United States; the United States has done it to Britain and so on. It is dangerous in foreign relations to regard other people's advice as objective just as it is childish to brandish certificates by foreigners as the greatest achievements of our foreign policy.

One needs to be particularly careful about Great Britain, where many of the attitudes to India—good and bad for us—are deter-

mined by the 'sweet memories' of their earlier relationship with us. We have also to take into account the fact that many Britishers had a set of expectations about independent India, which we have fortunately not fulfilled. These expectations were summed up in one of Winston Churchill's speeches in the House of Commons, when he predicted that power in India was being handed over to men of straw and India would meet disaster shortly. The fact that India has not met a disaster of any serious kind so far is not welcome to those objective scholars who predicted it.

In fact, it is interesting to recall how many people based their thinking on India on an expectation of disaster. Those in the East who compared Congress with the Kuomintang as well as those in the West who predicted the collapse of Indian democracy, have been belied by history. There is of course the third category to which a country like Pakistan belongs—a category which hoped for parity with India in disaster. It will be tragic if a great country like India is to be swept off its feet by unsolicited advice rendered to it or opinions expressed abroad by people with predetermined attitudes to India.

Undue Alarm

Another danger needs to be equally averted. A nation which suddenly discovers its greatness often gets unduly alarmed by failures or scared of problems. In the recent past, opinion in the United States of America has repeatedly illustrated this tendency. In India likewise, there are many who refuse to live with problems and attempt to run away from them. The present mood of 'tiredness' in some quarters about the state of our relations with China or Pakistan is indicative of this phenomenon, of which a different kind of manifestation is the expression of fond hopes that India would have no enemies and only friends all around.

It appears to me to be utterly naive for anyone in India to think that this country, with its size and population, can live in a naughty

world with nothing but friendliness and sympathy from all quarters. This is not to say that we are going to have permanent enemies but only that we are going to have problems permanently, unless of course a new world order based on peace and international co-operation takes the place of this world of bullies. It is one thing for us to declare our own desire to live in friendship with everybody. It is an entirely different thing for us to begin to believe that others will leave us alone only because we do not mean them any harm.

It is of course an entirely different matter if our urgency to get rid of our problems arises out of deep calculations of their cost or their impact on our internal affairs. While there may be some who view our problems from these angles, there are certainly others who display a particular frame of mind which at first refuses to see problems and then tries to run away from them when they begin to stare us in the face. This can be dangerous because, as has been said above, a great country like India is not likely to be left alone by others and it must develop the habit of living with problems. In a sense, much of the crisis in our foreign policy arises out of our own failure to have learnt to live with our problems.

China

Learning to live with problems is of course not the same thing as refusing to settle our disputes. There can be no doubt that our conflicts with China on the one hand and Pakistan on the other greatly curb our manoeuvrability in foreign affairs and limit our possible role in the wider world. At least in the case of China, it appears true that it also would feel hindered in embarking on its grand global role if the Himalayas become a constant irritant. The recent evidence of China's anxiety to soften her position regarding India has to be taken into account.

But there are some wider considerations that India must keep in view in regard to China. In the

first place, the Sino-Pakistan alliance does indicate a long term strategy on the part of China towards India which certainly spells danger for us; in fact, the meaning of continued China-Pakistan friendship for India is a continued pressure on the integrity of this country and a continued attempt to prevent the consolidation of India's unity upon which rests our hopes of emerging as an independent power factor. Secondly, any agreement based on unilateral concessions by India and without a *quid pro quo* of some kind will further help the Chinese to prove that India is weak and unsteady, that when one is to deal with Asia one may deal with China alone. Thirdly, even if we get reasonable terms for settling the border conflict, we have to take note of their likely impact on China's position *vis-a-vis* the Soviet Union.

If the effect of a Sino-Indian agreement is to make China able to pursue her quarrels with the Soviet Union with redoubled vigour, a short term view of national interests and settlement of the border will rebound against us in the long run. Unlike Burma or Nepal, we are not non-aligned in the Sino-Soviet conflict and all our policies must be guided by that consideration. Any India-China settlement would not be worth the paper it is written on unless it is backed by reasonable guarantee of Chinese good conduct and it is only through continued Indo-Soviet friendship that the normalisation of China's international outlook may be brought about. In short, if an India-China settlement is to result in a vast improvement in China's manoeuvrability in the world and a corresponding reduction in ours, it would be defeating for us to rush to the conference table.

Pakistan

Likewise in regard to Pakistan, there is a lot to be said for improving our relations; in fact, one may even go to the extent of saying that in the ultimate analysis the test of Indian statesmanship would be on how it resolved this problem of Pakistan. But, to make

generous concessions to Pakistan in the hope that once the disputes are settled good relations will follow would be to overlook the nature of Indo-Pakistan relations. A settlement of the Kashmir problem, *other things remaining equal*, may in fact result in further pressure on India to yield to Pakistan in other areas.

The United Nations

The Pakistan problem raises also the other issue of India's attitude to the United Nations. A problem about the United Nations is that its structure is not conducive to the growth of loyalty to the organisation except among those who have been accorded a privileged status under the Charter. Thus the great powers, who exercise the veto, may have a stake in the UN; so also the very small countries who are regarded as equals only in this forum. Even among the great powers there has been a realisation that it is not safe to tackle too many problems through the UN. Senator Jackson's famous speech asking the United States to be less bothered about the UN and Khrushchov's persistent efforts to have the troika principle accepted are indicators that the great powers do not feel quite comfortable there.

The position is indeed most difficult about countries like India—who are not small enough to be thankful to the UN for giving them a vote, nor big enough to be accepted as Permanent Members of the Security Council. In that sense, India should be among the countries least interested in the UN. An Indian attempt to strengthen the UN is understandable but our efforts should first be directed towards evolving a more realistic structure of the organisation.

In the past most of the great powers have defied the UN; in fact, it might have become the measure of a country's greatness to get away with things which the UN did not endorse. Our own concern for the UN in regard to Kashmir may be a measure of our inability to function as a power in our own right. The sur-

render of their sovereign rights by a few countries like India may not make any difference to the capacities of the UN, except, of course, in relation to those countries.

Flexibility

It is important for us to regain a degree of flexibility in our foreign relations. What is crucial in this matter is *not to fix ourselves to another foreign policy* in place of the one which exists, but to get rid of the fixation about this one. It is apparent that if the world stabilises at the level of today, India will be hard pressed; while the second class powers will have secured a place in the sun, countries like ours will be left out. Thus it may be our role to bring up further complicating issues today and attempt to add to the present state of confusion in the world. The kind of new world which China and France hope to build will relegate not only India but a few other important nations to a status of insignificance.

For example, in de Gaulle's scheme of things, Germany has little or no place except as a constituent unit of a Europe under his leadership. The world has slighted the German people for long and what with the great progress achieved in the two Germanys, and what with the crucial position of these States in Europe, Germany deserves a much higher status in the world than she enjoys. It may not be easy for us to suggest any solution of the German problem but we may start talking of it and start upholding the case of the Germans, which seems to be going by default today.

Likewise, there is no reason why Japan should not be involved in a much bigger role in the affairs of Asia and of the world. There is something unnatural in the present subdued state of Japan and in a multipolar world, Tokyo as much as Berlin must begin to be important. Nearer home, a country like Indonesia ought to find her place as one of the major nations of the world. With or without Malaysia, Indonesia continues to

be a great country playing an immensely important role in a crucial region of the world.

The Arabs, led by the UAR, are a force of equal significance and there must be some way of accommodating them in a new world structure in a vastly enhanced role. If an East African federation comes into being, it will have its own claim to greatness, although the African stage has for long been dominated by the smaller countries who, by accident, attained independence first.

Brazil in Latin America, with a population of more than 60 million and an area of more than 8,500,000 kilometres, must become more important than a mere member of the organisation of American States. Yugoslavia also is one of the most important nations of the world and it must secure its position. If the world system dominated by the two great powers is to yield place to a new scheme of things, it must take sufficient note of the claims of these countries and ours.

Bilateral Relations

One possible plank of our foreign policy, therefore, could be a conscious attempt to enter into consultations with these countries and develop close bilateral relations with them consistently with our existing cordial relations with the two super powers.

It will be futile for India to try to distinguish itself by its refusal to accept the mores and styles of world politics today. In fact, in our rethinking on foreign policy, the first major need is to get rid of the feeling that we are cleaner than other nations and that we must remain so. If it is somebody's business to uphold the highest standards of conduct and tread the path of the three monkeys of hearing no evil, seeing no evil and talking no evil, let it not be India's.

If we are able to function in this difficult world with hard-headed realism, we may soon discover that international prestige is not like virginity and that once lost, it can still be regained.

A vacuum to fill

RASHEEDUDDIN KHAN

STATES are known by the policies they pursue. And the validity of a political policy depends on its capacity to reflect more or less authentically in its formulation and directive, the changing spectrum of national and international power-relationship. There is therefore an ever present need for all the States to re-examine and consequently re-orient their policies in terms of the protection and promotion of their vital national interest in the context of the pulls and pressures operating at a given moment. Ideology and idealism can and must provide the frame-of-reference and criteria for policy evaluation. They cannot however substitute for a policy itself, nor should they be allowed to vitiate the necessities of *real-politik* if they are essentially to serve simultaneously the role of instruments of *comprehension* and *change*.

All policies need careful pruning and modifications at suitable intervals even if the goals remain constant. But the periodicity of reassessment of a foreign policy depends not only, as is obvious, on the changes in world political equations but also, and in a sense primarily, on the growing and complex domestic needs of a country and the compulsive demands of fulfilling those very needs through the reconciliation of the urges of *internal* growth with the available opportunities in the *external* situation. In this organic sense alone the foreign policy of a country is considered the external manifestation of its internal necessities. For this academic reason alone, if not also for genuine reasons of practicality, there seems a clear and present

need for a thorough re-assessment of India's foreign policy both in its conceptual validity and functional effectivity.

Since the time of our national independence in 1947, we have passed through two broad phases of diplomatic developments before entering the current third phase which began in 1962. In Phase One, 1947-1955, we were in the formative, hesitant and bungling stage, trying to delineate the larger and fundamental aspects which should govern our attitudes and commitments in the councils of the world. We were hankering for a governing principle so as to make it the bed-rock of our foreign policy. In the five canons of *Pancha Shila* we found an all-inclusive doctrine, which we diligently promoted in Phase Two, 1955-1962, which saw its finest hour in Bandung and expired in the forlorn valleys of Bomdi-la.

Pancha Shila gave an ideological respectability to our foreign policy and greatly boosted up our prestige as the leader of the non-aligned world. We lost an opportunity to live up to the expectations of our friends and foes, largely due to tactical immaturity and not to the inadequacy of our basic assumptions. *Pancha Shila* as a *modus vivendi* of international co-existence has probably not lost its validity even now, but the strategy and tactics of its implementation needs radical transformation if it is to promote *rapprochement* without compromising the power-position of its sponsors. To reduce it to an attitude of complacency or elevate it to the abstract realms of political morality is a useless exer-

cise which will degenerate it to the level of a slogan.

And in a way we in India, despite our denial to the contrary, did nothing more than this with the concept of *Pancha Shila*. It became a magic word which we thought would cast its spell on the world around. We believed that its enunciation and mechanistic application was a sufficient safeguard to redress the balance of the conflicting world of our time. In our well-meaning zeal to sponsor a morally desirable principle, we neglected in ourselves and overlooked in others the expedient and ever-present profane urges of power-politics.

Newness

This was one of the fatal errors of our foreign policy for which we paid in blood before the Chinese hordes in the snow-capped ranges of the Himalayas in October-December 1962. The poser has aptly put it that this crisis in India's policy partly arises out of its irrelevance to the changed situational conditioning of world politics, and that China's belligerency is but one of the indicators of this change and not an isolated action. It is therefore germane to observe the 'newness' in this changed situation.

The sixties of this century in its political orientation reveals certain aspects which makes it qualitatively different from the preceding decade. Even if the larger challenges remain the same, the postures and possibilities and combination of forces have changed. Two new aspects, among others, deserve particular attention. Firstly is the fact of the tremendous increase in the community of free nations and the consequential enlargement of the United Nations. The fast unfolding of the decolonization process set in motion after the end of the war almost as a chain reaction resulted in the liberation of more than a dozen countries in South East and West Asia between 1945-60, and of about 30 countries of Africa within a span of five years, 1957-62.

As of now, the United Nations comprise 113 recognized sovereign States, as against less than half that number at the inception of

that organisation in 1945. In a very real dialectical sense the aggregation of these 'quantities' of independent States in the modern world, help to transform the 'quality' of international politics.

Secondly, after the establishment of nuclear and tactical-weapon parity between the blocs and due to the terrifying fear of the very extinction of civilization and life in the eventuality of a third world war, the politics of bi-polar confrontation has entered a new phase, where the calamity of total collision has receded to the background and the prospects of limited engagements and short-term conflicts particularly between junior members of the two blocs and/or bloc-free non-aligned States, have come to the forefront.

The earlier apprehensions of regional wars inevitably leading upto world conflagration have now lost their grounds of fear. With the shift of emphasis from total confrontation (including the dreadful probability of a nuclear holocaust) to piecemeal, restrictive and local combats, which have also not remained wholly ideologically motivated, the bi-polar balance of power had yet another reason for becoming inoperative.

Distinct Change

The creation of bi-polarity was a structural manifestation of cold war in international politics, when within a matter of a few years after the war, the supremacy of only two States, the USA and the USSR, appeared decisive for the solution of basic issues of global war and peace. That original position has now undergone a distinct change. Due to a variety of factors, the cold war has failed to freeze the world into two water-tight compartments. Actually the continuance of the cold war beyond the point where its divisive pull (which had earlier segregated the world into antagonistic camps) no longer possesses its original gravitational potency, has made it an irrelevant factor—or in any case it has not remained the relevant factor—in any purposeful analysis of world politics.

Today, the cold-war provides the background but not the context of

the valid operational categories within which it is possible to understand and formulate a given foreign policy. We are now passing through what may be called the meta-cold war phase, in which world politics has reverted to the system of multipolar and regional balance of power—not in its traditional, (that is, pre-cold war) unitary form, but in its modernistic (that is, meta-cold war) confederal form.

In this new form, the balance of power is a two tier phenomenon, in which the super-powers continue to exercise their decisive, but abridged, paramountcy of world politics, and on the other hand, the second rate powers comprising the lower tier, who have been steadily encroaching on the once preserved domain of the super-powers, have exhibited their autonomy of action involving occasional discord and tension even with their respective power-poles.

Not only the schizm between Moscow and Peking, and occasional irritations between Moscow and Warsaw, but the estrangement between Washington and Paris, and the continuing tussle between Washington and Bonn, are indicative of this change. Today the monoliths of the East and the West are no more intact, save in the imagination of their doctrinaire ideologues. And with their decomposition, bi-polarity has become a formal and a titular concept.

Fissiparous Tendencies

The growth of fissiparous tendencies among bloc members was natural in the atmosphere of relaxation which followed the 'thaw'. But the point to remember is that precisely this autonomy of action of the bloc components militated against the basic assumption of bloc-solidarity. Yet another factor which challenged bi-polarity was the emergence of the non-aligned powers, who without becoming a third force, nevertheless disrupted the super-power hegemony. Their existence proved that alignment or pre-alignment is not inevitable,

and that non-alignment was not tantamount to isolation.

The reasons for the *detente* and loosening of bloc cohesion can be seen partly in the building-up of regional economies and their increasing inter-dependence not only in terms of interchange of technological know-how, but more so in terms of the dependence on loans, aids, investments, export-import agreements, etc. This became necessary after the virtual collapse of the colonial system, whose liquidation began as a consequence of the second world war. This led to the sudden spurt for, what may be called, total growth, which became a characteristic feature of almost all the countries in the post-war era of reconstruction, due either to their devastation in the war or to their impoverishment because of centuries of colonial thralldom and neglect. But the logic of bi-polarity restricted this process of growth by attaching strings to aids, by penalising the non-aligned and wasting the resources and energies on an arms build-up.

The new process of disengagement between blocs had again allowed the nations of the world to get busy with their more pressing tasks of building their economies and patterns of societies. With this the focus of interest has again become internal and has not remained global to the same degree as it was until a few years ago. This has brought about a chain reaction in the policy adjustments of the States towards problems of international politics.

Growing Interdependence

Secondly, with the revolutionary transformation in the means and methods of communications, the pace of world integration at various levels became accelerated, and despite ideological rigidities and rifts, it became impossible for countries of all political shades to extricate themselves from the compelling needs of transactions, lending and borrowing between each other. This process of inter-dependence and inter-penetration between the countries, particularly of the two ideologically closed blocs, resulted through the weakening of the foundations of frag-

mentation in challenging the invulnerability of the two monoliths.

Thirdly, as a result of this development many States reveal a tendency, by learning from the mistakes of the past, to depend more on pragmatic thinking and realistic approaches. With the correction of the partisan myopia by the life-warm experiences of *real-politik* during the last decade and a half, the dogmatic black-and-white picture of world politics has now been replaced by a multi-hued image, which approximates to reality. In this visual correction, the non-aligned countries, particularly those of Africa, have played a significant role by fact of almost disregarding the ideological bifurcation and establishing relations based primarily on the promotion of their interests for mutual benefit. Their non-recognition of bi-polarity at least for purposes of their relationship with the outside world, expressed in their trade relations, political dealings and performance in the United Nations, was yet another factor contributing to its weakening.

The Possible Alternatives

In this context then, what ought to be the lines and direction of India's foreign policy? The poser has called attention to four possible alternatives. The first alternative is to accept 'India's weakness' and play a 'subdued role in foreign affairs and wait until the country has attained a minimum level of power to make its presence felt in the world'. In this connection four points are to be noted. Firstly, it is not valid to assume that India is weak, which it is only in an absolute but not in a relative sense. And in politics this makes a great difference. Already India is one of the 'weighty' regional powers and a fair contender to the leadership of a section of the non-aligned world.

Secondly, we have within the last sixteen years established traditions of playing an effective role as spokesman not only for the rights of the uncommitted nations but also for the promotion of democracy at home and peace abroad. Our proposed subdued role in

foreign affairs would further isolate us from the congeries of the backward societies, who look to us as one of the pioneering models of balanced democratic growth. We can retreat from the front-line of this category of States (where indeed we are at the moment) only at our peril, and with the penalty of losing an important base of our diplomatic prestige.

Demotion

Thirdly, our withdrawal from the world scene would also entail greater difficulties in attracting support—financial, technical and diplomatic—which at present we get largely due to our 'exalted' status among the developing (or shall we say, backward!) countries. Conversely, since withdrawal from the world scene would mean neglect by the super-powers, for purposes of economic development, complete dependence on one super-power, ostensibly the United States, would mean our demotion to a satellite position.

Fourthly, to say that India as yet does not possess even a minimum level of power is to exaggerate the situation. Power is not physical force but the sum-total of geo-political advantages, capacity to back policies by effective sanctions—not merely military and economic, but also diplomatic, in order to promote a given interest. In this sense India enjoys an obvious initial advantage by her geo-political potentiality to play a power role.

The second approach mentioned in the poser implies in effect the subordination of India to China. This is dangerous and unrealistic. We can look forward to the normalization of relations between China and India, but never to the time when the underlying rivalry between them for positions of strength as power-factors in Asia and the world, would cease completely.

The third policy pattern is already partially followed by India, but it cannot be viewed as a total perspective of a new foreign policy.

The fourth suggestion emphasises two things: (a) the need to create

a new force of the non-aligned countries and (b) to strive for the expansion of the activities of the United Nations so as to strengthen it by propagating the idea of the abridgement of national sovereignties. Both the suggestions are idealistic. And further, why is it necessary to renounce the aspiration of becoming a power-factor in order to realize the two objectives? If that is to avoid conflicts, then where is the security that as long as there are other powers, India's powerlessness would not actually contribute to the accentuation of the conflicts which are sought to be avoided?

Two Failures

The real crisis of India's foreign policy arises out of two failures on our part, namely: (a) lack of vision in giving an interest-oriented dimension to our policy of non-alignment and (b) lack of reappraisal of the changed structure of the international power-relationship.

One of our major contributions to world politics of our generation was our pioneering effort gradually to evolve a workable scheme of non-alignment as a realistic and beneficial alternative to alignments of all shades and forms. It has paid us dividends, but suddenly with the Chinese intransigence we needlessly felt as if the root cause of our calamity was non-alignment. On the contrary, if the Chinese invasion has proved anything more concretely, it is the fact that: (a) India's non-alignment did not prevent (as was dreaded by the pessimists) the opposite bloc to rush all the available aid spontaneously; (b) the leader of the Eastern bloc, the USSR, after an initial equivocation, gave its full moral support to India, thereby disrupting its bloc solidarity; (c) the aligned countries such as Pakistan were disillusioned that in times of emergency the distinction between allies and friends become inoperative, therefore, they realized that it is wiser to remain non-aligned and get the best of both worlds.

The conclusion is clear that alignment and not non-alignment was compromised by the Chinese aggression. There is thus an

urgent need to develop non-alignment further in the changed situation, by working positively for the total collapse of the bloc monoliths and the relaxation of tensions. In doing this it is to be remembered that firstly, as the poser points out, it will not serve any purpose to take a China-obsessed view of our foreign policy, either out of fear of that country or out of the too narrow a consideration of undoing the wrong. It will merely give a negative aspect to our already not-quite-positive a foreign policy.

Secondly, it is to be realized that if our relations are strained with Pakistan and China—respectively our 'traditional' and 'modern' adversaries—it is understandable in the context of our conflicts. But the pity even here is that with countries in South East Asia (Indonesia, North and South Viet Nam, Thailand, for instance) and with almost all the new States of Africa, our relations may be described as not more than correct. Moreover, with a majority of States in Asia and Africa (with the possible exception of the Arab States) our relations are rather precariously satisfactory. This should be all the more alarming in the context of our cherished wish to play a leadership role.

Only Acquaintances

With the bulk of the States the world over, we are just good 'acquaintances'. We have hardly any firm friend and no committed ally. The deliberate attempt to insulate ourselves from the arena of political tussle in the name of non-alignment has reduced even our natural stature in world politics. We confused non-alignment with non-involvement, and needlessly hesitated to take a lead in programmes of Asian development and voluntarily recoiled from the currents of expanding unification of the fraternity of developing societies.

In the Belgrade Conference of the non-aligned, this was demonstrated much to our chagrin when the African States all but disowned us as an unworthy compeer in the struggle of the backward colonial

people. In our conflict with China and Pakistan, it is we who are isolated for two very different reasons. Certainly there might be something wrong with the world, but are we sure there is nothing wrong with our own perspective and postures of diplomacy?

Geopolitically, India is so situated that it cannot afford to enjoy the 'splendid isolation' that the United States enjoyed in the 19th century due to the latter's location in the New Hemisphere and beyond the seas. Physically we are too much part of the world and in an era when the world has shrunk, it is idle to pretend that we can enclose ourselves in, what Tagore called, 'the narrow domestic walls'. The contemporary period of world history makes it all the more impossible for a land so large and populous, so strategically placed and politically a model of democratic growth like India, to remain aloof from the streams of international existence. Our foreign policy must take cognisance of this fact to make India an independent power-factor in the new, emerging multipolar balance of power.

Within the ambit of non-alignment with the super-powers, we can yet have, simultaneously, a greater cohesion at the lower tier with certain neighbouring countries by promoting a larger flow of goods and services and by improving our cultural and diplomatic ties. This would give us an opportunity to play a positive role in maintaining a regional equilibrium of forces. Together with this, we ought to deal with the super-powers with less inhibition and greater flexibility, so as to explore the prospects of making India the convergence point of peaceful competition between the East and the West. For various reasons of their respective power-interests, both the super powers have already given enough evidence to show their special concern in the development of India.

Special Status

It is no chauvinism to reiterate that India has a special status in Asia and in the developing regions of the world, but so far we have not tangibly backed-up our aware-

ness of the fact with positive measures of sustaining our status. India's potential big-power position in Asia was accepted by the erstwhile British Government of this country as the cardinal postulate of its imperial policy. The British never failed to utilize India's locational advantage for their world colonial designs.

Surely the Republic of India has not inherited imperialism and its policy of aggrandisement, but it has certainly succeeded to a power-status which it ought to recognize and maintain. But this we miserably failed to do and instead got enmeshed somehow in a morass of moralizing diplomacy. Disgusted by the naked use of force and doctrinaire postures, in an attempt to evolve a new conduct for inter-State politics, we sought to transform mundane principles of foreign policy into immutable canons of political ethics.

Turning Point

Fortunately, the 'liberation' of Goa—our first act of political maturity as a sovereign State—also emancipated us from the shackles of hollow moralism. As a first reaction, it deflated our (false) value in the councils of the world. But more important than that, it gave us an opportunity to demonstrate that our emphasis on co-existence and peaceful negotiation does not, and should not, mean that we have abjured the use of force under all circumstances.

The integration of Goa is one of the turning points in India's foreign policy. It was a vigorous manifestation of our desire to defend and consolidate national interests. But to do this more effectively hereafter not only *vis-a-vis* an *absentee* and third rate imperial power like Portugal, but also in defiance of the formidable contenders for Asian hegemony like China, and the perennial disturber of regional tranquility like Pakistan, we will have to build our internal strength by all-pervasive attempts at modernization, including rapid industrialization and greater production based on a coherent economic policy and disciplined political action. The least which the Congress Government

can do is to put its Bhubaneswar resolutions of 1963 into practice.

Dichotomy

The dichotomy between policy enunciation and programme formulation, made deeper by the further contradiction between programme and performance, degenerates our internal politics to an inchaote activity at cross-purposes. If foreign policy is not an improvisation but a genuine reflection of the existing needs and levels of domestic growth, then there is all the more reason for us to devote greater attention to the prior and primary task of comprehensive national reconstruction, if we wish to score diplomatic success.

India's foreign policy, in consonance with its position—demographic, strategic and as a model of democratic growth—has to be positive, realistic and power-oriented. It is to be remembered that in the final count there are only two big power contenders in South East and East Asia, namely China and India. The Sino-Indian conflict, whatever its origin, is essentially symptomatic of the struggle for spheres of influence between the two rising giants of Asia.

Japan, like Britain, is not a continental power and will have to suffer for its primordial geographical isolation in an age where size, population, location and natural resources far outweigh technological developments and industrialization; and also when imperialism of the 19th century type is no longer possible.

Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan and Burma have a status potentially not more than that of second rate powers. In the emerging multipolar balance of power, China is already playing its role cleverly. There is a vacuum for India to fill. In the measure we shall succeed, we would redeem not only the promise we hold out to the world, but also contribute to the stability of multipolarity and provide an effective countervailing power to the threatening dominance of China, not only in Asia but also in the multi-ethnic fraternity of the developing regions of the world.

Assess the national interest

ROMESH THAPAR

TO continue to discuss India's foreign policy only in terms of alignment and non-alignment is somewhat naive and short-sighted, particularly at a time when the urgent need is dispassionately to locate national interest and to safeguard it no matter what the cost in men and money. This understanding is growing, but the heated polemics of the recent past inhibit a break-through to more realistic assessments. That it would be foolhardy for India to

be anything but non-aligned is generally accepted, but there is an extraordinary apathy over how this non-alignment is to be translated into practical policy, made coherent—and this involves a clear conception of our national interest.

What is suggested is not startlingly original. In the tense post-war years, when two ideologically hostile blocs threatened the peace of the world and also the prospects for economic deve-

lopment in the backward regions, the enunciation of a non-aligned position and the elaboration of its implications was to an appreciable extent responsible for paralysing the brinkmanship of the nuclear powers. The *detente* which we witness today owes much to the strivings of the non-aligned who were often mobilised and inspired by Nehru's India.

If we have appeared confused since the fateful Chinese adventure on our Himalayan frontier, it is because we have unthinkingly, may be defensively, wandered into the belief that non-alignment *by itself* is a policy. This never was so, and never should be. Non-alignment remains, as always, the essential frame within which we have to build our foreign policy attitudes.

Past Experience

The events of the past few years should have helped to deepen our understanding of the role we are to play in the world. Earlier, we saw only a frustrated Pakistan, militarily aligned with the West, as a likely troublemaker. Now, China, a friend turned foe, links itself with Pakistan and assumes a threatening posture along an extended and difficult mountain frontier. Earlier, the newly-risen nations of Asia and Africa were seen as our national allies in the struggle to end colonialism, to save world peace and to forge the programmes for the development of backward regions emerging into freedom. Now, the ideological schism between the Soviet Union and China infects the dialogue among the non-aligned and creates certain cleavages among them about the *detente* and its motivations. Earlier, even beyond the periphery of the non-aligned, India's voice was respected. Today, it is suspect.

The western powers, generally speaking, see the weakening of India's international position as the long-awaited opportunity to 'discipline' her independence-loving leadership. But, fortunately, they are not agreed on how this is to be done—a fact which we often lose sight of in our dogmatic moments, thereby restricting our own

capacity to play off one against the other. The scope for manoeuvre will increase as solidarity in the existing blocs crumbles. Meanwhile, the Soviet Union, and the communist States close to her, work to preserve the old alliance because they believe—and this needs to be stressed—that it is vital to the balance of power which they hope to achieve as the *detente* unfolds.

Increasing Power Centres

Then again, viewing the world from Delhi, what do we see? True, the nuclear parity or stalemate forces the *detente*. But our world is no longer dependent wholly on the policy-makers in Moscow and Washington. Peking is launched upon a scheme of extending her own sphere of influence. Paris plays for leadership in Europe and even attempts a revival of her influence in Asia and Africa. Among the newly freed, the desire develops to belong to bigger, more influential groupings. Malaysia is born. An Arab nation toils for a single personality. In East and West Africa, similar strivings are seen.

As the power centres increase and assume various attitudes, there will be need to be sensitive to the many nuances of situations. The trend towards bigger groupings increases international stability, assists the formation of more productive markets, insulates backward areas from the colonial-type activities of developed, expanding economies, and should be welcomed by a potential big power such as India which has no interest in expansionism.

But, even as we view these trends towards multinational statehood, we must take note of the grave threats posed to the hard-won unity of India. Pakistan, psychopathically conscious of her minor power image in comparison with India, is prepared opportunistically to link herself with pacts and powers so that she can feel the glow of belonging to a bigger entity. Her nuisance value is increasingly exploited on the unresolved Kashmir issue by those who wish to embarrass India,

politically and militarily. It does not need any special knowledge to estimate the wastage of scarce resources involved in the confrontation with Pakistan, but a certain degree of perception is called for to understand that our neighbour's ultimate objective is to weaken the central power in India and thereby to encourage non-secular, un-democratic processes which could well lead to the dismemberment of the sub-continent.

To achieve this long-term objective, the present and succeeding leaderships of Pakistan are likely to receive considerable assistance from the adventurist policies of China. An elaborate analysis of China's motivations is not necessary to provide the evidence for this assumption. Peking would rather that China constituted the only big power in Asia. An India, dynamic both economically and politically, inhibits the growth of Chinese influence. It is now becoming apparent that some such calculations conditioned Peking's decision to undertake an elaborate military operation in the Himalayas on the fatuous plea that India was being aggressive! Its purpose was to topple the 'discredited' Nehru government and to set in motion various disruptionist forces. A combined operation by Pakistan and China would prove even more dangerous, unless the nation is made fully conscious of these stratagems.

Tortuous Negotiations

Interestingly enough, our friends in the West, who expressed great anxiety to offer us military assistance against the Chinese threat, were reluctant unconditionally to commit themselves to the defence of India. We are now in the second year of the complicated, tortuous negotiations to create the military deterrent required to be built up with the help of the West, and in the meantime our defence system remains gravely imperilled. Quite clearly, these powers would also like to cut us down to size, but they are as yet confused as to how this is to be done and to what extent. Or, perhaps, they wait for the final end of the

Nehru Era and the crystallisation of the nascent centrifugal trends now becoming visible across the sub-continent.

Russian National Interest

Only the Soviet Union among the big powers has a massive stake in the political unity and economic viability of India, especially in the context of China's likely moves among the 'oppressed peoples' of Asia and Africa. It is with a certain sense of satisfaction that Moscow views the moves towards larger groupings among the small, under-developed nations. Each such grouping is a new barrier to the spread of Chinese power and influence. The growth of Indian ambitions is accepted, even encouraged, for these are unlikely to collide with those of the Soviet Union. Hence the anxiety to salvage India's damaged prestige, and the desire to strengthen her economic bargaining position *vis-a-vis* the West. That our policy-makers do not respond more energetically and in self-interest to the Soviet presence is merely a reflection of our continuing subservience to outdated western theory and concept, a subservience which is ununderstandable to our non-aligned allies but tolerated as a minor aberration by Moscow.

The Soviet Union, meanwhile, is obsessed with the fear that unless she is able to support her foreign policy initiatives with an increasing quantum of fundamental nation-building economic aid she may fail in her efforts to contain China and to out-manoeuvre the western powers. The faltering economies of the non-aligned demand sustenance during this period of transition which heralds the *detente*. The USA's current assistance to these economies, and its potential capacity to increase this assistance, cannot be dismissed as 'imperialistic' and 'destructive', as of no consequence to nation-building.

In this connection the wide-ranging trade talks between the USSR and Japan are of significance. Japanese industrialists, conscious that their major export market

in the USA might be affected when the European Common Market begins to raise barriers against US goods and forces them back to the home markets, are seeking stable, long-term trade with the USSR. The economies of the two countries are in many ways complementary, with the USSR able to absorb both consumer and capital goods production. Trade with Japan, Moscow anticipates, will create 'surpluses' from Soviet industry with which to aid under-developed economies. Japan, on her part, is apparently prepared to play this role, for she does not relish the idea of dabbling in the uncertain political situations which prevail in Asia and Africa.

India's foreign policy-planners, to begin with, have to re-forge and strengthen economic and military understanding with the USSR. This has to be done with the knowledge that such an understanding is in the interests of both countries, that our national interests are complementary and that, even though there may be minor tactical differences between our two States, there is broad agreement on basic, long-range perspectives.

Such a posture, however, no matter how subtly implemented, is bound to create problems in our relations with the West. These relations have to be nourished and extended, but not at the cost of national interest. The logic of the *detente* should help us to understand that even within the western world there is a large body of influential opinion which has come to the firm conclusion that a Soviet military and economic commitment to India is to be warmly welcomed in the interests of peace. This sentiment will grow, and we should do everything to encourage it.

Understanding Africa

Having ensured a Soviet commitment, or call it what you will, it is equally important for India to salvage her prestige among the non-aligned. Our relations with the Arab nation demand a priority long denied. Here, again, national interests are complementary. So, too, the Arab attitude to the Soviet

Union. Of course, greater skill will be needed to consolidate relations with the often mutually opposed Arab governments, but we are fortunate that our position here has not been so damaged as in South-East Asia.

And through joint actions with the Arab nation we will be able to stabilise and deepen our relations with the peoples of free Africa whose potential influence on international developments in the second half of this century we have yet to comprehend. It is an aspect of our foreign relations on which little or no work has been done. A whole continent has been more or less neglected.

South East Asia

A principled approach to the problems of the non-aligned, together with a readiness to institutionalise certain major facets of our relationship, will win us respect and friends in Europe and South America. However, in South-East Asia, the prospect is more clouded, gloomier. A careful and sensitive involvement on our part in France's attempt to 'unite and neutralise' Viet Nam might spark the beginnings of a fusion with Cambodia and Laos. A sympathetic attitude towards Britain's encouragement of Malaysia, and an intelligent intervention in that area, might help ease the tensions mounting with Indonesia which also searches for a big power status. Some of our most perceptive minds will have to focus their attention on the problems of this region, not the amateurs entrusted with the task at present.

The complicated business of freeing ourselves from the paralysis which grips us in the realm of foreign policy is necessarily dependent on how we tackle our frontier controversies with Pakistan and China and our hyper-sensitive contacts with Burma, Ceylon, Nepal, Sikkim and Bhutan. There can be no sudden solutions on the basis of this or that initiative. The challenge presented by Pakistan and China introduces the major tensions in our relations with our other neighbours, and therefore it is this challenge which

has to be faced courageously at the frontiers and at home.

We cannot adopt emotional and rigid postures on undemarcated borders, for in so doing we will only appear unreasonable. We must act with renewed energy to achieve an adjustment of our frontiers which does not damage our national interest and which may well involve the 'swopping' of certain territories. This calls for maturity among the people, a maturity which has to be painstakingly developed in the face of unthinking hysteria.

But, even as we proceed to take these initiatives, we will have to abandon the begging bowl, the fawning before every visiting foreign official in transit through the country, the pathetic long-enduring trust we place in the nations of the West who we believe have the abundance and inclination freely and unconditionally to feed us, industrialise us, and to arm us. In other words, it is about time that we stood up firmly on our feet, assessed what has to be done to nourish our economic self-sufficiency, and acted, no matter what the sacrifice, to achieve it. Only then will we be in a position to claim that we have a sovereign foreign policy, that we intend to work for it and defend it.

Mental Blockage

The great blockage to independent thinking is the deep-rooted fear that if we do not accept western terms on arms aid during the next few years, while we are organising our own production potential, we may find ourselves defenceless. This fear is false for two opposite reasons. First, the allies of Pakistan, who treat her as a 'favoured nation', do not intend giving India a military superiority. And, second, the balance of world forces is such that India cannot be abandoned to Chinese blackmail by these same allies or by the USSR.

We are learning the truth slowly, as is evidenced by the fruitless negotiations to obtain our minimum military needs from the reluctant western powers, but are hesitant to accept the vitally

necessary equipment from communist sources. Our short-sightedness in this respect reflects our tendency to consider China as the only real enemy today, just as earlier we used to focus on Pakistan as the only foe. At last we are beginning to view both Pakistan and China as part of a rather persistent threat, and this ultimately should clear the cob-webs about military aid and related matters.

Discard Servility

We must, in other words, rid ourselves of the complex that servility produces results, both economically and militarily. We must be angry when anger is called for. India is a potential big power, whose friendship and support, based upon national interest, would be much sought after by various nations and groups of nations, communist, capitalist and socialist. We have to learn to appreciate our own growing relevance in the community of nations, and in the process purge ourselves of the opportunism which has of late come to be associated with our international postures.

Those who would silence us with questionable aid, who would urge us to subdue our interventions and protests, who would persuade us that our security lies in foreign-controlled air-umbrellas, aircraft-carriers and military expertise, do, in fact, make us impotent at a most crucial moment in the affairs of this world—for along this path there is not even the guarantee of fundamental economic development, only political palsy.

Where are the men who will implement this kind of bold, realistic, principled policy which seeks to secure our national interest? The great architect of our once-independent foreign policy, who in several ways conditioned the thinking of a majority of mankind, is no longer in effective control of the policies of this nation. There is no one to remedy the failures of the past and to develop creatively the positive content of that past. Only unimaginative administrators attempt a break-through. A seemingly hopeless prospect, but let it stir us into action.

Spinster on the shelf

SEMINARIST

WHAT is the image which India presents to the world? Not that of the home of an ancient spiritual tradition or that of the initiator of the modern concept of non-alignment. No one is interested in the past, even in the recent past, and in our achievements in history. It is the present that matters; and the current image of India is of a weak, confused, discredited, leaderless country, threshing feebly like an old and wounded crocodile as it sinks under its own weight in blood-stained water.

There is no aspect of the Indian scene that gives ground for hope. The government is without a continuous, directive impulse; politics lack values; corruption in public and official life is rampant; the food situation is at the mercy of PL 480; the army is defeated and demoralised. The Prime Minister sits apart, aged and defunct, like Milton's 'Chaos as Umpire', and not as the responsible head of the administration; and the President, when he exerts himself at all, indulges in sky-writing.

It is not only our enemies who regard the Indian scene as black with clouds, and conclude that the only thing conspicuous by its absence is a silver lining. This is the universal view. Britain believes that the future of Asia rests with China and that it would be best for India to make terms with the men at Peking. One could, of course, write Britain off as a perfidious shop keeper who is

concerned about his commercial interests and the water supply to Hong-Kong. But there is a growing feeling also in influential circles in the United States (which can hardly be accused of wanting to appease the Chinese Communists) that Nehru's India is incapable of a determined effort to save itself and that any Asian policy will have to reckon with China as not merely a powerful but as the dominant force in Asia.

The Soviet Union too, while still our friend, has sadly watched us slipping down the slope, incapable of guarding what we regard as our frontiers, losing our influence in Asia and Africa and seemingly clinging to Britain's skirts while Britain spurns us with embarrassment. It is a sense of robustness which the world believes that India lacks; and apparently even a national humiliation such as that of October 1962 cannot sting this sense into us. Compared to Nigeria, Malaysia, Indonesia and Kenya, India appears a weakling nation which hugs its shame.

This, to any Indian, whatever his political hue or sphere of interest, is a sad position. Is this the tryst with destiny which Nehru spoke of in 1947? Is this the India that raised its banner as the spokesman of Asia in the counsels of the nations, that flayed with its tongue the aggressor in Korea as well as the aggressor in Suez, that prided itself on its leadership of civilized opinion and the uncommitted world

even while it coyly renounced it? It is now, of all countries, France and not India, which asserts that Asia is for the Asians and insists that China cannot be ignored in the United Nations and elsewhere. It is Cairo and not Delhi that is the prime junction of the non-aligned world; and it is to the court of Nasser and not of Nehru that the leaders of the Arab, African and Asian nations flock.

Internal Strength

The reasons for India's decline in the eyes of the world are plain for all but us to see. Foreign policy is poised on internal strength and the latter does not exist in India. Our plans have not been fulfilled and our military hollowness has been exposed. China, starting virtually from nothing, has made much headway in building herself up; we, with many assets in 1947, have gradually and consistently declined. We have wishfully brushed aside from our memories the rout of our armies in October 1962, but the rest of the world has not forgotten.

It is of no avail to argue that China has a war machine and economy of long standing while we have always been a peace-loving nation. This would be a telling argument if we were considering the occupation of Peking or of Lhasa. But it requires no great military strength to protect our borders against raids, be they massive as in the case of the Chinese attack or minor such as those in which Pakistan indulges frequently. What these require are courage and foresight; and it is these which seem lacking in India, both in the army and outside its ranks.

Lacking the basic industrial and military muscle, and with large portions of what we regard as our territory occupied by the enemy, India has become the 'sick man of Asia'. We play the same role in our continent as Turkey played in Europe in the 19th century. (I will not elaborate this parallel further and seek to identify the Indian version of Abdul the Damned.) We have no sustained, long-ranging view on foreign affairs; instead, we have, like ins-

tant coffee, an 'instant' foreign policy. It is a Nescafe approach to problems. We react to each crisis and stagger because we have not yet fallen.

For a number of years we have been faced with the problem of Chinese incursions into what is generally accepted in this country as legitimate Indian territory. We could have made up our minds either to gird ourselves to throw out the Chinese or to reach a settlement with China. In fact, we did neither. We combined assertions that we would never renounce an inch of our soil with failure to prepare ourselves for a military resolution of the problem although it was clear that nothing but force would be respected by the Government of China. We pressed forward in the Aksai Chin sector with 'penny packet patrols' and goaded the Chinese without taking any precautions on the Nefu border.

We acted on a premise—for which there was no foundation but which suited our inertia—that China would never dare or care—the choice of the verb depended on the ideology of the speaker—to attack India in any strength. When finally we were caught out we rushed to the western powers for aid. Then the Chinese withdrew while Britain and the United States made it clear that their military aid would be conditional. No one was eager to be tied in alliance to a country which appeared to bring with it more problems than profits. The elusive virgin of non-alignment had become the spinster on the shelf. So in turn Indian opinion reacted to this pressure from the western powers and there was a demand that India should surrender to China in order to be able to deal better with Britain and the United States, and their client Pakistan. Such effusions of muddled thinking, which take no account of either Bomdila, Walong and Chushul, or of the long-term Chinese threat, abound in the daily press.

No Easy Solutions

To revive our image, to revivify India, we need clear sightedness and long-term planning. We must

recover our stamina and restore purpose to our efforts. We must accept as adults that we are confronted with two enemies, China and Pakistan, and that no permanent settlement is possible with either. Even if we relinquish thousands of square miles to China, we will be unable to live in peace and friendship with her. She has a way of life and a political ambition that are wholly at cross purposes with ours. An India that is forced to live on her knees, on the sufferance of China, would not be true to herself.

With Pakistan too even if we agree to hand over the valley of Kashmir, we would not have bought friendship; for the *raison d'être* of Pakistan is hatred of India. True realism consists in acceptance of the fact that we will have to go through a long haul in our relations with both China and Pakistan; to seek peace with either because we are down at the moment is no more than cheap escapism.

Friendship Potential

After all, it is not a bad hand which we hold. The Soviet Union is hostile to both our enemies, and our future lies in drawing closer to the Soviet Union. Nor need this derogate from non-alignment, for the United States too is opposed to China; and though Pakistan is a military ally, the United States has not the same emotive links with Pakistan as Britain has. We could, therefore, without compromise of independence, draw closer to the only two great powers of the contemporary world. Non-alignment is not solely, as it has so often been in the past, a neurotic development of allergies; it could also be close friendship with both sides of the 'cold war' which is being waged no longer. Then would the image of India which we desire, of national honour and of a nation on an unbroken march, be restored; and it would be an image in accord with reality. India can no longer hope to preach to the world from a position of safety. For too long have we sought to save the world by our example; now we will have to save ourselves by our exertions.

Books

It was a strange coincidence of events that the first public feelers about the American plan to move the Seventh Fleet to the Indian Ocean for a 'feel' of its waters came about at a time when India lost one of her foremost foreign policy theorists, who had persistently advocated since 1943 the supreme need for India to develop as a maritime power so as to be able to ensure the security of the Indian Ocean area, in association with Britain and the Commonwealth.

Panikkar was the first among the Indian publicists to point out to his countrymen the vital importance of the Indian Ocean to our security at a time when the leaders of the National Congress, still engrossed in the national struggle, had no time to do any perspective thinking on the problem of free India's defence on the basis of geographic realities. Panikkar wrote in his book *India And The Indian Ocean* (1945): 'The peninsular character of the country with its extensive and open coast line, and with a littoral which is extremely fertile and rich in resources, makes India entirely dependent on the Indian Ocean over which her vast trade, has for the most part, found its way to the marts of the world all through history'. (pp. 82)

While to the other countries, the Indian Ocean is only one of the important oceanic areas, to India it is the vital sea where her life lines are concentrated. Her future is dependent on the freedom of that vast water surface. No industrial development, no commercial growth, no stable political structure is possible for her unless the Indian Ocean is free and her own shores are fully protected. On the basis of the above argument, Panikkar concluded, 'The Indian Ocean must therefore remain truly Indian' because the danger to the security of the Indian Ocean may come by the way of the Atlantic as well as the Pacific Ocean, as also by the way of the Persian Gulf.

He said, 'A renovated and triumphant China with her population irresistibly moving south from Tonkin to Singapore may become a greater menace to the Indian Ocean than even Japan with her lines of communication extending so far from the sources of her power'. (*Strategic Problems Of The Indian Ocean*, 1944, pp. 9). China, after all, had a long naval tradition. In the fifteenth century, Chinese fleets visited Indian posts. The naval power of the Sri Vijayas and later the naval power of the Portuguese in the Indonesian archipelago prevented the southward expansion of China over the ocean. He said in 1945, 'That movement towards the south which is indicated by

the significant demography of the area may, in all probability, be reflected in the naval policy of resurgent China'. In this context, he also referred to the strategic position of Indo-China: 'If, as is possible, Indo-China falls after the war within the Chinese sphere of influence, her authority over the southern waters will clearly be dominant'. (*India And The Indian Ocean*, pp. 86).

Panikkar also reminded his countrymen in 1945, '... powerful interests in the U.S.A. are urging on the administration that it is necessary to have more island bases in order to ensure American naval preponderance in the Pacific. . .'. He assessed, 'The naval power of the U.S.A. is already such as to make it a factor in any part of the "Indivisible Sea"'. Panikkar also dealt with other factors which might draw the U.S.A. to the Indian Ocean. 'America has developed considerable interests in the Middle East. Oil concessions in Saudi Arabia and in Iran, not to speak of the Bahrein islands indicate the growth of strong economic interests in the drainage area of the Indian Ocean. America will emerge out of the present war with global and not hemispheric ideas of strategy, and the possibility therefore has to be visualised of America entering the Indian Ocean as a major naval power.' (Ibid pp. 87)

There was also the possibility of Russian entry into the Indian Ocean through the Persian Gulf. Panikkar said, 'The political, industrial and military organisation of Central Asia under the Soviets gives a new content to the old Russian conception of unrestricted entry into the open sea. . . The lines of traffic developed for the purpose of Lend-Lease aid to Russia in the present war demonstrated the vital importance of the Persian Gulf to the Soviets. . . The possibility of the presence of a naval power of the magnitude, resources and persistence of Russia on the Persian Gulf is in itself to revolutionise the strategy in respect of the Indian Ocean'. (Ibid pp. 88-89)

Panikkar could foresee that for a long time to come free India's navy would not be in a position to police the Indian Ocean by herself. He suggested, 'The control of the Indian Ocean, must, therefore, be a co-operative effort of India and Britain and other Commonwealth units having interest in the Ocean with the primary responsibility lying on the Indian Navy to guard the steel ring created by Singapore, Ceylon, Mauritius and Socotra.' (Ibid pp. 95.)

Considering the land defence of India, Panikkar wrote, in 1943, 'The growth of the military power of

the Soviets on the north-west frontier has raised new problems. With the ever-increasing range of bombers, the cities of North-Western India will be open to effective attack' (This problem arising from the proximity to Soviet power was partially resolved by the creation of Pakistan in the north-west region of the Indian subcontinent in 1947).

Panikkar warned, 'The growth of China as a military power and the recent shifting of the bases of its economic and military organisation to the South-East create equally difficult problems for India'. (*The Future of South-East Asia* pp. 30). He suggested the creation of a Triune Commonwealth of Hindustan, Pakistan and Burma as one major step for the defence of the Indian sub-continent. Referring to the defence of Burma, he stressed the fact, 'it is India's primary concern no less than Burma's to see that its frontiers remain inviolate. In fact no responsibility can be too heavy for India when it comes to the question of defending Burma' (Ibid pp. 41).

The old Indian empire, according to Panikkar, had much in its favour as a common defence area. It included Aden as an outpost, kept the Persian Gulf and the Oman coast within the orbit of Indian policy, neutralised Tibet and held strongly to the eastern frontier of Burma. He lamented the gradual break-up of the defence scheme beginning with the surrender of Aden to the Colonial Office. He wrote in 1943, 'The transfer of the Persian Gulf to the Foreign Office, the separation of Burma and the weakening of the Indian policy towards Tibet and the culmination of British Indian influence in Kashgar were the other steps which have in a period of ten years weakened the defence position of India' (Ibid pp. 45).

In the light of the experience of the Second World War which was still on, he concluded that a Curzonian concept of a greater Moghul Empire in Delhi was no longer a possibility. '... what is possible is that on the basis of equality and freedom of Pakistan, Hindustan and Burma should be united as a single defence area, held together and strengthened by co-operation with Britain to form a great structure for peace and security in Asia' (Ibid pp. 46).

Writing again in 1946 in his book, *The Basis of an Indo-British Treaty*, Panikkar brought in Mackindor's geo-political concepts to confirm his ideas about free India's defence. India geographically occupies the peninsular as well as the continental position. But India has no future as a major Asian land power, for by land she can be no more than an appendage of only minor interest to the Soviet Union which controlled the heartland. India must of necessity align herself with the maritime system.

To quote Panikkar, 'The essential fact is that India is a maritime State with a predominant interest on the sea. She is of the true Rimland, whose continental affiliations are comparatively negligible. From the continental point of view of Eurasia, she is only an abutting corner, walled off by impassable mountains. From the sea and air point of view on the other hand, she is one of the great strategic centres. From the maritime point of view, she dominates the Indian

Ocean. From the air point of view, she is claimed to be an "air island". She is the natural air transit centre of the maritime areas. To the maritime State system, India is invaluable. To the continental system she is unimportant' (pp. 5).

In 1947, Panikkar published two papers in the 'India Quarterly' on *The Himalayas and Indian Defence*. He pointed out therein that in the days of air power, the effectiveness of the Himalayas as a protective barrier to India no longer held good as in the past. He said, 'If the pure geographical definition of the Himalayas as having the width of only 150 miles is taken, that is to say, if it were possible to isolate the range and forget the (Tibetan) plateau to the north, the Himalayas in spite of their immense height should not be an effective barrier.'

But, he added 'the essential point about the Himalayas is not their width of 150 miles, but the plateau behind it, which in itself is an elevation of about 15000 feet and is guarded on all four sides by high mountains. In fact the vast barrier upland behind the Himalayas provides the most magnificent defence in depth imaginable. No centre of dynamic power can be created anywhere near the ranges. The climatic conditions above the plateau are most unsuited and unfavourable for air operations and the distance involved from any reasonable point where enemy can concentrate and deliver a continuous attack on the Himalayan side is so great as to be negligible'.

As regards land defence, he concluded, 'The creation of a broader no-man's land on both flanks of the Himalayas will give to the Indian peninsula sufficient area for the development of her defence potential free from interference.'

He also touched upon the point of naval defence in these papers. He said, 'If the control of the sea is lost, not only could she (India) be blockaded and her economic life subjected to slow strangulation, but the centres of her industry pounded out of existence by carrier-borne aircraft. . . The control of the Indian Ocean alone will save India from disaster from blockade, sea-borne invasion and destruction of economic life from air attack.'

The partition of India in August 1947 with two flanks of Pakistan forming a new type of *cordon sanitaire*, weakened the defence potential of India to a large extent. The communist revolution in China in 1949 which almost coincided with the first atomic explosion in Russia, together with the Sino-Soviet treaty in February 1950 brought about a geo-political shift in the world balance of power. As a result, many of the presumptions on which Panikkar had built up his theory of Indian defence and foreign policy were outdated very soon after the transfer of power in India. Even then we find an impress of his ideas on Indian foreign policy, especially in its formative stage.

One of the first steps taken by free India to ensure the security of the Indian Ocean was to recall the Indian armed forces from South-East Asian countries

where they had been despatched by the British authorities in the interests of the European colonial powers to suppress national liberation movements. Also, Jawaharlal Nehru took the lead in organising the first Asian Relations Conference in New Delhi in March-April 1947, the object of which was to rouse a collective voice of protest against the recrudescence of western imperialism in Asia, particularly in the countries of the region of the Indian Ocean.

On the other hand, when communism appeared to be an ascendant force in Malaya, Burma and Indo-China in 1948, the Government of India refused to be enamoured by the anti-colonial nature of these communist movements. The strategic position of Malaya in the defence of the Indian Ocean as elaborated by Panikkar, might have been taken into consideration when the Indian Government soft-pedalled British imperialism in Malaya, nay, more than that, provided transit facilities to Gurkha soldiers for the suppression of the communist (Chinese) dominated rebellion there.

The Government of India rushed to the aid of Burma in 1949, when as a result of the Communist-Karen revolt, the government under U. Nu lost control over the major portion of its territory, and its authority remained limited to a few major towns alone. India called a Commonwealth Conference in Delhi to arrange for financial aid to the Burmese Government in distress and sent supplies of small arms.

The Indian Government did not extend recognition to the communist-oriented government of Indo-China under Ho Chi-minh although it recognised him as the head of the anti-colonial struggle against French imperialism in Indo-China and regarded the Bao Dai Government as a French protegee.

On the other hand, in the case of Dutch aggression on Indonesia (1947-49), India took various positive steps, including the calling of the Asian Conference on Indonesia in January 1949, with which two Commonwealth powers, Australia and New Zealand, were associated. The emergence of a friendly non-communist Indonesia was most important in India's defence strategy in the Indian Ocean.

On the sea-board of the Indian Ocean in West Asia, as well as East Africa, the Government of India took a rather lenient view of British presence in Iran, Iraq, Oman, Aden, Suez, Kenya, and also in Cyprus. Even after the Suez invasion in the fall of 1956, it tried its best (after the collapse of the Franco-British misadventure), to heal the breach between Egypt and Britain so as to restore normal relations. The Government of India has been generally more critical about French and Portuguese imperialism in East and North Africa. Also, it was strongly opposed to American entry in West Asia through the proposed MEDO, the Eisenhower Doctrine, the Baghdad Pact or the CENTO, (as also entry into S.E. Asia through the SEATO).

In 1946, the Congress Party expressed its disapproval of Russian presence in North Iran, although in

garbed language. Prime Minister Nehru did not approve of U.S. intervention in Indo-China in June 1950 in the wake of the Korean war and strongly opposed the proposed U.S. military intervention in the critical phase of the war in Indo-China in 1954.

One of the most important foreign policy decisions about the continuance of the Commonwealth membership was taken by the Government of India in April 1949. Considering the strength of the anti-Commonwealth sentiment prevalent, forcefully subscribed to by Nehru himself in the recent past (Cf. *The Discovery of India*, 1945), this decision to maintain close ties with Britain through the Commonwealth was at least partially influenced by the ideas of defence strategy propagated by Panikkar during 1943-47. According to Professor Gurumukh Nihal Singh, speaking at the Indian Council of World Affairs on May 3, 1949, 'the problem of defence and the onrush of communism in Asia must have been among the reasons that influenced the Government of India to remain in the Commonwealth'.

It would be, however, wrong to overstress the influence of any particular publicist in the formulation of free India's foreign policy, which was so largely Prime Minister Nehru's own making. But it is interesting to study the ideas of Panikkar in the formative phase. These help us to find some clues to certain anomalies and apparent contradictions in the working of Indian foreign policy which was officially declared to be based on certain abstract principles such as: (1) non-alignment with power blocs, (2) support to the principle of freedom for colonial peoples and (3) opposition to racial discrimination.

As a diplomat representing India in two Chinas, Panikkar attained both celebrity as well as notoriety. A proper assessment of his contribution to Indian diplomacy can be made only when the Government of India opens the secret files of the External Affairs Ministry relating to his period of ambassadorship in China during 1948-52, the momentous period of the Korean War which tended to escalate into a world war on several occasions. This was also the period of establishment of Chinese sovereignty over Tibet after forty years of sterilisation which posed before free India the tremendous problem of a live border of about 2000 miles along the Himalayas. It is time that the career of such a colourful but controversial personality as Panikkar's be studied at a scholarly level particularly as rethinking about the basic premises of our foreign policy has begun. The Government of India can help by making the files relating to our China policy during the period of Panikkar's ambassadorship, open for study.

Karunakar Gupta

INDIA'S INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES By J. S. Bains.

Asia Publishing House.

While much has been written and a great deal of effort expended on explaining the principles which underlie India's foreign policy, there is hardly any

work which has attempted to study the main international issues in which India is involved from the standpoint of international law. Bains sets out to fulfil this task. Although his book is entitled *India's International Disputes*, not all issues discussed in it strictly fall into the category of disputes. He has however thought it necessary to deal with them because they have a direct bearing on other disputes and have brought India's name into international view.

He has selected eight issues for study. These relate to the treatment of people of Indian origin in the Union of South Africa, the Indo-Pakistan water dispute, the Jammu and Kashmir question, the problem of persons of Indian origin in Ceylon, the Tibetan question, the case concerning the right of passage over Indian territory in respect of Dadra and Nagar Haveli, the Sino-Indian border dispute and Goa.

In each case there is a brief historical background and an attempt to examine India's case from the standpoint of international law. Bains comes to the conclusion that in respect of all these 'disputes' India's position can be successfully vindicated on the basis of the prevalent rules of international law.

Dealing with the question of the treatment of Indians in South Africa, he discusses the arguments of the Union of South Africa in favour of her stand that this constitutes an internal affair and is outside the scope of the United Nations and shows, on the basis of an examination of the charter of the United Nations and on the basis of precedents in traditional international law, that the discriminatory policies of the South African Government is an item which may legitimately be dealt with by the United Nations.

The Indo-Pakistan Water Dispute has now been settled as a result of the Indus Waters Treaty concluded in April, 1960. Bains, however, after examining the legal aspects of the case comes to the conclusion that 'it is India rather than Pakistan which in the interest of good neighbourliness and peace has climbed down from a position legally unassailable'. He considers that India has made a substantial concession by agreeing to let Pakistan use virtually the whole of the water of the western rivers and also a substantial flow from the eastern rivers for the duration of the transition period.

The use of this water would have helped India to meet the problem of wheat shortage and fulfilled the needs of her own desert areas and parched lands in Punjab and Rajasthan. Over and above this, India has agreed to pay a large sum of money for the Indus Basin Development Fund in order to help Pakistan build the replacement works. These concessions, in his opinion, make this bargain overwhelmingly favourable to Pakistan. He therefore wonders 'how far the conclusion of this treaty on the part of India may be considered an act of statesmanship'.

On the Jammu and Kashmir question he proves by a reference to the relevant constitutional enactments that the accession of Jammu and Kashmir to the Indian Union was perfectly valid. India therefore

has every right to demand that her legal claims be respected and Pakistan withdraw aggression. He feels moreover that India would have been within her rights not to accept the proposals of plebiscite made in the two U.N. resolutions of 1948 and 1949. Having done so however she must conform to the obligations arising out of them.

He goes on to show that these obligations are dependent on Pakistan fulfilling certain conditions. 'The failure of Pakistan to fulfil her obligations under these resolutions', says the author, 'together with a material change in power relations in South Asia entitles India to view the problem in a new light'. He is critical of the Indian Government's argument which 'simultaneously insists that Pakistan must withdraw aggression and at the same time recognises that she (India) felt bound by the two resolutions'. Baines' comments are naturally based on the position as it stood before the recent Security Council debate. The stand taken by the Indian representative, M. C. Chagla, leaves hardly any room for the kind of criticism made by Bains in his book.

Coming to the subject of Tibet, he is sharply critical of the stand of the Indian Government. While conceding that 'ever since 1951 when the Seventeen Point agreement was signed, in spite of the disturbing developments like the flight of the Dalai Lama, the Sino-Indian border dispute and the discussion of the Tibetan question in the United Nations, no country has even attempted to give a belligerent status to the Dalai Lama's government, much less a recognition of the sovereign character of the hilly kingdom', he feels that India's 'negative attitude' to the question has considerably lowered the Indian Government in the eyes of those who have been her constant admirers. 'If the Indian Government', he says 'had protested against the ruthless activities of the Chinese armed forces, far from being a violation of international law, it would have been the recognition of a healthy practice which in due course may become binding on all the members of the world community'.

On the complex problem of the Sino-Indian border dispute, Baines has rather interesting views to put forward. He says that in the North East the Indian Government's claims have been primarily based on treaties which had been expressly or tacitly accepted by China and Tibet. These treaties have been based on the watershed principle which is the accepted criterion of delimitation of boundaries in such mountainous areas.

He points out later that in those cases where neither the treaty nor the watershed principle provides any clue to the problem, the control of the area would depend on the extent of effective jurisdiction. 'As a matter of law, even if the treaties or international understandings refer to a particular line, unless it is effectively maintained through proper administrative steps, an adverse possession by usage and custom by the other party may divest the former of the claim which otherwise may be valid on account of that treaty. . . In the North East, the area south of the MacMahon Line as shown in the Indian maps pre-

pared at Simla has been under the effective jurisdiction of India. . . But the same is not true in the case of Ladakh region of India where there seems to be a disparity between the border based on treaties, usage and custom and the extent of actual effective jurisdiction.

In the final analysis, international law recognises the validity of those boundaries which whether based on treaties, or usage or watershed principle or some other criterion, are also effectively maintained by the parties concerned. In this case, therefore, while India is rightfully holding its own in the area south of the traditional boundary in the eastern and central sectors, the *status quo* in the western sector is more favourable to China. Whether this is due to negligence or inefficiency of the Indian Government or its blind faith in the peaceful intentions of the People's Government of China, is beside the point.

While it is for legal experts to pronounce on the validity of the principle enunciated by Baines from the standpoint of international law, there does seem to be a flaw in the argument that 'effective control' should be the only and the decisive factor in this matter. In any case, India having offered to refer the whole matter to the Hague Court, if necessary, has nothing to feel guilty about so far as her stand is concerned.

Goa and the question of the Portuguese enclaves are no longer live issues and no useful purpose would be served in going into Baines' views on these questions. The author's concluding evaluation however calls for some comment. He has criticised Indian representatives for having 'emphasised the moral and political aspects of their cases rather than the legal ones' and accused them of having 'at times subordinated a discussion of the rules of international law to moral and human considerations'. While however it is comforting to note the author's verdict that 'India has sufficient legal precedent on her side and is in a favourable position to voice its view on any of these issues in international forums' one can hardly agree with him that India's case should have rested purely on the legal aspects of the case and steered clear of the moral, human and political aspects.

J. M. Kaul

HIMALAYAN BATTLEGROUND: SINO-INDIAN RIVALRY IN LADAKH By Margaret W. Fisher, Leo E. Rose and Robert A. Huttenbeck.

Pall Mall Press, London, 1963.

This is the first scholarly book on some aspects of the border dispute between India and China. The three authors, all research scholars of the California University, U.S.A., have undertaken to place the dispute over Ladakh in its historical setting, to trace the position of Ladakh in its changing relationship with Kashmir, Tibet and China through the centuries, and to take a close look at the evidence presented by the two sides (China and India) in support of their respective claims. The result is an excellent study born of meticulous scholarship and deep understanding of

the issues involved. It deserves to be widely read and equally widely popularized.

According to the authors, national honour and minutia of legal interpretation have their roles in the India-China dispute, but basically the issues hinge on considerations affecting national security and the broad economic and political interests of India and China, and also involving the long term interests of neighbouring States, among them the Soviet Union. With regard to the problem facing the Chinese during 1956-57, it seems clear that the Aksai Chin route was essential to Chinese plans for the exploitation of a sullen Tibet. Indeed, in the event of any serious weakening of the Peking government, this area might well prove to be the key to the Chinese hold on Tibet.

It was not that the unexpectedly comprehensive character of the Chinese occupation of Tibet had failed to arouse Indian apprehensions. Prudence had dictated reticence. The decision was to place major emphasis on economic development, to cultivate amicable relations with Peking and to move quietly to strengthen the more strategic areas of the border. But it was here that a major miscalculation took place. Indian effort was focussed on the better understood problem of the north-eastern frontier area, the strategic importance of which had been highlighted during the second world war.

The authors have tried, by tracing the history of Tibet, Ladakh and Kashmir and Sinkiang, to show that West Tibet and Ladakh together form a natural geographic unit, having close economic, trade and political interests while submitting to the cultural and religious superiority of Lhasa. The real contribution of the book lies in analysing the role Ladakh has played in Central Asian, Indian and Chinese affairs throughout history.

A unified and dynamic China controlling Sinkiang and Tibet and possessing modern technology would definitely want to have a foothold south of the Himalayas in order to enable her to possess the key to Central Asia and its affairs.

But as this book shows, as late as 1842, West Tibet was a part of Ladakh and it was only by the 1842 Treaty that the Dogras relinquished the ancient Ladakhi claim to it. By the middle of the 19th century, the British hold over North Western India was completed and it was now that the real possibility of a clash of interest between British India and Imperial Russia enabled the Chinese to assert their sovereignty over Sinkiang. Imperial China eroded by foreign powers and internal rebellions was too weak to arouse the jealousy of the two big powers. As the authors put it, 'China's very weakness redounded to its advantage, as the British preferred to shore up Chinese rule against Russian encroachment. . . The Russians were for many years content with this situation, since it allowed reasonably full exploitation of Russian economic advantage'.

Generally speaking, after 1890, the northern frontier of Kashmir did not give much trouble to the Britishers. The British were satisfied with the Karakoram

frontier. In 1858, the British interest in Aksai Chin was outweighed by concern over the Raskam valley and the Taghdumbash Pamir, where the claims of Hunza and China clashed and the threat of Russian intervention at the doorway of India seemed imminent. In March 1899, the British Government made an offer to Peking to demarcate the boundary suggesting that Aksai Chin and the Qara Qash basin be conceded in exchange for Chinese recognition of Hunza's claims to the western end of the Taghdumbash. But the Ch'ing court made no reply, thus rejecting it by default.

In 1895, when the 13th Dalai Lama came to power, he showed considerable strength and diplomatic imagination. He started asserting his independence by establishing friendly relations with the Russians. Various ties between Russia and Tibet gave rise to rumours of a possible threat to the security of India. So the British moved to act and the result was the Lhasa convention.

In the Lhasa Convention of 1906 the British refused to stipulate that Tibet would be treated as a province of China and also rejected Peking's demand that China's sovereignty over Tibet be recognized. The treaty placed restrictions on both British and Russian freedom of action in Tibet. The Russian spectre was thereby laid to rest, although at some cost to the British position in Central Asia, but in favour of China.

In the beginning of the 20th century, both the Chinese and British were conscious of each other's presence and were busy strengthening their frontiers. The British treaty with Bhutan in 1910 is an evidence of this fact. When in 1910 the Chinese troops moved to Lhasa and consequently the Dalai Lama fled to Sikkim, the Chinese laid claim to Nepal, Sikkim and Bhutan, but these were firmly rejected by the British Indian authorities. It is interesting to note that at that time the Chinese made no claim to sovereignty over Ladakh, nor was any disagreement stated concerning the border between Ladakh and Tibet as depicted on British Indian maps.

Another significant point is the exposure of the hollowness of the Chinese approach to the political significance of the Dalai Lama's religious authority in certain border districts. On June 13, 1914, Sun Pao-chi, China's Foreign Minister, informed the British Minister in Peking that 'the Tibetans affected to think that they had rights over all places inhabited by Lamaists, but this was not so'. But it is ironical that the Chinese communists adopted that very viewpoint concerning areas inhabited by Lamaists in the sub-Himalayan regions of India.

The authors have taken considerable care in analysing the conflicting border claims of the two countries and their scholarly research of the report by the officials of the two countries has been highly complimentary to the Indian side. They arrive at the conclusion that 'once documents were assembled, however, it was clear that the Indian case was not only far stronger than the Chinese, but also possessed a

solid basis quite apart from any questions of "British Imperialism" and any tendency to be apologetic about the Indian position has completely disappeared'.

The writers have painstakingly checked all the available materials and sources cited by the officials of the two sides and they have come to the conclusion that the Indian Government was both thorough and careful in presenting its case. On the other hand, the Chinese Government showed no interest in the substance of the talks, as their astonishingly careless presentation makes so obvious. The maze of internal inconsistencies, quotations out of context, and even blatant and easily discernible falsehoods clearly show that China had paid no attention to the preparation of its case.

Possibly, the only purpose for such a presentation would be to sow confusion and doubt among those who had no opportunity to check the sources cited and those who could not believe that a government would sponsor demonstrably false assertions. The map presented by the Chinese on the scale 1: 200,000 regarding Sinkiang's border with Ladakh prepared on the basis of the 1941 survey whose authenticity was questioned by the Indian officials as it was only a photostat of a map, is an example of such mendacity. As the talks were at that time being held in Peking, the authors naturally wonder why the Chinese decided to present the photostat and not the original?

Most interesting of all, the fact which emerges from the analysis of the official report is that the Chinese often resorted to the tactics of arguing opposite conclusions from the same evidence and source. The authors have with the help of the documents concerned shown that what the Chinese presented was 'a shoddy piece of work betraying a fundamental contempt for evidence'.

Gargi Dut

FOREIGN POLICIES IN A WORLD OF CHANGE

Edited by Joseph E. Black and Kenneth W. Thompson.

Harper & Row, New York, 1963.

This is a massive book of more than seven hundred and fifty pages consisting of twenty-four chapters, dealing with as many countries. To mention them as they appear: Britain, France, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Switzerland, Italy, Spain, the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, Turkey, Egypt, Tunisia, Nigeria, East African countries, South Africa, Pakistan, India, Japan, the People's Republic of China, Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Canada, and the United States. Thus all the nations which would qualify as major powers have been included. At the same time adequate representation has been given to the 'new' nations as well as those with long experience in the world community. Some States like Switzerland have been included because they have played a special role in world affairs. With the exception of those on Communist China and Nigeria, each chapter has been written by a leading scholar of the nation concerned. *Foreign Policies in a World of Change* can safely be described as a standard work

and will be found very useful by students and experts as well as by the general reader.

The study is based on analytical and comparative methods. It seeks to draw attention to the fact that while the foreign policy of each nation has certain unique characteristics, there is also a high degree of inter-relatedness of policies and objectives. The countries covered here will provide a good basis for making comparisons. A more noteworthy feature of this study is that it is centred around the concept of 'a world of change'. The editors and authors are fully conscious of the fact that the world situation is in a state of flux and the assumptions which were valid in the fifties are no longer valid today.

A certain lack of uniformity was to be expected and all the chapters here are not cut to the same pattern. However, most of the authors have given attention to the process of policy formulation as well as the process of policy execution. The major current foreign policy problems of each nation have also been discussed. Dyura Nincic in his chapter on the foreign policy of Yugoslavia very ably sums up the assumptions behind most of the chapters of this book.

'The elements that shape a country's policy', he says, 'are many and varied, and they are subject to change. While the conduct of a country's foreign affairs naturally reflects its internal political and social structure, and its historical background and geographical environment, foreign affairs are also fashioned by the broader international setting within which the country has to operate. In the final analysis, foreign policy is a result of the complex interplay between the goals a nation seeks to achieve in the international sphere and the general context within which these goals are to be attained'.

The editors have added a valuable introduction in which they discuss the various methods of studying foreign policies and emphasise the merits of the analytical method which has been generally followed in this book. They have also discussed the relative importance of the various factors which have to be kept in view while studying a nation's foreign policy: the history, geography, natural resources, industrial development, military capacity, population factors, government, leadership and diplomacy.

Their observations on the last point deserve special mention, as they will help us in our search for the causes and remedies of some of our failures in the field of foreign affairs. 'History', they say, 'abounds with incidents when nations have achieved particular objectives through wise diplomacy, even when some of the more obvious elements of power were lacking. Likewise, there are many cases when otherwise powerful nations have failed to play the role expected of them because of weakness in the diplomatic field'.

The chapter on India's foreign policy has been written by A. Appadorai and should be read with great care by those who want to understand the main problems facing us in this field. While admitting that in some respects India's vital interests have not been adequately advanced by our foreign policy

and its implementation, he has reminded us that this is also true of many nations who have been following a different policy, a conclusion which is substantiated by several chapters in this book. Besides, he rightly asserts that it is 'too one-sided and pessimistic a conclusion that India's foreign policy has no achievements to its credit'.

At the same time, he makes it clear that some serious thinking in the field of foreign policy is called for. While there is no need to be pessimistic or panicky, complacency has equally to be avoided. 'It appears to me', says Dr. Appadorai, 'that India's foreign policy is on the cross-roads, not in the sense in which some members of the Indian Parliament viewed it—substitution of alignment for non-alignment—but in the more fundamental sense of finding adequate sanctions for a policy based on Pancha Shila'.

Bimla Prasad

COEXISTENCE: ECONOMIC CHALLENGE AND RESPONSE By Henry G. Aubrey.

National Planning Association, Washington, D.C.

The Stalinist era in the Soviet Union was marked by national autarchy and a sublime isolation from the main currents of world economy. Ever since the Soviets, discarding their previous inhibitions, emerged in the underdeveloped world with striking offers of trade and aid under the slogan of 'competitive co-existence', the West has been confronted not only with an alternative to her *modus vivendi* but also a formidable challenge in a field which had hitherto been her exclusive preserve.

Western statesmen and economists as such have been racking their brains as to 'what use is being made of the economic instruments in Soviet and western policy,' 'what is the impact in the less developed areas economically, psychologically and politically,' and 'what are the tasks and alternatives for the western policy in the face of the competitive challenge.'

To investigate these questions and a string of others related to them objectively and scientifically, the National Planning Association set up in 1956 a project entitled 'The Economics of Coexistence'. The volume under review is the final one in a series of eight studies made by the Project Committee and was the fruit of patient—at times agonising—research by some of the top brains of America for years on end.

The study laments that although the magnitude of the trade as well as aid of the Soviet bloc is much smaller than that of the West *vis-a-vis* developing countries, yet it has been the painful experience of the West that dollar for dollar, the western effort in trade and aid has been much less appreciated than the Soviet one by the beneficiaries. The West's image among the developing two-thirds of humanity is thus a receding, shrinking one as compared to the Soviet image which bids fair to be a colossus with every bout of Soviet trade/aid. Since the final outcome of struggle between western democracy and communism rests on the capacity of each to capture the minds of

men in the uncommitted world, the battle of images is the most crucial one for the West and that is the essence of competition in coexistence.

The Soviet bloc in this battle initially won impressive victories. Having thrown the gauntlet, it had in its favour the momentum of the calculated and well thought out moves of a challenger, while the West was at best reactive, not initiating.

The bloc was buttressed by many more advantageous factors. Being a new-comer in trade and aid, it enjoyed to some extent the welcome accorded to an unexpected bearer of goodwill and largesse. Its foreign trade having been a trickle in the past, it could multiply its volume of trade in spectacular percentages. Its growth being self-centred, its capacity to trade has increased sizably. Free from multilateral commitments, it can concentrate on selected regions and selected commodities and ensure amazing results. The institution of state trading endows it with a singular power to make trade look like aid.

Purchases from developing countries at a time when they are groaning under the weight of their surpluses refused by the West, offers of long-term trade pacts symbolising security, and self-liquidating barter deals i.e. the bloc's purchases from developing countries of goods which the latter fail to sell to the West, and its supplies of capital goods which the latter need most for rapid industrialization, project an image of it that is far more flattering than the one which the atomised western markets, plagued by business and price recessions with countless private traders seemingly on the prowl to maximize their profits, present.

Historic distrust of the West to which it is an heir because of its colonial past, the West's reliance on the profit motive and its emphasis on aid as a weapon to combat communism are additional handicaps in its way. Technical safeguards and rigid, cumbersome procedures in American programmes and the control of counterpart funds or local currency deposits combined with high interest rates chargeable on foreign loans give to developing countries the impression of a vexatious money-lender. The protective quotas and tariff walls in the West, which deny to developing countries the blessings of the rationale of comparative costs, and the agricultural support prices of the U.S.A., which pile surplus on surplus, making her compete with primary producers in the sales of cotton, cereals, fats and oils, distort a picture of affinity between the West and the developing countries.

The Soviet bloc, on the other hand, has forged an intimate bond of mutuality by supporting in brave words as well as positive trade-and-aid practises all their aspirations and ambitions for self-assertion, national power and rapid industrialization. Its assistance to basic industries in the public sector stands out as a monument to its sincerity in assisting them industrialize rapidly as opposed to the U.S.A.'s leaving this to the vagaries of her private enterprise. The bloc's assistance strengthens and sustains its image

of close affinity with the developing countries also because of its emanating from the countries which, like the developing ones, were on the ladder of development just the other day.

The West by virtue of its vastly superior resources can take up with confidence the challenge of 'competitive coexistence' thrown by the Soviet élan of trade-and-aid moves, but Henry G. Aubrey, the author of *Coexistence: Economic Challenge and Response*, suggests that instead of being a mere reactive, *the West must develop an autonomous foundation on which its policy could rest in non-competitive as well as competitive situations.* (Italics added). For this, he urges the West to be one with the developing countries in their pursuit of development; allow them evolve their own pattern of economic, social and political development; accept their neutralism as genuine; and welcome social and economic changes in their traditional order.

Long-term planning in foreign aid programmes, healthy functioning of international markets, close collaboration and cooperation among the western partners, an adequate rate of growth and a national fervour inspired by idealism behind aid programmes are some of the cornerstones of his mosaic of the western image in developing countries which, he believes, would provide a positive answer to the challenge of competitive coexistence and also arm the West with an autonomous policy of forging an enduring bond with them that goes beyond, and is independent of, this challenge.

Aubrey's study reveals that despite their loud professions and protestations of solicitude for the underdeveloped part of the world, the Soviet bloc and the West have not yet exerted their full capacities and potentialities of aid. Secondly, the need for a political settlement between the two is a prerequisite for 'cooperative coexistence', which would be infinitely superior to 'competitive coexistence', and hence acquires an added significance in the bid for growth of developing countries. Thirdly, the West is painfully aware of the gaps and cracks in its trade and aid relationships, but seems to be suffering from a paralysis of will rather than match action with an imaginative policy.

Fourthly, the West being a forerunner in programmes of global aid and international trade should have been more experienced and skilled in projecting and promoting the image of its system abroad, but surprisingly enough, it left the initiative to the Soviet bloc to perfect the techniques of this. Fifthly, the peaceful battle of competitive images is going to be decisive. So the West must awaken some time. And lastly, trade and aid policies of the Soviet bloc are not likely to influence the political decisions of the recipients, if the West is vigilant enough to provide the latter with alternative openings to fall back upon.

Coexistence: Economic Challenge and Response is a rewarding study for economists, statesmen and sociologists. Every word of it being based on research, it is a mine of useful information and objective

analysis. Whatever one's personal predilections and sensibilities, one cannot but admire the profundity of its treatment of the economic challenge of competitive co-existence.

H. S.

ON THE PREVENTION OF WAR By John Strachey.

Macmillan & Co., Ltd. 1962.

With the enormous advance in science and technology, the fear of a nuclear holocaust has been posing a grave threat to the very existence of humanity. History is replete with examples of man's infinite capacity for self-annihilation and self-regeneration. The new-found weapons of mass destruction have unequivocally proclaimed that war as an instrument of settling disputes between nation-States has become outdated and the 'balance of terror' has to be transformed into the 'balance of hope.' But the extreme mutual dread which the fatal consequences of nuclear war arouses does not in any way lessen the possibilities of a full-scale nuclear war.

John Strachey in this provocative and brilliant study believes that, for the preservation and maintenance of peace, the complexities of war in its varied aspects have to be grasped and understood. That explains why the author has devoted the first part to the current military doctrines as viewed both in the East and the West. The author had the advantage of exhaustively studying the manifest problems of defence both as minister in-charge as well as the spokesman of his party on this subject in Parliament for over a decade. As such he maintains, first, that stability in the balance of power is the *sine qua non* for averting the 'bizarre type of "war-without-fighting."'

Secondly, he emphasizes the importance of maintaining adequate conventional forces, beside the nuclear striking force. Thirdly, he deplores that the NATO governments do not appreciate that the era of nuclear parity has come to replace the era of western nuclear predominance. Fourthly, he holds the opinion that both Russia and America are acquiring more and more sophisticated means of delivery rather than building up of stocks of weapons. Fifthly, he deprecates the diffusion of nuclear weapons—which a New York correspondent has termed the 'proliferation of the flowers of evil'—among other nations of the world.

In Part Two, Strachey discusses the prospects and possibilities of disarmament which is a 'prerequisite' to preventing a world conflagration. He adopts the pragmatic approach—typical of the British—of having stability of balance at a lower level of armaments because general and complete disarmament remains a pious hope. Moreover, the big powers have taken full advantage of the universal desire for peace in conducting their policies. The protracted disarmament negotiations are an eloquent testimony to the fact that what these two sides are interested in is 'political warfare, or the putting of the other man in the wrong, not the conclusion of a disarmament

agreement.' Both sides have put forward proposals which they themselves did not intend to implement!

Given mutual confidence and understanding, a seemingly unbreakable impasse can be got over. We find its best example in the recently concluded Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty which explicitly forbids nuclear tests in the air, the atmosphere and under water. Although the treaty does not by itself remove the mutual antagonism of the two rival camps; although China and France, two powerful nations, are not signatories to it; although innumerable political issues have to be solved; yet it is a significant step in the process of unfreezing the cold war and saving us from the frightening prospect of a multinuclear world. And it is here that the interest of the super powers and the human race coincides in its essentials.

In Part Three, Strachey examines the national intentions of various categories of nation-States in the contemporary world. He considers Soviet Russia neither an angel of peace nor the devil incarnate. She has ceased to be a 'nation-State-with-a-mission' partly because of the course of her social development and partly because of her dread of nuclear war. He sees Chinese bellicosity and dogmatism as a disturbing factor in the present world situation.

The West generally feels that in leading a *crusade* against communist regimes, it is also fighting at the same time for what it calls *liberty*. Its declared mission is to 'preserve the right, the freedom, of the two-third of the human race to develop empirically and experimentally'. What these ambiguous words imply, we are not competent enough to know. The newly-independent countries are extremely nationalistic and they want help from other developed countries without any interference whatsoever.

In Part Four, the author makes a passionate plea for some degree of world unification in the nuclear age under a single authority. With all its failings, the United Nations is a standing monument to man's will to unity and peace. The development of the UN as a single 'power-of-last-resort' would be a major step in the prevention of war. For that, it is imperative that the two super powers, America and Russia, come to an agreement to prevent other States from acquiring nuclear arms and to renounce their use in the settlement of problems affecting them. However, there are three hopeful forces working in that direction: 'First there is a tendency for the economic and social systems of the advanced, industrialized nation-States to approximate to each other, whether they are organized in the Communist or the capitalist way. Secondly, there is the sheer dread of nuclear war. And thirdly... a new attitude of mind is emerging, an attitude transcending both national and ideological loyalties...' (p. 303).

Disarmament by itself is not an Alladin's lamp. By and large, the arms race is a mere symptom of a deep-afflicted malady accentuated by the yawning gap between the 'haves' and 'have-nots.' With as broad a prospective as that of Strachey's it is surprising that he concentrated his attention only on the military implications of the problem, con-

Communications

I WAS much interested in your 55th issue wherein the discussion is how to deal with the 'irrational beliefs of our people'. I was curious to know how the matter was dealt with by the eminent men who had gathered in Bangalore to discuss. The discussion appears to have focussed on organization. I fear truth cannot be dug out organizationally or untruth demolished that way. The organization may likely soon become a new variety of irrationality.

We can divide all opinions into three compartments: Truth, that is what we have through the senses and through reason found to be true, untruth, that is, what we have in the same manner found to be untrue; (the certainty in both cases being tentative and open to revision on further evidence); and a third compartment which is definitely required, wherein to place matters which men of science must conclude as unreachable and incapable of investigation through our senses and our reason, and on which we must permit people to hold views based on faith.

Some may treat this third division of things as unnecessary for life, but they must allow others to hold it to be necessary and to have faith-supported views on matters falling within that division. The true scientific attitude cannot permit classification of this last set of views as irrational. We may pluck the little flower from the crannied wall and hold it in our hand, root and all, but there is a point beyond which our desire for total knowledge fails. Admission of this region of unknowability must expand into respect for Faith to function in that region. May I end up saying that Faith in this third field is non-rational, not irrational.

Madras, March 6, 1964- C. RAJAGOPALACHARI

I READ the SEMINAR issue on 'Scientific Attitude' rather carefully. Frankly speaking I was disappointed. I think the organisers and the participants lost track of the main theme of the meeting. I was under the impression that the meeting was called to discuss the impact of science on society in India — past, present and future. Kosambi's contribution and Rehman's appear to be the best of the lot.

I thought we were going to start with the promise that the participants had a fairly well developed scientific attitude and they had

gathered together to exchange views and arrive at agreed steps to help hasten the impact of science on our society, which even now in the twentieth century is more than 75 per cent feudal.

I am wondering if right at the start it is necessary to attack religion. After all, if one thinks of Hinduism as a religion (and it is the majority religion) it is nothing but a series of rituals. Many of these rituals are connected with agricultural practices and the dependence of our rural folk on the vagaries of nature. Thus if science could help alter the balance of forces and our dependence on nature, the rituals and the underlying superstitions are bound to change radically.

One of the contributors talks about the publication of popular scientific books as in the U.S.A. I think one must bear in mind that publication of books will not serve the purpose unless scientists and others interested in popularising science resort to audio-visual methods. Life in rural India is difficult and different to what we urban people are used to! But if we really desire that science and scientific thinking should have sufficient impact on our society we will have to devise special methods and approaches for rural people. It is there that you will be able to strike at the root of our deep-seated prejudices and superstitions.

In this regard I think the policy of establishing 'Vigyan Mandirs' in villages started by the C.S.I.R. some years ago was a step in the right direction. I do not know if this has been abandoned officially, but that is what has happened in reality.

There are also economic factors involved in the propagation and continuance of certain beliefs and superstitions. The faith in astrology and the fatalistic attitude is a reflection of deep-seated frustration. This has been so in every country and society. Growth of confidence in one's own ability depends on the limited or unlimited opportunities available to an individual and once this self-confidence is developed, reliance on one's destiny and fate wears thin.


It is ironic that a meeting convened to discuss the impact of science on society should have decided to form an organisation to inculcate and develop the scientific attitude amongst the scientists. Aren't we a long long way from having an impact on society in this country?

Lucknow, March 15, 1964

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veniently ignoring the economic compulsions behind it. 'Twenty-five years ago the decisive issues were economic,' says the author. He thus seems to imply that the economic motivations have *now* ceased to be of primary importance. This is a far-fetched conclusion subjectively arrived at after viewing the phenomenal rate of growth achieved by western countries. But here live only the chosen few (comparatively speaking) of the gods; the outcasts (who are many) live in abject and degrading poverty in the vast continents of Asia and Africa—or maybe they live because they cannot die.

Sensitive as he was to mankind's suffering, Strachey's spirit revolted at the very idea of a nuclear confrontation between the two super powers because of its fatal consequences. In the process, the author just forgets man's appalling proclivity to exploit ruthlessly his fellow beings. He could have said with John F. Kennedy that the crucial issue facing mankind is the attainment of 'freedom and equality' and an end to 'injustice, tyranny and exploitation.' It is the creation of such a congenial atmosphere which will be a 'major breakthrough to peace.'

Narendra Kumar

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS. By Charles P. Schleicher.

Prentice-Hall, Inc., New Jersey, U.S.A., 1962.

This book presents an incisive view of the nature of relations in contemporary society. Dr. Charles P. Schleicher who is a professor of political science and Associate Director, Institute of International Studies & Overseas Administration, University of Oregon, demonstrates that the study of international relations is beyond the current events stage, and is concerned with the complex factors significant in today's life: power, ideology, geography, geopolitics, sociology, economics and psychology. With a vivid comprehension of the roots and growth of the tensions and disturbances behind the headlines, he gives exhaustive data by which the enduring aspects of international affairs can be recognised. Beginning with 'the frame of reference', Schleicher includes in his study an orbit which encompasses the dynamic forces and objectives; forms and procedures; resources and international policies; limiting and controlling factors and, finally, with a series of articles written by distinguished experts, discusses in detail 'the United States and its world relationship'.

By an article contributed by Richard L. Park and Russell H. Fifield, the author maintains that India is not only the pivotal country in South Asia but also the leader, and that all of South Asia and much of South East Asia are influenced by her policies. The principles which have guided India's foreign policy since 1947 were developed by Nehru from 1926 onwards. The authors note that India has chosen to ride the middle path between the two super-powers and that it wishes to influence both, thus assisting in resolving differences, reducing tensions, and making it easier for the peaceful

pursuit of change in the social and economic development of its people.

The writers point out that India has not wavered from its position of non-alignment since 1947 and that the United States and the Soviet Union have not changed their 'fundamental strategies'. Keeping aloof from military and political pacts abroad, India believes that its advice (when sought) may be taken with seriousness by parties in dispute. India's world policies centre around its wish to form a neutral base of diplomacy thus enabling to help create conditions favouring world peace. It is the neutralist attitude which has given India a number of occasions to 'decide international issues on their merits' and, also, successfully attract a UN following among the Afro-Asian States.

It is argued that the more the cold war can be confined, and the larger the group of 'neutralists', the less likely is it for a third world war to begin! However, both the United States and the Soviet Union have found it advantageous to gain the support of India by allowing her vastly increased economic aid. Other aspects of India's foreign policy include support for nationalist movements throughout the Afro-Asian world; opposition to discrimination based on race, colour, or creed; support to disarmament; opposition to nuclear testing; and the encouragement given to bridge the economic gap between the so-called developed and underdeveloped worlds. India and the United States are generally in agreement on these policies but they differ on the question of military policy.

Schleicher is of the opinion that an individual may profess and embrace several ideologies such as nationalism, liberalism, Christianity, socialism or capitalism, neutralism and Gandhism. He says that he has known individuals (not Americans, of course) who professed to be Christians, communists and nationalists! He goes on to say that many Indians hold that both Soviet and American society represent western materialism, and that 'the conflict is between shades of gray rather than between black and white, bad and good.'

Schleicher is right when he says that domestic and international politics are similar in many respects. They both involve the use of power, frequently for similar ends; they employ the same forms of power and many of the same techniques. One, which is perhaps the principal reason for the international struggle for power, is that power is essential to security in an anarchist world—a world without world government. He expresses the doubt whether in the modern age, free States are compatible with free men and it is the essence of the democratic faith that 'the State exists for man rather than man for the State'. Including a scientific note in his study, he says that 'it is an anomaly of the second half of the twentieth century that the population explosion carries the threat of producing too many people while the atomic explosion threatens to destroy them all'.

S. M.

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
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


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


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
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
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57

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SOME REGIONAL CONTRASTS

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FURTHER READING

A select and relevant bibliography prepared by **Dinesh Chandra Sharma**

COVER

Designed by **Ronjon Roodro**

The problem

OUR economic performance in the period of planning has been depressing. So depressing that some are advocating giving up planning altogether, forgetting that in the pre-plan period our performance was even worse. The government inherited from the British an almost stagnant economy, and judged in that context the slow but definite progress should not be lightly dismissed. But while the critics of planning as such are wide off the mark, those who doubt whether we are having the right kind of planning are not obviously so. Even if we leave out the sad performance of

the last two years, which may well be atypical, the long run average of 3.5 per cent growth of income per year is hardly something to be smug about. With population growth of well over 2 per cent, this leaves very little margin for any improvement in the standard of living.

A view which is widely held, with a certain amount of justification, is that there is nothing much we can do to improve the situation by better planning, because what goes wrong is not planning but implementation. Our administrators are corrupt, our managers too slow, our bureaucratic hierarchy keeps efficiency out with remarkable agility. There is so much truth in all this, that we might almost think that this is the right explanation. But hardly any underdeveloped country has an efficient machinery for implementation, and still they seem to get along. Compared with the communist countries our implementation machinery is weak, so that we need not expect to emulate the Soviet Union's 11 per cent growth rate or Poland's 8 per cent, but there is no reason why we should be prevented by the machinery of implementation from achieving what Brazil or Turkey does (6 per cent).

The whole question of our bad implementation is a curious one. On the one hand, we find Shonfield suggesting in his somewhat immoral book, *The Attack on World Poverty*, that most of western aid should be concentrated on India, Mexico and Brazil, because these countries have the ability to make effective use of it; on the other hand, we go on exchanging these hair-raising tales of bad implementation of Indian plans. I suspect our implementation is bad, but not much worse than that of most non-communist under-developed countries.

Joan Robinson, the Cambridge economist, is the author of an aphorism about India: 'Whatever you say about India, the converse is also true.' (The statement is not meant to apply, I suppose, to the aphorism itself). A most striking aspect of the last decade of planning is the sharp contrast which can be seen between the performances of different parts of the Indian economy. To quote one such contrast, if India's agriculture were growing at the rate Indian industry is, we would have been competing for the top marks in the field of economic growth. To quote another case, if agriculture in the rest of India were growing at the rate at which agriculture in Punjab is growing, India's overall rate of growth of national income would be something of a miracle. India's economic performance in the last decade has been markedly uneven, and until we track down the causes of these sharp regional and sectoral contrasts, the question of reformulation of our economic planning cannot be fully discussed.

In Bengali moral stories, which used to be compulsory reading for school children, there

is a character called Gopal who appears at regular intervals and does all the right things for others to emulate. In the mythology of economic development, Japan occupies the same position as Gopal. Foreign experts are continually telling us to emulate Japan's industrial initiative and its agricultural efficiency, and we have tried, at least on paper, the Japanese method of cultivation and the Japanese style of small scale industries. The results have not been as encouraging as we expected, but that I do not think is a sufficient reason for despairing about learning from Japan. In fact, there is a great deal to be learnt from Japanese experience, particularly about agricultural organisation. There is also quite a lot to be learnt from the experience of the communist countries, including the experience of China, a subject which is increasingly becoming a taboo, and taboos are hardly ever conducive to efficiency. But most of all, I think, we must learn from the experience of India itself. The sharp contrasts in the Indian economy conceal enormous possibilities of toning up our economic performance.

There are four particular contrasts which I would like to emphasise: (i) a sectoral contrast, (ii) a regional contrast, (iii) a contrast between different fields of foreign competition, and (iv) a contrast between the different areas in the relation between the State and the individual. These contrasts should be studied with a view to obtaining specific suggestions for improving our economic planning.

What are the reasons for the sharp difference between our sluggish agriculture and our quite agile industry? Irrigational expansions in India have not been negligible. Fertilizers, long neglected, are coming in at quite a rapid rate. A beginning has been made in pesticides, better seeds, etc. Much more remains to be done, but the bottleneck has turned out to be not so much the lack of the material resources, but an inability to make good use of even the existing resources. What has gone wrong? One answer which is not negligible is that nothing has gone wrong, because nothing ever was right. India's agriculture has a long history of complete stagnation, and only during the fifties it started showing, according to official estimates, some signs of life.

A recent study of Professor M. L. Dantwala¹ casts very serious doubts about the claims of achievement during the fifties, and it seems possible that the increase in agricultural output during the fifties was not anything to wipe off a well-deserved, long reputation of stagnation. In that context the resurgence of stagnation in the last few years does not look anything more than the continuation of a chronic ailment. But

¹ In V. M. Dandekar and N. V. Sovani (ed.), *Changing India. Essays in honour of Professor D. R. Gadgil*.

the question still remains: what is the cause of this persistent stagnation? A clear answer to this is not easy to give, but some suggestions which might have a bearing on this could be put forward.

First of all, agriculture like any other form of production requires technical knowledge, and while we have produced a considerable amount of modern inputs for agriculture, we have not succeeded in inspiring the cultivator to acquire the necessary knowledge to use them, or even to recognise what benefits may follow from their use. There is no class as conservative as the peasants, and this is not really surprising when it is remembered that very few of them have any margin over subsistence to afford to take the slightest amount of risk. Our agricultural extension services were aimed precisely at this problem, but the results have been quite poor. One reason for this is the complete lack of any system of incentives for the extension officer to pass on his knowledge to the cultivators. He gains little from success and loses equally little from his failure in communicating knowledge and inspiring initiative.

One alternative scheme which has been suggested² and which, in my opinion, deserves very serious consideration, is to set up a net-work of technically trained 'villages sales representatives', who would be given some land to cultivate and to earn an income, and also to demonstrate to others the advantages of modern inputs. The incentive to share their knowledge with the villagers comes from giving them a commission on the distribution of fertilizers, pesticides, improved seeds, etc. I do not know whether an incentive scheme of this kind will definitely work or not, but the lack of any system of incentives in the present operation of the extension services is undoubtedly the cause of a considerable difficulty in disseminating modern knowledge and in extending the use of modern inputs. This problem is one that challenges the economists' ingenuity.

There is also a price problem. Much of our industry is protected and the domestic prices are higher than foreign prices. Just the reverse is true of agriculture. Professor B. N. Ganguli has recently drawn our attention to the fact that we have been 'to a certain degree following the policy of agricultural protection in the reverse.'³ The Habeler Report on *Trends in International Trade* had observed that 'the price of wheat and so the reward offered to domestic wheat producers has been controlled at so low a price that even the imports of U.S. wheat provided under special surplus-disposal arrange-

ments have had to be subsidised in the Indian market to bring the price down to the low level earned by domestic producers.'⁴ So part of the contrast in the behaviour of industry and agriculture in India may arise from protection of industry and the reverse of that in considerable parts of agriculture.

Quite apart from the question of the absolute terms of trade, there is the problem of price fluctuation over time. Agricultural prices we have not yet succeeded in stabilising at all, and this has a baneful effect on agricultural incentives. This whole set of problems raises two or three obvious policy issues. Should we revise our general price policy to give agriculturists more incentive to produce by raising the terms of trade and also by reducing fluctuations? On the question of terms of trade, how are we going to compensate for the rise in the cost of living which an increase in food prices will entail? Regarding fluctuations, can we improve the situation by more direct participation of the State in the trade in foodgrains? Will State trading in this sphere allow the price of food to be kept low for the consumer while the price to the cultivator is raised? How big is the traders' margin, the squeezing of which is the key to this dual policy? A great deal of thought should be spent on this set of questions with obvious implications on public policy.

A third and perhaps a more important aspect of the agriculture-industry contrast is our success in bringing about fundamental changes in our industrial society and our failure in making any significant dent on the rural social structure. The cooperative movement, which was the great source of hope, has almost petered out, and where it is active it has got so closely aligned to the ruling classes in the rural hierarchy that we can hardly expect it to usher in a social revolution. Land reform has been carried out with varying success, but while the big landlords might have been subdued, the bulk of the non-cultivating owners have found means of escape. As a drag on incentives for improvement and on economic efficiency, I can hardly think of anything more pernicious than our structure of land ownership. In appreciating the contrast between industry and agriculture, this problem has to be studied in detail.

The regional contrast is less straightforward than this sectoral one. A variety of complicated factors go into the making of the sharp difference between the dynamism of Punjab and Rajasthan, on the one hand, and the stagnation of Assam, Orissa, Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal, on the other.⁵ Perhaps, the irrigational

2. The scheme is due to Professor Stephen A. Marglin. See his 'Towards a Revolution in India Agriculture', *Economic Weekly*, Annual Number, 1964.

3. 'Agricultural Development and the Price Mechanism'. Presidential address in the All-India Agricultural Economics Conference, 1963.

4. *Trends in International Trade*, G.A.T.T., Geneva 1958; quoted in Ganguli, p. 19.

5. See K. N. Raj, 'Some Features of the Economic Growth of the Last Decade in India', *Economic Weekly*, Annual Number, 1961.

policy of the British is one of the more discernible factors in this contrast. Punjab has been used to irrigation and to possibilities of modern methods of cultivation for a very long time, and the slow process of learning may have come to fruition in Punjab in a way it has not elsewhere. The partition and the arrival of a big class of energetic people with varying amounts of liquid capital could have been a contributory factor. I do not really think this regional question can be answered quickly in terms of a couple of wise statements. It is a wide field for research and we are here scratching at the surface of some of the most baffling problems of economic development. But whatever lessons we have learnt already from this contrast will be relevant for chalking out plans of economic development for the country as a whole.

The difference between Punjab and the more slowly growing areas is not confined to agriculture only, but extends also to industry. Punjab's notable success has been in bringing modern techniques to small scale production. These small industries have cropped up in Punjab at a fabulous rate, and there is a sign of a movement of this kind in Madras, although the latter is much more modest. Similar things have not happened elsewhere. What is the explanation of this different experience? Has the long association of Punjab with the Indian Army, and that of Madras to a smaller extent, got anything to do with it? The army undoubtedly did a great deal for the Punjabi, in getting him out of the traditional village society and on to contact with the modern world.

If there is a lesson to be learnt from this, it is not that militarism pays in the long run, but that mobility does, even when it comes through the army. What can we do to encourage this mobility in the rest of the country? In some countries political movements have played the same part, but obviously not in India. From the point of view of policy, this question of bringing people into contact with the opportunities of the modern world poses a big problem for planning India's economic development. Savings of the army employees have also contributed to investment in Punjab, and this brings in also the question of easy credit for economic development, an area where little has been achieved for the country as a whole.

In the field of foreign competition, coming to our third contrast, we have had a reasonably quick rate of import substitution in a number of lines, but a depressingly slow rate of expansion of exports. This contrast is not too difficult to explain. In the field of import substitution, bans on imports or prohibitive duties have made the life of the producer of import substitutes safe and easy, but the exporter has to face severe competition abroad, since export subsidies are limited. I do not think we should

take too much delight in the rate of our import substitution, because much of it has been achieved at the expense of economic efficiency. We have to look only at an industry like the motor car industry to see how scandalously inefficient domestic production can be.

A variety of studies have revealed rather depressing long run prospects for Indian exports. But there is a group of modern products where the export prospects are not inherently bad and much depends on the price at which we can offer our products. This consideration, combined with our protectionist import policy, has led a number of economists, such as Professor Jagdish Bhagwati, to recommend a devaluation of the Indian rupee. There are various ways of having this devaluation, one which involves least change being the export subsidy on the non-traditional exports and a corresponding duty on the imports. A simpler system may be a more conventional kind of devaluation, with corrective duties and subsidies for particular commodities. I am personally not completely convinced that devaluation is the only answer, but with the persistent trouble we are having with our foreign exchange this is a subject which must receive serious attention.

Our whole foreign trade policy seems to be very oddly organised. Private entrepreneurs have been reaping fabulous profits on the basis of protected markets without anything to justify the profits in terms of economic efficiency. Even importers make extraordinary profits, thanks to a peculiar facet of our import restrictions. Those who are granted specific quotas on imports are not subjected to paying enough duty on them to neutralise the profit margin, and in fact, thanks to the near-monopoly, these quota-holders succeed in pocketing scandalous amounts of profits. The State loses here an opportunity for earning a lot of revenue; the monopolists are directly helped by State control; and the pattern of investment tends to shift from healthy lines on to these avenues of earning abnormal profits. It should perhaps be added that this kind of situation also encourages graft and corruption, since the reward from these practices is high with the present system of import control.

On the export side also there are a great deal of oddities. For example, the rule which allows exporters to use part of the foreign exchange earned to import certain special goods, leads to an export policy which is geared to short run advantages rather than to long run considerations. Our export prospects, in general, are rather bad, and these are not helped any by the absence of proper long run planning of export expansion.

I turn now to the fourth contrast. The public sector has seen a great deal of expansion, and

in spite of propaganda to the contrary, its record of efficiency is no worse than that of the private sector, and in some fields is substantially better. But at the same time, in fields where the government has operated not through public ownership, but through control, the record is very dubious indeed. The question of controls has a peculiar link with the Indian brand of socialism. As someone who has always believed in socialism, I find this fascination for controls very difficult to understand. What controls do, at best, is to deal with economic difficulties in the quickest possible way, and are ideal to tackle problems of short run shortages, e.g., of food during a crisis, or of essential materials when they have to be quickly directed to specific channels. At worst, they may not achieve the direction which was desired, and may only help a group of organised businessmen to earn huge profits protected by the State.

The Report of the Steel Committee, chaired by Professor K. N. Raj, has shown how the results of control in India have often confirmed the worst fears of the critics. The question would be asked whether in the name of socialism we have the right to create pockets of inefficiency, and to create opportunities for a few to earn State-protected abnormal profits. Obviously, many types of control will have to be retained, but the present flood of controls seems inefficient and uncalled for.

On the other side, the question is well worth asking whether for achieving successful socialist planning, we should not extend the area of ownership outside the present limits. The question of socialism through controls versus socialism through public ownership can be illustrated with the issue of bank nationalisation. The point is generally admitted that the present system of private banks not only helps to conceal 'black money', of which there is far too much in India, but contributes substantially to the growth of economic concentration in India. One method of tackling the problem is to have an elaborate system of checks and controls on the private banks. But the experience of control in India suggests that very rarely does it achieve the desired objects, and it is worth bearing in mind that the investigation of the closure of the Palai Bank showed how easily evasion was achieved. The alternative of nationalising the banks would, therefore, seem to be worth considering.

The opposite argument that efficiency will decline if banks are run by the State is not borne out by the experience of the working of the nationalised State Bank of India. Such things as evasion of income tax and of avoiding foreign exchange regulations will undoubtedly be more difficult with a system of nationalised banks. I would not like to be dogmatic on this

question, and there are indeed some arguments on the other side also, but I think the onus is on those who oppose the nationalisation of banks to show how direct controls will be more effective in this field than they have been elsewhere.

The question of taxation is also related to this aspect of the problem of planned development. We frequently boast that we have a very progressive system of taxation, and indeed there is truth in this (except in the income range of the upper middle class, where our tax rates seem unduly tame). Beyond the upper middle class our tax rate is remarkably high, but this means very little, since methods of evasion are well worked out in India. The salaried employees of course do not have an escape, but for many businessmen, the high marginal rate of taxation makes very little difference. In fact it is in the relatively less worthwhile kinds of business that the opportunities of tax evasion are the greatest. A salaried engineer will have to pay all his tax; a manufacturing entrepreneur much of it; a trader can evade a great deal; and a black marketeer need not pay any tax at all. Thus the contrast between our theoretical tax rates and the actual ones not only means that our tax system is not so progressive after all, but also shows possibilities of misallocation of productive resources. Until we can devise a tax arrangement which reduces the present colossal rate of evasion, the problem of resource mobilisation will continue to worry us. This then is another field which needs a great deal of attention.

In setting out the problems facing Indian economic planning, I have tried to touch on a variety of issues. I do not think there is any magic formula for getting our economy out of its present rut. It is only a detailed examination of a variety of practical issues which can suggest ways of improving our performance. Hidden possibilities have to be studied by looking at the sharp internal contrasts in the economy: the fast rate of industrial expansion as opposed to the crawling rate of agricultural growth; the dynamism of specific regions in contrast to the stagnation in the rest of the economy; the deceptively fast rate of import substitution compared with virtual stagnation of exports; and the swift and successful expansion of the public sector contrasted with the failure of our methods of direct control of the private sector. If we reformulate our planning in the light of our experiences in contrast, we should be able to gear our economy to a much faster rate of expansion.

There is cause for optimism if and only if we are ready to face these questions which have been thrown up by the last thirteen years of planning.

AMARTYA KUMAR SEN

A dilemma for planning

N. V. SOVANI

WHILE I enjoyed reading Dr. Sen's forthright and penetrating analysis of contrasts in the present Indian economic scene, I thought that it was preoccupied with symptoms rather than the deeply embedded causes. The contrasts which he underlines are certainly important but to me they are not uncommon in the development decades of many other countries. I am not even for a moment suggesting that they are part of a common pattern in the growth process or that they arise or have arisen from the same causes. While taking note of them, I would like to try to go behind them to find the cause or causes of our present economic malaise.

But lest I raise unnecessary expectations, let me put in a couple of disclaimers at the outset which will also hint at the conclusion that I will be reaching. Firstly, although I shall make the attempt at getting at the underlying causes,

I am not sure that I will succeed. Secondly, even if I succeed it may not be easy, or even perhaps possible, to suggest remedies for them in operative terms. I cannot but end on a sceptical note.

I may start off by reviving a distinction, in a somewhat changed form, which used to be made in the earlier discussions on economic progress, the distinction between economic growth and economic development.¹ Economic development is overwhelmingly a technical matter, focussing on the application of new technology and the quantitative changes which it brings about. It is very largely a self-confined process which does not necessarily result in an ongoing movement, the forward and backward linkage effect notwithstanding. It may not even realise itself fully and develop excess

1. A. P. Usher : 'The Balance Sheet of Economic Development', *Journal of Economic History*, Fall, 1951.

capacity in industry or agriculture (irrigation).

In contrast, economic growth is economic development and something more. This *je ne sais quoi* makes it a self-sustaining process which broadens from precedent to precedent. It builds upon itself. It is qualitative and touches most of the people, institutions, behaviour patterns, values, etc., in a country. It energises the mass of people to undertake the tasks of growth on their own. This is the most sensible meaning that can be read into the concept of the 'take-off' which it is impossible to define in quantitative, statistical terms. It is a qualitative climactic concept.

It is only after this kind of take-off that the converses of well-known economic propositions came true. Not only is capital formation necessary for economic growth but the growth process itself brings about capital formation. Not only is employment created by capital investment but more employment also creates more capital.

No Growth

With this distinction in mind, I would like to say that in India we have had economic development but not economic growth. Development, like knowledge, comes but growth, like wisdom, lingers.

The new Deputy Chairman of the Planning Commission was, I think, trying to say something akin to this the other day in Bombay when he is reported to have observed: 'Our plan implementation succeeded where it was a question of technical achievement such as power production, but it broke down the moment it became a human problem and the peoples' cooperation was required.'²

A similar feeling was described by a foreign commentator a few years ago. 'For most enlightened Indians the sole aim of their five year plans is social justice and human betterment. No foreign warning of imminent bankruptcy or starvation has yet been enough to deflect them from this single and immaculate objective. But they seem to have thought that

they could pull off the economic revolution as a kind of academic exercise, its success guaranteed by scientific principles. Within these limits, they have in fact made astonishing progress. But the elite, while working in the service of the common people, has evidently supposed that it could succeed without their massive and fully organised cooperation.'³

Technical Achievement

This is India's problem. The planning effort of the preceding 13 years and its success, such as it is, is a technical achievement. There are good reasons to believe that this achievement could have been much more shining if several mistakes had not been committed. But one is not at all sure whether it would have been possible to generate the upsurge of growth even if these had not been made. There is no necessary cause and effect sequence between technical achievement and growth.

I would not therefore like to indulge in the popular game of technically finding fault with economic planning in India, or its implementation. Although I have had my share of this past-time, I have increasingly come to realise the very limited fruitfulness of it. However effectively a technical problem is solved it cannot by itself bring about that rising tide of human endeavour, effort, daring, persistence, involvement and dedication, which is the very essence of the growth process. In the absence of these, even a shining technical achievement may leave the country frustrated, apathetic and so sluggish as to be on the verge of stagnation.

Why has this happened? We may turn this around and ask instead, 'Why shouldn't it have happened the way it has?' If we look at the development of thought on economic progress in India historically, we find that we have never asked ourselves this question. We have always assumed that everything will turn out right. For Dutt, Ranade and others of their generation, India appeared to be ready

for the industrial revolution and what was needed was an activist government policy in regard to industrialization, including protection and the permanent land revenue system all over the country. This idea persisted through the following decades although we gradually abandoned the necessity of a permanent revenue settlement.

We experienced a little disillusionment about protection after it came in the 'twenties, but this did not proceed much further because of the newly growing belief in economic planning in the 'thirties. On the eve of independence, planning was a word to conjure with along with independence. The belief in planning was unbelievably naive. Most advocates of planning felt that you could do almost anything with it; the impossible almost immediately, the miraculous only taking a little more time. The assumption was tacitly made that all that we needed was the application of the technique of planning and everything else was ready in the country for its success.

The planning effort was duly launched. An active economic policy was adopted. We went through a few bad and good patches. When agricultural production suddenly shot up in 1952 and 1953 (apparently or really is still a matter of debate!), it was widely alleged that the agricultural revolution was on. It evaporated soon afterwards though. And then the first faint gleanings of some things not going the way they should began to appear. It was felt that people at large were not participating in the economic effort.

Insufficient Participation

The community development scheme was thought to be an answer to this judging from the success it had had in the Etawah district. Ignoring the real causes and conditions of its success, the community development schemes were made into an administrative programme to be extended to the whole country in a few years. It soon turned out to be an empty shell.

So we lighted on another answer, the Panchayati Raj. This is now in

2. *Times of India*, 22 February, 1964.

3. Cyril Dunn: 'Changing India', *Observer*, London, April 19, 1960.

the process of implementation. But if I am not very much mistaken, I quite clearly see the first doubts appearing regarding this as well. I do not wish to decry it; only I would not be surprised if it turns out to be disappointing. I am giving here one example from among others. Many more can be added but one is sufficient as an illustration.

Tradition of Apathy

Even though we have often assumed away many of the obstacles in the way of our economic progress, we have not been entirely unaware of what is or was wrong with us. Ranade wrote long ago that our greatest enemy was the general apathy of the people. Tilak spoke about the slumber and indolence of his countrymen. But this was a disquieting thought to be suppressed and vehemently denied because it was also unfortunately given expression to by the alien rulers and other foreigners. It thus became tainted with suspicion. It was suppressed in the growing nationalist reaction, in the comfortable belief that it was the result mainly of foreign rule and that it would disappear with political independence. We can now unreservedly assert that this has not happened and that we have to look at ourselves more closely to find the answer.

In my opinion this lies deeply embedded in our social structure and *mores*. Hindu society is characterised by a low basal social metabolism. The social structure has a low efficiency for change. It is deadly in its efficiency in smothering social change. It is oriented to maintain a rigid stability, hardly distinguishable from stagnation. The basic type of personality it breeds is apathetic, seeking security in dependence, non-involved, routine loving and fond of empty ritual.

We are not only non-aligned in foreign policy but also non-aligned in personal work commitment and endeavour. We generally seem to act from a sense of duty (*dharma*)—‘the pale ash of a burnt-out fire’. There is very little sense of purpose or involvement. Our intellec-

tual tradition is more theoretical than operational and possibly, as a result, we tend to believe too much in the power of words. As in mythology, we have a secret belief that one can work wonders by chanting a magical word (*mantra*), (that is why there are too many exhortations and speeches).⁴ Steady hard work, though we do not say so, does not seem to us to be very attractive. In the famine of human endeavour which this gives rise to, it is no wonder that economic growth does not appear.

The situation is bewildering. To quote the foreign observer already cited, not because his observation is authoritative or self-evident but because it expresses in a nutshell what many Indians also have felt and sensed: ‘It may be that Indians are no more controlled by the ideals of their religion than we are by the Ten Commandments. But it still appears that it is religion which makes the villagers’ penury tolerable. The traveller through India often meets cavalcades of bullock-carts. . . heading towards a religious festival. It is easy to get an impression not of grinding poverty but of bucolic idyll. Yet a professor from the sacred Hindu city of Nasik has lately hinted that the villagers have withdrawn into a world not of true religion but of fantasy. “Their poverty is terrible”, he says, “and their contentment inexplicable.” He suspects that they need the guidance not of economists but of psychologists.’⁵

Sea Change Required

If the causes of our present social and cultural *malaise* lie so deep, the task of activating the masses would appear to be nothing less than the remaking of the whole nation, a social and cultural change of tremendous magnitude. Economic change is only a part of this wider change. It cannot be brought about successfully while neglecting the other, nor can it by itself bring

about the social and cultural change needed. How should these be brought about?

The frank and the blunt answer is that we do not know. This may surprise many because at first flush there easily occur to us many things which can be done to spark the change. A more careful second look would suggest that here we base ourselves primarily on the experience in other countries where growth has occurred. Now there is nothing wrong in this. One should learn from experience. But then if we look at this experience we would be surprised at how little we know in this field.

No Easy Answers

Economic historians looking at the past achievements of developed countries always rationalise a beautiful sequence of cause and effect and isolate causes or factors responsible for the Industrial Revolution or growth. But in most cases these are more logical than actual. In most cases it appears that the contemporaries did not see them as such, neither did they strike them as such. What really worked is obscure, and naturally so because this is essentially a qualitative rather than a quantitative question and qualitative changes are always too mercurial to be captured by contemporary observation and record, the raw materials of the historian.

We have therefore only guesses regarding what worked in other countries and even if we knew more precisely and definitely what worked, we cannot be sure that it will work universally irrespective of time, space and culture. We know, for instance, that the development of nationalism in India did not bring about that kind of social integration and regeneration which it did in several European countries.

Because the catalytic agent differs from country to country and from time to time, we do not know what will work in India. It may be an old thing, it may be an entirely new thing. There is, however, one certainty about it, that it must come from within the

4. See my: ‘Non-economic Aspects of India’s Economic Development’ in *Administration and Economic Development India*, Ed. Braibanti and Spengler, Duke University Press, Durham (N.C.), 1963, pp. 260-280.

5. Cyril Dunn: ‘Changing India’, *Observer*, London, April 10, 1960.

Indian society itself. It cannot be imported like technical know-how or machinery and no amount of foreign aid will help in the matter. Neither are foreign experts any help. They may suggest but neither have they, or can they have, any certain remedies. We must work out our own solution and there are no short-cuts to it.

That we do not know what will work in generating the growth process, is by no means a unique situation. It is historical and almost universal. It also underlines the corollary that men do not wait for the solution to appear first before going to work. They work with hunches (wrong or right) and hope for a break through. And this is right because the solution does not come out of the blue. It develops in the field. It may be hit upon when something else is being tried. It develops from our own work, not from pure contemplation. If we want the solution, we must first give up our belief that it will be revealed to us. We must work in all ways that we know and not slacken until we get it. There is no substitute for hard work.

Sensitivity to Differences

We may also cheer ourselves with the thought that perhaps there are qualitative changes already occurring around us which are bringing about the desired change and we do not recognize them. Just as quantity changes into quality, it takes quite a considerable time for qualitative changes to gather enough momentum to become discernible in quantitative terms. If Punjab agriculture and industry is making rapid progress, perhaps the present policy suits the genius of that land. It obviously does not suit other regions. Something else may suit them. The rapidity with which the vasectomy camps multiplied and continue to multiply in Maharashtra may be because they suit the people. Again, they may not suit other people. These are a couple of examples which only illustrate the general point. There may be many more and we must be sensitive to them, and try to nurture them as best as we can.

This may be the doctrine of growing points with a difference.

We must also try to avoid some of the things which in our country are definitely inimical to such careful and patient nurture. As I have already said, exhortations and speeches are not like mythical *mantras* which bring about the desired things by mere incantation. We are also impressed more by the dramatic than by unassuming steady work. We are also impatient and are too prone to generalise particular experiences. What succeeds in some field, in some area, is hastily applied everywhere—to ensure its failure.

Trial and Error

Just as we are hasty in this respect, we are too slow and sometimes totally reluctant to give up anything we start even though all indications are that it is a failure beyond repair. We are very sensitive to failure, refuse to admit it as long as possible and tend to cling to it indefinitely. We can perhaps grieve less and be bold enough to reject what is found wanting. There is no loss of face involved here. It is after all the way of trial and error. But if we accumulate errors without cutting them out, our capacity to undertake new experiments is reduced and consequently our capacity to progress suffers.

The long and short of it is that we know of no sure-fire remedies for bringing about the enthusiastic participation of the people in economic development and bringing about economic growth. There are no turn-key remedies. We must persist in our endeavours with steady, unyielding effort on all fronts.

By all means improve the technical efficiency of our plans, remembering that this alone is not sufficient. Efforts in other fields are also necessary and we must work in the hope that if we try hard things might click sometime, somewhere. However much we may dislike this situation, it cannot be assumed away or ignored and there is no other way of fighting or mastering it except by dedicated hard work.

Agricultural approach

M. Y. GHORPADE

IT is agricultural production which largely determines the real rate of growth in an underdeveloped economy. The pace at which industrialisation can proceed mainly depends on the agricultural surplus of food and raw materials. The agriculturist must produce surplus food for the industrial worker and surplus raw materials for the industrial factory. (But we in India are actually deficit in food. Under PL 480 we now intend importing as much as 6 million tons a year). In the early stages of industrialisation (i.e., before the industrial base is strong enough to grow on its own strength by ploughing back its own surplus), the agricultural surplus has to provide the initial investments in

industry. (Otherwise, the financial and political burden of foreign borrowing can become too heavy. We are already experiencing the strain).

Moreover, in an underdeveloped country the bulk of the market for manufactured goods stems from the purchasing power or effective demand of the agricultural sector. (But in India the standard of living of a large number of rural families is going down instead of increasing).

That is why V. T. Krishnamachari in his book on planning in India wanted agricultural production to be doubled at least in ten years, i.e., by 1971, and per capita

production 15 years, i.e., by 1976. But the pace of progress in agricultural production so far has fallen very much short of the rate of increase needed to achieve that modest target. Population is increasing at the rate of 2.5 per cent per annum. Agricultural production, we are told, has increased, on an average, at the rate of 3.6 per cent per annum during the first and second five year plan periods. Of this increase only about 1.6 per cent is attributed to actual increase in productivity; the remaining 2 per cent annual increase being due to increase in the area under cultivation. (There will be comparatively less scope for increasing the area under cultivation in the third and subsequent five year plans.)

Moreover, it is difficult to say how much of this increase is a stable increase in food production. There are so many uncertain factors including the monsoons. The economic survey for 1963-64, presented to Parliament by T. T. Krishnamachari, states that 'agricultural production as a whole declined by 3.3 per cent in the 1962-63 crop season. The output of rice fell by 2.8 million tons or 8 per cent and of sugar cane and wheat by about 7.5 per cent each'.

Irrigation

The picture will not be complete without a mention of the statistical increases in the area under irrigation, supply of fertilisers, etc. The area under irrigation increased from 51 to 70 million acres between 1951-61. The gross irrigational potential of major and medium irrigation schemes is expected to rise by 6.8 million acres during the last two years of the Third Plan as compared to an increase of 3.5 million acres during 1962-63 and 1963-64. An additional area of 3.2 million acres is expected to be brought under minor irrigation.

The Economic Survey for 1963-64 also mentions that the rate of utilization of irrigation potential has increased from 50 per cent in 1955-56 to 71 per cent at the end of the Second Plan and it is about 80 per cent in the current year. A lot more remains to be done. According to V. T. Krishnamachari, for fuller utilization of existing

irrigation potential, some 30 to 40 thousand miles of field channels need to be dug every year for the next ten years.

It is estimated that the consumption of fertilisers increased by more than 300 per cent since 1950-51. The consumption of nitrogenous fertilisers (in terms of nitrogen) rose from 193,000 tons in 1960-61 to 450,000 tons in 1963-64 and is expected to rise to 750,000 tons in 1965-66.

The increase in agricultural production during the Third Plan is expected to be equal to the increase in the first two plans. But even that is far below the rate of growth needed to achieve the target of doubling agricultural production and per capita production in 10 and 15 years, i.e., by 1971 and 1976 respectively.

Agricultural production ultimately depends on what actually happens on the farm, on various types of farms in different regions and under different conditions. Statistical aggregates may be useful landmarks but they do not tell the vital story of the farm and the farmer—the actual impact on the standard of living of different sections of the people in different regions and sectors. One tends to get lost in over-all figures and to forget the farmer and his problems. It is not sufficient to produce certain supplies and utilities. The intensity and efficiency of their application at the right point and in the right manner is the crux of the matter and makes all the difference between success and failure.

Electrification

Hydro-electric power supply has increased appreciably in our country, but only about 8 per cent of it is going to the villages, partly for rural electrification and partly for agricultural purposes like pump sets, etc., whereas about 60 to 70 per cent goes to industry. Is this priority wise or even defensible? Only about 10 per cent of the villages of India would be electrified by the end of the Third Five Year Plan and yet, in the State of Madras, all the villages would receive power by the end of the

Third Plan. How come this great disparity? Is this prudent planning?

So also there is considerable variation in the percentage of irrigated land in different regions. The national average is about 26 per cent, but in the State of Mysore less than 7 per cent of the cultivable land is irrigated. How much greater must be the disparities from district to district or at the block level? In planning the utilisation of river waters, or in the creation and distribution of irrigation and power potential, is any thought given to the great need to narrow down these disparities and aim at a more balanced development of all regions, sectors and sections of people?

The Package Approach

In every State the best irrigated district is chosen for the intensive application of the 'package' approach, of contacting every family and planning the input and output of every farmer in an integrated manner. There is one village level worker for every 250 families in these selected package programme districts; he sees to it that the necessary supplies and services are made available according to a scientific input-output proforma or chart for each family holding. Production in such districts is known to have gone up by about 30 per cent, though the cost of production also goes up somewhat. This is a useful effort which gives valuable experience (though it is to be seen to what extent this rate of increase is stable and self-generating).

But why has the package approach not been tried in unirrigated areas where the real battle against poverty has to be fought? This is very essential. If it is done, we will get a realistic assessment of the economic feasibility of many of the improved methods and practices which we preach to the subsistence farmer of arid tracts.

The valley of Sandur in Bellary district of Mysore State, for instance, has good lands but no assured irrigation. It has to depend on an annual rainfall of about 30 inches which is fairly regular. In other words, in the rainfed cate-

gory the Sandur valley is very favourably placed. Yet, a recent realistic official estimate of average yields in Sandur, (for the purpose of fixing fair rents on government managed lands) ranged from one to five bags of jawar per acre (valued at Rs. 30 per bag) depending on the quality of the soil.

The Poor Farmer

A family possessing 5 acres of poor quality land would get a gross income of only about Rs. 150 to Rs. 300, i.e., Rs. 30 to Rs. 60 per acre. (Even at 4 bags an acre the gross produce works out to Rs. 120 per acre). Ten cart loads of cattle manure per acre would itself cost Rs. 50 to Rs. 100 at Rs. 5 to Rs. 10 per cart load and often the manure is just not available in sufficient quantity. Therefore, the farmer usually manures only half his land every year, with great effort. The net income he gets is below the subsistence level and he has to find other avenues of work and wage earning in order to ensure the minimum to live. A traditional wedding ceremony or serious illness or other calamity only increases his indebtedness and helplessness.

This is a fair description of the economic condition of a vast majority of our agricultural families. How can such families increase production? For example, government gives a loan of Rs. 3000 for constructing an irrigation well, but the small, poor farmer has no adequate security to offer and the Block Development Officer naturally plays safe and distributes these loans mostly to rich farmers who would probably have constructed a well even without government assistance.

If the land is full of weeds only deep tractor ploughing can deal with it effectively. But government tractor charges are Rs. 30 per acre, i.e., equal to the price of one bag of jawar. Pesticides and fertilisers would mean more expense. Can he afford these luxuries? And yet they are not luxuries but necessities to increase production. The figures speak for themselves. Under these conditions can he even dream of taking sizable, interest-

bearing loans from government for contour bunding etc.? The cost of permanent fencing is too prohibitive and so out of the question. Has anybody calculated the damage caused by the large number of unproductive cattle which are allowed to roam at large? Even alternative seasonal employment is possible only if there is a certain amount of irrigated land in the area or other dependable avenues of wage-earning.

If government wants these farmers to do more intensive farming, should it not ensure and demonstrate that the cost of scientific agricultural inputs and loans will not exceed the realistically calculated gross yields and will leave a fair margin of return for the family labour? Can these down-trodden, subsistence farmers be treated on par with the more well-to-do farmers of bigger holdings of irrigated land? Should not the element of government subsidy be far higher for these poor farmers to make them increase production?

Many have no cash even to buy good seed. If they borrow seed from a rich farmer they have to pay compound interest on the cost of such seed until they harvest their next crop from which they repay the loan. Even the gunny bags needed to pack the produce after harvest have often to be supplied by the *savakar* to whom the crop is partly or wholly mortgaged.

Inadequate Facilities

The godown facilities of government have not even touched the fringe of the problem and all types of crop cannot be stored in the type-design godown. For example, jawar or millet which is the staple crop in the Sandur area cannot be stored in government godowns and there is an acute shortage of this grain for two to three months every year. Yet ragi and jawar is the basic diet of the poor man in these parts and the greatest need of the landless labourers, (who cannot afford the wheat and rice sold in government fair price shops, if any).

In any case the government fair price shop is mainly meant for the urban consumer and not so much

for the rural labourer. And the 'fair price'—fair to whom, to the producer or the consumer—and which consumer? For the producer, fair price should of course be related to the extent of government subsidies and the criteria of economic return.

Cooperative Credit

The success of co-operative credit sounds excellent on paper. It is true that the volume of co-operative credit has increased appreciably in the last ten years. It was about Rs. 200 crores in the Second Plan and it is expected to rise to Rs. 500 crores by the end of the Third Plan. But much of this is utilized in the rich irrigated tracts. And already in some States, like Mysore, the problem of under-utilization of available co-operative credit is becoming serious. Why?

In the sugar cane areas, where the farmers are economically strong and supply cane at a fixed fair price to the sugar factory, they are able to make fairly good use of co-operative credit and supplies. The co-operative society is also able to recover the loans by deductions at the factory where the produce is taken. But in the poor unirrigated tracts—which constitutes the bulk of our cultivated land—co-operative credit is monopolised by a few powerful elements and the rest are not strong enough even to ask for it.

A co-operative society is formed, it draws credit and distributes it to a few people and is often not seriously bothered to recover it; the society defaults and stagnates, until it is wound up in a few years time. A new society is started and the story is repeated.

That this is no theatrical exaggeration will be seen if one tries to collect reliable statistics of the number and type of agricultural families who are members of a co-operative credit society (or service co-operative as it is now called) and have actually received some credit for three to five years without a break. Such figures would be very revealing. Statistics of the number of villages covered by co-operative societies are also

very misleading. One can easily imagine how efficient such sickly societies are likely to be in arranging timely supplies of vital agricultural inputs for the poor farmer in the dry food crop areas?

Co-operative credit therefore has not touched even the fringe of the problem, and so the hold of the money lender is still very strong. The money lender still provides the bulk of the agricultural credit and distress money and is in a position to dictate terms.

The Role of Government

Is it not the role of a progressive government to throw its weight, fully and squarely, on the side of these weaker sections who are too weak even to claim equality of opportunities and status? In practice, however, government officials seem to be more amenable to the powerful elements with economic and political influence. Then how are the weaker sections to get their rightful place and experience democratic socialism during their lifetime? Panchayati Raj will, no doubt, politically activate the weaker sections to some extent. But this will take some time and, in the meanwhile, what is the role of government in this respect?

In the name of non-interference should a progressive government be neutral in this unequal struggle for existence? The old collective village leadership was based upon a caste hierarchy and occupational inter-independence. That is inevitably disintegrating. A new leadership with a clear social purpose and a collective will is yet to emerge at the village level.

Mere multiplication of personnel, without adequate training or fixing of clear responsibilities and specific targets by which to judge them, will be wasteful. The system and psychology of punishment and reward has to be restored. This is vital. At present nothing happens if a village level worker or an extension officer does no work. The worst punishment is a transfer. For good work there is no reward. As a matter of fact there is absolutely no system of measuring or evaluating his vital work. The result is that even simple, basic

things remain undone. For example, after so many years of freedom, there are still some 10 to 20 per cent of the villages in our country without even a proper drinking water well.

We talk so much about insufficiency of manure and the great need for composting. Every year official forms are filled up for the purpose of compiling statistics, but nothing substantial is done in the field. In most villages there is no site available even for building houses and huts to relieve human congestion and it literally takes years before a small piece of land is acquired by government for this purpose. Where then is the space for systematic composting and the tying of cattle? The result is that lands go unmanured while cattle are allowed to scatter their dung all over the place to be wasted and not even used for burning.

And yet what a revolution in agricultural production can result from systematic composting and green manuring for each farm. There was one panchayat which received an income of several thousand rupees every year by organising compost pits in a five acre plot. But this was an isolated instance.

Then again, stud bulls are supplied by government to improve the breed of cattle but there is inexcusable lethargy and indifference in castrating the other bulls. The truth is that in our country neither in the ruling political party nor in government service, have official prospects anything to do with performance.

Investment in Man

Panchayati Raj is yet new but political parties do not allow it to grow on healthy, efficient, non-political lines. Power and patronage appears to be the end all. The rest does not seem to matter. So while big things are planned, implementation is hopeless. Sometimes even big things are not carefully thought out. For instance, our compulsory education programme in the countryside should really be farm and craft oriented. That would really mean basic education on Gandhian lines with a

social purpose. But as things stand today, education is designed to produce third rate clerks who are physically and psychologically unfit for agriculture. And yet we say that agriculture should receive the highest priority, and that manual labour and technical skills are very important.

Investment in man is ultimately the answer. Officials and non-officials, or rather salaried and elected personnel, will have to be given adequate training to fulfil this task of rural regeneration for greater production consistent with social justice. But the basic structure also has to be equal to the task. It is clear that a piecemeal approach will not succeed. It will only result in a phenomenal wastage of resources. For instance, it is well known that demonstration plots, where all or many of the improved techniques have been applied at the same time, have shown marked results compared to farms intended to demonstrate the effect of only one or two improved practices. Therefore, to make an impact, our approach to a family, village, block, or district has to be a total, integrated one. In the absence of such an integrated approach the village agricultural production plan will remain only on paper.

Agriculture as Industry

The total agricultural requirements of every family—especially the economically weaker families—will have to be supplied as a whole and realistically recovered from the increased output, calculated and achieved on a practical basis. Agriculture will have to be looked upon as an industry and not as some subsistence activity sanctioned by destiny. Seventy-five per cent of rural households consist of small farmers. Dry crop areas comprise about 70 per cent of the cultivated area. We therefore just cannot afford to be indifferent to the fate of the small farmers and the unirrigated areas.

We should calculate the scientific cost per acre, per crop, to maximise yields and to ensure that the net return even to these high cost units, viz., small farmers in dry crop areas is an adequate incentive

to achieve planned yields. This economic net return can be ensured by a realistic system of minimum prices and various types of operational subsidies weighted in favour of the small farmer and the grower of food crops. In this context, control over the wholesale and retail profits, though important in itself, can be only of marginal significance from the producers point of view. It cannot be used to evade the basic issue of a fair return to the producer and other facilities to maximise yields.

In every village and every block, the realistic and practical basis of these scientific inputs and outputs should be demonstrated by government to their own satisfaction and the satisfaction of the people by running model farms. Production plans for individual farms (prepared on the basis of practical experience on model farms), taken together, should constitute the village agricultural production plan. The panchayat and the service co-operative (responsible for supplies) should work in a co-ordinated manner to achieve these results.

Coordinated Functioning

It is essential that even at the block level there should be an unified and integrated approach. The first task of the block organisation should be to keep in close contact with the panchayat and village co-operatives on the one hand and the district and the State level authorities and institutions on the other, to anticipate and remove bottlenecks in time and see that the planned supplies and services reach the village and the farms effectively and in an integrated manner. This would be a total approach, a 'package' approach where the direction and adequacy of supplies is co-ordinated and closely implemented at the village and block levels.

But this is exactly what is not happening at present, particularly in the area of subsistence farming which still constitutes the bulk of our agriculture. Individual farmers, depending on their influence and intelligence, make such use of available supplies and services as is physically possible or as they can afford. It is a rather indifferent

and haphazard approach and the majority of the farmers do not get effective help. Even those who do, get it in a piecemeal fashion. The block administration is, in practice, more of a helpless onlooker rather than an effective co-ordinator so far as essential supplies are concerned. It, no doubt, has some technical services. But supplies and services go together; the one cannot do much without the other.

The block to be really successful should go a step further and plan the balanced development of the block as a whole and see that such a plan is included in the State plan. For instance, it is essential that every block command a certain amount of irrigation. Where major or medium irrigation is not possible, minor irrigation should be given high priority. And where even small tanks cannot be constructed, tube wells and small anicuts and bandaras should be constructed for the balanced growth of the area. Irrigation wells should be concentrated in such blocks instead of areas where other forms of irrigation are possible.

Electricity for agricultural pump sets is a very important factor. It is both labour and capital intensive and results in an increase of both employment and economic returns. The unemployment and underemployment situation should be carefully assessed in each block and irrigation, power, small and medium industries should be planned to meet these conditions blockwise and districtwise. The planning and execution of public works should also be dovetailed into such block plans to create *balanced agro-industrial units*.

Urban Rural Differences

The present sharp difference between the urban and the rural should blur and ultimately wither away. Otherwise the conflicts and contradictions of the situation will make democratic progress very difficult. Only such an approach will give real content to the concept of planning from below.

Allocation in the State budget should be rationally related to such scientific block plans to ensure the best use of scarce re-

sources. At present things are very unsystematic. Irrigation wells and tanks are sanctioned in a quixotic manner and without reference to any block wise priorities or economic criteria such as irrigation potential per unit of capital investment, relative effectiveness in reducing inequalities or increasing food production, etc. New works and schemes are taken up to make use of central aid while old tanks and roads are neglected, denied minimum maintenance and repairs. About 50 per cent of the irrigation tanks are in a state of disuse due to inadequate maintenance. Is this not tragic?

Land Reform

Even our thinking on land reforms is becoming stagnant and unrelated to the problems in the field. Abolition of the big zamindar was simple and straightforward. The zamindar as a rent collector had become an anachronism. But only a part of the leased out land belonged to the big absentee landlord. The problem of tenancy is not as simple as it looks.

It is interesting to note that 25 to 30 per cent of the leased out land belonged to owners of holdings below 10 acres; and 50 per cent of the leased out land belonged to owners below 20 acres. It is estimated that one sixth of the households leasing out land were owners of less than one acre. It is significant that the bulk of the leased in land was in the possession not of the small but of the middle group of cultivators who are the principal beneficiaries of land reforms and Government rural development schemes.

In Mysore, out of 26.8 million acres under cultivation, about 6.1 million acres were estimated to be leased out. Of this about 3.6 million acres belonged to small owners with less than a basic holding and, therefore, liable to be resumed for personal cultivation. Here we can see the conflict of interest between the small owner and the tenant who may or may not be small.

According to the National Sample-Surveys, in 1953-54, about one

fourth of the cultivated area was leased in and of this nearly half belonged to non-resident owners, i.e., the absentee landlord consisting of not only the big landlord but also the small owners working in urban areas, pensioners, widows, ex-servicemen and the like. Moreover, do our reforms attempt to analyse the various reasons behind leasing out of land by resident owners?

The tendency for the land of the small farmer to pass over to the more well-to-do farmer needs very careful watching. The economic insecurity of the small farmers seems greatly to outweigh any security which the law attempts to give. In fact, the small tenants have not improved their position. The bulk of the small tenants are helpless against the much greater power and influence of the middle and big owners. It is shocking that a land records corrective drive, according to a minister in Uttar Pradesh, showed up some 3.8 million wrong entries. Concealed tenancy arrangements are becoming the order of the day. All this only goes to indicate that unless the economic and administrative realities are clearly understood and boldly tackled, mere legal rights will not go very far.

Concept of Ceiling

The concept of 'ceiling' has also run into some economic difficulties. In Mysore, the surplus land available for redistribution after the application of the ceiling was estimated at 200,000 acres (out of a total of 26.8 million acres of land under cultivation) as per the committee on land reforms, a few years ago. A bill on this basis is yet to become law. When it does, even this small surplus will not be available for distribution.

This surplus was based on an income ceiling of Rs. 3,600. If the income ceiling is high then there is no surplus available for distribution (the ceiling then being only an upper limit for future acquisitions). If the ceiling level is pitched low then it compares very unfavourably with the level of urban incomes and a whole set of

problems of urban-rural parity and incentives come up. Moreover, what are we doing to ensure the economic stability of the small farmer and landless labourer who is supposed to get the surplus land?

Therefore, our approach to land reforms can no longer be doctrinaire or static. It should be based on the socio-economic dynamics of the changing rural scene. Laws should be simple and realistic and not create too much uncertainty. They should be quickly implemented and not be allowed to flounder on legalistic and constitutional quibblings. Otherwise their whole purpose is destroyed.

We have seen how the post-war increase in agricultural prices acted as a major factor inducing people to produce for the market. We have also said that minimum prices and subsidies should ensure a fair economic return to the family farm, which comprises 75 per cent of the rural households. This will also give an incentive to commercial farming and result in greater investments on improvements to land and livestock.

Reasonable Surplus

As things stand at present, we cannot really say that the flow or transfer of funds from agriculture to non-agriculture has been significantly reduced. Unless the farmer starts getting a reasonable surplus which it becomes worthwhile for him to plough back into land, we cannot have a self-generating movement towards better farming and higher yields resulting in a steady improvement in the standard of living in the countryside.

In England, the agricultural sector is heavily subsidised to give maximum incentive to increased production and to reduce dependence on food imports. And yet prices are kept within reasonable limits for the urban consumer and in terms of the balance of payments position.

It would be interesting to study the nature and motivation behind investments in land in India. For instance why are tractors confined mainly to Punjab? By and large, in spite of increased monetisation,

we have not got away from primitive techniques even on the bigger farms. There are about a million farms above 50 acres but only about 30 to 40 thousand tractors. If many of these farms have not taken to tractors, do we know to what extent this is due to fragmentation of holdings or the cheapness of available labour or bullock power or the disinclination to invest heavily in land for sound economic reasons, etc.

Punjab's Experience

Incidentally, Punjab is the only State where consolidation of holdings has been done on a comprehensive and systematic basis. During consolidation a portion of the land has been set aside for the panchayat to be used for communal purposes. Why has consolidation not been undertaken in other States although it is such a vital step and an effective answer to the fragmentation of land? In Punjab one is impressed by the number of family farms of 5 acres and above.

Absence of surplus labour (many join the army), high proportion of irrigated land, rural engineering industries and workshops, social homogeneity and a forward looking agro-industrial outlook are some of the characteristic features which put Punjab ahead of other States. If more cheap power is made available it could do still better.

In India, the land labour ratio favours intensive family cultivation. In Japan, where the average holding is smaller than ours, the yield per acre is one and half to twice the yield in the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. Our yields are about the lowest in the world. Why? We can no longer evade this question.

We must break through our classic stagnation. It is not an insuperable task. But only an integrated and realistic approach can create a system which will not only increase production considerably but develop a self adjusting mechanism which, in a democracy, will ensure that inequalities remain within tolerable limits.

Industrial advance

DILIP MUKERJEE

LOOKING at the Indian scene today, no one can miss the upsurge which has sent the general index of industrial production (1956=100) up from 73 in 1951 to 162 in 1963. The general index, in fact, understates the achievement; the weightage assigned to traditional branches of manufacture like jute and cotton textiles (38 per cent) obscures the tremendous advances made in base metals, metal products, machines and chemicals. As the latest *Economic Survey* points out in an endeavour to dramatise the transformation which has taken place, India can now produce each year ten standard cement plants of 200,000 tons each year, two paper plants of 50 tons per day capacity, Rs. 12 crores worth of machine tools, 40,000 railway wagons and 250 locomotives. Equally impressive is the headway made in technical education—the starting point of the effort to build a technologically mature society. Admissions at the graduate level are now around 17,000 a year, with another 31,000 joining diploma courses each year.

There is, of course, another side to the medal. Those busy chalking up claims for the Congress raj—politicians and their apologists—are naturally reluctant to admit to the grave weaknesses. When brought face to face with them, their favourite gambit is to explain away failures as 'inescapable' growing pains. Critics with their own axes to grind are equally vociferous in tracing all defaults back to ideological origins. The truth founders in between because there is not enough of independent and objective assessment. Splendid institutes have come up—their growth rate is something fantastic—which should be filling this need if they were not so wholly depen-

dent for sustenance upon subventions from the Establishment.

No one seriously disputes that progress has been patchy and lopsided. The evidence all around the industrial scene is too glaring to be ignored or explained away. But instead of getting down to a sober appraisal of the performance, both the Establishment and the Opposition have been content to seek alibis. Ask the responsible ministry in New Delhi about the lag in the fertilizer industry and pat will come the answer that private enterprise has let the country down. The licenses it was given for new units have remained largely unutilized, allegedly confirming that Indian entrepreneurs lack the courage and the wherewithal to undertake the large and lumpy investment required in modern, capital intensive industries. The licensees plead not guilty, claiming that the taxation and pricing policies effectively bar investment. The World Bank backs up their view, but then this is dismissed as yet another example of the Bank's ideological bias against Indian socialism.

Hurling charges back and forth gets us nowhere. Ideology is, indeed, important but, is it the primary issue that is sometimes made out? The facile phrases and the cheap jibes employed on either side strengthen the suspicion that ideology is often being used to confuse the real problem or sidetrack it. The entire debate on the expansion of Bombay refineries got sadly derailed when it was made out to be a dramatic tussle between the leftist K. D. Malaviya and the oil giants. The economics of expansion got submerged in the exchange of innuendoes with Malaviya himself somewhat to

blame for not bringing them into focus.

Technical Imbalances

Ideology is, in any case, of little relevance in breaking the operational bottlenecks which are holding back industrial production. These bottlenecks are the result of technical imbalances arising from the failure to advance in a coordinated manner over the whole industrial front. Broadly speaking, the growth in basic resources—these admittedly take time to develop—has fallen behind the demand for them. There is, for instance, considerable fabricating and processing capacity but not enough steel or pig iron to feed them. In chemicals also, there is the same gap between the capacity to turn out end products and the local supply of starting materials.

Another set of imbalances is revealed when one examines specific inter-industry relationships, the shortage of welding electrodes providing a case in point. This relatively small and inexpensive item is in no sense difficult to produce—certainly not for a nation which is bidding to build her own steel plants. Yet, inadequate domestic production aggravated by a precipitate import cut threatened last year to bring the whole structural fabricating industry to a standstill until emergency imports of electrodes retrieved the situation.

Ball and roller bearings and compressors are two examples of basic components widely used in the engineering industry in which, again as in the case of electrodes, domestic capacity has failed to keep in step with the volume and variety of demand. In part, the explanation may be that some of the starting materials for bearings and compressors are not yet available from local manufacture. Bearings need high carbon steel while compressor-makers have often complained of the lack of matching diesel engines and of the scarcity of special steels. But this can hardly be the whole explanation since few industries in India have a secure materials base.

Some uncovered gap in the industrial structure may well have

been unavoidable. The lag in steel and pig iron which will get a good deal worse in the coming years before it gets better, may be attributed to the lack of resources. Bokaro has now become a fourth plan project with foreign exchange required for still to be secured. The British and the Germans were not as forthcoming with support for expansions at Durgapur and Rourkela as New Delhi had hoped for, resulting in a delayed start to the Third Plan programmes. But was this not itself attributable to the 'avoidable' failure on our side to get the original million ton plants firmly on production to permit the governments concerned to justify to their electorate further aid for the projects?

Incapacity for Coordination

Again, one may claim that the failure on our part was not really avoidable because it was basically rooted in the lack of operating experience. This argument can be stretched a good deal backwards but it is sufficient for our present purpose to recognise the complexity of the task in basic industries. We could indeed have done better if the zeal and determination displayed in setting up these 'shrines' of modern India had been extended to making them work.

The decision to build a new plant can (and probably is in fact) made by a handful of people but operating it calls for integrated steps in many directions—raw materials, transport, labour, exchange for spares and components, among others. It is a striking feature of the current Indian scene that anything requiring coordinated decisions gets held up somewhere along the line, a situation indicative of the political failure to weld the top echelon of leadership into a well-knit team.

While these larger problems have beset basic industries, can the same be said for the less intractable gaps in items like compressors and bearings? Although public sector ventures have theoretically been on the agenda in the case of both, the task has really been left to private enterprise. Why has it not done better in such fields, pre-

sumably offering the same sort of profitability as electric motors and cables which have never lacked for entrepreneurs? No definitive answer can be attempted without far more detailed knowledge, but some of the factors at work may be mentioned here which may have a wider relevance.

First, the investment required for a large project with a sufficiently wide manufacturing range is fairly heavy. (For the public sector bearings project the cost was estimated at Rs. 8 crores and for a combined compressor cum pump unit at Rs. 15 crores). Somewhat smaller and less diversified plants would no doubt require less capital but still of an order of magnitude that might daunt all but the largest entrepreneurs. Was their interest initially inhibited by the threat of powerful public sector competitors? The threat never materialised but the misgivings it caused seem to have had a discouraging effect. The obvious moral to point is that licensees, whether public or private, must not be allowed to block growth by pre-empting capacity.

Secondly, a satisfactory pattern of coexistence can never be worked out in 'mixed' industries unless the State defines the norms to which its enterprises will seek to conform. A healthy respect for profits is only the starting point.

Licensing Policies

If State enterprise has at times seemed to be the dog in the manger, licensing policies have been even more unhelpful. The fragmentation of total capacity among many claimants has had the effect in some industries of turning away major entrepreneurs or inclining them to mark time until the field thinned out with the exit of dubious licensees. These cases are difficult to document but are widely known in industry circles.

From this one may generalise that licensing policy needs serious rethinking if future progress is not to suffer from the hesitations much in evidence during the current plan. Economies of scale must, of course, receive adequate recog-

nitition, not merely to attract the competent and resourceful entrepreneurs but also because of the intrinsic benefits to the economy. Secondly, a license (which bestows on the recipient the great privilege of reserving by State fiat a portion of capacity adjudged to be required by the country) must be made subject to a 'means test'. Something of this nature is already in force but it needs to be made far more rigorous.

No Comprehensive Approach

These are, in a sense, procedural issues. A more fundamental need is to make the formulation of plans more technically competent and comprehensive. It is hardly sufficient to set a target for machine tools in terms of the value of production to be achieved by the end of a plan period—much like ordering books by the shelf space they are to occupy. For a meaningful target to be framed a good deal of preparatory work needs to be done at the technical level which is just now no one's responsibility.

There are, doubtless, institutions like development councils but their estimates do not amount to much more than an aggregation of hunches. The basic task of detailed market investigations to assess the types of tools required by existing and projected industries does not seem to have been attempted prior to framing the Third Plan.

Steel is almost the only sector for which detailed demand studies have recently been carried out, but the questions that still remain to be answered in relation to future production planning indicate the size of the task that target setting involves. Once the targets are set, the implications thereof in terms of inputs—fuel, power, materials, components and of course investment—need to be worked out with care as a preliminary to setting related targets. The material balances worked out in relation to the Third Plan were either wrong in conception or subverted at the implementation stage, leading to the sorry state of affairs which one sees all around.

The heavy engineering projects at Ranchi and Durgapur provide

telling examples. When the Chief of the Soviet team was recently asked to assess the production prospects of the heavy machine building plant, he countered with a series of questions. When could he expect to get the materials and skilled manpower required? At full capacity, machine building would require 70,000 tons of forging and castings (to be obtained from a captive foundry-forge being set up alongside which is now two years or more behind), 45,000 tons of rolled metal of some 400 different specifications, 7,000 tons of electric motors and 600 tons of ball bearings.

He might have also mentioned an even more serious drawback—New Delhi's failure to move towards standardisation of metallurgical equipment so that this machine-building plant can start on the primary task of collecting design and workshop drawings without which manufacture cannot commence.

Completing Equipment

The report by Babich and his team of Soviet engineers, on whose recommendations the present engineering complex is based, had provided a long list of completing equipment. It was suggested that the manufacture of these should be developed separately to feed the machine-building plant. After visiting some of the private sector enterprises like Texmaco, Telco and Jessop, the Babich team came to the conclusion that work on auxiliary equipment might be farmed out to them. The team also emphasised that certain types of equipment had better be left wholly to other units which, starting small, might develop into specialised plants in the fullness of time.

While the Babich report was eagerly seized upon to get the complex started—it was a fine and impressive decision to set up a large engineering enterprise—very little has been done to ensure that the requisite completing equipment (means of control, electricals, lubricating gear, hydraulic systems) becomes available on time. In other words, even if the materials and other inputs required

within the Ranchi complex were somehow mobilised, there would still be little practical benefit from the production achieved there without the completing equipment.

Another example of planning gone haywire is provided by the associated mining machinery plant at Durgapur. The equipment for underground use will require in many instances flameproof electric motors. A source of supply does not yet exist within the country, and the plant management when interviewed early this year did not know what were New Delhi's plans for filling this gap. These motors are just one of many items which Durgapur will find it extremely difficult to procure.

The same story is repeated at the Bhopal heavy electricals plant. For the production programme envisaged for the Fourth Plan, Bhopal will need Rs. 30 crores of imports over the five years since ancillary industries have yet to develop. This brings one back to the imperative need for far more comprehensive preparations before launching new projects—something which now goes largely by default.

New Delhi officialdom will, one suspects, dismiss this plea by pointing to the rash of working parties, groups, panels and committees now allegedly functioning on detailed industry-by-industry plans. But this is only window dressing! To many, this may appear to be an extremist view but not after one has been 'privileged' to see the naive and ponderous minutes of several of these bodies. Busy businessmen and overburdened officials who adorn agencies get together for a half day, glance through papers made ready by an equally harrassed secretariat and disperse by agreeing to everything 'on principle'. This is no substitute for the detailed work which requires to be put in to make planning technically competent and complete.

Planning Commission's Role

The Planning Commission (more correctly, one wing of this vast, amorphous body) has at times talked of setting up technical task

forces to do this very job in each of eight major sectors. 'In principle', the Minister for Steel, Mines and Heavy Engineering (the person most directly involved, other than the Minister for Oil and Chemicals) agrees. But with barely two years to go before we begin on the next plan, there is not one task force functioning yet. No one is prepared to say where the hitch arises but one rather suspects that the real bottleneck is the absence of a consensus at the highest political level.

To vest the Planning Commission with added technical authority is something which the executive ministries may not particularly relish. Yet the technical task in any one field needs to be tied up at so many points with what is happening elsewhere that a ministry-wise, and therefore compartmentalised, approach does not seem to be an adequate answer. This patent inadequacy is presumably being siezed upon by others, who feel that economic coordination is their particular prerogative, to advance their own cause.

The result is half-baked planning for which we are paying a very heavy economic and political price. The need for maintenance imports is rising both because of the avoidable lags in basic industries (readily illustrated by the million tons of steel brought in during 1963-64) and because of the gaps left inadvertently or otherwise in the industrial structure.

Dependence on Aid

Caught between escalating needs and the diminishing political interest in aiding India in this period of thaw in the cold war, India's leaders are thrashing about in search of solutions. The one that T. T. Krishnamachari and his *alter ego*, Asoka Mehta, are pressing upon the country is reliance upon foreign private investment. Hence the tax concessions in this budget to key industries and to private foreign individuals, preceded by a portentous policy speech by the Finance Minister. In this he asked not only for opening the doors wider to foreign investment but also for shedding past

inhibitions which led India exclude overseas capital from vital sectors.

Many complex issues are raised by the policy which Krishnamachari is expounding which can only briefly be touched upon here. A recent British study calculates that gross foreign investment in India during the 13 year period 1948-60, both in cash and kind, came to a total of Rs. 238.6 crores but the outgoings on account of profits, royalties and repatriation of capital came to Rs. 642.9 crores. This set of figures may be deemed exceptional because of the repatriation of some plantation and petroleum capital during this period as a direct consequence of independence, but the point to note is the outgo of almost Rs. 60 crores in 1960—which must now have risen further—on account of profits and royalties. This leads the study to conclude that all 'foreign private investment is expensive. At the very least, profits run to 10 per cent a year after payment of taxes; in all probability they are much more. To this should be added the high cost of knowhow, licenses and such like'.

Other Drawbacks

The second point to make about foreign capital is its 'narrow spread', heavily dependent on the fortunes of two or three industries. A third is the unsuitability of much of the technology it brings in. Many more arguments can doubtless be adduced, but in a pattern of development which leans so heavily on foreign aid and investment there is little point in elaborating the charges.

Given the pattern, we shall need as much foreign investment as we can get regardless of the cost, immediate and prospective. Asoka Mehta, when asked why India should in striking contrast to China depend so heavily on outside aid and capital, summed up the situation in one brief comment: it all depends upon the degree of discipline that India's leaders have the will and the courage to impose upon the country.

Asoka Mehta is right in his analysis. The point to note is that self-reliance need not raise

ideological issues; countries as differently motivated as China and De Gaulle's France feel that they must not depend unduly on foreign support. Discipline on the Chinese pattern cannot perhaps be imposed on India's open society nor have we the resource endowment which buttresses De Gaulle's 'go it alone' policies. Yet, Indian industrial advance can certainly be made less dependent than it is today by a determined endeavour to do what we can for ourselves.

Need for Self-reliance

Among the developing countries, we are better off than most others in possessing a large scientific and technical cadre—African countries as W. A. Lewis points out are obliged to import even nurses and telegraphists. If only we use this cadre more fully, there is so much that we can do by way of self-help. (We could go Japanese and start to copy machines if we cannot immediately start designing them).

Much of the big and sophisticated equipment will still have to be imported, just as the USSR is currently negotiating with Britain for £ 100 m of chemical plant. But smaller and less complex units are within our competence only if we summon the necessary effort of will. Our progress may not be grand and spectacular but will be surer even if some hardship and privation have to be endured at the start.

Ideology has little bearing on the particular problems of industrial advance with which this article has been concerned. These problems need sorting out in any case to make future progress more orderly, regardless of where we are politically headed. Irrespective of the ideology, we need above all a strong central leadership which knows its mind and has the determination to ensure that policy decisions will be implemented down the line. This has been the great lack in New Delhi, a situation made worse since Bhubaneswar. How to remedy this situation is a puzzle for political pundits which this mere economic commentator had better leave well alone.

Some regional contrasts

J. KRISHNAMURTY

IN recent years it has become increasingly fashionable to make inter-regional comparisons of economic development. Particularly in a country like India, where it is difficult to get data for long periods of time, the cross-sectional approach of comparing different regions or States at a point in time, or for a limited set of years, has much to commend itself. Unhappily, however, the grave limitations of this approach are rarely appreciated, and there exists the great danger of wrong conclusions being drawn, based on the fallacy of misplaced concreteness.

One major approach has been the analysis of State incomes. This has been done for some years by various State agencies, but the first

serious effort to make inter-State comparisons was by Professor Raj.¹ On the basis of the available evidence, he suggested that, in all probability, Punjab, Rajasthan and Madhya Pradesh were forward States; then came Madras, Bihar, Bombay and Andhra Pradesh where some progress had been registered, and the remaining States had experienced hardly any changes in the first decade of economic planning in India.

While the above picture does seem substantially correct, there are severe limitations inherent in the approach and in drawing conclusions from it. The pattern of public sector investment, especially that financed by the Centre, must

*I am deeply indebted to Professor K. N. Raj for advice and comments. Responsibility for errors is, however, entirely mine.

1. K. N. Raj: 'Some Features of the Economic Growth of the Last Decade in India', *Economic Weekly*, Annual, February 1961.

be borne in mind. The differences in irrigation facilities and in the infra-structure industries at the beginning of the period would also be a significant factor determining State growth rates. The figures for income from services are highly doubtful and their distribution between States is based on the highly dubious assumption that inter-State productivity differentials do not exist, and do not increase over time. It is also not clear whether one should consider income growth or per capita income growth as an index of economic advance, since the population factor is not a purely economic variable.

Subsequent estimates of State income differ only in specific details and procedures. They are fairly reliable in respect of agriculture and manufacturing and highly conjectural in all other sectors. Estimates have also been made of

it would be best to supplement it by a consideration of inter-State productivity differentials in the commodity production sectors and an analysis of changes in the occupational distribution of workers. The absence of reliable State indices for service industries would continue to be a grave limitation; this can only be corrected by a detailed study of productivity trends which, unfortunately, has not as yet been done.

In two recent studies³, the National Council of Applied Economic Research has brought out many significant aspects of inter-State variations in income from agriculture, and from the manufacturing industry in 1960-61. It is instructive to observe the significant inter-State differentials which exist in agriculture and in the manufacturing industry.

the case of net output per acre, Assam, West Bengal and Madras are way ahead, while Rajasthan is far behind. In the industrial sector, in the case of factory establishments, Assam, Bihar and Maharashtra lead, and Jammu & Kashmir and Andhra Pradesh come at the bottom of the ladder. But in this case it is difficult to draw any significant conclusions as the nature and composition of industrial output varies considerably from State to State. In agriculture also, differences in cropping pattern have to be kept in mind. In the case of small enterprises, Punjab and West Bengal stand far ahead, and Andhra Pradesh and Orissa register an extremely low output-employment ratio.

We may now proceed to analyze shifts in the occupational distribution of workers during the period 1951-61. At present this approach is subject to severe limitations.

State	Net output per worker (All India prices) Agriculture (in Rs.)	Net output per acre (All India prices) Agriculture (in Rs.)	Output/Employ- ment ratio Factory establishments (Rs.)	Output/Employ- ment ratio Small Enterprises (Rs.)
Andhra Pradesh	335	154	1,387	236
Assam	572	323	3,544	445
Bihar	302	164	3,508	428
Gujarat	514	127	2,987	963
Jammu & Kashmir	285	180	1,083	497
Kerala	1,086	419	1,671	615
Madhya Pradesh	380	113	2,197	384
Madras	476	258	2,702	484
Maharashtra	413	122	3,421	856
Mysore	393	119	2,349	544
Orissa	500	195	2,902	280
Punjab	872	163	2,537	1,288
Rajasthan	298	66	1,861	311
Uttar Pradesh	480	170	2,323	443
West Bengal	767	300	2,823	1,101

inter-district differential in goods and services produced, by the National Council of Applied Economic Research, but one finds it difficult to place much reliance on them².

In view of the inherent limitations of the State income approach,

2. For a more elaborate discussion of the NCAER estimate see my review 'Regional Inequalities', *Economic Weekly* December 21, 1964.

From the table above one observes that in agriculture net output per worker is extremely high in Kerala, Punjab and West Bengal, and particularly low in Jammu & Kashmir and Rajasthan. But, in

3. 'Agricultural Income by States 1960-61' and 'Income and Structure of Manufacturing Industry 1960-61 (A State-wise Analysis)', National Council of Applied Economic Research, New Delhi.

The categories into which workers are divided are extremely broad and analytically hybrid, and figures for female labour are very doubtful. We shall, therefore, restrict ourselves to a consideration of shifts in male labour in two States. The States chosen are Punjab, a distinctly progressive State, and Orissa, one of the most backward States, as far as the last decade is concerned.

Period Category	Orissa 1951	Orissa Increase in 1961 over 1951	Punjab 1951	Punjab Increase in 1961 over 1951.
All workers	100	100	100	100
I Cultivators	58.00	65.57	54.48	38.43
II Agricultural Labour	16.20	11.56	9.79	1.16
III Mining, Quarrying, Livestock, Forestry, Fishing etc.	2.20	0.43	0.85	2.07
IV & V Household Industry and Manufacturing other than household industry	6.19	8.50	8.26	38.34
VI Construction	0.56	0.50	1.06	8.94
VII Trade & Commerce	3.65	— 2.99	8.55	— 3.37
VIII Transport, Storage, & Communication	0.75	1.49	2.16	3.98
IX Other Services	12.43	14.94	14.85	10.45
I+II	74.20	77.13	64.27	39.59
IV+V+VI+VIII	7.50	10.49	11.48	51.26

Source: Based on Appendix III of 'Regional Patterns of Shifts in Employment from Agriculture to Non-agriculture 1951-61', Ashok Mitra (Paper read to the All India Population Seminar, Delhi, 1964. Mimeographed.)

From the table, it is obvious that Orissa has seen a shift of workers into agriculture, while Punjab has seen a major shift away from agriculture. In the dynamic sectors like manufacturing (including household industry), construction and transport, storage and communication, Punjab has forged ahead, while Orissa has registered slight progress. The only really surprising thing which comes out of the comparison is the apparently symmetrical behaviour of trade and commerce in the two States. But the similarity is really superficial.

In Punjab the absolute fall in male workers in trade and commerce must be understood in terms of the effects of the partition. According to Cirvante⁴: 'The largest class of refugees coming from Pakistan depended on trade and business . . . As against this, the Muslims who left India were mainly cultivators and artisans'. According to the evidence of the Census Commissioner for the Dis-

placed Persons' Census, in East Punjab the ratio of 'earners' in trade and commerce to total 'earners' who had come in from West Pakistan was 26.3 per cent in October, 1948. For PEPSU, the ratio was 19.4 per cent.

It does seem likely that, in the process of rapid economic growth which occurred in Punjab in the last decade, there must have been a significant shift of workers away from trade and commerce which had an unduly large number of workers after the partition, into

industry, large and small. This, in all probability, was not merely a shift of workers, but of liquid mercantile capital as well.

In the case of Orissa, the explanation seems to be that the period 1931 to 1951 saw a very rapid growth of workers in trade and the fall in 1961 was in the nature of a corrective to the unduly rapid growth of the earlier period. This may be seen from the following table which, unfortunately, is for Bihar and Orissa, not for Orissa separately.

Year:	1911	1921	1931	1951
Bihar & Orissa	4.1	3.5	3.6	4.8

Source: Daniel and Alice Thorner: 'The Working Force in India 1881-1951', Census of India 1961 Project, Indian Statistical Institute, Bombay. (Mimeographed). These figures relate to the percentage of male workers in Trade and are obtained from series 3 of Part Four of the above work.

4. Vakil: 'Economic Consequences of the Partition', p. 130-131.

City/Year Category	Amritsar		Ludhiana		Jullundur	
	1951	1961	1951	1961	1951	1961
I — IX	100	100	100	100	100	100
I	3.08	0.44	2.36	0.61	2.65	1.09
II	0.36	0.57	0.05	0.26	2.40	0.73
III (excluding mining and quarrying)	0.24	0.67	0.01	0.83	0.15	0.54
IV & V (including mining and quarrying)	15.68	33.82	8.29	42.47	13.17	31.06
VI	1.09	8.04	5.43	3.31	—	2.70
VII	29.96	25.28	31.84	19.61	25.96	19.97
VIII	7.06	10.61	5.44	8.37	7.11	10.40
IX	42.58	25.57	46.58	24.54	48.56	33.57
IV + V + VI + VII + Mining & Quarrying	23.83	52.47	19.16	54.15	20.28	44.16

Source: 'Occupational Structure of Cities 1901-61': B. R. Kalra. Paper read to the All India Seminar on Population, Delhi March 1964 (Mimeographed).

The remarkable performance of the Punjab deserves further elaboration. Punjab has the third highest per capita consumption of electricity in 1961-62. In industry, the performance is stupendous. Net value added, in factories covered by the Census of Manufacturing Industry, increased by 225 per cent in 1958 over 1950. The output of paper increased between 1956-57 and 1961-62 by 134 per cent, that of cement by 50 per cent and re-rolled steel by 115 per cent. The number of cycles produced increased by 116 per cent, sewing machines by 52 per cent and the value of agricultural implements and machine tools increased by 255 per cent. In the field of agriculture, taking 1950-51 as base=100, in 1961-62, the index was 157.29 for foodgrains, 316.91 for fibres, 226.14 for non-food crops and 176.20 for all agricultural products.⁵

Another index of the magnitude of the Punjab Leap Forward is the massive shift in occupational structure in the three major cities

of Punjab, as indicated in the table above.

In these three cities the impact of industrialization is massive. What is interesting is that not merely have the number of workers in trade and commerce fallen in these cases, but there are also big falls under the 'other services' category. Unless we have a further break down of 'other services' we cannot be really sure, but it does seem likely that general labour in particular would have shifted from this category, on a large scale, into industry.

The analysis does suggest that there is one State which has registered significant economic development in the last ten years. This has not been one-sided development; agriculture and industry have both grown at remarkable rates. In this sense, Punjab provides a contemporary parallel for other States and serves to prove that rapid economic development is possible in a democratic set-up.

When one comes to explanations, one runs into difficulties. While large-scale recruitment from this region to the army did prove a vehicle of modernization, it is difficult to judge the extent to which it did so. The partition too was a

significant factor making for greater mobility, adaptability and a greater orientation towards economic achievement. It undoubtedly brought in a wealthy class with liquid capital willing to experiment with new ways of making money. Irrigation in Punjab was an inherited asset which even before the introduction of planning was being effectively utilized in conjunction with modern production techniques. This undoubtedly made the response to increased irrigation much more marked in Punjab than elsewhere. There were also perhaps a large number of cultural and sociological factors responsible for Punjab's superior economic performance, but on these one can only speculate.

The strategic significance of agriculture to a programme of industrialization is well brought out by the case of Punjab—a State deficient in minerals and such essential raw materials as iron and coal. Successful agriculture and adventurous entrepreneurship seem to make up the amalgam of economic progress. This is one of the biggest lessons one can draw from regional contrasts—that it is not so much the resource endowment, as the efficiency of utilization that makes for economic advance.

5. The figures in this paragraph are obtained from the 'Statistical Abstract of Punjab 1962' issued by the Economic and Statistical Adviser to the Government of Punjab, Chandigarh, 1963.

Savings and income inequalities

RANGANATH BHARADWAJ

THE quantitative exercises undertaken to estimate savings in the Indian economy by the Reserve Bank of India¹ and the NCAER²

have given rise to conflicting opinions regarding the actual rates of savings and their policy implications. The NCAER surprised us

1. 'Estimates of savings and investment in the Indian Economy: 1950-51 to 1957-58'—*Reserve Bank of India Bulletin*, March 1960, followed up by another study extending the findings

to 1958-59 in the same publication of August 1961.

2. National Council of Applied Economic Research: 'Savings in India', April, 1961.

when it claimed that the average savings-income ratio moved up from around 6 per cent during the period 1948-1951 to 8 per cent during the First Five Year Plan and further to 10 per cent during the first two years of the Second Plan. Compared to the Reserve Bank's estimate of the average savings-income ratio of 6.6 per cent during the First Five Year Plan and 7.9 per cent during the first three years of the Second Plan, the findings of the NCAER are certainly reassuring! The NCAER further cheered us up when it placed the marginal propensity to save at 20 per cent—almost equal to the rate achieved in some of the advanced economies—as against the more modest estimate of the Reserve Bank.

The Reality

Recently, Professor K. N. Raj³ and Dr. A. Rudra⁴ have subjected these findings to rigorous scrutiny. The upshot of their analysis is (i) that the estimates of the NCAER are on the higher side, (ii) that in the absence of suitable basic statistics both the studies had to resort to certain arbitrary empirical procedures rendering the validity of any sophisticated deductions drawn therefrom highly tenuous and (iii) that the problem of generating a high rate of savings required by the planned developmental programmes still remains very much with us.

This failure to achieve a satisfactory rate of domestic savings becomes all the more disturbing when viewed against the background of increasing income inequalities, growing unemployment and underemployment (both reflecting in the distressingly low levels of living of a large section of the population), increasing dependence on foreign assistance and a low rate of growth indicating also the low productivity of investments already made. It is usually argued that a price has to be paid

by keeping egalitarian considerations in abeyance if a higher rate of savings and investment is to be generated. We seem to have paid this price alright; but in return we have secured just a salesman's sample of growth! Our experience compels us to have a closer look at this oversimplified proposition which presents a high rate of growth as necessarily antithetical to a more equitable distribution. In what follows, an attempt is made to analyse, though in a crude and indicative way, some aspects of this issue.

Following Ramsey's fundamental work⁵, theoretical discussions in the search for an optimum rate of saving have proceeded on the basis of an aggregative model wherein a single (homogeneous) decision unit chooses an intertemporal pattern of consumption on the basis of a certain utility function defined over time and a pure discount rate which reflects the valuation placed on time by the decision units. Under such circumstances, currently foregone consumption is compensated by a higher stream of consumables in future (provided the system is 'productive').

Thus the choice between different rates of growth of total output is reduced to merely a problem of time preference. The question of interpersonal distribution of sacrifices or of benefits does not arise in such a formulation. However, this aspect cannot be ignored, especially in the context of an underdeveloped economy, where distinct income-classes are too much of a reality to be aggregated into an homogeneous unit.

The Two Categories

The argument proceeds, in the literature on development, on the basis of a rather broad classification of the society into two income categories, viz., a class of profit-earners and a class of wage earners. It is then assumed, what seems most natural, that the marginal rate of savings of the profit-earning class with its higher income is appreciably higher than

that of the wage earning class having subsistence income. For analytical convenience, the marginal propensity to save of the wage-earners is assumed sometimes to be zero. It is then a matter of straightforward arithmetical logic that the higher the share of the profit-earning class, the greater the instantaneous rate of savings in the economy.

From this it is further deduced that a profit-oriented distribution would result not only in a higher rate of growth but would also generate a continuous process of industrialization leading ultimately to higher income levels through full employment⁶. This would be so provided: (i) all savings are invested and (ii) the marginal productivity of labour increases continuously with investment leading to larger and larger investible surpluses; wages not rising *pari passu* with productivity. The policy inference to be drawn from this reasoning seems to be that the pattern of investment and the choice of technique in the economy should be such as to generate more income in the hands of the profit-earning class.

Main Features

Let us examine this thesis in the context of an economy, such as ours, which has the following features:

1. Acute income-disparities prevail with almost 70 per cent of the population living at a bare subsistence level.
2. The major sector (agriculture) accounting for more than half of the national income and employing nearly three-fourths of the population suffers from low productivity and a high man-land ratio which is on a steady increase.
3. The industrial sector is sharply set apart from the backward agricultural sector in all its socio-economic features and is dominated

3. 'The Marginal Rate of Saving in the Indian Economy', Oxford Economic Papers, February 1962.

4. 'Rate of Saving in India', *Economic Weekly*, Special Number, July, 1963.

5. F. P. Ramsey: 'A Mathematical Theory of Saving', *Economic Journal*, 1928.

6. See W. A. Lewis: 'Economic Development with Unlimited Supplies of Labour', Manchester School, May, 1954.

by an oligopolistic market structure.

4. Finally, the State has undertaken planning in the framework of a 'mixed' economy.

The problem of growth has two distinct aspects. There is the problem of generating savings—not only at a point of time, but also assuring increasing volumes of investible surpluses in the future. Secondly, we have the problem of utilization of savings such as to lead to the fulfilment of the social objectives (which, in our case, are accelerating the rate of growth and lessening inequalities of income and wealth).

Generation of Savings

Take the first question of the generation of savings. That savings would be generated at a point of time if incomes are concentrated in the hands of the high-saver, profit-earning group needs no proof. But the question then arises: can there not be a possibility that the high rate of instantaneous savings so generated conflicts with a future higher average rate of savings for the economy as a whole?

Such a conflict could arise if concentration of incomes retards the general labour productivity in the economy and reduces the efficient realization of the productive potentialities of investment. It is possible that labour productivity is positively and highly correlated with income in the very low ranges. The technologically feasible maximum output may not be achievable due to the very low absorptive capacity of labour reflecting in low skills, weak organisation, lack of incentives and interest in work and physical incapacities due to sheer malnutrition.*

This is strikingly evident in the agricultural sector where the cultivators have shown very poor response in respect of utilizing the available irrigational and other facilities. When the cultivator refuses to take any risks in the form of any deviation from his traditional mode of operation, with

his meagre income, his behaviour appears to be quite rational. When such conditions prevail in a major sector like agriculture whose productivity so crucially determines and sets the pace for industrial programmes the situation becomes all the more serious.

Up to a certain level of income, one could consider productivity as being strongly correlated with income arising from a qualitative improvement in labour and organization, apart from the possibility of better utilization of complementary inputs. If this is so, developmental efforts aimed at bettering the conditions of the very low income groups need not necessarily endanger the aggregate saving potential in the economy in the long run. This might, in fact, lay a stronger foundation for generating higher savings in the future, even though the instantaneous rate of savings might be adversely affected.

Profit-oriented Investment

Alternatively, one could still visualize a highly profit-oriented investment pattern supplemented by a State-guaranteed scheme assuring the 'minimum standard of living' to all which might help sustain labour productivity. This implies, however, a bold State plan and necessitates a huge amount of public savings.

One would, however, be correct in pointing out that the productivity response to income increases might slacken as incomes are improved from very low levels and that even thereafter the incomes would still be low enough to generate zero or very negligible voluntary savings. A profit-oriented investment pattern would then be favoured on the assumption that the private savings so generated are utilized either voluntarily or through efficient controls in such a way as to fulfil the social objectives. Alternatively, the taxation system should be efficient enough to draw upon these surpluses.

However, the concentration of wealth and income in the hands of a few renders, as the experience suggests, the efficient and effective operation of the taxation or any

measures of control extremely difficult. A highly progressive taxation, which becomes necessary in such cases provides great incentives for evasion and creates pressure groups which makes efficient administration of such taxes almost impossible⁷. Also, it does not seem feasible to sustain a high rate of growth over a long period from the savings of only a minority with a vast majority outside or on the fringe of the tax net.

Social Implications

At the same time it becomes politically very difficult to increase beyond a limit the tax burden on the less favoured sections of the community, who being aware of the iniquities of the situation refuse to join in even though they might be capable of contributing to the savings effort. This situation arises because individuals would be ready to sacrifice provided there are others who would do the same⁸.

The individual, in isolation, feels that his savings decisions are too insignificant to make any difference to the total picture and, as such, loses a sense of social purpose (which is especially necessary if the lower income groups are expected to restrain consumption), or, more importantly, feels that any sacrifice made at considerable disutility to himself would not fruition in future benefits—at least not proportionate to his own sacrifice, considering the iniquitous initial position. This is further strengthened by his scepticism regarding the possibilities of comparable sacrifices from those better off.

Whereas the cost of initial sacrifices for these individuals is great enough, the distribution of benefits is not guaranteed to them—in fact, they are the first victims of inflation which almost always accompanies economic development. Such a situation makes even the middle income group less inclined towards making a sustained sav-

* Consider the colossal losses incurred due to the high rate of premature death which renders the investment made at considerable cost totally abortive

7. See Prof. D. R. Gadgil's 'Planning and Economic Policy in India', 1962 for an incisive treatment of this point which recurs in a number of places.

8. This aspect has been very lucidly presented by Prof. A. K. Sen in his 'On Optimising the Rate of Saving', *Economic Journal*, September, 1961.

ings effort — indeed, it is positively hostile to taxation and other forced savings methods*. Perhaps, built-in egalitarian forces in the investment pattern and State policy might make it easier to tax the lower and middle income groups without invoking strong antipathy.

The Oligopolist Structure

As pointed out earlier, a highly profit-stimulating investment pattern could be favoured provided there are in the process inherent forces working towards the attainment of the social objective of a more equitable distribution. However, the presence of an oligopolistic structure in the industrial sector has to be reckoned with as a forceful fact working against this⁹. The presence of economies of scale, technological discontinuities and the possibility of product differentiation facilitates the creation and strengthening of oligopolies.

The oligopolists, unlike the producers under perfect competition, are in a better position to appreciate the total market situation. Further, they will have little inducement to expand production as additional output will have to be sold at a fast declining marginal revenue in view of limited effective demand which again is a consequence of low incomes in general.

However, this does not imply that no investment is undertaken. It, nevertheless, has important consequences for the pattern of investment. In the first place, investment is undertaken in those industries which already have a considerable demand like textiles. However, since the increase in aggregate demand is still handicapped by general poverty, the new investment displaces the traditional units in the industry, causing technological unemployment. This would mean that the newly employed in the modern industry would receive a wage which would be higher than the average for the economy. And this at the cost of

the loss of income and employment to those in the traditional sector who now swell the ranks of those whose income is well below the average wage for the economy. This substitution, in itself, should not be disfavoured since it adds to productivity, if the technological unemployment is remedied through the expansive forces of development. However, since the gaining and the losing sectors have no close links, the process is hindered.

Consequences

Another consequence of the oligopolists situation would be the relative ease with which they can command scarce resources such as foreign exchange, capital and skilled labour. This leads to distortions in allocations through the adoption of highly capital-intensive technology or by way of the production of luxury goods. The production of luxury goods is accompanied by an aggressive salesmanship which sets up, on the one hand, demonstration effects and creates, on the other hand, an unproductive service sector.

This eats into whatever savings would possibly originate from the urban working and middle classes which are relatively better off being the recipients of some of the benefits of industrialization. Quite apart from the dissipation of savings, it produces social tensions which might well hinder sustained growth not to speak of any planned attempts to redistribute benefits in favour of the backward sectors of the economy¹⁰.

The burden of the above is not to deny the importance of generating investible surpluses but merely to underline the even greater importance of the utilization of these surpluses so that the social objectives may not be frustrated. Admittedly the reasoning has been neither rigorous nor exhaustive. However, attention has been focused on a few issues which, I feel, are relevant to the formulation of policies aimed at achieving a sustained high rate of savings over time.

* Witness the recent strong opposition to the CDS. And this, let us remember, was during an emergency.

9. See Luigi Spaventa: Dualism in Economic Growth: Banca Nazionale del Lavoro, December, 1959.

10. See Professor Gadgil's provocative convocation address to the Nagpur University delivered on January 20, 1962. Reprinted in publication cited earlier.

Taxation

ASHOK MITRA

LET me start this discussion with one or two simple propositions. If we want the government to perform certain activities, we have to provide it with the requisite command over resources. The larger the burden we impose on the State, the wider must be its command over resources. A government can of course always create money so as to be able to command goods and services from within the economy. But since this adds to the total supply of purchasing power in the country, prices rise, instability sets in, production and investment decisions get affected adversely, and the fixed income groups are badly hurt. On the other hand, through taxation, the government can compulsorily acquire a proportion of the purchasing power of the community and use the appropriation for commanding the goods and services necessary to accomplish the tasks which the community has in the first place asked it to.

In this instance, since there is no increase of total purchasing power, there is no inflation either. (This is not always true, but as a statement of first principle is per-

haps unexceptionable.) If the government can obtain additional purchasing power through floating loans or obtaining more profits from the public enterprises, then too no rise in prices would take place. In an underdeveloped economy, the possibilities of raising resources either from the capital market or from profits from State enterprises are rather restricted. The broad choice in fiscal policy is therefore between taxation and inflation. If we want to stay away from the hazards of inflation, the major fiscal instrument has to be taxation.

It will be indeed unfortunate if there is any illusion in this regard. Economic development, after all, involves a cost; it calls for some sacrifice at the margin for the community as a whole. Where a substantial proportion of the developmental activities is carried on in the State sector, this sacrifice would assume the form of additional taxation. How this burden of additional taxation should be distributed amongst the different sections of the community can, and will be, a matter of argument, but nobody who claims to believe in

State-directed economic planning can question the need for larger tax revenue. If he does, he is either a hypocrite or an ignoramus.

Some Nursery Arithmetic

Now for some nursery arithmetic. Our national income in 1963-64 must have been in the region of Rs. 16,000 crores at current prices. The aggregate expenditure on defence services has amounted to nearly Rs. 800 crores, that is, 5 per cent of the national income. The defence outlay in the 1964-65 budget is of a similar order of magnitude, and we will be on fairly safe grounds to take it as datum that, for an indefinite number of years, the country's defence expenditure would continue to be around 5 per cent of the national income.

It is also extremely unlikely that, however economy-minded we try to be, considering together the Union and the State governments, the cost of current administration could be brought down below the current level, which is about 6 per cent of the national income. In fact, the presumption is the other way, namely, that as the capital stock in the government sector gets enlarged, sooner or later the proportion of current national product which is to be set up apart for purposes of maintenance will have to increase, and there will be no compensatory contraction elsewhere. Between the requirements for defence and for current administration and maintenance, therefore, resources equivalent to at least 11 per cent of national income will have to be provided for in the government sector for a number of years from now on.

The requirements for the public sector Plan outlays will come on top of the above mentioned categories of expenditure. Let us proceed on the assumption that the over-all value of the capital-output ratio in the Indian economy is 3:1.¹ (The capital-output ratio is an animal of many hues, but, for purposes of this exercise, let it be taken as a broad indicator of the

efficiency of capital investments in terms of additional output, after averaging out investments in the economy over a number of years.) For an average rate of national income growth of 5 per cent per annum, capital formation of the order of 15 per cent of the national income would therefore be necessary; for a 6 per cent rate of growth, the requirement would be for capital formation of the order of 18 per cent; and so on.

If we now introduce an ideological bias and stipulate that at least three-fifths of new investments must take place in the State sector—as has been spelled out in the Third Plan—, clearly capital formation on government account should approximate between 9 to 11 per cent of the national income, in case our target continues to be a steady rate of growth of the order of between 5 to 6 per cent.

Resources equivalent to 20-22 per cent of national income have therefore to flow to the State exchequer if the government is to meet the cost of current administration, satisfy the nation's requirements for defence, and also fulfil the Plan targets in accordance with the hypotheses stated above. If, at any time, it is decided to raise further the share of government in total investment operations, there has to be a corresponding increase in the proportion of resources to be placed at the disposal of the State.

Significant Factors

What has been the position in recent years? A significant factor which has somewhat eased the strain on the budgetary process is that, for the last few years, external aid amounting to almost 3 per cent of the national income has been added to the government's resources. Internal-market operations, including several small savings schemes, have been yielding around 4 per cent of the national income and the surplus from public enterprises (including railways) has been contributing the equivalent of another 2 per cent.

From non-tax and external sources, therefore, the public sector is currently being able to scrape together nearly 9 per cent

of the national income. Tax revenue in 1962-63 amounted to about 11.5 per cent of the national income, and the revised estimates indicate that this has gone up to almost 13.5 per cent in 1963-64. Thus resources aggregating 22 or 23 per cent of the national income are already under the command of the State, and, if our assumptions are correct, should generate a 5 to 6 per cent rate of growth per annum.

Relevant Questions

Three questions can be raised at this stage: (a) are we satisfied that our investment allocation between the private and government sectors is reasonable, and would not require a shift in favour of additional public capital formation in the near future; (b) are we satisfied that the assumption regarding the value of the capital-output ratio in the Indian economy does not need any upward revision; and, finally, (c) are we confident that, other things remaining the same, we would be able at least to maintain the current relationship between taxation and national income?

To consider (a) first. Obviously, there is an element of cost involved in expanding the socialist sector in the economy, and it is on the face of it improbable that this cost can be met either through floatation of loans or through external accommodation. If it is nonetheless decided that the pattern of allocation of fresh investments must be altered from, let us say, the Third Plan ratio of 3:2 to 4:3 (or 5:4) in favour of the public sector, either the public enterprises have to yield more surplus, or the citizens must be persuaded to surrender more to the State in the form of taxation.

The issue involved in (b) is even more crucial. For the last three

2. National income in the base year of the Third Plan, 1960-61, was Rs. 14,160 crores at current prices. The hoped-for increase in national income over the five years is around 30 per cent, that is, nearly Rs. 4,250 crores in terms of 1960-61 prices. Since postulated total investment is Rs. 10,000 crores, the capital-output ratio works out to something like 2.4:1. But may be one should not take the Third Plan statements too seriously!

1. Some further arithmetic will show that, if one considers the entire period of the First and Second Five Year Plans, the aggregate value of the capital-output ratio has in fact been close to 3:1.

years we have not been able to reach anywhere near the goal of 5 to 6 per cent growth per annum. It could well be that the underlying assumptions regarding the efficiency of the investments undertaken are seriously at fault,² and we might feel the need to increase the size of investment operations across-the-board, if part of the lost ground is to be retrieved. That would mean enlarging the scale of capital formation activities in the government sector as well, and would necessarily call for more tax revenue.

An accelerated programme of both socialisation and over-all rate of growth would thus imply a higher appropriation of tax revenue as a proportion of national income, for the other sources are likely to be inelastic over the next few years.³ Can we really raise this proportion, or even maintain it at last year's level? The current year's budget proposals, alas, would indicate otherwise.

The Tax Plateau

Tax yield in 1963-64, for the Centre and the States taken together, would add up to around Rs. 2175 crores if one takes the revised estimates; with national income at current prices estimated at Rs. 16,000 crores, the tax revenue thus works out to 13.5 per cent of national income, as already indicated. Assuming conservatively that real national income would increase by 4 per cent in the current year, additional income generated would therefore be nearly Rs. 650 crores at 1963-64 prices. Since the yield from the new tax proposals (Union and States taken together) would come up to barely Rs. 65 crores, obviously the marginal rate of taxation envisaged is just around 10 per cent. The over-all rate of taxation, on this basis, is thus expected to decline from last year's level. It could be that, as has happened consistently in recent years, the yield from

existing tax categories would be higher than what has been assumed, but, even taking this possibility into account, it would be hard to suggest that total tax revenue in 1964-65 would reach beyond 13.5 per cent of the national income. Very definitely, we have arrived at a tax plateau.

Political Realities

It would be rather crude and superficial to assert that the absence of severer measures of taxation in this year's proposals represents a deliberate holding back on the part of the Finance Minister so as to garner a number of personal political harvests. Nonetheless, broader political implications certainly inhere to any set of budget proposals, and it is a perfectly understandable point of view that a Minister of Finance must operate within the boundary conditions set by existing political realities. Let us consider what these realities are.

There is, in the first place, an element of optical illusion in the statement that the level of taxation in the country currently amounts to 13.5 per cent of national income. In agriculture, which still continues to produce nearly half of the total national output, the burden of taxation scarcely amounts to 7 per cent of aggregate income. The yield from direct taxation does not certainly exceed 2 per cent of agricultural income, and, even when allowance is made for the relatively heavy imposts added by the 1963-64 Union budget, the incidence of indirect tax revenue too cannot amount to more than 5 per cent of total income.⁴ Clearly, the aggregate tax revenue of 13.5 per cent of national income is a compound of two disparate tax structures: since in agriculture the level of taxation is only around 7 per cent of income, in the non-agricultural sectors the tax burden has to be in the region of 18 to 19 per cent of income.

Certain dilemmas in Indian taxation policy immediately be-

come obvious. Even in the non-agricultural sectors, many amongst the low income-earning groups would not be paying any direct taxes, and therefore the effective burden of taxation on some higher income categories would amount to 25 per cent of income or still more. These categories would comprise the industrial and business communities, civil servants and major professional groups. They would include not only the people who organise private sector activities, but also those who administer and manage public affairs, and educate and inform the nation. While they would not collectively constitute a significant proportion of the total electorate, they are strategically located, and are politically most vocal.

It is arguable that, when average tax levels tend to exceed 25 per cent of income, at least some amongst these professional groups start getting disturbed; disincentive and disenchantment ensue, and if this disenchantment proceeds afar, not only are investing decisions affected, political alienation also sets in. The Congress, as an amalgam of class interests, has to be sensitive to such nuances in the evolving situation: this, I suspect,—and not the Kamaraj Plan—explains the replacement of Morarji Desai by T. T. Krishnamachari, and also explains why the accent in this Union budget is on selective readjustments and not on further advances. The substitution of the super profits tax on companies by the much less onerous surtax, and the substantial relief accorded in personal income tax to those earning more than Rs. 15,000 per annum, would indicate the crystallisation of a judgment that taxable capacity has about been reached for a fair number of non-agricultural income-earning groups.

The Alternative

What then is the alternative? If further tax burden on non-agriculture has to be ruled out, tax revenue as a proportion of national income can be raised only if the income-earners in agriculture could

3. This may come as a snap judgment, but when one considers together the five major State activities, namely, railways, steel, power, irrigation and State trading, and reviews the current trends of net returns in each, any optimism seems uncalled for.

4. For a detailed discussion, see my contribution: 'Tax Burden for Indian Agriculture', in *Administration and Economic Development in India*, Duke University Press, 1963.

be persuaded to part with a higher fraction of their incomes. Here we come face-to-face with the other basic dilemma in the country's tax policy. It would be grossly unfair to push up the incidence of indirect taxes on agricultural income beyond the current level: a great part of the burden of the indirect levies falls on the landless labourers and small cultivators, and it will be doing violence to all canons of fiscal justice to press harder on them. Should not therefore direct taxes on agriculture be increased steeply, and at least doubled from the present ridiculous level of 2 per cent of total income?

Votes and Agriculture

Unfortunately, agriculture is where the votes are. Under the Constitution, taxation on agricultural property and incomes comes under the purview of the States. The yield from direct taxes on agriculture can improve only if State governments are prepared to raise additional resources from land revenue and agricultural income tax, the proceeds from both of which have remained stagnant since Independence. The obstacles here are almost insuperable. As is well known, the Congress party machines at the States level are usually controlled by the prosperous peasantry, and their reluctance to tax themselves is understandable; there is a similar reluctance on the part of the opposition parties.

In those few States where attempts have been made to increase the yield from land revenue through enhancement of rates or levy of surcharges, the result has been the generation of much political heat but very little of additional resources. After all, adult suffrage as a weapon of retribution cannot be taken lightly: it is the top 20 per cent of the agricultural population who would be most hit by any type of additional levies on land, and they control the bulk of the rural votes. It is therefore hardly feasible to raise the land revenue charges, however flimsy might be their current impact; it is equally impossible to enlarge the scope of the agricultural income tax (only nine States at

present enforce such a tax, and the aggregate yield is less than Rs. 11 crores); cess on improved lands too has to be ruled out as impracticable.

Where do we go from here? Most of the arguments against raising the burden of direct taxation on agriculture are lightweight. For example, it has been said that, with net output per acre roughly around Rs. 200 per annum, a family holding 15 acres of land would have an annual income of only Rs. 3000, and, since non-agricultural incomes up to this level are exempted from direct taxes, we would be ill advised to recommend a different treatment for agricultural incomes. But the fact remains that about half of the total cultivable land is made up of holdings of more than 15 acres in size: enhanced rates of levy on ownership — and cultivation — of such land could go a long way to ease the problem of resources for development. It is also difficult to see why the administrative burdens for collecting such additional levies should be any greater than what is associated with the task of collecting ordinary land revenue.

Lessons of History

Since agricultural tax sources have remained inelastic, whatever agricultural development has been attempted under the plans has had to be financed through a net draft on the other sectors of the economy. One can build a moral case to justify this, but nonetheless this is a reversal of the process of history. British economic growth was sparked off by the Industrial Revolution, which was largely made possible through transfer of the resources of the gentlemen-farmers for industrial operations. The economic upsurge of the United States in the latter half of the last century can be mostly attributed to southern agriculture, which provided the surplus for industrial expansion in the North-East. In the present century, both Japan and the Soviet Union illustrate cases of growth propelled by resources squeezed out of agriculture.

Of course, there is no *a priori* reason why we must not try to

innovate and see whether we might not obtain the necessary savings for economic growth from the non-agricultural sections of the community. But the practical difficulties are formidable. We cannot simultaneously subsidise both the rural peasantry and the urban electorate. Subsidy somewhere means additional taxation somewhere else. With the current level of taxation very near to 20 per cent of income in the non-agricultural sectors, the scope for further taxes is certainly limited there in the existing situation. No doubt administrative devices to check evasion would be of great help in improving the collection of tax revenue, but, despite my socialist convictions, I for one am unable to accept the proposition that elimination of black marketeers and corrupt businessmen is enough to solve the problem of resource mobilisation.

Summing Up

Let me sum up. In my judgment, we are heading towards an impasse. Foreign aid, according to all indications, is tapering off. Surplus from public enterprises is unlikely to increase very much in the near future; the general clamour, we must not forget, is to subsidise such activities. In the circumstances, if we want both accelerated economic growth and progressive socialisation of the economy and at the same time a larger outlay on defence services, taxation as a proportion of national income must go up. But since the political theology demands that the agricultural community should be subsidised and not taxed, the only source of fresh taxation has to be the urban population. However, if the latter, in view of the fact that income growth has slowed down, prices are rising and, in any case, they are already contributing more than their share, refuse to pay more taxes, the authorities would then have to throw in the sponge.

Clearly, we are fast approaching a situation where something will have to give: will it be rapid economic growth, or will it be the issue of socialism, or will it be the notion that subsidy is a painless, costless operation?

Planning and controls

A. K. BAGCHI

THE issue of direct physical controls has acquired fresh significance after the decision of the Government of India to decontrol coal and most varieties of steel. In a centrally planned economy some direct controls are necessary in order to achieve the goals specified by the government. The main reason for this is that government cannot rely on the free operation of the market mechanism to bring about the desired results, particularly if there is a tendency for demand to outrun supply in most commodities.

If, as an alternative to directing the allocation of resources by means of controls, government allows the prices to find their own levels, three undesirable results will generally follow. First, producers will tend to invest the resources in projects which yield quick results. In an underdeveloped economy such as India this will considerably damage the prospects of growth in the long run, as the more productive projects often take a long time to mature and yield their profits very slowly. Also, projects which yield large external economies but are not directly profitable will not be taken up.

Secondly, if there is excess demand for the major commodities, an inflationary situation will develop, with adverse consequences for the distribution of income, and for the balance of

payments. Thirdly, the results of government economic policy will become largely unpredictable. For, the allocation of the scarce resources over time cannot be predicted under the haphazard operation of the market mechanism. If, furthermore, prices rise continually, this will introduce another element of uncertainty: all prices do not rise uniformly, and the expectation in people's minds that prices will rise will further distort the situation in a fashion which is very difficult to predict beforehand.

Hence it becomes necessary to check the movement of prices in some respects and supplement the operation of the market mechanism by means of controls over economic activities. Along with the institution of controls over production, distribution and consumption of the commodities concerned, a definite price policy has to be formulated. It is possible to allow prices for certain non-essential categories of consumption of a commodity to find their own level, while ensuring the supply of the commodity for some essential uses at a fixed price. This is what was in effect recommended by the Raj Committee in the case of steel.

Alternatively, prices can be fixed with reference to the costs of production at market prices. This is the policy which was generally followed by the Indian Tariff

Board and the Indian Tariff Commission in the past. Finally, prices may be fixed on the basis of the relative degrees of scarcity as indicated by the plan. These are nothing but what are commonly known as 'shadow prices' or 'accounting prices'.

Pricing

As the name indicates, accounting prices are aids to economic calculation. The solution to a problem of achieving certain given ends will involve a particular allocation of resources between different uses; associated with this solution will be, under certain assumptions, a set of prices for the resources. One can, if it is found convenient to do so, use these prices for calculating the profitability of any new project which is proposed. The rationale of deriving shadow or accounting prices is that the market often fails to reflect the proper degree of scarcity of a particular resource: a favourite example is that of labour in underdeveloped countries.

Unskilled labour is generally in excess supply in these countries; hence in calculating the profitability of projects it is often recommended that labour should be treated as a costless good. This does not imply that labourers *should* be paid a zero wage, or that there might not be costs involved in moving workers from villages to towns, and converting an unskilled, undernourished village labourer into a skilled, properly nourished industrial worker.

Shadow prices deduced from common sense considerations are only a rough guide when detailed plans do not exist: in a properly formulated plan, the problem of allocation of scarce resources will have to be solved directly with reference to the objectives specified.

Even in a centrally planned economy, it is not possible to direct the use of resources entirely by means of shadow prices. That is to say, one cannot say in all cases that a particular resource, say steel has a greater shadow price in the production of tractors than in the production of cars and therefore

should be directed to the production of tractors. The reason is that the valid comparison may be not between the shadow prices of steel in the two uses, irrespective of the scales of production, but between the total values of output yielded in the two uses when the scales of production of cars and tractors are specified.

Moreover, the relative values yielded in the two uses may also be altered as one changes the horizon of the plan. If one considers only a five year period as the time horizon, the export of high grade coking coal from India may yield a greater value than it does if it is used within the country. But if the horizon is extended to twenty years the ranking of the two uses in terms of values may be changed.

Private Enterprise Criterion

In a partially planned economy such as India, the prospect of guiding the use of resources by means of shadow prices is even more remote. By the very rationale of its existence, private enterprise cannot be interested in the maximization of social welfare as such. The ultimate criterion for the use of resources to a private businessman cannot be anything except profit. To him, it is immaterial that the shadow price of labour is zero; what matters is that he has to incur certain monetary costs (including wages, contribution to workers' provident fund, etc.) for each labourer he employs. In the same way, the total benefits to society accruing from a project over a long period of time are not directly relevant to the businessman; if he is really interested in the maximization of profit, he will try to find out the combination of projects which will yield him the greatest amount of net assets in the long run.

There is no point in criticising private enterprise for following such principles: the ultimate criterion of efficiency for it is provided by profitability. Instead of trying to curb its efficiency, the price and control systems must be designed in such a way that following the profit motive itself, the private entrepreneurs adopt policies which

are conducive to the goals set by the government. If prices and control systems can be manipulated by the private entrepreneurs so as to deflect the course of economic policy, then the only remedy is to see that the opportunities of making a profit by violating government regulations are narrowed down.

It can be argued that even if controls and prices are properly designed with an eye to the broad objectives of social and economic policy, in a partially planned economy undergoing development, departures from intended results are bound to take place. For, if the optional allocation of resources differs radically from the allocation which yields the greatest profit in the short run, speculators will find ways of diverting the scarce resources from the socially more beneficial but less profitable uses to socially less beneficial but more profitable uses. If this is true, then one has to recommend direct physical allocation of all the scarce resources even in a partially planned economy: that is to say, the remedy for evasion of controls on prices and controls may be sought in a greater stringency of the physical allocation system.

Haphazard Control

However, this particular argument cannot really be tested in India for the simple reason that most of the control measures were instituted in India in an *ad hoc* fashion to deal with specific problems of scarcity. The prices of controlled commodities and the methods of allocation of scarce resources when the latter are subject to direct control were never related in any systematic fashion to the broad objectives of economic policy. The statutorily fixed prices and the control methods in India are *ad hoc*, haphazard, complicated and uncertain in their effects. Furthermore, they encourage the concentration of economic power, which runs counter to the aims of the economic policy of the government of India. The remedy of decontrol will cure the disease only by killing the patient.

Two specific illustrations can be given of the above contentions.

First, let us take the case of foreign exchange. It is generally agreed that the official rate of exchange does reflect the real relative values of rupees and foreign currency, particularly the currency of advanced economies. This is not primarily because the Indian price level is, in general, higher than the price levels of other countries at the official rate of exchange. The main reason for considering the Indian rupee overvalued is that while there are many commodities (primarily capital and intermediate goods) for which demand is far in excess of supply within India and which can be produced much more cheaply in other countries than in India (some of these commodities are still not produced within India at all), there are very few Indian commodities for which the similar propositions would be true in advanced countries.

Defects in The System

With the Indian exports falling short of Indian imports by large margins and with foreign exchange reserves completely exhausted, it was inevitable that foreign exchange control would be instituted in various forms. Even the advocates of the devaluation of the rupee would not claim that completely flexible exchange rates would solve the problem of continually adverse balance of payments without completely throttling the growth of investment. The complaint is not primarily against the control of transactions in foreign exchange as such, but against the principles (or lack of principles) and the organisation of the exchange control system.

The Indian foreign exchange control system has grown as a result of accretions at different times since the period of the second world war. Along with physical control of imports and exports and of foreign exchange transactions, an elaborate system of import duties has also been built up to protect infant (and not-so-infant) industries. There are also various measures of export promotion for commodities like cotton textiles, leather goods, jute

goods, and so on. All these different systems have never been properly co-ordinated, so that policies are often adopted which are contradictory to one another.

Examples of Misuse

Many examples of such inconsistency were provided officially by the Report of the Export and Import Policy Committee. In particular, it is suspected that the building up of many industries under tariff protection has involved the misuse of foreign exchange. The automobile industry is a glaring example of this misuse. Furthermore, the system of tariffs and exchange control is related only as an afterthought to the national plans: there is no real attempt at viewing the earning and spending of foreign exchange as a problem in the allocation of resources within a global plan.

Apart from the defects in conception of the control system, there are the defects in organisation. The organisation is almost always cumbrous, and the purpose of the control is lost sight of in the whirling spools of red tape. For instance, the purpose of the industrial licensing system was to see that new industries are built up efficiently in properly chosen locations. For this, it is essential that some organisation should be able to review the plan for setting up plants and see that the plan is actually carried out. But the authorities issuing licences for new industrial units act independently of the import control authorities who issue the licences for importing capital goods.

Hence, an industrialist may spend a lot of time and money in getting a scheme for expansion or establishment of a new unit sanctioned and yet not obtain the licence for the import of necessary capital goods. There is on the other hand no effective system for checking that the promises to export more on the basis of which licences are issued are based on realistic grounds and taken seriously*.

Under the present system of controls, the established industrialists and importers enjoy a distinct

advantage over new entrants; there is also a premium on being big, because it is only the people with enough money and resources who can hope to present a technically competent scheme and wait for long months during which the controlling authorities grind out their decisions. There is no simple remedy against this situation; if small industrialists are deliberately and successfully encouraged, the first casualty will be economic efficiency, for, most branches of modern industry do demand costly preparation of projects and a large scale of investment for achieving satisfactory results. (Of course, very often the measures for encouraging small industrialists are simply rendered futile because the bigger industrialists manage to acquire control of these small units by indirect methods).

This conflict between a minimum degree of efficiency and dispersion of economic power is one of the major reasons why one cannot achieve socialism through controls and without direct government control of most major economic sectors.

But within the framework of partial planning itself, the present system of foreign exchange controls is responsible for a different kind of inequity. The users of foreign exchange get it at the official rate of exchange; but the goods imported often go into the fabrication of other commodities which sell at prices which are much higher than the cost of the components. Thus the users make abnormal profits with the help of the control system, and the government gets back only a small part of these abnormal profits, particularly if the users are unincorporated businesses, the profits of which are very difficult to tax.

Exchange Auction

One widely advocated remedy for this is exchange auction. If inflationary consequences can be guarded against, the auction of

* The troubles of a typical industrialist under the present licensing system are described vividly in the article 'Government Procedures and Industrial Development', *Economic Weekly*, Annual Number, February 1964.

foreign exchange will certainly help to mop up a large part of the excess profits earned with the help of imported goods. But the allocation of foreign exchange between different uses cannot be decided on the basis of exchange auction. The allocation of foreign exchange must be determined by the scheme of priorities in the national plan. If the shadow price of foreign exchange can be calculated, than that can be used as a rough guide to consistent decision-making. For instance, it can be ensured that three units of internal resources are not spent in the automobile industry for saving one unit of foreign exchange, when another project is debarred precisely because the cost of production comes out as three times that in advanced foreign countries.

After the priorities for the use of foreign exchange for different purposes have been fixed and the allocation of the foreign exchange between the different major uses has been made, government can institute the auction of the quotas of the foreign exchange fixed for each use; a free market for foreign exchange may be introduced for non-essential uses if the supply is in excess of the demand from the sectors which have been accorded priority.

Flexibility Required

However, in the present Indian situation the scope for such auction is not probably very great: one has to ensure that the users of foreign exchange have the financial and technical competence in the industries for which they buy the foreign exchange. There is no reason why the people with the necessary qualifications should be willing to pay the highest price. Furthermore, for many projects the immediate profitability of the use of foreign exchange may not be great but the beneficial effects on the national economy may be considerable. In such cases there is no alternative to giving subsidies to the producers.

Thus the alternative to the present system of control is one which is conceived with reference to the broad economic plan and which embodies the properties of flexi-

bility and efficiency. A free-market in foreign exchange is a wild dream; the scope of foreign exchange auctions is also strictly limited. But there is room for a system of controls supplemented by foreign exchange auctions which will be directly related to the scheme of priorities embodied in the national plan.

The Case of Steel

Similar remarks can be made in the case of control of steel. One cannot but agree with the Raj Committee that the system of controls on steel was extremely illogical: the priorities fixed by the authorities had little operative significance since a rating of high priority did not ensure speedy delivery; the delays between the placing of orders and the final delivery were quite unpredictable, and a large part of the steel sold found its way to the black market. The Raj Committee performed a valuable service in laying bare the absurdity of the whole situation and in suggesting a more streamlined control system.

But the Raj Committee missed this chance of trying to find out what should be the principles of allocation and pricing of steel. It criticised the average cost-plus formula of the Tariff Commission, because this encouraged the producers to prefer the varieties of steel which require less rolling time and are relatively heavy (because the Tariff Commission determined the replacement cost of the plants on the basis of gross tonnage). There is much justification for such criticism. The costs which the Tariff Commission took into account were market costs, no calculation of accounting prices was ever made and little account was taken of developments in related fields. The reason, of course, was often that the terms of reference of the Tariff Commission precluded consideration of the wider issues. What should be the principles replacing the cost-plus formula of pricing?

The Report of the Raj Committee contains a frequent complaint that the relative retention prices of the different categories of steel do not conform to the relative levels of

excess demand. Is it implied that the relative retention prices should in fact be set with an eye to the present levels of excess demand? We have seen why such a policy cannot be followed in an economy with any semblance of national economic planning. The alternative which remains is to decide upon the allocation of steel between different categories with an eye to the demands of the economy as a whole, and to fix retention prices on the basis of the cost-plus formula for each of the categories separately (and not for the total production of steel as the Tariff Commission did). This will take care of the problem of greater technical difficulty and longer rolling time for many categories of steel.

Special bounties can be given to the producers when a radical increase in the production of certain categories is desired. The selling prices of steel, however, can be fixed with a view to mopping up the excess profits of users. The operation of this system obviously requires physical controls at the levels of production, distribution and use to check that the pattern of allocation of steel between different sectors dictated by the plan is adhered to. The present decision to delegate the powers of fixing prices to the Joint Plant Committee is really a means of evading the responsibility for determining principles of price fixation.

Foodgrains

Apart from foreign exchange and capital or intermediate goods such as steel or cement, the other groups of commodities for which controls have been imposed from time to time are foodgrains. The optimal allocation of foodgrains is much easier to decide upon than the optional allocation of foreign exchange or steel, for the simple reason that only considerations of short term needs are relevant for the former, and the short-term needs are not difficult to estimate. The chronic shortages of food, the necessity of feeding the growing industrial working population, the rise in prices of foodgrains, and the consequent pressure on the general price level — all these taken to-

gether, one would have thought, clamour for the control of the distribution of foodgrains.

The Opposition

The opposition to such control is almost wholly political in nature—some of it quite respectable, some not so respectable and therefore covert and probably more effective in keeping alive a free market in foodgrains. The respectable opposition stems from memories of the wartime control of foodgrains, of long queues, black markets, and chicanery of all sorts. However, our present administrative machinery is almost certainly more adequate, the democratic spirit has also percolated to the low-income strata of society, and a properly conceived system of control of foodgrains need not lead to the repetition of all the wartime inconveniences. If the control system is really comprehensive and if the penalties against racketeers are drastic, there should be little room for manoeuvring by black marketeers.

However, there is a fantastically large amount of money to be made through speculation in foodgrains; many a rising industrialist gathered his financial resources by such means. The substantial, and effective, opposition to foodgrains—specially at the levels of State governments—stems almost wholly from these quarters. The bigger peasants in villages may also be opposed to compulsory procurement of foodgrains if the prices fixed are too low. But if the policy of 'protection in reverse' against agriculture (referred to by Professor B. N. Ganguli who has been quoted by Professor Sen) is altered, the opposition from the latter source will diminish.

Even if the system of control of allocation of the major commodities and resources is based on sound principles and properly administered, this will not usher in socialism in India. So long as an independent role is given to a large and independent private sector, the intended results of government policy will inevitably be distorted by the actions of private industrialists. One of the main purposes of controls will be to keep such deviations of actual from intended results

within bounds. (In this connection, it is well to remember that one of the main motives behind the imposition of stricter controls over foreign exchange in 1957 was to protect our foreign exchange reserves against the results of mounting private demands for imports of capital goods and raw materials).

Furthermore, if the accent of economic policy is on economic efficiency and if the private sector operates in major industries, the concentration of economic power is also inevitable. Our policy of encouraging small business has often been half-hearted, muddled and largely futile. (After all, it is a strange code of ethics which tries to protect the freedom of a man with assets of Rs. 5 lakhs against a man with assets of Rs. 1 crore but does little to protect the freedom of a man with nothing at all against a man with assets of Rs. 5 lakhs.). Direct fiscal methods or outright nationalization and not controls are the proper means for redressing the inequality of incomes and wealth.

Political Implications

Finally, although one is supposedly writing on an economic problem, it will be misleading to pretend that the existence of an expanding private sector does not have political implications. Apart from the purely economic forces distorting the intended results of government economic policy, there also exists continuous pressure for deflecting government economic policy at the source, or, still more frequently, at the levels of implementation.

While the advocates of socialism without major institutional changes in India must be reminded of all these qualifications, the role of properly conceived, direct controls within the present set-up must be stressed once again. The alternative to socialism is not a hopeless muddle; a much higher degree of efficiency and equity can be achieved without altering the present distribution of income, wealth and economic power radically, if the goals of national economic plans are taken more seriously and if the instruments are designed to serve those goals and not some other, more ephemeral, ends.

Exchange stability

ASHOK GUHA

IT is no longer fashionable these days to speak of the foreign exchange 'crisis'; what we have, it seems, is more of a 'problem', or a 'situation'. The change in terminology appears comforting. In fact, however, it merely presents in disguise an increasingly grim reality. Balance of payments pressure today is no mere passing episode; it is and will continue to be the order of the day, an almost permanent feature of the Indian economic scene.

How did we ever get ourselves into such a predicament? According to one school of thought—the fatalists—our crisis, like Julius Caesar's is one of ambition; it is the price of a reckless defiance of the inexorable facts of stagnant exports and rigid import coefficients. Given stable import ratios, our efforts at precipitous growth have meant soaring import requirements.

On the other hand, thanks to the low income-elasticity of demand for them, our exports at constant prices have risen but little in response to economic growth abroad; and their low price elasticity has thwarted attempts to increase export earnings by trimming prices. Thus, we cannot possibly pay for the wherewithal of ambitious development. Fate has ordained for us a modest rate of economic growth and any attempt to exceed this must end in shortage and frustration.

There is a measure of truth in this fatalistic view of things. The markets for our traditional exports are undeniably inelastic, at least in the short run. The specificity of domestic resources severely limits the prospects for import substitution; so does their immobility. Yet these problems are basically transitory in character. What is

specific in the short run might after all be flexible in the long; resource mobility is often merely a function of time; and even elasticities of demand rise as the consumer gets time enough to attune his tasks and habits to a new price structure.

The rigidity of technical and demand relationships might precipitate an occasional crisis; but one wonders if it can account for as chronic and fundamental a disequilibrium as we seem to be experiencing. Certainly, our government does not subscribe to the fatalistic doctrine; for import control and export promotion would be little better than quixotic if imports were irreplaceable and export earnings incapable of expansion.

The other explanation of our plight is less circumscribed by fate and, to that extent, more challenging. According to it, the trade gap is simply the excess of spending over resources. A sufficient surplus of output over current consumption will, in this view, always ensure balance of payments equilibrium. For, with home consumption slackening, resources will be diverted *via* the incentives of the price system to export production and import substitution. Granted a measure of flexibility and mobility, trade will thus tend to an even balance.

Unfortunately, our Second and Third Plans have been bedevilled by a shortage of savings. Investment since 1956 has tended to outrun investible resources from saving and capital inflow—some reflection of the unequal race between the two may be found in the scale of deficit financing; and it is this excess spending that has

overflowed into balance of payments pressure. Our ambitions may not have overleapt the bounds of possibility, but, in this view, they have certainly far exceeded our efforts.

Salvation

Where then does salvation lie? Clearly, investment—the main-spring of our growth—must not be sacrificed. And, of course, while the dispensers of foreign capital remain godlike in their unpredictability, we can scarcely rely on their favours to make good our omissions. Thus, greater austerity is our only possible course, and the balance-of-payments effect of any of our policies is a direct function of its contribution to our savings.

Curiously, however, our trade policy is not, in primary interest, at least, a design for austerity. We have sought instead to enmesh the free play of market forces in a network of controls, hoping fondly that direct restriction of imports and stimulation of exports may somehow be possible together. Yet if savings do not rise, our very success in import control would simply divert home consumer demand to exportables: a fall in exports and we would be back in the initial wilderness.

But—it may be asked—may not our trade policy have produced by happy chance unintended but favourable effects on saving? This is a question which needs somewhat more detailed examination. Savings may be increased either through a rise in real incomes or through an increase in thriftiness at any level of real income. Now, the real income effects of trade control are ambiguous. On the one hand, import restrictions improve the terms of trade; on the other, they distort the allocation of domestic resources. Which of the two effects would dominate in any given case would depend on circumstances, but certainly no warrant can be found here for universal protection at prohibitive rates.

As for the impact of our trade policy on the propensity to save, this is supposed to arise chiefly from its inflationary effects.

Domestic demand, denied the outlet of a trade deficit, concentrates ever more than before on domestic output, forcing up prices. The rise in prices, it is held, chokes off the excess demand through the 'forced savings' that the inflationists believe in. For instance, the depreciation of cash balances forces those who aim at a specific real volume of wealth to save more. Again, the lag of money wages behind prices redistributes income in favour of the high-saving capitalist class. But, of course, inflation produces counter-effects too. Thus, if popular expectations project rising prices into the future, a flight from capital might ensue, with erosive effects on savings.

Transient Effects

The net result is indeterminate; and in any case, such inflationary effects are transient, short-term phenomena. As the money-supply increases in response to the growing demand for cash, as wages catch up with prices, the impact of the price rise on saving propensities dies out and the old savings position is restored—unless there is a fresh dose of inflation.

All this seems to rule out the possibility that we have—by accident if not by design—hit upon the way to exchange stability. On the contrary, like Canute bestriding the waves, we seem to have been rejoicing in a possibly pleasurable but quite futile exercise of authority. Indeed, there seems to be a distinct chance of our trade policy having actually reduced our savings and impaired our foreign exchange position. No doubt our failure on the savings front has in large measure been absorbed by an inadequacy of investment, especially in the private sector. Who knows how much of the shortfall in private investment in key sectors of the Third Plan is attributable to the counter-attraction of high and shattered profits in the import-replacing industries?

But if trade controls have failed so far, what are the alternatives?

There is, of course, the way of even more stringent regulation—

of exports ruthlessly compelled as well as imports rigorously controlled. Clearly, such a policy will, in the first instance, improve the balance of trade: but, in the absence of increased savings, it will do so only by generating excess demand and sustained inflation at home. In the resulting scramble for resources, investment might lose out to consumption, undermining our rate of growth. Even, however, if it does not, the unsatisfied home demand will tend to attract resources away from export industries and to make of India a smuggler's paradise.

To be effective in such an environment, trade control will require ever-increasing coercion and incentives—and an administrative machinery far stronger than that of most advanced countries, not to speak of ours. Even, therefore, if such an inflationary policy is politically feasible, it may be quite impossible of implementation.

Simpler Course

Might it not be a simpler course to abandon all controls imposed on balance of payments grounds¹ and use the fiscal weapons to the hilt? Inefficient distortions of resource allocation would thus be avoided, while the savings problem would be directly attacked. Increased taxation, of course, can never be popular. Yet, if our expenditures are to be trimmed to the Procrustean bed of our limited resources, the growth rate must either be pruned or taxes increased. Any pattern for exchange stability reduces in the last analysis to this unpalatable choice.²

1. This does not, of course, imply repeal of duties, justifiable on other premises (such as 'infant industry' tariffs) but of protection spuriously applied on the plea of 'saving foreign exchange for India'.

2. We have not dealt with the widely advocated alternative of devaluation since this, no less than our present policy, would involve mere tinkering with the externals of our problem without impinging directly on the central issue of savings. Indeed, to the extent that import control involves earning revenue for the government, it can mobilise savings more effectively than devaluation.

Books

QUIET CRISIS IN INDIA. Economic Development and American Policy. By John P. Lewis.

The Brookings Institution. Washington, D. C., 1962.

This is a study with a different look, and it is worth looking at. The author sees India's economic development programme based on perspective planning as the first and most significant non-communist economic experiment in Asia, and feels that Americans have a vital stake in India's attempt to achieve radical economic transformation by constitutional procedures. The emphasis on radical transformation is as firm as on constitutional procedures. He is no advocate of a go-slow process, supports the fundamentals of economic planning, and does not believe that agriculture and heavy industry are or should be competing aims. Yet, he is not unmindful of dangers ahead. He considers the sixties to be a crucial decade, if not a dangerous decade. The achievements of the Indian development effort in the next few years will largely determine India's political future and will have a heavy bearing on the future of other Asian and African countries. Its success should be a primary concern of American foreign policy in the years just ahead. These are the basic propositions of the book, and even if they are not new, the treatment of the subject is.

This study was begun in 1958 and covers the results of the last general elections of 1961/62 but

was completed before the Chinese decided to move in October 1962. It has the merit of being articulate, sympathetic, and subject to neither unqualified optimism nor unqualified pessimism. It seeks to analyse in depth, take a total and balanced view, and is gifted with rare clarity of expression. Its conclusions may not please all schools of thought, but why should they?

India faced a strenuous testing time during the forties when transfer of power was followed by unprecedented communal upheaval. During the fifties the leadership flowered and India's prestige was high in the councils of the world. But now in the sixties another testing time has come. Professor Lewis refers to the work of the American political scientist and journalist, Selig Harrison, who has done a most careful but disturbing analysis recently in his book, *India; The Most Dangerous Decades*.

Harrison does not forecast an actual break-up of the nation-State into autonomous fragments, but he does expect that the disintegrative drift will be arrested and reversed only by the strong arm of a revolutionary totalitarian government. As to whether the latter will be a rightist military dictatorship or a communist regime, Harrison thinks probably the former, but also that constitutional breakdown of the first kind would be almost as tragic as the second, in view of the procedural uni-

queness of the Indian development experiment. What is this uniqueness?

Let us look at the conclusions reached by Lewis. The study is loaded with 'meat', and only its main points can be touched here. He puts great emphasis on India's faithful adherence so far to a constitutional mode of development, from which stem the unique dignity of the Indian development experiment and the unique importance of its success to the U.S.A. Is there enough support for such a view within both countries? This is crucial, as India's fidelity to constitutional methods is due for a most strenuous testing time before the decade is over, and American involvement in India has grown since the Chinese pierced the Himalayan barrier. It is felt that the political outcome is apt to depend markedly on the near-term progress of the present regimes's economic development scheme, which calls for particularly heavy imports during the current decade.

The next conclusion is significant, for it has a bearing on how to meet the challenge. How does India's development experiment look to the author, and what should American policy towards it be? As a piece of macro-economic calculus, the principal strategy which is incorporated in the Second and Third Five Year Plans (and presumably will be in their successors), is regarded as basically sound and fairly well spelled out in its details.

In view of this, it would be self-defeating for American policy to resist an 'excessive' emphasis on heavy industry in India. What is deemed to have been less satisfactory is, however, the scheme's subsidiary strategy—to mobilise redundant rural manpower. Success in this area will require the encouragement of India's friends and, in particular, more imaginative use of American surplus food. But, in general, Lewis thinks that the design of the development effort eminently warrants American support, and that its implementation will require dollar assistance in the sixties, probably somewhat more than is officially admitted.

The third conclusion pertains to procedures for rendering U.S. Government assistance and for determining the forms of its financial conveyance. This needs careful study and revision, but concern for its own balance of payments position, should not tempt the U.S. Government to make hastily conceived changes which may not help much but hurt the effectiveness of its foreign assistance.

Difficult policy adjustments are required on both sides to ensure the success of the Indian development effort, and these have been touched upon too. If accepted objectives are to be realised, access of non-traditional exports from India to western markets must be facilitated. The U.S. and western countries would do well to initiate efforts to obtain the necessary domestic political consent.

On the Indian side, the most difficult of policy adjustments are the exceptionally complex but urgent reforms which appear to be indicated in the

field of rural development. India still has to import several million tons of foodgrains after a decade and a half of independence. Also, Indian administration still has to get over its 'law and order' hangover, and become fully activist and development-oriented as required by the nation's economic objectives.

Finally, Lewis ends on a pious note, but seriously suggests the need to curb prejudice or inaccurate and incorrect brand images which Indians and Americans have come to form of one another. There is no such thing as a typical Indian or a typical American. It is a crude caricature to describe an American as affluent, materialistic, belligerent and insensitive, or an Indian as mystical, pacifist, sanctimonious and wily.

This is a study which may provoke more argument than agreement, but I would not be surprised if the proportions were reversed. It is the work of a healthy and qualified mind.

A. K. Banerjee

THE MAKINGS OF A JUST SOCIETY By Chester Bowles.

Published by the University of Delhi.

It is a sign of the times that the western world, traditionally complacent about the status of underdeveloped countries as colonial, agricultural appendages to the developed countries, has in recent years thrown up enlightened statesmen who are keen to identify themselves with the irrepressible urge of the underdeveloped world for development. The lectures by Chester Bowles delivered at the University of Delhi included in the present book under review symbolise this new and welcome trend.

It is noteworthy that very often the quality of the contributions in this field by political spokesmen from the developed countries is vitiated by the tendency to sell their model of development to the underdeveloped countries rather than to make a genuine, although difficult, attempt to *understand* the problems of these countries. The present book is to a great extent free from this tendency, and presents a stimulating insight into some of the vital problems of growth in the underdeveloped countries.

In his first lecture on 'Five Essentials of Nation Building', Bowles very rightly emphasises that the objectives of the efforts in nation-building in the newly developing countries are 'much broader than the building of roads, the development of industries and the production of more food.' Nay, these objectives are 'characterised by a sense of social purpose'. He has not mentioned that this is embodied, for instance, in the case of India, in the goal of a 'socialist pattern of society'. Further, Bowles very appropriately observes that: 'The leisurely pace at which the United States and Europe developed during the 19th century is no longer adequate to keep ahead of the rising global demands for a better existence.' From these very sound observations, it very logically follows that the 19th century model of capitalist

development of western countries is outmoded for the purposes of the present-day underdeveloped countries both because it militates against the resurgent urge for social justice and a rapid pace of social and economic progress.

Bowles has abstained from stating this conclusion very explicitly which follows from his own logic. He, however, underlines 'a unifying sense of national purpose with effective communication between the people and their leaders' as one of the five essentials of nation-building. There is no satisfying indication, however, in his analysis as to what would provide this much-needed 'sense of national purpose'. It may be suggested that the goal of a 'socialistic pattern of society' in India is a recognition of this need for a 'unifying sense of national purpose' in an era when the model of capitalist growth has a restricted appeal only to the propertied classes and no appeal whatsoever for the masses.

While referring to the Latin American countries, Bowles mentions 'as a major obstacle to the political and economic growth . . . the reluctance of the more privileged groups to move with the times.' This obstacle, it may be added, is present in almost all the underdeveloped countries where the traditionally privileged groups entrenched whether in industry, trade or agriculture are not often opposed to development as such; the snag is that they wish it to happen without altering the social framework within which they are privileged. The subordination of these groups to social urgencies and priorities is, therefore, one of the essential pre-requisites for creating that unifying sense of national purpose without which mass identification and participation in national development is difficult to attain.

The second chapter on 'Dynamics of the Rural Economy' is perhaps the best of the five lectures and contains many discerning observations on the rural problem. The experience of America is not directly germane to the solution of the agrarian problems in the now developing countries. Unlike America, these countries are characterised by a high man-land ratio, coupled with a dead-weight of outmoded semi-feudal conditions of tenure hampering peasant interest and initiative in development.

Thus, while in America the emphasis for agricultural development has generally been on appropriate methods of farm management signifying basically a technological approach, in the underdeveloped countries, say India, the emphasis has inescapably been on structural changes in semi-feudal conditions of land ownership which are reinforced both by a traditional social structure, and the high man-power pressure on scarce land resources. These changes have generally been regarded as basic pre-requisites to any sustained interest by the vast numbers of peasants in improvement of agriculture.

The example of Japan, which Bowles describes in some detail, is more germane where 'the sweeping land reforms' in 1946 for the first time destroyed feudal privileges of landlords with a bold stroke and

converted 94 per cent of all Japanese farmers into owner-cultivators. The 'political, social and economic effects' of this rural transformation were far-reaching. The experience in this field in underdeveloped countries reveals, however, that changes of the type which were brought about in Japan are not very easy to accomplish. There is a considerable degree of opposition from landed interests to these structural changes aimed at diffusion of land ownership among actual tillers of the soil.

Bowles himself states with reference to India: 'Some agricultural authorities accept the existing pattern of land ownership as reasonably satisfactory and argue that the process of land distribution has gone far enough. By and large, they assert, it is the larger landowner—the man who still controls 50 to 250 acres—who has the education, the skills and the personal incentives, which enable him to understand and accept new techniques and rapidly to expand his production.'

Bowles very effectively argues against this 'trickle-down concept of rural improvement. . . which ignores the fundamental principles of rural development.' The attack on this concentration of land-holding, however, represents the most crucial challenge to the newly developing countries since the landed interests use their combined economic, social and political power to thwart the efforts at curbing this concentration. It is, however, increasingly borne out by facts that without a serious attack on this concentration, all attempts at ameliorating the conditions of the vast masses of peasants remain partial in their scope and effects.

Bowles does recognise the 'political power of the traditional social structure and the landlord opposition in the predominantly agricultural countries.' He rightly discounts, however, any scepticism that 'competent democratic governments genuinely dedicated to the welfare of their people cannot win the political support necessary for reforms.' It may be that one of the main factors responsible for failure of political groups to see these reforms through and face up to the resistance of vested interests has been the fond belief in the efficacy of development 'trickling' down from the large land owners to the vast masses of small cultivators. Bowles has himself raised doubts about the soundness of this belief and recent experience appears to confirm his observations. The challenge of land reforms must be faced afresh keeping in view the penetrating insight with which Bowles concludes this lecture: 'What happens in the muddy little villages and rural towns so often by-passed by economists and technicians of development, will largely shape the economic and political history of Asia, Africa and Latin America in the coming years.'

In the chapter on 'Growth with Social Justice' he suggests that India develop 'a realistic balance between government planning and government investment in the essential infra-structure on the one hand and a fast growing, socially responsible private sec-

tor on the other.' In his view, the task of a developing nation is 'not to forego the creative aspects of private enterprise for fear of its excesses but rather to find the measures to discourage these excesses without discouraging responsible initiative.'

India's five year plans, it may be pertinent to note, far from ruling out any scope for the private sector, assign it an appropriate place in the planned economic development of the country. At the same time, in regard to the relationship of the private and public sectors, the clear idea behind the plans was that '...if development is to proceed at the pace envisaged and to contribute effectively to the attainment of the larger social ends in view, the public sector must grow not only absolutely but also relatively to the private sector.' (Second Five Year Plan, p. 28).

It may not be wrong to infer that the 'central and critically important role' of the State in the above strategy is not merely confined to creating 'the so-called infra-structure—the roads, rail transport, schools, power, the communication net-works'. The 'control of private monopoly and the enlargement of the public sector in strategic lines of production and trade' is an inseparable part of the India strategy for industrial development. Indeed, without this crucial role of the State it does not appear how 'concentration of private economic power' can be checked and accentuation of economic inequalities curbed.

The experience of the past years in India has confirmed the desirability of implementing this strategy with greater consistency and earnestness. During the last decade or so public sector expansion in India has benefitted substantially a few big business houses which dominate the field of private enterprise and have emerged as still more powerful concentrations of economic power. These concentrations control financial and distributive agencies and thereby secure control over surpluses which they direct to less desired social objectives. The diffusion of resources to small and middle enterprises in the private sector and the over-all direction of resources to planned priorities is rendered extremely difficult, if not impossible, because of the power wielded by these concentrations.

The crucial question is: are regulatory fiscal and monetary measures enough to check this tendency without the State maintaining its strategic position in the production and distributive apparatus of the economy? Bowles has raised very vital issues in this chapter which require a lot of well-informed discussion in the light of actual trends of development in this field of private-public sector relationships in different underdeveloped countries.

The last chapter deals with an assessment of the prospects of China's development and a comparative evaluation of the prospects of both China and India.

On the whole, the lectures included in the volume are stimulating and are in refreshing contrast to the

views and statements of orthodox political opinion in the United States.

Praful Chandra Joshi

TALKS ON PLANNING By P. C. Mahalanobis. Indian Statistical Series, No. 14.

Asia Publishing House, Bombay.

It has been suggested that the quality of theoretical economic thinking in any country is inversely correlated with the growth performance of the economy of that country. Economists of Japan and Germany (to take the capitalist countries first) are hardly comparable with their counterparts in the U.K. and the U.S.A., and yet the rates of growth of the former two countries has been consistently and significantly higher than those of the latter. In the socialist countries, Poland has the greatest galaxy of world-famous economists, and yet the rate of growth of the Polish economy is one of the lowest in that group of countries. Among the underdeveloped countries, India can perhaps claim to have the largest number of significant economists, but our economic performance is not likely to turn green with envy any other underdeveloped country.

The above hypothesis is naturally very comforting to an economic policy maker who is not a professional economist. This will particularly be so in the case of one who is not a policy maker by virtue of the fact that he is a professional politician but is called in as an expert in economic planning. Such a person is naturally prone to have nothing else but contempt for the economic theorist.

Professor P. C. Mahalanobis, who began as a physicist besides being an important member of the Tagore circle, over the years became the *doyen* of the Indian statisticians. For a brief period of three or four years (roughly from 1953-54 to 1956-57) he became the economic planner *par excellence* in the country. With this background, it is natural that Professor Mahalanobis does not have much patience with the professional economist. While it would be quite unfair to attribute to Professor Mahalanobis the extreme view presented at the beginning of this review, he is completely convinced that 'the classical and Keynesian theories developed in the advanced capitalist countries...are of little help for tackling the problems of economic development.' His view is that, 'Familiarity with economic theories suited to advanced western countries had acted as a thought barrier to economic progress in India. . .'. As a concrete example, he informs us that 'The proposal for constructing a new steel plant with a million ton capacity was rejected from the First Five Year Plan under the influence of the economic theory of the capitalist countries.'

Is there some hope of utilising economic thinking in the socialist countries? Unfortunately we draw a blank there also, because it is 'often difficult or impossible to introduce method in operation in socialist countries for lack of political sanctions.'

This necessarily leads one to the conclusion that a feasible economic policy can be worked out only

by those who are not professional economists because lack of familiarity with economic theory is an asset. One should for the sake of politeness occasionally confess one's ignorance of economics, but this should be done in a manner that does not make the economist too cheeky. One additional advantage of this ignorance is the removal of any inhibition regarding the independent rediscovery of well-known theoretical propositions, without necessarily being inhibited while passing judgement on classical economic theory, Keynesian economics, etc.

If comprehension of economic theory and familiarity with the methods of economic analysis is not the *forte* of Professor Mahalanobis, what explains the profound influence of his thinking on Indian planning? The talks, notes, and essays included in *Talks on Planning* shed interesting light on this question. They cover the period 1952-60, beginning with his famous lecture at the National Institute of Sciences (October, 1952), and including a set of papers leading up to and following the classic 'Draft' of the 'Draft' Plan-frame. In this volume are also included a set of papers on the problem of the development of human resources. The very first piece in this volume is an interesting study of Nehru as a planner, reprinted from *A Study of Nehru* published by the *Times of India* on the occasion of Nehru's 70th birthday. The only work of Professor Mahalanobis of significance in the field of planning not included in this volume is his paper, 'The Approach of Operational Research to Planning in India' originally published in *Sankhya*, and republished as No. 18 in the same series as the volume under review.

The picture of Professor Mahalanobis which emerges from these published writings is of one with a bold and speculative mind which does not hesitate to attack problems involving apparently insurmountable difficulties. It is also a picture of one who has acquired the rather rare ability to 'sell' these speculative exercises. As an example of such intellectual courage, look at the acceptance of the challenge to work out a strategy which would eliminate unemployment in ten years or less, while simultaneously guaranteeing a significant rise in standards of living and an increasing equality of income.

The strategy which Professor Mahalanobis worked out is summarised by him as follows: 'In India the highest priority must be given to the establishment and expansion of the basic industries. Large investments in the basic industries would, of course, give rise to increased demand for food, cloth and other consumer goods. In India it is possible and desirable to meet this demand by setting idle hands to work in the traditional way or in small scale industries to produce consumer goods and other necessities as much as possible. This would also create much employment all over the country.' (Ibid., p. 95.)

Professor Mahalanobis succeeded in persuading the country that his version of the Second Five Year Plan would help 'to liquidate unemployment as quickly as possible and within a period not exceeding ten

years' (p. 22). He succeeded in convincing the Planning Commission that the pressure on foreign exchange resources involved in the contemplated magnitude of expansion of basic industries would be manageable. Indeed, for some time he performed the remarkable feat of making a large number of people swallow his strategy hook, line, and sinker.

It is easy to be wise in 1964 when the problems of unemployment and poverty, and foreign exchange and inequality are still nowhere near solution. It is easy to point out mistakes of facts and of economic logic in the Mahalanobis strategy. This however would be a futile exercise. For, we must not forget that Professor Mahalanobis deserves the credit for giving new dimensions to our planning efforts. His emphasis on the expansion of basic industries to make us more or less self-sufficient in the production of machinery as the only possible basis for large scale and rapid industrialisation was certainly sound. Even his obsession about steel targets is not without merit. After the virtual breakdown of his strategy in the very first year of the Second Plan due to the foreign exchange crisis and other difficulties, one can notice a shift in his centre of interest. Even in this phase, he has been correctly arguing for a more rational educational system, greater allocation to scientific education and research, and for a policy of man-power planning.

Professor Mahalanobis has also popularised the methods of quantitative analysis, and the demonstration he gives in several pieces included in this volume of his remarkable ability of marshalling statistical data to make his points in a telling manner is worth emulation. There is no doubt at all that the positive elements in the approach to planning canvassed by the Professor definitely overshadow the deficiencies of this approach. If efforts at achieving a high rate of growth fail in India, this would be the result of neglecting to implement the positive aspects of the growth strategy presented by Professor Mahalanobis.

K. A. Naqvi

HINDUISM AND ECONOMIC GROWTH By Vikas Misra.

Oxford University Press, Bombay, 1962.

If confident ignorance is bliss, then the book under this rather catching title excels in its blissfulness. The 'object' of the study, it says, 'is to discuss and assess the impact of Hinduism on India's economic growth'. Such a study can obviously be made only on the basis of a clear-cut understanding of the concepts under discussion, namely, *Hinduism* and *economic growth*. Unless and until these concepts have been clarified and well-defined, no attempt can really be made to assess or establish the relationship which might exist between the two categories of thought and institutions.

This is a problem which the book faces right at the beginning. 'Hinduism', it says, 'we will define in its etymological sense, and use the term religion to include the leading theological concepts, the broad

philosophical ideas, and the general social structure (so far as it has a theological sanction).

Apart from being clever in its construction, the definition adduced hardly makes any sense. Take, for instance, its reference to the etymological sense of Hinduism. Even the most daring etymologist will blush to imagine any such sense. The word 'Hindu' itself has not yet found a place in any standard etymological dictionary of the English language. Since, at this stage, it may well be argued that by 'etymological sense' what was really intended was to convey the 'dictionary sense' of the word, let us also examine what *The Concise Oxford Dictionary* has to say on the subject and how far it really clarifies our understanding of the problem.

Hinduism, we are now informed, refers to 'Polytheistic religion of the Hindus'. A Hindu, on the other hand, is defined as an 'Aryan of N. India who... professes Hinduism'. The tautology no doubt is perfect. But can we really expect to enhance our knowledge through such tautological manipulations? Can there be any sense in a correlation which is derived without knowing either the subject or the object? The answers to these questions are too obvious to merit explicit replies. Without delving any further, it may be pointed out that the rest of the definition also falls to pieces the moment one begins to scrutinise it carefully. 'The leading theological concepts, the broad philosophical ideas, and the general structure' referred to are nowhere specified. They remain mysteriously hidden somewhere outside the pale of a book whose sole object is to assess their very influences on the economic life of a nation.

So far as economic growth is concerned, the study is based on the assumption that the models devised by some economists, such as J. J. Spengier, W. W. Rostow, W. A. Lewis, etc., to measure industrial growth under certain given conditions and framework can be transplanted anywhere simply by using their vocabulary and verbiage. To do so, it collects a series of references, whether relevant or not, from studies relating to economic theory and thought, history of economic growth and development, sociology of population and politics, etc., and scatters them all through the book.

Had it simply concentrated on one of the models, collected enough empirical data to test its usefulness and applicability in the Indian context, and restricted its area of enquiry only to measure India's economic growth for a short span of time, the study would still have served some useful purpose. As it is, it neither gives us an insight into the mechanism of economic growth nor the religious-cultural influences, sublime or subtle, which are supposedly directing its course.

The book is divided into three parts: the first dealing with the 'earlier civilization' or a 'general survey upto A.D. 1500'; the second with the 'Mughal period and after', and the third with 'reform and nationalism'. Part One is a cursory look at history. It draws 'inferences' which, according to the author's own

confession, 'are inconclusive and, indeed...arbitrary'. These arbitrary and inconclusive inferences relate to 'attitudinal and institutional' aspects of Hinduism which, we are told, exerted pressure in opposite directions. The caste system is thus supposed to have encouraged 'specialisation, division of labour and hereditary skill' as well as acted as 'a serious obstacle to economic mobility'. The 'life-view' favoured material progress, provided 'an impetus to enterprise', and at the same time accentuated 'other-worldliness'. In general, it however acted as 'a serious drag on economic growth'.

Part Two is concerned with the Mughal rule against the 'medieval background (1500-1750)' and the hundred years following the disintegration of the Mughal power. It concludes that while the 'Hindu mind was on the way to recovering its receptivity and energy', the nature and scope of investment opportunities 'suffered as a result both of internal political instability and of the policies and practices of the East India Company in the field of external trade'.

Part Three which covers another hundred years, 1850-1947, deals with some of the important historical developments which took place during this period. It is primarily concerned with the political, social and economic consequences which followed in the wake of British Raj and the struggle for freedom. The main thesis, *Hinduism and Economic Growth*, as such steps back and withdraws behind the curtain.

'An Overall View' summing up the generalisations made at the various stages of the study are given at the end. These include the following five propositions:

1. In early times the institutions and attitudes of Hinduism generally helped rather than hindered economic growth (and welfare). They did this by encouraging specialization and the division of labour, providing for the maintenance of the indigent and unfortunate, on the whole promoting population growth apart from the prohibition on widow remarriage and ...providing useful conventions relating to agricultural cultivation.
2. When the impact of western industrialisation began to be felt in India, these institutions and attitudes began to act as brakes on economic growth.
3. Although there has been some adjustment to present-day needs, this adjustment lags behind needs, and despite official (or public) condemnation of caste such adjustment proceeds extremely slowly.
4. For the future, what is needed is an intelligent attack on the harmful institutions and attitudes so as to make the Hindus a less inhibited and a more robust factor in economic growth. What is particularly wanted is the removal of obstacles to the improvement of social status.
5. All in all, although Hinduism as a factor affecting economic growth has been far outweighed

by other factors, it still remains an important factor. That importance is enhanced when the success of the present planned effort to advance the whole Indian economy hangs in the balance. In such a situation any adverse influence may prove decisive'.

Ranjit Gupta

PROBLEMS OF ECONOMIC GROWTH Edited by M. K. Haldar and Robin Ghose.

Congress for Cultural Freedom, New Delhi. 1960.

PATHS TO ECONOMIC GROWTH Edited by Amlan Datta.

Allied Publishers Private Ltd., New Delhi. 1963.

Professor W. Arthur Lewis, the brilliant West Indian economist presided over a conference in Tokyo in 1957, where an outstanding group (26 in number) of economists considered problems of economic growth. India was represented by Professors Gadgil, Dantwala, Amlan Datta and Asoka Mehta (now Deputy Chairman of the Planning Commission). Dr. Sumitro of Indonesia, Professors Hoselitz, Bauer, Bicanic, Jouvenal and Edward Shils were the other participants. Bertrand de Jouvenal of France was correct in pointing out to the learned economists that 'people seem to lose sight of the fact that the Americans had a geographical advantage which all countries do not have—a tremendous extent of territory—and that the western European countries had a historical advantage which may not be repeated for other countries—that of enormously increasing their demand for raw materials and being alone in so doing'. At this conference there was a noticeable change in the 'intellectual climate' and this was specifically evident in the agreement on a number of once controversial issues. It was agreed that the collectivisation of the farms, or any large-scale reorganisation of the countryside, was unnecessary to increase food production. Bearing in mind the failure of Russia, Yugoslavia and Poland and the success of Japan, whose farms are of small size, the delegates were convinced that Asia could go ahead with its own methods of raising food production. It was also rightly agreed that each country should live by the principle of 'comparative advantage' and produce what it can best and since India has enough coal, it could build a steel industry, and hence, perhaps, today, our showpieces of industry are our steel plants.

However, this conference bore out the fact that under-developed countries should not rely on foreign aid, but lift themselves by their own 'bootstraps', and it was Lewis who suggested that about 20 per cent of the national income should be the aim of most governments in taxation. The public sector in economic development found favour with most of the economists, since many of the initial fruits of economic growth—dams, roads, transport—are legitimate areas of public operation, and since priorities in certain fields could only be established by government. But the economists did hold that the expan-

sion of the public sector did not necessarily entail direct nationalisation.

In 1961, economists from Asia, Africa and Europe met at a seminar at Poona, convened under the joint auspices of the Congress for Cultural Freedom and the Gokhale Institute of Economics. The learned economists (two dozen participated) discussed paths to economic growth and endeavoured to find an alternative to capitalist and communist ways to economic development and prosperity. In order to probe to what extent industrialisation was possible and in what manner its fruits could be made available to the largest number of people, the economists discussed the objectives of planned development; organisational problems in agriculture including co-operative farming; the need for population control; problems of industrial location and transport; the role of trade unionism in underdeveloped countries; the social strains which develop in the process of industrialisation.

It is a sad fact but economists assume too easily that what works best in an advanced country must be best for economic development. E. F. Schumacher points out that Gandhi never made this mistake. He quotes Gandhi as saying, 'England has sinned against India by forcing Free Trade upon her. It may have been food for England but it has been poison for this country'. He quotes Gandhi again as saying that 'India is being ground down, not under the English heel, but under that of modern civilisation and that much of the deep poverty of India is due to the departure from swadeshi in the economic life and that if not a single article of commerce had been brought from outside India she would be today a land flowing with milk and honey'.

Thus, the writer shows that the institution of money, if handled in a manner which is 'food' for advanced countries, may become poison for the underdeveloped. Today, there is general agreement that a country struggling for development cannot do so on the basis of free convertibility of its currency. J. P. Narayan is one with Schumacher in stressing Gandhian ideals in economic development. The economists at Poona, throughout their deliberations, bore in mind that though there are some basic requirements which have to be fulfilled to make material progress possible, yet there is no set path which every people must tread to achieve its economic salvation.

S. M.

ROLE OF SMALL ENTERPRISE IN INDIA'S ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT By P. N. Dhar and H. F. Lydall.

Asia Publishing House.

FINANCES FOR SMALL-SCALE INDUSTRIES IN INDIA By K. T. Ramakrishna.

Asia Publishing House.

What is a small-scale industry and what should be its role in India's economic development? Much

depends on how one answers this question. For, a policy or a programme, if it is going to succeed, must be based on a clear understanding of what it is expected to achieve. Not only the goal must be known but also why it is desirable should be clearly understood.

But, unfortunately, there exists a tremendous confusion on the subject. The promotion of small-scale industries has been widely acclaimed as one of the most appropriate means of developing industry in India. Japan is usually held up as the great example of what can be done in this way. But very few have paused to examine the nature of these industries. Consequently, both the doctrine of small industry and the policy for its development continues to be based on a few *a priori* assumptions.

Of the two books under review, the first tries to clear this confusion. It examines the nature of small industry and questions the assumptions on which the government programme for its development is based. The second deals with only one aspect of the programme, and is descriptive rather than analytical. Both reach the conclusion that ultimately small industry will have to stand on its own feet. But the former reaches it on the basis of economic reasoning and detailed analysis of the problem. The latter is a mere compilation of available information with occasional interjections of opinions and conclusions unsupported either by arguments or by facts.

Dhar and Lydall make a sharp distinction between traditional industries and modern industries. The so called 'small-scale industries' are actually small units in modern industries. Therefore, the term 'small scale industries' is a misnomer. The former are labour intensive and largely rural or village industries using traditional methods and producing traditional goods. The latter are largely urban, using both power and machinery and modern techniques of production to produce modern products.

This is a meaningful distinction for it puts the problem in proper perspective. The assumptions on which the programme for the development of small industries is based and the arguments which are advanced in its support, both in official and non-official circles, really relate to traditional industries and are not much relevant to small industries. Firstly, the small industries are not labour-intensive and therefore they are not much of a help in solving the employment problem or to maximise output with minimum use of scarce capital. The authors give statistical data to prove that these industries use more capital and more labour per unit of output as compared to large industries.

Secondly, they cannot be decentralised as is often assumed. They must be located at places where amenities such as trade facilities, communications, raw material and technical skill, electricity, machinery and finance are easily available. Consequently, they have to be in towns and near centres of large industries. Thirdly, the argument of equality

and incomes may be tenable from a social point of view, but it does not help capital formation and savings. And what is more, the wages in small industries are usually less than what they are in large industries.

This, however, does not mean that small industries should not exist or be promoted. But they should not be created for their own sake. They are only a means to further industrialisation. The small firms should become viable, efficient economic units so that in due course they may expand and form part of large industries either as full-fledged units or as ancillaries to them. The authors are, therefore, of the opinion that the programme should be directed towards removing disabilities of small industries rather than protect them as babies and offer preferential treatment to them.

The different aspects of the official programme for the development of small industries are being examined by the authors in this light. They correctly stress the need to locate industrial estates nearer towns and large industries. They should be built and allocated to producers on a commercial basis. And, above all, they should be created not as homes for invalids but as nursery beds of small enterprise.

These industries must be given every technical and financial help but not subsidies, protection or preferences. Marketing assistance should again be limited to spreading information and finding suitable outlets for finished products. Preference margins for government purchases, reserved share of the market, guaranteed sales and other similar measures tend to keep small industries inefficient by giving them a feeling of safety and riskless existence.

In the financial field, a further extension of the State Bank and scheduled banks should be encouraged to cover up loans to small enterprises. But preferential low rates of interest on loans advanced to small industries must go.

The authors thus lay stress on the efficiency and growth of small industries rather than their creation as a goal in itself. They have, however, overlooked a particular type of small enterprise which is sometimes called 'intermediate industry'. It uses labour-intensive and capital-saving technique and produces modern products. Shoes, soap, furniture, matches are good examples of such an industry. Should it be encouraged and promoted for its own sake since it is no burden on our scarce capital? If so, what assistance and help may be provided and in what manner? In recent years there has been much talk about 'intermediate technique'. Particularly Gandhians and a few economists have advocated its cause. It would have helped a good deal if this was subjected to economic analysis and its validity tested.

The second book unlike the first does not question the assumptions on which the official programme for small industries are based. It accepts the official

definition of small industries and proceeds to examine how best they can be financed. This appears to the author as the only important issue so far as small industries are concerned. For, as he says, 'every problem of the *small producer* concerning production or material, quality or marketing is in the ultimate analysis a financial one'.

Having stressed this point in a long introductory chapter, the author gives a detailed description of the working of the agencies, governmental and non-governmental, engaged in meeting the financial needs of small producers. None of them, according to him, have so far been able to help the small producer adequately. Nor has the State taken steps to evolve an institutional set-up which may meet the requirement in a satisfying manner. He also emphasises the necessity of providing 'external aid' to make the industries technically efficient and economically viable units, worthy of the credit which may be offered.

It is a pity that the author should have spent five years in finding out what is already known. Most of what he has said is no doubt informative, but such information is already available in government reports and other official and non-official publications. To collect and present it in a compact way is all that he has been able to achieve.

Wherever the author has ventured into expressing opinions and presenting conclusions, he appears to have done so without thinking. He blames the conservative policy of the government because it acts as a money lender to industry and, at the same time, admits that the small industries are not credit worthy and fail to fulfil the requisite conditions to qualify for loans. It is difficult to understand why banks, the government and financial corporations go all out to aid an industry which suffers from every conceivable ill and defect. The author has consistently referred to this and, yet, feels unhappy at the lack of funds this branch of industry receives. Why? No reason is forthcoming.

Again, while describing the importance of marketing, the author observes: 'The significance of the scheme to develop small scale ancillaries in the country lies in the fact that some of the small scale industries will have an *assured market* for their products'. But he still feels that 'in the long run co-operative marketing will have to solve the marketing problems of small scale industries. Immediately, however, they need help from the State.' Since the author accepts that small scale industries should be promoted for their own sake (he does not explain why), most of the observations and conclusions are made without discussing their basis or giving reasons for them.

Lack of clear understanding of the nature of small industries as compared to village or traditional industries has led him to hold half-baked opinions. In the last chapter, for instance, the examples of Japan, Germany and Switzerland and even the USA and England are quoted to show what India can

learn from them in solving the problem of finances for small industries. It is difficult to understand the relevance of such a comparison.

Firstly, the nature and working of such industries in those countries is quite different. They are part of the modern industry but exist on a small-scale. Secondly, they are efficient, viable economic units. And, lastly, the considerations of labour-intensive techniques and decentralisation are not very relevant issues in the context of those countries. If India is to follow their example, the arguments generally given in support of small industries will have to be given up. And, as Dhar and Lydall have shown, the sooner it is done the better. But Ramakrishna evidently is not aware of all this. He compares India's case with others without giving any basis for such a comparison. Like so many others, he just rides with the wave.

G. P. Srivastava

INDIA'S FOREIGN TRADE By Dr. S. K. Verghese.

Allied Publishers.

This book based on the dissertation submitted by the author to the University of Delhi for her Ph.D. degree, naturally bears the character of an academic work. The author is more concerned in compiling the relevant material on the subject and presenting all possible points of view on the different issues dealt with than in putting across any particular point of view.

There is a general discussion in the first chapter on the organisation and financing of foreign trade which sums up arguments for or against direct and indirect trade, gives a useful description of the various intermediaries in foreign trade such as commission agents, brokers, freight forwarders, etc., and goes on to list different terms of payment and to explain the utility and merit of each of these forms. While the chapter is useful as a background to those that follow, there is hardly anything original in it and more or less covers in a brief compass what might be found in standard text books on the subject.

It is only when she comes to the organisation and import of foreign trade in India that one finds evidence of interesting and original research. For, instance, she has made a study of some of the 20 to 25 thousand export and import houses which engage in foreign trade in India. On the basis of replies received to a questionnaire from 877 firms which represent a cross section of the trade interests in India, she comes to the following conclusions. More than 54 per cent of the firms are proprietary and partnership firms, the majority of them having not more than 3 to 4 partners. Only 8 per cent of the firms engaged in the export trade of India maintain branches abroad. Most of the firms which maintain branch offices abroad are foreign firms. Those Indian firms which have branches abroad have them only in neighbouring countries such as

Burma, Ceylon, Pakistan and in some cases in East Africa.

Only 344 firms, i.e., 37 per cent, have more than one office in India, the rest being unitary organisations with a single office. About 314 firms are composite firms engaged in export and import trade and a still larger number—408—is also engaged in internal trade. Most of the exporters are engaged in a line of business, exporting goods to certain markets and importing goods available in those markets and distributing them to retailers in India. Countrywise specialisation is more common than commoditywise specialisation among Indian exporters. About 36 per cent, i.e., 329 firms, of the total exporting houses are engaged in some sort of production or processing of goods.

In a subsequent chapter there is a rather scathing criticism of Indian trade missions abroad. 'The foreign service personnel who are at present entrusted with the task have neither the training nor the aptitude for the work. It is necessary that people with sound knowledge of economics and practical training should be sent as trade commissioners, consuls, etc. Foreign commerce being a specialised branch of our foreign relations should be entrusted in the hands of people who have thorough training in the analysis of economic data,' says Dr Verghese. She then goes on to make the suggestion that a scheme for training promising young men for undertaking foreign trade activities should be investigated. The present system of India's trade organisation, she feels does not ensure the training of the right type of men, because, although our universities provide the theoretical background, practical knowledge can be acquired only from opportunities in field training.

There is an interesting discussion on the controversial topic of State trading and on the activities of the State Trading Corporation. The author however again seems to fight shy of taking sides in the controversy and seems to be content with stating the case on both sides. While criticising the attitude of traders for viewing export and import trade operations from their individual context and for resenting interference with the status quo, she feels that the State Trading Corporation should also try to utilise the services of the existing trade channels and says that 'care should be taken that the existing channels are not abruptly disturbed as that would adversely affect our foreign trade'.

She expresses the view a little further on that 'as government officials do not possess business experience and freedom for initiative, it is necessary that more and more businessmen with practical knowledge and business acumen replace the government officials'. One is tempted to ask whether there would be any point in continuing to call the organisation a State Trading Corporation if her advice were really accepted and all government officials on the body replaced by businessmen 'with practical knowledge and business acumen'.

Coming to the question of the relative share of Indian and foreign firms in the foreign trade of

India, the author traces the vicissitudes of Indian firms engaged in foreign trade from the days when British control over the administration and economy of the country was very nearly complete, to the recent period following independence. As late as 1931 the relative share of Indians in the external trade of India was estimated by the Indian Chambers of Commerce as 15 per cent of the total external trade. But during the last two decades, the share of Indian traders in the external trade of India has undergone considerable change. According to recent surveys Indian firms handled nearly 70 to 74 per cent of our import trade and 60 to 71 per cent of our export trade during the years 1951-52 and 1956-58. But even so, the author feels that in the ever changing conditions of international commerce where high pressure salesmanship is required, Indian firms present an outmoded picture and there is need for rationalising our export trade organisation.

Discussing the financing of India's foreign trade and its techniques and institutional aspects, the author points out that a little less than half of India's total external trade on private account is financed through the medium of bills and the proportion of bills is greater in export than import trade. 'Generally speaking', states Dr. Verghese, 'the attitude of banks in India is more conservative than it should be and the problem is not so much the paucity of funds as the defects in the organisation of the trade which prevent the smooth flow of funds from the banks to the traders. The solution lies in remedying these defects. There is great scope for developing acceptance credit for financing our export trade'. She also sounds a note of warning about the dangers inherent in the bulk of our trade being financed by foreign exchange banks because, despite their efficiency and cheapness, the predominant reliance on foreign banks for servicing such an essential activity as foreign trade is unsound.

A telling illustration of our dependence on foreign agencies for our export trade is the export trade in tea. Dr. Verghese devotes a special chapter to the subject. This has been a very wise decision on the part of the author because tea occupies the pride of place in India's foreign exchange earnings and accounted on an average during the period 1950 to 1960 to 20 per cent of India's total foreign exchange earnings. But the export trade in tea is mainly in foreign hands, British firms playing the dominant role. Out of the six broking firms in Calcutta, 4 are predominantly non-Indian as regards ownership and management. These four firms handled over 96 per cent of the total business in Calcutta in 1954-55. In Cochin there are only 2 broking firms, both of them non-Indian.

A survey of the relative share of Indian and foreign firms in the export trade of tea conducted by the Reserve Bank of India indicates that 64.7 per cent of the export trade was conducted by foreign firms in 1958 even though the share of Indian firms has increased from 17.9 in 1951 to 35.3 in 1958. The

author has pointed out that the situation is complicated by the fact that 'any attempt to bring about deviation from the customary practice to broaden the trade as regards control and destination of trade is likely to be defeated by the retaliatory policy of the producers in collusion with the trade and the consumers abroad. She suggests that diversification of our export trade by developing direct commercial relations with countries which are at present importing through London would be helpful in reducing our undue reliance on London markets.

As a study of the existing structure of the foreign trade of India, its various institutions and its methods of financing, Dr. Verghese's work is excellent. But she has not gone into broader questions of the patterns and directions of our foreign trade, the methods to be adopted to overcome the foreign exchange crisis and the initiatives to be taken to increase our exports and to reduce our dependence on imports from abroad by policies of import substitution and other measures.

J. M. Kaul

FAMINES IN INDIA—a study in some aspects of the economic history of India. By B. M. Bhatia.

Asia Publishing House, Bombay, 1963.

Ever since we heard it for the first time as children, we have not forgotten the biblical story of 'The Seven Fat Kine and the Seven Lean Kine', and we grew up to see that piece of biblical imagery translated from time to time into stark reality—the unhappy fact of the lean outnumbering the fat by three to one. A swing of the economic pendulum never results in prosperity and scarcity in equal proportions. Today, in India, the food situation is far from being satisfactory and we face the solid fact that we have not been able to grow as much food as our country needs. Hence the spectre of a food crisis and resultant famine is constantly before us. Famines, whether in India or elsewhere, are as old as man's hunger. What is famine? In the olden days, famine was defined as 'a state of extreme hunger suffered by the population of a region as a result of the failure of the accustomed food supply'. An old lady, writing in an Australian Morning Bulletin said, 'Danger to the world's future food supplies sprang, not so much from a lack of nature's gifts or human resources as from indifference, apathy and lack of action'. The latter is very true when one reads the history of famines when India was ruled by Britain.

Incorporating his thesis in the first ten chapters of the book under review, with the addition of the eleventh chapter on the Bengal famine of 1943, Dr. Bhatia covers a period from 1850 to 1945. The author asserts, and rightly so, that no genuine 'economic history of India' covering the British period of Indian history could be regarded as complete, unless it included a far-reaching study of the causes and nature of the various famines and scarcities which ravaged this country since 1860. Dr. Bhatia observes

that apart from the new approach he has chalked out on the subject, the study is based on the official records of the Government of India at the National Archives in New Delhi, and he goes on to say that this material was not tapped earlier for survey by any economic historian since, perhaps, the pioneering efforts of R. C. Dutt.

The author expresses the hope that his book will not only serve as a reference study but will also stimulate further research in the all-important problems of food and agriculture in India. He adds that 'the history of famines has been dealt with in the context of the uneven development of the country's economy resulting from foreign rule, the inadequacy of the government and under-development. Touching upon some of the most important aspects of economic development of the country during the latter half of the nineteenth and the early part of the present century, the author makes a humble contribution to the economic history of the country over the most crucial period of the country's economic development during the British regime'. In fact, Dr. Bhatia's book is an indictment of British rule in India.

Even though India once was (rich grain-lands are now part of Pakistan) one of the richest granaries of the world having supplied foodgrains to other countries, it is a historical fact that famines often occurred. With improved systems of transport and communications in this country, the scourge of famines did not decrease, but 'in a period of about 90 years from 1765 when the East India Company took over the Diwani of Bengal, to 1858, the country experienced twelve famines and four "severe scarcities". The frequency of famines showed a still further increase during the first fifty years of the direct rule of India by Britain. Between 1860 and 1908, famine or scarcity prevailed in one part of the country or the other, in twenty out of the total of forty-nine years'.

Dr. Bhatia has highlighted his study with the account of one of the most disastrous famines in India which occurred in Bengal in 1943. This famine wrought havoc and took a heavy toll of precious lives through the mismanagement of the state of affairs by the then Government of India. In this context, it is amusing to note that L. S. Amery, then Secretary of State for India, speaking in the House of Commons on 'the present difficult food situation in India', listed the following four reasons which had given rise to that situation: (a) tendency of cultivators to withhold food grains from the market; (b) hoarding; (c) difficulties of transportation; and (d) *The fact that Indians were eating more per head as a result of increased incomes.* Amery's statement ridiculed the one made by Lord Curzon in 1900 that 'India's millions were starving because of England's neglect of duty to India'.

In 1901, William Digby wrote in his *Prosperous India* that 'famine approximates more and more

towards becoming a representative of the normal condition of many parts of India.' With officials inactive and unprepared and with no premonitory signs; no widespread failure of crops; no alarm in the press and with no discussion about applying the Famine Code or starting test works, the famine, almost like the cyclone of 1942, broke on Bengal with people dying in the open streets. Dr. Bhatia points out that the commercial revolution, construction of railways and the Suez Canal, brought prosperity to those engaged in trade and commerce but disaster to the agriculturist. The author tells of the growth of commerce and the stagnation of agriculture; of growing prosperity of the commercial classes and increasing poverty of the rural masses; of rising prices (in Burdwan District the price of medium rice rose from Rs. 7.5 a maund on 18 November, 1942, to Rs. 29.75 a maund in May 1943 and by August 1943 rice was quoted in most districts of Bengal at Rs. 40 to Rs. 50 a maund) and stationary wages, of an increase in export of foodgrains, and the existence of an endemic state of hunger in a substantial section of the country's rural population and ineffective agrarian legislation. It was during this period that the part played by speculation in regulating the prices of foodgrains in a period of drought and scarcity was officially recognised. The famine in Bengal carried away 15 lakhs of persons due to starvation on the pavements of Calcutta, but not a single person among the dead belonged to Greater Calcutta.

Dr. Bhatia discusses, in the 'Epilogue' to his book, the future of food and famine in India, and says that 'the ultimate solution of the food and famine problem, however, lies in the increase in production of foodgrains. Substantial progress has been made in that direction since 1951, but self-sufficiency is still a distant goal. In fact, the Ford Foundation team which visited India in 1959 to report on the country's food problem, expressed the view that after ten years of planned economic development, India was still faced with a "food crisis" and unless steps were taken to step up food production in the country to 110 million tons a year by the end of the Third Plan, her economic and industrial progress will be in jeopardy. Recent developments in her economy have raised food to the position of India's foremost economic problem'.

Having established the fact that famines are no longer the result of the wrath of nature but drift of governments, this writer recalls President Radhakrishnan addressing the World Food Congress when he said that "Food supply is the most elementary thing and that nations can take the advantage of the greatest scientific techniques and modern appliances available to us, fertilisers, better seeds, irrigation.' Also, the late President John F. Kennedy spoke 'of the conviction that all men are equal by reason of their natural dignity and that same dignity in the twentieth century requires the elimination of large-scale hunger and starvation'.

S.M.

POVERTY AND PLANNING By C. N. Vakil.

Allied Publishers.

Although the authorship of this book is attributed to Professor C. N. Vakil, strictly speaking it is an anthology for it contains two articles by Gandhiji and six written in collaboration with Dr. P. R. Brahmananda. Let us, however, turn to the contents of the anthology. At the instance of Gandhiji, a questionnaire was sent around in 1928 to economists about 'Indian poverty, its causes and remedies'. Professor Vakil wrote a series of articles in answer to it.

He assigns six internal causes together with some external causes for the poverty of India. The six internal causes can be summed up as:

- (1) 'The majority of the agricultural population has not enough work . . . for about five months in a year.
- (2) 'It is a notorious fact of our social life that the active workers in each family are few.
- (3) 'Those large number of able-bodied beggars (sadhus or fakirs) are dependent on society in general for their maintenance.
- (4) 'The climate of this country comes in the way of continuous and sustained work either physical or mental.
- (5) ' . . . a large number of people resigning themselves to fate and not exerting themselves as much as they can for greater production.
- (6) 'a . . . one-sided educational system.'

In dealing with all these internal causes of poverty, he doesn't mention the feudal relations and the British rulers' consistent neglect of irrigation, reclamation, introduction of better methods of agriculture and so on. Similarly, he doesn't talk of British exploitation of India. He does not mention the annual tribute from India to Britain and abroad, which was, according to an estimate even in 1921 and 1922, about 2,198.8 million rupees.

Without all these things, he traces poverty to some minor, contributory causes. No wonder Gandhiji took Vakil to task and said, "There is, no doubt, enough in the chapters to show that foreign exploitation of India is a cause of poverty. But in collecting causes the Professor has evidently felt some delicacy about mentioning what is obviously a primary cause.' In spite of Vakil's remonstrances, Gandhiji's criticism is entirely justified.

Vakil also asserts in his articles on poverty that, 'the general law of Malthus that there is a tendency for population in any country to increase at a faster rate than the means of subsistence remains unchallenged.' The Professor ought to know that facts have challenged this Malthusian Law. R. K. Mukherjee, studying the movement of population and production in India between 1910 and 1933 shows that 'the increase of total agricultural production has

outstripped population growth.' P. J. Thomas writing in the *Times* in 1935 declared: 'Between 1900 and 1930 population in India increased by 19 per cent but production of foodstuffs and raw materials increased by about 30 per cent and industrial production by 189 per cent.'

Having studied the causes of poverty in India in a superficial manner, Vakil imagines two alternatives before India: '(1) The masses may be crushed out of existence by sheer want . . . or (2) they may grow desperate and become the powerful instrument of revolution. . . The Professor does not seem to set store by his first alternative. The second alternative implies that poverty is the cause of revolutions. If so, beggars ought to be the instruments of it. But they never have been. Obviously the professor either doesn't know or does not want to dwell on the deeper causes of social revolutions.

But, what he says about such a revolution is more interesting. He maintains, 'he who decries a steady and substantial progress for the country must necessarily be conscious of such possibilities (i.e. revolution), irrespective of the fact whether he is a leader of the people or a representative of the British Government.' The implication here is that a social revolution is not conducive to a 'steady and substantial progress for the country.' One wonders whether Vakil knew his history; for no social revolution has ever impeded progress. On the contrary, it is revolution which has led to substantial progress.

In 1937, Vakil delivered at the Osmania University a series of lectures on 'The State in Relation to Economic Progress in India.' His characterisation of the colonial State structure of British India is misleading. According to him, 'upto 1920, in British India we did have one State; it may be described as the Bureaucratic State.' But when Dyarchy was introduced by the Montford Reforms, he thinks bureaucracy was 'tempered to some extent by public opinion as voiced in legislatures and by the existence of ministers in charge of transferred departments.' With the 1935 Act, he concedes that the bureaucratic State continues at the centre but declares that it 'is due to be transformed into the Federal Government of India at an early date.' From this it would appear as though bureaucracy would end with the formation of a federal type of government. Does this mean that the Professor does not know what bureaucracy means?

In a series of articles, 'What's Wrong with Our Economic Situation' published in a Bombay journal in 1949, he advises the capitalist in the following manner: 'The capitalist. . . should realise that he would be swamped by the few forces of destruction if he did not take care to reform himself in time. The capitalist is naturally afraid of the communist. If this fear is sincere, then the only alternative for the capitalist is to embrace the socialist and make terms with him in time.'

Unwittingly, perhaps, Professor Vakil is not very complimentary to the socialist in assigning to him a

kind of black-leg role. Then he goes on to the responsibility of labour. 'The existence of strikes in recent times, the complaints of absenteeism and go-slow methods in factories, the well-known tendency of impudence combined with neglect of duty among certain classes of workers, must be held responsible for the prevailing fall in production or difficulties in increasing the same.' But he does not go into their wages, their demands, problems of retrenchment and victimisation for trade union activity and other things labour had to face and defend itself from. He doesn't enquire into the real causes of the prevailing fall in production.

All this is an indication of Professor Vakil's political bias. In conformity with this bias, he wants a trade union movement without a political outlook, and a politically emasculated labour force. He concludes with the hope that ' . . . the society will be able to see that independent study of labour economics grows in the country, making it possible for a greater understanding between labour and capital, providing useful and constructive criticism of the labour policy of the government, and safeguarding the consumers' interests in the process, thus contributing its share to the balanced development of the country.'

In short, what Professor Vakil says to labour is that labour should work more, produce more and, of course, shouldn't demand higher wages because higher wages lead to higher prices which in their turn would hit the consumers. But what he forgets is that labour itself forms a major part of the consumers and it cannot consume without adequate purchasing capacity. But, of course, one should admit that Professor Vakil is consistent in his attitude to labour. In 1930, in a lecture delivered at Elphinstone College, he declared, 'when I say that we want rapid economic development of an all-round character what I mean is something like what Mussolini does at present for Italy.' Mussolini's attitude to labour and to capital is well-known.

Economists of competence all over the world did see even in 1947 the dangerous, aggressive, expansionist implications of Marshall Aid. But Professor Vakil sings paeans to it in 1949. He says: 'Heroic efforts are being made for their recovery both by the peoples of the U.K. and of Western European countries with the powerful support of the U.S.A., which has freely placed huge resources at their disposal in the form of Marshall Aid.'

Professor Vakil gives a long bibliography at the end. Curiously enough, it consists of nothing else except (i) publications of Professor Vakil—singly or jointly with others, (ii) publications based on research guided by Professor Vakil, (iii) unpublished research theses for the Ph.D. degree guided by Professor Vakil, (iv) theses approved for the M.A. degree, and other publications edited by Professor Vakil. No further comment is required.

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
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
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
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symposium participants

THE PROBLEM

A pointer to the essential background
of the present debate

HISTORICAL REALITIES

P. N. Dhar, Director, Institute of
Economic Growth, New Delhi

BASIC WEAKNESSES

Surindar Suri, Social scientist,
Visiting Professor, Otto Suhr Institut,
Berlin

ANOTHER OPPORTUNITY

G. S. Bhargava, special correspondent of
'The Indian Express'

FORGOTTEN FACTS

Sisir Gupta, Research Secretary, Indian
Council of World Affairs

THE SEPARATISTS

Inder Malhotra, political correspondent
of 'The Statesman'

WHAT IS AT STAKE

V. K. Krishna Menon, former Defence Minister,
Government of India

COMMUNICATION

A. A. A. Fyzee (Bombay)

DOCUMENTARY

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BOOKS

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Kusum Madgaokar, S.M., Narendra Kumar,
and G. P. Srivastava

FURTHER READING

A select and relevant bibliography
prepared by L. C. Kumar

COVER

Designed by Chowdhury/Grewal

The problem

ONCE again, the future of the Vale of Kashmir, inhabited by some two million people, threatens the peace of a sub-continent which embraces nearly 550 million. The interest of foreign powers, the religious background to the question, the meaning of political power in a strategically vital fringe area, the ambitions of men and movements, have hardened the attitudes of India and Pakistan. Kashmir, which was to be the living repudiation of the basis of the partition of the sub-continent, is now sought to be used to justify its absolute fulfilment. There is talk of independence, of special status, of accession, of secession, of aggression, but the truth cannot be hidden. Years of apathy, of failure to deepen the roots of a secular and democratic life on this sub-continent have created an explosive situation which men of narrow and limited vision in India and Pakistan seek to exploit. The sickness we plan to cure has been analysed again and again, but we do not as yet know what has to be done. Kashmir's future is only the first of a chain of inter-locked problems which we can no longer afford to neglect. There are, in fact, no easy answers to these problems. This symposium attempts to refresh the mind of thinking people in our country to help them arrive at conclusions.

Historical realities

P. N. DHAR

THE Kashmir problem is once again with us. This time it is not the hardy annual which pops up in the Security Council where Pakistan repeats the same charges over and over again and India presents her case for the nth time. This time another dimension has been added to it by the release of Sheikh Abdullah. It is perhaps not strictly correct to call it a new dimension; it was there all

the time but it was somewhat dormant.

The theft of the sacred relic in Srinagar opened up the Kashmiri Pandora's box; many things flew out of it; among them, Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed's decade-old 'strong' leadership and the resilience of the National Conference as a political party. The Sheikh is once again at the centre of the political stage in Kashmir drawing

large crowds and expressing his opinions freely and without much self-restraint. All this has resulted in something which looks like a crisis in Indo-Kashmir relations and thereby presents a serious challenge to Indian democracy.

But, as in the original Pandora's box, the one thing which has not flown out is hope, hope of at long last settling the problem of Kashmir. Before we delineate the nature and content of this new hope in Kashmir, it seems necessary to recapitulate the essentials of what has been called the Kashmir problem. This is necessary because so much has been said and written about it that quite often the basic issues get blurred.

The Problem

The important point to be remembered about the Kashmir problem is that it is *not the cause* of Indo-Pakistani differences but *a consequence thereof*. It is an awkward left-over of the partition of the sub-continent, in the same way as the problem of the distribution of waters of the Indus basin was after the partition of the Punjab. The fundamental fact to be kept in view for a proper understanding of the problem of the accession of Kashmir to India is that the partition of the Indian sub-continent was not accepted by the Indian people and their leaders as arising from the theory that Hindus and Muslims constituted two different nations.

They agreed to Pakistan as a compromise—in specific Muslim-majority areas in British India—under the exigencies of prevailing circumstances and the pressures of the ruling power, in much the same spirit as they had compromised about communal electorates where they had no choice. The general principle was clearly stated in the A.I.C.C. Resolution of June 15, following the announcement of the Mountbatten Plan: 'The A.I.C.C. earnestly trusts that when present passions have subsided, India's problems will be viewed in their proper perspective and the false doctrine of two nations in India will be discredited and discarded by all.'

And as Jawaharlal Nehru emphasised later to Michael Brecher, 'we cannot accept that (the two nation theory) because once we accept that nationality goes by religion, we break up our whole conception of India.'

Had it not been so, partition would have extended a *de-facto* recognition to Hindus and Muslims as two distinctive nationalities having nothing in common in their long and rich cultural heritage. Above all, the consequences of such a position could have been tragically fatal for the large Muslim minority of 40 million in India. They would have had to choose only between migrating from India and staying as unwanted aliens.

Since partition, India and Pakistan have developed in opposite political directions. Pakistan became a theocratic State and India laid down the framework of a secular State. In these circumstances, a certain degree of ideological conflict is and has been inevitable.

Abdullah's Earlier Stand

In this clash of principles, Kashmir has emerged as a symbol and safeguard of Indian secularism. Sheikh Abdullah was the first person to see that. It used to be his claim that the two-nation theory had met its Waterloo in Kashmir. This was no idle boast of his. As the leader of the Kashmir freedom movement he had been a consistent fighter against Muslim separatism in the form of the two-nation theory or its precursor, separate electorates.

In his Presidential Address to the 1938 Session of the J. and K. Muslim Conference, he said, 'I reiterate today what I have said so often. Firstly, we must end communalism by ceasing to think in terms of Muslims and non-Muslims when discussing our political problems. Secondly, there must be universal suffrage on the basis of joint electorates. Without these two, democracy is lifeless.'

And after 11 years—during which time the two-nation theory

and two separate States of India and Pakistan had been born—he said in 1949 in his Presidential Address to the annual session of National Conference: 'Our struggle against Pakistan aggression is fundamentally a struggle of ideology on which there can be no compromise. The two-nation theory is not only anti-social and anti-democratic but violates the will and word of God.'

Again, broadcasting over Radio Kashmir on its second anniversary, he said, 'there is nothing in common between Pakistan ideology and Kashmir political faith. Kashmir's accession to India is final and will last so long as our aims and ideals continue to be the same as they have been in the past... The community of outlook in regard to this objective (religious tolerance) has knit the National Conference and the Indian National Congress together. This clash of ideologies led Pakistan to attack Kashmir and this community of outlook and understanding made India come to the aid of Kashmir.'

Behind these declarations and policy formulations was the force and weight of the Kashmir freedom movement, led by the National Conference. This struggle, as happens in all such cases, was opposed by the upper classes whose economic and social privileges it threatened. Left to itself the local upper class opposition to it should have crumbled. But it was caught in the vortex of Indian politics.

Muslim League Attitude

The conservative, reactionary and communal elements which had been organised with fostering care by the Maharaja's regime won support from their Indian counterpart, the Muslim League. The Muslim League never lent any support, moral or material, to the Kashmir freedom movement. Indeed it could not. It could not afford to antagonise the princely order, its ally in the political chessboard of India. And when partition took place, the old struggle continued, although the plane

shifted. It was not the Muslim League now, but the Government of Pakistan.

The withdrawal of the British had removed the main prop of petty feudal reactionaries. The intervention of Pakistan was their only hope of survival. And Pakistan did not take long to oblige. Despite a Standstill Agreement, she imposed a rigorous economic blockade of the State. Supplies of petrol, cloth, salt and food-grains allocated by the then Government of India, and other essential supplies were stopped in the hope that hunger and privation would force the accession of Kashmir to Pakistan. Since this did not happen, a full scale invasion under the guise of a tribal raid was launched which only hastened Kashmir's accession to India.

The Accession

It is said that Pakistan's aggression compelled Kashmir to accede to India. While it is true that the Pak invasion precipitated it, the accession to India was not something unnatural. The political evolution of Kashmir had taken a form and direction which created predisposing circumstances in favour of this step. And nobody knew this better than Pakistan herself. Otherwise she would not have resorted to the drastic course of military intervention to force the issue.

Kashmir, therefore, is not merely a matter of territory for India; it touches the very core of her polity. If anything happens to disturb the centre piece, Indian society will be shaken to its foundations with consequences too frightful to contemplate.

However, it has to be recognised that although the Kashmir freedom movement received much strength from its alliance with that of the rest of the country, it developed a distinctive ethos of its own. It was due partly to the comparative isolation caused by the high mountain ranges of the Himalayas surrounding the State and partly to the deliberate attempt of the feudal ruler to in-

sulate his subjects from external influences. But more than this, the greater economic backwardness of Kashmir tended to give a sharper radical turn to its freedom movement. The feudal economic conditions had arrested the growth of its middle class.

'New Kashmir' Thesis

Whatever could be called middle class elements were predominantly non-Kashmiri, particularly Punjabi. The National Conference leadership, although middle class in composition, found its main support in the peasantry and the artisans. This drove the Kashmiri leadership to political and economic radicalism. Their programme was presented in a historic document called *New Kashmir*, which later became the source of National Conference policies and programmes.

The National Conference was therefore anxious to preserve this distinctive individuality of Kashmir. As a result of this and because of the special circumstances in which formal accession took place, Kashmir was given a special status in the Indian Constitution and a Constituent Assembly of its own to draw up its constitution. The Inaugural Address to the Assembly listed the tasks as originally set out in the *New Kashmir* thesis.

One of the first steps which this Assembly took was to pass what became the most drastic piece of land reform in India. Nehru said, 'I confess that I look with some envy on the speed and clarity with which they (Kashmir Government) have performed this task there, considering the enormous trouble we have had in the various States of India, the difficulties, the obstruction and the delays that we had to face, and so, I became a little envious when I saw this was done in Kashmir.'

Again, special legislation was passed on citizenship rights. For a long time, Kashmir laws had prevented an outsider, that is, any person from outside the State, from acquiring or holding land in Kashmir. The National Conference Government was anxious to

preserve that right because it was afraid that a poor but attractive place like Kashmir would be overrun by money bags from elsewhere. And so on.

We are not listing all the subjects on which special treatment was extended to Kashmir. But the underlying idea was to give effect to the wishes of the people of Kashmir without making them inconsistent with the Constitution of India. An understanding on these matters was reached between Kashmir leaders and the Government of India in July 1952, and became popularly known as the Delhi Agreement. Earlier, the Indian Constitution had made provision for this caveat under Article 370.

Unfortunately, however, serious differences arose among National Conference leaders themselves on the implementation of the Delhi Agreement. This created a tense situation which was further aggravated by the Jammu Praja Parishad agitation which demanded full integration of Jammu and Kashmir with the rest of the country. This was a period of considerable mutual distrust between National Conference leaders which finally resulted in the dismissal of Sheikh Abdullah from the premiership and his arrest later in August 1953.

Abdullah's Consistency

If one were to examine carefully all the speeches and statements which Sheikh Abdullah has made since April 11, 1952, when he delivered the famous Ranbir Singhpur speech, publicly expressing his misgivings about the wisdom of closer integration with India and his doubts about the true secular nature of the Indian State, down to the Id day declaration at Srinagar on April 23, 1964, there are certain themes which run in a recurrent manner. It is true that the Sheikh is enunciating these themes now with greater vigour and much vehemence, but their contents remain largely unchanged.

So far, Sheikh Abdullah has not repudiated his faith in secular democracy; he has not advocated

Kashmir's accession to Pakistan; he realises that the problem of Kashmir is vitally linked with communal harmony in the sub-continent. He knows that the sovereign independence of a tiny State like Kashmir, surrounded by expansionist and aggressive powers, will be chimerical. Although he has given a tremendous boost to the slogan of plebiscite, he has gone on record to indicate that he is not dogmatic about it and has hinted at other ways of ascertaining the wishes of the people.

Situation Today

What then is the problem just now? So far as one can see, the problem is that both New Delhi and the Kashmir leader must see and appreciate the strong points in each other's case. New Delhi has to appreciate that whereas legally and constitutionally Kashmir's accession to India is valid, it has become politically controversial and to expect that Sheikh Abdullah will now accept, without question, the verdict of the Kashmir Constituent Assembly in this matter is to strain human nature. It is necessary, therefore, to find ways and means whereby the legitimate part of Sheikh Abdullah's grievances can be met.

It does not seem to be impossible to resolve the differences between Sheikh Abdullah and the Government of India. The Sheikh has not—at any rate, so far—denounced either the original Instrument of Accession or the Delhi Agreement. Within this framework fruitful negotiations ought to be possible. The Instrument of Accession was limited in its scope, as in the case of all other States, to defence, communications and external affairs. The Delhi Agreement satisfied the political and other demands of Kashmir leaders within the Indian constitutional system.

It is true that in the case of other States the sphere of accession was widened later but, in the case of Kashmir, a transitional period was considered necessary. The late Gopalaswami Ayyangar, who moved the adoption of

Article 370 in the Constituent Assembly, took pains to explain why the State was not being integrated with the Republic of India as other acceding States. He said, 'this discrimination is due to the special conditions of Kashmir. That particular State is not yet ripe for this kind of integration. It is the hope of everybody here that in due course even Jammu and Kashmir will become ripe for the same sort of integration as has taken place in the case of other States (cheers). At present it is not possible to achieve that integration. There are various reasons why this is not possible.'

And if there is dissatisfaction at a closer integration of Kashmir with India, it only proves that the reasons which the late Gopalaswami Ayyangar gave the Constituent Assembly still operate. It is true that the greater autonomy enjoyed by Kashmir State has not always been good for Kashmir. Sheikh Abdullah himself suffered as a result of it when he ceased to be the Premier. Much beneficial legislation of the Indian Parliament got dammed in Kashmir because of the special position of this State.

There were people who had foreseen this development. Maulana Hasrat Mohani had described the special treatment of Kashmir as discrimination against it. But all this should be left for the Kashmiris to decide, as it was intended to be.

Myths and Make-belief

This will mean that New Delhi will have to give up some of its myths and the make-believe in which it has wrapped itself. It ought to realise that a politically satisfied Kashmir is not only sound democracy but also very effective international diplomacy. The Government of India has neither been able to settle the issue at the Security Council nor has it been able to deinternationalise the issue. It is no use claiming that the Kashmir problem has been settled. It obviously has not. We still have a cease-fire line which is supervised by U.N. Observers. The Security

Council is still seized of the problem. And there is a territory which calls itself 'Azad Kashmir'.

Similarly, Sheikh Abdullah must accept the fact that today is not the day after his arrest. Eleven long and eventful years have passed since. It is not easy to reverse historical processes. The Sheikh will necessarily have to shed his Rip-van-Winkle attitudes and refocus his lenses and adjust himself to new realities. He has to have some sense of magnitude and realise the implications of the political behaviour of two million Kashmiris for the seventy millions of minorities in the Indo-Pakistan sub-continent. It is often suggested that minorities in either country should not be affected by what happens elsewhere. This is ideally desirable, but one expects greater understanding from the Sheikh about the present strength of—and dangers to—India's secular democracy.

National Security

Sheikh Abdullah also must appreciate that Kashmir for India does not only pose a problem of secularism and democracy but also a problem of national security. The changing balance of power situation in Asia, particularly in the immediate neighbourhood of Kashmir with an aggressive Chinese presence in Ladakh, makes it difficult for India to even conceive of a weak, vulnerable little State which is likely to become a cockpit of international rivalries.

Given faith in each other's bonafides and given the desire to find a solution, it should be possible for old comrades who have shared common political struggles together and held common ideals to find a *modus vivendi* which will satisfy Kashmir and at the same time deinternationalise the dispute. The two objectives are interlinked because Pakistan—and much of the world—takes its stand by the Kashmiri aspiration for self-determination.

This is the hope that still remains; the hope that must be realised.

Basic weaknesses

SURINDAR SURI

RECENT events in Kashmir have again exposed the hollowness of some of the Government of India's domestic policies. Sheikh Abdullah's release after eleven years of incarceration highlights basic weaknesses in Indian politics where a feather is used to fight a tiger but a hammer to scare a fly. The conclusion follows that the approach of the Indian leadership to problems of the country is atavistic. Developments in Kashmir provide a rude awakening.

Abdullah's release spells the end of the Emergency after its prolonged phoney existence. After the Chinese withdrew their forces from the Indian territory that they had occupied during the armed hostilities of 1962, the psychological tension which was built up among the people after the Chinese attack relaxed gradually; it disappeared by the summer of 1963. Thereafter the Emergency had neither a military and poli-

tical justification nor a psychological one. Yet no one was able to persuade the government to lift it.

The Sixteenth Amendment to the Constitution made it illegal to advocate secession of any part of India. As a result the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam altered its constitution, which had demanded the separation of Dravidian territories and their formation into an independent State. But Abdullah advocates self-determination for the people of Kashmir with the implied right of secession. He might be held to challenge the territorial integrity of India.

At the moment he seems to be more powerful than the Constitution, for no one dares to touch him. He was told by the Prime Minister of Kashmir that he would not be rearrested. Sadiq says that the situation in Kashmir is under control and that the challenge

thrown out by Abdullah will be treated as a political issue, not a legal or constitutional one.

Emergency regulations and the Sixteenth Amendment to the Constitution are examples of the tendency of the Government of India to use a hammer to kill a fly. Disturbances in India during the time of the Chinese attack were non-existent, public enthusiasm and the morale of the people were high. Instead of harnessing this upsurge of emotions in a positive direction, the government started to make use of repressive measures which showed that it felt incapable of harnessing the constructive energies.

The use of great power to curb social unrest shows up the weakness of the government rather than the seriousness of the crisis. If the crisis were serious, the government would not be able to curb it with all the regulations in the world. But if the danger was not serious, and hence could be curbed relatively easily, constitutional and emergency measures were not needed. The trouble with using them is that popular respect for constitutional measures is eroded.

Unnecessary prolongation of the Emergency is like calling 'wolf' too often. The pay-off will come when there is a real Emergency; it will be difficult for the people to take it seriously. When a man like Abdullah challenges the Regulations, there is polite silence. But doesn't this discredit the rule of law, which should treat each individual on the same basis.

Lack of Vision

The lack of political vision is responsible for the passive attitude the government has taken about Kashmir. An active policy would have sought to unite the whole of Kashmir, for Kashmir divided is a running sore. In accepting the present division, the government has surrendered political initiative to anyone who might effectively raise the cry of United Kashmir. If you are not on the political offensive, you are likely to be on the defensive and

retreating. The Prime Minister knows this dictum quite well when he is in Parliament; but the understanding is absent when he deals with border areas and the outside world.

If one is to judge from the government's inactivity, Kashmir must be politically the most mature part of the country and the most loyal, for apparently secessionist propaganda is not dangerous in Kashmir as it is in Madras or any other part of the country! Or it might be that Abdullah is the only political leader in the country who possesses political initiative; others are reacting to what he says or they are waiting helplessly. The Government of India, which has not taken a public stand on the points raised by Abdullah, maintains a discreet silence. But this situation cannot last.

Political Initiative

Political power must go where political initiative resides: that is the golden rule of democratic politics. At the moment the initiative is disjoined from power; the latter has become hollow while the former grows embittered. Either the initiative must be suppressed, that is, Abdullah imprisoned again; or Kashmir and possibly India, might lie at his mercy.

In fact, the tragic history of the rise and triumph of the Muslim League in the years preceding 1947 is being repeated. Nationalist leaders acquiesced in the creation of Pakistan because they considered it the lesser evil. As the time of Independence neared, nationalist leaders were awed by the effectiveness of the Muslim League in disrupting social life. They became convinced that the League could become a perpetual nuisance. The nightmare of communal warfare, which had been evoked by some British spokesmen seemed likely to turn into reality. Many Congress leaders came to believe that political stability would be jeopardised by a permanently disaffected minority.

A truncated India, although contrary to the ideals and goals of

the nationalist movement, appeared the practical solution to the communal dilemma. Appeasement of the Muslim League seemed to promise peace. It was expected that the creation of Pakistan would leave the population in India relatively homogeneous in religious terms and, with the miscreants gone, communal conflicts would subside. The theory of two nations, which served as justification for the demand for Pakistan, was accepted temporarily in the hope that it would be fully appeased. Events have shown that this was a profound misjudgment.

Two-nation Havoc

Jinnah was also a victim of the fallacy that he could raise the two-nation theory, or permit the arousing of communal passions, as temporary expedients to gain specific ends. In the very first declaration after the creation of Pakistan, Jinnah stressed that the new State would not be theocratic. He called upon Hindus and Christians and other non-Muslims to accept Pakistan as their homeland and to give it their unreserved loyalty. He promised equal status to all citizens of Pakistan irrespective of religion or race.

But Jinnah, no less than the nationalist leaders, was disappointed. His Pakistan was 'moth-eaten' because the logic of the two-nation theory applied not only to provinces but also to districts and sub-districts. Pakistan was split apart by a thousand miles of foreign territory and so emasculated that it appeared hardly viable.

Once accepted, in however limited a fashion, the two-nation theory has continued to wreak havoc. Vast migrations of refugees, who suffered untold miseries and loss of lives, were the first signs that the calculations of the politicians had gone astray. The creation of Pakistan did not spell the end of communal conflict; rather, it institutionalized communalism, rendering the problem of religious conflict insoluble except in the extreme logical form

of the total elimination of Hindus and other non-Muslims from Pakistan and of Muslims from India.

The logical culmination of communalism, with all the barbarism and terror that would accompany it, is a frightful prospect. But it stares us in the face. If non-Muslims leave Pakistan and Muslims quit India, the very nature of the two States would undergo drastic change. Pakistan seems already on the way to becoming a purely Muslim country. West Pakistan is almost free of non-Muslims and it is possible that a similar situation would develop in East Pakistan. In India there would not only be grave repercussions following the communal exodus from East Pakistan, but it is well to bear in mind that the disease is endemic in Pakistan as well as in India. Communalism is the symptom, not the disease; the disease is lack of leadership.

Sense of Belonging

Despite the agitation for separation conducted in many parts of India, especially Tamilnad, there is in fact a sense of inevitability about belonging to India. Even leaders of the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam are convinced that political separation from India is not a political possibility. Recently I talked to a leader of the Mizo Hill Areas in Assam who stands for an autonomous State; yet his talk of autonomy was not very convincing. This man is in fact an Indian nationalist who has not yet found a rightful place on the Indian political stage.

The situation in Kashmir is different: there is no sense of inevitability about belonging to India. Kashmir is the test case for the viability of India as a secular State because Kashmir's allegiance to India cannot be taken for granted. This is the main point of Abdullah's speeches since his release, yet it is well to remember that he is subject to forces which threaten to sweep him aside.

The truth is that the Government of India has failed to win the allegiance of the youth of

Kashmir. It has failed to gain their respect, co-operation, loyalty. The youth of Kashmir is deeply alienated from India; it seems to have nothing in common with the Indian people. Surely the reason for this is not lack of economic assistance; 'cheap rice' is a political slogan used against India in Kashmir.

Antipathy Against India

If antipathy in Kashmir against India is widespread, the root cause is that no one in position of political authority in India—whether on the government side or on that of the opposition—seems to have an idea of what makes a political community and of what holds a political community together. Economic self-interest is an important part of political cohesion—or 'nationalism', in popular parlance—but India has not yet reached the stage of socio-economic development where economic rationality would be the determining factor of political behaviour. Economic forces have not grown sufficiently to serve as decisive motivating factors. Where the economy is relatively weak and undeveloped, the gap is filled by ideological considerations, either religious or, in less primitive conditions, political.

Neither in India nor in Kashmir may we expect for many years to come or perhaps for decades that rational considerations—material self-interest or devotion to moral values such as secular humanism, social welfare, or universal sarvodaya—will guide the conduct of the masses. Even social goals, when followed rationally, cease to be political for they are subject to rational calculation. This was the main point of the Marxian revolution in political theory and political practice.

The utopian socialists, according to Marxist analysis, strove to achieve moral or political goals in a logical or rational manner. In the particular social order in which they lived this was quite impossible. Rational action, whether social or individual, cannot be carried out consistently in

a situation of acute material scarcity whether real, as in India, or artificial as in many industrially well-developed countries. On the one hand political action has to be concentrated on removing the basic deficiency of the prevailing situation, i.e., development of the forces of production by removing the fetters of incompatible and unharmonious social and economic institutions which hinder it. But this process cannot be carried out rationally or logically because the social milieu compels a resort to religious or political illusions and ideologies. An ideology has to be grafted to a social programme.

This is a task to which the communist leaders, from Marx and Engels to Lenin, Stalin, Khrushchov and Mao Tse-tung have devoted themselves more or less successfully. In any case, most of them have left their impress on the history of their peoples and of the world. The achievements of the great communist leaders, howsoever we might dislike them and reject them, cannot be called into question. This shows that they achieved a genuine symbiosis with the dynamic forces and currents which shaped the lives of their peoples when they stood at a turning point.

Apathy in India

The feeling, that the people of India and especially their leadership (Congress or other) are not engaged in the gear-box of the engines of social evolution, produces the widespread sense of frustration and futility among so many individuals, especially the intelligentsia. The world is moving faster and faster, but India is not moving with the rest of the world.

Of course, many things are happening in India. Factories are built, dams are constructed. Tragedies occur: there are riots, famine, much human suffering. But the sense of participation is lacking, especially the sense of mastery over one's circumstances. The sense of purpose is lacking: we do not know where we are going. We do not know what kind of a society will develop in India in the next few decades, for leadership is

lacking; vision is lacking. We may feel frustrated, unhappy, angry, but for most of us there is no escape. We'll swim or sink in the ship of India, toss in the waves with it; we'll stay in it, come fair weather or foul. This is not because we are all very patriotic, but there simply is no alternative.

The Kashmiris

But the people of Kashmir, and especially its youth, does see an alternative. Whatever the alternative, whether it be good or evil, real or illusory, Kashmir is not bound to stay with India. At least the Kashmiris feel this way, and the present crisis springs out of their determination to keep the alternative open.

Abdullah voices Kashmiri sentiments when he says that the full accession has not taken place or that there are no ties between Kashmir and India. His words do not mean that Kashmir must leave India or that India has no legal or political *locus standi* in Kashmir. He is not voicing his sentiments alone. He listens to the many voices rising in Kashmir. He tries to express the many different sentiments which breathe silently in the breasts around him.

In a way it would be better if the people of Kashmir were definitely against India; it would show that India stood for something definite, and that a people who had a choice, or thought that they did, could opt for it or against it. But today India does not seem to stand for anything definite, clear-cut. Even the image of India as a secular State is tarnished. The Muslims in India do not feel secure. What is worse they have a feeling of being treated unfairly and as second class citizens.

Muslims in India cannot protest loudly, but the Muslims in Kashmir do. The Kashmiris are reacting to the lack of political vision and leadership in India in a way that none of us can do. It is a reaction of despair, but there is always a focal point around which the reactions might crystallise. Pakistan, a State composed of

their co-religionists is there to beckon them.

Yet the Kashmiris cannot be accused of religious intolerance or fanaticism. On the whole they have proved loyal citizens of India during the past seventeen years. Even now their voice is not hysterical and their minds are not closed. If there is failure in Kashmir, it can hardly be blamed on the Kashmiris. If Kashmir is potentially Pakistan, its creator is India.

Yet there is no point now in blaming the present political leadership in India, whether it be that of the ruling party or of the opposition parties. It has done its best; it has achieved much; it has left even more undone; but it is played out. If it is still in the saddle today, the reason is that there is no visible alternative. No new men, no new ideas. Mere criticism helps no one; if it were effective it might demoralise the present leadership. But that would not necessarily bring new men or new ideas to the fore.

A Mirror

Kashmir today is mirror of India's future. Disillusionment among Kashmiris is of the same kind as that among a great many people in India, but in Kashmir it has a means of expressing itself which renders it dramatic and ominous. But the fear that seizes many of us when we ponder on the unpleasant eventualities that confront Kashmir is not born merely out of concern for the well-being of the people of Kashmir. They might jump out of the frying pan of a shaky secular State into the fire of a theocratic one, which would certainly mean a diminution of the mind and a reduction in the scope for the development of society and personality.

We need the Kashmiris more than they need us: we need them as fellow citizens to prove to the world and to ourselves that we are indeed a secular and democratic State, one which is worth living in. If we cannot prove that to the people of Kashmir, we cannot prove it to any one, not even to ourselves, however much we may hug our illusions.

Another opportunity

G. S. BHARGAVA

DIFFERENT sections of public opinion have reacted differently to Abdullah's release and its aftermath. Leaving aside political, personal and other predilections of the people concerned, this shows the vast divergence in approach to what is described as the Kashmir problem.

The Prime Minister has never viewed it 'as a question of territory.' As he said in the course of the Lok Sabha debate on the Delhi Agreement on August 7, 1952, 'the strongest bonds that bind will not be of armies or even of Constitution to, which so much reference has been made but bonds which are stronger than the Constitution and armies—bonds that bind through love, affection and understanding.'

By and large, Abdullah and the National Conference of his day re-

ciprocated this approach. But a strange concatenation of circumstances had subsequently reduced this relationship between Kashmir and the rest of India to mundane considerations like subsidised rice and route permits. The tragedy was that this happened while Jawaharlal Nehru continued to be the unquestioned leader of India and while, in the initial stages, Abdullah was in control of the situation in Kashmir.

It is the possibility of a return to the old relationship which is pregnant with promise in the otherwise cloudy situation of today. Before one scans the horizon for a silver lining it is necessary to assess the hangover of the last eleven years in Kashmir. Also pertinent are some of the facile arguments advanced in support of the *status quo*, if not a reversion to the Bakshi period, in the State

and the discussion developing on those points.

A very significant recent development is the purely legalistic attitude taken by the former Defence Minister, V. K. Krishna Menon, and others of his way of thinking. The Indian Independence Act provided for accession by the ruler and it was there the matter ended in October 1947, they say. Abdullah challenges this position on two counts: first, that morally India is committed to ascertain and honour the wishes of the people and, secondly, the fact that a dispute with Pakistan has been before the U.N. Security Council for the last 16 years shows that the legality has no basis in reality. It is like getting a decree from a court of law without being able to execute it, he points out.

A supplementary argument by Abdullah is that if accession by Maharaja Hari Singh were adequate, why was the Constituent Assembly made to ratify it in 1956. To this his critics point out that, as Prime Minister of Jammu and Kashmir, Abdullah had thought the accession to India was complete and that the Constituent Assembly was competent to ratify it. The discussion develops with the Sheikh stressing that until his deposition and arrest in August 1953, spokesmen of the Central Government, like the late Gopalaswami Ayyangar and the late B. N. Rau, had been saying that the Constituent Assembly could only express its opinion on accession but could not supplant a plebiscite.

He alleges that after his arrest, when the successor Government headed by Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed had let loose repression on the people and had bought up or browbeaten the members of the Constituent Assembly, India took the short cut of having the accession ratified by the Constituent Assembly instead of going in for a plebiscite. This he holds 'illegal, unconstitutional and immoral.'

Element of Pique

An element of pique also is discernible in the Sheikh's complaint on this score. He says in effect that during his tenure of Prime Ministership, New Delhi had taken

an altruistic stand of honouring its commitment to the people of Jammu and Kashmir in letter as well as in spirit, thus making his task nearly impossible. But, after his arrest, the Central Government had got reconciled to ratification of the accession by the Constituent Assembly, which he had advocated unsuccessfully in the past.

As far as the Prime Minister is concerned, the shift in emphasis is perhaps a reflection of the trust he had in Abdullah and his capacity to carry the people of Kashmir with him. Since Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed did not enjoy such confidence he was apparently not set the difficult task which Abdullah had been confronted with. Secondly, in 1947 India coveted Kashmir to disprove the two-nation theory on which the partition of the sub-continent had taken place. In the context of the communal challenge posed by Pakistan and the reaction it had given rise to within our own frontiers, Kashmir became a bulwark of India's secular ideal. With the passage of time, the emotional ramifications of the issue had become so deep-rooted that continuance of Kashmir within the Indian Union became necessary for the continuance of the Muslim minority as full-fledged citizens of India.

Attitudes in Pakistan

Pakistan's approach did not suffer from a similar shift because it was throughout based on the single-minded urge to possess Kashmir. Ideas and ideals never mattered with the rulers of Pakistan at least as far as Kashmir was concerned. First, they pressed their claim to the Valley on the basis of religion and tried to annex Kashmir. Since 1954, when they realised that religion would definitely determine the result of a plebiscite, the rulers of Pakistan became staunch champions of the 'right of self-determination' of the Kashmiris to be exercised through a plebiscite.

An interesting converse to the Pakistani attitude is the position of the Jan Sangh and allied elements in India. Like the Pakistani policy this has the double virtue of consistency and clarity. First, it

holds the Instrument of Accession signed by the Maharaja to be the final word on the subject. Secondly, it denounces the land reforms initiated by the government headed by Abdullah as directed against the Hindus of the State. The former ruling Dogra dynasty had a social base in Jammu, comparable to that in the Hyderabad of the Nizam. A concentration of landlords had developed under that umbrella and conditions of serfdom prevailed for the cultivators. Ninety six per cent of the population eked out a miserable existence on land and the *per capita* income was Rs. 11 a year. The bulk of this section was Muslim and the landlords by and large were Hindus.

Class and Community

Besides, there were two classes of intermediaries in the rural set-up, the jagirdars and the muafidars. The jagirs were bestowed on people for services rendered to the Maharaja while the muafis were given as charity to individuals and institutions. Generally, Brahmins were entitled to such charity.

Thus, even if the land reforms had been motivated by a sense of social justice they appeared communal to the dispossessed Hindus. Similarly, even if the Jan Sangh opposition to the Abdullah Government were prompted by class interests it had a larger communal appeal in Jammu and the rest of India.

The Jan Sangh, or the Praja Parishad as it was then known, did not also take kindly to the removal of Maharaja Hari Singh and the curtailment of the powers of his successor. If it had its way, the Jan Sangh would have liked New Delhi to do in Kashmir what the Chinese had done in Tibet with the essential difference that the Maharaja and the social base on which his rule rested be left undisturbed. The settling of refugees in Kashmir to unsettle the composition of the population was also advocated.

But, in the context of India's overall foreign and domestic policies, the Jan Sangh line would

have been totally out of place. First, while India had readily recognised Chinese suzerainty over Tibet and did not take any active steps to undo the occupation of the Roof of the World by the Peking regime, neither Pakistan nor China has endorsed our legal position in Kashmir. Nor could we have militarily won political recognition of the legal fact.

Above all, having taken the issue to the United Nations, we could not have defied world opinion even though it has been patently unfair to us. The Peking regime, in this respect, is in the happy position of not being even a member of the U.N. Among the others defying the world organisation Portugal and South Africa are in a category in which we can never place ourselves. Even if the treatment meted out to us by the western bloc (or what remains of it) in the Security Council warrants disrespect to the U.N. resolutions on Kashmir, we could not afford to walk out of the world organisation. Nor are we in the position of Britain and the Soviet Union which had treated the world organisation with contempt on the Suez and Hungarian issues respectively.

The 'Original Sin'

Whether it was due to our inexperience in world affairs or bad advice on the part of our mentors like Lord Mountbatten, New Delhi committed what can be called the original sin of referring the Pakistani invasion of Kashmir to the U.N. Largely it was in keeping with the Prime Minister's idealistic world view. It was thought that with the help of the U.N. we could get the Pakistani aggression vacated and restore to the Kashmiris their inalienable right to decide their future. Otherwise, the possibility existed then of a unilateral military solution or a bilateral political settlement. Given more time, our troops would have cleared the so-called Azad Kashmir area of the Pakistani raiders. The area of the former Gilgit Agency would have been a different kind of problem, but that could have been the price of a settlement with Pakistan.

But we spurned both these means because we wanted not the terri-

tory of Kashmir but a liaison between a secular and a democratic India and a like-minded Kashmir. That was why the voluntary offer to ascertain the wishes of the people after normalcy had been restored. That was also the reason why Nehru never wavered in his support to Abdullah in all that he had done to undo the power and position of the Maharaja.

Other Frustrated Moves

In 1948, when Sir Mohammed Zafrullah Khan admitted before the Security Council Pakistan's complicity in the tribal invasion of Kashmir, Abdullah, who was a member of the Indian delegation to the Security Council, suggested withdrawal of the complaint. It would have been possible to do so then by expressing satisfaction with the Pakistani admission and stressing our ability to deal with the situation on our own. The cease-fire line would then have become the international frontier between India and Pakistan.

The late Gopalaswami Ayyangar reportedly turned down Abdullah's suggestion. It could not be because he had faith in the Security Council's capacity to get the Pakistani aggression vacated. It was perhaps because he thought that without an international guarantee Kashmir would continue to be a bone of contention between India and Pakistan. It is pertinent to remember that at that time neither India nor Pakistan was in doubt that in a plebiscite the Kashmiris would vote for India.

More significantly, according to reliable information, the late Gopalaswami Ayyangar had in a letter written to Abdullah in February 1948 suggested an independent status for the Valley as a way out of the Pakistani opposition to its continuance in India.

These are significant pointers to an aspect of the situation which is basic, namely that Indo-Pakistan concurrence was essential for a lasting Kashmir settlement. Abdullah who had in the past put forward economic, political, social, secular and international reasons for Kashmir's continuance in India now talks differently about acces-

sion. Asked if he had not once thought accession to India was final, he said recently that it was a mistake because it did not have the approval of Pakistan and so did not bring peace and security to Kashmir.

Perspicacious observers have noted the contradiction between M. C. Chagla's assertion in the Security Council that Kashmir's future had been settled once and for all and the almost simultaneous assurance by Abdullah to Field Marshal Ayub Khan that Pakistan would be consulted before a final settlement was arrived at. The reply to the Pakistan President was written from the Prime Minister's house!

Dichotomy

This dichotomy in Indian policy is due to the absence of *rapprochement* between the legal and factual positions. The location of Kashmir, the length of its border with Pakistan, and the fact that formerly the trade routes opened into what is now West Pakistan, have vested Pakistan with a position which it does not enjoy morally or legally. Similarly, the emotional attachment which has grown in India for Kashmir and its importance for the strengthening of the secular forces here rule out any sharp departure from the existing reality.

The developments within Kashmir during the 11 years of Abdullah's intermittent incarceration arise partly from this divergence between the legal and factual positions. Firstly, the then Prime Minister, Bakshi Ghulam Mohamed, made it a law and order problem and put severe restrictions on civil liberties. An order banning meetings and demonstrations under Rule 50 of the State Security Act was constantly in force in Srinagar. Yet, significantly, the known Pakistani elements were never really curbed. They might not have held meetings or staged demonstrations but they were all the while active. Incidentally, they also provided a leverage to enable the State Government to get whatever it wanted from the Centre.

Subsidisation of rice and the distribution of licences and route per-

mits were the other weapons in Bakshi's armoury to keep the people contented. In other words, a commercial relationship was built with India within a framework of political and emotional affinity to Pakistan. This explains the fact that the son of the former Chief Secretary to the State Government (who was incidentally very close to Bakshi) was among those who staged a pro-Pakistan demonstration in Srinagar recently. So were many others who while making hay under the Bakshi dispensation continued openly to look to Pakistan.

India's Image

Reporting of Kashmir news by All India Radio and several of the newspapers had become totally one-sided thanks to Bakshi's hold on the correspondents functioning or interested in Kashmir. With the result the people began to depend on Pakistan propaganda doled out by the so-called Azad Kashmir radio. The ban which was imposed in the Sheikh's time on listening to Pakistan broadcasts became a dead letter.

The then State Government had also built a lobby in the rest of India. A partial list of 700 beneficiaries of the bus route permit system (placed on the table of the Kashmir Assembly in March last) contained the names of prominent political personalities of Chandigarh, Delhi, Lucknow, Bombay and even Bangalore.

I think Sheikh Abdullah was right when he said that Bakshi, with the *mantra* of 'accession is complete' on his lips did everything he could to distort the image of India. Graft became the main binding force between the State and the Centre.

The situation following the theft of the relic was a providential opportunity for India, which was missed again. The believers were so agitated about it that an openly pro-Pakistani leader like Mohiuddin Qarra was reported to have pleaded for 'India's help' in Kashmir's greatest hour of need. The despatch of officers of the Central Intelligence Bureau was very well

received. The relic was restored and the situation brought under control. But there is a widespread feeling in Srinagar that for political reasons New Delhi is shielding the real culprits. Some observers believe that if the Central officers had speedily brought to book the 'real culprits', much of the damage done during the Bakshi regime could have been offset.

The formation of the Sadiq Government in February last is an important development in the recent history of the State. It meant a definite break with the past as far as blanket repression and organised corruption were concerned. Even in the matter of Abdullah's release, the role of the Sadiq Government was by no means insignificant. Jawaharlal Nehru has said that during Bakshi's Prime Ministership itself the Centre and the State had agreed in principle that Abdullah should be set free.

But the State Government was putting it off, sometimes on the plea that the tourist season was on and then on the ground that with unemployment high during the lean winter months his release might lead to a breach of the peace. These excuses covered the entire twelve-month period of the year. As periodical 'reinforcement' came Pakistan's efforts to stir up trouble at the United Nations.

Sadiq's Courage

It must be said to the credit of G. M. Sadiq and his colleagues that within a month of their assuming office they decided to release the Sheikh notwithstanding all these considerations. Even the Centre was taken by surprise by Sadiq's announcement on March 31 last that Abdullah would be released and that a political decision to that effect had been taken.

It was a case of somebody coming forward to bell the cat and Sadiq took the initiative. It is also remarkable that by setting Abdullah free, the Sadiq Government has numbered its days. If, as it is hoped, everything ends happily, Abdullah would become the Prime Minister and Sadiq would be out. If, on the other hand, the situation deteriorates and, God forbid, we

have to go back to the Bakshi period, then Sadiq and his colleagues would be misfits in such a set-up. This courage of conviction of the Sadiq Government stands out in the murky Kashmir situation.

'Independence' Notion

A word in conclusion about the idea of an independent Kashmir. It has already been said that the late Gopalaswami Ayyangar had reportedly suggested it as a solution to Abdullah in 1948. According to the then Praja Parishad, the idea received support from the Russian delegation to the U.N.O. in Paris in early 1952. The Parishad had seen in it a communist plot to make Kashmir a sovereign State on the borders of both Russia and China and then use it as a spring-board for a communist revolution in the rest of India. At the Second Congress of the Communist Party of India in Calcutta in 1948, 'the policy of advocating Kashmir's accession to India was attacked and the theory was propagated that revolutions must come first.'*

In 1953, it was alleged by the communists that the U.S.A. was the source of the independence idea and that Adlai Stevenson, as Presidential candidate, visited Srinagar to sell it to Abdullah. In a recent statement Abdullah denied the charge and pleaded absolute innocence, saying that he had played host to Stevenson at the instance of the Central Government.

In short, it seems futile to see foreign roots for solutions canvassed by one party or another. The only relevant point is that India should clothe the legality of Kashmir's relations with India with factual and political sanctity. Whether it can be done unilaterally or through joint Indo-Pakistan efforts or through a concerted approach on the part of leaders like Nehru and Abdullah time alone will tell. All that has happened is that another opportunity is offered to open a happy chapter in the modern history of Kashmir.

* For detailed account of this and other developments see Sisir Gupta's forthcoming book.

Forgotten facts

SISIR GUPTA

THE problem of Kashmir was in a sense inherent in the incompleteness of Lord Mountbatten's scheme of partitioning India and in the haste in which the scheme had to be rushed through. Both the Congress and the League accepted the scheme under the duress of circumstances; and in June 1947 neither of the parties had the capacity and spirit left to reject what the Viceroy would propose. At this time a more complete partition scheme might well have been acceptable to Indian and Pakistani leaders—a scheme which would have determined in advance

the question of the Indian States and thus the size and boundaries of the two succeeding States.

That Jinnah accepted in 1947 the partition of Bengal and Punjab which he had rejected earlier as a plan to convert Pakistan into a rural slum, showed his desperation and helplessness; the Congress could have, in different circumstances, made an issue out of the Mountbatten Plan's treatment of Sylhet and the N.W.F.P. The agreement to have the boundaries of the two countries determined by a British arbitrator also was

an indicator of the readiness of the Congress and the League to take only as much as they could manage to get from the British. If, at this time, the British authorities had firmly decided upon a policy of allocating the princely States to the two countries, there might have been an easy settlement of these questions, including that of Kashmir.

It was not only possible but probable that a complete partition scheme would still have left India and Pakistan as unfriendly neighbours. Mountbatten's press secretary says that in the prevailing atmosphere of those days India and Pakistan had to quarrel over something; if it was not Kashmir, it would have been Calcutta or Lahore. But this still leaves unanswered the question—why a man with tremendous foresight and thoroughness, like Lord Mountbatten, did not thrash out the States' issue, which was likely to lead to conflict and chaos in the sub-continent.

Conflicting Images

Perhaps (and this is often lost sight of) the British themselves were not quite sure what kind of India they wanted to leave behind. Opinion at home was divided on this issue, symbolised by the Conservative Party's advocacy of the Princes' rights to remain independent. True, the leaders of the government—Prime Minister Attlee, Attorney-General Shawcross and India Secretary Listowel—had clearly expressed their opposition to this principle; but their statements were not always unequivocal or calculated to facilitate an early solution of the question. For example, Attlee stated in the House of Commons: 'If I were asked what would be the attitude of His Majesty's Government to any State which has decided to cut adrift from its neighbours and assert its independence, I would say to the ruler of that State: "Take your time and think again." I hope, that no irrevocable decision will be taken prematurely.'

The origin of the Kashmir conflict was in the conflicting images that India, Pakistan and Britain had of

the shape of the sub-continent after freedom. Apart from the prediction of disaster that the Tories made in regard to India, even the most well intentioned Britisher seemed to have envisaged a prolonged process of adjustment of boundaries in the sub-continent. The Congress thought that all States within the geographical boundaries of India would become integrated into a strong, centralised Indian Union, just as those within Pakistan would join Pakistan. The Muslim League thought that while its dozen states would present no serious problem for Pakistan, India would be balkanised and some, if not all, of the larger States of India would remain independent.

Because their roles have been somewhat reversed by subsequent events, few remember that it was the Congress which always insisted that the rulers should not be permitted to decide the future of their States, while the Muslim League insisted on the rulers' rights to decide the future. What is more, the Congress stressed the principle that there could be only two and not more than two States in the sub-continent; the Muslim League envisaged a number of independent States in this area. Mohammad Ali Jinnah repeatedly stated in the period June-August, 1947 that the rulers could, if they so chose, remain independent. In fact, he said this even earlier. When Gandhi pointedly asked Jinnah in 1944 if Pakistan would include Kashmir also, the League leader categorically stated that his scheme related to British India, not to the Indian States.

In 1946, Liaquat Ali Khan issued a statement to say that the States did not have to send representatives to the Indian Constituent Assembly, if the rulers did not like to do so. It was in terms of a League-Princes combination against the Congress that the Muslim League evolved its attitude towards the States question.

Balkanisation

As freedom came, the urgent need to balkanise India and pre-

vent the emergence of a consolidated and centralised Indian Union, very much larger in size and resources, became the guiding consideration behind the League's policy. The inter-communal status conflict, once symbolised by the League's demand for 'parity' between the 25 per cent Muslim minority and the rest in India, now became an international status conflict. Two independent nations were equal only before the Law; to achieve equality in practice it was necessary to see that they roughly corresponded to each other in size, resources, population and the vastness of their problems. A pronounced feeling in Pakistan that it had lost in the partition bargain, that what was apparently the hour of triumph was in reality a grave tragedy for the Indo-Muslim community, began to lend further strength to the League's determination to confront the Congress with new challenges.

Early Pakistan Moves

It is good to remember that the invasion of Kashmir was not the first move Pakistan made in regard to the States. Jinnah's statements supporting the independence of the States, the acceptance of an Ambassador from Travancore, the offer of a blank cheque to Jodhpur, the encouragement to Hyderabad, the acceptance of the accession of Junagadh were all done before August 15, 1947. The original League advice to Kashmir, as expressed in statements by the leaders of the Muslim Conference, was that it should remain independent.

It is only when the futility of attempts to prevent India's integration was demonstrated that the invasion of Kashmir was launched. The growing feeling that the 'crafty' Indian leaders would not only foil Pakistan's larger game but also deprive her of what was hers, viz. Kashmir, provided the background of Pakistan's invasion of Kashmir.

In his decision to let loose the tribals against Kashmir, Jinnah was motivated by two different considerations—the annexation of Kashmir and the diversion of the restive tribals against India. He

miscalculated the internal situation in Kashmir and the Indian army's capacity to undertake a major operation at a few hours' notice, although he was right in his assessment of the weakness of the State's forces. By October, 1947, the Indian leaders had developed a greater self-confidence than they had showed before. The involvement of Sheikh Abdullah and the National Conference with the State's request to India to accept its accession underlined to them the moral aspects of the question.

Accession and After

Accession became complete when Maharaja Hari Singh signed the necessary document. The Indian Army accomplished a rare military feat as it air lifted troops to Srinagar to successfully resist the raiders, who were, as it is now known, led by the ablest of Pakistan's generals. Jinnah, who was waiting in Abbotabad 'to ride in triumph' to Srinagar, was rudely shocked by events and ordered the British Commander of Pakistan's forces to launch a full scale war; the officer politely pointed out that he had to consult his British colleagues in the Indian Army before such a war could be undertaken!

Jinnah demanded immediate consultation with the Indian leaders; when Mountbatten went to Lahore (Nehru was not keeping well enough to go there) Jinnah promised he would 'call the whole thing off' if India would agree that the future of the States would be decided on the basis of some principles laid down by him. India promised a reference to the will of the people of Kashmir on the accession issue, after Pakistan called off the invasion.

The battle of words and statements started immediately thereafter: to India's charge that Pakistan was encouraging aggression, Pakistan replied by charging India with 'fraud, deceit and violence' in Kashmir. To India, Pakistan was the aggressor, because the fact of invasion was there; to Pakistan, India, because Kashmir was about to fall to her, only if the Indian troops had not been sent. One of

these familiar Congress-League deadlocks had now developed and, as was the custom in those days, the two governments kept His Majesty's Government fully informed of their points of view.

His Majesty's Government, conscious of the implications of appearing in a new role in the sub-continent so shortly after the withdrawal, offered advice which was almost equally good from their view point—reference of the question to the United Nations. India, led by Lord Mountbatten, was the first to lodge the complaint with the Security Council.

A few hours before Gopalswami Ayyangar got up in the Security Council to present India's case on Kashmir in January 1948, Gandhi had undertaken his fast in India to force the Indian Government to pay back to Pakistan their cash balances with the Reserve Bank of India. Much has been said in later years about the mess that Ayyangar made of India's case; what is forgotten by those who make such charges is that the domestic context in which he spoke in 1948 was very very different from the one in which Krishna Menon, for example, spoke in 1957. In 1948 the fate of the Indian Government depended on its capacity to root out the communal forces in India. The Pakistan and the communal questions were still intertwined—in most minds.

Trends in Congress

Within the ruling party two distinct approaches had found support; one of toughness towards Pakistan on the assumption that its hostility to India was inherent in the process of its creation, another of softness towards the neighbour in the hope that partition itself was temporary and that some form of Indo-Pakistan constitutional arrangements were necessary. In a way, both these attitudes had something to do with the attitudes to Muslims in India: it was the logic of the tough approach that an Indian nationalism *vis a vis* Pakistan should be built, no matter what happened to the Indian Muslims in the process; the second approach, which Gandhi favoured, was based on the as-

sumption that the security of India's Muslims and of India's secularism depended on how she managed her relations with Pakistan. The first approach was based on the assumption of the permanence of Pakistan and its hostility towards India; the second on the assumption that Pakistani friendship was possible and some form of annulment of the partition necessary to protect the values by which the Indian national movement used to swear.

Nehru's Alternative

It is only in later years that India attempted to find a third alternative—that while Pakistan was hostile and likely to remain hostile to India, India could quarantine Pakistan, so far as her own Muslim problem was concerned. If Patel's name could be associated with the first approach and Gandhi's with the second, the third approach was essentially that of Nehru. It is an open question whether the validity and viability of either of the three approaches has yet been proved, but they have appeared in sharper relief with the passage of time.

In many minds, however, the subtle differences between the Patel and the Nehru lines are still not clear, which explains the wide differences in tone and content between the speeches of Nehru and the Nehruites (like Krishna Menon) on the problem of the sub-continent. It is necessary for the success of the Nehru line to quarantine Pakistan (hoping that Pakistan also would be free from its disease one day) but it is also necessary to guard against the possibility of the growth of an anti-Pakistan nationalism in India. Like many other lines of Nehru, it is too subtle for some of its exponents and too involved with contradictory positions for others.

In any event, Gopalswami Ayyangar's performance was determined by the fact that within India the attitudes to Pakistan were still fluid and powerful forces were at work behind the conflicting approaches. To carry on an anti-Pakistan tirade in the UN might strengthen those forces internally which were trying to

undermine the stability of the Indian Government of the day. Sir Zafrullah Khan was bound by no such constraints; moreover, he said what some of the Security Council members were mentally prepared to hear: India was ablaze; the sub-continent was finding it difficult to function in freedom; outside assistance, advice and influence was necessary to restore peace to the area!

In 1948, decolonisation was already on the agenda of world politics; the future of colonial control depended on the validity of the theory that the colonies were not mature for freedom. If India, the first of the colonies to be freed, made a mess of her affairs (Zafrullah spoke for hours to prove that it had) others ought to take note of the fact. The attitudes in the Security Council began to evolve in this context.

While India wanted the U.N. to take note of the 'situation' in Kashmir and persuade Pakistan to withdraw, the majority of the Council members agreed with Pakistan that they had to investigate the full range of India-Pakistan questions, not just the Kashmir question. Hence the attitude to India's charge of 'aggression'.

UN's Role

The Council despatched the UNCIP after the lapse of four precious months: fighting in Kashmir and the open involvement of regular Pakistan forces made matters worse in these months. The UNCIP succeeded in bringing about a cease fire* on January 1, 1949; for years, thereafter, the Commission and other Representatives of the Council attempted in vain to find a solution. Unfortunately, all of them, including Sir Owen Dixon, were bound by the Resolutions of the Council and had to begin to explore the possibilities of a settlement by talking of what they knew to be impracticable—a plebiscite. The most miserable performance was of Frank Graham who spent months in trying to get India and Pakistan to agree on the quantum and nature of forces to be left in Kashmir; he rightly concluded, how-

ever, in 1952, that what was necessary was direct negotiations between India and Pakistan.

Foreign Involvements

Unfortunately, by the time this realisation dawned in the UN, that India and Pakistan should be asked to resolve their problems, the involvement of outside powers in Kashmir was evident. The Prime Minister of Britain and the President of the United States had openly intervened in the dispute in August, 1949 when they urged India and Pakistan to accept the UNCIP proposal for arbitration; the London *Economist* had frankly written at this time: 'India's relations with the United States have lately grown closer than at any previous period...it is to be hoped that the United States will—with all the tact necessary—keep up the pressure'.

In December 1952, as Graham was suggesting direct talks, reports circulated about the possible formation of MEDO with Pakistan as its cornerstone. Before the Indo-Pakistan talks (which began in April 1953 at a Prime Ministers' meeting in Karachi on a very optimistic note) could get down to the practicalities of a Kashmir solution, U.S. military assistance to Pakistan was announced. Within a year Pakistan became a 'firm ally' of the United States and Britain; before 1955 ended, the Soviet Union categorically supported the Indian position on Kashmir. Earlier, at a Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference, Australia generously offered to contribute to a Commonwealth force to police Kashmir.

It would be wrong to regard all expressions of opinion by outsiders as motivated by their partisanship in the affairs of the sub-continent, although the well-meaning foreigner sometimes showed an amazing degree of lack of awareness of the issues at stake, of the fact that Kashmir was not just a piece of real estate over which India and Pakistan had quarrelled. What is more, the important fact that the pattern of

* Lord Birdwood thinks that it was the British officers in the two armies, and not the UNCIP, who had brought about the end of what was an impossible fratricidal war for them.

international relations in Asia was fundamentally different from Europe, (if only because the nation-state principle was not implemented here), escaped attention; Pakistan's argument that it was the homeland of the 'Muslim Nation' was taken at its face value, ignoring the larger reality that Pakistan, apart from any other consideration, had divided the Indo-Muslim community.

It would also be wrong, however, to regard all expressions of opinion by outsiders as merely naive. The strategic importance of Kashmir in the global context, the fact that the dispute involved India (the second largest State in the world), the use of Pakistan in the oil politics of West Asia, were among the factors responsible for calculated moves from some quarters to 'resolve' the Kashmir problem in a particular way. In India, at least, the solution of an 'Independent Kashmir' was from the beginning suspect; Abdullah's conversion to this idea was widely believed to be somebody else's work.

The Repercussions

The performance of the 'friendly foreigner' as a mediator was not the only way in which foreign interest in Kashmir adversely affected the prospect of a solution; its major impact was in hardening attitudes in India and Pakistan to each other. The advocates of the Gandhian approach to Pakistan were greatly weakened by the demonstration of Pakistan's desire to befriend outsiders in order to settle scores with India; the non-communal elements in Indian politics became anti-Pakistan for its pro-western leanings; and the emotional outburst of the inverted communalist became patriotism even in the eyes of India's 'rational' Left.

For the emergence of a friendly attitude in India to Pakistan, it was necessary to pose the Pakistan problem in terms of its impact on India's internal problems. Involvements of foreign interest made Pakistan a foreign policy issue for India and divided the ranks of the Indian secularists in their attitude to Pakistan. Likewise, the con-

tinued propping up of Pakistan by outsiders resulted in the prevention of the realisation there of the basic truth that Pakistan's stability could be ensured only when it had come to terms with the reality of its interdependence with India, that a 'modernist' Pakistan had to discover other bases of sustenance than a mere anti-Indian and Islamic sense of belonging.

The surprising thing about recent Indian history is how easily and how soon the elites in India and Pakistan lost sight of the patent reality that partition had solved nothing, that the solution of their domestic problems needed reopening of the issues of 1947. It is improbable that without foreign intervention India and Pakistan would have settled down to their negative nationalisms. Paradoxically, ideas like joint defence began to be propounded by those who were most involved with external elements and only when it was not possible any longer to extricate Indo-Pakistan problems from their global implications.

Petrification

The petrification of the Kashmir problem impeded the success of direct negotiations and changed the context in which it had to be viewed. The later UN Representatives recognised this; but by that time the UN had lost its effectiveness in dealing with the sub-continent. The UN became and remains even today, a forum for Pakistan to publicise its Kashmir case against India; for India, the UN has lost all relevance.

A degree of hope was raised at the time of the signing of the Indus waters agreement that India and Pakistan would begin gradually to solve their other problems. Behind this hope was a mistaken notion about the canal waters treaty, that it represented an Indo-Pakistan settlement. (In reality, the treaty amounted to a decision by Pakistan to ensure an enormous amount of foreign assistance by not talking of one of its problems with India).

Equally strong was the fond hope that China's challenge would bring India and Pakistan closer;

in practice, the growth of the Chinese threat only strengthened the anti-Indian forces in Pakistan. China acted as one more foreign power interested in limiting or curbing India by encouraging Pakistan in its anti-Indian activities. What is more, Kashmir became, more than ever before, significant for India—not only because its strategic importance in the defence of India was underscored, but also because the Sino-Pakistan alliance underlined the need for a vigorous nationalism in India in the face of external threats.

China's Presence

The Chinese challenge changed the mood and posture of India and made her aware of the need for guarding her integrity at all costs. The Sino-Pakistan alliance appears to India as directed against India's continued existence as a unified nation-state; the Kashmir issue, not unnaturally, appears in this context as symbolic of her struggle for survival in a hostile surrounding. It has helped to make a few pro-Chinese communists pro-Pakistan and ready to re-open the Kashmir question; but it has, made a much larger number of others anti-Pakistan for the same reason. In Pakistan, it has helped not only to sustain the unreal assumption that India can be brow-beaten or bullied with the help of outsiders, but also provided a new political justification for the posture of relentless hostility to India.

After groping for an effective alliance against India for years, Pakistan today has discovered such an opening. Not until the Sino-Pakistan bluff is called by firm Indian handling of the threat, can Pakistan be brought back to the mood of treating problems with India realistically; at this moment when Bhutto boasts that the end of the road is in sight, over-zealous Indian attempts to befriend Pakistan can only result in confirming Pakistan's belief that at last India has been caught on the wrong foot.

It is of course necessary to be aware of the cost of Indo-Pakistan tension; for one thing, the ultimate guarantee of the emotional

security of India's Muslims (and Pakistan's Hindus) would be a *modus vivendi*, or Indo-Pakistan coexistence. In one sense, the real issue in Kashmir is the coexistence of India and Pakistan as friendly neighbours.

But there are other issues involved; the integrity and security of India is under threat. A pernicious extension of the theory of self-determination to her sub-national groups, a growing military threat to her borders, increasing infiltration and subversion of various kinds, a high-pitched propaganda war against her—these are the realities India has to face.

Any solution of the Kashmir question under these pressures would appear self-defeating even for those who appreciate the essential unity of the Indian sub-continent. Such unity can hardly be paved by the substitution of the present pattern of one stable and one unstable State in the sub-continent by a pattern which makes India also unstable and weak; it is India's strength which will eventually act as the sheet anchor of stability in southern Asia.

Educating Pakistan

Meanwhile, no attempt should be spared to convince Pakistan that India has not reason to be hostile to her, that only if Pakistan accepts the fact of belonging to the sub-continent can her own problems can be tackled in sub-continental terms, and that Indo-Pakistan problems like Kashmir can be viewed differently. For Pakistan, India is in the ultimate analysis her best and most helpful friend, and *vice versa*. Nothing is more unreal than the hope or fear of a permanent state of Indo-Pakistan conflict.

Unfortunately nothing is more real at this moment than Pakistan's refusal to come to terms with these patent realities. It will be a great tragedy if in facing the immediate challenge, India also begins to regard as permanent the present Pakistan attitudes to India and loses her flexibility in viewing problems with Pakistan.

The separatists

INDER MALHOTRA

THERE is a widespread belief that the concept of an independent Kashmir arose in Sheikh Abdullah's mind only shortly before his deposition and detention in 1953. This is wholly incorrect, although it is true that a year or so before his arrest, the Sheikh spoke out in favour of the idea far more clearly than ever before.

Another erroneous belief is that independence was thought of as an easy and attractive way out of a difficult choice between India and Pakistan. The tantalizing vision of an independent Kashmir, as some sort of an oriental Switzerland, existed long before Pakistan was even dreamt of by poet Iqbal.

What is true, however, is that the open advocacy of independence for Kashmir by Abdullah in the early fifties coincided with a sharp decline in his popularity, thanks largely to his own misdeeds and the corruption and high-handedness of his cohorts, who frittered away in a few years the tremendous popular support and goodwill which had brought the National Conference to power. It is also true that by the time the Sheikh's popularity slumped, the gallant and glorious fight against the Pak-

istani invaders had lost its momentum; it had indeed frozen into an uneasy cease-fire, punctuated by an occasional eruption along the cease-fire line and frequent acrimonious debates in the Security Council. Furthermore, several foreign countries, or individual do-gooders, took it upon themselves—for a mixed bag of motives, of course—to foster the cause of Kashmir's independence.

But all these were catalytic agents which brought to the fore what had existed for long; they were not the causes or source of any new phenomenon.

An incipient longing for independence and for a separate sovereign existence is by no means unknown in most regions of India, the craving for separateness arising from geographical, ethnical, linguistic or historical factors. But in Kashmir the sentiment proved stronger than elsewhere in the country for a number of reasons.

First, Kashmir's geography and topography. The picturesque mountains which surround the pretty valley have isolated it from the rest of the country rather effectively. They have become a

physical as well as a mental barrier; a state of affairs aggravated by the fact that through an accident of history, Kashmir became a princely State and not a part of what was then known as British India. The arrangement suited the British who were not bending backwards to promote Indian unity; for the Dogra ruler, Kashmir's aloofness ensured a welcome immunity from the winds of change and national revolution blowing in the rest of the country.

Secondly, even more than other ethnic groups in India, the Kashmiris seem conscious of their distinctiveness; after living in parts of the country for generations, the Kashmiri pandits act and behave as an Englishman would when required or compelled to live outside the British Isles.

Distinctive Nationalism

Little wonder, therefore, that in this background even Kashmiri nationalism grew, not so much as part of the mainstream of Indian nationalism, but more or less parallel to it.

Not from 1953, nor from 1947, but from as early as 1931, Abdullah and his associates in the National Conference made no secret of how their minds were working. Then, as today, the Sheikh maintained that the Kashmiris had been ruled by outsiders for too long, and it was about time that they were given a chance to rule themselves.

The leadership of the national movement in India has proved to be purblind on many counts. Among these must be listed its failure to discern the clear signs of the separatist trend of the freedom movement in Kashmir. Far from attempting to apply any corrective, leaders like Mahatma Gandhi, Jawaharlal Nehru, Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan and Maulana Azad went all out to give complete and unreserved support to the National Conference movement in Kashmir.

The impetus behind the formation of the Muslim Conference and its subsequent conversion into the National Conference need not be

discussed here. But it has to be recorded that from the start, Abdullah and his political lieutenants inculcated among the people of Jammu and Kashmir a view of Indian (and Kashmiri) history which is grossly distorted and alarmingly disruptive. Day after day, week after week, year after year, decade after decade, the people of Kashmir have been told that they have been 'slaves' for more than 500 years.

Leaving aside a few rabid Hindu communalists, nobody in the whole of India would dream of describing Akbar as a 'foreign ruler' who enslaved and oppressed India. But this is precisely what the cream of Kashmir's nationalist movement has been saying all along. With remarkable consistency, dating back to 1931, the Sheikh recounts among the 'foreign aggressors who enslaved Kashmir', the Mughals, not to speak of the Pathans, Sikhs and Dogras. The British are incidentally not mentioned, presumably because theirs was an indirect rule! According to the Sheikh, freedom disappeared from Kashmir the day the last of the Kashmiri sultans was dethroned by the Mughals.

Parenthetically, it must be added that this view of Indian history is by no means repudiated by those members of the Kashmir intelligentsia who would be revolted by the thought of Kashmir being made a separate country outside the Indian political orbit!

The Subtleties

How else does one explain the extraordinary phenomenon of most Kashmiris glibly describing their State as *mulk* (country) and themselves as a *quam* (nation). Both India and Pakistan are usually described as Kashmir's 'neighbours'. And this is done not only by Abdullah, Mirza Afzal Beg and others, but also by men like Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed and even that ludicrous figure on Kashmir's political scene, Shamsuddin. As late as in September last, Shamsuddin pompously thanked India 'for all it has done for Kashmir'.

The logic of this state of affairs should have been clear to anybody

just as there need have been no mystery about the true meaning of the 'Quit Kashmir' movement, launched in 1945. But obviously many were misled into thinking that this somewhat incongruous and incomprehensible slogan was adopted to imitate the 'Quit India' demand of the Congress Party and Gandhi three years earlier! But the 'Quit India' slogan was directed against the alien rulers, the British. In other princely States, the objective of the freedom movement rightly was that the princes should give up their feudal power and let their States become part of democratic India. No ruler was expected to 'quit' his State. But in Kashmir he was, because, besides being a feudalist, the Maharaja was apparently an alien!

Maharaja and Abdullah

Here, a brief digression is called for to stress that on one point at least the then Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir, Sir Hari Singh, and his relentless adversary, Sheikh Abdullah, were agreed. Both considered Kashmir to be a separate country from the rest of the Indian mainland; both wanted it to be left alone. The only difference between them was that while the Maharaja considered himself a part and parcel of Kashmir's beautiful landscape, the Sheikh wanted to throw the Maharaja out.

It is also an irony of history that after India became free and Pakistan came into existence, and Britain's so-called paramountcy over the princely States lapsed, Maharaja Hari Singh lost no time in trying to carve out a separate and independent existence for his State. He thus anticipated Abdullah by a few years!

While the Maharaja and his minions were toying with the idea of independence, the Sheikh himself, as leader of the National Conference movement, was inscrutably non-committal. One reason for his inscrutability and indecisiveness might well have been that he wanted to get rid of the Maharaja before claiming independence for the State. But

a decision was forced on the Sheikh by the Pakistani raiders; he had no option but to suggest accession to India as the only way to get the help of Indian troops to combat Pakistani aggression.

With the benefit of hind-sight, the historians and political theorists can speculate endlessly on whether or not the dream for independent Kashmir could have been revived by the Sheikh had Delhi followed a Kashmir policy different from what it did after Kashmir became part of India in the wake of the Pakistani invasion. Learned tomes will no doubt be written on this subject. There is a clear case, however, to make one or two pertinent points.

India's Ambivalence

First, the ambivalence of India's Kashmir policy has been utterly unfortunate and a source of much avoidable trouble. Nobody can blame the Sheikh for reminding the world that even after the Kashmir Constituent Assembly had been formed and indeed after it had ratified Kashmir's accession to India (a ratification which the Sheikh challenges on the ground that his arrest rendered the Constituent Assembly unrepresentative), Indian spokesmen assured the U.N. and the world that the Constituent Assembly was not competent to pronounce on the question of accession!

A reflection of the same policy was India's consistent willingness to negotiate with Pakistan on the basis of a plebiscite in the State and to attend periodic debates in the U.N. Security Council. It is besides the point whether this policy was right or wrong. What is relevant here is that it kept alive in Kashmir an air of uncertainty which encouraged both those who sought Kashmir's accession to Pakistan and others who wanted to carve out an independent State.

In this connection, it needs to be emphasized that while Abdullah was undoubtedly the loudest exponent of independence (or some variation thereof) in 1953, he was by no means the only one. As he has publicly pointed out more than

once, eight top leaders of the National Conference in 1953 were party to a report on the settlement of the Kashmir dispute, outlining four solutions, of which two envisaged independence for the entire Jammu and Kashmir State or a part of it.

It is not necessary to recount the details of the four proposed solutions. But it would be instructive to recall that besides Abdullah the members of the Committee were Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed, Mirza Afzal Beg, G. M. Sadiq, Maulana Masoodi, Sardar Budh Singh, Shamlal Saraf and G. L. Dogra.

The Centre's reluctance to hasten the process of Kashmir's integration with the rest of the country, the conceding of such symbols of Kashmir's separateness as a distinctive State flag and an elected head of State, and the fatuous decision to permit Kashmir's Chief Minister to style himself as Prime Minister may be small things in themselves. But, cumulatively, they fostered separatism in Kashmir at a time when other powerful factors drove the State in that direction.

During the eleven years following Abdullah's arrest, the ambivalence of India's Kashmir policy persisted; the dispute between India and Pakistan was allowed to become a running sore; to make matters worse, those who were supposed to represent the link with India were allowed to perpetrate the worst type of corruption and gangsterism in Jammu and Kashmir. With what results need hardly be recorded.

Independence Urges

Arguments for independent Kashmir have become stronger than they were in 1953. It is pointed out, for instance, that until India and Pakistan equally accept a solution, the people of Kashmir cannot have peace and security—an argument which is buttressed with the assertion that only a small part of Kashmir's border touches India and a very large part of it abuts on Pakistan.

It is also argued that the Bakshi regime has alienated the Kashmiri

people from India so completely that a large number of them are anxious to break the State's link with India and make it a part of Pakistan. Since such a development would be disastrous for the minorities in both countries, independence is suggested as a sensible and honourable way out!

It is thus a great pity that what is basically a pernicious idea, because it might easily become the precursor of the political disintegration of India, appears in a reasonably favourable light to many, especially to most foreigners. It is true that some foreigners have been harbouring the idea of an independent Kashmir from purely selfish motives. Many countries may be hoping to fish in troubled waters once a small and delectable place like Kashmir becomes independent of India and Pakistan. But not all of them are motivated by the same feelings; some genuinely consider independence to be the only solution.

No Viability

All that needs to be added is tersely to point out that whatever its other merits and demerits (merits may include the possibility of bringing India and Pakistan together, and the demerits have been indicated above) an independent Kashmir, which really means an independent valley—because the people of Jammu would never accept independence and Pakistan would never part with 'Azad Kashmir'—is not at all viable either politically or economically.

The valley just cannot feed itself. And if it depends on others to feed it, will foreign intervention be far behind? It must be said however that it is not necessary that undesirable intervention would be from one bloc only. International intrigue and fishing in troubled waters is a game both can play.

Apart from the danger of Kashmir becoming a cockpit of cold war politics of the worst type, how would its security be jointly guaranteed by India and Pakistan, one of which is an ardent ally of China and the other a victim of Chinese aggression?

What is at stake?

V. K. KRISHNA MENON

MUCH has been said and written about Kashmir during the last seventeen years. Terms such as the 'Kashmir problem', the 'Kashmir dispute', the 'Kashmir question' and the 'Kashmir issue' are often used both in ignorance and disregard of realities. To this is added the recent novelty, 'The Kashmir irritant'!

The reality, however, is that the State of Jammu and Kashmir, the entire territory over which the former Maharaja ruled, is a Constituent State of the Union of India and has been such since October 26, 1947. It will continue to so remain despite invaders, subversionists, saboteurs, do-gooders, honest brokers, interventionists, imperialists and others, knaves or fools. The reason is that the people of India are awake and alert.

When Britain was about to withdraw from India, she decided to release herself and the Princes' States from existing relationships. The British Government, then the paramount power, set out the position as follows:

'Political arrangements between the States on the one side and the British Crown and British India on the other, will thus be brought to an end. The void will have to be filled either by the States entering into a federal relationship with the successor or governments in British India, or failing this entering into particular political arrangements

with it or them.' (Memorandum of the Cabinet Mission, May 12, 1946.)

The former Indian States were to accede to one or other Dominion only—India or Pakistan—according to their decision expressed through laid down procedures and processes.

Jammu and Kashmir did not accede to either Dominion as early as the rest of the States. On August 12, 1947, the State, however, sought to enter into 'standstill arrangements' with the two Dominions as was contemplated by the Cabinet Mission itself in regard to the princely States in the transitional period. Pakistan (M. A. Jinnah) concluded such an agreement with the Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir. India was approached for a similar, though different, agreement.

The agreement with India covered a great many more topics and details which required discussion. The Government of India, therefore, asked the then Prime Minister of Kashmir (the Maharaja's Prime Minister) to come to Delhi to settle matters. This invitation was accepted, but the visit did not materialise as the invasion of the State by Pakistanis prevented its Prime Minister from leaving.

The proposed standstill agreement with Pakistan was a simpler matter. It covered few subjects and the transitional arrangements

contemplated covered only a few items. On August 16, 1947, Pakistan agreed to the standstill agreement offered by the State. A few days later, on August 31, (this is not to say that Pakistan's aggression commenced only on that date: it was certainly prepared for from as early as the preceding May), Major General Scott, a British officer who commanded the Maharaja's army at that time, reported to his Government about border raids from Pakistan.

The Invasion

These raids increased in intensity and dimension. The Maharaja's Government protested to Pakistan on September 4. Meanwhile, Pakistan imposed an economic boycott, cutting off essential supplies to the State. On September 18, Pakistan severed the rail link between Jammu and Sialkot.

Scott's diary gives dates, facts and figures about the mounting raids which soon assumed the character and size of an invasion. Villages were plundered, men and women molested and killed and places sacked and burnt. The diary, under the date October 10, 1947, refers to the activities of some sections of the Pakistan army. The invasion was now under way. The North-West Frontier Province Premier (of Pakistan) announced that firearms would be distributed liberally to all 'except the enemies of Pakistan'.

Norman Cliff of the London *News Chronicle*, reported to his paper on October 13:

'Pakistan has cut off from Kashmir supplies of petrol, sugar, salt and kerosene oil, although a standstill agreement between them has been signed.'

On October 15, the Maharaja, perhaps more from habit than on the basis of legal rights or political claims as existed at the time, appealed to the British Prime Minister about the economic blockade and the invasion of his State in Poonch! The Maharaja said:

'People all along the border have been licensed and armed with modern weapons under the pretext of general policy which does

not appear to have been followed in the case of internal districts of West Punjab. Whereas military escorts are made available for several other purposes, none is provided for the safe transit of petrol and other essentials of life. Protests merely elicit promises which are never implemented. As a result of obvious connivance of the Pakistan Government, the whole of the border from Gurdaspur side up to Gilgit is threatened with invasion which has actually begun in Poonch.'

This meant that the Pakistan incursion was no longer a 'raid' or even a series of raids! It extended from the western border, over the western districts of the State, towards the south of the State, right up into the mountain area and to the Sinkiang border. In all these areas, the invaders were liberally supplied with Pakistan arms and equipment. The protests of the Maharaja's government to Pakistan's provincial and central authorities were of no avail. The invaders continued along the Jhelum Valley to Srinagar.

Nothing impeded their formidable onslaught, except a temporary slowing down at Uri, fifty miles from Srinagar, where one hundred and fifty men under a State Forces Brigadier fought a last ditch battle and destroyed a vital bridge which denied ingress to the invaders. Pakistan Sappers, however, built a new bridge in forty-eight hours! The invaders were also resisted by the local population. The latter too fought last ditch battles with whatever weapons, including lathis, which they could muster. This was on October 22, 1947.

The Accession

The British Commander-in-Chief of the Indian Army, informed the Defence Committee in New Delhi on October 25 that a force of 5,000 or over (nearly two Brigades) had attacked and captured Muzaffarabad and Domil, and that the invaders 'expected considerable reinforcements.' The invaders were but 35 miles from Srinagar.

On October 24, the Maharaja appealed to India for protection. He applied to accede to India in accordance with laid down procedures.

Enough evidence has come to hand that the Pakistan invasion had been prepared for from as early as June 1947 and that British officers of the Pakistan army knew about it. Jinnah had given orders to the Pakistan army on October 27 to move into Kashmir. Field Marshal Auchinleck claims to have obtained cancellation of these orders under the threat that all British officers would be withdrawn from the Pakistan army.

India accepted the Maharaja's application for accession in due accord with procedures and also sent troops to protect Kashmir. India consulted the president of the National Conference, Sheikh Mohammed Abdullah, who urged acceptance. It has also been revealed that Prime Minister Nehru consulted Gandhiji before sending troops and obtained his assent. The Government of India followed up the protests to Pakistan made by the Maharaja.

Pakistan's Responsibility

The Governor General (Lord Mountbatten) went to Lahore. Then Jinnah made what may appear a *faux pas*, but it is revealing. He proposed to Mountbatten that both sides should call off their forces. Jinnah had all along been asserting that Pakistan had nothing to do with the 'raids' and that he had no control over the 'tribesmen'. Mountbatten asked him how he could in such circumstances obtain withdrawal of the invading side. Jinnah blurted out: 'If you do this, I will call the whole thing off.'

The invasion is where the present 'Kashmir Story' begins, where it has its base and being. The reality of Kashmir becomes the 'problem', 'dispute', 'question' by this fact of Pakistan's invasion.

We have insisted and must continue to insist that we have not referred to the Security Council a 'dispute' or are dealing with one. It is in truth, in law, in politics and in terms of the approach to

it, a *situation* created by Pakistan's aggression and invasion. There would be no Kashmir 'problem' at present but for the aggression by Pakistan. There would be no continuance of it but for the connivance, condonation and support of this aggression by the western powers. It may not be a presentation agreeable to all, but it is necessary. It is the stubborn fact.

On December 22, our Prime Minister wrote to the Prime Minister of Pakistan requesting his government to deny to the raiders (i) access and use of Pakistan territory for operation against Kashmir, (ii) military and other supplies, and (iii) other aid that might tend to prolong the struggle. We waited for a week. No reply came. Having failed in our *pouparlers* with Pakistan, our Prime Minister informed Liaquat Ali Khan, the then Prime Minister of Pakistan, that everything he had tentatively proposed and discussed with him was at an end since Pakistan would do nothing to end her aggression, pretending that no such thing had taken place.

Our Motives

We then decided to take the matter to the Security Council. It is a mistake to think that it was our reference of this matter to the United Nations which is the cause of the continuance of the *situation*. What did we tell the Security Council, and what remedy did it invoke? These facts are important. To dismiss them as 'legalisms' is escapist or perverse.

On January 1, 1948, the Government of India made a complaint to the United Nations under Article 35 (Chapter VI) of the Charter. We asked that:

'The Government of Pakistan be asked to prevent tribals in the State of Jammu and Kashmir and to deny to the raiders access to and the use of territory in operations against Kashmir, military and other supplies and all other kinds of aid that might tend to prolong the fighting in Kashmir.'

We did not use strong language, or ask for United Nations' inter-

vention by force, as in the Congo in 1960. Article 35 says that: 'Any member may bring any *situation*, whose continuance is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, to the attention of the Security Council.'

We said that such a *situation* now exists between India and Pakistan. The word 'situation' is not our coinage. The Charter makes a distinction, and a firm one, between a *dispute* and a *situation*. There was not and is not a territorial dispute or a judicial question of sovereignty or title to be adjudicated between the parties. Pakistan and India are parties in the sense that one is the aggressor and victim, the other the complainant and the accused. Ours was a reference to the Security Council under provisions which deal with 'questions of international peace and security'. What was our prayer? It was that:

'The Government of India request the Security Council to call upon Pakistan to put an end immediately to the giving of such assistance *which is an act of aggression against India.*' (all italics mine.)

I have set out this part of the story at some length, though yet very briefly, as it is essential to an adequate understanding and appreciation of the issues involved and projected and to assert the true fact that Pakistan's invasion is the origin and the continuing cause of this 'problem.'

Vacation of Aggression

What follows? The answer is obvious. It sticks out a mile. Hence all the devices to go round it! This answer is: aggression must be vacated if there is to be a 'solution'.

In the face of India's complaint before the Security Council, the answer of Pakistan was filed on January 15, 1948. In a letter, Pakistan's Minister of Foreign Affairs said: 'The Pakistan Government emphatically deny that they are giving aid and assistance to the so-called invaders or have committed any act of aggression

against India.' The letter went on to say: 'On the contrary, and solely with the object of maintaining friendly relations between the two Dominions, the Pakistan Government have continued to do all in their power to discourage the tribal movement by all means short of war.' It was from Sir Zafrullah Khan, whose country was at that time waging war against us, that the fact was afterwards confirmed.

The Anglo-American Answer

The evidence of foreign correspondents and Pakistani utterances at the time about Pakistan's invasion are overwhelming. Yet, the western countries did not and have not till today spoken against this aggression, much less condemned it. They have also failed to take note (to put it mildly) that Pakistan had deceived the Security Council. The Anglo-American answer has been to make Pakistan a military ally and also to support her case diplomatically.

The United Nations appointed a commission—the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP). We did not vote for its appointment, as under British initiative the resolution appointing the Commission was in such language as challenged our position. We, however, received the Commission and gave it all cooperation. The several interim reports of the Commission alone are a mine of material proving Pakistan's aggression, the validity of our case and, furthermore, Pakistan's failure to honour obligations.

The item before the United Nations is called the 'Indo-Pakistan Question'. We did not so name it nor did we agree with the title of the item. To us, it was and is our complaint against aggression, but we took the view that the Council can call it what it likes.

Our Prime Minister's main concern at that time was to stop the fighting. The Indian Army had moved in, at a day's notice, saved Srinagar, driven the invaders out of Baramulla, which they had sacked and burned, killing thousands of people. The Indian army

routed the invaders from Baramulla. In a few months, India's armed strength began to beat back the aggressors. Our heavy armour went up the heights of the Zojilla Pass, a feat never accomplished before. It struck terror into the invaders.

The Resolutions

In spite of our military advantage, we accepted the Commission's proposal for a cease-fire and did everything to assist it. We accepted the UNCIP's proposed resolutions which Pakistan rejected at first and only accepted after several months.

Thus the resolution of August 13, 1948, and a subsequent one of January 5, 1949, are the two resolutions by which we are engaged. We thereby accepted the cease-fire, and withdrew our victorious and advancing forces at certain points to establish a cease-fire line. The two resolutions hang together.

Of the two, the first resolution has been called a 'concertina' resolution. Briefly, it consists of three parts, and Part II contains two sub-parts. It is of the essence of the resolution, very obviously and expressly stated, that the implementation of each succeeding part follows on the implementation of the previous one.

The resolution of January 5, 1949, has at least two features which are part of its essentiality. It follows from the full implementation of Part III of the resolution of August 13. Furthermore, it was not by way of a commitment but was a plan for the implementation of Part III of the resolution of August 13.

By Part I(A) of the resolution of August 13, the cease-fire line was established. The remaining part of the resolution is still unimplemented. It will take more space than the editor can give me to set out the resolutions or their vicissitudes in full. It is sufficient for the present to point to the import and implications of the remaining clauses of Part I, whereby:

- (a) both parties agreed to desist from any measures to aug-

ment the military forces under their control in Jammu and Kashmir;

- (b) both governments agree to appeal to their respective sides to assist in creating an atmosphere favourable to negotiations.

Note: It had been expressly stated that 'for the purpose of the Resolution "military forces" include all forces, organised and unorganised. . .'

According to the UNCIP reports themselves, Pakistan had augmented her forces without reference to the United Nations. Pakistan has also persisted in and accentuated her campaigns of hatred, threats of holy war (*jehad*) and resorted to subversion and sabotage on the Indian side of the cease-fire line.

Thus, Part I, except for the cease-fire, is still-born. We may now look at Part (A), which may be set out in full:

1. As the presence of troops of Pakistan in the territory of the State of Jammu and Kashmir constitutes a material change in the situation since it was represented by the Government of Pakistan before the Security Council, the Government of Pakistan agrees to withdraw its troops from that State.
2. The Government of Pakistan will use its best endeavour to secure the withdrawal from the State of Jammu and Kashmir of tribesmen and Pakistani nationals not normally resident therein who have entered the State for the purpose of fighting.
3. Pending a final solution, the territory evacuated by the Pakistani troops will be administered by the local authorities under the surveillance of the Commission.

Neither Pakistan troops, nor irregulars, have been withdrawn as set out in (1) and (2) above.

In regard to (3), Pakistan evacuated no territory, but on the contrary and according to UNCIP reports established administration in the northern areas where she had then no effective control. She has since annexed and also changed the status of these areas including the 'settlement' and cession of territory to China!

Part I and Part II(A) have not even now been implemented in regard to both of the above, the onus of performance and the responsibility of default is *solely and exclusively* with Pakistan. The rest of the resolution is also still-born owing to Pakistan's default.

No question of India implementing any part of the resolution arises. Sixteen years have passed, conditions have changed and what is contained in the rest of the resolution has become unperformable. 'Changed conditions', the well-known doctrine of International Law of *Rebus sic Stantibus* was cited by India in 1957 before the Security Council.

It is an error for us to argue that these resolutions are obsolete and invite odium. We are 'engaged' by these resolutions. But we have no unfulfilled commitments or defaults to account for. If the resolution is argued as obsolete, we will be charged with the onus of wanting to terminate the cease-fire and precipitating a military conflict. We have stated publicly that we will not take the initiative in, or invite, warlike action.

The Facts

The position in regard to Kashmir is that:

- (1) The State is an integral part of the Union. Therefore, aggression or partition, secession, cession and all of it relate to India—the Union.
- (2) The accession is full, final, complete and irrevocable. It may be added, it is 'perpetual'.
- (3) Pakistan is an aggressor. She has invaded and annexed the sovereign territory of the

Indian Union. She must vacate her aggression.

- (4) Pakistan is a military ally of the West and is thereby facing us in Kashmir with augmented strength contrary to Part I of the Resolution.
- (5) The western powers have complicated the situation, encouraged Pakistan and made her obstinate. They are also parties, however indirectly, to the continuance of the aggression. They are, therefore, disqualified from claiming 'impartiality'.
- (6) Pakistan has no *locus standi* in the State or in regard to the future of Kashmir. She is there as an invader. The only role which she can play in obedience to the Charter, the U.N. resolutions and to civilised behaviour is to vacate her aggression.
- (7) Pakistan has successively deceived the Security Council, made perverse use of the United Nations' time and machinery. She has therefore no right to the help of the world body or to the respect of the United Nations.
- (8) Pakistan maintains considerable forces in Union territory which she has illegally occupied and threatens international peace and security.
- (9) More recently, Pakistan has taken advantage of the perfidious attack of China against us, threatened us and allied herself with China, without regard to scruple or decency.
- (10) Pakistan seeks to weaken our resistance by violations and inroads into our territory by infiltrations, subversion and sabotage all along our border

We may now consider each of the above briefly.

Accession

ACCESSION : This is not a legalistic issue. By the challenge to accession, the territorial integrity and the sovereignty of the Union also stands challenged. The accession is complete and full. It has been voluntary and carried through

under due procedures. It has received the assent of the people, even though the latter is not necessary for the validity and the perpetual character of a State's accession. The contention that the accession is either temporary, provisional or revocable, is totally wrong. Accessions are not revocable. Our Constitution contains no provision for 'de-accessions' or partial or temporary accessions.

The Legal Position

The Union of India was created by the decision of the people of India in constituent assembly. In this decision, the representatives of Kashmir participated. If the accession of Jammu and Kashmir is to be reopened, the same will apply to the hundreds of States which have acceded to India. It will lead to the balkanisation of India, towards which British imperialism made many attempts but was thwarted by Indian nationalism.

It is established International Law and practice that acceded territories cannot withdraw from accession. The Supreme Court of the United States, the High Court of Parliament in Britain, have both so decided in the cases of Texas and Western Australia respectively.

It is not true to say that we accepted partial or temporary accession or that our assertion that accession is full and irrevocable is an afterthought. Listen to what Gopalaswami Ayyangar said to the Security Council as early as May 1948 :

'I desire to say a few words on the question of accession. . . . "whether the State of Jammu and Kashmir is to accede to India or Pakistan". The contention has been advanced that the accession is for a temporary period and a limited purpose, and when that period elapses and that purpose has been served, it ceases to be operative.

'We on our side repudiate this claim. The accession which took place on 26th October, 1947, was both legal and lawful. It has been followed up by India in the discharge of all the obli-

gations that her acceptance of the accession has imposed upon her. She has saved the Jammu and Kashmir State from disintegration. She is now resisting those who are attacking that integrity even today. She is protecting the States' large population from the unfriendly attentions of raiders from outside.'

The State of Jammu and Kashmir has acceded to India in all subjects in the central list and the concurrent list, subject to due processes. This cannot be altered except by amendment of the Constitution of India. Those who would seek to argue that accession is either tentative or a legalism, should pause to consider the facts of history and the implications of their argument for the survival of the Union.

To challenge accession is to strike at the very foundations of our constitutional edifice and at the unity and stability of the country. It is to seek to reverse history, to betray nationalism, and to render sterile the sacrifices and endeavours of the last sixteen years.

Self Determination

SELF DETERMINATION : The other argument which follows from tilting at accession is secession. Most of the proposals or ideas about a so-called 'settlement of the Kashmir problem' amount to, or directly point to, secession of a part of the Union from it. Some of these proposals also call for the cession of territory. There is no provision in our Constitution for secession. By a recent amendment to our Constitution we have made the advocacy of it unconstitutional. It is the further amputation of India which this country will not tolerate. It runs counter to our determination to affirm and strengthen the defence of our frontiers and our freedom.

Secessionists base their position on what they call 'self-determination'. Self-determination cannot be offered to a part of a Union. The 'self' which is relevant is the whole nation—and it has been determined. Furthermore, in re-

gard to Jammu and Kashmir, the State, both by participation in the Constituent Assembly and by acceding in all subjects in the central and concurrent list and by the act of its own Constituent Assembly, which itself proceeds from accession, endorsing the entry into the Union, has completed and reaffirmed all process of determination at all levels. Secession can only result in the seceding part joining another State or being a separate State itself. We may consider these separately.

Cession

CESSION: The State to which this part of the Union is asked to be ceded or which is implied or denoted is Pakistan. The *raison d'être* of this idea, if anything at all, is that the majority population of Jammu and Kashmir is Muslim and its affinity is with Pakistan. This is the two-nation theory which we never accepted and will not countenance. This notion was condemned and rejected after a full analysis of it by the Kashmir Constituent Assembly itself, as an idea that could not even be entertained.

To argue that it is contained or inherent in some of the statements of the pre-accession period, or in the Cabinet Mission's proposals is erroneous. We are a secular State. Our survival as a nation depends on the maintenance and strengthening of secularism. To accept the two-nation theory is to expose the minorities in both Pakistan and India to suspicion and danger. If accepted, it can only lead to violence, civil war and disruption in both countries.

The handing over of territories by one State to another is an abhorrent idea. People are not chattel and territories are not 'property'. It is the kind of thing that the Union of South Africa does in pursuance of her *Apartheid* policy. In days gone by, when territories like Florida, Louisiana, Alaska and Rhode Island were purchased and added on to the United States, it was by no means regarded either as a democratic or desirable practice. All this, however, happened long

ago. The transfer of territories and population is abhorrent to our ideas of human individuality and values.

Separate State

A SEPARATE STATE: This broadly is the argument of an 'independent Kashmir'. No such thing can survive. A so-called independent Kashmir, attributed to American machinations, be it true or otherwise, will in the present conditions of the world be an American satrapy. Its role will be to facilitate the projection of the world's cold war on to the roof of our country. Kashmir or any part of it cannot be independent except with vast outside assistance, economic, political and military.

If it is to be with India's economic and military support, the whole argument for 'independence' falls to the ground. If it is to be supported by Pakistan, then it is only the extension of present illegal annexations. It would bring Pakistan more directly into conflict with India. If 'independence' is to be internationally sustained, it means United States tutelage today even if the United Nations' name is added to it. If 'independence' is to be sustained by the Soviet bloc in the cold war or by China, it is equally bad.

An 'independent' Kashmir, in the context of China's aggression and expansionism, is a menace to India. Whether it is in effect an American base against the Soviet Union or a weak or foreign protected territory, it is against the interests of the people of the area, and a danger to India. Neither the economy nor the security of an 'independent' Kashmir is maintainable.

These ideas, ludicrous and impractical as they may be, are here discussed and examined, not because they would or could materialise, but merely to reveal their hollowness and incongruity. Furthermore, all these ideas and the policies pronounced by their advocates run counter to the position we have maintained, even in the United Nations itself. It is time that we understood and

stated publicly that these projections are part of the policy of Anglo-American diplomacy and of its policy towards India.

The United Nations resolutions are often cited against our positions, on behalf of self-determination, plebiscite, de-accession and what not, but without purpose or effect. The Anglo-American side, which hitherto has been able to find some country to sponsor a resolution drafted by it at the successive meetings of the Security Council invariably insists on the words: 'Recalling the previous resolution, etc. . .'. It thinks that by these, plebiscite, self-determination and other ideas, which are really conundrums and are aimed at India's security and territorial integrity, can be underscored.

Such resolutions would never pass the United Nations, except by the adoption of the subterfuge of making them 'procedural', requiring only seven votes and not subject to veto. It has been the device to propose the sending out of a Graham or a Nixon or anyone else for exercising good office or for calling on 'both parties to enter into conversations', to preface such resolutions by the words 'recalling previous resolutions'. The United Kingdom, with great adroitness in the field of hypocrisy, would proclaim it as an article of faith in regard to loyalty to the United Nations!

To be Remembered

What then has to be remembered are two or three main things.

Firstly, that the only resolutions which we are engaged by are the resolutions of January 17, 1948, August 13, 1948, and January 5, 1949.

The first is the one which calls on India and Pakistan not to do anything to aggravate the situation and furthermore to report to the United Nations. It says:

'Recognising the urgency of the situation;

'Taking note of the telegram addressed on 6th January by its

President to each of the parties and of their replies thereto to which they affirmed their intention to conform to the Charter; Calls upon both the Governments of India and Pakistan to take immediately all measures within their power (including public appeals to their people) calculated to improve the situation and to refrain from making any statements and from doing or causing to be done or permitting any acts which might aggravate the situation;

'And further requests each of those Governments to inform the Council immediately of any material change...'

Pakistan's Defaults

India does not have to fight shy of this resolution, 'recalling previous resolutions'. She has observed its injunctions and adhered to it in word and spirit. Pakistan has not. The UNCIP has drawn attention to Pakistan's defaults and transgressions. The UNCIP has pointed out a 'material change'—the intervention of the Pakistan troops, not merely tribals. The Anglo-Americans conveniently ignore all this, although they themselves subscribed to the Resolution of August 13, 1948, which also refers to this.

Pakistan had all along denied the presence or intervention by the Pakistan army in the State. The UNCIP became aware of the intervention by Pakistan troops and learnt about it on July 7, 1948, from the Pakistan Foreign Minister at Karachi. Korbelt, one of the Commissioners, refers to it in his book as a (bombshell'. The Foreign Minister admitted that the Pakistan army had been fighting against India since early May of that year. In point of fact, however, it was even earlier. The self-same Foreign Minister had denied the presence of his country's troops, their participation in the fighting and that his country had given aid to the 'raiders'.

Sir Zafrullah Khan now tells the Commission that there were three brigades of the Pakistan regular army in the State actually engaged

in fighting. Their despatch and presence ran contrary to the affirmations made until then and also to the undertakings given to the Security Council. Sir Zafrullah Khan's answer to the question posed by the UNCIP on this matter was that if Pakistan did not invade Kashmir, India would have invaded her.

Violating the Law

The UNCIP took a serious view of the situation and this matter figures in several paragraphs of its report. Sir Owen Dixon, a Judge of the Supreme Court, has said that he 'was prepared to adopt the view that when the frontier of the State of Jammu and Kashmir was crossed on, I believe, October 20, 1947, by hostile elements, it was contrary to international law and that when in May 1948, as I believe, the regular Pakistan forces moved into the territory of the State that too was inconsistent with International Law.'

Not only in the reports of the UNCIP or in Sir Owen Dixon's statement do we find the reference to Pakistan's dishonesty, aggression and violation of law, but in the United Nations Resolution itself. Clause 1, Part II(A) of the Resolution of August 13, 1948, has it that :

'As the presence of troops of Pakistan in the territory of the State of Jammu and Kashmir constitutes a material change in the situation since it was represented by the Government of Pakistan before the Security Council, the Government of Pakistan agrees to withdraw its troops from that State'.

The other aspect of these resolutions, which those who have opposed India conveniently forget when they 'recall the resolutions', is even more important and basic.

In regard to the Resolution of August 5, 1949, often only para 1 is quoted and most of the rest of the clauses are 'forgotten', as also the relation of para 1 to the whole, and the relative import. Even this is not the most important aspect in respect of these resolutions. The Resolutions of August 13, 1948, and January 5, 1949, were

arrived at after considerable discussion with the Government of India, mostly with the Prime Minister himself. They were agreed upon and accepted by India only after we received clarifications and assurances. We asked to be ensured against any future ambiguities or misunderstandings on fundamentals.

We received assurances, after which alone did we agree to the resolution. These are not private assurances or general ones. They were all communicated to Pakistan. They are part of the UNCIP report to the Council. They are assurances given authoritatively on behalf of the United Nations. They are integral parts of the engagements in which we and the United Nations are involved. The resolutions are not meaningful or complete, or *valid* without the assurances and clarifications.

Let me summarise these assurances which, let it be remembered, the Commission gave in the competence vesting in it by the terms of its appointment. They were given on behalf of the Security Council. These assurances make clear beyond doubt India's position and the error of Pakistan's contentions. India made it clear and did so publicly that she accepted the resolutions on the basis of the assurances. The latter are the United Nations' and Pakistan's commitments as well.

The Assurances

Pakistan accepted the resolutions after much delay. They had official knowledge of these assurances, that the UNCIP had given them and had committed the United Nations. Those who have opposed us at the Council, particularly the United Kingdom and the United States, are also committed to them. Summed up, these assurances include the following:

- (i) Responsibility for the security of the State of Jammu and Kashmir rests with the Government of India.
- (ii) The sovereignty of the Jammu and Kashmir Gov-

ernment over the entire territory of the State shall not be brought into question.

- (iii) There shall be no recognition of the so-called Azad (Free) Kashmir Government.
- (iv) The territory occupied by Pakistan shall not be consolidated to the disadvantage of the State of Jammu and Kashmir.
- (v) The administration of the evacuated areas in the north shall revert to the Government of Jammu and Kashmir and its defence to the Government of India who will, if necessary, maintain garrisons for preventing the incursion of tribesmen and for guarding the main trade routes.
- (vi) Pakistan shall be excluded from all the affairs of Jammu and Kashmir, in particular in the plebiscite, if one should be held.
- (vii) If a plebiscite is found to be impossible for technical or practical reasons, the Commission will consider other methods of determining fair and equitable conditions for ensuring a free expression of the people's will.
- (viii) Plebiscite proposals shall not be binding upon India if Pakistan does not implement Parts I and II of the resolution of August 13, 1948.

Legality of Accession

I would also add here that the legality of Kashmir's accession was never in question. On February 4, 1948, Warren Austin, the United States Representative on the Council, said:

"The external sovereignty of Kashmir is no longer under the control of the Maharaja... with the accession of Jammu and Kashmir to India, this foreign sovereignty went over to India

and is exercised by India, and that is how India happens to be here as a petitioner."

For sixteen years, this matter of 'the Indo-Pakistan Question' has been debated in the Security Council. Pakistan has threatened us with war often enough in her statements before the Security Council. Still we have, as loyal members of the United Nations, attended its meetings. We have not and will not depart from the position set out in the Assurances. That being our position, certain consequences follow to which I shall soon refer.

Meanwhile, we may examine one or two of the novel ideas which are newly purveyed or sought to be forced on us from within this country and from without.

Joint Defence

There has been talk not only after the Chinese invasion but even before of what the sponsors (who do not always own up to its authorship) of it have called 'The Joint Defence of the Sub-continent.' This hotch-potch idea, hopelessly impractical and perhaps sinister may, however, be looked at. Recently, it has been reincarnated with perhaps the appearance of a little more flesh in its new body as 'the Confederation of India and Pakistan'. The two are, however, much the same. The former is necessarily included in the latter. We may, therefore, study them together.

First of all, defence against whom? India needs defence *vis-a-vis* Pakistan, who has given her no peace since her inception. Will a 'Confederation' or 'Joint Defence' serve this purpose of defence against Pakistan?

India needs to defend herself against China. China, to all intents and purposes, is Pakistan's new ally. The two are fellow aggressors and have lately shared out our territory. They are together in the thieves kitchen. Common hostility to India binds them together. Apart from this, does any one seriously suggest that Pakistan is a military, poli-

tical or moral asset to us in our defence against China!

Against whom is this 'defence' postured? Is it not the same kind of 'defence' envisaged in the SEATO and the CENTO? Is it not another name for involving us in the cold war, for using this sub-continent, and more particularly the State of Jammu and Kashmir, as a base against the Soviet Union? With the Sino-Soviet differences on the one hand and the reported grant of bases by Pakistan to the United States (in the sovereign territory of the Union of India, but now under Pakistan's illegal occupation) does not the plan amount to making India a military base for the western bloc?

Are we a democracy to be 'confederated' with a military dictatorship, which holds down Baluchistan and East Bengal, not to speak of 'Azad Kashmir' by terror and in colonial conditions? Are we a secular State to be yoked to theocratic reaction, which is the basis and character of Pakistan? Are we a non-aligned country to be confederated with a key unit of the SEATO and the CENTO? Are we to open the territory of India, without let or hindrance to Pakistani infiltration and easy access? This, among other things, is the true, but sinister, meaning of 'confederation'.

Condominium

The most newly purveyed idea is that of a 'condominium'. I say newly purveyed, as there is nothing original about this. As an idea, it has been discarded everywhere in the world. It belongs to a past age. In that past, it was a device of making concessions to reaction which empires thought useful or necessary. Reaction, though militarily defeated by the empires, chose to keep alive as henchmen under a facade of equality of status. This was its *raison d'être* in the Sudan until recently.

In regard to Kashmir, a simple exercise in arithmetic will be helpful in examining this new condominium. Pakistan is in *de facto* possession of half of Kashmir.

She has no *de jure* right at all. Under this scheme her *de facto* possession will extend to the whole of Kashmir, while she will newly acquire a parallel *de jure* status over the whole territory. We would have to abandon our sovereignty or share it, and part of our administrative authority over the half we administer would go to Pakistan. In such a condominium, we shall be more under foreign dictation too for more reasons than one!

Condominium, as between two republics, is a new idea. Perhaps only one of them is in reality a republic. If a condominium were possible, as between Pakistan and India, what is the *rationale* for the survival of the two of us as separate States?

Contradictory and Impossible

Both these ideas bristle with contradictions and impossibilities. They need not be seriously entertained. They are not entitled to our concern, nor need they provoke our anxiety. Like the proverbial mule, these ideas have 'no pride of ancestry and no hope of progeny!' Like the mule again, if allowed to be born, the offspring will only display obstinacy, and the use of its hind legs! We may, therefore, regard this business with amused unconcern, or treat it with indifference.

I have refrained from dealing with the situation created by Sheikh Abdullah's many speeches and by the postures he has adopted. We can take all this in our stride. The Government of India and of Kashmir, which represents the people, can alone speak for Kashmir. The very fact that most of the proposals propagated have common factors, that they are based on the assumption of the secession of Kashmir and envisage the 'parties' as Kashmir, Pakistan and India, for these reasons alone, they need not hold hopes or fears for us.

They are also based on the totally unacceptable concept of the equal roles of Pakistan, India and Kashmir. They all call for secession. They are all conveniently oblivious of the fact that, but for the accession and the material

and moral stature of India, none of the exponents of the proposals would be free even to espouse these ideas!

Kashmir is India

Kashmir is India! It is India existing in part of her. Every part is a microcosm, that is also the macrocosm. True, there are many things to be done in and about Kashmir, as there are in the rest of India. They all call for solutions and persistent endeavours. So far as Kashmir is concerned, any other attitude would only promote instability in administration, doubt and false hopes in the people of Kashmir, confusion in the minds of the Afro-Asian people and governments, and display a lack of faith in, and regard for, our Constitution.

The people of India have given to themselves this Constitution. The social and material advance we have made, as well as the Rule of Law and our electoral processes, are reduced to an inferior status and endangered if these proposals on Kashmir are seriously entertained. Public opinion has been much aroused. It is significant that the support for these splitting and fissiparous policies lie in the parties and groups of social reaction, in vested interests, in opportunism.

In a way, all this may be found to have done us some good. The country has been roused. Kashmir is not no man's land, is not for political roulette. To tolerate any challenge to the place of Kashmir in the Union is to challenge India's integrity and sovereignty. It is to acquiesce in or accept dismemberment of the country, to submit to the pressures from outside and to reaction from within.

We will not let the proposals be passed. As has been vowed by those who valued liberty, national dignity and honour in the annals of history, we shall with faith and courage, but equally with knowledge of the imperative necessity of resistance to the powers of reaction and alert to the dangers to India's integrity, say, 'They shall not pass'.

Communication

The problem of Kashmir is a problem closely connected with the partition of the subcontinent which took place in 1947. For proper appreciation and understanding of the problem, therefore, it is essential to analyse the basis of that partition, and to find out on what basis the partition was agreed to mutually by the two parties concerned in the partition.

Here, among other sources, the basic document comprises the terms of reference upon which the Radcliffe Commission was appointed by the two parties to draw up and demarcate the boundary lines between the two successor States. According to these terms, so far as the British Indian territories were concerned, the Hindu majority areas were to be retained by India and the Muslim majority areas were to go to Pakistan. Had Kashmir been British-Indian territory, under the terms of the partition and in consonance with the agreed basis thereof, the Kashmir Valley would have gone to Pakistan.

But Kashmir was a princely State and not British-Indian territory. Under the terms whereon power was transferred by the then British government, the day on which the British rule ended, the rulers of princely States attained the status they enjoyed before they entered into treaty relations with the British government as the suzerain power, and they had the option to accede to either of the Unions or to remain independent. But Lord Mountbatten had made it clear that the princely States in exercising their option must have due regard to the basis of partition.

This is borne out by the fact that when Junagadh acceded to Pakistan, India very justifiably challenged the step taken by the ruler of Junagadh, pointing out that the accession was not in consonance with the basis of partition. On the same basis, India prevented the Hyderabad, Jodhpur and Bhopal rulers from exercising options according to their own will and asked them to accede to India in accordance with the basis of partition.

Turning to Kashmir, however, we find that India chooses to follow, *at the present moment*, quite a different course, disregarding the facts of partition she herself upheld in the case of Junagadh and others. In Kashmir's case, the ruler at the time of partition did not accede to either of the

States. When, however, a part of his own territory was disturbed and overrun by raiders from across the border, he sought India's assistance in clearing them. India made it a condition that such assistance could be granted only if he acceded to the Indian Union. The letter of the ruler in this behalf, and the reply of Lord Mountbatten thereto (cited as appendix A), make it clear as to what actually was the nature of the accession agreed to. From these documents, it is evident that the accession of Kashmir State to India was neither final nor irrevocable.

This is further borne out by the two separate resolutions passed in the U.N. Security Council, with India as the consenting party, on August 13, 1948 and January 5, 1949, respectively. (See appendix B and C). Part III of the resolution of August 13, 1948 and also Clause 1 of the resolution of the January 5, 1949 make it very clear that India did not consider the accession as final and irrevocable. Rather, India pledged itself to see that the question of the accession of the State of Jammu and Kashmir to India or Pakistan shall be decided 'through the democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite' (*vide* Clause 1 of the UN Security Council resolution of the January 5, 1949). In further corroboration of this fact there is the speech of the late Gopalaswami Iyyengar at the meeting of the Security Council, wherein he clarified and expounded the position of India *vis-a-vis* the question of accession (see Appendix D).

The main object of this note is to offer the readers of the *Seminar* facts upon which a wise decision can be based. In considering the question of accession, we must also study Article 370 of the Constitution. It is a long and complicated provision of law, but its last part is as follows:

'(3) Notwithstanding anything in the foregoing provisions of this article, the President may, by public notification, declare that this article shall cease to be operative or shall be operative only with such exceptions and modifications and from such date as he may specify: Provided that the recommendation of the Constituent Assembly of the State referred to in Clause (2) shall be necessary before the President issues such a notification.'

The proviso makes it clear that without the concurrence of the Constituent Assembly of the State, no action can be taken by India. Therefore although in a sense there has been an accession of the State of Jammu and Kashmir to the Union of India, such accession is not complete and irrevocable, but is subject to many legal and political conditions.

The final solution of a problem like that of Kashmir can only be a moral and political one. We have to see first, what would be in all the circumstances of the case good for the *people of Kashmir*; secondly, it must be a solution which must have the *concurrence* of the people of Kashmir; thirdly, without repudiating important resolutions of the United Nations, the fair name of India should not be besmirched by attacks from the nations of the world; and finally, the solution must also seek to have the approval of Pakistan, who is a party to the dispute.

If all these conditions cannot be satisfied, it is perhaps time to think of international arbitration—a solution which would unite both parts of Kashmir—and not create a tragedy of the kind, for instance, of Germany. The warning finger of history points to Alsace and Lorraine as well.

It is the hope of the common man that the leaders on both sides of the border will not make the mistake of allowing an ulcer to remain on the body of the subcontinent which may take half a century of blood and tears and sweat to heal.

Bombay, May 3, 1964

A.A.A. FYZEE

APPENDIX A

Reply of 27th October 1947, from Lord Mountbatten to Maharaja Hari Singh:

Your Highness's letter dated 26th October 1947 has been delivered to me by Mr. V. P. Menon. In the special circumstances mentioned by Your Highness, my Government have decided to accept the accession of Kashmir State to the Dominion of India. In consistence with their policy that in the case of any State where the issue of accession should be decided in accordance with the wishes of the people of the State, it is my Government's wish that, as soon as law and order have been restored in Kashmir and its soil cleared of the invader, the question of the State's accession should be settled by a reference to the people.

APPENDIX B

Extracts from Resolution of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan of 13th August 1948:

PART I

- A. The Governments of India and Pakistan agree that their respective High Commands will issue separately and simultaneously a cease-fire order to apply to all forces under their control in the State of Jammu and Kashmir as of the earliest practicable date or dates to be mutually agreed upon within four days after these proposals have been accepted by both Governments.
- B. The High Commands of the Indian and Pakistani forces agree to refrain from taking any measures that might augment the military potential of the forces under their control in the State of Jammu and Kashmir. (For the purpose of these proposals forces under their control shall be considered to include all forces, organised and unorganised, fighting or participating in hostilities on their respective sides.)

Here follow Clauses C, D and E. . .

PART II

Truce agreement:

Simultaneously with the acceptance of the proposal for the immediate cessation of hostilities as outlined in Part I, both Governments accept the following principles as a basis for the formulation of a truce agreement, the details of which shall be worked out in discussion between their representatives and the Commission.

- A. 1. As the presence of troops of Pakistan in the territory of the State of Jammu and Kashmir constitutes a material change in the situation since it was represented by the Government of Pakistan before the Security Council, the Government of Pakistan agrees to withdraw its troops from that State.
2. The Government of Pakistan will use its best endeavour to secure the withdrawal from the State of Jammu and Kashmir of tribesmen and Pakistani nationals not normally resident therein who have entered the State for the purpose of fighting.
3. Pending a final solution, the territory evacuated by the Pakistani troops will be administered by the local authorities under the surveillance of the Commission.
- B. 1. When the Commission shall have notified the Government of India that the tribesmen and Pakistani nationals referred to in Part II Clause A(2), hereof, have withdrawn, thereby terminating the situation which was represented by the Government of

India to the Security Council of having occasioned the presence of Indian forces in the State of Jammu and Kashmir, and further that the Pakistan forces are being withdrawn from the State of Jammu and Kashmir, the Government of India agrees to begin to withdraw the bulk of its forces from that State in stages to be agreed upon with the Commission.

Here follow Clauses B 2 and 3, and C1. . .

PART III

The Government of India and the Government of Pakistan reaffirm their wish that the future status of the State of Jammu and Kashmir shall be determined in accordance with the will of the people and to that end, upon acceptance of the truce agreement, both Governments agree to enter into consultations with the Commission to determine fair and equitable conditions whereby such free expression will be assured.

APPENDIX C

Extract from Resolution of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan of 5th January 1949 :

The United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan,

Having received from the Governments of India and Pakistan, in communications dated 23rd December and 25th December 1948, respectively, their acceptance of the following principles which are supplementary to the Commission's Resolution of 13th August 1948 :

1. The question of the accession of the State of Jammu and Kashmir to India or Pakistan will be decided through the democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite;
2. A plebiscite shall be held when it shall be found by the Commission that the cease-fire and truce arrangements set forth in Parts I and II of the Commission's resolution of 13th August 1948 have been carried out and arrangements for the plebiscite have been completed. . .

Here follow Clauses 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10.

APPENDIX D

Extracts from the speech of Gopalaswami Ayyangar made at the meeting of the Security Council on 6th February 1948 :

The representative of Pakistan said :

'India's reply and India's stand throughout has been : "We accepted Kashmir's accession provisionally—for the moment—in order to deal with the emergency that has arisen; and once the emergency was out of the way, the question of accession would be decided by the people through a plebiscite."'

This is not quite an accurate description of India's attitude. That attitude would be more correctly described in the following

words. 'We accepted Kashmir's offer of accession at a time when she was in peril in order to be able to save her effectively from extinction. **We will not, in the circumstances, hold her to this accession as an unalterable decision on her part.** When the emergency has passed and normal conditions are restored, **she will be free by means of a plebiscite either to ratify her accession to India or to change her mind and accede to Pakistan or remain independent. We shall not stand in the way if she elects to change her mind.'** That, I think, is the proper description of India's attitude.

If I may explain the position a little more in detail, the law bearing on the facts is as follows. Under Section II of the India Act, any Indian State is at liberty to accede to either Dominion or to remain independent. If a State did accede to that Dominion, it could not withdraw from that accession without the permission of that Dominion. What India had said was : 'Kashmir offered her accession at a time of peril to her, and we shall not hold her to this offer. We shall accept it now but we shall leave it to her and her people to change their minds and ask to withdraw from the accession to India and to accede to Pakistan or remain independent. If Kashmir does change her mind, **then we commit ourselves to the position that we shall give our consent to her withdrawal from the accession to India.'** That, in effect, is the position involved. There can really be no provisional accession, though that expression has been loosely used in the course of speeches, broadcasts and newspaper comments in regard to Kashmir's accession.

The instrument of accession is a document complete in itself. To the best of my memory, the instrument in the case of Kashmir, does not contain any conditions. It does not state that the accession is provisional. The commitment which the Government of India made for themselves on the question of ascertaining the wishes of the people was contained in a letter accompanying the accepted instrument of accession. The Government of India is certainly bound by its commitment, but it would be wrong to call the accession itself a provisional accession.

With regard to this question of accession, we should remember that it became complete and operative on 26th October 1947. The effect of the Government of India's commitment is regard to the plebiscite was that if, on the plebiscite being taken, the vote went against accession to India, India would release Kashmir from the accession. Upon such release, the accession, which upto that point must be considered to be valid and effective, would, as it were, cease.

Documentary

Extract from Jinnah's statement on the Muslim League position vis-a-vis Indian States (17 June, 1947).

M. A. JINNAH

Constitutionally and legally, the Indian States will be independent sovereign States on the termination of Paramountcy and they will be free to decide for themselves to adopt any course they like. It is open to them to join the Hindustan Constituent Assembly or the Pakistan Constituent Assembly or decide to remain independent. In the last case they enter into such agreements or relationship with Hindustan or Pakistan as they may choose...we do not wish to interfere with the internal affairs of any State; for, that is a matter primarily to be resolved between the rulers and the peoples of the States. Such States as wish to enter the Pakistan Constituent Assembly of their free will and desire to discuss or negotiate with us, shall find us ready and willing to do so. If they wish to remain independent and wish to negotiate or adjust any political or any other relationship such as commercial or economic relations with Pakistan we shall be glad to discuss with them and come to settlements which will be in the interest of both.

(The Indian Annual Register 1947, p. 112 (0))

Extract from a letter from Maharaja Hari Singh to Lord Mountbatten, offering Accession with India (26 October, 1947).

MAHARAJA HARI SINGH

With the conditions obtaining at present in my State and the great emergency of the situation as it exists I have no option but to ask for help from the Indian Dominion. Naturally they cannot send the help asked for by me without my State acceding to the Dominion of India. I have accordingly decided to do so and I attach the Instrument of Accession for acceptance by your Government. The other alternative is to leave my State and my people to freebooters. On this basis no civilised government can exist or be maintained.

(Source : White Paper on Jammu & Kashmir)

Extract from G. S. Bajpai's Aide Memoire to UNCIP (Annexure 21) 13 July, 1948.

G. S. BAJPAI

(3) ... The Commission must be aware that, after the transfer of power to India and Pakistan on the 15th August 1947, each

Indian State which, previously, had treaty relations with the Crown, became free to accede to India or to Pakistan. Kashmir had approached both us and Pakistan with the proposals for a standstill agreement. Pakistan had entered into such an agreement. Aware of the intricacies of the position of Kashmir, we had not acceded to Kashmir's request for a standstill agreement. Further, there was no iota of evidence to suggest that, before the invasion of Kashmir by the tribesmen created an unprecedented situation, we had made any attempt to obtain the accession of Kashmir. *Where, then, was the evidence in support of the charge that accession had been obtained by fraud?* As regards force, the position was that, from September, we had heard of incursions into Jammu and Kashmir State from the Pakistan border. On the 24th October, we received news of the invasion of the Kashmir valley by tribesmen. The facts of this invasion had already been reported to the Commission. . . . *The accession took place on the 26th of October; India's troops landed in Kashmir the following morning. As regards the military aid that India rushed to Kashmir, this was not only in discharge of a constitutional obligation which she undertook when she accepted the accession of Kashmir; it was also in response to a moral obligation, namely the obligation of every civilised nation to protect the life, honour and territory of a neighbour which had been suddenly attacked and whose destiny the perpetrators of this unprovoked aggression sought to determine by methods practised by gangsters.* On both sides of the border, communal passions were at fever heat at this time. Those who were attempting to coerce Kashmir into accession to Pakistan were also raising the cry 'On to Delhi'. Had they succeeded in their aim in Kashmir, India would have been the next victim. India had, therefore, sent her forces to Kashmir under the triple obligation of a constitutional and a moral duty to a neighbour and friend and the obligation of self-defence.

(5) . . . *Either our charge of Pakistan's complicity, now complicity in the shape of an undeclared war against us, was true or untrue. If it were untrue, we were prepared to face the obloquy of condemnation of the civilised world. On the other hand, if it were true, then the Council of the United Nations were under an obligation to demand that Pakistan should cease hostilities against us, deny all aid to the raiders and withdraw her own troops as well as the outsiders from the State territory. We had nothing to hide and there was nothing of which we were ashamed, or need be ashamed. But, I repeat, we attached the highest importance to the declaration of Pakistan's guilt and, if this guilt were proved, to Pakistan being directed to do what seven months ago, we had asked the Council that Pakistan should be asked to do. Until this matter was settled there could be no question of discussing the details of a plebiscite.*

**Extract from Sheikh Abdullah's address to the Kashmir Assembly
5 November, 1951.**

SHEIKH ABDULLAH

. . . I shall first speak on the merits and demerits of the State's accession to India. In the final analysis, as I understand it, it is the kinship of ideals which determines the strength of ties between two States. The Indian National Congress has consistently supported the cause of the State's people's freedom. The autocratic rule of the princes has been done away with and representative governments have been entrusted with the administration. Steps towards democratisation have been taken and these have raised the people's standard of living, brought about much needed social reconstruction, and above all built up their very independence of spirit. Naturally, if we accede to India there is no danger of

a revival of feudalism and autocracy. Moreover, during the last four years, the Government of India has never tried to interfere in our internal autonomy. This experience has strengthened our confidence in them as a democratic State.

The real character of a State is revealed in its Constitution. The Indian Constitution has set before the country the goal of secular democracy based upon justice, freedom and equality for all without distinction. This is the bedrock of modern democracy. This should meet the argument that the Muslims of Kashmir cannot have security in India, where the large majority of the population are Hindus. Any unnatural cleavage between religious groups is the legacy of Imperialism, and no modern State can afford to encourage artificial divisions if it is to achieve progress and prosperity. The Indian Constitution has amply and finally repudiated the concept of a religious State, which is a throw-back to medievalism, by their religion, colour, caste and class.

The national movement in our State naturally gravitates towards these principles of secular democracy.

As regards the economic advantages, I have mentioned before the road and river links with Pakistan. In the last analysis, we must however remember that we are not concerned only with the movement of people but also with the movement of goods and the linking up of markets. In Pakistan there is a chronic dearth of markets for our products. Neither, for that matter, can she help us with our industrialisation, being herself industrially backward.

(Information Service of India, New Delhi.)

Extract from 'Kashmir in the United Nations', Section VI(b) UNO: KASHMIR (1 January 1948).

KASHMIR & UN

(1) Under Article 35 of the Charter of the United Nations, any member may bring any situation, whose continuance is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, to the attention of the Security Council. Such a situation now exists between India and Pakistan owing to the aid which invaders, consisting of nationals of Pakistan and of tribesmen from the territory immediately adjoining Pakistan on the North-West, are drawing from Pakistan for operations against Jammu and Kashmir, a State which has acceded to the Dominion of India and is part of India. . . The Government of India request the Security Council to call upon Pakistan to put an end immediately to giving of such assistance which is an act of aggression against India. If Pakistan does not do so, the Government of India may be compelled in self-defence, to enter Pakistan territory, in order to take military action against the invaders. The matter is therefore one of extreme urgency and calls for immediate action by the Security Council for avoiding a breach of international peace.

(6) The grave threat to the life and property of innocent people in the Kashmir Valley and security of the State of Jammu and Kashmir that had developed as a result of the invasion of the Valley demanded immediate decisions by the Government of India on both requests. It was imperative, on account of the emergency, that the responsibility for the defence of the Jammu and Kashmir State should be taken over by a government capable of discharging it. But, in order to avoid any possible suggestion that India had taken advantage of the State's immediate peril for her own political advantage, the Dominion Government made it clear that, once the soil of the State had been cleared of the invader and normal conditions restored, its people would be free to decide their future by the recognized democratic method of a

plebiscite or referendum which, in order to ensure complete impartiality, might be held under international auspices.

(7) The Government of India felt it their duty to respond to the appeal for armed resistance because

(i) they could not allow a neighbouring and friendly State to be compelled by force to determine either its internal affairs or its external relations;

(ii) the accession of Jammu and Kashmir State to the Dominion of India made India legally responsible for the defence of the State.

(13) In order that the objective of expelling the invader from the Indian territory and preventing him from launching fresh attacks should be quickly achieved, Indian troops would have to enter Pakistan territory; only thus could the invaders be denied the use of bases and cut off from their sources of supplies and reinforcements, in Pakistan. Since the aid which the invaders are receiving from Pakistan is an act of aggression against India, the Government of India are entitled, in international law, to send their armed forces across Pakistan territory for dealing effectively with the invaders. However, as such action might involve armed conflict with Pakistan, the Government of India, ever anxious to proceed according to the spirit of the Charter of the United Nations, desire to report the situation to the Security Council in accordance with the provisions of Article 35 of the Charter.

Government of Pakistan. Document I. Pakistan's Reply to India's Complaint.

PAKISTAN POSITION

(3) . . . the Pakistan Government emphatically deny that they are giving aid and assistance to the so-called invaders or have committed any act of aggression against India. On the contrary and solely with the object of maintaining friendly relations between the two Dominions the Pakistan Government have continued to do all in their power to discourage the tribal movement by all means short of war. This has caused bitter resentment throughout the country, but despite a very serious risk of large scale internal disturbances the Pakistan Government have not deviated from this policy. In circumstances which will be clear from the recital of events set out in Document III, it may be that a certain number of independent tribesmen and persons from Pakistan are helping the Azad Kashmir Government in their struggle for liberty as volunteers, but it is wrong to say that Pakistan territory is being used as a base of military operations. It is also incorrect that the Pakistan Government is supplying military equipment, transport and supplies to the 'invaders' or that Pakistan officers are training guiding and otherwise helping them.

Extract from the Owen Dixon Report to the Security Council

SIR OWEN DIXON

. . . I have suggested, that a different conception exists of the process of ascertaining the will of the people. . . At all events I have formed the opinion that if there is any chance to settling the dispute over Kashmir by agreement of India and Pakistan it now lies in the partition and in some means of allocating the Valley rather than in an over-all plebiscite. The reasons for this may be shortly stated.

The State of Jammu and Kashmir is not really a unit geographically, demographically or economically. It is an agglomeration of territories brought under the political power of one Maharajah. That is the unity it possesses. If as a result of an over-all plebiscite the State as an entirety passed to India, there would be large movements of Muslims and another refugee problem would arise for Pakistan, which would be expected to receive them in very great numbers. If the result favoured Pakistan, a

refugee problem, although not of such dimensions, would arise for India, because of the movement of Hindus and Sikhs. Almost all this would be avoided by partition. Great areas of the State are unequivocally Muslim. Other areas are predominantly Hindu. There is a further area which is Buddhist. No one doubts the sentiment of the great majority of the inhabitants of these areas.

I recommend that the Security Council should press the parties to reduce the military strength holding the cease-fire line to the normal protection of a peacetime frontier.

Extract from the Jarring Report. April 29, 1957.

JARRING REPORT

10. The resolution of 5 January, 1949, envisages the holding of a free and impartial plebiscite to decide on the question of the accession of the State of Jammu and Kashmir to India or Pakistan. On exploring this question of a plebiscite I was aware of the grave problems that might arise in connection with and as a result of a plebiscite.

... India which had brought the case before the Security Council on 1 January, 1948, felt aggrieved that the Council had so far not expressed itself on the question of what in their view was aggression committed by Pakistan on India. In their view, it was incumbent on the Council to express itself on this question and equally incumbent on Pakistan 'to vacate the aggression.' It was argued that prior to the fulfilment of these requirements on the part of the Security Council and on the part of Pakistan the commitments of India under the resolution could not reach the operative stage.

19. While the Government of Pakistan, after a certain hesitation, fell in with my suggestion in principle, the Government of India, however, did not feel that arbitration as outlined by me, would be appropriate. They explained that, while they were not against the principle of arbitration... they felt that the issues in dispute were not suitable for arbitration, because such procedure would be inconsistent with the sovereignty of Jammu and Kashmir and the rights and obligations of the Union of India in respect of this territory.

III

20. In dealing with the problem under discussion as extensively as I have during the period just ended, I could not fail to take note of the concern expressed in connection with the changing political, economic and strategic factors surrounding the whole of the Kashmir question together with the changing pattern of power relations in West and South Asia.

21. The Council will, furthermore, be aware of the fact that the implementation of international agreements of an ad hoc character, which has not been achieved fairly speedily may become progressively more difficult because the situation with which they were to cope has tended to change.

(Ministry of External Affairs, New Delhi)

Extract from V. K. Krishna Menon's speech in the Security Council, February, 1957.

V. K. KRISHNA MENON

... A plebiscite is a peaceful process, and you cannot force this peaceful process. It is like some people using the machinery of democracy in order to destroy it. So, similarly, the word 'plebiscite' embodies the great idea of self-determination and it simply is not to be misinterpreted... Holding of a free and impartial plebiscite, therefore, is possible only when there is a preparatory condition... We do not seek to take up a moral position in the world but the newspapers speak about it. We

are only one country among 80, we have no special position of any kind and we must ourselves be able to judge the situation. Reference has been made to arbitration—such a reference has been made several times, not only by the representative of Pakistan but also by others, and it has been stated, with some degree of distress of mind, that at one time we refused to go to arbitration. Again arbitration is a word like plebiscite which can be bandied about. I have never heard of a plebiscite being taken in one of the constituent units of a Union. I should like to draw your attention to the fact, which I have set out before, that the arbitration tribunal, in this particular case, was asked to set down questions that it was going to arbitrate upon. But there was disagreement in the Commission itself on the suggestion which was only adopted by a very small majority.

Extract from Firoz Khan Noon's speech in the Security Council, September 1957 (S.C.O.R. 24 September 1957).

SIR FIROZ KHAN NOON

No change of any kind which should render the holding of a plebiscite impracticable has taken place in Kashmir. The basic factors which existed nine years ago exist today. The changes, if any, in occupied Kashmir are the creation of India herself and have been brought about in direct defiance of the directives of the Security Council. India surely cannot plead the length of her aggressive stay in Kashmir as an excuse for not honouring her international agreement.

It is alleged by India that if a plebiscite is held in Kashmir, the Muslims of India would be placed in jeopardy. . . . How is it that, suddenly, after ten years of comparative calm, following the holocaust which befell the sub-continent in 1947, it is now being asserted that if the people of Kashmir are allowed to exercise the right of self-determination, it would lead to the general massacre of forty million Muslims in India? There is an obvious implication here that the Government of India is certain that the voting in a plebiscite will go in favour of Pakistan. And it is also obvious that this certainly is the real reason why India is avoiding a plebiscite.

Govind Vallabh Pant's speech at Srinagar, 1 July, 1955.

GOVIND VALLABH PANT

It is necessary to quote at length from what the Union Home Minister had said: 'We made certain statements when Kashmir acceded to India which cannot be denied. But when we made the statements the circumstances were different from what they are now. The time factor is very important. Many things have happened since then. During these eight years Kashmir has been following a certain policy for its advancement and many development schemes are in progress. Pakistan has entered into a military alliance with America. The Constituent Assembly of Kashmir which was elected on the basis of adult franchise has taken a definite decision. Resolutions passed by the Jammu and Kashmir National Conference on the eve of the elections to the Constituent Assembly and the inaugural address delivered by Sheikh Abdullah made it abundantly clear that the Constituent Assembly had been constituted primarily for the purpose of determining and deciding this vital issue. While I am not oblivious of the initial declaration made by the Government of India I cannot ignore the important series of facts which I have briefly referred to above. In these circumstances I personally feel that the tide cannot be turned now. This relates to that part of Jammu and Kashmir which is with us. The other part has not made its choice so far; people there perhaps have not been given the opportunity to do so. Conditions there are not reported to be satisfactory. The Pakistan Government has failed to agree to any reasonable conditions for a plebiscite, not do I see any possibility of its agreeing to any. We are anxious to reach a settle-

ment with Pakistan on all points. We would like the best neighbourly relations to exist between India and Pakistan.'

(*The Hindu*, 10 July, 1955)

Extract from Prime Minister Nehru's speech on the Kashmir issue to the Lok Sabha (29 March 1956).

JAWAHARLAL NEHRU

... Legally and constitutionally, Kashmir acceded to India. There is no doubt about it. This also is an undoubted fact. You may criticise the speed with which this was done, the manner of it, but the fact is that, legally and constitutionally, the State of Jammu and Kashmir acceded to India. Therefore, it became the duty of the Indian Union to defend, to protect, Kashmir from aggression and drive out the invaders. I would go a step further and say that even if Kashmir had not acceded to India, even then it would be our duty to defend it. I am trying to develop a constitutional argument in stating the point. It is because of India being a continuing entity. That is, we were India and we are India and a part of it went out, opted out, let us say, and became Pakistan. We allowed it to opt out. Now, whatever did not opt out remained with India till such time as something was done, some decision was taken. That is, our responsibilities continued in regard to every part of what was India until that part deliberately and positively became not India. I am even taking into consideration that no final decision had been taken about Kashmir's accession to India; but the fact it was not in Pakistan itself cast a duty upon us to protect it against any attack. But, however, this point does not arise because in effect it did accede to India.

... There was a great deal of talk about plebiscite and a good deal of talk as to what India should and should not do. But throughout this period, the first demand of the United Nations has been in every respect the withdrawal of Pakistan forces from that area occupied by them. Other factors came later. . . Today, eight and a half years after that, those armed forces are still there. All this talk of plebiscite and other things is completely beside the point. In fact, those questions only arose when Pakistan had taken a certain step, that is, withdrawal of armed forces. . .

... There were many other conditions—pre-requisites—to plebiscite. Well, many attempts were made. They did not yield results. I am not going into detail as to whose fault it was. The fact is that they did not yield results.

(Lok Sabha debates)

Extract from N. S. Khrushchov on Kashmir, 10 December, 1955.

N. S. KHRUSHCHOV

... the peoples of the State of Jammu and Kashmir, who belong to different nationalities and different faiths live as friends and want to work for the well-being of their beloved State—the Republic of India.

Viewing the Kashmir question from an impartial and objective position, the Soviet Union has always expressed feelings of sincere friendliness for the people of Kashmir and for their peace-loving democratic forces which have already established friendly relations with the progressive and peace-loving forces of the Republic of India which clearly understands the national aspirations of Kashmiri people.

The question of Kashmir as one of the States of the Republic of India has already been decided by the people of Kashmir. This is the people's own affair.

(*'Kashmir, an Open Book'*, Srinagar)

Extract from Clement Attlee (former Prime Minister of England) on Kashmir.

CLEMENT ATTLEE

I gather that the tension of a few years ago has relaxed and that everyone in Kashmir and Jammu, apart from the territory

occupied by Pakistan, is convinced that the present division of the country has come to stay.

We attended a meeting of the Constituent Assembly which is engaged in putting into final form the new constitution. I was assured that nowhere in India is there less communal tension. Certainly at the reception given to us there were more than 1,500 guests who seemed representative of every community.

Altogether my impression is that judging by results, the present regime is successful. It is also thoroughly democratic with local self-government all the way up from the village. *I think that Kashmir has definitely opted for Union with India.*

(*Evening Star*, 20 Nov., 1956)

SINO-PAK COMMUNIQUE

Extract from Sino-Pak Joint Communique.

7. The President and the Prime Minister agreed that the border dispute between India and China should and can be resolved peacefully through negotiations. They expressed the hope that the Kashmir dispute would be resolved in accordance with the wishes of the people of Kashmir as pledged to them by India and Pakistan. It would be of no avail to deny the existence of these disputes and to adopt a big nation chauvinistic attitude of imposing one's will on others. Massive military preparations have never been the answer to international differences; they only create new tensions and bring added burdens to the people. An early settlement of these disputes, they considered, was necessary in the interest of world peace and the well-being of the peoples of Asia.

(Sd.) Marshal Chen Yi, Vice-Premier and Foreign Minister of the People's Republic of China.

(Sd.) Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Pakistan.
(*Pakistan Times*, 24 Feb., 1964)

Extract from M. C. Chagla's speech in the Security Council (5 February, 1964).

M. C. CHAGLA

A plebiscite is only a machinery for ascertaining the wishes of a people. There is nothing sacrosanct about it. There are other methods which are equally efficient. The British Government has, in the last twenty years, transferred power to a large number of its colonies, but it has never thought of ascertaining the wishes of these colonies by holding a plebiscite. In India itself no plebiscite was held to determine either whether the people of the sub-continent of India wanted freedom or whether the majority of Muslims living in the country wanted partition. The United Kingdom came to the conclusion that independence should be given and the country should be partitioned because it was satisfied that the Indian National Congress on the one hand and the Muslim League on the other represented the people on these two issues. In Jammu and Kashmir the National Conference as a party represented the overwhelming majority of the people of that State, and, as I have already pointed out, it fully supported the accession of Jammu and Kashmir to India.

... as Jammu and Kashmir is an integral part of India, *what we have been doing is adjusting our relations with a constituent State of the Indian Union.* It is on par with the Congress of the United States dealing with one of its fifty federated States. Therefore, the question raised by Pakistan is purely a domestic matter with which only India is concerned and in respect of which Pakistan has no right to intervene or interfere and which has

been specifically excluded under the Charter from the jurisdiction of the United Nations.

It has often been said and, I think, it has also been repeated by the Foreign Minister of Pakistan, that the only bone of contention between India and Pakistan was Kashmir and that if the problem of Kashmir were solved to Pakistan's satisfaction, then there would be friendship and full co-operation between our two countries. I beg to differ. As I have pointed out before, it is difficult to understand the basic philosophy on which the policy of Pakistan is based. In every aspect of its foreign policy, it has disclosed an anti-Indian bias. At one time we were told by responsible Pakistan leaders that the reason why they were driven into the arms of China was our Kashmir policy; as China did not like this reason for Pakistan's friendship for China, they changed the tune and suggested that even if the problem of Kashmir was solved, Pakistan would continue to support China. In other words, Pakistan's present attitude of hostility towards India is not due to the Kashmir problem alone, but it is something more deep-seated.

Extract from Z. A. Bhutto's speech in the Security Council (4 February, 1964).

Z. A. BHUTTO

Certainly, no one must then demand the end of any colonial regime because there is no colonial regime which has not behind it the sanction of time much longer than that commanded by the Indian occupation of Kashmir. If the Security Council was exercised over Kashmir in 1948, why should it not be exercised over it in 1964? If it be said that the circumstances have changed, they have changed only in this respect that in 1948 the people of Kashmir were engaged in armed fighting against India in Kashmir and in 1964 they are not.

If this change is supposed to operate to the disadvantage of those who laid down their arms on the pledge given by the United Nations that their rights would be peacefully secured, is it not virtual inducement to them to resume hostilities?

... Indian spokesmen have claimed that since three elections have taken place to the State Assembly, which has supported 'the State's accession' to India, it is no longer necessary to hold a plebiscite to determine whether the people of Jammu and Kashmir wish their State to accede to India or to Pakistan. Quite apart from the fact that elections to a legislature can never be the equivalent of a plebiscite on the specific issue of accession, these elections were held to the so-called Constituent Assembly and its successor assemblies in Indian-occupied Kashmir.

Extracts from the speech of the Foreign Minister of Pakistan before the Security Council 5 May, 1964.

Z. A. BHUTTO

'For 16 years India has stalled and prevaricated. The moment has arrived which will decide whether India and Pakistan will justly settle their dispute and fulfil their destinies or whether they will remain estranged from each other and thus lose their ventures in a challenging and expanding world. . . If the Indian authorities again resort to suppression of the people of Kashmir by force, the people of Pakistan may find it extremely difficult to stand aside and may demand of their Government whatever measures are necessary for the amelioration of the situation in Indian-occupied Kashmir. . . It has been authoritatively established by the (U.N.) Commission that the cease-fire order was meant to be 'linked' (this was the exact expression used by the Commission) with a truce and with the establishment of proper conditions for a plebiscite. . . Actually, however, regardless of what the representative of India might say here, a declaration by either

party that the agreement embodied in the UNCIP resolution is obsolete, does not deserve to be given any consideration unless that party is to be understood as denouncing the cease-fire also and contemplating a resumption of hostilities. . . India claims that the people of Kashmir have already expressed their wishes on the question of accession. We maintain that the people of Kashmir have not so far been allowed to exercise their right of self-determination. We assert that they have yet to take a decision on the question of accession to India or to Pakistan.

Extract from the speech of India's M. C. Chagla before the Security Council 8 May, 1964.

M. C. CHAGLA

My delegation hopes that even at this late hour, the members of the Council will give careful thought to the matter and give an answer to these questions :

- (1) How is it that Pakistan occupies two-fifths of Kashmir?
- (2) Has she any legal right to be in possession and control of any part of Kashmir territory?
- (3) Has she any right to negotiate and give away any part of Kashmir to China?
- (4) What steps should the Council take to make Pakistan vacate her aggression?

. . . It is clear on the perusal of the records of the Security Council that the ceasefire line is a complement of suspension of hostilities and can be considered separately from Part II and therefore from Part III of the Resolution of August 13, 1948. But there is a sinister significance in the suggestion of the Pakistan Foreign Minister. It is not merely a legal argument—it is a threat to disturb the peace of the subcontinent because in another part of his speech he made no secret of his Government's intention to excite and inflame people to go to the rescue of the people of Kashmir. . . Pakistan and China are both aggressors in Kashmir. (One is in illegal possession of 32,000 sq. miles of territory and the other about 17,000 sq. miles). Both have acquired their gains by the use of force and aggression. Affinity between them is all too obvious.

Extracts from the speech of India's M. C. Chagla before the Security Council, 12 May, 1964 .

M. C. CHAGLA

Let me, therefore, end on this note—that we treat the Kashmir problem as being as much a human problem as a legal or a political one. The question we should address to ourselves is: what solution will lead to peace and happiness of the people of Kashmir and inter-communal unity not only in that part of India but the rest of the country? I wish to state with all the confidence and emphasis I possess that any disturbance of the status of Kashmir which has already been settled will result not only in serious troubles in Kashmir itself but in the whole of the sub-continent of India. If this Council is interested in the maintenance of peace and international relations, it should avoid any superimposed solution upon the two countries or any intervention in any talks or discussions we might have with each other.

The Kashmir question will not be solved by interminable debates and discussions in the Council. It will only be solved when Pakistan realises that Kashmir is not a political shuttlecock in the game of anti-Indian policies which she has for the time being adopted. The Kashmir question will be solved when Pakistan realizes that India wishes her well, has no designs on her independence and that in the prosperity of the two countries lies the prosperity of the whole sub-continent. In this prosperity the people of Kashmir must have their share as an integral part of India.

Books

A HISTORY OF KASHMIR

By Prithivi Nath Kaul Bamzai

Delhi Metropolitan Book Co.

The rush of events in Kashmir, engulfing the present, and the din of conflicting interests tend to make us forget that Kashmir has a rich historical background—political, economic, social and cultural—which goes back to thousands of years. A close study of the chequered course of this history gives one a better perspective for understanding and diagnosing the maladies afflicting the State.

Though Indians in the pre-Muslim era were never known to be given to history as such, yet there is no dearth of historical material pertaining to Kashmir. *Rajatarangini* by Kalhana with numerous additions at later dates is, of course, the most important one. Kalhana refers to eleven earlier

compositions, which gave exhaustive data about the shifting sands of history in various periods. The early writings were in verse and inclined to be rhetorical. Combined with the systematic writings in Persian, accounts of foreign travellers and archaeological finds, they enable a researcher to give a connected account of the history of the State since the time the valley of Kashmir was a lake 'twice the length and three times the width of the Lake of Geneva and completely encircled by snowy mountains as high and higher than Mont Blanc. . .'

As one turns the pages of this history and reads about the rise and fall of Hindu Rajas, Muslim Sultans, Sikh Sardars and Dogra princes under the aegis of the British, leading to the establishment of a democratic government under the National Conference after the independence of India, one is struck by certain specific features of Kashmir's story which

must be taken due note of by those engaged in resolving the current political tangles of the State.

Kashmir is almost impregnable so far as natural frontiers go. The invaders from outside, however, usually received encouragement from some disgruntled Kashmiri element. Babar, for instance, invaded Kashmir twice ostensibly to help some pretender to the throne of Kashmir 'but really to bring it under his control.' During the reign of Hussain Shah Chak (1563-1570) Akbar extended his influence in Kashmir because of the petitions for aid received by him from Kashmiris who were arrayed in Sunni-Shia camps for an internecine conflict. During the reign of Yaqub Khan, Akbar annexed Kashmir to his empire because he had received a deputation consisting of some leading Kashmiris like Sheikh Yaqub Sarfi and Baba Daud Khaki against the ruler. Ahmad Shah Abdali's invasion of Kashmir was prompted by the invitation of Afrasiyab Khan, deputy of the Subhedar of Kashmir.

The second striking fact in the history of Kashmir is that 'its people rose to great heights of art, culture and economic prosperity when it received the impulses from outside rather than from within. . . ' Kashmir was at the zenith of its glory during the days of Ashoka, Kanishka, Lalitaditya and Avantivarman. After Samkaravarman's death, the Kashmir rulers, with a view to safeguarding their small kingdom against a possible conquest by the new Muslim kings of North India, 'sealed the passes and behind the protecting walls of high mountains reduced the people of Kashmir to the plight of a beleaguered garrison. What happened afterwards is given below in the words of the author :

'But the resources of the small kingdom were too poor to maintain a large population. Connections with the centres of trade and commerce in India being severed, the pressure on agricultural land increased, resulting in the emergence of powerful landlords. Kashmir thus presents the picture of a besieged fortress which, when its provisions get exhausted, becomes the scene of unrest and mutiny among the garrison itself.

'... The kingdom thus fell into a vicious circle. The masses being reduced to poverty, the State revenues dwindled, resulting in fresh taxation and more misery. The soldiers deserted the King's army and took service under the powerful barons or organised themselves into bands of armed candottieri offering their services to one or the other of the numerous claimants to the throne.

'No wonder we witness intrigues, rebellions, murders and quick successions of kings.'

The tragic fate of Yusuf Shah—one of the most cultured rulers of the Sultanate period—at the hands of Akbar gives a lie to the possibility of an independent Kashmir in the neighbourhood of an imperial power. 'He . . . realised early,' says Bamzai, 'that with the rise of an imperialist power at the centre, Kashmir, in spite of its natural defences,

could not hold for long its independent status, and all his attempts were devoted to avoiding bloodshed and chaos that would follow the adoption of an unrealistic attitude to an inevitable fate. But he could not convince and convert to his view, his nobles and subjects and hence his tragic end.' The invasion of Kashmir by Pakistan despite her Standstill Agreement with Maharaja Hari Singh of Kashmir in 1947 reminds one of the historic truth of what Yusuf Shah realised about four centuries ago.

The intrigues of the British during the rule of Maharaja Gulab Singh and his successors—Ranbir Singh, Pratap Singh and Hari Singh—to undermine the ruler's power and influence, and to wrest from him Gilgit, form a sordid story in mailed-fist diplomacy.

Kashmir today stands at the crossroads. Bamzai's history of it holds out certain definite directions for its leaders, particularly Sheikh Abdullah.

H. S.

KASHMIR: AN HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION

By James P. Ferguson.

Centaur Press, London. 1961.

Kashmir has been very much in the limelight lately but there is a tendency to look upon it exclusively in relation to the Indo-Pak dispute or more recently the dispute with China. A proper understanding of the peculiar problems confronting this State requires, however, an examination of these problems in the context not only of the current entanglements but of the entire past of this State.

From this point of view, the book under review will be found useful because it sums up the history of Kashmir right from the period of the great Buddhist ruler, Asoka, to whom is attributed the foundation of the ancient capital of Kashmir, Srinagari, up to the point when India and Pakistan became independent and Kashmir acceded to the Indian Union. The author who is a Fellow of the Royal Asiatic Society and spent about fifteen years on the staff of an Indian College has used as his source the well known work, *Rajatarangini* of Kalhana.

The striking thing about Kashmir, the author points out, is the strong continuity and identity which it has preserved throughout the many changes of its history. The Kashmir of the old chronicles and tales of travel is easily recognisable in the Kashmir of the present age, and very often it is the same things that were noted centuries ago which attract the visitor's attention today. This continued identity is due in large measure to the well-defined geographical features which have served to isolate Kashmir and keep it unaffected by the cataclysmic changes which were enacted in the plains of Northern India. The historical invasions of India followed a course never very far away from Kashmir, but the intervening distance was filled by a series of mountain ridges, increasing in height and difficulty towards the interior, and in these ridges lay

Kashmir's safety. The invading hordes preferred the easier gains and richer prizes of Hindustan to the toils and scanty rewards of a mountain campaign, and for centuries Kashmir remained unmolested, absorbed wholly in the affairs that went on within its own borders.

A further reason for the continuity of Kashmir's life, the author considers, is the devotion which the Kashmiri has for his own valley but the attachment which the Kashmiri feels to his own land, it is emphasised, is confined to the Vale of Kashmir. 'The State of Kashmir is a political creation', says Ferguson, 'but for the Kashmiri, as for history, his country is only the Vale of Kashmir, the territory of the Jhelum and its tributaries from its source to Baramula. It is this which is distinctive and which receives his affection. Its traditions, its customs, its sacred places of pilgrimage, its arts and crafts, are remembered, cherished and transmitted from generation to generation and the result is that the general impression is one of continuity and identity'.

While laying stress on the history and the past of Kashmir the author has not been able to overcome the temptation of giving his own version of the disputes with Pakistan and China. He has tried to present the substance of the disputes and the sequence of events that led to them in an objective manner but inevitably the author's subjective viewpoint protrudes into the text. Even though he has not been as crude as some Englishmen have been in their partiality towards Pakistan and has adopted a pose of neutrality in the matter of the Indo-Pak dispute on Kashmir, Pakistan's case does come out in a more favourable light than India's.

Referring to the Azad Kashmir movement, Ferguson describes it as a 'resistance movement' among the Muslims. He traces the origin of the movement to the fact that 'in July 1947 the Maharaja had already increased his Hindu and Sikh forces and had enjoined the Muslims to surrender their weapons to the police'. Rather than do this, many of the latter, says the author, withdrew to the hills of the Poonch district, bordering West Punjab, from where they carried on local warfare. It was out of this revolt that the Azad or Free Kashmir movement developed, the author tells us, and adds that this movement supplied a government to 'those portions of the Kashmir State that bordered on Pakistan and were not under the control of the Srinagar Government.'

Subsequent events are described thus: 'From Poonch the Muslim guerillas made contact with the tribal territories of the North-West Frontier, the people of which had for many years made serviceable rifles in their villages by primitive methods, and from them they secured a supply of arms. . . The tribesmen, aroused by the stories which they had heard, attacked Kashmir by way of the Jhelum Valley from Muzaffarabad to Baramula'. The picture painted by the author is one of Indian resistance, one might almost say intransigence, even though the

author does not actually use the word, to repeated efforts by U.N. mediators to bring about a settlement.

In relation to the dispute with China over the Aksai Chin area of Ladakh, the author, after recounting all the historical data that is available, gives his verdict in favour of the Indian case. For this he bases himself on the following facts. The Aksai Chin area has been shown on maps as part of Ladakh since approximately 1870. Such maps have been quite public and for almost a century they have been generally accepted. No protests or counter-claims have been made, and no border incidents have occurred until recent years. Thus the present-day boundaries of Ladakh, including the Aksai Chin area, have been established and have been in existence without question and without change for a period considerably longer than those of many, perhaps the majority, of modern States. 'A review of recent happenings creates the impression', Ferguson points out, 'that the facts already noted with considerable prescience by Hayward, Johnson and Shaw in the middle of the nineteenth century regarding the easy nature of the Aksai Chin route to Central Asia came to be strongly appreciated by the Chinese in the middle of the twentieth century, and acting unilaterally and expeditiously, they constructed a road through Ladakh territory and presented the Indian Government with an accomplished fact'. He therefore lends full support to the Indian case and approvingly records that 'India considers the only solution to the dispute to be the entire withdrawal of Chinese personnel outside the borders of Ladakh as these have been publicly declared and accepted for the last hundred years'.

Interesting as Ferguson's views on the disputes might be, it is not these that are likely to attract interest in his book. The chief merit of the work lies in the excellent historical summary it contains of the various periods of Kashmir's history, the picture of ancient Kashmir that he reconstructs, his descriptions of the Mughal gardens and his compilation of the accounts of Kashmir left by early travellers.

J. M. Kaul

THE HISTORY OF STRUGGLE FOR FREEDOM IN KASHMIR—CULTURAL AND POLITICAL.

By Prem Nath Bazaz.

Kashmir Publishing House, New Delhi.

This voluminous book purports to be an 'un-attached' study of the problems facing Kashmir in their historical setting. The ostensible viewpoint is democratic and secular. The material presented is claimed to be unbiased and motivated by a desire to arrive at the truth in the interest of the freedom and well-being of not only the people of Kashmir but of the rest of India, and of Pakistan as well. With all this, Bazaz falls into Pakistan's snares, reveals strong anti-Indian prejudice and takes positions which are communal and anti-democratic. While he utters warnings against the Soviet Union

and communism, he shows not the slightest awareness of Anglo-US machinations.

He begins with a rapid survey of the political and cultural history of Kashmir from the earliest times. This research into the past is certainly useful and interesting but if it is meant to bolster up the thesis that Kashmir is totally distinct from the rest of the country, it fails completely. Admittedly Kashmir has its peculiarities, just like any other region of India, Kerala for instance. But Bazaz's facts themselves reveal that Kashmir has never stood in isolation from the rest of the country. It was never regarded as a foreign land either by its own people or by people in other parts. It was greatly influenced by the thought-currents—Hindu, Buddhist or Islamic—and in its turn influenced those thought-currents.

Bazaz goes on to describe the 'dark years of tyranny' following the disintegration of the Mughal Empire; the Sikh rule over the Valley; the emergence of the Dogra Raj when the British sold Kashmir to Maharaja Gulab Singh; the worsening conditions of the people; and the genesis of the popular movement. In the beginning the national movement was run on communal lines—a struggle of the Muslims against the Hindu Raj. But generally, with the emergence of Abdullah and other progressive leaders, it took on a broader, more democratic and secular form. Bazaz himself once associated with this movement in the early years. In 1939, the name of the All Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference, which had since 1932 led the popular struggle, was changed to the All Jammu and Kashmir National Conference.

Bazaz resigned from the National Conference in 1940. He has a lot of harsh things to say against the National Conference. Some of his criticisms are perhaps valid. But his main criticism that Abdullah did a disservice to the struggle by bringing it under the influence of the Indian National Congress springs from his failure to see the true nature of the struggle and how it could be advanced. India at that time was fighting for freedom against British imperialism and Kashmir's fight was an integral part of this struggle. Kashmir's fight could not be run in isolation from the mainstream of the freedom struggle. In so far as the Congress led the freedom struggle, it was not only correct but necessary for the National Conference to have the closest connection with it. Bazaz suffers from the illusion that that the four million Kashmiris can stand by themselves and march towards freedom and democracy. The partition of India on communal lines was a tragedy and a victory for imperialism. But with partition, Bazaz completely shed his secularism and his party, the Kashmir Socialist Party, and advocated that Kashmir should join Pakistan.

Bazaz tries to build up a lawyer's case against India. Kashmir's accession to India is not democratic because a Dogra ruler decided it. He questions the secular character of the Indian State, lashes out at many aspects of India's domestic and foreign

policies, turns the searchlight on the faults and failings of the Nehru government.

The question, however, is: are the possibilities for democratic development and secularism greater in India or in Pakistan? Pakistan is an avowedly theocratic State. There is not even a semblance of democracy there. Minorities—not only Hindus but Buddhists and Christians also—are systematically persecuted, killed or hounded out. It is an ally of the western military bloc. Can any genuine democrat place India and Pakistan on par? At one place Bazaz describes the Pakistan invasion of Kashmir as an elemental tribal uprising. It is only while dealing with the UN discussions that he makes a reference to the Pak aggression. So much has his objectivity been blurred that in his blind hostility towards India he cannot see facts straight.

He has, however, devoted a revealing chapter to the so-called Azad Kashmir and its government. This government, he admits, is a puppet of the Pakistan Government, and Azad Kashmir is a colony of Pakistan. There is starvation and misery all round. The old feudal structure remains. Although, before accession to India, Bazaz's party called for the Dogra ruler to opt for Pakistan, in his book he takes a more guarded stand. His plea is that the Kashmiri people should themselves decide their future—through a plebiscite.

Kashmir is as much a part of India as any other State. It is so logically, constitutionally and by the verdict of the people exercised through elections. To try and upset this is to play the communal game of Pakistan and make Kashmir a pawn in the hands of imperialism. If the National Conference Government of Kashmir has failed to improve the lot of the people, if it has not been sufficiently democratic, the task is to make it more popular and not clamour for an independent State, which can never be truly free or viable in today's conditions, or for accession to Pakistan. Kashmir can march to progress and prosperity only in unison with the democratic forces of the rest of India.

One hopes that in the ten years that have elapsed since Bazaz wrote the book, the developments in India and Pakistan have made him realise the errors of his thinking.

V. M. K.

DANGER IN KASHMIR

By Josef Korbel.

Princeton University Press. 1954.

The Kashmir problem is so well-known and has so long been discussed that its genesis, the issues involved in it and even the essential facts of the problem are forgotten or lost sight of. This state of affairs owes itself not to peoples' apathy but to the distorted propaganda of the interested parties, the so-called 'third parties.' And when the interested parties speak through supposedly responsible and certain high-placed U.N. officials like Josef Korbel, the propaganda becomes more effective and the distortion acquires a semblance of truth, more so when

they are accompanied by a profession of impartiality and nobility of intention.

Josef Korbel was the Czechoslovak delegate at the Security Council and was nominated to the United Nations Commission on India and Pakistan. Along with the other members of the UNCIP, he visited India, Pakistan and Kashmir. Later on, the Peoples' Republic of Czechoslovakia sent its own delegate, Dr. Chyle, to replace Korbel in 1949. Then Korbel wrote the present book with the help of a Rockefeller Foundation grant. The book is foreworded by C. N. Nimitz, Fleet Admiral, U.S. Navy, who was sought to be sent as arbitrator to our sub-continent. We must, of course, bear in mind all this background information about Korbel while reading his *Danger in Kashmir*.

The Kashmir dispute originated in the so-called 'tribal' invasion of Kashmir with active material help of the Pakistan Government and army. After the Kashmir ruler's accession to India, and on his request, the Government of India, so advised by Mountbatten, sent its troops to Kashmir and later appealed to the Security Council to ask the Pakistan Government to prevent its military and civil personnel from participating in or assisting the invasion, and to deny to the invaders access to and use of its territory for operations against Kashmir. The Security Council did not comply with this request. Instead, led by its Anglo-American majority it converted the Kashmir issue into a debate and sought to put Pakistan, the invader, and India, the complainant, on the same footing. It created the five member Commission, known as the UNCIP, with mediation as its role. It wanted to establish an 'impartial' plebiscite administration to assess the free will of the Kashmiri people. All these things were embodied in the Security Council resolution of April 21, 1948.

Even at this stage several things became self-evident. Firstly, the Anglo-American bloc commanding a majority in the Security Council was not interested in nailing down Pakistan as aggressor, it was not interested in restoring peace on the sub-continent so long as the Pakistani forces were successful. Secondly, it was interested in turning Kashmir over to a U.N. authority, that is, an Anglo-American authority, so that not only the accession of Kashmir and the popular government of Kashmir led by the National Conference could be superseded, but also military bases could be established against the Soviet Union to make the American encirclement of the Soviet Union complete. Thirdly, in order to effect these things, the UNCIP was to serve as a transition, was to prepare the way for an 'arbitration administration' and then 'an arbitrator'. Fourthly, under no circumstances could the Kashmir issue be allowed to be settled lest such a settlement should deprive the Anglo-American bloc of strategic positions in Kashmir.

This has been the state of affairs all along. Let us turn here to what Korbel has to say on the Secu-

rity Council Resolution of April 21, 1948: '... The Security Council avoided taking sides in the dispute. It did not, as India requested, condemn Pakistan as aggressor, nor on the other hand did it touch upon the legal aspect of Kashmir's accession to India.'

The quotation poses Pakistani aggression and the juridical aspect was not raised by either India or even Pakistan as Korbel admits a little later on. So then, there is only one side, viz., the Security Council did not 'condemn Pakistan as aggressor'. This obviously means ignoring the material fact which gave rise to India's complaint and shielding the aggressor. And yet, Korbel maintains that the Security Council 'handled the problem impartially.' It would seem that in Korbel's logic, ignoring a fact is impartiality!

It is just this kind of impartiality that the UNCIP practised throughout its activities. Soon after its arrival at Karachi early in July 1948, Zafrullah Khan 'informed the Commission that three Pakistani brigades had been on Kashmir territory since May.' Even so, 'the Commission preferred not to express its opinion openly about this new and most important element in the picture. . . .' And then when the Government of India urged condemnation of Pakistani aggression, 'the Commission knew that such a policy would immediately close the door to any further negotiations with Pakistan.' So, the Commission made negotiating of a cease-fire its first business. Korbel himself tried to persuade Nehru in vain to declare an unconditional cease-fire. It was only then that the Commission came out with its August 13 cease-fire and truce proposals in which the Commission 'admitted the presence of troops of Pakistan in the territory of the State of Jammu and Kashmir.'

On some aspects of this August 13 resolution, the Commission gave India and Pakistan sometimes verbal and sometimes written clarifications, but they were always mutually contradictory and diametrically opposite. As the *Economist* remarked, 'It is hardly too much to say that the negotiations have from the start been vitiated by the Committee's regrettable tendency . . . to issue "elucidations and clarifications" to one side, on request, without communicating them to the other.' But of course Korbel doesn't mention this aspect of their 'impartial' activities.

The August 13, 1948, resolution was followed by the January 5, 1949, resolution which, among other things, made provisions for the nomination of a plebiscite administrator. Korbel's part ends here, and his place was taken by Dr. Chyle of the People's Republic of Czechoslovakia. From now on, the Commission could not function as a mouthpiece of the Anglo-American bloc in the Security Council. That is what exasperates Korbel. The presence of Dr. Chyle was not a happy circumstance for the other members of the Commission. When they proposed arbitration in the matter of truce between India and Pakistan, Dr. Chyle exposed its evil character on the

ground that the offer of arbitration exceeded the Commission's terms of reference. The US delegation strove for arbitration from as early a date as June 1949 with the quite frankly avowed intention to bring Admiral Nimitz at the earliest possible moment to the sub-continent in the capacity of arbitrator.

After the successful military conference of Karachi, there was to be a joint political conference on August 22, 1949, between India and Pakistan to decide on plans for disbanding and disarming the so-called Azad forces and the withdrawal of the armies. But the Commission surprisingly cancelled the meeting on August 18 without reference to the Governments of India or Pakistan who had already prepared for the conference. Korbél writes, 'Both Governments... could not even agree upon the nature of the agenda and the idea of a common meeting had to be abandoned.' But Dr. Chyle in his minority report argued that the 'conflicting points of views were well-known previously not only to the Commission but also to the two Governments,' and that the Commission had no right to cancel the conference and that such cancellation could be done only by the two participating governments. The argument went against the Anglo-American plans to send Nimitz as arbitrator and consequently Korbél describes Dr. Chyle's activities as 'full of abusive attacks on the American and British Governments,' and declares 'this disruptive activity of the Communist delegate was enough to justify dissolution of the Commission and, the transfer of its functions to a single mediator'. Obviously Dr. Chyle's arguments to bring India and Pakistan to the negotiating table are 'disruptive' in the eyes of Korbél because they disrupt the American plan for an arbitrator.

To implement the UNCIP's resolutions, there were the so-called United Nations military observers, all belonging to the Anglo-American bloc, to assist the Pakistan and Indian military authorities in demarcating the cease-fire line. But they carried on large scale spying, smuggling and other subversive activities. Korbél doesn't have a word to say on the matter.

Although this State's accession was ratified by a popularly elected Constituent Assembly under the leadership of Sheikh Abdullah, the individual mediators like Sir Owen Dixon and P. Graham went on working out their proposals for partition or an independent Kashmir. The slogan of Independent Kashmir is only the English translation of 'Azad Kashmir' and the purpose is the establishment of over-all authority, i.e., US authority. Naturally it suits Pakistan because of its close ties with the US, with Seato and Cento. So, in the eyes of the Anglo-American bloc, and consequently of Korbél, it is India which has been time and again intransigent. Impartial, indeed!

According to Korbél, the reason for the Kashmir dispute is the Hindu-Muslim religious difference. He writes, 'The real cause of all the bitterness and bloodshed, all the venomous speech, the recalcitrance and suspicion that have characterised the Kashmir

dispute is the uncompromising and perhaps uncompromisable struggle of two scales of human values, two spiritual attitudes that find themselves locked in deadly conflict. . . ' This is how Korbél tries to conceal the real cause of the conflict—the Anglo-American bloc and its desire to get at the strategic areas in Kashmir. What is more, Korbél vociferously denies any such Anglo-American plans for war bases. In defining his idea of the real cause for the Kashmir dispute, Korbél slips in the phrase 'perhaps uncompromisable struggle.' The sinister implication is that if it is uncompromisable, the solutions are either a plebiscite or a third party administration of Kashmir. 'Only an impartial plebiscite or other similarly democratic solution to the problem can put an end to the danger of a conflict between India and Pakistan and at the same time restore to Kashmir the possibility of an openly administered democratic life.' With examples like South Korea, South Vietnam, and the Congo one need not long wonder about the meaning of an 'openly administered democratic life.'

According to Korbél, the danger in Kashmir is the 'fungi of Communism.' So he praises Pakistan's initiation of 'a course of action which clearly revealed her willingness to become an active participant in the free world's defence against Communism.' In contrast, India has insisted on 'a course of policy independent of the global conflict.' The result is that 'inevitably the issue of Kashmir was immediately drawn into this clash of policy'. So India cannot have 'peace by being neutral, by sitting on the fence.' In other words, until India forsakes neutrality, 'the free world cannot but remain concerned with the problems and the people of Nehru's ancestral home.' There we are!

Kusum Madgaokar

TWO NATIONS AND KASHMIR

By Lord Birdwood

Robert Hale, London. 1956.

Sir Walter Lawrence in *The India We Served* says of the Kashmiris that 'they were in truth a very hopeless people, but as they gained confidence they threw off their indolence . . . and am confident that under a just government they will win a good name'. Birdwood dedicates his book to the Kashmiris. His original intention was to write two chapters (on Kashmir) of a larger book meant to relate the story of the passing of power on the Indian sub-continent and some of the problems which then confronted the new States. But his several visits to Kashmir and an exhaustive probe into the Kashmir 'problem' led him to write an exclusive treatise (the author terms it a diary) on Kashmir.

Lord Birdwood was commissioned by the David Davies Memorial Institute of International Studies (a body devoted to prompting the objective study of international problems). In *Two Nations And Kashmir*, which deals with events until 1955, the author deals with Kashmir's past history; the Dogra dynasty; the tribal invasion; the United

Nations intervention and the removal of Sheikh Abdullah.

Lord Birdwood notes that in 1930 a certain Sheikh Abdullah (then 25 years old) returned to Srinagar and started a movement to demand greater Moslem representation in the administration, and in 1932 he set up the 'All Jammu and Kashmir Moslem Conference' claiming to speak on behalf of the entire Moslem population of the State. From 1939 onwards there were two political organisations in the State, both opposed to the Maharaja's government, yet also in ambiguous opposition to each other. The author notes that junior leaders in both these parties were quite conscious of their greater opportunities in an independent Kashmir. He observes that the then Her Highness of Kashmir paid much attention to the extravagant imagination of her Swami who believed in the renaissance of Rajput power in India under Kashmir leadership. The author is of the opinion that had there been in Kashmir in 1947 a popular ruler with an effective, undivided, representative government based on popular support, a bid for independence might well have been successful.

Lord Birdwood recounts the tribal invasion of Kashmir, the formal accession of Kashmir, and notes Lord Mountbatten as saying that 'it is my Government's wish that as soon as law and order have been restored and the soil cleared of the invader, the question of the State's accession should be settled by a reference to the people'. With his release from prison on September 29, 1947, Abdullah spent his first few days of freedom in reasserting his leadership and after paying two visits to Delhi found greatness thrust upon him. So much so, that he wished for a people's government in Kashmir. The author points out that if Sheikh Abdullah had then been confirmed as the people's leader, he (Lord Birdwood) would have risked the fate of the Kashmir Valley in his hands.

Writing with regard to the India-Pakistan dispute over Kashmir, Lord Birdwood recalls Gandhi as saying that 'Kashmiris were one people, enjoying one culture and one language' and that 'partition of Kashmir was unthinkable'. The author is of the opinion that India's intention in referring the Kashmir dispute to the United Nations was only to have Pakistan severely reprimanded for assisting an act of aggression against India.

Lord Birdwood does not give any solution for settling the Kashmir dispute, but he does hint at a condominium and, in the context of the Kashmir problem and communalism, he quotes Jinnah as saying on the day of the realisation of Pakistan: 'We are starting this State with no discrimination, no distinction between one community and another, between caste or creed.'

The author brings his narrative to an end with the hope that 'time would play its part as a final but rather unsatisfactory healer' and 'let us assume that within twenty years the problem will have been solved'.

S. M.

THE STRUGGLE FOR KASHMIR

By Michael Brecher.

The Ryerson Press, Toronto, 1953.

In this well-documented, definitive study, *The Struggle for Kashmir*, published under the auspices of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs and the Institute of Pacific Relations, the author of *Nehru—A Political Biography*, Michael Brecher, has dealt with the extremely controversial and explosive subject of Kashmir which still continues to plague relations between the two sister-States of India and Pakistan. The author has delved deep into the source material to give an objective and penetrating analysis of 'the greatest and the gravest single issue in international affairs.'

By the India Independence Act of July 18, 1947, the princely States were granted the juridical right to accede to either India or Pakistan or to remain as independent entities. Both India (though hesitantly for obvious reasons) and Pakistan accepted this interpretation of the relevant clauses of the Act, and by August 15, 1947, all the princely States—except Kashmir, Junagadh, and Hyderabad—had acceded to either of the two countries. The difficulties that were encountered in the case of these three States were partly due to 'the dichotomy in communal composition of the people and the ruling dynasty.' The Kashmir Maharaja's procrastination was facilitated by 'the outbreak of mass violence and an unprecedented exchange of population in the Punjab.'

However, as a result of the full-scale tribal invasion, abetted and endorsed by the Pakistan Government, this vacillation of the Maharaja soon ended. It is the confirmed view of Campbell-Johnson, Press Attache to Lord Mountbatten, that Jinnah ordered his regular troops to march into Kashmir on October 27, 1947, as he felt that the tribesmen by themselves would not be able to capture Srinagar. The Indian troops, facing heavy odds, proved equal to the formidable task and pushed back the invaders sixty-five miles west of Srinagar before the cease-fire was agreed upon by India and Pakistan.

The circumstances which gave rise to the tribal invasion led by Pakistani officers have been differently interpreted. These differences in approach are clearly discernible in the debates of the United Nations. India specifically charged Pakistan for 'giving transit to the invaders; allowing them to use Pakistan as a base of operations; supplying them with military equipment and transport; and permitting Pakistani nationals to participate in the fighting as well as to train the tribesmen.' Pakistan in turn accused her neighbour of 'a persistent attempt to undo the partition scheme; a pre-planned and extensive campaign of genocide against the Muslims in East Punjab and the Punjab's princely States; an unlawful occupation of Junagadh and neighbouring States; the acquisition of Kashmir's accession by fraud and violence; the failure to fulfil its obligations

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
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under the Partition Agreements; all this with the object of "the destruction of the State of Pakistan."

In spite of the various resolutions passed by the world forum and the numerous commissions set up, the intractable problem of Kashmir is no nearer solution because the self-styled guardians of the so-called free world cannot reconcile to the independent policies being pursued by a newly-emerging country like India, and have equated the aggressor and the aggrieved! This was natural, for the feudalistic-theocratic State of Pakistan, by its very conception, was a willing tool in the hands of the western powers.

The dismemberment of a nation is not easily forgotten nor easily forgiven. Historical analogy is some time relevant to clarify an issue, to show the magnitude of a task, and to put a problem in proper perspective. The German annexation of Alsace-Lorraine in 1871 was ruefully compared by Frenchmen to 'the tearing of children from their mother.' As a critic succinctly puts it: 'French pride and French bitterness over the loss of Alsace-Lorraine was to vitiate every effort at permanently satisfactory relations between Germany and France. He (Bismarck) can scarcely have expected that the French would never become reconciled to their loss; that, on the contrary, the desire for *revanche*, unspoken perhaps, but fixed in the heart, would persist and even grow in intensity in later years.' Kashmir, symbol of the country's democratic and secular political system, looms over the thinking of Indians as much as the loss of Alsace-Lorraine emotionally involved the French.

Much has happened since this study was completed in 1953. Pakistan's military alliance with the United States injected the smell of the cold war into the subcontinent. Another material change in the situation was recently brought about by the ceaseless campaign of villification launched by China against this country which was a prelude to an attack on Indian territory. New China has signed a border agreement with Pakistan by which the latter hands over an area of 13,000 square miles to reinforce an alliance with the enemy of an enemy! The struggle for Kashmir has entered a new, and perhaps decisive, phase.

Narendra Kumar

KASHMIR: CENTRE OF NEW ALIGNMENTS

By Balraj Madhok

Deepak Prakashan, New Delhi, 1963.

On the Kashmir issue, as in many other internal and international questions, the Government of India has been obsessed with 'an ideal standard of political morality'. This has misled it into courses of action inconsistent not only with its interests but also with its declared policy. Consequently, both the Indian people and world opinion fail to understand, in fact tend to misunderstand, its declared aims and objectives.

The basic facts about Kashmir are well known. The State acceded to India in October 1947; Pakistan

committed aggression on Indian soil and occupied one third of the State; India went to the United Nations to protest against Pakistan's action and appealed to world opinion to make it vacate her wanton and naked aggression. And yet the fact of accession seems to be an open question even to this day. Otherwise it is difficult to explain the reference to terms such as 'plebiscite' and 'peoples wishes' by the Indian Government and the repeated assurance by the Prime Minister that India would not move away from her basic stand on the Kashmir problem.

The recent release of Sheikh Abdullah, who remained in jail for 10 years on charges of treason, his subsequent activities, and the statement of various leaders including the Prime Minister, have created a feeling as if the whole question of accession is going to be reopened. Again, India, who fought for her territorial integrity against aggression by Pakistan, today looks like an aggressor herself to most of her friends. How did it happen that India, who appeared as an aggrieved party before the United Nations, today finds herself equated with Pakistan by a majority of its members.

The reasons are obvious. India is extremely sensitive to world opinion—or, rather, its disapproval. It has an incredible naive anxiety to create an impression on the world that its policies and actions are rooted in liberalism, democracy and morality. Consequently, statements of policy remain divorced from the action which must follow. Facts no longer remain facts, but change with the 'present circumstances'. Actions promised cannot be taken because the 'new situation' requires a different course of action. First, facts are set forth with a curious tone of finality and conviction, and then the government behaves as if these facts were less than facts and, therefore, the hesitation and fear to act on these facts.

This book is an attempt to review the Kashmir problem in the light of the above contradictions in the policies of the Government of India. According to the author, the history of the Kashmir problem is an unbroken record of India's follies in international diplomacy and world politics.

India committed her first mistake by holding direct talks with Pakistan in 1947-48, when the latter was still committing aggression in Kashmir. India's position was unassailable. Legally, politically and constitutionally Kashmir became a part of India after accession and it was India's moral duty to repulse aggression to maintain her territorial integrity. But, instead, India tried to do business with the aggressor and went so far as to give an offer of plebiscite under the United Nations after peace and the rule of law had been established in Kashmir. This commitment, besides putting a question-mark over the accession of Kashmir to India, gave Pakistan the hope of securing by the peaceful method of plebiscite what she failed to achieve by force.

India committed the second mistake when it appealed to the United Nations for a peaceful settle-

ment of the problem. In its anxiety to avoid war at all costs and to maintain its misplaced emphasis on political morality, India allowed an outside interference in a purely internal and domestic problem. Thus Pakistan was able to politicalise and internationalise an issue in which it had no *locus standi*.

The UN from the very beginning put India and Pakistan, the victim of aggression and the aggressor, on the same footing. This came as a rude shock to India. The voting pattern in the Security Council was no doubt influenced by the considerations of world power blocs, as each had its stake in Kashmir to further its ends. But India was herself to be blamed. India should have specifically charged Pakistan of unprovoked aggression and not of mere abetment of aggression by giving passage to tribal raiders through her territory. Even more inexplicable was the failure of the Indian spokesmen to lay proper stress on the fact of accession by the Maharaja which in itself was full, final and irrevocable and from which all the rights of the Government of India flowed. By avoiding the specific charge of aggression in her complaint, the Government of India compromised its own position before the Security Council from the very beginning.

Without waiting for the United Nations to act, India declared a cease-fire in January 1949 which was reciprocated by Pakistan. Whatever may be said about the advisability of cease-fire at the time it came, there is no denying the fact that it, in a way, simplified the problem of Kashmir. By declaring the cease-fire and allowing the Pakistani forces to remain in occupation of the Pakistan-held areas of the State, the Indian Government virtually accepted a partition of the State.

The third mistake which India committed was her reliance on Sheikh Abdullah. He was playing a political game which could secure for him absolute authority over Kashmir. In this he tried to find support wherever he could. First, he clung to communists who raised slogans of 'self determination' in 1947 and indulged in political agitation to get their demand fulfilled. Later, when he found that it was not possible to reach his goal with their help, he tried to join hands with the western powers, who by that time had started favouring the idea of an 'independent Kashmir'.

India's fourth mistake was not to integrate Kashmir with the rest of India. While Pakistan, after the cease-fire, got busy in integrating occupied Kashmir into Pakistan, India refused to abrogate Article 307 and allowed Kashmir not only a separate constitution but also a separate flag. This created an impression in the world that the GOI did not really consider Kashmir a part of India.

Of the many proposals put forward by the UN, the UK and the USA, the one made by Sir Owen Dixon seems to the author to be the best. He believes that since the present Indian Government,

wedded as it is to peace at the cost of national honour, shall do nothing to undo aggression on her soil, it is practicable to recognise the status quo as the final solution of the problem. He mentions three possible bases for the partition of Kashmir: (i) the present cease-fire line, (ii) changes in the cease-fire line, which would give Pakistan a couple of thousand square miles of additional territory without involving the partition of the valley which would remain with India as a whole, and (iii) partition of the valley as well.

In this, Madhok is motivated by the desire to check further communist aggression in Kashmir. He feels that it would not be possible to push the Chinese back if the Indian forces operate from Jammu or some other territory with no direct link with Ladakh. But before reaching a settlement on Kashmir, it must be remembered that the legal and political entity of the State until 1947 no longer exists. The fact of its virtual partition must be frankly admitted. Moreover, whatever may be done, Pakistan will continue to look upon India as its enemy. Pakistan's very existence as a separate State, and the unity of the two wings, depends on keeping anti-Indian frenzy at the highest pitch. The Sino-Pak Pact, the growing demand for a reorientation of Pakistan's foreign policy in favour of Communist China and Pakistan's threats to the West about arms aid to India confirm this conclusion. That Pakistan may help the expansion of communism in South East Asia is now no longer a matter for speculation.

It is, therefore, of the utmost importance that the existing stalemate is ended by arriving at a solution through a realistic appraisal of the situation. This demands the highest statesmanship, realism, diplomatic skill and tact on the part of India and her allies. If Kashmir's accession to India is final, as indeed it is, the Government of India should start integrating it with the rest of the country. If it is not, then the Government should reach a settlement with Pakistan on the basis of the partition of the State. The policy of hesitation and fear will further tarnish our image before our own people and before the world.

The book is a good example of excellent material in the hands of a bad craftsman. Its language is bad, its printing is defective and the style is crude. The material is presented in such a manner that even its original worth tends to diminish. The same material could have been used to present a forceful, convincing and logical exposition of the Kashmir problem. But, unfortunately, the author's emotional overtones have marred the fluency of narration and arrangement of facts.

Even the solutions of the problems as outlined by Madhok look pedestrian, though they may have valid points. And, then, immediately after suggesting them, he asserts that the people of India shall never tolerate the humiliation implicit in these suggestions!

G. P. Srivastava

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
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
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a
selection
from
the
writings
and
speeches
of
Jawaharlal Nehru

who during fifty years of
activity became the catalyst
for rational, humanistic
thought in our country

We wish to record our thanks
to the publishers of Jawaharlal Nehru's
An Autobiography, *The Discovery of India*
and *Unity of India*. We are indebted to
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text of his writings and speeches and to
'Foreign Affairs' from which extracts
have been taken.

My politics had been those of my class, the bourgeoisie. Indeed all vocal politics then (and to a great extent even now) were those of the middle classes, and Moderate and Extremist alike represented them and, in different keys, sought their betterment...In 1920 I was totally ignorant of labour conditions in factories or fields...Just then a new interest developed in my life which was to play an important part in later years. I was thrown, almost without any will of my own, into contact with the peasantry...As a result of the externment order from Mussoorie I spent about two weeks in Allahabad, and it was during this period that I got entangled in the Kisan (peasant) movement...That

visit was a revelation to me. We found the whole countryside afire with enthusiasm and full of a strange excitement...Looking at them and their misery and overflowing gratitude, I was filled with shame and sorrow, shame at my own easygoing and comfortable life and our petty politics of the city which ignored this vast multitude of semi-naked sons and daughters of India, sorrow at the degradation and overwhelming poverty of India. A new picture of India seemed to rise before me, naked, starving, crushed, and utterly miserable. And their faith in us, casual visitors from the distant city, embarrassed me and filled me with a new responsibility that frightened me.

1921

Gandhiji, indeed, was continually laying stress on the religious and spiritual side of the movement. His religion was not dogmatic, but it did mean a definitely religious outlook on life, and the whole movement was strongly influenced by this and took on a revivalist character so far as the masses were concerned. The great majority of Congress workers naturally tried to model themselves after their leader and even repeated his language. And yet Gandhiji's leading colleagues in the Working Committee—my father, Deshbandhu Das, Lala Lajpat Rai, and others—were not men of religion in the ordinary sense of the word, and they considered political problems on the political plane only. In their public utterances they did not bring in religion. But whatever they said had far less influence than the force of their personal example—had they not given up a great deal that the world values and taken to simpler ways of living? This in itself was taken as a sign of religion and helped in spreading the atmosphere of revivalism.

I used to be troubled sometimes at the growth of this religious element in our politics, both on the Hindu and the Muslim side. I did not like it at all. Much that Moulvies and Maulanas and Swamis and the like said in their public addresses seemed to me most unfortunate. Their history and sociology and economics appeared to me all wrong, and the religious twist that was given to everything prevented all clear thinking. Even some of Gandhiji's phrases sometimes jarred upon me—thus this frequent reference to *Rama Raj* as a golden age which was to return. But I was powerless to intervene, and I consoled myself with the thought that Gandhiji used the words because they were well known and understood by the masses. He had an amazing knack of reaching the heart of the people. . .

What I admired was the moral and ethical side of our

movement and of satyagraha. I did not give an absolute allegiance to the doctrine of non-violence or accept it for ever, but it attracted me more and more, and the belief grew upon me that, situated as we were in India and with our background and traditions, it was the right policy for us. The spiritualisation of politics, using the word not in its narrow religious sense, seemed to me a fine idea. A worthy end should have worthy means leading up to it. That seemed not only a good ethical doctrine but sound, practical politics, for the means that are not good often defeat the end in view and raise new problems and difficulties. And then it seemed so unbecoming, so degrading to the self-respect of an individual or a nation to submit to such means, to go through the mire. How can one escape being sullied by it? How can we march ahead swiftly and with dignity if we stoop or crawl?

—Autobiography

1923

Long ago, right at the commencement of non-co-operation or even earlier, Gandhiji had laid down his formula for solving the communal problem. According to him, it could only be solved by goodwill and the generosity of the majority group, and so he was prepared to agree to everything that the Muslims might demand. He wanted to win them over, not to bargain with them. With foresight and a true sense of values he grasped at the reality that was worth while; but others who thought they knew the market price of everything, and were ignorant of the true value of anything, stuck to the methods of the market-place. They saw the cost of purchase with painful clearness, but they had no appreciation of the worth of the article they might have bought. . .

But almost all our leaders continued to think within the narrow steel frame of the existing political, and of course the social, structure. They faced every pro-

blem—communal or constitutional—with this background and, inevitably, they played into the hands of the British Government, which controlled completely that structure. They could not do otherwise, for their whole outlook was essentially reformist and not revolutionary, in spite of occasional experiments with direct action. But the time had gone by when any political or economic or communal problem in India could be satisfactorily solved by reformist methods. Revolutionary outlook and planning and revolutionary solutions were demanded by the situation. But there was no one among the leaders to offer these.

The want of clear ideals and objectives in our struggle for freedom undoubtedly helped the spread of communalism. The masses saw no clear connection between their day-to-day sufferings and the fight for swaraj. They fought well enough at times by instinct, but that was a feeble weapon which could be easily blunted or even turned aside for other purposes. . .

In this way political reactionaries came back to the political field in the guise of communal leaders, and the real explanation of the various steps they took was not so much their communal bias as their desire to obstruct political advance. . .

—Autobiography

1927

With the greatest pleasure I bring the warm and hearty greetings of the Indian National Congress which has commissioned me to link our national movement with this international united effort to fight Imperialism. We in India have experienced the full strength of Imperialism. We know accurately what it means and we are naturally interested in every movement which is directed against Imperialism. In fact, if you want a typical example that will help you to understand the nature and consequence of Imperialism, I think you will find

nothing better than India. . . Our problems touch us naturally very deeply but I may say to you all, whether you come from China, Egypt and other distant lands, that your interests are bound up with ours. And the Indian problem too is of interest and importance for you.

I cannot tell you here the whole history of Indian exploitation—how India is maltreated, repressed and plundered. . . And all that I can do is to bring to your notice one or two of the most important factors which we have to consider particularly in this international congress. You have heard of various disturbances, massacres, and random butcheries and most of you have heard of the Amritsar incidents. Do not believe that because this affair has given rise to greater uproar than many others, it is in any way the singular and the worst episode in the history of India since the Britishers came to us. They came to us, as you doubtless know, by pitting one province against another until they finally established themselves firmly. During the whole period of their stay, they have followed the old policy of 'Divide and Rule'. . . The early history of their occupation is one of the most wildest and most shameless examples we have ever seen in the history of the world. . . a period in which free-booters prowled about and committed plunders and robberies in the land in an unbridled manner. You know perhaps also of the event which is known as the 'Sepoy Mutiny' and which took place 70 years ago. It is called so but if fate had willed otherwise and the so-called rebels had been crowned with success, then to-day it would have been called the Indian War of Independence. . . Numberless comrades and friends of ours are detained in prison without any accusation and without any trial. . .

This gives rise often to a little sensation but the real injuries committed by the Britishers in India—the real exploitation is much more severe than the shootings, and hangings, which occasionally give rise to some disturbance, the systematic method

in which the workers, labourers and farmers are being exploited and has made India what it is to-day. We read in history, not only of the ancient times, but also of the modern period of the riches of India. India has allured by her riches the most different peoples from different extremities of the world, but if now one goes to India, the most horrible poverty stares him in the face. . . This is the India of to-day. No statistics, facts or numbers are wanted to convince you of this that India has suffered terrible economic decline and that if definite steps are not taken to prevent this process India will altogether cease to exist as a nation. . . In the most multifarious ways, the spirit of the Indian people was destroyed and it was attempted to take away from them, every capacity for active and constructive work. The conscious policy of the Britisher in India was to attempt to divide us. . . In the policy of the British Government in India we must reckon even the Indian princes and great land-owners as their confederates, because a free India would lead to the liberation of the farmers from exploitation. Then again we often see a harmful agreement between the British Capitalists and Indian Capitalists. . .

. . . Who can be deceived for a moment as to what will happen to Great Britain if she does not possess India? There would then be no British world-empire. What will take place in future when India is once free? I cannot say, but it is certain that the British world-empire will cease to exist. From their capitalistic and imperialistic points of view, the British try to do everything in their power to retain their possession of India. Their whole foreign policy is to a great part influenced by this aim; therefore they must build up a firm overlordship in India. The result is that India has suffered and still suffers. But that is not all. On account of India other lands have suffered and suffer still. You have heard of the last instance of the activity of British Imperialism in India—the sending of Indian troops to China. They were sent

inspite of the sharpest opposition offered by the Indian National Congress. I must remind you of the fact—even to my shame. I must mention—that Indian troops were often used to repress other people. I read to you the names of the number of countries in which Indian troops have been sent by the English for their purpose. In the year 1840, they went to China for the first time, and in the year 1927, they are still going there and during this time, they have been used three times without number. They were in Egypt, Abyssinia, in the Persian Gulf, in Mesopotamia, Arabia, Syria, Georgia, Tibet, Afghanistan and Burma. It is a horrifying list.

. . . It is clear that such a state of things is insupportable for India. We can't tolerate it any longer, not only because freedom is good and slavery is bad, but because it is a question of life and death for us and our country. You too who have come here from the different countries of the world cannot tolerate these dreadful chains which are also a great hindrance to your own freedom. For us in India, freedom is a pressing necessity. But it is not less important for you if we win our freedom. . .

—Address to the League Against Imperialism

I was returning from Europe in good physical and mental condition. . . My outlook was wider, and nationalism by itself seemed to me definitely a narrow and insufficient creed. Political freedom, independence, were no doubt essential, but they were steps only in the right direction; without social freedom and a socialistic structure of society and the State, neither the country nor the individual could develop much. . . I found the vast political, economic, and cultural changes going on in Europe and America a fascinating study. Soviet Russia, despite certain unpleasant aspects, attracted me greatly, and seemed to hold forth a message of hope to the world. Europe, in the middle

twenties, was trying to settle down in a way; the great depression was yet to come. But I came back with the conviction that this settling down was superficial only, and big eruptions and mighty changes were in store for Europe and the world in the near future.

To train and prepare our country for these world events—to keep in readiness for them, as far as we could—seemed to be the immediate task. The preparation was largely an ideological one. First of all, there should be no doubt about the objective of political independence. This should be clearly understood as the only possible political goal for us; something radically different from the vague and confusing talk of Dominion Status. Then there was the social goal. It would be too much, I felt, to expect the Congress to go far in this direction just then. The Congress was a purely political and nationalistic body, unused to thinking on other lines. But a beginning might be made. Outside the Congress, in labour circles and among the young, the idea could be pushed on much further. . .

—Autobiography

1929

The Lahore Congress remains fresh in my memory—a vivid patch. That is natural, for I played a leading role there, and, for a moment, occupied the centre of the stage; and I like to think sometimes of the emotions that filled me during those crowded days. I can never forget the magnificent welcome that the people of Lahore gave me, tremendous in its volume and its intensity. I knew well that this overflowing enthusiasm was for a symbol and an idea, not for me personally. . . The whole atmosphere was electric and surcharged with the gravity of the occasion. Our decisions were not going to be mere criticisms or protests or expressions of opinion, but a call to action which was bound to convulse the country and affect the lives of millions. . .

—Autobiography

Comrades,—For four and forty years this National Congress has laboured for the freedom of India. During this period it has somewhat slowly, but surely awakened national consciousness from its long stupor and built up the national movement. . . Many of the giants of old are not with us and we of a later day standing on an eminence of their creation may often decry their efforts. That is the way of the world. . . Brick by brick has our national movement been built up, and often on the prostrate bodies of her martyred sons has India advanced. . .

This is the glorious heritage that we have inherited and you wish to put me in charge of it. I know well that I occupy this honoured place by chance more than by your deliberate design. Your desire was to choose another—one who towers above all others, in the present day world of ours—and there could have been no wiser choice. But fate and he conspired together and thrust me against your will and mine into this terrible seat of responsibility. . . But I am grateful indeed for your confidence in one who strangely lacks it himself. . .

. . . The whole world to-day is one vast question-mark and every country and every people is in the melting pot. The age of faith, with the comfort and stability it brings, is past, and there is questioning about everything, however permanent or sacred it might have appeared to our forefathers. Everywhere there is doubt and restlessness and the foundations of the State and society are in process of transformation. Old established ideas of liberty, justice, property and even family are being attacked and the outcome hangs in the balance. . .

. . . The brief day of European domination is already approaching its end. Europe has ceased to be the centre of activity and interest. The future is with America and Asia. Owing to false and incomplete history many of us have been led to think that Europe has always dominated over the rest of the world and Asia has always let the legions of the West

thunder past and has plunged in thought again. We have forgotten that for millennia the legions of Asia overran Europe and modern Europe itself largely consists of the descendants of those invaders from Asia. We have forgotten that it was India that finally broke the military power of Alexander. Thought has undoubtedly been the glory of Asia and specially of India, but in the field of action the record of Asia has been equally great. But none of us desires that the legions of Asia or Europe should overrun continents again. We have all had enough of them.

India to-day is a part of a world movement. Not only China, Turkey, Persia and Egypt, but also Russia and the countries of the West are taking part in this movement, and India cannot isolate herself from it. . .

Civilisation to-day, such as it is, is not the creation or the monopoly of one people or nation. It is a complete fabric to which all countries have contributed and then have adapted to suit their particular needs. . .

When everything is changing it is well to remember the long course of Indian history. Few things in history are more amazing than the wonderful stability of social structure in India which withstood the impact of numerous alien influences and thousands of years of change and conflict. It withstood them because it always sought to absorb them and tolerate them. Its aim was not to exterminate but to establish an equilibrium between different cultures. . . With the coming of the Muslims the equilibrium was disturbed, but India sought to restore it and largely succeeded. Unhappily for us, before we could adjust our differences, the political structure broke down, the British came and we fell.

Great as was the success of India in evolving a stable society she failed in a vital particular and because she failed in this she fell and remains fallen. No solution was found for the problem of equality. India deliberately ignored this and built up her social structure on inequality and we

have the tragic consequences of this in the millions of our people who till yesterday were suppressed and had little opportunity for growth.

And yet when Europe fought her wars of religion and Christians massacred each other in the name of their Saviour, India was tolerant, although, alas, there is little of this toleration to-day. Having attained some measure of religious liberty, Europe sought after political liberty and political and legal equality. Having attained these also she finds that they mean very little without economic liberty and equality. And so to-day politics have ceased to have much meaning and the most vital question is that of social and economic equality.

India also will have to find a solution to this problem and until she does so her political and social structure cannot have stability. That solution need not necessarily follow the example of any other country. It must, if it has to endure, be based on the genius of her people and be an outcome of her thought and culture. And when it is found, the unhappy differences between various communities, which trouble us to-day and keep our freedom, will automatically disappear.

Indeed the real differences have already largely gone, but fear of each other and distrust and suspicion remain and sow seeds of discord. The problem before us is not one of removing differences. They can well remain side by side and enrich our many sided culture. The problem is how to remove fear and suspicion and being intangible they are hard to get at. . . Logic and cold reason are poor weapons to fight fear and distrust. Only faith and generosity can overcome them. . . Do we want outsiders who are not of us and who have kept us in bondage to be the protectors of our little rights and privileges, when they deny us the very right to freedom! No majority can crush a determined minority and no minority can be sufficiently protected by a little addition to its seats in a legislature. Let us remember that in the world

to-day almost everywhere a very small minority holds wealth and power and dominates over the great majority.

I have no love for bigotry and dogmatism in religion and I am glad that they are weakening. Nor do I love communalism in any shape or form. I find it difficult to appreciate why political or economic rights should depend on the membership of a religious group or community. I can fully understand the right to freedom in religion and the right to one's own culture, and in India specially, which has always acknowledged and granted these rights, it should be no difficult matter to ensure their continuance. We have only to find out some way whereby we may root out the fear and distrust that darken our horizon to-day. The politics of a subject race are largely based on fear and we have been too long under subjection to get rid of them easily.

I was born a Hindu, but I do not know how far I am justified in calling myself one or in speaking on behalf of Hindus. But birth still counts in this country and by right of birth I shall venture to submit to the leaders of the Hindus that it should be their privilege to take the lead in generosity. Generosity is not only good morals. And it is inconceivable to me that in a free India the Hindus can ever be powerless. So far as I am concerned I would gladly ask our Moslem and Sikh friends to take what they will without protest or argument from me. I know that the time is coming soon when these labels and appellations will have little meaning and when our struggle will be on an economic basis. Meanwhile it matters little what our mutual arrangements are, provided only that we do not build up barriers which will come in the way of our future progress. . .

If the Calcutta resolution holds we have but one goal to-day, that of independence. Independence is not a happy word in the world to-day for it means exclusiveness and isolation. Civilization has had enough of narrow nationalism and

gropes towards a wider co-operation and interdependence. And if we use the word independence we do so (not ?) in the sense hostile to the larger ideals. Independence for us means complete freedom from British domination and British imperialism. Having attained our freedom, I have no doubt that India will welcome all attempts at world co-operation and federation and will even agree to give up part of her own independence to a larger group of which she is an equal member.

The British Empire to-day is not such a group and cannot be as long as it dominates over millions of people and holds large areas of the world's surface despite the will of their inhabitants. . . The British Empire to-day is indeed gradually undergoing a process of political dissolution, it is in a state of unstable equilibrium. . .

There is talk of world peace and pacts have been signed by the nations of the world. But despite pacts armaments grow and beautiful language is the only homage that is paid to the Goddess of Peace. Peace can only come when the causes of war are removed. So long as there is the domination of one country over another there will always be attempts to subvert the existing order and no stable equilibrium can endure. . . The weight of a great empire is heavy to carry and long our people have endured it. Their backs are bent down and their spirit has almost broken. How will they share in the commonwealth partnership if the burden of exploitation continues? Many of the problems we have to face are the problems of vested interests, mostly created or encouraged by the British Government. . .

We have had much controversy about independence and Dominion Status and we have quarrelled about words. But the real thing is the conquest of power by whatever name it may be called. I do not think that any form of Dominion Status applicable to India will give us real power. A test of this power would be the entire withdrawal of the alien army of

occupation and economic control. . .

We stand, therefore, to-day for the fullest freedom of India. This Congress has not acknowledged and will not acknowledge the right of the British Parliament to dictate to us in any way. To it we make no appeal. . .

And we who take this perilous path of national strife do so because there is no other way to an honourable peace. But we long for peace and the hand of fellowship will always be stretched out to all who may care to grasp it. But behind the hand will be a body which will not bend to injustice and a mind that will not surrender on any vital point. . .

I must frankly confess that I am a socialist and a republican and am no believer in kings and princes or in the order which produces the modern kings of industry, who have greater power over the lives and fortunes of men than even the kings of old, and whose methods are as predatory as those of old feudal aristocracy. I recognise, however, that it may not be possible for a body constituted as is this National Congress and in the present circumstances of the country to adopt a full socialistic programme. But we must realise that the philosophy of socialism has gradually permeated the entire structure of society the world over and almost the only point in dispute is the pace and the methods of advance to its full realisation. India will have to go that way too if she seeks to end her poverty and inequality though she may evolve her own methods and may adopt the ideal to the genius of her race.

We have three major problems: the minorities, the Indian States, and labour and peasantry. I have dealt already with the question of minorities. I shall only repeat that we must give the fullest assurance by our words and our deeds that their culture and traditions will be safe.

The Indian States, even for India, are the most curious relics of a by-gone age. Many of their rulers apparently still believe in

the divine right of kings—puppet kings though they be—and consider the State and all it contains to be their personal property, which they can squander at will. A few of them have a sense of responsibility and have endeavoured to serve their people, but many of them have hardly any redeeming feature.

It is perhaps unjust to blame them, for they are but the products of a vicious system and it is the system that will ultimately have to go. . . Meanwhile the Congress is perfectly willing to confer with such rulers as are prepared to do so and to devise means whereby the transition may not be too sudden. But in no event can the people of the States be ignored.

Our third major problem is the biggest of all. For India means the peasantry and labour and to the extent that we raise them and satisfy their wants will we succeed in our task. And the measure of the strength of our national movement will be the measure of their adherence to it. . . The Congress it is said must hold the balance fairly between capital and labour and zamindar and tenant. But the balance has been and is terribly weighted on one side and to maintain injustice and exploitation. The only way to right it is to do away with the domination of any one class over another. . .

. . . Paternalism in industry or in the land is but a form of charity with all its sting and its utter incapacity to root out the evil. The new theory of trusteeship, which some advocate, is equally barren. For trusteeship means that the power for good or evil remains with the self-appointed trustee and he may exercise it as he wills. The sole trusteeship that can be fair is the trusteeship of the nation and not of one individual or a group. . .

. . . The least that every worker in field or factory is entitled to is a minimum wage which will enable him to live in moderate comfort, and human hours of

labour which do not break his strength and spirit. . .

All these are pious hopes till we gain power and the real problem therefore before us is the conquest of power. We shall not do so by subtle reasoning or argument or lawyers' quibbles, but by the forging of sanctions to enforce the nation's will. To that end this Congress must address itself.

—*Presidential Address at the Lahore Session of the Indian National Congress.*

. . . It was true that I had achieved, almost accidentally as it were, an unusual degree of popularity with the masses: I was appreciated by the intelligentsia; and to young men and women I was a bit of a hero, and a halo of romance seemed to surround me in their eyes. Songs had been written about me, and the most impossible and ridiculous legends had grown up. Even my opponents had often put in a good word for me and patronisingly admitted that I was not lacking in competence or in good faith.

Only a saint, perhaps, or an inhuman monster could survive all this, unscathed and unaffected, and I can place myself in neither of these categories. It went to my head, intoxicated me a little, and gave me confidence and strength. I became (I imagine so, for it is a difficult task to look at oneself from outside) just a little bit autocratic in my ways, just a shade dictatorial. And yet I do not think that my conceit increased markedly. I had a fair measure of my abilities, I thought, and I was by no means humble about them. But I knew well enough that there was nothing at all remarkable about them, and I was very conscious of my failings. . .

. . . My reputation as a hero is entirely a bogus one, and I do not feel at all heroic, and generally the heroic attitude or the dramatic pose in life strikes me as silly. As for romance, I should say that I am the least romantic of individuals. It is true that I have

some physical and mental courage, but the background of that is probably pride: personal, group, and national, and a reluctance to be coerced into anything.

... On the whole, the crowd had filled some inner need of mine. The notion that I could influence them and move them to action gave me a sense of authority over their minds and hearts; and this satisfied, to some extent, my will to power. On their part, they exercised a subtle tyranny over me, for their confidence and affection moved inner depths within me and evoked emotional responses...

Conceit, like fat on the human body, grows imperceptibly, layer upon layer, and the person whom it affects is unconscious of the daily accretion. Fortunately the hard knocks of a mad world tone it down or even squash it completely, and there has been no lack of these hard knocks for us in India during recent years...

... Public functions, addresses by municipalities and local boards and other public bodies, processions and the like, used to be a great strain on my nerves and my sense of humour and reality. The most extravagant and pompous language would be used, and everybody would look so solemn and pious that I felt an almost uncontrollable desire to laugh, or to stick out my tongue, or stand on my head, just for the pleasure of shocking and watching the reactions on the faces at that august assembly! Fortunately for my reputation and for the sober respectability of public life in India, I have suppressed this mad desire and usually behaved with due propriety. But not always...

—Autobiography

... I had no objection to crowds, but there was not sufficient inducement to get pushed and knocked about and my feet crushed—the usual fate of people accompanying Gandhiji. I had plenty of other work to do, and had no desire to confine myself to

khadi propaganda, which seemed to me a relatively minor activity in view of the developing political situation. To some extent I resented Gandhiji's pre-occupation with non-political issues, and I could never understand the background of his thought. In those days he was collecting funds for khadi work, and he would say frequently that he wanted money for *Daridranarayan*, the 'Lord of the Poor', or 'God that resides in the Poor'; meaning thereby, presumably, that he wanted it to help the poor to find employment and work in cottage industries. But behind that word there seemed to be a glorification of poverty; God was especially the Lord of the poor; they were His chosen people. That, I suppose, is the usual religious attitude everywhere. I could not appreciate it, for poverty seemed to me a hateful thing to be fought and rooted out and not to be encouraged in any way. This inevitably led to an attack on a system which tolerated and produced poverty, and those who shrunk from this had of necessity to justify poverty in some way...

Whenever I had occasion to discuss this with Gandhiji, he would lay stress on the rich treating their riches as a trust for the people; it was a view-point of considerable antiquity, and one comes across it frequently in India as well as medieval Europe.

—Autobiography

1931

... Our national movement had originally begun because of the desire of our upper-middle classes to find means of self-expression and self-growth, and behind it there was the political and economic urge. It spread to the lower middle classes and became a power in the land; and then it began to stir the rural masses who were finding it more and more difficult to keep up, as a whole, even their miserable rock-bottom standard of living... Ill-equipped and almost unawares, the overburdened village was thrown into the world market and was tossed

about hither and thither. It could not compete on even terms. It was backward in its methods of production, and its land system, resulting in a progressive fragmentation of holdings, made radical improvement impossible. So the agricultural classes, both landlords and tenants, went downhill, except during brief periods of boom. The landlords tried to pass on the burden to their tenantry, and the growing pauperisation of the peasantry—both the petty landholders and the tenants—drew them to the national movement. The agricultural proletariat, the large number of landless labourers in rural areas, were also attracted; and for all these rural classes 'nationalism' or 'swaraj' meant fundamental changes in the land system, which would relieve or lessen their burdens and provide land for the landless. These desires found no clear expression either in the peasantry or in the middle-class leaders of the national movement.

—Autobiography

Gandhiji's conception of democracy is definitely a metaphysical one. It has nothing to do with numbers or majority or representation in the ordinary sense. It is based on service and sacrifice, and it uses moral pressure... He claims to be 'a born democrat'. 'I make that claim, if complete identification with the poorest of mankind, longing to live no better than they, and a corresponding conscious effort to approach that level to the best of one's ability, can entitle one to make it.' He further discusses democracy: '... Nor is bulk a true test of democracy. True democracy is not inconsistent with a few persons representing the spirit, the hope and the aspirations of those whom they claim to represent. I hold that democracy cannot be evolved by forcible methods. The spirit of democracy cannot be imposed from without; it has to come from within.'

Whether Gandhiji is a democrat or not, he does represent the

peasant masses of India; he is the quintessence of the conscious and subconscious will of those millions. It is perhaps something more than representation; for he is the idealised personification of those vast millions. Of course he is not the average peasant. A man of the keenest intellect... And yet withal he is the great peasant, with a peasant's outlook on affairs, and with a peasant's blindness to some aspects of life. But India is peasant India, and so he knows his India well and reacts to her lightest tremors...

Many of us had cut adrift from this peasant outlook, and the old ways of thought and custom and religion had become alien to us. We called ourselves moderns, and thought in terms of 'progress', and industrialisation and a higher standard of living and collectivisation. We considered the peasant's view-point reactionary, and some, and a growing number, looked with favour towards socialism and communism. How came we to associate ourselves with Gandhiji politically, and to become, in many instances, his devoted followers? The question is hard to answer, and to one who does not know Gandhiji, no answer is likely to satisfy. Personality is an indefinable thing, a strange force that has power over the souls of men, and he possesses this in ample measure, and to all who come to him he often appears in a different aspect. He attracted people, but it was ultimately intellectual conviction that brought them to him and kept them there... Step by step he convinced us of the rightness of the action; and we went with him, although we did not accept his philosophy. To divorce action from the thought underlying it was not perhaps a proper procedure and was bound to lead to mental conflict and trouble later. Vaguely we hoped that Gandhiji, being essentially a man of action and very sensitive to changing conditions, would advance along the line that seemed to us to be right. And in any event the road he was following was the right one thus far, and if the future

meant a parting it would be folly to anticipate it...

—Autobiography

1933

He survived the fast. On the first day of it he was discharged from prison, and on his advice Civil Disobedience was suspended for six weeks.

Again I watched the emotional upheaval of the country during the fast, and I wondered more and more if this was the right method in politics. It seemed to be sheer revivalism, and clear thinking had not a ghost of a chance against it. All India, or most of it, stared reverently at the Mahatma and expected him to perform miracle after miracle and put an end to untouchability and get swaraj and so on—and did precious little itself! And Gandhiji did not encourage others to think; his insistence was only on purity and sacrifice. I felt that I was drifting further and further away from him mentally, in spite of my strong emotional attachment to him...

And I could not understand how he could accept, as he seemed to do, the present social order, which was based on violence and conflict. Within me also conflict raged, and I was torn between rival loyalties. I knew that there was trouble ahead for me, when the enforced protection of gaol was removed. I felt lonely and homeless, and India, to whom I had given my love and for whom I had laboured, seemed a strange and bewildering land to me. Was it my fault that I could not enter into the spirit and ways of thinking of my countrymen? Even with my closest associates I felt that an invisible barrier came between us and, unhappy at being unable to overcome it, I shrank back into my shell. The old world seemed to envelop them, the old world of past ideologies, hopes and desires. The new world was yet far distant...

India is supposed to be a religious country above everything

else, and Hindu and Moslem and Sikh and others take pride in their faiths and testify to their truth by breaking heads. The spectacle of what is called religion, or at any rate organised religion, in India and elsewhere has filled me with horror, and I have frequently condemned it and wished to make a clean sweep of it. Almost always it seems to stand for blind belief and reaction, dogma and bigotry, superstition and exploitation, and the preservation of vested interests. And yet I knew well that there was something else in it, something which supplied a deep inner craving of human beings. How else could it have been the tremendous power it has been and brought peace and comfort to innumerable tortured souls?...

I am afraid it is impossible for me to seek harbourage in this way. I prefer the open sea, with all its storms and tempests. Nor am I greatly interested in the after life, in what happens after death. I find the problems of this life sufficiently absorbing to fill my mind...

—Autobiography

1934

I am told most of the Indian films, both silent and talkies, do not err on the side of artistry. They are usually operettas or melodramas, drawing upon some theme from old Indian history or mythology.

I suppose they supply what is most appreciated by the city people. The contrast between these crude and painful shows and the still surviving artistry of the folk-song and dance, and even village drama, is very marked. In Bengal, in Gujrat and in the south, one discovers sometimes with a shock of pleasant surprise, how fundamentally, and yet unconsciously, artistic the mass of the village people are. Not so the middle classes; they seem to have lost their roots and have no aesthetic tradition to cling to. They glory in cheap and horrid prints made in bulk in Germany and Austria,

and sometimes even rise to Ravi Varma's pictures. The harmonium is their favourite instrument. (I live in hope that one of the earliest acts of the Swaraj government will be to ban this awful instrument.)

—Autobiography

Right through history the old Indian ideal did not glorify political and military triumph, and it looked down upon money and the professional money-making class. Honour and wealth did not go together, and honour was meant to go, at least in theory, to the men who served the community with little in the shape of financial reward.

The old culture managed to live through many a fierce storm and tempest; but though it kept its outer form, it lost its real content. To-day it is fighting silently and desperately against a new and all-powerful opponent—the *bania* civilisation of the capitalist West. It will succumb to this newcomer, for the West brings science, and science brings food for the hungry millions. But the West also brings an antidote to the evils of this cut-throat civilisation—the principles of socialism, of co-operation, and service to the community for the common good. This is not so unlike the old Brahman ideal of service, but it means the brahmanisation (not in the religious sense, of course) of all classes and groups and the abolition of class distinctions. It may be that when India puts on her new garment, as she must, for the old is torn and tattered, she will have it cut in this fashion, so as to make it conform both to present conditions and her old thought. The ideas she adopts must become racy to her soil.

—Autobiography

Personally I dislike the praise of poverty and suffering. I do not think they are at all desirable, and they ought to be abolished. Nor do I appreciate the ascetic life as a social ideal, though it may suit

individuals. I understand and appreciate simplicity, equality, self-control, but not the mortification of the flesh. . .

Nor do I appreciate in the least the idealisation of the simple peasant life. . . What is there in the 'Man with the Hoe' to idealise over? Crushed and exploited for innumerable generations he is only little removed from the animals who keep him company.

This desire to get away from the mind of man to primitive conditions where mind does not count, seems to me quite incomprehensible. The very thing that is the glory and triumph of man is decried and discouraged, and a physical environment which will oppress the mind and prevent its growth is considered desirable. Present-day civilisation is full of evils, but it is also full of good; and it has the capacity in it to rid itself of those evils. To destroy it root and branch is to remove that capacity from it and revert to a dull, sunless and miserable existence. But even if that were desirable it is an impossible undertaking. We cannot stop the river of change or cut ourselves adrift from it, and psychologically we who have eaten of the apple of Eden cannot forget that taste and go back to primitiveness. . .

—Autobiography

Whenever India becomes free, and in a position to build her new life as she wants to, she will necessarily require the best of her sons and daughters for this purpose. Good human material is always rare, and in India it is rarer still because of our lack of opportunities under British rule. We shall want the help of many foreign experts in many departments of public activity, particularly in those which require special technical and scientific knowledge. Among those who have served in the I.C.S. or other imperial services there will be many Indians or foreigners, who will be necessary and welcome to

the new order. But of one thing I am quite sure, that no new order can be built up in India so long as the spirit of the I.C.S. pervades our administration and our public services. That spirit of authoritarianism is the ally of imperialism, and it cannot co-exist with freedom. It will either succeed in crushing freedom or will be swept away itself. Only with one type of State it is likely to fit in, and that is the fascist type. Therefore it seems to me quite essential that the I.C.S. and similar services must disappear completely, as such, before we can start real work on a new order. Individual members of these services, if they are willing and competent for the new job, will be welcome, but only on new conditions. It is quite inconceivable that they will get the absurdly high salaries and allowances that are paid to them to-day. The new India must be served by earnest, efficient workers who have an ardent faith in the cause they serve and are bent on achievement, and who work for the joy and glory of it, and not for the attraction of high salaries. The money motive must be reduced to a minimum. The need for foreign helpers will be considerable, but I imagine that the least wanted will be civil administrators who have no technical knowledge. There will be no lack of such people in India.

—Autobiography

1936

Where do we stand then, we who labour for a free India? Inevitably we take our stand with the progressive forces of the world which are ranged against Fascism and Imperialism. We have to deal with one imperialism in particular, the oldest and the most far-reaching of the modern world, but powerful as it is, it is but one aspect of world-imperialism. And that is the final argument for Indian independence and for the severance of our

connection with the British Empire. . .

But of one thing I must say a few words for to me it is one of the most vital things that I value. That is the tremendous deprivation of civil liberties in India. A government that has to rely on the Criminal Law Amendment Act and similar laws, that suppresses the press and literature; that bans hundreds of organisations, that keeps people in prisons without trial and that does so many other things that are happening in India to-day, is a government that has ceased to have even a shadow of a justification for its existence. I can never adjust myself to these conditions, I find them intolerable. And yet I find many of my own countrymen complacent about them. . . We in the Congress welcome all co-operations in the struggle for Indian freedom: our doors are ever open to all who stand for that freedom and are against imperialism. But they are not open to the supporters of repression and those who stand by the British Government in the suppression of civil liberty. We belong to opposite camps. . .

. . . Our direct action struggles in the past were based on the masses, and especially the peasantry, but the backbone and leadership were always supplied by the middle classes, and this, under the circumstances, was inevitable. The middle classes are a vague group or groups; at the top, a handful of them are closely allied to British imperialism; at the bottom are the dispossessed and other groups who have been progressively crushed by economic circumstances and out of whose ranks come the advanced political workers and revolutionaries; in between are the centre groups, which tend often to side with the advanced elements, but which also have alliances with the upper groups and live in the hope of joining their superior ranks. A middle class leadership is thus often a distracted leadership looking in two directions at the same time. In times of crisis and struggle, when unity of aim and activity is essential, this two-faced leadership is bound to injure the cause and to hold back when a forward move-

is called for. Being too much tied up with property and the goods of this world, it is fearful of losing them; and it is easier to bring pressure on it and to exhaust its stamina. And yet, paradoxically, it is only from the middle class intellectuals that revolutionary leadership comes, and we in India know that our bravest leaders and our stoutest comrades have come from the ranks of the middle classes. . .

How is this problem to be solved? Inevitably, we must have middle class leadership but this must look more and more towards the masses and draw strength and inspiration from them. The Congress must be not only for the masses, as it claims to be, but of the masses; only then will it really be for the masses. I have a feeling that our relative weakness to-day is due to a certain decay of our middle class elements and our divorce from the people. . .

I am convinced that the only key to the solution of the world's problems and of India's problems lies in socialism, and when I use this word I do so not in a vague humanitarian way but in the scientific, economic sense. Socialism is, however, something even more than an economic doctrine; it is a philosophy of life and as such also it appeals to me. I see no way of ending the poverty, the vast unemployment, the degradation and the subjection of the Indian people except through socialism. That involves vast and revolutionary changes in our political and social structure, the ending of vested interests in land and industry, as well as the feudal and autocratic Indian States system. That means the ending of private property, except in a restricted sense; and the replacement of the present profit system by a higher ideal of co-operative service. . .

How does socialism fit in with the present ideology of the Congress? I do not think it does. I believe in the rapid industrialisation of the country and only thus I think will the standards of the people rise substantially and poverty be combated. Yet, I have co-operated whole-heartedly in the past with the khadi programme

and I hope to do so in the future because I believe that khadi and village industries have a definite place in our present economy. They have a social, a political and an economic value which is difficult to measure but which is apparent enough to those who have studied their effects. But I look upon them more as temporary expedients of a transition stage rather than as solutions of our vital problems. . .

The problem of untouchability and the Harijans again can be approached in different ways. For a socialist it presents no difficulty for under socialism there can be no such differentiation or victimisation. Economically speaking, the Harijans have constituted the landless proletariat and an economic solution removes the social barriers that custom and tradition have raised. . .

The major problem of India to-day is that of the land—of rural poverty and unemployment and a thoroughly out-of-date land system. A curious combination of circumstances has held back India during the past few generations and the political and economic garments it wears no longer fit it and are torn and tattered. . . But we can say with confidence that the present order has reached the evening of its day, and it is up to us to try to mould the future as we would like it to be. . .

—Presidential Address at the Lucknow session of the National Indian Congress

1937

Civil Liberty is not merely for us an airy doctrine or a pious wish, but something which we consider essential for the orderly development and progress of a nation. It is the civilized approach to a problem about which people differ, the non-violent way of dealing with it. . . The man with the cracked skull might collapse and die, but the suppressed opinion or idea has no such sudden end and it survives and prospers the more it is sought to be crushed with force. History is full of such examples. Long

experience has taught us that it is dangerous in the interest of truth to suppress opinions and ideas; it has further taught us that it is foolish to imagine that we can do so. . .

. . . Congress Ministries should avoid, as far as possible, all coercive processes and should try to win over their critics by their actions, and, where possible, by personal contacts. Even if they fail in converting the critic or the opponent, they will make him innocuous, and the public sympathy, which almost invariably goes to a victim of official action, will no longer be his. . .

But in spite of this approach and this desire to avoid coercive action, occasions may arise when Congress Ministries cannot avoid taking some such action. No government can tolerate the preaching of violence and communal strife, and if this unfortunately takes place, it has to be curbed by having resource to the coercive processes of the ordinary law. We believe that there should be no police censorship or banning of books and newspapers, and the largest freedom should be given to the expression of opinions and ideas. . . But still, it must be remembered that there may be exceptional cases of books and newspapers which are so manifestly of an obscene character or promote violence or communal hatred and conflict that some action to check them has to be taken.

—*'The First Objectives', The Unity of India.*

1938

Science has brought all these mighty changes and not all of them have been for the good of humanity. But the most vital and hopeful of the changes that it has brought about has been the development of the scientific outlook in man. It is true that even today vast numbers of people still live mentally in the pre-scientific age, and that most of us, even when we talk glibly of science, betray it in our thought and actions. Even

scientists, learned in their particular subjects, often forget to apply the scientific method outside that charmed sphere. And yet it is the scientific method alone that offers hope to mankind and an ending of the agony of the world. This world is racked by fierce conflicts and they are analyzed and called by many names. But essentially the major conflict is between the method of science and the methods opposed to science.

In the early days of science there was much talk of a conflict between religion and science, and science was called materialistic and religion spiritual. That conflict hardly seems real today when science has spread out its wings and ventured to make the whole universe its field of action, and converted solid matter itself into airy nothing. Yet the conflict was real, for it was a conflict between the intellectual tyranny imposed by what was deemed to be religion and the free spirit of man nurtured by the scientific method. Between the two there can be no compromise. For science cannot accept the closing of the windows of the mind, by whatever pleasant name this might be called; it cannot encourage blind faith in someone else's faith. Science therefore must be prepared not only to look up to the heavens and seek to bring them under its control, but also to look down, unafraid, into the pit of hell. To seek to avoid either is not the way of science. The true scientist is the sage unattached to life and the fruits of action, ever seeking truth where-soever this quest might lead him. To tie himself to a fixed anchorage, from which there is no moving, is to give up that search and to become static in a dynamic world.

Perhaps there is no real conflict between true religion and science, but, if so, religion must put on the garb of science and approach all its problems in the spirit of science. A purely secular philosophy of life may be considered enough by most of us. Why should we trouble ourselves about matters beyond our ken when the problems of the world insistently demand solution? And yet that secular philosophy itself must have some background,

some objective, other than merely material well-being. It must essentially have spiritual values and certain standards of behaviour, and, when we consider these, we enter immediately into the realm of what has been called religion. . .

—*Address to the National Academy of Sciences at Allahabad.*

1939

Some socialists and Marxists, thinking in terms of Europe and its pacifists, tried to ridicule the method of non-violence. I am no admirer of European pacifists, and crisis after crisis has shown them to be not only totally ineffective but often the unconscious tools of reaction and even warmongering. Theirs has been the negative passive attitude which surrenders to evil and violence because resistance would lead to a breach of their pacifist doctrine. Political surrender leads almost inevitably to moral surrender also.

But the non-violence of the Congress is the very opposite of this, and the basis of it was no surrender, political or moral, to what it considered evil. It involves, as all policies do, the acceptance of compromises when circumstances dictate them, but essentially, perhaps, it is more uncompromising than other policies. It is dynamic and not passive; it is not non-resistance, but resistance to wrong-doing though that resistance is peaceful. In practice it has proved remarkably successful, not only in achieving visible results, but also in the far more important task of strengthening the morale of the nation and training the people for peaceful, disciplined, and united action.

Almost everybody, including the Socialists, accepted this as the national policy and realized that there was no alternative. It is true that some did so rather mechanically without accepting its implications and sometimes not acting wholly in accordance with it. So far as I was concerned, I had no difficulty in accepting it, although it was no article of faith for me.

or could I say that it would be applicable under all the circumstances. It applied fully to India and to our struggle, and that was enough for me.

I decided to devote my energies towards bridging the gulf between the old leaders and the new socialist group. To some extent I was fitted for this task, as I had intimate contacts with both. I was convinced that India could not do without either of these groups, and here seemed to me no valid reason why there should not be the fullest co-operation between the two in the struggle against imperialism. The old leaders were tried men with prestige and influence among the masses and the experience of having guided the struggle for many years. They were not lightists by any means; politically they were far to the Left, and they were confirmed anti-imperialists. Gandhiji, standing behind them and supporting them from outside the Congress organization, was, of course, a tower of strength to them and to the country. He continued to dominate the Indian scene, and it was difficult to conceive of a big struggle without him. The Socialists, though a small group and speaking for a minority, represented a vital and a growing section, and their influence was spreading, especially among the youth. I was akin to them in their ideology and their objectives, and to me and to many others they represented the future. . .

—*From Lucknow to Tripuri*, The Unity of India

1940

There are very few persons in India, I suppose, whether they are Indians or Englishmen, who have for years past so consistently raised their voices against Fascism and Nazism as I have done. My whole nature rebelled against them, and on many an occasion I vehemently criticized the pro-Fascist and appeasement policy of the British Government. . .

This war has led already to widespread destruction and will

lead to even greater horror and misery. With those who suffer we sympathize deeply and in all sincerity. But unless the war has a revolutionary aim of ending the present order and substituting something based on freedom and co-operation, it will lead to a continuation of wars and violence and utmost destruction.

That is why we must dissociate ourselves from this war and advise our people to do likewise and not help in any way with money or men. That is our bounden duty. But even apart from this, the treatment accorded the Indian people during the past year by the British authorities, the latter's attempt to encourage every disruptive and reactionary tendency, their forcible realizations of money for the war from even the poor of India, and their repeated affronts to Indian nationalism, are such that we can never forget or ignore.

No self-respecting people can tolerate such behaviour, and the people of India have no intention of tolerating it.

I stand before you, sir, as an individual being tried for certain offences against the State. You are a symbol of that State. But I am something more than an individual also; I, too, am a symbol at the present moment, a symbol of Indian nationalism, resolved to break away from the British Empire and achieve the independence of India. It is not me that you are seeking to judge and condemn, but rather the hundreds of millions of the people of India, and that is a large task even for a proud Empire. Perhaps it may be that, though I am standing before you on my trial, it is the British Empire itself that is on its trial before the bar of the world. There are more powerful forces at work in the world today than courts of law: there are elemental urges for freedom and food and security which are moving vast masses of people, and history is being moulded by them. The future recorder of this history might well say that in the hour of supreme trial the Government of Britain and the people of Britain failed because

they could not adapt themselves to a changing world. He may muse over the fate of empires which have always fallen because of this weakness and call it destiny. Certain causes inevitably produce certain results. We know the causes; the results are inexorably in their train. . .

—*Statement at his trial in Gorakhpur prison*

1945

The modern mind, that is to say the better type of the modern mind, is practical and pragmatic, ethical and social, altruistic and humanitarian. It is governed by a practical idealism for social betterment. The ideals which move it represent the spirit of the age, the Zeitgeist, the Yugadharma. It has discarded to a large extent the philosophic approach of the ancients, their search for ultimate reality, as well as the devotionism and mysticism of the medieval period. Humanity is its god and social service its religion. This conception may be incomplete, as the mind of every age has been limited by its environment, and every age has considered some partial truth as the key to all truth. Every generation and every people suffer from the illusion that their way of looking at things is the only right way, or is, at any rate, the nearest approach to it. Every culture has certain values attached to it, limited and conditioned by that culture. The people governed by that culture take these values for granted and attribute a permanent validity to them. So the values of our present-day culture may not be permanent and final; nevertheless they have an essential importance for us for they represent the thought and spirit of the age we live in. A few seers and geniuses, looking into the future, may have a completer vision of humanity and the universe; they are of the vital stuff out of which all real advance comes. The vast majority of people do not even catch up to the present-day values, though they may talk about them

in the jargon of the day, and they live imprisoned in the past. . .

In all this there appears to be a firm belief in science and yet an apprehension that purely factual and purposeless science is not enough. Was science, in providing so much of life's furniture, ignoring life's significance? There is an attempt to find a harmony between the world of fact and the world of the spirit, for it was becoming increasingly obvious that the over-emphasis on the former was crushing the spirit of man. The question that troubled the philosophers of old has come up again in a different form and context: How to reconcile the phenomenal life of the world with the inner spiritual life of the individual. . .

The discovery of India—what have I discovered? It was presumptuous of me to imagine that I could unveil her and find out what she is to-day and what she was in the long past. Today she is four hundred million separate individual men and women, each differing from the other, each living in a private universe of thought and feeling. If this is so in the present, how much more difficult is it to grasp that multitudinous past of innumerable successions of human beings. Yet something has bound them together and binds them still. India is a geographical and economic entity, a cultural unity amidst diversity, a bundle of contradictions held together by strong but invisible threads. Overwhelmed again and again, her spirit was never conquered, and to-day when she appears to be the plaything of a proud conqueror, she remains unsubdued and unconquered. About her there is the elusive quality of a legend of long ago; some enchantment seems to have held her mind. She is a myth and an idea, a dream and a vision, and yet very real and present and pervasive. There are terrifying glimpses of dark corridors which seem to lead back to primeval night, but also there is the fullness and warmth of the day about her. . .

. . . We are citizens of no mean country and we are proud of the

land of our birth, of our people, our culture and traditions. That pride should not be for a romanticised past to which we want to cling; not should it encourage exclusiveness or a want of appreciation of other ways than ours. It must never allow us to forget our many weaknesses and failings or blunt our longing to be rid of them. We have a long way to go and much leeway to make up before we can take our proper station with others in the van of human civilization and progress. And we have to hurry, for the time at our disposal is limited and the pace of the world grows ever swifter. It was India's way in the past to welcome and absorb other cultures. That is much more necessary to-day, for we march to the one world of to-morrow where national cultures will be intermingled with the international culture of the human race. We shall therefore seek wisdom and knowledge and friendship and comradeship wherever we can find them, and co-operate with others in common tasks, but we are no suppliants for others' favours and patronage. Thus we shall remain true Indians and Asiatics, and become at the same time good internationalists and world citizens.

My generation has been a troubled one in India and the world. We may carry on for a little while longer, but our day will be over and we shall give place to others, and they will live their lives and carry their burdens to the next stage of the journey. How have we played our part in this brief interlude that draws to a close? I do not know. Others of a later age will judge. By what standards do we measure success or failure? That too I do not know. . .

—*The Discovery of India*

1947

During the past two hundred years we have seen the growth of western imperialisms and of the reduction of large parts of Asia to

colonial or semi-colonial status. Much has happened during these years, but perhaps one of the notable consequences of the European domination of Asia has been the isolation of the countries of Asia from one another. . .

Today this isolation is breaking down because of many reasons, political and other. The old imperialisms are fading away. The land routes have revived and air travel suddenly brings us very near to each other. This Conference itself is significant as an expression of that deeper urge of the mind and spirit of Asia which has persisted in spite of the isolationism which grew up during the years of European domination. As that domination goes, the walls that surrounded us fall down and we look at each other again and meet as old friends long parted. . .

In this Conference and in this work there are no leaders and no followers. All countries of Asia have to meet together on an equal basis in a common task and endeavour. . .

For too long we of Asia have been petitioners in western courts and chancelleries. That story must now belong to the past. We propose to stand on our own feet and to co-operate with all others who are prepared to co-operate with us. We do not intend to be the playthings of others.

In this crisis in world history Asia will necessarily play a vital role. The countries of Asia can no longer be used as pawns by others; they are bound to have their own policies in world affairs. Europe and America have contributed very greatly to human progress and for that we must yield them praise and honour, and learn from them the many lessons they have to teach. But the West has also driven us into wars and conflicts without number and even now, . . . after a terrible war, there is talk of further wars in the atomic age that is upon us. In this atomic age Asia will have to function effectively in the maintenance of peace. Indeed, there can be no peace unless Asia plays her part. There is today conflict in many countries, and all of us

n Asia are full of our own troubles. Nevertheless, the whole spirit and outlook of Asia are peaceful, and the emergence of Asia in world affairs will be a powerful influence for world peace. . .

Peace can only come when nations are free and also when human beings everywhere have freedom and security and opportunity. Peace and freedom, therefore, have to be considered both in their political and economic aspects. The countries of Asia, we must remember, are very backward and the standards of life are appallingly low. These economic problems demand urgent solution or else crisis and disaster might overwhelm us. We have, therefore, to think in terms of the common man and fashion our political, social and economic structure so that the burdens that have crushed him be removed, and he may have full opportunity for growth. . .

We have arrived at a stage in human affairs when the ideal of that 'One World' and some kind of a world federation seems to be essential though there are many dangers and obstacles in the way. We should work for that ideal and not for any grouping which comes in the way of this larger world group. We therefore support the United Nations structure which is painfully emerging from its infancy. But in order to have 'One World', we must also in Asia think of the countries of Asia co-operating together for that larger deal. . .

We seek no narrow nationalism. Nationalism has a place in each country and should be fostered, but it must not be allowed to become aggressive and come in the way of international development. Asia stretches her hand out in friendship to Europe and America as well as to our suffering brethren in Africa. We in Asia have a special responsibility to the people of Africa. We must help them to take their rightful place in the human family. The freedom that we envisage is not to be confined to this nation or that or to a particular people, but

must spread out over the whole human race. That universal human freedom cannot also be based on the supremacy of any particular class. It must be the freedom of the common man everywhere and full of opportunities for him to develop. . .

—*First Asian Relations Conference, New Delhi*

Mr. President, many years ago we had made a tryst with destiny itself. We had taken a pledge, a vow. Now the time has come to redeem it. But perhaps the pledge has not yet been redeemed fully though stages have been reached in that direction. We have almost attained independence. At such a moment it is only appropriate that we take a new pledge, a new vow to serve India and her people. After a few moments, this Assembly will assume the status of a fully free and independent body, and it will represent an independent and free country. Therefore, great responsibilities are to devolve upon it. If we do not realize the importance of our responsibilities then we shall not be able to discharge our duties fully. Hence it becomes essential for us to take this pledge after fully understanding all its implications. The resolution that I am presenting before you relates to that pledge. We have finished one phase, and for that rejoicings are going on today. Our hearts are full of joy and some pride and satisfaction. But we know that there is no rejoicing in the whole of the country. There is enough of grief in our hearts. Not far from Delhi, big cities are ablaze and its heat is reaching us here. Our happiness cannot be complete. At this hour we have to face all these things with a brave heart. . . The task of wresting freedom and ousting the foreign government has been before us till now and that task is now accomplished. But uprooting the foreign domination is not all. Unless and until each and every Indian breathes the air of freedom and his miseries are banished and his hard lot is improved, our task remains un-

finished. . . At a time when we are on the threshold of freedom we should remember that India does not belong to any one party or group of people or caste. It does not belong to the followers of any particular religion. It is the country of all, of every religion and creed. We have repeatedly defined the type of freedom we desire. In the first resolution, which I moved earlier, it has been said that our freedom is to be shared equally by every Indian. All Indians shall have equal rights, and each one of them is to partake equally in that freedom. We shall proceed like that, and whosoever tries to be aggressive will be checked by us. If anyone is oppressed we shall stand by his side. If we follow this path then we shall be able to solve big problems, but if we become narrow-minded we shall not be able to solve them.

I beg to move, Sir,

That it be resolved that:

(1) After the last stroke of midnight, all members of the Constituent Assembly present on this occasion, do take the following pledge:

At this solemn moment when the people of India, through suffering and sacrifice, have secured freedom and become masters of their own destiny, I, . . . , a member of the Constituent Assembly of India, do dedicate myself in all humility to the service of India and her people to the end that this ancient land attain her rightful place in the world and make her full and willing contribution to the promotion of world peace and the welfare of mankind. . .

—*Speech on the assumption of power, midnight of the 14-15 August*

1948

Friends and comrades, the light has gone out of our lives and there is darkness everywhere and I do not quite know what to tell you and how to say it. Our beloved

leader, Bapu as we called him, the Father of the Nation, is no more. Perhaps I am wrong to say that. Nevertheless, we will not see him again as we have seen him for these many years. We will not run to him for advice and seek solace from him and that is a terrible blow not to me only but to millions and millions in this country. And it is a little difficult to soften the blow by any advice that I or anyone else can give you.

The light has gone out, I said, and yet I was wrong. For the light that shone in this country was no ordinary light. The light that has illumined this country for these many years will illumine this country for many more years and a thousand years later, the light will still be seen in this country and the world will see it and it will give solace to innumerable hearts. For that light represented something more than the immediate present. It represented the living truth and the eternal man was with us with his eternal truth reminding us of the right path, drawing us from error, taking this ancient country to freedom.

All this has happened. There is much more to do. There was much more for him to do. We could never think that he was unnecessary or that he had done his task. But now, particularly when we are faced with so many difficulties, his not being with us is a blow most terrible to bear.

A mad man has put an end to his life, for I can only call him mad who did it, and yet there has been enough of poison spread in this country during the past years and months and this poison has had effect on people's minds. We must face this poison. We must root out this poison and we must face all the perils that encompass us and face them not madly or hardly, rather, in the way that our beloved teacher taught us to face them. The first thing to remember now is that no one of us dare misbehave because we are angry. We have to behave like strong determined people, determined to face all the perils that surround us, determined to carry out the man-

date that our great teacher, and our great leader has given us, remembering always that if, as I really believe, his spirit looks upon us and sees us, nothing would displease him so much as to see that we have indulged in unseemly behaviour or in violence.

So we must not do that. But that does not mean that we should be weak but rather that we should in strength and in unity face all the troubles that are in front of us. Unity, I said: we must hold together and all our petty troubles and difficulties and conflicts must be ended in the face of this great disaster.

That great disaster is a symbol to us to remember the big things of life and to forget the small things. We have thought too much of the small things. Now the time has come again; as in his life, in his death, he has reminded us of the big things of life, the living truth, and if we remember that then it will be well with us and well with India.

And while we pray, the greatest prayer that we can offer is to pledge to dedicate ourselves to the truth, and to the cause for which this great countryman of ours lived and for which he has died. That is the best prayer that we can offer him and his memory. That is the best prayer that we can offer to India and ourselves.

—Broadcast to the Nation,
January 30th

Sir, may I associate myself with what you have said? It is customary in this House to pay some tribute to the eminent departed, to say some words of praise and condolence. I am not quite sure in my own mind if it is exactly fitting for me or for any others of this House to say much on this occasion, for I have a sense of utter shame both as an individual and as the head of the Government of India, that we should have failed to protect the

greatest treasure that we possessed. It is our failure, as it has been our failure in the many months past, to give protection to many an innocent man, woman and child; it may be that the burden and the task was too great for us or for any government. Nevertheless, it is a failure. And today the fact that this mighty person whom we honoured and loved beyond measure has gone because we could not give him adequate protection is a shame for all of us. It is a shame to me as an Indian that an Indian should have raised his hand against him, it is a shame to me as a Hindu that a Hindu should have done this deed and done it to the greatest Indian of the day and the greatest Hindu of the age.

—The Constituent Assembly
(Legislative), New Delhi.
February 2

The communal poison, which has brought disaster upon us, will put an end to our freedom also if we are not vigilant and if we do not take action in time. It was to awaken us to this impending danger that Gandhiji undertook his last fast two or three weeks ago. His self-crucifixion roused the nation's conscience and we pledged before him to behave better. It was only then that he broke his fast.

Democracy demands discipline, tolerance and mutual regard. Freedom demands respect for the freedom of others. In a democracy changes are made by mutual discussion and persuasion and not by violent means. If a government has no popular support, another government which commands that popular support takes its place. It is only small groups who know that they cannot get sufficient popular support that resort to methods of violence, imagining in their folly that they can gain their ends in this way. This is not only utterly wrong but it is also utterly foolish. For the reaction to the violence of the minority, which seeks to coerce the

majority, is to provoke the majority into violence against them.

This great tragedy has happened because many persons, including some in high places, have poisoned the atmosphere of this country of ours. It is the duty of the government as well as the people to root out this poison. We have had our lesson at a terrible cost. Is there anyone amongst us now who will not pledge himself after Gandhiji's death to fulfil his mission—a mission for which the greatest man of our country, the greatest man in the world, has laid down his life? . . .

—Allahabad, February 12

... The world is in a bad way, and this great continent of Asia or Europe and the rest of the world are in a bad way and are faced with problems which might almost appear to be insurmountable. And sometimes one has the feeling that we were all actors in some terrible Greek tragedy which was moving on to its inevitable climax of disaster. Yet, when I looked at this picture again from afar and from here, I had a feeling of hope and optimism not merely because of India, but also because of other things. I saw that the tragedy which seemed inevitable was not necessarily inevitable, that there were many other forces at work, that there were innumerable men and women of goodwill in the world who wanted to avoid this disaster and tragedy, and there was certainly a possibility that they would succeed in avoiding it. . . .

We all know that reference has been made—I will mention one or two matters—to linguistic provinces and to the question of language in this Assembly and in the country. I do not propose to say much about these questions except to say that it seems to me and it has long seemed to me inevitable that in India some kind of reorganization of the provinces should take place to fit in more with the cultural, geographical and economic condition of the

people and with their desires. We have long been committed to it. . . .

The same argument, if I may say so, applies to the question of language. Now, it is an obvious thing and a vital thing that any country, much more so a free and independent country, must function in its own language. Unfortunately, the mere fact that I am speaking to this House in a foreign language and so many of our colleagues here have to address the House in a foreign language itself shows that something is lacking. It is lacking, let us recognize it; we shall get rid of that lacuna undoubtedly. But, if in trying to press for a change, an immediate change, we get wrapped up in numerous controversies and possibly even delay the whole Constitution, I submit to this House it is not a very wise step to take. Language is and has been a vital factor in an individual's and a nation's life, and because it is vital, we have to give it every thought and consideration. Because it is vital, it is also an urgent matter; and because it is vital, it is also a matter in which urgency may ill serve our purpose. Here is a slight contradiction. Because, if we proceed in an urgent matter to impose something, maybe by a majority, on an unwilling minority in parts of the country or even in this House, we do not really succeed in what we have started to achieve. Powerful forces are at work in the country which will inevitably lead to the substitution of the English language by an Indian language or Indian languages in so far as the different parts of the country are concerned; but there will always be one all-India language. Powerful forces are also at work in the formation of that all-India language. A language ultimately grows from the people, it is seldom that it can be imposed. Any attempt to impose a particular form of language on an unwilling people has usually met with the strongest opposition and has actually resulted in something the very reverse of what the promoters thought. I would beg this House to consider the fact and to realize, if it agrees with me, that

the surest way of developing a natural all-India language is not so much to pass resolutions and laws on the subject, but to work to that end in other ways. For my part I have a certain conception of what an all-India language should be. Other people's conception may not be quite the same as mine. I cannot impose my conception on this House or on the country just as any other person will not be able to impose his or her conception unless the country accepts it. I would much rather avoid trying to impose my or anyone else's conception and, instead, work to that end in co-operation and amity and see how, after we have settled these major things about the Constitution, after we have attained an even greater measure of stability, we can take up each one of these separate questions and dispose of them in a much better atmosphere. . . .

—The Constituent Assembly,
November 8

1949

Now, if I may address you particularly, that is, the industrialists and those concerned with India's commerce, a great deal of stress has been laid in the past year or two on the sensitiveness of the investor, of the businessman, of the industrialist. He is a frightfully delicate person, and if any wrong word is said or some speech is delivered, his temperature goes up. The sensitiveness of the body or of the mind or of the spirit is nothing as compared to the sensitiveness of the pocket. I should like you just to think about it, of the talk that has taken place in the last year or so, of how the groups which you represent so well have been frightened by the budget or by something else that has happened or by certain other measures taken or not taken. All this has repeatedly been said and there is, no doubt, some truth in it. I do believe you have been frightened. But do you think it has redounded to your credit in the country to recount to all and sundry repeatedly that you are

frightened by what happens? May I tell you that instead of adding to your credit, it has made people think that you are rather timid folk, and that you are no longer in your prime? When I say not in your prime, I am not referring to your individual ages but rather to the fact, that—and this is a fundamental fact—capitalists and industrialists in India are not big enough to face the problems of the day and generally the idea is spreading that their stature is rather small and that they get frightened at the slightest upset and start complaining and retreating into their shells and asking others to help them. . . After all, in the world today, you know that various ideologies, economic and political, are in conflict. In the main, there are two: on one side the so-called capitalist ideology and on the other the so-called communist or Soviet ideology. I think this is a very crude way of summing up the question. It is a fact that they are different economic approaches to the problem and each party is convinced of the correctness of its own approach. But it does not necessarily follow that you must have either this or that.

There may be many intermediate ways. It is not a question of theory: of communism or socialism or capitalism. It is a question of hard fact. In India, if we do not ultimately solve the basic problems of our country—the problems of food, clothing, housing, and so on—it will not matter whether we call ourselves capitalists, socialists, communist or anything else. If we fail to solve these problems, we shall be swept away and somebody else will come in and try to solve them. So, ultimately, these major problems of the day are not going to be solved by argument or by war but by the method that succeeds in delivering the goods. . . That method need not necessarily be an extreme method belonging to either of these two rival ideologies. It may be something in between. In fact, you find in most countries in the world that there is an attempt to find other ways which certainly are completely divorced from the old style capitalism and which go towards what

is normally called socialism. They are fast approaching it. It may be that in India also we may be able to find some way more suited to the conditions of our people, some middle way. Therefore, I am not enamoured of these 'isms' and my approach is, and I should like to say the country's approach should be, rather a pragmatic approach in considering the problem and I want to forget the 'ism' attached to it. . . We need not be dogmatic about this or that approach. Anything that comes in the way has simply to be ignored, and be swept aside. . . Forget your pocket and if you cannot forget it, do not mention it. It goes against you. The only test should be whether it is good for the masses, and no other.

Now, take another thing which seems to be almost like the proverbial red rag to the bull—nationalization. What exactly does it mean in the context of India? . . . We think that in India, as it is today—I will not talk about the world, because each country has its own problems and has its own way of approach—certain basic industries, the key industries, should be under State control, but remember again that when a State plans its industrial or other development, planning itself involves a certain measure of control or direction from the State. Otherwise there can be no planning. The Indian National Congress, seventeen years ago, laid down the policy of State control of basic industries or mother industries and certain other essential industries and services. . .

—*The Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry, New Delhi, March 4*

. . . Now, I just want to ask you another and a very difficult question that always faces me and my government. We were born and bred, if I may say so, politically in the Gandhian doctrine. We did not adopt Gandhiji's views wholly either in regard to non-violence or in regard to economics. Nevertheless, we accepted many of them as

suited to our country—and may be suited to the world in some ways, if not a hundred per cent, but in a large measure. Now, imagine a people who had carried through their struggle for freedom, trying always to adhere to peaceful methods, having to face an extremity of violence and having to face the armed might of the State. Now, it was no pleasure to us to do so and it brought great problems and conflicts in our minds. We were responsible, as a Government, for peace and order in the country and if we did not maintain peace and order there was danger of the whole country going to pieces. . . We talked of Gandhiji and then proved false to him at every step. It was a painful thought. The facts, as they were in the country, compelled us to act in a particular way. I do not know whether it would have been better if we had acted differently. . . Now, that problem comes up again and again in its varying phases. Here we are committed to civil liberty in its broadest form.

There can be no freedom in a country without a wide extension of civil liberties. We are also interning people without trial in large numbers and some of our provincial governments are passing legislation of a kind to which we took the greatest objection in the old days. It is an irony of fate that we have to do this. Yet, we have done it and done it after full thought, not casually, because the matter was of the most serious concern to us. Now, what are we to do about it? People come to us complaining about civil liberty and they find a certain answering echo in our minds. The fact is that if we do not act, something infinitely worse takes place in the country—chaos and disorder. Not chaos and disorder only, for you know that brutal murders have taken place in some parts of the country, and if there is one thing that this government cannot possibly permit as long as it calls itself a government or has a semblance of authority, it is deliberate murder and sabotage that any group may indulge in. I do not mind the preaching of any doctrine, provided there is no violence in it.

I do not think any interpretation of civil liberty includes the preaching of violence or acts of violence. And in the past year and a half in this country we have had to deal with various phases of intensive violence, whether it came in the early days of August, September and October in the Punjab or Delhi, or whether it came subsequently from communal organizations or from certain labour bodies, and a good deal from certain sections of the Communist Party of India, at first chiefly in and around Hyderabad—on both sides of the Hyderabad border—in West Bengal and elsewhere. Now, I want to make it perfectly clear that it still remains our conception of civil liberty that we should allow the fullest freedom of people of all groups to preach their doctrines, provided there are no incitements to violence. It just does not matter whether we agree with that doctrine or not; if it does not lead to violence, we shall allow it to be preached. But if it does, if it is meant to lead to violence or sabotage, than it will not be allowed, and if it is necessary to limit civil liberty for that purpose, civil liberty will be limited. There is no other way. . .

. . . We are not going to allow gangsterism to flourish in this country. Now, it is a great pity that this kind of thing should be associated in people's minds with Labour or the workers as such, because I am convinced that the workers of India, the labour force of India, is a fine labour force, a fine lot of people. Occasionally, they may get excited or be misled, but properly approached, they are fine material, and after all it is out of this material that you are going to build India. You have to deal with that material and you have to deal with it fairly and justly. . . Our government has tried to encourage the organization of labour, trade unions and the like, because it is well known that from every point of view, it is better that labour be properly organized, that it should have freedom to organize, freedom to deal with its own interests than that it should remain unorganized, unable to protect itself or to deliver the

goods. So we have encouraged it. . .

—*The Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry, March 4*

1950

I, therefore, submit that, in our relations with Pakistan, we have first of all to follow a policy of firmness and adequate preparation but always to maintain a friendly approach. Again, there can be no doubt that India and Pakistan, situated as they are geographically and otherwise and with their historical background, cannot carry on for ever as enemies. If they do, catastrophe after catastrophe will follow; either they will wipe each other out or one will wipe the other out and suffer the consequences, which is unthinkable. We are passing through trouble and crisis, largely due, in my opinion, to a certain fund of hatred and violence accumulated during the days before Partition. We have inherited this legacy and we must face it. Let us forget the governments—our Government and the Government of Pakistan—and think of the millions of people who live next door to one another. At some time or other, those millions will have to come together, will have to co-operate, will have to be friends. There is no doubt about it. Let us think of that future which may not be very distant and let us not do things today which may lead to generations of rivalry and conflict. . .

—*Parliament, New Delhi, February 3*

Whatever they may say, most countries normally do not like to change. The human being is essentially a conservative animal. He is used to certain ways of life and any one trying to change them meets with his disapproval. Nevertheless, change comes and people have to adapt themselves to it; they have done so in the past. All countries, as I said, are normally

conservative. But I imagine that our country is more than normally conservative. It is for this reason that I venture to place these thoughts before you. I find a curious hiatus in people's thinking. I find it even in the thinking of scientists who praise science and practise it in the laboratory but discard the ways of science, its method of approach and the spirit of science in everything else they do in life. They become completely unscientific. If we approach science in the proper way, it does some good and there is no doubt that it will always do some good. It teaches us new ways of doing things. Perhaps, it improves our conditions of industrial life but the basic thing that science should do is to teach us to think straight, to act straight and not to be afraid of discarding anything or of accepting anything, provided there are sufficient reasons for doing so. I should like our country to understand and appreciate that idea all the more, because in the realm of thought our country in the past has, in a sense, been singularly free and it has not hesitated to look down the deep well of truth whatever it might contain. Nevertheless, in spite of such a free mind, our country encumbered itself to such an extent in matters of social practice that its growth was hindered and is hindered in a hundred ways even today. Our customs are just ways of looking at little things that govern our lives and have no significant meaning. Even then, these customs come in our way. Now that we have attained independence, there is naturally a resurgence of all kinds of new forces, both good and bad; good forces are, of course, liberated by a sense of freedom but along with them there are also a number of forces which, under the guise of what people call culture, narrow our minds and our outlook. These forces are essentially a restriction and denial of any real kind of culture. Culture is the widening of the mind and of the spirit. It is never a narrowing of the mind or a restriction of the human spirit or of the country's spirit. Therefore, if we look at science in the real way and if we think of these research institutes and laboratories

in a fundamental sense, then they are something more than just little ways of improving things and of finding out how this or that should be done: . .

—*Speech at Digwadih, April 22*

When we talk of cultural relations, the question that immediately arises in my mind is—what exactly is the 'culture' that people talk so much about? When I was younger in years, I remember reading about German 'kultur' and of the attempts of the German people to spread it by conquest and other means. There was a big war to spread this 'kultur' and to resist it. Every country and every individual seems to have its peculiar idea of culture. When there is talk about cultural relations—although it is very good in theory—what actually happens is that those peculiar ideas come into conflict and instead of leading to friendship they lead to more estrangement. It is a basic question—what is culture? And I am certainly not competent to give you a definition of it because I have not found one.

One can see each nation and each separate civilization developing its own culture that had its roots in generations hundreds and thousands of years ago. One sees these nations being intimately moulded by the impulse that initially starts—a civilization going on its long path. That conception is affected by other conceptions and one sees action and inter-action between these varying conceptions. There is, I suppose, no culture in the world which is absolutely pristine, pure and unaffected by any other culture. It simply cannot be, just as nobody can say that he belongs one hundred per cent to a particular racial type, because in the course of hundreds and thousands of years unmistakable changes and mixtures have occurred.

So, culture is bound to get a little mixed up, even though the basic element of a particular national culture remains dominant.

If that kind of thing goes on peacefully, there is no harm in it. But it often leads to conflicts. It sometimes leads a group to fear that their culture is being overwhelmed by what they consider to be an outside or alien influence. Then they draw themselves into a shell which isolates them and prevents their thoughts and ideas going out. That is an unhealthy situation, because in any matter and much more so in what might be called a cultural matter, stagnation is the worst possible thing. Culture, if it has any value, must have a certain depth. It must also have a certain dynamic character. After all, culture depends on a vast number of factors.

If we leave out what might be called the basic mould that was given to it in the early stages of a nation's or a people's growth, it is affected by geography, by climate and by all kinds of other factors. The culture of Arabia is intimately governed by the geography and the deserts of Arabia because it grew up there. Obviously, the culture of India in the old days was affected greatly, as we see in our own literature, by the Himalayas, the forests and the great rivers of India among other things. It was a natural growth from the soil. Of the various domains of culture, like architecture, music and literature, any two may mix together, as they often did and produce a happy combination. But where there is an attempt to improve something or the other which does not naturally grow and mould itself without uprooting itself, conflict inevitably arises.

Then, also, comes something which to my mind is basically opposed to all ideas of culture. And that is the isolation of the mind and the deliberate shutting up of the mind to other influences. My own view of India's history is that we can almost measure the growth and the advance of India and the decline of India by relating them to periods when India had her mind open to the outside world and when she wanted to close it up. The more she closed it up, the more static she became. Life, whether of the individual,

group, nation or society, is essentially a dynamic, changing, growing thing. Whatever stops that undermines it.

We have had great religions and they have had an enormous effect on humanity. Yet, if I may say so with all respect and without meaning any ill to any person, those very religions, in the measure that they made the mind of man static, dogmatic and bigoted, have had, to my mind, an evil effect. The things they said may be good but when it is claimed that the last word has been said, society becomes static.

The individual human being or race or nation must necessarily have a certain depth and certain roots somewhere. They do not count for much unless they have roots in the past, which past is after all the accumulation of generations of experience and some type of wisdom. It is essential that you have that. Otherwise you become just pale copies of something which has no real meaning to you as an individual or as a group. On the other hand, one cannot live in roots alone. Even roots wither unless they come out in the sun and the free air. Only then can the roots give you sustenance. Only then can there be a branching out and a flowering. How, then, are you to balance these two essential factors? It is very difficult, because some people think a great deal about the flowers and the leaves on the branches, forgetting that they only flourish because there is a stout root to sustain them. Others think so much of the roots that no flowers or leaves or branches are left; there is only a thick stem somewhere. So, the question is how one is to achieve a balance.

Does culture mean some inner growth in the man? Of course, it must. Does it mean the way he behaves to others? Certainly it must. Does it mean the capacity to understand the other person? I suppose so. Does it mean the capacity to make yourself understood by the other person? I suppose so. It means all that. A person who cannot understand another's viewpoint is to that extent limited in

mind and culture, because nobody, perhaps, barring some very extraordinary human beings, can presume to have the fullest knowledge and wisdom. The other party or the other group may also have some inkling of knowledge or wisdom or truth and if we shut our minds to that then we not only deprive ourselves of it but we cultivate an attitude of mind which, I would say, is opposed to that of a cultured man. The cultured mind, rooted in itself, should have its doors and windows open. It should have the capacity to understand the other's viewpoint fully even though it cannot always agree with it. The question of agreement or disagreement only arises when you understand a thing. Otherwise, it is blind negation which is not a cultured approach to any question. . .

—Inauguration of the Indian Council for Cultural Relations, New Delhi, April 9

1951

We have suddenly emerged into a new age. Of course, every age is a new age but, I suppose, it is correct to say that this age of ours is especially so; and the symbol of the age is the atom bomb or atomic energy, if you like, but it is well to remember that today atomic energy is thought of in terms of atom bombs only. And if the atom bomb is the symbol of this age, then everything is conditioned by that symbol—man's thinking, man's fears and everything else.

We seem to live under this shadow. Are we, with the very proud and magnificent edifice of our civilization, nearing the afternoon or evening of this civilization? Have we lost the creative spirit? Have we lost the energy and faith that go with the dawn of civilizations? Can we recapture that spirit of the dawn in this afternoon and convert it into something other than what it is today or is it inevitable that the afternoon will be followed by the evening and then by the shades

of night? I do not know but my mind struggles with this problem. It also struggles with the smaller problems of the day, for we cannot ignore them. The problem of our civilization, however, is the major question mark of the day.

How are we to meet these problems? UNESCO says, by education, science and culture. Of course. How else? And yet we find that education, as our distinguished Chairman just told us, has been leading us into wrong channels. We find science perverted to serve evil ends. We find that culture, instead of being something that broadens our vision and gives us wisdom, sometimes actually narrows us and engenders wars. It is not culture but the slogan of culture that is used anyhow and each person who uses it means something quite different by it. Thus, the very things that ought to help us in solving the world's problems, namely, education, science and culture, become barriers to that solution. How are we to get over these difficulties? Surely, not by denying them or by saying that education, science and culture are no good. Certainly not, because, after all, they are the only available means for us to forge ahead, understand and solve these problems. Therefore, we have to adhere to them and yet, while adhering, we have to realize that these words often become debased in our mouths and in our activities, more especially in the field of politics, where every noble word or sentiment man has ever invented or thought of becomes base coin.

UNESCO, I understand, is carrying on, here in India and possibly elsewhere, investigations into what is called the problem of tensions. They study all kinds of tensions; tensions between capital and labour, tensions between communities, between groups and so many other tensions, of which the world is full today. I wonder if it would not be a worthy exercise for UNESCO to study them at Lake Success. Why not study them at the UN headquarters? Why not study them in the various Chancelleries of the world, since they are the root cause of the tensions

of the world today and not those people who occasionally might, in a fit of excitement, break a few heads. They are fortunately few but those who sit in the Chancelleries are preparing to break millions and billions of heads. How then are we going to stop that? Surely not by studying the petty problems of the market place or of some obscure corners of the world, when this major problem overshadows the world.

I am placing before you in all humility the problems that confront me. I may tell you that when I think of these problems, all pride of intellect goes, because I have seen intellect prostituted to base ends. Sometimes, intellect by itself leads to nothing. All pride of achievement fades because of this tremendous lack of achievement that stares us in the face today. I do not know what remains in its place. Perhaps, some pride must remain, because, as long as there is strength, one must have some pride in doing one's duty, whatever the achievements might be. Apart from the personal equation, the big question does stare us in the face. How are we, however and wheresoever situated, to meet this great problem in this atomic age of ours? We find people, nations and statesmen talking in terms of the greatest certitude about their being right and about their undertaking some moral crusade or other for the benefit of mankind.

Sometimes, I feel that the world may be better off if there were fewer of these modern crusaders about. Everyone wants not only to carry on a moral crusade in his own environment but to impose his moral crusade upon another. When moralities or the objectives of the moral crusades differ, conflict inevitably comes. The fact of the matter is that in theory there is and there ought to be a great deal in common between what is considered culture and truth. Nevertheless, the world is a place with much variety.

The great nations of the world have very different backgrounds; their historical development has been different; even their wants

are different today. In a great part of contemporary Asia, the primary wants are food, clothing, housing and tolerably healthy conditions of living. You cannot expect any high flights of culture where the primary needs of mankind are not satisfied. People necessarily think of these primary needs in a great part of Asia. Other countries think differently, because of their different needs and different backgrounds.

In a country like India, we cannot forget the great and glorious past we have had and there is no reason why we should forget that past. We try to get rid of the burden of that past where it is wrong or out of place to remember it. Our roots, however, must necessarily belong to that past. The first thing to remember is that, while the world is inevitably developing common ways of action and thinking—because this has become essential, inevitably also there are going to be differences which we must recognize and allow full play, without trying to impose our will on others in order to obliterate those differences. I would apply this test even to a country like India and much more so when we talk of the whole world. Many countries seem to think that it is their duty to make others like themselves.

This is essentially an age of science and technological development. This technological development goes ahead with an ever increasing tempo and it will no doubt affect the lives of men and, perhaps, may end up in their deaths. In many ways, it results in tremendous advance and we can say with assurance that many of the problems of past history, namely, those of food, clothing, housing and health services and all that a human being requires, are capable of solution today. There is enough in the world for all and more. Therefore, the old cause of conflict no longer exists. Yet, something is lacking. The fact is that this technological age has brought greater conflicts in its train in spite of its promise of putting an end to conflicts.

This again is a great contradiction for, notwithstanding the con-

tinuous talk of peaceful progress, co-operation and mutual understanding among nations, we move in contrary directions. Our knowing one another more, instead of making each of us understand and appreciate the other, often brings dislike of the other. How can we get over these contradictions? I take it that the problem of UNESCO is essentially this: how to get over difficulties in order to realize its ideals? How to utilize education, science and culture in the right way and prevent its exploitation for wrong ends? I think that these efforts will not bring success, unless somehow or other they can affect this other major factor which seems to hang over world affairs today. How it can be done, I do not know. . .

—UNESCO Indian National Commission, New Delhi, March 24

1952

Repeated references have been made to the policy the Congress adopted for a number of years. An hon. Member said that I used to go around shouting about linguistic provinces from the house tops and at street corners. I am not aware of having done so at all. In fact, I have never been very enthusiastic about linguistic provinces. My views on our provinces are peculiar. Coming, as I do, from the biggest of India's provinces, I feel that provinces in this country should be much smaller than they are. It is not necessary to have the whole paraphernalia of a Governor, a High Court and so on for every province. But mine was a lone voice, even when the Constituent Assembly was considering this matter. We were so used to existing conditions that we were satisfied to let things continue as they were. . .

Speaking for myself, I have been overburdened with the thought that we must give the topmost priority to the development of a sense of unity in India because these are critical days. Any decision that might come in the way of that unity should be delayed till

we have laid a strong foundation for it. Because of that, I for my own part have frankly—and I should be quite frank with this House—not taken any aggressive or positive step in regard to the formation of linguistic provinces. Although I agreed with the demand, I left it at that in many cases. . .

—Lok Sabha, New Delhi, July 7

India seems to me an odd mixture of traits and characteristics. Some fill me with joy and faith and others with alarm. I cannot predict which will prosper and which will ultimately win. That, the future will tell. All I can say is that I have a great deal of faith in my country and in my people. At the same time, what is wrong with our country is also quite obvious. We are narrow in mind and vision; we not only lack creativeness of mind but the atmosphere in which it can flourish. I am astonished at the way the word 'culture' is bandied about in India. To me this only means that there is no culture where this is done. Culture is not something that can be bandied about. It does not talk too much and does not shout too much. The other day, I read one of Rabindra Nath Tagore's poems or rather a translation of it, which spoke of the wonderful variety of India where innumerable streams have flowed, producing the culture we now possess. The capacity to absorb these various streams of culture is a part of the creativeness of India. Therefore, there is no reason why we should adopt the narrow outlook of pride and folly which makes us think that we have everything and that we need receive nothing from outside. South-East Asia and the Far East have borrowed freely from India's cultural inheritance. Similarly, we find evidence of other cultures in India. Of course, the basis of Indian culture remains unchanged even though it has absorbed other cultures. Such was the country of our distant ancestors. Gradually, a change came. We became afraid of others and shrank into ourselves. We did not want either

to go out ourselves or to let others come in. We developed narrow grooves of thought and narrow divisions amongst ourselves, each division isolating itself from other castes or groups. We practically imposed a ban on travel abroad. People were afraid they would lose their caste or religion if they went out of India. We came to attach more importance to what we ate, drank or touched than to other far more important aspects of life. The transformation you see now was not sudden—this shrinking into ourselves, this closing of our eyes to all that was going on around us and thinking that what we possessed was everything and that there was nothing more to learn. When an individual or a community starts to think like that, the individual or community is doomed because life is an ever growing, dynamic process. No kind of vitality can be static. The moment growth stops, decay sets in and the ultimate result is death. Thus did we in India become static in our life and culture. This process of decay through the centuries can be traced in our literature. We start with magnificent literature. Then we come to classical Sanskrit, which is also very beautiful. However, it gradually deteriorates and we reach a stage when Sanskrit comes to be written in long involved sentences, sometimes even running to two pages. There is no strength or vitality left in it. Interpretations and explanations bear testimony to the decay of the language. Instead of being inspired by great ideas, we have even lost what we had. Our old architecture was magnificent and was, perhaps, among the greatest architectures of the world. See how it became degraded! It still retained its craftsmanship but the mobility of design that had come from simplicity was gone. It became heavier and heavier. There was no dignity in it, only hard work. When a country is dynamic, it reveals itself in a myriad activities. We hope to be dynamic again. Perhaps, it was necessary for us to learn a lesson before we became dynamic.

What inspiration can we draw from something which is static and half dead? That is the question. I am amazed that people should

function in such a narrow way, that they should shut their minds and demand that others shut their minds, too, against everything new and talk only of Indian culture. I know something about culture. Those who preach that doors should be shut do not know anything of culture. Every process of exclusion means lack of culture; every process of inclusion indicates growth. Those elements that believe in pushing things away narrow the mind and the nation falls back to a period of static culture. We have to be dynamic or else we cannot survive. . .

—*the University of Saugor,*
October 30

If I may take this matter a little further, I am not at all enamoured and as the days go by I become more and more suspicious of the crowds of people who go out of India for so-called education. Undoubtedly, there has been some change in this state of affairs since the days when I went abroad. At that time, a great majority of Indian students used to go to the United Kingdom in the hope of adorning the profession of law subsequently. Well, some of them did; most of them did not. Now people go mostly for technical studies, and this of course is infinitely better.

Such information as I have goes to show that most Indian students in England and America do well in their work. I have nothing against that. In every matter, be it education, science, culture or anything else, I dislike nothing so much as the narrowly nationalistic approach which makes us think that we have attained the summit of wisdom and that we need not learn anything more. That kind of attitude denotes a static condition. And anything that is static becomes stagnant and gradually leads to death. I am all for opening our minds to every kind of knowledge or information that can be obtained. I am all for free intercourse with the rest of the world; I am all for inviting people from other countries to come here to learn from us and to teach us.

I want no barriers. Therefore, it is not with a view to having a barrier that I say what I am going to say.

I have explained what my basic position is. Even so, I feel surprised at this excessive enthusiasm to rush abroad to learn something. It is, indeed, amazing how many people are constantly going abroad. I am not talking for the moment of students. That is quite another matter. Students should certainly go but I shall qualify that by saying that they should go only if they are capable of profiting by it and that not everybody whose parents have superfluous cash need go. I am talking for the present of people other than students.

During the last two or three years, there has been such an abundance of all kinds of scholarships, fellowships, this, that and the other that I have lost count of them. We became rather alarmed at the large numbers of people who went abroad. This included a very large number of officials of the Government of India and State Governments who, instead of doing their jobs, were constantly trying to learn something from abroad. This desire was no doubt laudable. We tried to make a rule so that nobody in government service could go without special reference to the Cabinet itself. The result of that rule was that half the work of the Cabinet was to consider these applications! It is amazing.

The other day, I had a chart prepared to show how many officials had gone abroad in the course of one year. It astonished me to see the number which ran into many hundreds. I agree that we should aim at higher efficiency and that our officials should go and learn. What disturbs me is the scale at which this has happened because of these scholarships and fellowships and things like that. There is a tendency to accept these scholarships too readily, because people feel that the United Nations or the FAO or some other organization is paying for them. They do not realize that payments are never made for nothing. In fact, a good part of the expense does fall on us. We also lose the ser-

vices of a highly paid man for a period. What do we pay him for?

—*Silver Jubilee celebrations of the Central Board of Irrigation and Power, New Delhi, November 17*

1953

I should like you to think for yourselves how far you have deliberately tried that humaneness of touch with the people you deal with in your offices and factories and how far you have made them feel that they are partners in a great undertaking. I recently went again to the Damodar Valley. I saw hundreds and thousands of workers doing odd jobs, carrying earth and so on. Meanwhile, the engineers, full of enthusiasm for the job they were doing, were explaining to me maps and charts. When I asked them, 'Have you ever tried to explain some of it in simple language to these workers who are carrying and shovelling earth from one place to another?' they said, 'No.' I called a few hundred workers there and sat by them. I asked them: 'What are you doing?' They said, 'We are carrying earth from here to there.' I said, 'Why?' They said, 'We don't know.' And then very briefly I tried to tell them of this magnificent undertaking, the Damodar Valley, which they were building.

I told them that great canals, great power works and factories would arise, that work opportunities would grow, that irrigation would prosper, and that there would be more food. I explained all this to them in very simple language. They felt it had something to do with them, that they would profit by it, and I hope that they took a little more interest in their work afterwards. Suppose all our engineers there explained things to them from time to time and took them into their confidence; I am quite sure that they would have more willing and more intelligent workers, because they would be producing in them a sense of partnership in a great adventure.

Have you ever tried to do that with your office and factory hands?

Do not think that these people are too dull or too unintelligent to understand it. . . If I went about like a schoolmaster or a boss ordering them about, their receptiveness would close up. I go as a colleague and a comrade and I credit them with intelligence to understand the most intricate problems. I talk to them about international affairs. I doubt whether many of our educated people know much about international affairs and their intricacies. Yet, I take the liberty and have the temerity to talk to the peasant in his field about international affairs, about our five-year plans, about the great things we are doing and I put it to him in simple language that he is a partner in all this progress. He grows interested when I tell him of this great land of India from the Himalayas to Cape Comorin, and all of us working together for the great common good. This human approach was always necessary, but today, with our democratic set-up, it is doubly essential because it is the people who finally decide. . .

—*Associated Chambers of Commerce, Calcutta, December 14*

There is a weakness in our country—a tendency to look to the sky and stars for guidance and to foresee the future by astrology. Blessed be those who are so interested! But our work lies in visualizing the future of our country not by looking to the stars and basing our calculations on their movements but by assessing our strength, resources and means and knowing how best to use them. Several factors and efforts go to the making and developing of our country but the engineers, probably, have the most active role to play. For they have the largest share in the execution of any plan. . .

Our services are steeped in a system of gradation or caste system which is probably the legacy of British rule. One could explain such a classification in the old system because it was the very basis of administration. All persons in the employment of government

were under the Viceroy, who was supreme, and perhaps such an arrangement was suited to those times. Such a pattern is totally out of place in the present set-up and conditions. But the pity of it is that people's minds still cling to the old system. It is possible that a renowned, first class engineer might be much more needed by us than any of our secretaries. Secretaries are available in abundance but engineers are few. It may be that though the engineer is working in his own sphere, yet in official status the secretary is in a way his superior. This is just a gradation. Whereas engineers have a reputation all over the world, the secretaries are not known to anyone outside Delhi. What I am driving at is that it is a wrong way to assess a man's worth by the salary drawn by him or the designation attached to his post. . .

Now let me warn you against one pitfall. I see a strange maldevelopment in the country and it conjures up before me a figure of a man five feet tall but with arms four feet long. The way government organizations and departments multiply leads us nowhere but to waste. With the growth of offices arises the problem of co-ordination between them. A co-ordinating agency is created and, as usual, its size also goes on increasing. Then arises the problem of how to co-ordinate the activities of the co-ordinating agencies. All this is at once baffling and amusing. If it is not stopped, I tell you; the head will remain small while the body will go on increasing in size. Such maldevelopment of organizations is dangerous to our country. It means that quality will suffer and quantity will increase. . .

—*24th Annual meeting of the Central Board of Irrigation and Power, New Delhi, October 26*

1954

I am not scholar enough to discuss the niceties of Hindu law. But I have dabbled in some broad

studies of law and custom and history and cultural developments. My own conception of Hindu society has been that it is essentially dynamic, not static and unchangeable. Indeed the mere fact that it has lasted a long time is due to a certain dynamism which has enabled it to adapt itself to changing conditions. Gradually, Hindu society became rather static, through the hardening of the caste system and in various other ways. This process was spread over hundreds of years, and the final seal was set upon it with the advent of the British Government in this country. . .

We have gone through political revolution in this country, and become independent. We are going through a process of economic change. There is another aspect, which is equally important, and that is social change. I do not think it is possible for you to think in terms of political change ignoring economic and social change. Most people now admit that economic change is as necessary as political change, but some people seem to think that 'social' change, using the word in a narrower context, is something entirely different from political and economic matters and that social life can be kept a closed preserve. I submit that this is not the right outlook, because life is an integrated whole. If the political context changes or the economic outlook varies, it follows that the social context also changes, whether you wish to or not. Therefore, a true revolution in a country must take into account all the three aspects together. The person who considers himself a political revolutionary but a reactionary or a conservative in the economic sense or in the social sense is not an integrated person; he lives in compartments, like Jekyll and Hyde.

Take the problem of untouchability. I cannot quote the sacred books, but many people hold that the sacred books enjoined in on them. Nevertheless, we came to the conclusion long ago that it must be done away with not only because it was unjust but, as Gandhiji repeatedly said, for the

very survival of Hindu society. That is to say, this important social change became essential even from the narrower point of view of Hindu society itself. That manner of thinking has to be applied to other problems of human relationships as well. After all, the biggest problems of the world are human relationships—whether of one individual with another, or an individual with a group, or one group with another group. . .

—Lok Sabha during the Special Marriage Bill debate, May 22

Our laws, our customs—for the moment I am speaking of the upper strata—fall heavily on the womenfolk. That is why we are introducing this and other pieces of legislation. This is a voluntary, permissive piece of legislation which people may or may not accept. If they marry in this way, they accept certain consequences. I do not see how anybody can object to it. Even though one objects, one has no reason to restrain other people, who do not object, from having their way. I am afraid many of our people have not got over primitive totems and taboos. We still live a clan life and think in a clan way, and many of our troubles are due to that fact. Therefore, I beg the House to take a larger view. . .

The House knows that customs have grown up under which different standards of morality are applied to men and women. You will find women standing up for this right of divorce though some men may challenge it because men happen to be in a dominant position. I hope they will not continue in that dominant position for all time. These different standards of morality cannot be maintained. Therefore, the approach in this Bill is to bring about a certain measure of equality between them. It is true that this cannot be done by law only. It is a question of custom, education, and basically of the economic position of the individual.

Some people say that if we have divorce by mutual consent, the

husband will exploit the wife, will kick her out and force her to give consent. It is a possibility; it may happen as many worse things often happen. I do not think it will happen if you give time. If the husband does want to behave in that way, the sooner the wife is rid of him the better. . .

—Speech in Lok Sabha on the Divorce Clause of the Special Marriage Bill, September, 16

... To hell with the man who cannot walk fast. It serves him right if he gets out of the ranks and falls out. We want no sluggards. We want no slow people who always complain about their service conditions and their transfers and so on. I am fed up with such complaints. Service conditions and salary and status may be important. But I want work and work and work. I want achievement. I want men who work as crusaders. I want men who are going to fight for what they think is right and not submit humbly to wrong. I want you to do big things. I want you to build up India. Can you conceive of a bigger thing than to build up this immense country of ours? That is the spirit in which you have to undertake this job. And let the weak and the slow and lazy go to the wall. There should be no pity for them.

—The Co-ordination Board of Minister for River Valley Projects, New Delhi, October 13

Planning is not putting down just as you want; planning is not merely giving priority to all things which you wish to do. Planning is something wider and deeper. . . Now, the first thing I should imagine about planning is to have a definite picture of where you are going to; one cannot frame vaguely, just doing good deeds from day to day like the boy-scouts, or putting up good enterprises which are good, of course, but we have to have some definite picture. I do not mean to say it

should be a rigid picture; it may be a changing picture as we gather experience, information, etc. Nevertheless, we have to plan for something. . . .

. . . . The mere fact of dealing with these vast populations is an exacting operation—changing them not at the top, not by laws passed by Parliament, but changing the human will, and taking them out of that static condition of mind and social habit which has been their lot for a long time. . .

. . . I wish to lay stress on that. The Planning Commission is of no use at all if it has a static outlook. That way, we sit, we sleep, we rest. One must have that dynamic outlook of change, change of every kind—political, of course, economic and social. . .

. . . The picture I have in mind is definitely and absolutely a socialistic picture of society. I am not using the word in a dogmatic sense at all, but in the sense of meaning largely that the means of production should be socially-owned and controlled for the benefit of society as a whole. . .

—*The National Development Council, November 9*

People talk about the public sector and the private sector. Does the House realize that the biggest and the overwhelming part of the private sector is the private sector of the peasants in India? That is the real private sector in our country, not the few factories we have.

There is much discussion about the public sector and the private sector. I said the other day—and said it more than once—that I attach great importance to the public sector. The pattern of society that we look forward to is a socialist pattern of society which is classless, casteless. So far as the Congress is concerned, for a long time past, it has laid down its objective as a casteless, classless society, which obviously, can be attained only in a socialistic pattern. But I would beg of you not

to imagine that because socialism conceives of nationalized industry, therefore you must have all industry nationalized. I think that as the socialist pattern grows, there is bound to be more and more nationalized industry, but what is important is not that there should be an attempt to nationalize everything, but that we should aim at the ultimate result, which is higher production and employment. If by taking any step you actually hinder the process of production and employment from growing, then that does not lead you to the socialistic pattern. In a country like India, where money, trained personnel and experience are lacking, we have to take advantage of such experience, training and money as we have. We want to make this business of building up India a co-operative enterprise of all the people. We try to avoid conflicts and try to avoid taking steps which have a chilling effect on this pattern. We want to go ahead in regard to production and employment. That is the vital thing. And in order to attain that, we have to create the right atmosphere and encourage initiative.

In regard to the public and the private sector, it is obvious that with the limited resources we have in the hands of the State, we cannot do all that we want to do at the present moment. We shall, of course, try to do as much as we can. But some people suggest that we must prevent the private sector from functioning in the field of industries. I think such an idea comes from confused thinking. I do not understand this attitude. I want a socialist society in India. I want to get out of this framework of an acquisitive society, but I am not going to get it by merely passing resolutions and raising slogans. I want India to move in that direction, carrying a large number of people with it. . .

—*Lok Sabha on December 21*

1955

We have met here because of an irrepressible urge amongst the peo-

ple of Asia and Africa. We have met because mighty forces are at work in these great continents, moving millions of people, creating in their minds urges and passions and desires for a change in their conditions. . .

We are determined not to fail. We are determined, in this new phase of Asia and Africa, to make good. We are determined not to be dominated in any way by any other country or continent. We are determined to bring happiness and prosperity to our people and to discard the age-old shackles that have tied us not only politically but economically—the shackles of colonialism and other shackles of our own making. No doubt there were differences in our discussions, and great criticism was levelled at certain resolutions; we had to meet such criticism because we wanted to achieve a common goal. But it is not resolutions that will solve the problems that face us today. Only our practises and actions will bring success to our aims and ideas. It is only then that we can make good what we lost in the past. We have to take a realistic view of all things and face them in a realistic spirit. . .

We want to be friends with the West and friends with the East and friends with everybody. The only approach to the mind and spirit of Asia is the approach of toleration and friendship and co-operation, not the approach of aggressiveness. I wish to speak no ill of anybody. In Asia, all of us have many faults as countries and as individuals. Our past history shows that. Nevertheless, I say that Europe has been in the past a continent full of conflicts, full of trouble, full of hatred. Europe's conflicts continue, its wars continue and we have been dragged into these wars because we were tied to Europe's chariot wheels. Are we going to continue to be tied to Europe's troubles. Europe's hatreds and Europe's conflicts? I hope not. . .

We have passed resolutions about conditions in this or that country. But I think there is nothing more terrible than the

infinite tragedy of Africa in the past few hundred years. Everything else pales into insignificance when I think of the infinite tragedy of Africa ever since the days when millions of Africans were carried away as galley slaves to America and elsewhere, half of them dying in the galleys. We must accept responsibility for it, all of us, even though we ourselves were not directly involved. But unfortunately, in a different sense, even now the tragedy of Africa is greater than that of any other continent, whether it is racial or political. It is up to Asia to help Africa to the best of her ability because we are sister continents...

—*The Asian-African Conference at Bandung, Indonesia, April 24*

... I think it may be said without undue exaggeration that India has played a significant role in times of difficulty. Often enough it was not a public role, but a gentle role of friendly approach to the parties concerned. This has sometimes helped in bringing them nearer to one another. We have never sought to be, and we have never acted as, mediators. . . All that we have suggested and sought to bring about is that the great countries should face each other, talk to each other and decide their problems themselves. It is not for us to advise them what to do. We can at best remove some obstacles which have arisen during the last few years.

India's contribution in this direction may perhaps be put in one word or two, Panchsheel, and the ideas underlying it. . .

I think we may take some credit for spreading this conception of a peaceful settlement, and above all, of non-interference. That each country should carve out its own destiny without interfering with others is an important conception, though there is nothing new about it. No great truths may be new. But it is true that an idea like non-interference requires emphasis, because there has been in the past a tendency for great countries to interfere with others, to bring

pressure to bear upon them, and to want these others to line up with them. I suppose that is a natural result of bigness. It has taken place throughout history.

This stress on non-interference of any kind—political, economic or ideological—is an important factor in the world situation today. The fact that it will not be wholly acted upon here and there is really of little relevance. You make a law, and the law gradually influences the whole structure of life in a country, even though some people may not obey it. Even those who do not believe in it gradually come within its scope.

The conception of Panchsheel means that there may be different ways of progress, possibly different outlooks, but that, broadly, the ultimate objectives may be the same. If I may use another type of analogy, truth is not confined to one country or one people; it has far too many aspects for anyone to presume that he knows all, and each country and each people, if they are true to themselves, have to find out their path themselves, through trial and error, through suffering and experience. Only then do they grow. If they merely copy others, the result is likely to be that they will not grow. And even though the copy may be completely good, it will be something undertaken by them without a normal growth of the mind which really makes it an organic part of themselves. . .

—*Lok Sabha, September 17*

Yesterday I had the honour to present a resolution before you which you passed. In it we stated that we wanted it to be clearly understood that we aim at a socialistic pattern of society. In the present resolution which deals with the economic policy, we have to give effect to that decision of yours, because ultimately it is the economic policy which is going to shape that picture of India which you call the 'socialistic pattern'.

This resolution is therefore of the highest importance.

In a resolution of this kind, however long-drawn-out it might be, one cannot enter into the details of policies. There is a danger in such resolutions, and that is that you may use striking words and vague phrases and imagine that you have given a great lead to the country. That does not help us, because we have to grapple with the problems of India. How to deal with those problems is itself a problem. The problems of unemployment and of raising the level of our people are not solved by broad decisions or slogans. I say this without any disrespect to those who wield striking words, because I myself have been a wielder of words all my life, drafting resolutions, getting them passed and so on. But a time comes when you have to forget words and deal with hard actualities. This applies more especially to Congressmen because they have much more responsibility than others in running the government and deciding the government's policy. For us merely to write resolutions is not good enough. What, then, must we do? The only thing to be done is to sit down and draw up a plan, a detailed plan. That is the function of the Planning Commission and of the government and of those whom they consult. Obviously, a Congress session cannot sit down and draw up a five-year plan.

This resolution contains a brief reference to the objective to be achieved. First of all, after expressing appreciation of what has been done, the resolution says that the time has now come for substantially increasing production, for raising the standards of living and for having progressively fuller employment so as to achieve full employment within a period of ten years. The first thing to note about this resolution is that it does not merely repeat what we have said before. It points out that the time has come for us to advance on the economic and social plane. In a sense we have been doing it, but we have not been doing it adequately. The time has come to put an end to unemployment in ten years. By ten years we mean two

five-year plan periods. I wish you to appreciate that we try not to word our resolution in what might be called bombastic language.

We are an old and mature organization with a great deal of experience. It is not desirable, therefore, that we should use words which are vague or bombastic. On the whole we understand what we propose to do. If we really give effect to this resolution it means bringing about a revolution in this country, an economic revolution bigger than any that has taken place in our times. Take the simple fact of putting an end to unemployment within ten years. Just try to think what it means in this country with its population growing year by year. It is a terrific job, the like of which has not been done in these circumstances in any other country.

Yesterday, we had the President of Yugoslavia here. It was a great privilege to have had amidst us such a great revolutionary, soldier of freedom and builder. Whatever Yugoslavia's troubles, unemployment has never been one of them. In fact, they are short of human beings to do their work. For us to compare ourselves with Yugoslavia in the matter of unemployment will not therefore lead us anywhere. Take the Soviet Union—a great big country, four or five times the size of India, with a population which is only about one-third of India's. The problem is different for them—a vast area with a small population. Our problem is different—a big country, heavily populated, and underdeveloped.

Similarly, we cannot compare our problems with those of America, England and Western Europe where they have had two hundred years of industrial growth. These comparisons may sometimes be helpful but they mislead. We have to understand our problem as it is in India, no doubt learning from what has been done in America, England, Yugoslavia, Russia or China, but at the same time bearing in mind that the conditions in India are special and particular. Further, we have also to understand that our background

is in many ways peculiar, particularly the Gandhian background.

- We talk about planning. As you all know, planning is essential, and without it there would be anarchy in our economic development. About five years ago, planning was not acceptable to many people in high places but today it has come to be recognized as essential even by the man in the street. Our First Five-Year Plan is now about three years old, and we are now thinking about our Second Five-Year Plan. A phrase in this resolution says that the second Five-Year Plan must keep the national aims of a Welfare State and a socialistic economy before it. These can only be achieved by a considerable increase in national income, and our economic policy must, therefore, aim at plenty and equitable distribution. The Second Five-Year Plan must keep these objectives in view and should be based on the physical needs of the people. These are really the important and governing words of the resolution and ought to be the controlling factors in drawing up the Second Five-Year Plan.

Before going on to other aspects of the question, may I say that a Welfare State and a socialistic pattern of economy are not synonymous expressions? It is true that a socialistic economy must provide for a Welfare State but it does not necessarily follow that a Welfare State must also be based on a socialistic pattern of society. Therefore the two, although they overlap, are yet somewhat different, and we say that we want both. We cannot have a Welfare State in India with all the socialism or even communism in the world unless our national income goes up greatly.

Socialism or communism might help you to divide your existing wealth, if you like, but in India, there is no existing wealth for you to divide; there is only poverty to divide. It is not a question of distributing the wealth of the few rich men here and there. That is not going to make any difference in our national income. We might adopt that course for the psychological good that might come out of it. But from the practical point

of view, there is not much to divide in India because we are a poor country. We must produce wealth, and then divide it equitably. How can we have a Welfare State without wealth? Wealth need not mean gold and silver but wealth in goods and services. Our economic policy must therefore aim at plenty. Until very recently economic policies have often been based on scarcity. But the economics of scarcity has no meaning in the world of today.

Now I come to this governing clause which I just referred to with regard to the Second Five-Year Plan, namely, that the Second Five-Year Plan should be based on the physical needs of the people. You will remember that yesterday the President also emphasized the necessity for basing planning on the people's physical needs. Our First Five-Year Plan was based on the data and the material we had at our disposal as well as on things that were actually being done at the time. Take these big river valley schemes. All these things were being done at the time and we had no choice but to continue them. We had to accept what had been done. Of course, we added one or two new schemes and rearranged the priorities. That is to say, our Plan was largely based on the finances available and consisted in taking up those schemes which were most useful. But it was limited planning, not planning in the real sense of the word.

The conception of planning today is not to think of the money we have and then to divide it up in the various schemes but to measure the physical needs, that is to say, how much of food the people want, how much of clothes they want, how much of housing they want, how much of education they want, how much of health services they want, how much of work and employment they want, and so on. We calculate all these and then decide what everyone in India should have of these things. Once we do that, we can set about increasing production and fulfilling these needs. It is not a simple matter because in calculating the needs of the people, we have to calculate on the basis not only of

an increasing population but of increasing needs.

I shall give you an instance. Let us take sugar. Our people now consume much more sugar than they used to, with the result that our calculations about sugar production went wrong. Now, why do they eat more sugar? Evidently because they are better off. If a man getting a hundred rupees finds his income increased to a hundred and fifty, he will eat more sugar, buy more cloth, and so on. Therefore, in making calculations, we have to keep in mind that the extra money that goes into circulation because of the higher salaries and wages, affects consumption. So we find out what in five years' time will be the needs of our people, including even items needed by our Defence Services. Then we decide how to produce those things in India. In order to meet a particular variety of needs we have now to put up a factory which will produce the goods that we need five years hence. Thus, planning is a much more complicated process than merely drawing up some schemes and fixing a system of priorities.

Behind all this is another factor—finance. Finance is important but not so important as people think. What is really important is drawing up the physical needs of the people and then working to produce things which will fulfil such needs. If you are producing wealth, it does not matter very much if you have some deficit financing because you are actually putting money back through goods and services. Therefore it does not matter how you manipulate your currency so long as your production is also keeping pace with it. Of course there is the fear of inflation. We must avoid it. But there is no such fear at present in India. On the other hand, there is deflation.

Nevertheless, we have to guard against inflation. We have to produce the equivalent of the money pumped in. Sometimes there is a gap between investment and production, when inflation sets in. For example, let us say we put in a hundred crores of rupees in a river

valley scheme which takes seven or eight years to build. During the years it is being built we get nothing out of it but expenditure. This can be balanced in cottage industries, in which the gap in time is not large. The additional money that you have put in is not locked up for long. Therefore in planning we have to balance heavy industry, light industry, village industry and cottage industry. We want heavy industry because without it we can never really be an independent country. Light industry too has become essential for us. So has cottage industry. I am putting forward this argument not from the Gandhian ideal, but because it is essential in order to balance heavy industry and to prevent the big gap between the pumping in of money and production.

But production is not all. A man works and produces something because he expects others to consume what he produces. If there is no consumption, he stops production. Therefore whether it is a factory or a cottage unit, consumption of what is produced should be taken care of. Mass production inevitably involves mass consumption, which in turn involves many other factors, chiefly the purchasing power of the consumer. Therefore planning must take note of the need to provide more purchasing power by way of wages, salaries and so on. Enough money should be thrown in to provide this purchasing power and to complete the circle of production and consumption. You will then produce more and consume more, and as a result your standard of living will go up.

I have ventured to take up your time in order to give you some idea of the approach that is intended in this resolution when we say that the Second Five-Year Plan should be based on the physical needs of the people. I hope it has helped you to understand the way we are thinking. I myself do not see any other way of rapid progress. The financial approach to planning is not rapid enough. I should like you to explain this to people when you go home to your respective towns and districts.

We are responsible for giving effect to this resolution. We have to fulfil our promise.

60th session of the Indian National Congress at Avadi, January 22

It seems to me that while the progress of women's education is forging ahead at such a pace, some attention may also be paid to men's education. Truly, no argument is required in defence of women's education. For my part, I have always been strongly of the opinion that while it may be possible to neglect men's education, it is not possible or desirable to neglect women's education. The reasons are obvious. If you educate the women, probably men will also be affected thereby, and in any event children will be affected. For every educationist knows that the formative years of a person's life are the first seven or eight years. We talk about schools and colleges which are no doubt important, but a person is more or less made in the first ten years of his or her life. Obviously, in that period, it is the mother who counts most of all. Therefore, the mother who has been well trained in various ways becomes essential to education.

Most mothers, trained otherwise, I regret to say, are not good mothers. They are too soft. They stuff their children with all kinds of eatables, put too many clothes on them, wrap their necks and heads and ears with all kinds of woollen apparel and make the boy or girl almost an imbecile before he or she grows up. Therefore, it is necessary for women to be educated, if not for themselves, at any rate for their children.

A great French writer once remarked: 'If you want me to tell you what a nation is like, or what a social organization is like, tell me the position of women in that nation.' The status and social place of women will indicate the country's character more than anything else. That applies equally to the educational, social, economic and other fields.

The idea that women should be kept away from most occupations

no longer finds favour. It might be that certain occupations are not suited for women, but that is a different matter. There are plenty of occupations which they could engage in and which they do engage in. If we analyse the matter carefully, we shall find that the average woman in India works in the field. In fact both man and woman work in the field. It is only when one gets to the middle class that the question of distinction arises. The great majority of our women have to work because economic circumstances compel them to work.

Unfortunately, the idea has been prevailing—I am glad to see that it is rapidly fading—that the less work one does the higher is one's status in society. Thus the person who never works at all has the highest status. In my own part of the country, you can see a woman working hard in the field or elsewhere with her menfolk, but when the husband begins to earn more, people seem to think that she should retire into purdah. . . The whole conception behind this business is totally unsuited to our times.

Of course, in my part of the world, there are strange stories which some of you may have heard about what the Begums of Oudh used to do or what people thought they ought to have done. They were so delicately nurtured, it seems, that whenever they saw an orange at a distance they caught a cold. It is said that when a doctor or hakim was called in, he was not supposed to feel the pulse in the normal way. Apart from being improper it was thought it might hurt the ladies' gentle wrists if the doctor touched them. So it was arranged that a slender thread should run from the wrist to the doctor who should feel the thread and read the pulse. That might have been a good way of proceeding in the matter, because most of these women were neurotics and required no treatment. And so it did not matter what their pulse said.

That age is past and everybody, man or woman, has got to be physically good and strong and mentally

alert, and do creative, productive work. A time is going to come when people will not tolerate a person who does no work. Therefore, apart from the intrinsic desirability of education, people should have education in sheer self-defence, whether it be defence as a nation against other nations of the world or within the nation itself. Of course, I admit as Prime Minister—and I am sure, my colleague, the Minister for Education, Maulana Azad, will also admit it—that it should be the duty of the State to provide education at all levels to everybody. I hope a time will come when that will be done. Right now, however, we are struggling against difficulties of finance. Education is of basic importance, of course; but at the same time it is tied up with the productive capacity of the nation. To increase the productive capacity many things of basic importance have to be done. We have to decide which problem is to be given priority of treatment and draw up a balanced system of priorities.

Obviously, in every system, education has to be given a very high place. The problem now is what type of education it should be and also how far we should go in for expensive buildings. Some of the expensive buildings which have been put up for village schools in North India are ugly, futile and in every sense bad. High structures are put up and charged for by the P.W.D. when a neat cottage would be infinitely more graceful and useful besides being inexpensive.

We have wrong ideas about many things and sometimes suffer from what may be called the Anglo-Indian conception of things. I am not using the expression in the racial sense but am referring to the mixture of conceptions arising from the impact of the English mind in India. In architecture, housing and other matters, we seem to have lost our foothold, more or less having lost faith in our own conceptions. We have accepted many western ideas, which were partly imposed on us regardless of the fact that India is a country entirely different from England, climatically and otherwise. Of course, the English rulers

did not worry much about these matters. They also felt that imperial izzat required that they should impose their own conception of things, buildings and the rest of it, even in a small place. But that was really our fault and not the fault of Englishmen. However, the fact remains that we have inherited all kinds of astonishing ideas about buildings and the rest. I am quite sure that education will advance rapidly if we simplify our ideas about buildings and spend more on education and less on bricks. I am all for dignified buildings for educational institutions. I believe that good buildings do produce a strong impression on the person concerned. I do not want shabby, shoddy structures; we should put up dignified, solid buildings, but, meanwhile, if we are to make progress, let us spend what we have on education and its content, rather than on brick and mortar. . .

—*The laying of the foundation tablet of a women's college at Teynampet, Madras, January 22*

Geography made India, in her long past, almost a closed country. Surrounded by the sea and the mighty Himalayas, it was not easy of entry. Migrations took place in India in the course of thousands of years but probably there was no big migration of peoples after the coming of the Aryans. We must contrast this with the tremendous movement of peoples right across Asia and Europe, one tribe driving the other and changing the texture of the population. In India, after the Aryans came, these incursions were relatively limited. They produced their effect but did not change overmuch that basic population. It must be remembered, however, that there were marked changes even in India. The Scythians and the Huns and the many others who came to India later developed into branches of the Rajputs and claimed ancient lineage.

The fact that India was for long a closed land gave it its peculiar character. We became as a race

somewhat inbred. We developed some customs which are unknown and not understood in other parts of the world. Caste, in its innumerable forms, is a typical product of India. Untouchability, the objections to inter-dining, inter-marriage, etc., are unknown in any other country. The result was a certain narrowness in our outlook. Indians, even to the present day, find it difficult to mix with others. Not only that, but people of each caste tend to remain separate even when they go to other countries. Most of us in India take all this for granted and do not realize how it astonishes, and even shocks the people of other countries.

Thus, in India, we developed at one and the same time the broadest tolerance and catholicity of thought and opinion as well as the narrowest social forms of behaviour. This split personality has pursued us and we struggle against it even today. We overlook and excuse our own failings and narrowness of custom and habit by references to the great thought we have inherited from our ancestors. But there is an essential conflict between the two, and so long as we do not resolve it, we shall continue to have this split personality.

In a more or less static period these opposed elements did not come into conflict with each other much. But, as the tempo of political and economic change has grown faster, these conflicts have come to be more in evidence. In the atomic age, at the threshold of which we stand, we are compelled by overwhelming circumstances to put an end to this inner conflict. To fail to do so is to fail as a nation and lose even the virtues that we have possessed.

We have to face, therefore, this crisis of the spirit in India, even as we have to face great political and economic problems. The industrial revolution is coming rapidly to India and changing us in many ways. It is an inevitable consequence of political and economic change that there should be social changes also if we are to remain as integrated human beings and an integrated nation. We cannot have political change and in-

dustrial progress and imagine that we can continue unchanged in the social sphere. The stresses and strains will be too great and if we do not resolve them, we shall crack up. . . . It is extraordinary how our professions run far ahead of our practice. We talk of peace and non-violence and function in a different way. We talk of tolerance and construe it to mean our way of thinking only and are intolerant of other ways. We proclaim our ideal to be philosophic detachment even in the midst of action, that of a *sthitaprajna*, but we act on a far lower plane and a growing indiscipline degrades us as individuals and as a community. . . .

—Foreword in Hindi to '*Sanskriti ke Char Adhyaya*' by Ramdhari Sinha '*Dinkar*', September 30

We have these other parties, the Socialist, the Praja Socialist, and the Communist. Where exactly do they stand? I have often tried to find out where the Socialists stand. Unfortunately they have got so accustomed to the use of strong language that it is difficult to find out any meaning in that language. It is just strong language. The Socialists generally live in a state of extreme frustration and are angry with the world because the world doesn't listen to them. India doesn't listen to them. I am very sorry I can't make India listen to them. I wish them prosperity. I wish them good fortune. But what am I to do when they remain cut off from the things that are happening in India and get angrier and angrier that success doesn't come their way? I advise them in all humility and in all modesty to find out what is wrong with themselves. We don't say we are infallible. We have made mistakes. You and I and all of us can progress only by trial and error. But we must have at least the capacity to learn from our mistakes, to correct them. Unfortunately our friends in the Socialist Party do not have the capacity to learn from anything, either other people's mistakes or their own mistakes. They do not seem

to know what the facts of life are in India. It is no good repeating slogans, however good the slogans might be. Repetition of a slogan does not create a policy.

Let us come to the Communists—these brave revolutionaries whose revolution consists not in an application of intelligence but in trying to find out what is happening 5,000 miles away, and trying to copy it, whether it fits in or not with the present state of India. Their mind is a kind of inverted mirror which reflects something that happened not today but some time ago in some other country. I am not against communism. I am not against socialism. The only thing is, I am for India and nobody else. I am for the Indian people. The other day the leaders of the Soviet Union came here and we gave them a welcome which they will remember and the world will remember. It was a friendly welcome, a cordial welcome, because we are not opposed to them. We are friendly with them and their country. We wish them well. But wishing them well doesn't mean that we should lock up our own minds and intelligence and forget our own experience and our own country. India is some definite entity in the world. And I cannot understand how anyone can simply imagine that India's mind and heart can be locked up and made to follow a dictated policy from somewhere else. Is that the kind of independence and freedom that we have achieved? Surely not. It is a different matter to be friendly, to learn from other countries. And I tell you there is a great deal that we can learn from Russia. Plenty of people from the Soviet Union are coming to India—technicians, doctors, and people who help in industries, from whom we intend learning. We are even sending for coaches for athletics. Similarly we want to learn from China, where there has been very great development recently of co-operatives. Well, we want to develop our co-operatives, and we shall send our people to learn how the Chinese are doing it and how far we can learn from them. We propose to learn a great deal from the United States of America,

which is the most advanced industrial power in the world. So we propose to learn from every country and we propose to be friendly with every country.

But our friends, the Communists, have the idea that friendship with one country inevitably means hostility towards another country. That is, to be friends you must not only be friends with me, but you must be enemies to my enemy, or those whom I consider my enemy. This, surely, is a remarkable attitude to take.

—Trichur, December 26

1956

We say, and I am glad you agree with it, that we want a socialistic pattern of society. That is a phrase which means, in one word, socialism. Do not imagine that it means anything other than socialism. A socialistic pattern is socialism. Some people seem to make fine distinctions among socialistic pattern, socialist pattern and socialism. They are all exactly the same thing without the slightest difference. But what they are is not such a very easy thing for anyone to put down and define, except in the broadest terms. We have not approached this question in any doctrinaire way. And that is good, because doctrinaire thinking leads to rigidity and rigidity of outlook at a moment of great change in the world is bad, because it leaves us high and dry. This should not mean that we think of a socialist pattern of society in some flabby, goody-goody way, though there are many people, perhaps more in India than elsewhere, who indulge in rather sloppy thinking on these subjects, and who think that by an expression of goodwill to all and sundry they have done their duty.

After all, we live in a social set-up which has its good points and which, undoubtedly, has its bad features. It is not much good our expressing vaguely our disapproval of the bad features or taking them for granted. We have to fight them and remove them

just as, let us say, we disapprove of untouchability and of caste. It is no good passively expressing disapproval. We have actively to do something to remove an evil in our social structure which comes in the way of human happiness, human co-operation and human progress.

—Conference of the All-India Manufacturers' Organization.
New Delhi, April 14

1957

The spirit of dogma, I say with respect, has affected badly the religious quest and made both minds and practices conform too rigidly. Rigid and intolerant ideas, ideas which assert in effect that 'I am in possession of the truth, the whole truth, every bit of truth, and nobody outside the pale has it,' narrow men's minds, shutting the door against a tolerant and objective approach, where men not only look up at the heavens without fear but are also prepared to look down into the pit of hell without fear. It seems to me that people in the Buddha's time were more advanced in tolerance and compassion than we are, although they were not so advanced in technology and science.

While I was at Nalanda it struck me that quite apart from the religious issues, there might be something worthwhile in the pagan view of life, because it is a tolerant view of life. While it may hold one opinion it respects the opinion of the others, and allows that there may be truth in the others' opinions, too. It looks at the universe and the mysteries of the universe and tries to fathom them in a spirit of humility. It realizes that truth is too big to be grasped at once, that however much one may know there is always much else to be known, and that it is possible that others may possess a part of that truth; and so, while the pagan view of life worships its own gods, it also does honour to unknown gods.

The scientist is supposed to be an objective seeker after truth.

Science has grown because in a large measure the great scientists have sought truth in that way. But I suppose no man today, not even a scientist, can live in a world of his own, in some kind of ivory tower, cut off from what is happening. Therefore, science today has perhaps begun to cross the borders of morals and ethics. If it gets divorced completely from the realm of morality and ethics then the power it possesses may be used for evil purposes. But above all, if it ties itself to the gospel of hatred and violence, then undoubtedly it will have taken a wrong direction which will bring much peril to the world. I plead with the scientists here and elsewhere to remember that the scientific spirit is essentially one of tolerance, one of humility, one of realization that somebody else may also have a bit of the truth. Scientists should note that they do not have a monopoly of the truth; that nobody has a monopoly, no country, no people, no book. Truth is too vast to be contained in the minds of human beings, or in books, however sacred.

—The Science Congress, Calcutta,
January 14

1958

The old civilisations with the many virtues that they possess, have obviously proved inadequate. The new western civilisation, with all its triumphs and achievements and also with its atomic bombs, also appears inadequate and, therefore, the feeling grows that there is something wrong with our civilisation. Indeed, essentially our problems are those of civilisation itself. Religion gave a certain moral and spiritual discipline; it also tried to perpetuate superstition and social usages. Indeed, those superstitions and social usages enmeshed and overwhelmed the real spirit of religion. Disillusionment followed. Communism comes in the wake of this disillusionment and offers some kind of faith and some kind of discipline. To some extent it fills a vacuum. It succeeds in some

measure by giving a content to man's life. But in spite of its apparent success, it fails, partly because of its rigidity, but, even more so, because it ignores certain essential needs of human nature. There is much talk in communism of the contradictions of capitalist society and there is truth in that analysis. But we see the growing contradictions within the rigid framework of communism itself. Its suppression of individual freedom brings about powerful reactions. Its contempt for what might be called the moral and spiritual side of life not only ignores something that is basic in man, but also deprives human behaviour of standards and values. Its unfortunate association with violence encourages a certain evil tendency in human beings.

I have the greatest admiration for many of the achievements of the Soviet Union. Among these great achievements is the value attached to the child and the common man. Their system of education and health are probably the best in the world. But it is said, and rightly, that there is suppression of individual freedom there. And yet the spread of education in all its forms is itself a tremendous liberating force which ultimately will not tolerate that suppression of freedom. This again is another contradiction. Unfortunately, communism became too closely associated with the necessity for violence and thus the idea which it placed before the world became a tainted one. Means distorted ends. We see here the powerful influence of wrong means and methods. . .

This is completely opposed to the peaceful approach which Gandhiji taught us. Communists as well as anti-communists, both seem to imagine that a principle can only be stoutly defended by language of violence, and by condemning those who do not accept it. For both of them there are no shades, there is only black and white. That is the old approach of the bigoted aspects of some religions. It is not the approach of tolerance, of feeling that perhaps others might have some share of the truth also. Speaking for myself,

I find this approach wholly unscientific, unreasonable and uncivilised, whether it is applied in the realm of religion or economic theory or anything else. I prefer the old pagan approach to tolerance, apart from its religious aspects. But whatever we may think about it, we have arrived at a stage in the modern world when an attempt at forcible imposition of ideas on any large section of people is bound ultimately to fail. In present circumstances this will lead to war and tremendous destruction. There will be no victory, only defeat for everyone. Even this, we have seen, in the last year or two, that it is not easy for even great powers to reintroduce colonial control over territories which have recently become independent. This was exemplified by the Suez incident in 1956. Also what happened in Hungary demonstrated that the desire for national freedom is stronger even than any ideology and cannot ultimately be suppressed. What happened in Hungary was not essentially a conflict between communism and anti-communism. It represented nationalism striving for freedom from foreign control. . .

We talk of a welfare state and of democracy and socialism. They are good concepts but they hardly convey a clear and unambiguous meaning. This was the argument and then the question arose as to what our ultimate objective should be: Democracy and socialism are means to an end, not the end itself. We talk of the good of society. Is this something apart from and transcending the good of the individuals composing it? If the individual is ignored and sacrificed for what is considered the good of the society, is that the right objective to have?

It was agreed that the individual should not be so sacrificed and indeed that real social progress will come only when opportunity is given to the individual to develop provided the individual is not a selected group, but comprises the whole community. The touchstone, therefore, should be how far any political or social theory enables the individual to rise above his petty self and thus

think in terms of the good of all. The law of life should not be competition or acquisitiveness but co-operation. the good of each contributing to the good of all. In such a society the emphasis will be on duties, not on rights; the rights will follow the performance of the duties. We have to give a new direction to education and evolve a new type of humanity. . .

But obviously it does not solve any of these problems and, in a sense, we remain where we were. In India we talk of the Welfare State and socialism. In a sense, every country, whether it is capitalist, socialist or communist, accepts the ideal of the Welfare State. Capitalism, in a few countries at least, has achieved this common welfare to a very large extent, though it has far from solved its own problems and there is a basic lack of something vital. Democracy allied to capitalism has undoubtedly toned down many of its evils and in fact is different now from what it was a generation or two ago. In industrially advanced countries there has been a continuous and steady upward trend of economic development. Even the terrible losses of world wars have not prevented this trend, in so far as these highly developed countries are concerned. Further, this economic development has spread, though in varying degrees, to all classes. This does not apply to countries which are industrially undeveloped. Indeed, in those countries the struggle for development is very difficult and sometimes, in spite of efforts, not only do economic inequalities remain, but tend to become worse. Normally speaking, it may be said that the forces of a capitalist society, if left unchecked, tend to make the rich richer and the poor poorer and thus increase the gap between them. This applies to countries as well as groups or regions or classes within the countries. Various democratic processes interfere with these normal trends. Capitalism itself has, therefore, developed some socialistic features even though its major aspects remain.

Socialism, of course, deliberately wants to interfere with the normal

processes and thus not only adds to the productive forces but lessens inequalities. But, what is socialism? It is difficult to give a precise answer and there are innumerable definitions of it. Some people probably think of socialism vaguely just as something which does good and which aims at equality. That does not take us very far. Socialism is basically a different approach from that of capitalism, though I think it is true that the wide gap between them tends to lessen because many of the ideas of socialism are gradually incorporated even in the capitalist structure. Socialism is after all not only a way of life but a certain scientific approach to social and economic problems. If socialism is introduced in a backward and underdeveloped country, it does not suddenly make it any less backward. In fact we then have a backward and poverty-stricken socialism. . .

—*'The Basic Approach,' published in the AICC Economic Review, August 15*

1961

We call ourselves a conference of non-aligned countries. Now, the word non-aligned may be differently interpreted but basically it was used, and coined almost, with the meaning non-aligned with the great power blocs of the world. Non-aligned has a negative meaning, but if you give it a positive connotation it means nations which object to this lining-up for war purposes—military blocs, military alliances and the like. Therefore we keep away from this and we want to throw our weight, such as it is, in favour of peace. In effect, therefore, when there is a crisis involving the possibility of war the very fact that we are unaligned should stir us to action, should stir us to thought, should stir us to feel that now more than ever it is up to us to do whatever we can to prevent such a calamity coming down upon us. So from every point of view and from the point of view of our inception and

being as modern nations this problem is dominantly before us. . .

I therefore submit that we must look at things in the proper perspective today. First things must come first, and nothing is more important or has more priority than this world situation of war and peace. . . Of course, we stand for anti-colonialism, anti-imperialism, anti-racialism, and all that. All our lives, the lives of most of us present here, have been spent in that and we shall continue the struggle, but nevertheless the point arises, at this particular crisis, as to what we are going to do. Pass long resolutions and make brave declarations? That is easy enough; we have done it before and we can do it today too; but what else can we do to meet the crisis, because the problem of war and peace has an intimate relation to all those other matters we stand for. It is war or the fear of war that has led to the cold war; It is the cold war which has resulted and is resulting in the old imperialism and the old colonialism hanging on wherever they exist because they deem it advantageous. . .

It has become a commonplace for people in every country to refer to the dangers of modern nuclear warfare. Although we talk about it, I am not so sure that even those who talk about it fully and emotionally realize what this means. We talk about the destruction of civilization, the destruction of humanity, the destruction of the human race, if nuclear war comes. Well, if this is so, something much more is required, some greater effort, some greater attempt on our part to do what we can to avoid it. I know that the key to the situation does not lie in the hands of this Conference or in those of other congresses or conferences. The key to the situation today lies essentially in the hands of two great powers—the United States of America and the Soviet Union. Nevertheless I think that this Conference, or rather the countries that are represented in this Conference, are not so helpless that they can look on while the world is destroyed and war is declared. I think we can make a difference—possibly we can, I cannot guaran-

tee it—and if so we should try our utmost to do it and not talk about other subjects, even though they are important subjects, while the world goes to its doom. That is the thing I would beg this assembly to remember. And I would beg that in whatever declaration it may make, this should be put foremost and topmost, and perhaps be isolated to show that it is the main thing, that other things may be very important but they are secondary. . .

It is a strange thing that some few years ago—six, seven or eight, if you like—this business of non-alignment was a rare phenomenon. A few countries here and there talked about it and other countries rather made fun of it, or at any rate did not take it seriously. 'Non-alignment? What is this? You must be on this side or that side'. That was the argument. Well, that argument is dead today; nobody dare say that, because the whole course of history of the last few years has shown the growing opinion, the spread of this conception of non-alignment. Why is that so? Because it was in tune with the course of events; it was in tune with the thinking of vast numbers of people. . .

I believe firmly that the only possible way ultimately to solve these problems, or many of them, is by complete disarmament. Yet it would be absurd for me to say, 'In the next week or month, decide on complete disarmament' because it is not a practicable proposition. Today the situation is such that their fears from each other are leading them towards greater armaments all the time, whether you look at one side or the other. Therefore, although I consider disarmament an absolute necessity for the peace of the world in the future—I think that without disarmament these difficulties, fears and conflicts will continue—nevertheless one cannot expect suddenly, because this Conference wants it, disarmament to appear on the scene in full panoply. . . I recognize that we cannot issue mandates. I think we are an important Conference. I think we represent countries which individually, and certainly jointly, represent some-

thing important and valuable in the world and our voice counts to some extent. That is true.

At the same time we must not overestimate our own importance. After all, we do not control the strings of the world, not only in the military sense but in other senses also. If our mandate ran it would be easy enough—we would issue the mandate. But we know that our mandate does not run all over the place. . . .

So I am venturing to suggest not any specific course of action but rather a mental outlook that should govern us in approaching this problem: that we should think of this as the most vital and important problem of the day and everything else as being secondary, however important it is. We can deal with other things more effectively and more strongly after we have dealt with this. Otherwise no other problem remains: they are submerged in the terrible disaster of war. . . .

That is the main point I should like to place before this assembly. . . .

—The Conference of Heads of State or Government of non-aligned countries, Belgrade

1962

Our Plan is the basic thing. It is meant to strengthen the nation, to increase the nation's welfare and the individual welfare of the nation. Ultimately, a country is only strong if its economy is strong and the people are progressing and their standard of living is being raised. That is why we have paid so much attention to the Plan. But sometimes a crisis occurs such as has occurred in India today, when all our energies have to be diverted to that end. That does not mean that we forget the Plan, because the Plan itself is one aspect of meeting the crisis in the long run, not in the immediate present. In the long run, a nation which is economically strong and productive can meet any danger. Thus, for instance, even if we have to prepare for military conflicts on a

large scale in the field of war, in fact, the only preparation, the real preparation is to produce the stuff that you want. That means production, that means the Plan—we increase our productive capacity, our electric power, our agricultural capacity—all, that becomes a part of the military effort, apart from everything else. So the Plan is by no means an alternative to a military effort. In fact, it is a part of it. It may, of course, be that the present Plan has to be adjusted somewhat to the present day needs. Those items in it which are not of a high priority can be delayed considerably. That is a different matter but in the main the Plan has to go on apart from everything else because of the situation created by the Chinese invasion.

Now, apart from that, I think this aspect should be understood and explained and publicised to our people, because our people—all of us, not only we, you and I—are not, I may use the word, military-minded. I am not ashamed on not being military-minded. Military-minded does not mean that we have no knowledge of military affairs. We may have, we have studied them, but I meant by 'military-minded', of thinking and functioning in terms of a military mind. The far more military-minded people are those who know nothing about military matters and who go up and down the streets shouting slogans—they are very military-minded, very aggressive-minded, very foolish-minded and very ignorant-minded. It does not help at all anybody. . . .

Since Independence, naturally, we have been anxious to protect our country and for the first time our defence forces have been directed from the country—not from Whitehall. . . .

The second change was the manufacture of equipment in India. Now that is a part of the general process of industrialisation, it is not only equipment, anything else. That is why the development of industry was considered important—the development of electric power, etc. . . .

The first point I would like you to bear in mind is this that while

today inevitably circumstances have forced us to face this war effort in our country, none of you—and no Indian, I hope—will ever agree to surrender to invasion or aggression. If that is agreed to, as it is, because we shall never agree to surrender, it does not matter how many reverses we may have to face, we will strengthen our resources and prepare for the final victory. If that is so, it follows that we must prepare for it.

We do not prepare for it by passing resolutions. Resolutions are good occasionally, but we have to prepare for it in every field, military, scientific, economic, agricultural and industrial. Every field should be coordinated to help in adding to the strength of India to meet this crisis. It may take some time, but there is no other way. We can't merely sit down and bemoan our lot. . . .

Now I want you to realise that—shocked as we have been, the public and everyone—and I can quite understand the shock the public has suffered during the last week or so—it has brought us, made us realise, that we were, shall I say, getting out of touch with realities in the modern world. We were living in an artificial atmosphere of our own creation and we have been shocked out of it, all of us, whether it is the government or the people though some may be in less fear. People say or talk 'we are four hundred million', just as the Chinese say 'we are six hundred million'. It has some significance, no doubt, but not very much. There can be six hundred million or four hundred million sheep and there can be a few stronger animals. The numbers in a sense potentially count, but ultimately it is the strength, cohesion and training of a nation that counts. And all these five-year plans are ultimately meant to give that cohesion, strength and training. . . .

But even from the point of view of war-like preparations, we have suffered a severe shock. It is no good sitting down to do a post-mortem on it. But the real thing that is out of joint is our whole mentality, our whole Government.

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INDIA'S FOREIGN POLICY by Jawaharlal Nehru

Unfolds the basic concepts of India's Foreign Policy in the words of its architect.

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the way Government is run here. It is not run on that basis. Government takes time to do anything and is slow moving. Now you cannot move slowly in this matter when you lose a battle by delay of a few days or you may lose a war if you don't change that. Therefore, we have to get out of that rut and move swiftly whatever we have to do. War with all its evils is a tremendous energising process. May be it will do us good, may be it will stiffen us and make us function quickly and effectively and get us out of these wrong and long bureaucratic methods that we are used to. . .

—State Information Ministers' Conference, New Delhi, October 25

History has taken a new turn in Asia and perhaps the world, and we have to bear the brunt of it, to fight with all our might this menace to our freedom and integrity. Not only are we threatened by it, but all the standards of international behaviour have been upset and so all the world is affected by it, apart from the immediate consequences. No self-respecting country which loves its freedom and its integrity can possibly submit to this challenge. Certainly India, this dear land of ours, will never submit to it whatever the consequences, whatever they may be. We accept the challenge in all its consequences.

It may be that this challenge is also an opportunity for us. Indeed, the people of India in their millions have demonstrated that they accept this challenge and have shown a unity and an enthusiasm such has been very seldom in evidence. A crisis has come and we have stood up to face it and meet that crisis. . .

—Lok Sabha on November 8

What, the question is asked, are we to do in this crisis, every one asks and no doubt people will gradually find out what to do. But

I should like to say a few words, to our approach to it, to our mental approach and in this a university has a great deal to do. The practical things that you may have to do, young students of the university, are there for you to be pointed out to. Some of the needs are obvious—like you to join the N.C.C. (National Cadet Corps) and the other organisations. These are obvious but there are many other ways because you must remember that in a crisis like this which involves war the people who are trained, the armies and the defence services play an important role. But remember that role is like an iceberg which shows only a part above the water. You know that an iceberg is something which shows a little bit above the water and a great deal underneath the water. So also militarily, the purely military effort of a nation shows a part above the water. It is obvious, it is important but the real thing that supports that military effort is the tremendous team behind it in which everybody in the country has to take part.

It is the industrial effort, agricultural effort and the effort of every citizen in the country. Below that again is the morale of the country, the spirit of the country which is the most important thing of all. I think we may say with assurance that this country has showed that morale, and it is because of that that all of us can speak with confidence about what is going to happen to this ancient country of ours even in this crisis. That is so but the other things will have to follow and no doubt will follow.

Now, people of my generation went through for many long years certain experiences in our struggle for freedom. We have had great leaders, Gandhiji; great preceptors. Gurudev; and we were powerfully influenced by them and we succeeded in achieving something which is not normally seen in such struggles, that is to say, while carrying on a struggle which normally is a bitter struggle, the struggle of nationalism against imperialism, in spite of that we managed, as a whole, to keep our

poise. We managed, as a whole, not to grow too bitter; that was very unusual and a very remarkable thing. Perhaps, that was due to the great leaders we had; perhaps, it was due to a certain spirit of India which rose up to uphold us and to guide us, perhaps to that and other causes. But it was a remarkable thing, a thing which impressed the world and is still remembered by the world as a unique achievement. And so it came about that when success came to us in this country and we achieved freedom, we did it with an astonishing lack of ill-will to anybody; even to those against whom we had struggled and fought for decades past.

Normally, when there is a conflict, there is an extreme ill-will, extreme bitterness, hatred resulting in violence. And that continues even after the conflict is over. When there has been a conflict between the nationalism of a country and the imperialism of another power governing that country, that bitterness goes deep down into the core of the people and I may mention that there are countries even though independent which have not forgotten their days of subjection by another and the bitterness has grooved them. Well, we survived that, although I would not say absolutely completely, but we did not have that because the teachers and the guides and the leaders that we had turned our attention in a different direction.

So, from people of my generation—some are present here though not many—the present generation is far removed. My generation went through this process of struggling and gathering experiences by the hundreds and thousands in India, in fact, even more than that, tens and millions in India. Thereby India and the people of India were conditioned. They were conditioned by every experience. If you want bodily strength you have to go in for bodily exercises. So a group and a nation are conditioned by trying hard for something; struggling for it, sacrificing and if you think of freedom, you have to remember that freedom is not a thing which can be achieved once

and will subsist forever without striving.

Freedom has to be achieved in almost every generation and if people are not capable of holding it then it slips away from them, they grow weak. So in my generation, the people of India strove to achieve it, thereby strengthened themselves, thereby conditioned themselves in many ways and finally achieved it and for most of you, the students of this university, it is past history. It has been done and you may think it has been achieved and nothing more is necessary except perhaps to nourish it somewhat. But freedom has to be achieved in every generation and it is perhaps a good thing that in your time now in the present generation, another assault has been made on our freedom. Not only to condition this in the normal way but to pull us out of our wrong ways we may have fallen into, the way of softness, of forgetting the principles which governed us and our country, which have so often been repeated by Gandhiji and Gurudev.

More particularly in this institution, it is necessary that you should remember them and it is very important, I think, that in this time of crisis not only should we do our best to serve the country, in the way we can, but that our minds shall be directed to the right way of serving the country so that not only do we achieve the certain result, which may be called certain triumphing over our present difficulties, but that we do so in the right way so that it lead to peace and proper conditioning and better frame of mind for us and even for those who may be opposed to us today.

War is a bad thing. It somehow brings out the worst in a person. To some extent it brings out some good qualities also, courage, sacrifice, but generally war today or at any time leads to certain brutalisation of an individual or of the group; it leads to hatred. And they are bad. A person who suffers from hatred, whether an individual or a group or a country, do

themselves no good. Hatred is a bad companion.

Another bad companion is fear and unfortunately in the world today, fear and hatred affect people more perhaps than any other emotion. Cold war is a product of fear and hatred and how to do without fear, hatred, I do not know but in certain measure I think in our own struggle for freedom, to some extent, I would not presume to say too much, we did away with fear and hatred and that was a remarkable feature of that struggle. Can we do that now? Or will we become victims of fear and hatred and their numerous ill-gotten progeny? That is an important thing to remember. Now a special duty comes to universities because these people are supposed to assemble together, the teacher and the taught, to think of the basic principles, to think not only of the duty of the day but what the directive principles should be in life, what your duties are and to take counsel with ancient wisdom and modern experience; more specially in Viswa Bharati where there is an abundance of reserve and stored wisdom, not only of the distant past but of Gurudev and where that university is supposed to be an international university, which certainly and rightly honours nationalism as it should but would not lose itself in some exaggerated form of nationalism forgetting the rest of the world.

Here in the Viswa Bharati, for instance, you have got various departments. You have got Cheena Bhavan and a very good thing too, under a distinguished scholar, a distinguished Chinese scholar. That is a good thing to remind you always that you are not at war with China's culture or the greatness of China in the past or in the present. You have no bitter feelings against the Chinese people as such; you are against a certain manifestation, a certain thing the Chinese Government has done, directing her forces to do things which are very wrong, some kind of war of the old imperialism. Therefore, we have to resist that and resist we will with all our might. But if you think that

China as a country or the Chinese people, hundreds of millions of people, are our enemies, they are not, and we should not consider them our enemies. We will fight anybody who attacks us, resist to the utmost their attack and drive them away. But there is a distinction in not mixing up things because the Government of China and certain people of China have attacked us and tried to do us injury—we will resist them. We will.

Because British imperialism exploited us and had dominion over us, we fought them, we drove them out. But we tried not to, to the best of our ability, feel ill will to an average Englishman. We imbibed their literature, we learnt their language, we profit by it still. We learnt sciences and so on and so forth. So we must distinguish an evil and not spread it out to cover a whole country. If imperialism is an evil we shall fight it; racialism is an evil, we will fight it. If a person or a country attacks us, we will fight but it will be wrong, and opposed to all our principles, the principles that built up Viswa Bharati, for us to hate because of this attack, a whole people of a country which is attacking us through its government and armed forces. That is why I am glad that you have got here a symbol of their co-operation, if you desire international co-operation, a co-operation between India and China in the Cheena Bhawan and I hope, while we fight the aggressor, we do not fight culture, we do not fight people who are friendly to us and we look forward to a time when we shall again have friendly relations with the people.

We have no quarrel with a people, with the people of any country, and I hope we will never have any quarrel with the people of any country. We will have quarrels with those who attack us and we will resist them. I hope this will be borne in mind because sometimes I think I see a drift the other way and things being said about the whole of China and the people. I think that is very wrong. It is wrong, basically wrong, in principle it is wrong

and it turns our minds in the wrong direction. It wastes our energy in futile hatred. Hatred is the most exhausting thing. Anger and hatred do not strengthen anyone.

... Problem is how can we be strong individually and as a group or a nation without indulging in hatred. It is a difficult thing to solve but it can be solved, it has been solved in the case of our own struggle, struggle for freedom. It was largely solved by the nation and not by the individual. There is no reason why we should not remember that and try to keep it before ourselves because you may dislike or even hate an evil thing but hating a people is not a good thing. It weakens you, not strengthens you; occasionally in a fit of hatred or anger, you may get a kind of nervous energy but not real strength. . .

—Visva Bharati on December 24

1963

August 1947 brought long-cherished freedom to our country. But in the wake of it came the Partition of India and, immediately after, mass killing on both sides of the new frontier and vast migrations. We had hoped that the Partition of India, which was brought about by agreement, would lead to the creation of two States which would be friendly neighbours and would co-operate with each other. That was natural, as not only geography but a common history and culture and the same language and many other factors common to both would, we thought, inevitably lead to friendly co-operation.

But this was not to be. The events after the Partition left a trail of great bitterness. We were trying to get over the immediate results of the Partition when the State of Kashmir was suddenly invaded from Pakistan and a new conflict arose. To us, trained and conditioned as we had been by Mahatma Gandhi, this came as a shock, for we had hoped that there would be no military conflicts with any other nation. After 14 months,

a cease-fire was agreed to and actual fighting stopped. Since then, although the Kashmir problem remained with us and gave a great deal of trouble, feelings in both countries gradually lost their bitterness and approached normality, in so far as the people were concerned. . .

On January 26, 1950, this new Republic came into existence and all our efforts were directed toward realizing the objectives laid down—political democracy and economic justice. We called the objective socialistic without adhering to any doctrinaire definition of the word. The system we evolved was consciously directed toward the welfare of the common man rather than to enrichment of the few; it is democratic because its processes are ultimately controlled by public discussion and by Parliament elected on the basis of universal adult franchise, and not by the secret purposes of a privileged minority.

While benefiting from foreign experiences—more especially, in the constitutional sense, from England and the United States—we did not wish to copy any foreign models. We believed that India had, by virtue of her long history and traditions, an individuality of her own and we should retain this without adhering to outworn ideas or traditions. We realized that the world was rapidly changing and we must keep pace with these changes without being swept away by them. We wanted to help, however modestly, in this developing pattern of international relations. We had no desire to interfere with other countries or impose our views on them. . .

The twin policies which have guided us since independence are, broadly, democratic planning for development at home and, externally, a policy which has come to be named, rather inadequately, 'non-alignment'...

... What is called 'non-alignment' has also not fared badly. This, strictly speaking, represents only one aspect of our policy; we have other positive aims also, such as the promotion of freedom from colonial rule, racial equality,

peace and international co-operation, but 'non-alignment' has become a summary description of this policy of friendship toward all nations, uncompromised by adherence to any military pacts. This was not due to any indifference to issues that arose, but rather to a desire to judge them for ourselves, in full freedom and without any preconceived partisan bias. It implied basically, a conviction that good and evil are mixed up in this world, that the nations cannot be divided into sheep and goats, to be condemned or approved accordingly, and that if we were to join one military group rather than the other it was liable to increase and not diminish the risk of a major clash between them. Essentially, 'non-alignment' is freedom of action which is a part of independence. This attitude no doubt displeased some people to begin with, but it has been of service to the cause of world peace at some critical moments in recent history. A large number of countries, including most of the newly independent States of Asia and Africa, have adopted a similar outlook on international affairs. It is possible that India has influenced their thinking to some extent in this matter; but, however that may be, 'non-alignment' is now an integral part of the international pattern and is widely conceded to be a comprehensible and legitimate policy, particularly for the emergent Afro-Asian States.

Consistent with our policy of promotion of peace and international co-operation, we welcomed the end of the civil war in our neighbouring country China and the proclamation of the People's Republic of China in December 1949. We began developing friendly and co-operative relations with our northern neighbour.

The wanton and massive invasion of last autumn has, however, brought an incalculable, ominous and explosive new element into the situation. Peking's propagandists have tried to sow confusion in the public mind over this; but no amount of sophistry can conjure away the fact that the People's Republic of China is

guilty of pre-meditated aggression. In 1954 India and China signed a general treaty on Tibet, in the preamble of which both parties pledged themselves to mutual non-aggression and respect for each other's territorial integrity. At that date, China knew precisely what the extent of India's territorial jurisdiction was; India, on the other hand, was not only not aware of the Chinese claims (they were not disclosed until five years later) but she had no reason even to suspect that there was any major question about the frontier.

All the fighting that has taken place, and the forcible seizure of territory by China, has been to the south and west—that is, on the Indian side—of the frontier as implicitly accepted by China herself in 1954. At no point have Indian troops ever gone beyond that line. The charge of aggression against the People's Republic of China thus holds, regardless of the controversy about the correct delineation of the border. This subject has been voluminously documented; what needs to be said here is that India's northern frontiers are not the result of any British imperialistic expansion, achieved in violation of China's rights or interests, but have their sanction in the facts of geography and history, and the generally accepted principles of international law. . . .

First, it would be wrong and inexpedient, and also repugnant to every sentiment of national honour and self-respect, to acquiesce in aggression, as plainly established as it is in this case. We must, therefore, insist that the aggression be undone to our satisfaction before normal relations can be restored. Whether a peaceful settlement can eventually be reached, therefore, depends largely on China.

Secondly, despite our friendliness, China's behaviour toward us has shown such utter disregard of the ordinary canons of international behaviour that it has shaken severely our confidence in her good faith. We cannot, on the available evidence, look upon her as other than a country with pro-

foundly inimical intentions toward our independence and institutions.

Thirdly, the Himalayan barrier has proved to be vulnerable. If it is breached, the way to the Indian plains and the ocean beyond would lie exposed; and the threat to India would then, likewise, be a threat to the other countries of South and South-east Asia. India's determination to resist aggression and retain her territorial integrity is, therefore, a vital factor in the safeguarding of peace and stability throughout this whole area.

This is no doubt appreciated by all the friendly countries whom we have asked for military and other assistance in the present emergency; and the prompt response that the request evoked, particularly from the United States and Great Britain, has been warmly acknowledged by the Government of India and the leaders of Indian opinion. It is obvious, however, that the defence of India in any long-term view calls for a sustained effort by India herself—an effort, moreover, which cannot be conceived entirely or directly in narrow military terms. . . .

... I have mentioned earlier that Indo-Pakistan relations had been steadily improving in recent years. The Chinese attack on India has, however, caused a setback. Pakistan authorities tended to regard the crisis in Sino-Indian relations as an opportunity to press India to make all sorts of concessions to them.

A new series of talks has been started between the two countries, and we in India would be the first to rejoice if they helped to ease the tension. Without prejudging the outcome of these discussions, it may be said, however, that they have no direct bearing on the problems we face with regard to China. The boundary to be protected delimits the territories of the Indian State and their defense is the responsibility of the Indian Government. What India needs is not manpower but weapons and other military equipment, which in the short run she must get from

other sources, and in the long run manufacture herself.

Pakistan, like other States, can help by refraining from giving aid and encouragement to China and thereby enabling her to multiply her pressures against us. Unfortunately, the attitude of Pakistan ever since the Chinese aggression on India has been the reverse of this, and this has undoubtedly added to our difficulties. We are eager to come to agreement with Pakistan in regard to Kashmir and other problems, but it must be remembered that the question of moving toward a possible change in Kashmir is so pregnant with explosive possibilities that any incautious step might have far-reaching effects involving the internal stability of the sub-continent, and thus weaken instead of strengthen our defenses. Also the settlement reached must be such that it makes for permanent improvement in Indo-Pakistan relations.

The conflict provoked by Chinese aggression raises wider issues than the simple demarcation of a remote border. It is difficult to understand why China chose to conceal her territorial claims for many years, pleading subsequently that 'the time was not ripe' for revising her maps; or why she had to mount large-scale, concerted attacks from one end to the other of the two-thousand-mile-long frontier; or why she rejects any approach to settlement other than through bilateral negotiations in the context of military force; or why she has been conducting world-wide anti-Indian propaganda denouncing the whole range of India's policies and depicting India as a tool of reactionaries and imperialists.

The fact appears to be that China's anti-Indian policy flows from her general analysis of the international situation, and reflects the aims and assumptions underlying her foreign policy as a whole. This policy itself, while formally subscribing to such ideals as peace and coexistence—though in the special Chinese meaning of these terms—leaves no room for non-alignment. If the world is viewed

as divided essentially between imperialists and communists, between whom war not only is inevitable in the end, but between whom tension in some form must be kept alive and even intensified as opportunity occurs, then there is indeed no place in it for the non-aligned. The non-aligned nations must, in this context, seem to be occupying an unstable, anomalous position from which, if they could be dislodged, either by cajolery or coercion, the result would be to accentuate the polarization of world forces. It is logical to conclude that China's multiple campaign against India is an exercise in real-politik on these lines. India is such an outstanding member of the non-aligned community that her defection, whether voluntary or enforced, cannot fail to bring grave and far-reaching consequences in its train.

If this analysis is well-founded, the challenge from China, as it has revealed itself, is not only to our foreign policy, but to our domestic policy as well. Both are rooted in our needs and interests, and spring from the same cultural outlook and the same scale of moral values. Tolerance, friendliness, the protection of the rights and dignity of the individual, peaceful settlement of disputes, the persistent effort to reach agreement through compromise and persuasion—these are the values we have been trying to uphold, imperfectly no doubt, in the conduct of our internal affairs. They represent a way of life, if I may so put it, a way of life that is anathema to the ruling ideologists in Peking, with their faith in power and violence as the instruments of benevolent change. . . . Means are more important than ends—this was the basic policy on which Mr. Gandhi laid constant stress. . . .

... The central fact is that the impact of China, whether it again takes an acute military form or makes itself felt more insidiously, is forcing the pace of growth in India. Both the Right and the Left have been affected, and the nation as a whole is growing up. It is learning that in the world today it is not enough to be devoted to peace, or to mind one's own

affairs, but that it is also necessary to have adequate armed strength, to adjust our relations with friendly countries in the light of the changing actualities of the international situation and, above all, to preserve and consolidate national unity. . . .

... If the frontier situation should deteriorate, we would naturally consider it desirable to take measures to tighten up the central authority. That is something that is likely to happen in a crisis under any system of government. But, even so, the basic democratic structure will, I think, continue.

It is pertinent to note that the the Soviet Union and the Communist States of Europe allied to it have not considered it necessary to change their friendly attitude toward India in spite of open Chinese hostility toward us. Indeed, they have continued their aid to India in various ways. This implies a recognition on their part that India and other non-aligned countries have a vital role in the existing balance of forces. . . .

... It may be that the cold war and the East-West antagonism of the 1950s will be gradually softened and transformed by the new pressures that have emerged within each bloc, as well as by the insistent demand of the 'uncommitted' countries for a systematic and world-wide assault on hunger, disease and ignorance. But war, and nuclear war at that, still remains the spectre which must be exorcized before mankind can breathe freely again. That is why disarmament, particularly the abolition of nuclear weapons, beginning with the cessation of all further tests, is of such supreme importance. . . .

Meanwhile, Indo-American relations have seldom been as close and cordial as they are now. The deep sympathy and practical support received from the United States in meeting the Chinese aggression has created a wealth of good feeling and, apart from that, there is much in common between us on essentials. President Kennedy's vision of a world of free and independent nations, freely

co-operating so as to bring about a world-wide system of interdependence, is entirely in accord with our own ideas. It is in this spirit that we have endeavoured to collaborate in peaceful and constructive work with the new Afro-Asian States, and with Britain and other Commonwealth countries with whom we have a long historical association. It is in this spirit also that we are doing our best to further the purposes of the United Nations as, most recently, in the Congo.

The United Nations admittedly has numerous shortcomings. The government of a country representing a large part of the world's population is still not subject to the discipline and the responsibilities that membership in the world organization would impose. Often, moreover, the judgement and activities of the United Nations have been swayed or inhibited by the passions and prejudices of the cold war. None the less, the United Nations is the chief repository of our hopes for ever closer and more effective international co-operation for security as well as welfare. It is dedicated to peace, freedom and justice—noble ideals which embody the aspirations of all mankind—and it may yet lead us out of this fear and strife-ridden age into a more settled future when the full potentialities of science and technology could be applied to the well-being of all peoples.

—Foreign Affairs, USA

1964

I have received so much love and affection from the Indian people that nothing that I can do can repay even a small fraction of it, and indeed there can be no repayment of so precious a thing as affection. Many have been admired, some have been revered, but the affection of all classes of the Indian people has come to me in such abundant measure that I have been overwhelmed by it. I can only express the hope that in the remaining years I may live,

I shall not be unworthy of my people and their affection.

To my innumerable comrades and colleagues, I owe an even deeper debt of gratitude. We have been joint partners in great undertakings and have shared the triumphs and sorrows which inevitably accompany them.

I wish to declare with all earnestness that I do not want any religious ceremonies performed for me after my death. I do not believe in any such ceremonies and to submit to them, even as a matter of form, would be hypocrisy and an attempt to delude ourselves and others.

When I die, I should like my body to be cremated. If I die in a foreign country, my body should be cremated there and my ashes sent to Allahabad. A small handful of these ashes should be thrown into the Ganga and the major portion of them disposed of in the manner indicated below. No part of these ashes should be retained or preserved.

My desire to have a handful of my ashes thrown into the Ganga at Allahabad has no religious significance, so far as I am concerned. I have no religious sentiment in the matter. I have been attached to the Ganga and the Jumna rivers in Allahabad ever since my childhood and, as I have grown older, this attachment has also grown. I have watched their varying moods as the seasons changed, and have often thought of the history and myth and tradition and song and story that have become attached to them through the long ages and become part of their flowing waters.

The Ganga, especially, is the river of India, beloved of her people, round which are intertwined her racial memories, her hopes and fears, her songs of triumph, her victories and her defeats. She has been a symbol of India's age-long culture and civilisation, ever-changing, ever-flowing, and yet ever the same Ganga. She reminds me of the snow-covered peaks and the deep valleys of the Himalayas,


which I have loved so much, and of the rich and vast plains below, where my life and work have been cast. Smiling and dancing in the morning sunlight, and dark and gloomy and full of mystery as the evening shadows fall; a narrow, slow and graceful stream in winter, and a vast roaring thing during the monsoon, broad-bosomed almost as the sea, and with something of the sea's power to destroy, the Ganga has been to me a symbol and a memory of the past of India, running into the present, and flowing on to the great ocean of the future.

And though I have discarded much of past tradition and custom, and am anxious that India should rid herself of all shackles that bind and constrain her and divide her people, and suppress vast numbers of them, to prevent the free development of the body and the spirit; though I seek all this, yet I do not wish to cut myself off from the past completely. I am proud of that great inheritance that has been, and is, ours, and I am conscious that I too, like all of us, am a link in that unbroken chain which goes back to the dawn of history in the immemorial past of India.

That chain I would not break, for I treasure it and seek inspiration from it. And as witness of this desire of mine and as my last homage to India's cultural inheritance, I am making this request that a handful of my ashes be thrown into the Ganga at Allahabad to be carried to the great ocean that washes India's shore.

The major portion of my ashes should, however, be disposed of otherwise. I want these to be carried high up into the air in an aeroplane and scattered from that height over the fields where the peasants of India toil, so that they might mingle with the dust and soil of India and become an indistinguishable part of India.

—from the Will and Testament
of Jawaharlal Nehru, dated
June 21, 1954



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
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
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
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



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PROHIBITION

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symposium participants

THE PROBLEM

An attempt to detail the criticism
against those who would prohibit
the drinking of alcohol

THE REALITY

S. Natarajan, veteran journalist who
works for the Council of Economic
Development, Bombay

NO CAUSE FOR PESSIMISM

Pitamber Datt Kaushik, Assistant Professor,
Department of Political Science, University
of Saugor

YESTERDAY AND TOMORROW

U.N. Dhebar, former President of the
Indian National Congress, now Chairman
of the Khadi and Village Industries
Commission

THERE'S MONEY IN THE RACKET

R.K. Karanjia, Editor of the
weekly news magazine, 'Blitz'

THE PROBLEM OF ARRACK

P. Kodanda Rao, prominent social worker,
was a member of the Prohibition Enquiry
Committee, Planning Commission, 1955

A CORRECT UNDERSTANDING

A.M. Khusro, Professor of Economics,
Institute of Growth, member of the
Study Team on Prohibition, 1963-64

BOOKS

Reviewed by Sudhir Mulji, J.M. Kaul,
A.K. Banerjee, Kusum Madgaokar, S.M.,
and Ranjit Gupta

COMMUNICATION

Satindra Singh (New Delhi)

FURTHER READING

A select and relevant bibliography
prepared by D.C. Sharma

COVER

Designed by Chowdhury/Grewal

The problem

THE architects of any social programme have to encounter the problem of bridging the gulf between what they practise and what they preach. To some extent, such a gulf is not only understandable but, if kept within reasonable limits, can be a healthy sign. An idealistic target, slightly higher than the anticipated capacity to achieve it, can be an incentive in all spheres of life. It is only when such a gulf widens to unbridgeable limits that the ideal projected assumes the garb of hypocrisy and becomes a target for criticism if not ridicule.

The fate of 'prohibition' in India is a victim of this very condition. Linked with this funda-

mental disadvantage is the protagonists' traditional rigidity to refuse to abandon ship or change course on an issue of 'prestige'. There seem to be no more Gandhis who had the inherent strength of character to admit: 'I have erred.' But, recently, the whole question of prohibition has come up for reconsideration, and, despite the Tek Chand Committee, the modification of policy in States such as Bombay is a positive sign of change.

The unbending approach to prohibition is evident by the fact that all prohibition bodies, whether at the enquiry or policy-making level, have only included those political and social celebrities who claim total abstinence, and whose attitudes are strongly biased by a deep-rooted, spartan ascetism. Until this day, no attempt has been made to associate eminent medical experts, scientists and non-political sociologists to study the prohibition problem. No attempt has been made to secure the advice and experience of the governments of such countries as have already experimented with prohibition.

The question of a scientific evaluation of prohibition programmes, therefore, does not arise. Ironically enough, the war seems only to be against the consumption of alcohol and not against drugs or other more 'approved' forms of intoxication. It would be interesting to know how many protagonists of prohibition are addicted to smoking, chewing tobacco and other such habits.

In the social sphere, the prevailing opinion that excessive drinking in other parts of the world earns less condemnation than in India is not correct. Drinking in excess and drinking beyond one's means are socially condemned all over the world. In developed countries, alcoholism is treated as a social disease and the very latest psycho-medical facilities have been created to cure alcoholics as mentally or physically deranged patients.

The approach of prohibition in other countries is, therefore, not only pragmatic but scientific and, therefore, has earned considerably more success than the type of prohibition which is being attempted in India. For example, in Russia, when the government found that alcoholism was on the increase, workers and others were photographed in drunken condition and their photographs exhibited in their places of work so that they might receive the social condemnation and humiliation they deserved at the hands of their comrades.

In America, 'Alcoholics Anonymous' has already earned a world-wide reputation for

curing alcoholism and has more success to its credit than the earlier prohibition drive many years ago which left scars on the moral life of the country, scars which are still visible.

In European countries, the production of cheap, yet pure, wines with a mild potency and cereal or fruit bases has enabled the people to drink in a healthy manner and keep away from hard liquor and hard drinking.

In India, unfortunately, there is a tendency to consider prohibition attitudes as inherent prerequisites to patriotism. Traditional cultural and religious dogmas are expounded against the use of liquor, not realising that this very start is very much on the wrong foot. The Indian community is dominated by Hinduism and faiths closely allied to it. One does not necessarily have to be a scholar to know that Hindu religious mythology can hardly provide any effective publicity material in favour of the present concept of prohibition. The Muslim and some minor communities, such as the Jains, could fulfil such a role better. Furthermore, 6.8 per cent of the Indian population is tribal, where religion, though at times influenced by Hinduism, often assumes localised beliefs.

Prohibition is held up as one of the achievements of independent India and as the two are always linked together, it would be interesting to study the socio-economic pattern of our drinking before independence.

In the Vedas, 'soma ras' occurs frequently and without inhibition. The very word *ras*, which means juice, suggests that our drinks had fruit, herb or cereal bases. Even remote tribals all over the country today use foodgrains, fruits, herbs or tubars as a base for their alcohol. As such, hard drinks with a purely or substantially chemical base are a legacy of foreign influence.

In Mughal times, flowers, fruits, various spices and medicinal herbs and plants went into the distillation of the most popular drinks. The prescriptions were often enough compiled by leading Hakims and Vaid. This also applied at lower social levels, sugar (*gur*) being the most popular base in the North and the coconut in the South. The tribal population mostly used millets or rice.

It is, therefore, an established fact that in Indian society, before its invasion by Europeanised society, alcoholic drinks were popular and contained an appreciable food and nutritional content and were least harmful and intoxicant.

When the British came, the so-called aristocracy enjoyed its drinks, still does, and was not

embarrassed by it. The upper middle class drank either for the sake of its own pleasure and necessity or to keep up with the social standards of the *Angrezi Sarkar*. This was particularly true of the civil services, army personnel and such non-official elements who wanted to enter that section of society which could make inroads into the seclusion of the *Angrezi Sarkar's* recreational activities after office hours. Drinking amongst the lower middle classes was confined to 'occasions' because of the prohibitive price.

The worker and peasant classes drank frequently but cheaply. There was no other alternative for relaxing under-nourished limbs, and this led to large-scale consumption of locally distilled liquor, often injurious to health particularly in the growing industrial areas. It is quite understandable that the economic suffering which this class of drinkers was subjected to has very largely influenced the present day protagonists of prohibition. Often, the management or ownership engaging farm and factory labour was hand in glove with the illicit suppliers and distillers. It is true that in a majority of cases the labourer's earnings hardly covered his liquor debts. This problem, however, was not confined to India alone. Other countries have also faced it and solved it but by a different approach to ours.

There was, however, one small but significant class placed in a unique position—the class of public men who advocated some religious, social or political cause. Some of them were devoted to the cause which they propagated, others pursued it for their material gains. This class drank only behind bolted doors and the present tendency to over-look 'bath-room' drinking but condemn 'public' drinking is a legacy from those days. Today, neither the 'Bara Sahibs' nor the scavenger or washerman would invoke much comment if they were seen 'at it', but the heavens would tumble if a 'leader' was caught in the act. Social drinking in the pre-independence era had, therefore, assumed a mongrelised pattern, without any pronounced cultural or social conventions.

Since independence, prohibition has assumed the proportions of a major national policy but the architects of prohibition, being confirmed abstainers themselves, cannot claim any knowledge of the pros and cons or virtues or vices of drink. This fact is not as insignificant as it may seem. Imagine a railway enquiry by a body of villagers who have never seen a railway train, or a labour enquiry solely left to a body of business magnates.

Let us now review the progress of prohibition to date. There are two dry States in the

country, viz, Bombay and Madras. The other States claim to have adopted programmes of 'partial' or 'phased' prohibition. The northern States for certain, and others in all probability, have declared some areas dry as 'window dressing' so that they may be in a position officially to white-wash any embarrassing queries from the High Command.

For example, in the Punjab, for obvious reasons, a district was declared dry where the predominant population was of a class of soldier cultivators who eschewed drink as a firm and deep-rooted tradition. In the ten years or so of prohibition, illicit distillation and consumption of liquor in this district has rocketed. Imagine a 'dry' Punjab where a yirile peasantry and labour not only enjoy but earn their drink.

In States such as Bombay, the farcical aspect of the claims of the success of prohibition programmes is perhaps the most open of secrets. Not only are people still drinking, but the poorer classes are drinking pure poison. Illicit distillation and allied crimes have become an inherent part of society with governmental corruption dovetailed into a snug pattern of mutual benefits. Who can blame a normally honest government servant drawing, say, Rs. 100 a month, facing a roaring cost of living, falling victim to a bribe five to ten times his monthly income.

Illicit distillation and boot-legging have become industries recognised as remunerative, right from the cottage to the big business level. Cynics have remarked that if ever it is proposed to scrap prohibition in Bombay, the stiffest opposition, directly or indirectly, will come from those who today stand to gain through boot-legging and illicit distillation. Amongst the middle classes, people who did not drink previously have taken to it as a result of the inherent human weakness of trying to break a social law which is considered an encroachment on one's personal freedom. Youngsters, who under normal conditions could never have been served a drink, now have free access to it having participated in its distillation.

In all fairness, a pragmatic evaluation of the progress of prohibition so far indicates a definite failure in States with total prohibition. Where there is partial prohibition, governmental efforts have been half-hearted and implemented mostly to have something on record whenever the High Command asks a question. The effectiveness of a programme launched with such a lukewarm attitude can only be marginal, if any at all.

Take the nation's capital for example. At home one can drink oneself silly. In public, where an automatic control would be exercised, one cannot touch a drop. Official functions find foreign invitees reaching for their hip flasks

with their Indian friends either scrounging on their supply, or having already bolted down their evening's quota before arriving. Forbidding drinks in clubs and public places on national festivals such as Holi and Diwali complete the picture of farce.

Enough has already been said against prohibition. What alternative programme has one to suggest? To begin with, the basic conception of prohibition has to change and a clear-cut dividing line established between alcoholism and socially or economically permissible drinking. Once the protagonists of so-called prohibition swallow this very small bitter pill the progress of 'effective' prohibition will be positioned to strike at the most vulnerable points of alcoholism.

Elsewhere all over the world, whether a country is westernised or oriental, drinking is permissible both by society and religion provided the consumer maintains a basic decorum in his drinking habits. Medium strength wines are health giving, invigorating and appetising. Socially, drinking encourages warmth and informality and in extreme climates provides much needed cool refreshment or warmth as the case might be. In moments of depression or nervous tension, a glass of wine, which is at any time less harmful than sedatives and drugs, is a great healer. If one drinks within his means and in moderation, he is not looked down upon by any society other than ours. It is interesting to note that in Europe if a person consumes his daily quota of wine he is not supposed to 'drink'. Only consumption of hard liquor is considered 'drinking'.

Once alcoholism and not drink are admitted as the target of our prohibition policy, a constructive programme to minimise addiction to alcohol can easily become not only an idealistic programme but also a programme which will inspire universal understanding and cooperation. Furthermore, it will be blessed with effective implementation.

To commence with, an effective prohibition policy will have to be based upon honest-to-goodness research, keeping in view socio-economic-cum-regional conditions and trends. Such research will have to be conducted by the best of talent which the country's social, medical, scientific and economic sphere can offer. In short, the base of the programme has to be scientific and not political.

To begin with, keeping in view the circumstances and broad proposals indicated in the preceding few lines, a panel of national drinks will have to be evolved and their production put on a scientific footing. To ensure scientific processing, only a limited percentage of alcoholic content will have to be subsidised to begin with. This would bring scientifically

processed and comparatively harmless liquor within the economic pattern of different classes of consumers at the mass level.

It is the experience of other countries that such action, combined with a rigid, if not drastic, repression of illicit distillation and excess consumption of the stronger variety of alcohol, has gone a long way not only in minimising the social or economic evils of alcoholism but also ensuring a clear-cut passage for effective prohibition.

While a list of national drinks is being evolved, our ancient Indian recipes should not be forgotten or swept aside. Much has already been lost but enough remains recorded in authentic archives especially those associated with the erstwhile princely States. It is of interest to learn that in days gone by Indian drinks were manufactured with great care in the observance of their medicinal values. As already mentioned, the ingredients were often enough fruit, vegetables, herbs and spices. Chemical formulae of hard alcohol is a legacy of foreign rule in India. The import of such liquor can be progressively reduced to a minimum. In fact, the export of our exotic liquors made out of saffron or partridges or whatever else, could assume rewarding dimensions.

Cultural, economic, regional and climatic influences will have to play a prominent part in evolving a panel of officially sponsored and scientifically processed drinks. It would be advisable to ensure that all these have a food base either of cereal, fruit, sugar or herbs. Drinks based upon concentrated chemical bases which are universally acknowledged as harmful will naturally have to be discouraged.

The eventual policy should be to accommodate those who, although condemning alcoholism, appreciate a modern approach to the problem of prohibition. The general idea should be to reduce the alcoholic content of our liquor, certainly to campaign against alcoholism and even make it prohibitive, both socially and economically, but not to deny the healthier effects of harmless drinking which man has done from the very earliest. Neither the communist countries nor the so-called free countries have ever been able to implement the type of prohibition which we are contemplating and it has been admitted that the best policy has to be corrective and reformative and not prohibitory.

As regards the social evils of alcoholism, there can be no two opinions. There can also only be but one opinion that social awakening in favour of the recognition and contempt of this evil has to have a social and not a governmental legislation and control is doomed to fail. We only have to cast an eye across the Atlantic to substantiate this point of view.

The reality

S. NATARAJAN

*'Between the idea and the reality
Between the motion and the act
Falls the Shadow.'*

T. S. Eliot

TO the tinkling of glasses which certainly held more potent stuff than lemonade or coca-cola, Dr. M. D. Gilder, Minister for Health in the Bombay Government, addressed a persuasive speech in favour of his prohibition policy. The place was the Green's Hotel and it was during the period when Bombay was moving slowly but inexorably towards total prohibition. It was a derisive audience that he addressed but Dr. Gilder, a second generation prohibitionist, was not in the least perturbed by the minor discourtesies meted out to him as the guest of the evening. Questioned about the programme and the possibility that the Congress Government might abandon it in the light of experience gathered in weeks of half dry and half wet days, Dr. Gilder gently raised his hand and spoke softly:

*Unborn tomorrow and dead
yesterday
Why fret about them if today
be sweet?*

Dr. Gilder had no reason to fret but his audience had. The Congress Government was moving on the crest of the prohibition wave, confident that any set-backs would vanish with the completion of the scheduled programme, confident

too that public opinion and the directive principle of the Indian Constitution enjoining the State to 'bring about the prohibition of the consumption except for medicinal purposes of intoxicating drinks and drugs which are injurious to health' ensured a steady course.

Behind the unanimous vote which had enshrined prohibition in India's Constitution lay half a century of steady education, first in the cause of temperance and, after 1924, in the cause of prohibition. The social reformers of Madras had in the 1890's been persuaded by Allen Octavian Hume, initiator of the Indian National Congress, to include temperance in their programme which already frowned on smoking. It was primarily a Bengal problem; 'Young Bengal,' wrote Bepin Chandra Pal, 'was baptised in brandy.' In western India, 'progressive' Hindus more discreetly formed secret societies where they demonstrated their modernity by eating meat and drinking alcohol. The adoption of temperance as an all-India programme was the outward manifestation of Indian recognition that drinking was not an essential part of progress. It had a special appeal to missionaries and western humanitarians who were embarrassed by the anxiety of converts to demonstrate their ostensible difference from the traditional

societies. The Indian temperance movement worked closely with the British temperance association and until 1924 its major activity consisted of securing individual pledges of abstinence and of condemning the government for its policy of auctioning licences for country liquor shops. From 1890 onwards, Gokhale took up this cause. The last Bengal social reformer, Sasipada Bannerjee, initiated the programme of temperance and recreation facilities for workers.

Thus, over a period of thirty years the movement concentrated on voluntary effort and persuasion. No expectations were placed on legislation, and criticism of the government was directed solely towards promoting a policy which delinked revenue from liquor consumption. The government for its part countered the agitation by favouring alternately 'maximum revenue, minimum consumption' and 'minimum revenue to restrain consumption of illicit liquor.' In 1920, the Government of the U.S.A. adopted the eighteenth amendment to its constitution and prohibition was enforced. This had far-reaching repercussions in India where intense propaganda was carried on by American missionaries and prohibition champions. (Incidentally, when I mentioned 'Pussy-foot Johnson' recently, I was accused of inventing the name and the man by both English and Indian friends who were too young to have felt the fervour of the twenties.)

Espousal by Congress

In 1924, the National Prohibition Association of India was formed and among its leading personalities were Kamakshi Natarajan, Gilder, C. Rajagopalachari and C. F. Andrews. It was the pressure of these men which won Mahatma Gandhi over to the cause and, within a year, prohibition became a major plank in the constructive programme of the Congress. In extending reluctant support to the acceptance of the Swaraj Party as the legislative arm of the Congress, Mahatma Gandhi indicated that its success would be tested by its ability to press prohibition

on the government. Ignored at first by the Swarajists, in September 1925 the Indian Legislative Assembly voted for prohibition—no non-official Indian opposing.

By 1926, the position in several provinces suggested that only delaying tactics had to be feared and vulnerable governments found little satisfaction in the fact that they were irremovable.

The First Commitments

That prohibition had been adopted in a few States did not make matters easier. By degrees, the provinces began to commit themselves, even though evasively. Thus, Bombay adopted prohibition as its ultimate goal but would not agree to any time schedule or to local option; Madras adopted prohibition within 20 years; the Punjab adopted a local option act but desired to watch results elsewhere before doing anything; Bengal ignored the resolutions of its legislature and of the Calcutta Corporation and refused to legislate; the United Provinces succeeded in defeating the prohibition resolution. These developments indicated both the firmness of official resistance and the political value of prohibition, whose non-political appeal touched all parties and even the political uninterested.

Moving a step forward in its espousal of prohibition, the Congress launched direct action against the liquor trade. It was, thought Mahatma Gandhi, an activity peculiarly suitable for women to picket liquor shops, and the women of Gujarat agreed with him. It spread over the country and there was a romantic appeal to Britons and Americans in the picture of secluded Indian women coming into the open to plead with liquor shopkeepers and customers. Welcoming the delegates to the All India Women's Conference, Lady Dorab Tata gave enthusiastic support to the cause:

'Drink is the cause of great misery in India,' she said, 'and it is well-known that most of the increase in wages of mill-workers (during and after World War I) have gone directly into

the liquor shops. I have no doubt that the introduction of prohibition will be of great benefit to the country's industries as well as to family life. I am sure the women of India are wholeheartedly with the prohibition reformers of the country.' (1930).

Nor was Lady Dorab Tata alone. Official committees, social workers, political leaders of all shades and industrial leaders gave expression to their hopes that prohibition would improve the living condition of the middle classes, the workers, the depressed classes and the aborigines. Confronted by such earnestness, British officialdom sought refuge in frivolous argument and incurred for their government the odium of having a financial stake in the liquor business. In the clash of political controversy, any suggestion that prohibition would not work was brushed aside. In 1933, the U.S.A. repealed prohibition. It carried no warning for Indian prohibitionists who based their case on:

- 1) the religious traditions of the two major communities;
- 2) the respect for law prevalent in Indian society;
- 3) the absence of a powerful liquor vested interest owing to the Government's policy of annual licence and auction;
- 4) the social antipathy to drinking — specially, the strong ingrained sentiment of Indian women;
- 5) the trend of opinion in all communities and among all sections of the people;
- 6) the intense propaganda for prohibition which had been carried on in the country.

Initial Moves

It must be remembered that, when drinking had been considered a mark of being advanced and progressive, in large parts of the country it had been indulged in secretly and outside the home. Then British and Indian social life had been close to one another. In the intervening years, the drift had been very far apart. There was

no reason for politicians at any rate to think that British social habits had permeated Indian society — and prohibition was very much a business of the politicians.

And so, when the Congress ministries were formed in the provinces (1937), they could hardly have abandoned prohibition and, even if they were so disposed, Mahatma Gandhi was pressing for 'immediate implementation.' There were vast variations in this, ranging from caution to gestures. Thus Madras under Rajagopalachari began with one district; Bombay launched prohibition in the city levying an urban property tax to compensate the loss in revenue; the United Provinces worked districtwise. Again, both Madras and Bombay exempted Europeans, the Central Provinces made a further concession to aborigines. Significantly, there was considerable criticism in 1937 at the compromises of the various provincial governments and in some quarters surprised protests at the Congress interest in prohibition.

The Second World War and political developments checked implementation for nearly ten years. But, when the Congress ministries returned to office in 1946, they took up from where they had left off. Since Western India and South India had initially gone ahead of the other regions, they have introduced larger doses of prohibition; elsewhere just enough is done to preserve the semblance of respecting the directive principle of the Constitution.

Inevitability

The historical background is essential for an understanding of the Congress decision to implement prohibition in Bombay and Madras. That this was not done more widely is due to the fact that outside Western and South India there was little interest in the cause and little understanding. The directive principle of the Constitution led to a token compliance elsewhere, and many Congress Ministers were seriously perturbed by the effect on the State's reve-

nues of an all-out prohibition policy. But, with the background, it is difficult to see how the Governments of Bombay and Madras could have evaded prohibition, particularly as the Gandhian movement had accused the British of following a 'sinful' policy in respect of liquor.

A better appreciation of these facts would have helped to eliminate the element of surprise and to temper criticism with greater responsibility. This in turn would have prevented the building up of entrenched positions from which the government at any rate has been unable to withdraw. It is always dangerous in India where caste thinking has been instrumental in creating social intolerance, to allow fixed positions to develop.

The Legal Position

The legal position as it obtains in the Prohibition States is very different from what prevails.—at any rate in Maharashtra of which I have personal knowledge. Legally, the manufacture, possession and consumption of country liquor is totally banned. The possession and consumption of foreign liquor is regulated by a permit system which for foreigners is more or less freely operated and for Indians is related to 'health'. The applicant for a 'health permit' has to be passed by a board. The citizen is made responsible for any unauthorised liquor found on his premises. The holder of a permit is required to have in his possession at any one time no more than the maximum quantity of foreign liquor permitted to him; the 'health permit' holder cannot drink in the presence of a non-permit holder, nor accept or offer drinks out of his quota. The normal democratic assumption that a person is presumed to be innocent until he is proved to be guilty, is reversed in the matter of liquor laws which allow considerable powers of search to the police.

The reality is very different and a great deal of the dissatisfaction with prohibition lies in the fictions it requires, the insecurity of living under laws which may be

applied at any time, the humiliations of a permit system, and the presence among law-abiding citizens of large numbers of anti-social persons whose activities range from illicit manufacture to illicit trade. At the highest level, enforcement of the liquor laws depends on the ministerial zeal for prohibition; at all other levels, it involves adjustments with the various individuals concerned with its working.

Much has been said of the corrupting of the Police, particularly that section charged with enforcement. A lawyer who has gained considerable reputation for defending the accused in prohibition cases, once observed that it is not forensic skill which is required but the ability to win over prosecution witnesses or the panch or minor policemen.

There are innumerable loopholes in the liquor laws which cannot be plugged: the health permit, for instance, is less liberal than the foreigner's permit—against the foreigner's normal four units, the maximum allowed to an Indian under the health permit is two. With the price of foreign liquor rising, there is a surplus in the foreign permits which is 'mopped' up by Indians, whether permit-holders or not. This source is more dependable than the bootlegger with whom one deals under strain. Secondly, there is another surplus from the unconsumed units of foreigners in transit which finds its way into the market. A possible third source could be the Indians who work in the homes of foreign residents where strict supervision is not exercised. These might be termed 'legitimate' leaks as opposed to the brisk trade in smuggled foreign liquor and the widespread business in the manufacture and sale of country spirits.

The Illegal Business

There is no way of eliminating the 'legitimate' trade unless by setting up an elaborate network of informers and agents provocateur. The illegal business thrives with the connivance of the police. An illuminating remark

by a friend who after a sojourn in the Capital was enthusiastic about the 'efficiency' of the Bombay Police, casts some light on the law and order situation in India. 'You do not know,' she said, 'how lucky you are to have prohibition in Bombay. It has helped to supplement the meagre salaries of the Police who can function effectively in other directions. Where there is no prohibition, there is invariably an inefficient police.'

Whether corruption can be compartmentalized may be in doubt in other parts of the country. But in the States where prohibition is in force, it is accepted that it cannot. However, the remark suggests that in India citizens have to pay for services to which they should be entitled by right and that such of them as have the money or the influence secure more than their due. In the prohibition areas, this trend is accentuated to such an extent that no section of the public can honestly claim to be unaware of it.

Consequences

One might divide the consequences of prohibition into the direct and indirect consequences. Directly, there has been the growth of a lawless element which for India is organised, not overburdened with scruples and operating very much in the open. There has been a blunting of the public conscience brought on by a clandestine and tolerated drinking and the uncertainties of enforcement policies. Where leniency is exercised by the administration, social drinking arises. But it has to be 'secret' because in theory foreign liquor is restricted and country liquor totally banned.

This secrecy differs from that observed in the nineteenth century where to drink was to be emancipated, and conservative society called for conformity. Indian communities have always attached more importance to conduct than to beliefs and today the sanctions which secured conformity are weakened. But because drinking has to be indulged in privately, it has made inroads into the home—at all levels. It would be a fair

assessment of the present situation to say that the area of evasion and flouting of the liquor laws is greater than the area of operation of the laws. In other words, any public opinion which might have existed against drinking has been largely dissipated in the years of prohibition.

What is the reason for this? Over-confidence in legislation is a major factor. Over-burdening of the enforcement police to a point where the government has perforce to ignore non-observance of the laws is another. Lack of candour in facing the facts of illicit trading in liquor is a third. Though the public has a fair notion of what is happening, the police naturally are in the best position to know the exact state of affairs. Can the police force entertain much respect for ministers individually and collectively when it listens to them acclaiming prohibition as a 'success' in the legislatures? At what level does the corruption of the police stop and what are the incentives for honest men in the force to remain honest?

These are basic questions. It will require more than an inquiry committee to discover how far the illicit trade is under the control of the police and to what extent the police are controlled by the trade. One might ignore the facile comment that illicit distillation has become a 'cottage industry' since it can neither be proved nor disproved. But it receives wide credence and this in itself is a fact which has to be faced. It is equally significant that we are beginning to see—what was not present before prohibition—the growth of a vested interest in the liquor trade whose ramifications can only be guessed at.

Two Alternatives

What then should the policy regarding alcoholic drinks be in the conditions outlined above? Two alternatives have been indicated: Maharashtra's Chief Minister, Naik, has declared himself for a relaxation of the restrictions which would virtually lead to tolerance of alcohol, by controlling the manufacture of indigenous

liquor both as to its quality and its alcohol content and by liberalising the permit system. The proposal to issue 'health permits' on the recommendation of an applicant's personal physician instead of on the certificate of an official board has not found favour with medical practitioners. It would mean in effect that anyone who wishes to drink can secure a permit and the profession would rather be spared the responsibility of having to participate in a farce. The underlying principle of the Naik policy is in the direction of containing the consumption of liquor and of inducing those who have already acquired the habit to consume beverages of lower alcohol content.

The other suggestion is to resort to more stringent laws and to insist on better enforcement. The strongest advocate of this is Morarji Desai who has publicly declared that, if he is given a year, he could make prohibition work in Maharashtra. This is a large claim considering that Morarji Desai had ten years of power in Bombay during which, I presume, he exerted himself to the best of his ability to establish prohibition. As significant as the failure of that policy in advancing the directive principle of the Constitution is the poor understanding of what prohibition means, or is meant to mean, among his own party colleagues.

No Unified Attitudes

All Congressmen know that prohibition means the passing of anti-liquor laws; the Bhubaneswar Congress has given signs of recognising that implementation is a major factor—so we may assume that the party appreciates that legislation is not enough; but as for the educative effort involved and the importance of personal example, it has to be conceded that Congressmen have been generally indifferent. The system of permits itself is the biggest negation of the foundations of prohibition and Morarji Desai must accept the responsibility for perpetuating it. If the views of leading Congressmen were taken, there would be an alarming confusion of divergent opinion on

who should be exempted from the operation of anti-liquor laws.

A factor to be taken into account is the elimination of voluntary temperance and prohibition workers after the beginning of the prohibition experiment. Since the government had taken up the cause, those who were engaged in the work before naturally expected that campaigning would be channelled through them. The government, it might be said, discouraged independent thinking, resenting equally criticism which deplored the mildness and tentative nature of its policy and denunciation of prohibition. As a consequence, we have not had in the Prohibition States the opposing influences of opposite pressures which existed in, for example, the U.S.A.; and an independent, effective public opinion never came into being.

Public Apathy

I have been struck by the reluctance of the other political parties to make an issue of prohibition, although from the general atmosphere around one it might be thought that prohibition was a peculiarly vulnerable point of the Congress. Even when it had become apparent that Naik had taken a bold step which would be strongly opposed by leading figures in his party, there has been no expression of supporting opinion apart from the first newspaper editorials commending his stand.

The prevailing conditions, however, amply justify the modifications he suggested originally, and the apathy of the public makes it the more essential for government initiative. The argument that there should be an all-India policy on the matter of modifying prohibition, is feeble since there has been no uniformity in prohibition itself. The Congress, not having insisted on all parts of India working in unison, cannot now talk in terms of a uniform policy. As a matter of fact, the States which have been waiting to see how Maharashtra fares, have no *locus standi* in Maharashtra's reconsideration of the subject. And it is to be deplored that attempts

should be made to force the Maharashtra Government to continue a policy not even by the Government of India but by the Congress Party.

The Enquiry Committees

The dragging in of the Tek Chand Committee is another irrelevance: the desire for change of the Maharashtra Government is itself a major factor to be weighed by the Tek Chand Committee which is inquiring into the working of prohibition. Finally, the directive principle of the Constitution cannot be brought in as an argument for pursuing an unworkable policy when it has never been referred to in the context of the non-Prohibition States.

The Planning Commission set up in April 1962 a three-man study team made up of an ex-judge, an economist and one other to go into the working of prohibition and suggest methods of carrying out the directive principle better. The team has submitted the first part of its report and its review of conditions obtaining both in the Prohibition and non-Prohibition States confirms the gloomiest expectations of critics of the policy. Particularly startling is the estimate of the law and order position, the rising influence of the gangster bootlegger and the intimidation of the ordinary citizen.

Of Greater Bombay in particular, it remarks that life and property and the honour of women is threatened by the organised menace of illicit manufacturers and smugglers. The top men among the gangster-bootleggers are never caught because they have acquired wealth, political influence and social prestige. A regular and systematic corruption of the police obtains. Having observed all this and recorded it with admirable candour, the team profess faith in prohibition and in the government's ability to secure effective enforcement of anti-liquor laws.

One of the more baleful proposals to ensure this is relaxing of the laws of evidence to make conviction for breaches of the anti-liquor laws easier by throwing the

onus of the proof on the accused and by permitting the police to dispense with the ordinary caution of having independent witnesses for search and seizure; dwelling unctuously on the evil consequences of preserving captured stills for production in evidence, the team favours prompt destruction. If more were needed than the lurid description of prevailing conditions given by the team to convince reasonable men that prohibition and democracy cannot co-exist, it is to be found in the proposals of the team for altering the laws of the land and the fundamental ideas behind these laws.

Disgraceful Exhibition

The theoretical case for prohibition which the team has outlined, is so absurd that it has provoked derision: its economic estimates of the costs of prohibition, enforcement, illicit distillation and smuggling, and of the effects on revenue are pretentious. In fact, if the report is meant to be taken seriously it is a disgraceful exhibition of special pleading; if it is not, it is a joke in the worst possible taste. Although it expresses itself strongly against the Naik proposals, its accumulation of facts concerning what is happening, in contrast to its expectations of what could be achieved, are the strongest arguments for settling down to consider seriously how best the Prohibition States can be redeemed from the ravages of prohibition.

It is no justification of the study team to say that its terms of reference were bad or that the 'study' was inhibited by the conclusions imposed on it. The evidence of the report clearly shows that what has to be saved is the administration of law and order, not prohibition. It is to the credit of Naik that he has seen this with unusual clarity. It is unfortunate that the absurdities of the Tek Chand Report have not only diverted attention from Naik's proposals but even hindered the implementation of the most basic one to allow consumption of beverages of low alcohol content.

No cause for pessimism

PITAMBAR DATT KAUSHIK

RECENTLY it has almost become a fashion to condemn prohibition. Without taking into consideration the gigantic dimensions of the evil which prohibitionists seek to eliminate, they are condemned as utopian idealists and impractical visionaries. True, some of the champions of prohibition have adopted a dogmatic, doctrinaire and rigid attitude which has done more harm than good to the very cause which is dear to their hearts. True, prohibition has not achieved the desired or even expected success in our country. Yet, prohi-

bition has done considerable good and it will be a great mistake to scrap it which is what some of its critics are clamouring for these days.

Prohibition is the latest method which has been evolved to fight the demon of drink. The evil of alcohol is a hoary curse which has been sapping the foundations of our society for a long time. It has been, in innumerable cases, a cause of destroying the harmony of marital relations; of undermining family co-operation by destroying the respect of children for parents

and of parents for children; of bringing misery, poverty and ruin to many a family by depriving the wife and children of their legitimate share in the earnings of husband and father. It has harmed the society at large by leading to innumerable cases of child delinquency and sex crimes and it has been responsible for the moral, physical and mental breakdown of a number of brilliant and promising young men.

The Early Reformers

The evils of alcoholism attracted the attention of social reformers all over the world almost from the very beginning of organized human society. In the beginning, fight against this evil took the form of imposing restrictions and limitations on the liquor trade. Later, temperance societies were organized to campaign against alcoholism and to reclaim the drink addicts. And, last of all, came prohibition. Prohibition means the complete or partial forbiddance of the use of intoxicating drinks by law. It represents the latest stage of the anti-drink campaign and the future of the anti-alcoholic campaign depends, to a considerable extent at least, on its failure or success.

In India, the fight against the drink-evil started as early as in the days of the Buddha and Emperor Ashoka, but it gained true momentum only after the advent of Mahatma Gandhi. Gandhiji regarded it to be more damnable than thieving and even prostitution. He held it to be more dangerous than rushing into fire or deep waters because while the latter destroyed only the body, the former destroyed both the body and the soul. He declared prohibition to be the greatest moral movement of the century and gave it a place of honour in his constructive programme. 'If I was appointed a dictator for one hour for all India', he declared, 'the first thing I would do would be to close without compensation all the liquor shops.'¹

In 1920, the Indian National Congress accepted it as an import-

ant part of its policy. Soon it came to be regarded as one of the four most important items of the constructive programme. In January 1929, the Congress Working Committee appointed a special committee headed by C. Rajagopalachari to carry out the programme. In 1930, Gandhiji assigned the first place to 'total prohibition' in his famous eleven points and during the Civil Disobedience movements the picketing of liquor shops proved to be the most successful and colourful activity of the Congress volunteers. The Congress at its Karachi session in 1931 categorically declared that any constitution which might be agreed to on its behalf must include total prohibition of intoxicating drinks and drugs.

A New Chapter

With the establishment of Congress Ministries in a majority of provinces in 1937, a new chapter opened in the history of India's fight against the drink evil. For the first time the provincial ministers tried to stamp out drinking by introducing prohibition with genuine ardour and on a substantial scale. In Madras, the Chief Minister, C. Rajagopalachari, declared in his budget speech that 'We regard the introduction of the prohibition of intoxicating drinks and drugs of such vital and fundamental importance to the well-being of the people that we felt that at whatever cost an effective start must be made at once.' Though the Congress Ministries could not introduce total prohibition due to financial difficulties and the briefness of their tenure, yet they made creditable progress in this direction.

After independence, prohibition became an integral part of our national policy and Article 47 of the new Constitution declared it to be the duty of the State to endeavour to bring about total prohibition. In compliance with this Directive Principle, the Planning Commission appointed the Prohibition Enquiry Committee in December 1954. The Committee was headed by Shriman Narayan

and was charged with the task of reviewing the experience gained and to find solutions to the problems and difficulties encountered in recent years.

The Committee submitted its report in October 1955 and recommended a two-year target, beginning from April 1956, for introducing total prohibition throughout the country. The Report was approved by the National Development Council in January 1956. On 31st March, 1956, the Lok Sabha also reiterated that prohibition must be regarded an integral part of the Second Five Year Plan. However, the goal could not be realised and by 1957-58 prohibition could be introduced only in 32.3 per cent of the total area of the country covering 42.3 per cent of our total population. Therefore, another Committee was appointed under the chairmanship of Tek Chand to suggest measures to make prohibition more effective.

The Critics

However, the enthusiasm for prohibition is not shared by all. As early as 1859, the great liberal thinker, John Stuart Mill, opposed it on the plea of individual liberty and in India his arguments were repeated time and again by British officials and a number of Indian intellectuals. In 1919, when prohibition was introduced in the United States of America, labour leaders like Samuel Gompers, the then President of the American Federation of Labour, opposed prohibition as a rich men's conspiracy against the poor by which the rich man wanted to keep the poor man away from the saloon, his motive being that the poor man, if sober, would work for lower wages and with greater efficiency.²

In 1937, when prohibition was introduced by the Congress Ministries, many Christians, Parsees and Harijans protested against the policy of prohibition in the name of religion. Prohibition has been

1. *Young India*, 25th June, 1931.

2. Refer, P. W. Wilson: *After Two Years—A Study of American Prohibition*, pp. 11, 22-23.

condemned by some people as a hasty and unpopular reform. It is opposed for being a financial monstrosity which leads to an enormous loss of revenue. It is also contested on moral grounds and it is maintained that instead of raising the moral standards of the society, prohibition leads to illicit distillation, bootlegging, secret drinking, etc., and releases the poison of bribery, corruption, gangsterism and crime. Above all, prohibition is denounced as utopian, impracticable, impossible of implementation. It is pointed out that before 1919, prohibition was tried in Finland, Turkey, Russia, Norway and Iceland but had to be given up after a short period. In 1919, the prohibitionists became so powerful in the U.S.A. that the Constitution was amended to introduce prohibition on a nationwide scale, but the experiment ended in failure and the Constitution was reamended in 1933 to repeal prohibition.

The Supporting Arguments

However, all these arguments were contradicted by Gandhiji and his disciples. 'The right of the individual', said Rajagopalachari, 'to commit acts injurious to himself, his family and society in general is a fiction-born of outborn theories of the liberty which have long since been discarded by progressive nations.'³ Gandhiji maintained that the drinking habit not only does no good to the labourers but actually destroys their vitality. He quoted Christian, Muslim and Hindu religious authorities to refute the argument that prohibition led to the curtailment of religious liberty. He maintained that prohibition combated immorality by removing the greatest cause of moral crimes, namely, the drink evil.

He contended that prohibition was not unpopular in India although most Indians, being teetotallers, did not bother their heads about alcohol addicts. He refused to give any weight to the financial argument and denounced drink and drug revenue as an extremely degrading form of tax-

ation which must go. He did not think that prohibition had been a failure in the U.S.A. and brushed aside the arguments concerning illicit distillation, bootlegging, violation of prohibition laws etc., by bluntly retorting that illicit distillation like thieving might abide till doomsday.⁴

The New Climate

The Gandhian rejoinder had its effect and for a time prohibition remained so popular in India that its critics had to remain silent. But since the Chinese attack of September 1962, and the promulgation of the emergency, prohibition has come more and more under fire. It is being said that it has been a total failure. 'Thirteen years of prohibition', wrote B. P. Contractor in April, 1963, 'have just been completed in Bombay. They have been far from "dry". In fact they have given rise to a thriving enterprise in illicit liquor.'⁵ Raj Bahadur, the Shipping Minister, has maintained that prohibition had done great harm to the foreign tourist traffic in India.

It is widely argued that in these critical times, when almost unbearable taxes are being imposed to meet the necessary expenditure on defence, the government must not indulge in utopian fads like prohibition which is depriving it of much needed revenue. S. K. Patil, the present Union Railway Minister, has gone to the extent of calling prohibition, 'A National Disaster', which has led not to the prohibition of the drink evil but to the prohibition of government revenue. Under these circumstances, the State Governments are finding it difficult to resist the temptation of increasing their revenues by scrapping prohibition. The Government of Uttar Pradesh has actually abandoned it and the Union Government had to issue in April, 1963, a directive to the State Governments not to scrap prohi-

bition, if they could not extend it further.

On December 31, 1963, V. P. Naik, the Chief Minister of Maharashtra, made an announcement which may prove a turning point in the history of prohibition. Naik's announcement contemplated two things:

1. liberalization in the issue of liquor permits for people above the age of 40;
2. the free sale of beer and toddy with alcoholic content not exceeding 3.5 per cent.

Naik maintained that his scheme did not mean any watering down of prohibition, but aimed at securing better implementation by curbing illicit distillation, the activities of bootleggers and illicit trade. He said that he was not acting against the Congress policy of prohibition. The change was only an administrative action to curb bootlegging and the government was not interested in making money out of the evil of drinking.

The General Response

The Naik Scheme has been both an object of enthusiastic welcome and trenchant criticism. *The Hindustan Times* called it 'the victory of good sense over shibboleth.' *The Times of India* welcomed it as 'a courageous move' which was to 'be greeted with three cheers for their good sense and boldness.' *The Economic Times* maintained that, 'Mr. Vasantrao Naik's courageous decision to modify the prohibition policy of Maharashtra Government represents a belated return of reason and practical wisdom in a domain of social welfare that has been persistently clouded by stubborn sentiment and dogma ever since Independence.' *The Statesman* greeted it as a 'return to sense'.⁶

Thus, the leading newspapers of the country welcomed the Naik Scheme in no unmistakable terms. Equally unmistakable was its denunciation by the Hyderabad Conference of the Prohibition

4. For further discussion of arguments for and against prohibition see P. D. Kaushik: *The Congress Ideology & Programme, 1920-47*, Appendix to Chapter V (Being published by Allied Publishers Pvt. Ltd., Bombay.)

5. *The Times of India*, 7th April, 1963.

6. Refer the Editorials of *The Hindustan Times*, dated January 3, 1964; *The Times of India*, dated January 3, 1964; *The Economic Times*, dated January 2, 1964; and *The Statesman*, dated January 5, 1964.

3. *Young India*, December 16, 1926.

Workers which condemned it as a 'retrograde' step. Many labour organizations such as the Maharashtra branch of the INTUC also protested vigorously. It was of the opinion that prohibition had been a boon to poor workers and their families and any relaxation of prohibition would be against their interests.

On the whole, I think Naik was sincere when he maintained that his aim was not to scrap prohibition but to curb bootlegging. Liberalising of liquor permits was a sensible step and may go a long way to curb not only bootlegging but also administrative corruption. But he went rather too far when he proposed the free sale of beer and toddy. He failed to realize that this would mean placing a strong temptation before the younger generation. He overlooked the ancient saying: 'first man takes a drink, then the drink takes the man and finally drink takes the man.' Moreover, it was based on the mistaken belief that bootlegging and illicit distillation are the by-products of prohibition. The truth is that illicit liquor trade existed much before prohibition came into existence. It is a product not of prohibition but of the high excise duties which make liquor so costly that illicit distillation becomes a very profitable business. Bootleggers do a roaring business even in countries like the U.S.A. and France where there is no prohibition and the sale of the licensed brew is unrestricted.

The Aftermath

Whatever might have been the intention of Naik, the aftermath of his announcement has made it clear that the other States want to water down prohibition not for curbing bootlegging and administrative corruption but for increasing their revenues. Within a week of Naik's announcement, the Madhya Pradesh Government and the Chief Minister of Mysore, Nijalingappa, expressed their intention to relax prohibition in their respective States. Their motive was clear. The Madhya Pradesh Government expected to earn one crore of rupees a year by scrap-

ping prohibition while the Mysore Government hoped to make an immediate saving of five crores annually by doing the same. The Mysore Government further expected that this saving would go up to eight to ten crores annually within two or three years.

Craving for Revenue

This craving for revenue was a most disquieting trend. Therefore, the Congress High Command intervened and advised chief ministers not to change the prohibition policy until the Congress Working Committee had first discussed it thoroughly. Consequently, Naik postponed the implementation of the second part of his scheme, namely, free sale of beer and toddy while he expedited the execution of the first part of his scheme, namely, liberalization of the issue of liquor permits. *The Times of India* has characterized this postponement as 'a retreat from reason',⁷ but I disagree with this view. I feel that the hopes built upon the Naik Plan were a little too optimistic. No doubt, the Naik Plan was a bold step. But the enthusiasts for it forgot that illicit distillation and bootlegging were much older than prohibition. They were, in reality, the by-products of the British liquor policy. The British Government imposed such high excise duties on liquor that the illicit liquor trade became a very paying business.

The introduction of the free sale of toddy and beer would have definitely been a retrograde step, although the other part of Naik's plan, namely, liberalization of liquor permits, was a move in the right direction. By implementing the latter immediately and postponing the free sale of beer and toddy Naik did the right thing, because while the liberalizing of liquor permits is likely to lead to a lessening of administrative corruption, the free sale of beer and toddy would have again exposed the younger generation and the labourers, who have been the real beneficiaries of prohibition, to the drink evil. Therefore, Naik's later stand on prohibition was a

retreat to reason rather than from reason.

After considering the history of the prohibition movement and arguments for and against it, we may now arrive at some tangible conclusions. First, the drink evil is a curse of our society and has done incalculable harm specially to the poorer classes. It is popularly believed that the drink evil is confined to the upper and the middle classes. Had it been so, it would not have been a very serious evil. But actually the real victims of alcoholism are the labourers and they are the persons who can least afford this vice. In a welfare State and a socialist society we cannot leave them to live and die as sub-human beings. We have to ameliorate their lot and for this the drink evil must go.

Secondly, prohibition has not had the desired success in India. In many cases it has intensified the evils of illicit distillation, bootlegging and administrative corruption. Even in Gujarat, where campaigning for prohibition has been more intensive than in other parts of the country, on an average, as many as 109 prohibition offences were registered daily in 1962-63.

The Gains

Thirdly, despite its anaemic success, prohibition has done more to remove the drink curse than any other thing. It is true that social evils cannot be removed by legislation alone, but it is also true that reformist efforts cannot achieve desired success without the help of legislation. Any way, legislation does facilitate the path of social reformers. That a law is violated is no argument for its repeal. Murders and thefts do take place despite laws. Does it mean that laws against these be abolished? Moreover, illicit distillation and bootlegging are by no means the product of prohibition. The real cause is the high price of liquor. These evils were very much in existence even when there was no prohibition and the way to eradicate them lies not in scrapping prohibition but in

⁷ *The Times of India*, editorial, Jan. 13, 1964.

giving up the lust for drink-revenue.

This leads us to the conclusion that prohibition must not be ended but mended. To scrap prohibition and let the labourers be the victims of the drink curse will be a retrograde step. At the same time, it is also true that a rigid and dogmatic approach will do more harm than good. Prohibition there must be but it must not be a blind prohibition. What has failed in India is not prohibition but the prohibitionists. We must adopt an intelligent prohibition policy based on the realization that prohibition is not an end but only a means of combating the drink evil. Naturally, the prohibition policy must be re-orientated from time to time in the light of practical experience. Eminent medical experts, scientists and non-political sociologists should be associated in the formulation of policy.

A Sound Policy

For the formulation of a sound prohibition policy certain facts will have to be kept in mind. First, total elimination of drink is neither possible nor desirable. We must realize the distinction between simple drinking and the drink evil, i.e., alcoholism. We must realize that what we have to fight is not drinking as such but alcoholism and fight it in such a way as to leave the minimum possible scope for the illicit liquor trade and administrative corruption. Light drinking can be a healthy and beneficial thing under certain circumstances, in cold climates and as a medicine. Such use of drink should be permitted and, let me add, liberally permitted otherwise it may lead to corruption among the administrative officers.

Secondly, it should be kept in mind that although alcohol heaps untold miseries upon the labourers, it does satisfy some of their social, psychic and physical needs. Socially, the toddy shop functions to some extent as 'the poor man's club' and provides some relaxation and recreation to the labourer after a day of hard toil. Psychologically, it proves to be a psychic

Alladin's lamp and enables him to forget the miseries of his life. Physically, it acts as a stimulant and a labourer, who has to work for long hours amidst the din of roaring machines, does need some stimulant after his toil.

Ensuring Success

Therefore, if prohibition has to be successful in India, arrangements must be made to provide recreational facilities and substitute beverages so that the labourer may satisfy his social, psychic and physical needs without recourse to drink. Thirdly, the lust for revenue from alcohol must be given up, otherwise half-hearted efforts to introduce prohibition are bound to end in failure. Last, but not least, it must be kept in mind that social legislation can never be enforced without active public co-operation. The government and the social reformers must co-operate in rooting out this evil. The respective spheres of these two agencies must be clearly distinguished.

The problem of eliminating the drink evil has two aspects—first, shielding the younger generation from the evil of alcoholism and, second, reclaiming the older addicts. The first requires the determined and combined efforts of both the government and the social reformers. But the latter falls primarily within the sphere of social reformers. Persuasive and not punitive and repressive methods should be used for this purpose otherwise prohibition will become a form of religious persecution. In this sphere, societies such as 'Alcoholics Anonymous' have achieved great success in the U.S.A. and many other countries. These should also be established in India. Thus the government and the social reformers should endeavour side by side to slay the drink-dragon. There is absolutely no cause for pessimism. Prohibition is an experiment. It will never seem to be a success until the time comes when its success is no longer in question. But it seeks to achieve a noble ideal. It will be great to fight for and realize this ideal. It will be glorious to die fighting for it.

Yesterday and tomorrow

U. N. DHEBAR

THE case for prohibition in India stands on fundamentally a different footing than the case for prohibition in other countries of the world. Prohibition in the West has always been associated with the struggle against alcoholism on physical or health grounds. Unaware as yet of this difference, the antagonists of the prohibition movement in India point a finger to the experience of the West, especially the United States of America, and argue that "the method of legislative compulsion which undoubtedly failed to yield results there can hardly succeed in India. They are also not wholly unjustified in arguing that drinking in moderate measures is physically not so harmful as it is believed to be. They are not on

that premise unjustified in arguing in favour of temperance.

Prohibition in India has suffered because it has been dealt with on the basis of the effects of alcoholism on the human system or the physical organism of the human being. There are, however, reasons far more potent in support which the opponents of prohibition may well try to understand. Also, they are weighty in a world which is slipping away from us in India. But they are even more weighty in a world which is appearing over the horizon as the world of tomorrow.

What is this human being in whose benefit the protagonists and antagonists of prohibition are carrying on this controversy? Is he a mere collection of chemical

compounds which develop consciousness as an epi-phenomenon to disappear at death; or is the human being endowed with something which is independent of the chemical compounds? In other words, is consciousness merely the product of the chemistry of which his body is made or is that consciousness an inner phenomenon which precedes birth and survives death?

Conception of Life

I am sorry for trying to lead the discussion towards a direction which may sound mystical in nature. But I cannot help it. After all, if there is to be a discussion at an intellectual level, it has to take into account the fundamental aspect of this movement in India. The origin of the movement is centuries old and has been the result of deep and mature thinking. It is not a brain wave of some Gandhian faddist as is consistently advertised. It is true that ignorance and impetuosity on the part of the enthusiasts of this movement have sometimes converted it into a fad.

The real issue however is this. What is our notion of the Indian citizen? Are the 45 crores who exist now and others who will come into existence hereafter, just so many bottles of chemical substances? Or, are these crores endowed with a consciousness which is independent, which existed before their birth and which will survive after their death? We, the people of India, have inherited from our forefathers not only our physical bodies which are finite and mortal; but we also have inherited from our forefathers a conception of life which has bound us to a universal and immortal principle through the centuries.

This conception of life is, in my opinion, our only hope against mass inertia and complacency among the leadership. It is the only conception which is likely to take us to the sources of inherent vitality and dynamism which are indispensable in making our life rich and noble. If the fountain in a certain way seems to have

dried up, it is because it is choked by a deep sense of defeatism and frustration. We are not ourselves. Everyday we are trying to forget ourselves. The only remedy is to revive what is best in the Indian way of life. In that way alone shall we be able to create in our society confidence in itself and give it a broad and durable base. Unless the social motivations which we place before it are oriented to suit its genius, we shall in vain struggle to move it with a momentum which a Gandhi could give.

This conception of life has been the essence of Indian existence ever since the *Upanishads* were written. We have learnt from this source that man, otherwise indistinguishable from an animal, has been endowed with a rare faculty which can help him to expand his vision to the uttermost extent so that he can, like Tagore and Gandhi, be universal and immortal. Alcohol in any form or to any extent, if it becomes a habit, must affect this faculty: this has been the experience of India through the ages.

Intuition

First of all, let us understand what this faculty is. Is it the same as a powerful mind or a sharp intellect? No. Is it something more than these. These are merely the outward expressions of that faculty. That faculty is intuition.

Drinking as a habit affects that faculty, hence the consistent counsel to the people of India in the Brahmanical age and the Buddhist and Jain era; in the era of saints and philosophers and finally the consistent counsel which followed into the conception of a new Indian society of which the foundations were laid in the latter half of the 18th century by Raja Ram Mohan Roy and which were being continuously strengthened by Ramakrishna Parama Hamsa, Swami Dayanand Saraswati, Lokmanya Tilak and Mahatma Gandhi. When Lord Buddha talked of non-drinking, he did not do so as a faddist, nor did Mahatma Gandhi.

I have broached a point of view which will take many unawares.

But it had to be broached if I had to clear the air and assert that this movement touches deeper sources of human reserves than merely safeguarding health. This point of view has also to be broached to caution not only those who argue against prohibition but for prohibition. Prohibition will be one more mechanical or artificial exercise superimposed upon the mentally suppressed masses of India if it is divorced from its real objective. Not the whole might of the Indian Government is going to save prohibition if it is so divorced. It is true that as a result we shall have an India which will be an ugly and a distorted copy of the West—may be a seventh rate copy at that.

It is possible that in that case Mother Nature will grudge having given us Buddha and Gandhi. They brought up the issue of man's real mission in life to the door of every Indian and tried to provide him with the wherewithals for fulfilling the mission. The issue of prohibition is thus linked up with the vision of the Indian race which did not regard the physical existence of its members as the beginning and the end of all that it was living for, but which regarded that every one of its members was endowed with an immutable, immortal and universal content which could make for a life of truth, beauty and joy possible in every one of its households.

World of Tomorrow

I said above that the reasons for prohibition continue to be as weighty for the world of tomorrow as they are for the world of today. As science and technology develop—as the world becomes more and more complex—decision making is becoming more and more difficult. We see creeping into the rules of conduct of men charged with decision making in complex situations, or in the rules of conduct of men who have to handle complex jobs, that they shall not be under the influence of alcohol while engaged in work. The driver of a car is handling a more risky vehicle than a bullock cart. The cart driver can take a little more liberty but the car driver cannot.

The air pilot is under a still stricter code of discipline and the space-man even more so. The rules which govern the operators in an atomic station will be far more stringent and so also the rules which will govern the common man and woman in the atomic age.

Preparation

What is the preparation we are making for such an age? Habit formation, if it is not to be crudely done, has to be scientifically approached. The human mind is not always so facile that it will adjust itself on the spur of the moment. The cultivation of habit is an art. One has to follow the path of training for a considerable time before we can form a desirable habit. Unless an idea becomes a part of our thinking, it will work as an imposition which the mind will resist. In the deeper layers of our consciousness, we have started feeling that a new age is upon us and it will come with the speed of lightning. The tragedy of the situation is that only a few are getting ready to respond to it in the way it could be responded to. The new age will bring its own disciplines and looking at it from a distance, if peace is to prevail, a beginning has to be made to cultivate the disciplines of peace from now on.

This throws a duty upon those who think in traditional lines, whether of eastern or western origin, to look into this question objectively. The most potent argument in favour of prohibition then will be: can sober decision-making which is indispensable in the atomic age be ensured without disciplining the mind which has to take it? If the frontiers of peace are to be laid in the minds of men, Indian experience teaches us that it has to be detached, balanced, equipoised, free from addiction of any kind. This is the greatest lesson our ancients learnt in the hard school of life and the greatest heritage which they have passed on to us, the richest heritage of our race.

Thirdly, for India, which is frantically struggling to emancipate its countless millions from the clutch-

es of poverty and indigence, the question of priorities is of supreme importance. If the production potential of the country is to be raised to the desired level, it is necessary to *save* as much as possible and save on all items which are not considered absolutely essential. This raises the question of priority. At the level of the masses, the priority has to be adequate food and education. I have yet to be convinced that our people at the lowest level can afford to spend on alcohol. Expenditure on drinking then must come into conflict with the basic priorities. Can we not expect those who can afford it to fall in line with this requirement? It becomes a national duty.

The argument that licensing can be made into a good source of revenue only shows that we have scarce regard for these priorities. Heartlessness behind this argument—to collect revenue from alcohol at the expense of food and education—can hardly do credit to the advocates thereof.

Implementation

Finally comes the question of implementation. The police alone is not going to succeed. It is the work of social leadership to provide the backing of public opinion. That is needed whether one thinks of temperance or full scale prohibition. Have we done our duty to the full! There are people working in the field of religion, education and social work in the thousands. It would not be impossible to provide the necessary organization for the work of educating public opinion in this respect. If there is failure, it is of the institutions interested in carrying out prohibition successfully. Laxity in this has affected the interest of the State as well as the people. But the remedy lies in supplementing what is wanted and not to go back on the commitment. I think there is so much to be gained and very little to be lost if the State, the people and the social workers can meet to provide that basic organisation as the States of Gujarat and Madras have done to make a success of the experiment.

There's money in the racket

R. K. KARANJIA

'It is wrong to say that wine makes men disreputable, the truth is that men bring wine into disrepute.'

— a Persian couplet.

IF Gandhiji were to return to this earthly scene and witness the distortion of his precepts and their perversion in practise by his disciples, the Mahatma's first act would probably be *satyagraha* against the monstrous sacrilege in his saintly name of prohibition by police enforcement.

The leader of the Indian freedom struggle, of course, insisted on prohibition not only as a weapon against British imperialism, but also as an instrument for the moral rehabilitation of the Indian people. His approach to the problem was, however, essentially a social one.

He desired to use every argument of persuasion and education for the conversion, by consent, of the addict, except the argument of force, of legislative enactment and police *zoolum*, as has been done by the Morarjis and pseudo-Mahatmas in the enforcement of prohibition.

Indeed, the very idea of enforcement was repugnant to the spirit of Gandhiji. Force and violence were to him the father and mother of all evils: and the whole brood of monsters of corruption, boot-legging and illicit distillation, crime, and contempt for law which has followed in the wake of prohibition by legislative imposition vindicate the Gandhian stand.

What was really the Gandhian attitude to the problem? Gandhiji was far from being dogmatic or

fanatical when he advocated prohibition way back in the 1920s as one of the weapons of the freedom struggle. For him the issue of prohibition was only a means to an end, the end being *swaraj*. It was a technique to outmanoeuvre the well-knit, remorseless machinery of the British Raj, hit the latter at the most sensitive point of its exercise profits, and contact the masses over a moral non-political issue to which there could not be any plausible objection.

Tactical Move

The adoption of prohibition as one of the major planks of the Congress programme helped the national organisation fighting for the freedom of the country to remain focused before the public gaze all the time. Congress workers preaching prohibition could move from village to village and meet the people without inviting the wrath of the British Government. The technique was so clever that even the pious Lord Irwin agreed to the prohibition programme advocated by Gandhiji on moral grounds.

At that time, there was a powerful and resourceful bourgeoisie which wanted to belong to the mainstream of the nationalist forces, but was anxious to avoid coming into open conflict with the British Government. It was not prepared to accept the militant revolutionary programme of the Congress; prohibition, however, like the anti-prostitution movement, enabled it to take part in the agitation against the Raj, thus broadening and deepening the flow of the national movement.

Under the guise of helping the moral and inoffensive prohibition programme, nationalist businessmen, even millionaires, liberally contributed large sums to the Congress funds to fight British imperialism.

Close associates of Gandhiji in the early twenties, like Kanji Dwarkadas, have affirmed that for him, prohibition was, in fact, more of a technique of struggle than an ideal to be pursued after freedom. This is clear from the fact that when a liberal minister approached

Gandhiji with a suggestion to implement prohibition by stages—the only possible way of selling prohibition at that time—Gandhiji vehemently opposed the move, declaring: '*Prohibition now or never!*' The reason was obvious.

Gandhiji was in a hurry to sharpen an instrument which would harry and harass the British Raj; he, therefore, insisted on '*Prohibition now or never.*' Dwarkadas, like many others, doubts whether Gandhiji was quite sincere about prohibition. That he was not so very sanguine about the successful outcome of this social reform, apart from its usefulness as a technique against the British, is proved by an aside he had with the late Motilal Nehru, who never accepted prohibition whole-heartedly.

Gandhiji had sought to chastise Motilal for accepting drinks at a public reception at Simla. Wrote Gandhiji in a letter to Motilal: 'I cannot but be grieved that you who lead the anti-liquor campaign, should publicly drink it and, what is worse, chaff at teetotalism.'

In a postscript to the same letter Gandhi added, 'I know that if a man drinks privately, he may drink publicly too. A public man, however, may not drink publicly, if he is likely to offend. I distinguish between private and secret drinking.' (Quoted by M. R. Jayakar in *The Story of My Life*, Vol. II, p. 332).

Motilal's reply to Gandhi was typical: 'To me, it is clear that deceiving men by keeping up false appearances is worse than offending them, and I must express my utter inability to understand how you can possibly reconcile yourself to the suggestion that I might drink privately if at all. I must also respectfully differ from the distinction you draw between "private drinking and secret drinking". In my humble opinion, it is a distinction without a difference.' (Idem, p. 335).

Flexible Approach

Gandhiji emphasised that 'public men should not drink in public', meaning that if necessary there is no harm in drinking privately, and this proves once again his non-

dogmatic, pragmatic and flexible approach to prohibition.

What Gandhiji had probably adopted as one of the main planks of the Congress programme for purely tactical reasons, was later perverted by hypocritical moralisers and kill-joy fanatics into a so-called national policy which only served to open the flood-gates of corruption and lawlessness, break the morale of the once-efficient police forces, squander public money, corrode public health, undermine public morality, and create a large anti-social fraternity of bootleggers and criminals, many of whom are gaining a foothold in Congress circles and in even ministerial quarters.

Net Result

In result, prohibition has only served to raise what is universally recognised as traffic in illicit and contraband brew into one of India's major cottage industries, and a whole gigantic underworld of big business in crime and lawlessness, corrupting not only society but also the police and law enforcement agencies, and threatening to vitiate even our democracy and the body politic with its powerful and poisonous lobby.

Indeed, the Gandhiji were ever so utterly earnest about prohibition as one of the postulates of Indian freedom, as many of his followers would argue, the consequences of its enforcement by legislation and police methods would so outrage his faith in morality, democracy and the rule of law that he would denounce it today as an infinitely greater tragedy for Gandhian thought and action than was the Chauri Chaura incident, and order its withdrawal.

It is such a genuinely Gandhian conviction, after giving prohibition a fully honest trial, that forces leaders like Vijayalakshmi Pandit and Vasant Rao Naik, the Governor and Chief Minister respectively, of Maharashtra, to give up a hopeless struggle. Realisation of this truth might well revolutionise the whole approach to the drink evil. Instead of prohibiting it by legislation and police enforcement, which creates strong reactions in the contrary direction among a free and demo-

cratic society, a new approach of education and social reform might bring about the results desired by Gandhiji with the willing consent of the populace.

The Price Paid

The havoc wrought by prohibition in Bombay, to which Morarji Desai gave the dubious status of the first Capital of Total Prohibition in the country, has reached demoralising proportions. The sprawling city is dotted with numerous 'colonies' of illicit brewers who peddle every kind of hooch from imported Scotch to indigenous Morarjin, to every nook and corner of the metropolis. How they manage the whole underworld organisation is a tribute to their ingenuity in the interminable battle of wits between bootleggers and the police.

Many are the tricks employed by the bootleggers. Some smuggle hooch in large quantities, cleverly conceived in automobiles. Private cars owned by citizens, even diplomats and ministers, are known to have been used surreptitiously at night for the illicit trade. It has been smuggled in trucks upon which huge floats are mounted for the annual Prohibition Week tamashas. Others use their ingenuity to conceal liquor containers in industrial equipment.

The human carrier is perhaps the commonest in use. On one occasion, the alarming incidence of pregnancy among women around the *check naka* helped the police to a major catch. On another, bogus school children were caught transporting hooch instead of books in bags slung from their shoulders. Lepers have found a flourishing profession as carriers of hooch for the reason that the police will not touch them. Liquor is also concealed in cycle tubes, rubber balloons or hot-water bottles secured firmly to human bodies under the clothing.

The trade is known to employ ex-servicemen and other toughs to deal with the prohibition police and their informers. Women in their employment are known, in order to protect their trade, to

have stripped themselves and charged raiding police parties with assault and rape. Radio transmitters and wireless sets are also used by the hooch business to alert carriers against the police bandobust. Indeed, such a powerful and effective big business has grown round the trade that the police may risk the displeasure of the *dada* at the cost of his life and family: little wonder that he succumbs to the temptation of the generous *hafta* and *dolce vita* offered by the trade.

Everybody knows these facts: the Morarjis more than others. It is only their cussedness that keeps the fraud going. The other day, this writer overheard Balasahib Desai, the witty and indulgent Home Minister of Maharashtra, ask his Excise Commissioner what he was doing. The official answered, 'Looking after Prohibition, Sir.' 'Oh', laughed the Home Minister, 'I thought that was done by bootleggers!'

Statistics

The average expenditure incurred by the government to enforce prohibition in Greater Bombay alone is Rs. 45,00,000. The official statistics available show that in 1961 there were 1,17,393 registered offences; in 1962, 1,26,569; and 79,096 only for the first half of 1963. Against this number of registered offenders, the number of those who could not be prosecuted was 5,346 in 1961; and 7,563 in 1962. Figures for 1963 are not available.

These figures, more eloquent than all the utterances of ministers and leaders during Prohibition Weeks, incontestably proclaim how completely the enforcement of prohibition has failed. The failure is due more often than not to the deep inroads made by the hooch barons into the police force, where many officers and ranks receive a regular monthly *hafta* which is often much more than their salary.

That prohibition in Bombay has been a 'gigantic farce and failure' was recently asserted by a former Presidency Magistrate, who said that he had tried as many as 30,000 prohibition cases. The magistrate,

G. J. Saldanha, on a recent visit to Goa, told the press there that he was convinced that the dry law had created grave social problems, and produced a new class of rich who respected neither law nor order but had developed a vested interest in the continuance of prohibition. The continuance of prohibition, he warned, would spell ruin to the country. Comparing 'wet' Goa with 'dry' Bombay, the magistrate observed: 'Here in Goa it is the bottles which seem to stare at the people and not the other way round as elsewhere. I have hardly seen drunkards here, unlike in "dry" Bombay.'

Bold Decision

Assessing correctly the dangerous situation which has arisen from the utter failure of prohibition, the new Chief Minister of Maharashtra, Vasantrao P. Naik, has adopted the bold and more realistic policy of, at least, relaxing the fraud before a final decision on an all-India basis is reached. According to Naik, the government came to this new decision 'because it did not want to convert the State into one of convicts under the dry law. As many as 4,00,000 people had been convicted for prohibition offences during the last 14 years.'

Supporting the policy of relaxation of prohibition enunciated by the Chief Minister of Maharashtra, the State Governor, Vijayalakshmi Pandit, in her address to the legislature, said that this new policy 'was a result of the experience of the enforcement of the prohibition law during the last 14 years. Government has become aware that prohibition as it now exists in this State can give rise to serious dangers to the common welfare and these dangers can be aggravated if an unrealistic or wishful approach is adopted to the goal towards which the Constitution directs us. It could never have been the intention that the State should provide law-breakers with an easy and profitable means of livelihood by illicit distillation or by trafficking in noxious alcohol.'

A more categorical admission of the failure of prohibition could not

be had than from these frank and honest statements by the Governor and the Chief Minister of Maharashtra. These provide the most devastating reply to those holier-than-thou demagogues who howl, in season and out of season, that prohibition has been a success and demand the continuance of the fraud only to satisfy their personal ambitions and gratify their wretched ego.

Consumption of good, wholesome alcohol is nothing new to the Indian way of life. Early Indian society was free from inhibitions like prohibition. Hindu religious mythology provides sufficient data to prove that in early Indian society drinking was part and parcel of all social events, activities and celebrations. It had its own place in their daily life. Whether at birth, or at marriage, or at harvest time, liquor flowed honourably, and people relished and consumed it without being ostracised. This is particularly true of the Vedic civilisation when *Soma Ras* was kept in every home and was served to guests.

Total Failure

Prohibition has been a total flop wherever it has been adopted. America, to which our so-called purists and prohibitionists often turn for inspiration, had introduced prohibition as an experimental measure. Like in India, there also, bootleggers reaped the harvest of the ill-advised measure, and crime and lawlessness flourished on a stupendous scale. The Government of the US, respecting the wishes of the people and concerned about their deteriorating health, bowed to their demands and repealed the harmful legislation. This happened in Sweden too.

It is a common fallacy, magnified and increasingly mouthed by prohibition faddists, that alcohol is bad for the health. On the other hand, well-known medical authorities affirm that alcohol is not only a preserver of health, but also an asset to the medical profession. It is a matter of common knowledge that in fainting fits, excepting when there are serious

cerebral conditions like haemorrhage or thrombosis or epilepsy, alcohol gives immediate relief.

Authoritative medical quarters maintain that there are fewer heart cases among those who consume liquor than among those who do not. Incidentally, this result is just the reverse to that of smoking, as, among those who drink, the blood vessels supplying the heart are dilated by alcoholic beverages. Sir William Osler, MD, whose book on medicine is accepted as authoritative, maintains that to avoid flu one must have a peg or so of brandy every day. Once, in a lighter vein, Sir William prescribed: 'If you get a cold, go home, put your hat on the bedstead, get into your pyjamas and drink brandy till you see two hats instead of one.'

Eminent pharmacologists have accepted the fact that alcohol produces energy and supplies the caloric needs of the body as food when, in certain cases, it is not possible to feed sick persons by mouth. Alcohol is also advocated by certain authorities as a tranquiliser in emotional upsets. It acts as a remedy for sleeplessness without producing any of the depressing effects generally attributed to various hypnotics like barbiturates and bromides. There have been, also, proved cases when a person has been kept alive by alcohol for an hour till such time as he is able to assimilate normal food.

Medical science concludes, in the light of this knowledge, that whereas other substances continue to be in circulation in the human body for a long time, thereby producing prolonged untoward symptoms, alcoholic beverages are absorbed and oxidised, producing immediately a beneficial effect. All this applies, of course, to alcohol consumed *moderately*.

Waste of Resources

Finally, living as we do between two war fronts created for us by China and Pakistan, is it advisable for the nation to indulge in the enormous waste of our much needed financial resources to sup-

port the proven humbug of prohibition? In recent times, prominent economists have strongly pleaded for a rethinking on prohibition. Thus, Professor D. R. Gadgil, writing in the Annual Number for 1963 of the *Economic Weekly*, said:

'If, in fact, nobody drinks as a result of the law, there is no doubt that the economy will benefit greatly from prohibition. However, if large numbers drink in spite of prohibition and it gives rise to consumption of bad quality liquor and the corruption of the police and the administration, the need for rethinking becomes very strong.'

Another renowned economist, Dr. K. N. Raj, Director of the Delhi School of Economics, in the same issue of the journal observed:

'From the economic point of view the case for reconsidering the policy of prohibition is that there is involved here a "luxury good" the demand for which is not only widespread but fairly inelastic within a certain range of prices. Abolition of prohibition can yield an additional Rs. 100—150 crores per annum, a large part of which really accrues now to the bootleggers.'

The views of such authorities are entitled to respectful attention. They cannot be dismissed by the crusaders of prohibition merely shouting themselves hoarse that the policy has succeeded. What these crusaders do not have the moral courage to admit—although they are aware of the fact—is that the only success it has brought is to bootleggers who, like Big Businessmen, contribute to Congress funds for their own benefit.

If one who knows what's going on can make a suggestion to Justice Tek Chand, his enquiry might cover the organised pressure lobby which has been lately working overtime to prevent any rational withdrawal from prohibition. For there's money in the racket, more money than morality!

The problem of arrack

P. KODANDA RAO

PROBLEMS in the social sciences do not lend themselves to treatment as objective as those in the physical sciences. Maximum objectivity must, however, be aimed at even if not always attainable. The Wickersham Commission on prohibition conducted perhaps the most ambitious and thorough investigation of the policy as well as its implementation in America. Although it took about eighteen months and was assisted by a battery of researchers, it was unable to arrive at a firm and unanimous finding. It, however, recommended, by a large majority, that prohibition should not be repealed, but should be tried for some time longer, and even then it should be revised but not repealed, so that its gains be conserved and only its defects eliminated. That prohibition was repealed was not because the Wickersham Commission recommended it.

In India, the Prohibition Enquiry Committee of Madhya Pradesh

in 1951, and the Andhra Pradesh Prohibition Committee of 1954 discussed both policy and administration. They came to the conclusion that prohibition had 'failed' and recommended its repeal, but did not recommend a return to the *status quo ante*, but individual rationing, which amounted to a radical revolution in the excise policy! The Prohibition Enquiry Committee of the Planning Commission of 1955-56 and the Tek Chand Committee of 1964 were invited to suggest measures to implement prohibition more effectively.

The study of prohibition will be facilitated by as clear a definition of it as possible. It may be no exaggeration to say that the life of the citizen is beset with prohibitions, legal or customary, of one kind or other. The criminal law, the electoral law, the marriage laws, the traffic laws, to mention a few, prohibit certain actions by him, although in his own interest

and that of society. In the present context, prohibition refers only to the consumption of intoxicating drinks such as alcoholic liquors and drugs such as opium.

Article 47, which finds a place among the Directive Principles of State Policy in the Indian Constitution, runs as follows :

The State shall regard the raising of the level of nutrition and the standard of living of its people and the improvement of public health as among its primary duties, and in particular, the State shall endeavour to bring about prohibition of the consumption, except for medicinal purposes, of intoxicating drinks and of drugs which are injurious to health.

This Article delimits the scope of prohibition and defines its objective. Prohibition is thus one of the 'primary duties' of the State; it was made obligatory by the use of the word 'shall' and even more obligatory by the use of the words 'in particular' but was weakened by the use of the word 'endeavour'. According to Article 37, the Directive Principles are not justiciable, and the Indian citizen cannot legally compel the State to implement them, but they are as fundamental in the governance of the country as the Fundamental Rights.

Varied Policy

The implementation of prohibition was thus left to the discretion of the several States which were, in consequence, free to make it either immediate or remote, absolute or gradual, uniform or selective with regard to persons, intoxicants and areas. The several States in India have taken advantage of this latitude and have differed widely in their attitude towards prohibition. Some have introduced it throughout their jurisdictions; others only in parts, and still others have ignored it altogether.

The prohibition laws in India do not absolutely prohibit the consumption of alcoholic beverages, but permit many *legal exemptions*. For instance, the Defence Forces,

foreign diplomats and foreign tourists are permitted to consume 'foreign' liquors such as whisky. Parsees, Jews and Christians are permitted to use liquor for sacramental purposes. Indian citizens are given permits for the consumption of 'foreign' liquor on production of medical certificates stating that it was necessary for their health although, paradoxically enough, prohibition was enjoined in the interest of health! Legal prohibition is absolute only in the case of liquors such as country spirit or *arrack*, which is distilled, and *toddy*, which is brewed.

The Actual Consumers

There is a consensus of competent opinion that only a small minority, about ten per cent of men and a smaller percentage of women in India, consume any liquor. The rest are abstainers because of religious and social taboos. The great majority of the drinkers are the poorer classes, like labourers in fields and factories, and they normally consume, though apologetically, their traditional liquors such as *arrack* and *toddy*, which are less expensive, and these contribute the bulk of liquor revenue to the State and profits to the liquor contractors.

The small minority of drinkers, who are well-to-do and are highly sophisticated, fancy as a social grace and accomplishment the consumption of the more expensive 'foreign' liquors such as whisky and wine, either imported or manufactured in India, and they contribute a small fraction of liquor revenue. The fact that about ninety per cent of men and more of women do not find it necessary to drink alcohol in order to drown their sorrows, relax their tired minds and bodies, or enhance their joys and conviviality is pretty conclusive proof of the dispensability of alcohol.

Curiously enough, it is this sophisticated minority, which can and does get legal permits for rationed quantities of 'foreign' liquors on production of medical certificates, easy enough to procure, that vehemently criticises

prohibition which itself only prohibits the consumption of *arrack* and *toddy* by the poorer classes even if they produce medical certificates!

Success or Failure

The most comprehensive criticism of this section is that prohibition is, and is bound to be, a 'failure'. Deliberately or otherwise, they do not pause to examine whether their alternative, the current wet policy, is any less of a 'failure'. There is no objective criterion for judging whether prohibition has been a 'success' or a 'failure', even as there is no objective criterion to judge the 'success' or 'failure' of social reforms concerning prostitution, juvenile smoking, birth-control, education, untouchability, etc. Prohibition may be claimed to be a 'success' if not a drop of liquor was available in the dry area, and a 'failure' if even a drop of it was available in it.

Tested by such an absolute criterion, no law is or can be a 'success' or a 'failure'. In fact, these concepts are meaningless in such matters. The American Wickersham Commission said:

'It is a truism that no laws are absolutely observed or enforced. A reasonable approximation to general observance and to full enforcement is the most that we can expect. What, then, should be considered a reasonable enforcement of the National Prohibition Act? If we compare that Act with other laws, would not our measure be such an enforcement as operates, on the whole, as an effective deterrent and brings a high average of observance throughout the land?' (P. 61).

All that can be attempted is a comparative study of their effectiveness.

Apart from the subjective opinions of experienced persons, the 'failure' of a law is pretty universally assessed by the number of detected cases of its violation, although this cannot always be accurate since most of the violations may not have been

detected. Table I records the number of detected offences according to the Reports of Judicial Administration, Criminal, in the former Madhya Pradesh.

During seven of the eight years, the numbers of detected cases of illicit distillation were more numerous in the wet than in the dry half of the State! If these figures

not constitute the whole dry area. It is not as general as critics make out.

It has been argued against prohibition that illicit arrack, which is all that is available in the dry areas, is produced under insanitary conditions and is, therefore, deleterious to the health of its consumers. But, as shown above, illicit arrack is produced in the wet areas also, and in larger quantities and under no better sanitary conditions and cannot, therefore, be less injurious to the health of its consumers. Further, all arrack found in the dry area is illicit and can be easily identified as such and confiscated. But in the wet areas, it is extremely difficult to distinguish it from the licit, particularly when it is adulterated with the licit by the excise contractors, who are speculators.

Since illicit liquor flourishes under excise better than under prohibition more staff and expense is needed to check it in the wet than in the dry areas.

The Argument

It has also been said that consumption of alcohol since prohibition is more than it was before. This argument is questionable. Under excise, there was both licit and illicit consumption and more of the former than of the latter. Under prohibition, there was only the illicit. But as the price of illicit liquor under prohibition is three to four times that of the licit, the consumer would have to pay proportionately more to consume the same quantity of liquor or reduce his consumption if he could not afford to do so. The latter is more often the case.

Further, most people obey the law even if they disapprove of it because they are by nature law-abiding or they fear detection and punishment. Otherwise, there would be very little of licit consumption under excise, as illicit liquor is much cheaper there.

In some respects, the wet policy is decidedly worse than the dry. Arrack is a State monopoly, a nationalised industry. The right to its retail sale is auctioned

TABLE I

Nature of offence	1938	1947	1948	1949
Contempt of lawful authority	325	1516	1329	629
Excise Act	3115	3920	4753	5298
Prohibition Act	Nil	4881	5965	6801
Police Act	4015	7084	12022	12024
Local and Special Laws	28548	53898	65678	74647

Madhya Pradesh Prohibition Committee Report, 1951. P. 53.

According to these figures, the Prohibition Act was not the only, or even the most, violated one. If the number of its violations amounted to its 'failure' and warranted its repeal, the other laws were a greater 'failure' and should also be repealed!

Most critics of prohibition have singled out the illicit distillation of arrack to prove its 'failure'. They argue that such distillation was due to prohibition and had increased phenomenally and had become even a profitable cottage industry. Deliberately or innocently, they ignore the fact that the illicit distillation of arrack obtains under excise also, and that the main function of the Excise Department prior to prohibition and in the wet areas even now is the detection of illicit distillation cases. The Madhya Pradesh Prohibition Enquiry Committee discovered, to its surprise, that illicit distillation, as indicated by the detected cases, was more prevalent in the wet half than in the dry half of the same State, other factors being more or less common!

The figures of such cases are reproduced below:

Year	Dry half	Wet half
1947	2,104	2,598
1948	2,502	2,830
1949	3,615	3,013
1950	1,030	3,494
1951	1,117	3,037
1952	1,598	3,130
1953	3,331	4,712
1954	3,136	4,971

Tek Chand Report, 1964, P. 241.

warrant any conclusion, the wet policy fared worse than the dry!

The Excise Commissioner of Punjab revealed in December, 1963, that, although only one district in the State was dry and the supply of licit arrack by the government was pretty constant since independence, illicit distillation had gone up by about fifteen times! It is, therefore, not true that illicit distillation of arrack originated under prohibition, or that it was more prevalent under it than under excise.

Critics have asserted that illicit distillation had become a profitable cottage industry under prohibition. If they mean thereby that every second or third cottage was distilling arrack, it is an incredible exaggeration. In order to make profit, every distiller must have a fairly large number of customers. The population is not large enough for this even as there are not enough women to go round if each man wants two wives! Because of its powerful smell, it is impossible to distill without the neighbours coming to know of it. It will be necessary to keep them all in the conspiracy by appropriate inducements, lest any one of them should give information to the police.

If the distiller is arrested, he has to incur expenditure on account of the police, the lawyers and, if he is jailed, to provide for his family. Illicit distillation as a cottage industry is not a paying proposition, except in rare cases and in some large urban areas, which do

annually to the highest bidder. It is, therefore, to the financial interest of the successful bidder to maximise consumption in order to maximise his profits during the short tenure of his bid. He is under the almost irresistible temptation to adulterate the more expensive licit arrack with illicit arrack which is much cheaper since it is free from taxes and licence fees, etc.

Compared to the cost price, the sale price of licit arrack is unconscionably high. According to the Report of the Madhya Pradesh Prohibition Enquiry Committee, the cost price of a gallon of arrack in 1951 was Rs. 2 while its sale price varied from Rs. 13 to Rs. 52! According to the Tek Chand Report, the cost of a bottle of liquor, including the bottle, etc., in Himachal Pradesh was less than a rupee, the taxes and fees amounted to Rs. 10.94, and the selling price was Rs. 14! (P. 384) This differential was sought to be justified on the theory that consumption of intoxicants should aim at its reduction, and that increase in their price would reduce their consumption. This has proved to be mistaken, as an increase in price has not reduced consumption of licit or illicit liquor as the official figures in Table II indicate.

TABLE II

Year	Price per gallon				Licit consumption (gallons)	Illicit cases
	minimum		maximum			
	Rs.	As.	Rs.	As.		
1946	3	12	28	7	720,000	4,700
1947	3	12	28	7	565,000	4,700
1948	6	4	28	7	554,000	5,300
1949	5	7	29	6	560,000	6,600
1950	7	13	29	6	568,000	4,500

Madhya Pradesh Prohibition Enquiry Committee Report, pp. 37 & 44

The excise tax to the State and profits to the excise contractors are collected from the poorest economically and the weakest politically, when they are increasingly inebriate, and by speculative excise contractors who are naturally interested in maximising consumption and not averse to adulterating the licit with the cheaper illicit liquor. Indeed, it is difficult to find a tax more iniquitous,

more inequitable and more anti-social. Prohibition is free from the iniquitous taxation, the more iniquitous auction system and the malpractices inherent in it. It would thus seem that, on the whole, prohibition is better than excise.

It is difficult to believe that the critics of the prohibition of arrack are concerned with illicit distillation and the deleterious effect of the consumption of illicit liquor on the health of its consumers, for these evils prevail even more under the wet policy. *They are really, if not solely, concerned with the loss of revenue to the State and profits to the liquor contractors. Finance was, however, never the main and legitimate objective of excise.* As long ago as 1905, the then British Government, which did not dream of promoting prohibition in India, declared that its settled policy was 'to minimise temptation to those who do not drink and to discourage excess among those who do, and to a furtherance of this policy, all considerations of revenue should be absolutely subordinated.'

That government thought that the most effective way of implementing the policy was to raise the price of arrack high enough to discourage excessive consump-

tion of excise policy is to be estimated by the fall in licit as well as illicit consumption, and not by increase in revenue.

Revenue

It is, however, true that increasingly the British Government sought increase in revenue rather than fall in consumption, licit and illicit. But that was a shameless violation of its professed policy. The Madhya Pradesh Prohibition Enquiry Committee observed that there was no doubt that the excise policy was not calculated to minimise consumption but to maximise revenue. Prohibition eliminated the unconscionable revenue altogether. Those who would replace prohibition by excise are interested only in revenue for the State and profits for the excise contractors, and are callously and cruelly indifferent if illicit distillation prevails under excise and if unhealthy illicit arrack is consumed by the poor and the helpless.

The argument that prohibition resulted in loss of revenue is wholly untrue because the excise tax was replaced, deliberately, by the sales tax, which has produced more revenue than was lost through prohibition. *There was a change of tax, but no loss of revenue.* The sales tax is infinitely superior to the excise tax in that it is graded according to the capacity to pay, like income-tax; it is collected by merchants with permanent tenures who can hope to make up the losses of one year by profits during the following years, and are under no imperative temptation to make maximum profits within a year, like excise contractors with annual tenures. Increase in sales tax revenue is a welcome index of wholesome consumption, while increase in excise revenue is a lamentable index of unwholesome consumption.

The only way to combat illicit arrack is to provide licit arrack at a price low enough to make illicit liquor unprofitable: in which case, there can be no revenue to the State or profit to the private sector.

None of the arguments advanced by critics for replacing prohibition

by excise is valid. The only valid criticism against prohibition is that it is not uniform and universal even in the whole of India, much less in the world, and exemptions under the Prohibition Acts rob it of much of its moral sanction.

If illicit arrack is to be eliminated by the provision of licit arrack as stated above, it will be necessary to abandon its absolute prohibition and seek methods to limit individual consumption to moderation and prevent excess. This will not amount to an invitation to drink, even as the establishment of hospitals is not an invitation to ill-health but for the restoration to good health of the few people who, in spite of public health measures, fall ill.

Individual Rationing

Increase in the price of licit arrack is not likely to promote moderation in individual consumption. A more effective method is *individual rationing* of licit arrack, somewhat on the lines of rationing of whisky under the present prohibition laws. The ration should be limited to such quantities as will give a 'kick' to the consumer without driving him to anti-social behaviour!

Rationing is likely to be less violated than either prohibition or excise, though even then it will not be one hundred per cent effective. It will, however, not levy an oppressive financial impost on the poorer drinker, and collect it when he is inebriate and comparatively helpless. It is calculated to combat illicit arrack, safeguard the health and economy of the drinker, and also eliminate the present discrimination between whisky and arrack in the matter of legal permits for consumption.

The Madhya Pradesh and the Andhra Pradesh Prohibition Enquiry Committees, which recommended the repeal of prohibition, advocated individual rationing. It is highly significant that the Madras and Madhya Pradesh Governments, which had adopted prohibition, recommended indi-

vidual rationing to addicts for life in other States.

The Only Way

The current prohibition acts legalise the consumption of rationed quantities of liquors like whisky under some conditions. They may be amended to permit similar rationing of arrack. But this will be more legal than moral. Permits for the consumption of whisky and arrack will amount to defeating by legal action the policy of prohibition enjoined by the Constitution. But, as the Wickersham Commission observed: 'Undermining by legal action respect for the fundamental law is quite as destructive of respect for law as the things sought to be avoided.' The Indian Constitution spoke of prohibition, not temperance. It would, therefore, be more honest to adopt individual rationing of all liquors by an appropriate amendment of the Constitution.

Opium, which is an intoxicating drug, was being consumed by some people in India and yielded some revenue to the State and profits to the vendors. It has since been prohibited, except that addicts are given rationed quantities of it. Although there is still some smuggling of illicit opium and its consumption, there has been no agitation against its prohibition, as in the case of liquors.

Even the confirmed anti-prohibitionists acknowledge the consumption of alcoholic beverages and of opium as an 'evil' to be discouraged. But no evil can be discouraged so long as it yields profits to the public and the private sectors. Illicit arrack cannot be eliminated by police methods so long as licit liquor is more expensive under excise and unavailable under prohibition. Individual rationing of licit liquor at a price low enough to make illicit liquor unprofitable is more likely to ensure moderation in consumption of licit liquor, and keep out the illicit, conserve the health and wealth of the consumer, and do away with the unconscionable profits of the public and the private sectors, and is, therefore, preferable to prohibition or current excise.

A correct understanding

A. M. KHUSRO

LATE in April this year, when some parts of the Prohibition Study Team's Report leaked out, two almost diametrically opposite versions emerged of what the Report contained. One had expected that after the submission of the Report to Parliament and its final release on May 6, 1964, these opposite versions would yield place to a single, authoritative view. This, nevertheless, has not happened and different versions, poles apart from one another, continue to appear in the press. Confusion has got worse confounded by the editorial comments in several leading dailies, some based not on the Report proper but on a rather lop-sided leakage of it, and some based not on the whole Report but only on Part I of it while Part II is the real thing 'addressed more directly and specifically to the terms of reference'.

As an insider, I would be the first to admit that the Team itself is to blame to some extent for this confused and dualistic picture. The Report running into 431 printed pages, with a summary and recommendations consisting of another 114 pages and divided into 6 Sections and 45 Chapters, is not an easy matter to digest in a brief period of time. A great deal of subject matter has been pressed into this Report and it is necessary to cut down a good

deal of wood in order that the reader may see the trees.

While admitting this weakness in the presentation, it is fair, I suppose, to mention that partisan reporting has also been caused by one fundamentally wrong assumption which was made by many persons and newspapers—the assumption that the terms of reference of the Team were too restrictive and that it was not empowered to recommend anything outside the boundaries of prohibition. It could only tighten prohibition laws where they already existed and suggest a quick implementation of prohibition where it has not yet been implemented.

The Team itself never accepted this interpretation of the terms of reference. If this were to be the interpretation, some of the members, at any rate, would not have accepted its membership. While many a term of reference enjoined upon the Team to advise on legislative, administrative and other improvements with a view to a better implementation of prohibition programmes, some other terms gave it the freedom to examine the working of the prohibition policy by making an assessment of the magnitude of illicit activity and other prevalent abuses. Not only that. One crucial term of reference asked the Team 'to suggest practical

measures for reducing illicit traffic in liquor and combating other abuses and malpractices.' It is noteworthy that it was nowhere mentioned that the Team could not go outside the scope of strict prohibition to suggest these practical measures and the Team was quick to seize upon these terms of reference.

Some have been expecting from the Tek Chand Committee a recommendation for the complete and immediate enforcement of prohibition while others have been having pleasant expectations of a total abolition of dry laws. But, whether prohibition is enforced or abolished is not a matter of abstract logic; it is a matter deeply rooted in the social reality of the present Indian context. Any one who thinks that this country is ready for total abolition of dry laws is probably not paying sufficient attention to the politics of his times.

Uncommitted Realism

On the other hand, any one who believes that prohibition can be enforced all over the country with immediate effect can be suspected of being innocent of economic and social reality. No Committee appointed to study the liquor problem in 1963-64 can advocate either total prohibition or total abolition of prohibition. You can of course always fill the Committee with known anti-prohibitionists or committed prohibitionists and get them to say 'yes' to scrapping prohibition or to enforcing it immediately and universally.

But if the Team is not hand-picked with reference to a particular view-point, there is bound to be a minute of dissent, so sharply and genuinely divided is public opinion on this major issue both among the masses and the classes. There is only one way in which a Committee which is not hand-picked can study the problem of prohibition and maintain unanimity in its recommendations. This is the hard way of uncommitted realism, of empiricism, of making compromises where compromises are needed.

Such, I believe, was the case with the Tek Chand Committee Report.

When prohibition, enforced hurriedly and without adequate preparation, results in widespread abuses such as smuggling, illicit distillation and other forms of lawlessness, the unthinking anti-prohibitionist has the simple solution of giving up prohibition itself. When the shoe pinches, you throw away the shoe! The ardent prohibitionist, at the other extreme, has an equally thoughtless remedy. He closes his eyes to the reality of widespread evil and advocates a mere tightening-up of the law and a more rigorous implementation. He underestimates the pinch of the shoe and maintains that if you walk more firmly, the shoe will stop pinching!

The Tek Chand Team rejects either approach as unfeasible. Its approach is neither thoughtlessly anti-prohibitionists nor naively and doggedly prohibitionist. Having unearthed and studied in detail the numerous abuses prevalent in dry (and wet) areas, the Team evolves its basic strategy which is bound to annoy, by its middle-of-the-road reasonableness, both extreme prohibitionists and anti-prohibitionists, although it is likely to find favour with those who are not committed to any rigid positions and are prepared to approach the problem empirically with an open mind.

Basic Strategy

This basic strategy consists of two main planks: (i) consolidate the gains from prohibition wherever such gains can be shown to exist and don't throw them away; (ii) face squarely the problems which arise out of the prohibitionist set-up and don't shirk them, even if it requires taking some steps outside the strict fold of prohibition policy (see page 287 of the Report).

The Team proposes a multi-pronged attack on illicit activity in dry areas. This multi-pronged attack consists of:

- (a) the tightening of liquor law,
- (b) the upgrading of administration,

- (c) the control of medical and toilet preparations containing alcohol,
- (d) the control of raw material,
- (e) the intensified use of education and publicity mechanism, and, finally,
- (f) the containment of the profit of illicit activity through direct competition and shifting of consumers from illicit to licit drinking. (See pages 287-8).

No Absolute Solution

It is important to note that none of these solutions has been regarded by the Team as a complete solution unless resort is had to the last-named remedy of bursting the balloons of contraband profits. Education and publicity are long term measures and have very limited effect in the immediate future. Law can be tightened and administration can be improved; but many offences never come under the clutches of law and of administration. So long as illicit profits are high, all the money is available to dodge the law and to corrupt the administration.

Similarly, with profits as high as they are, neither the control of medical and toilet preparations nor that of the widely diffused and readily available raw material can be anything more than a partial control at best. The Team has thus given pride of place to deflating illicit profits through various measures such as liberalization of mild alcohols and a revolutionary tax and price policy with respect to liquor.

Some critics have assailed the Team for proposing a harsh system of liquor laws. Apart from the fact that a detailed study of the nature of liquor crimes shows the present laws to be quite inadequate both in preventing drinking and in promoting an orderly consumption, one must note that the Team does not put all its eggs in the legal basket. 'We are of the opinion that no system of law can effectively combat an illicit trade so long as profit margin ranges from 200 per cent to 1000 per cent.' (p. 287). It

also states, 'We have shown that the various solutions which it is customary to examine are all partial solutions and that they will become fully effective only if the profits of illicit activity are slashed.'

The Dry Areas

How does the Team propose to compete with illicit activity and slash illicit profits? Here it is important to see the Team's recommendations separately for dry and wet areas.

In dry areas it suggests that:

- (a) mild alcoholic beverages like beer, cider, light wines etc., with less than 5 per cent alcoholic content in bulk should be made available to persons above the age of 30;
- (b) toddy should be made available to persons above the age of 21;
- (c) permits for hard liquors should be issued, not on medical and health grounds, as hitherto, but on grounds of addiction and habituation;
- (d) the tribal populations should be permitted to brew and consume, though not to sell their own liquor;
- (e) the tax element and hence the price of liquor should be kept at a minimum so that licit drink may compete effectively with illicit liquor.

These measures deserve some discussion for, alas, they have not so far been correctly interpreted.

A matter which has surprisingly escaped attention is that the Maharashtra policy of liberalisation of mild liquors admits only of the consumption of 3½ per cent alcoholic beverages, while the Tek Chand Committee seeks to allow mild liquors up to 5 per cent alcoholic content. That difference of 1½ per cent which the Committee allows is crucial. While the prevailing Indian beers with 5 per cent alcohol cannot be permitted under the Maharashtra rule, they can be under the Committee's recommendations. Hard ciders (of 4 per cent alcohol) and light wines

cannot be allowed under the Maharashtra rules, but can be if the Committee's proposals are accepted.

Under the Maharashtra proposals toddy, which ranges between 3½ per cent and 7 or 8 per cent of alcohol, will require stabilisation of its alcoholic content necessarily through refrigeration and bottling—on a scale which is beyond the horizon at the current time. But, on the other hand, many varieties of toddy whose normal alcoholic content is 5 per cent and less, will be permissible under the Committee's recommendations. One is, therefore, surprised that this very significant aspect of the Committee's realistic liberalisation programme whose main idea is to arrest illicit activity and shift drinkers from the contraband to the licit market, has not received the attention it deserved.

To the question whether those who drink hard liquors for the sake of 'kick', etc., will shift at all to mild varieties, the Team answers in the affirmative. Two kinds of drinkers will shift: those whose natural preference was for soft liquors but who had been forced to drink hard and those who may prefer hard but who are law-abiding and would any day drink mild liquors because they are licit. This reasoning has been buttressed by empirical evidence to the effect that among normal sales of drink, light liquors account for a very impressive proportion—ranging between 40 and 60 per cent.

The Age Limit

Unlike the Government of Maharashtra which proposes to allow mild liquors above the age of 21, the Team recommends an age of 30 years. Here too ample statistical data have been brought to bear on the point that the bulk of demand for drink comes from the ages above 30 years, so that permitting mild liquors above this age not only curbs illicit drinking effectively but also safeguards the young and socially and economically unsettled population from the impact of drinking. The monthly

quota for mild liquors has been fixed at 3 units, i.e., 36 beer bottles or an equivalent quantity of alcohol in the form of other mild liquors.

The Tek Chand Team recommends the availability of toddy of 5 per cent alcohol above the age of 21. At first glance there are some conditions attached to toddy drinking, but a close scrutiny reveals these to be hardly restrictive in nature, and in any case essential even as factory laws are essential for orderly business. Toddy is to be drunk only at the premises of sale; but the fact in Indian villages is that toddy is drunk at the toddy shop which is a sort of village club and is not taken home. It is to be served only within specified hours. But in fact, as everyone knows, it is served and *has to be served* during the late afternoon and evening.

Basis of Permits

Yet another innovation of the Team is the new basis for the permits for hard liquors. Hitherto permits have been issued in dry areas generally above the age of 40 years on medical and health grounds. Consultation with medical professionals of diverse viewpoints made it very clear to the Team that there is no medical case for administering alcohol on a regular basis. There may be a case with respect to a few specific ailments at specific points of time—though even this is denied by many medical scientists. But there is no general medical case on a continuous permit basis for making a person drink. The Team, therefore, refuted the medical basis and instead substituted addiction and habituation as grounds for issuing hard liquor permits.

The Government of Maharashtra had given the Team to understand that hard liquor permits in Greater Bombay, which number only 10,000 in a population of about 5 million, were utterly insufficient with the result that numerous people were drinking hard illicit liquor produced locally or smuggled from other areas. If these permits could be increased to say 50,000, a great deal of illicit acti-

vity could be contained. Under the medical argument, the Maharashtra Government would find it impossible to increase the number of permits to 40 or 50 thousand unless the integrity of the medical profession were to be under severe strain through the offer of various undesirable rewards for issuing permits.

The new basis of addiction-habitation substituted by the Team would, however, enable the administration to increase, if necessary, the number of hard liquor permits to a figure which will adequately contain one of the most questionable anti-social activities which is illicit production and procurement of liquor. On close examination, therefore, the Team's recommendation on hard liquor permits amounts to an important measure for the containment of illicit activity.

The Wet Areas

The Team's recommendations for wet areas, I believe, are as far-reaching as those for dry areas. Contrary to the impression recently created, the Team has refused to recommend immediate or an early extension of prohibition in wet areas. 'Under the circumstances . . . realistically speaking, complete prohibition with immediate effect in all the wet areas is not a feasible proposition,' (p. 392) as this will subject the wet areas to the same upsurge of unlawful and anti-social activity which is such a prominent feature of dry areas today.

A phased programme of movement towards prohibition has thus been recommended and only if these phases could be gone through successfully would it be possible to arrive at the final phase of total prohibition. The main idea in the first three phases, lasting over twelve years, is to change the consumption pattern of liquor from hard to relatively soft drinks partly by a step-by-step reduction in the alcoholic content of licit liquors from the present levels to wine strengths (10 per cent of alcohol) in the second phase, and from there to

beer strengths (5 per cent alcohol) in the third phase.

Tax incentives and price incentives are to be provided in favour of relatively lighter drinks so that consumer preference shifts to lighter varieties. Meanwhile, educational and publicity programmes will be intensified, a vigorous drive will be launched to wean people away from hard liquors and for that matter from all liquors, and, after some years, a Committee has been recommended to be appointed in order to take stock of whether these programmes have worked well and whether a given area is ripe for the introduction of prohibition.

Gradualness

The point one must note here is that the Tek Chand Committee has substituted temperance and gradualness in place of immediate prohibition. This in itself is an unusual recommendation in this country but one which has far-reaching implications, not the least important among these being the support of institutions, organizations and individuals who recognize the socio-economic undesirability of excessive drinking but who have not so far been helpful in not commending the anti-liquor programme just because they do not like the immediacy, the unpreparedness and the thoughtless implementation of these programmes.

That the Tek Chand Committee had neither a prohibitionist nor an anti-prohibitionist bias is seen at many places in the Report. Staunch prohibitionists generally claim a reduction in drinking in dry areas and deny the excessive prevalence of illicit distillation and allied crime. On the other hand, anti-prohibitionists claim an unusual upsurge in drinking as well as in contraband liquor production. It was left for the Team to investigate this matter in detail and to show that while drinking in dry areas has got somewhat reduced, both compared to the past wet set-up and compared to the wet areas of today, this small reduction in consumption is accompanied by such a significant deterioration in the quality of

liquors drunk and such a vast increase in illicit production and allied crimes that the society in the aggregate could not be said to have gained in an overall manner, even though specific instances of individual and social good are quite numerous such as those among industrial workers in many an urban centre and in those areas where social work has accompanied the enforcement of prohibition.

The Team has also shown that the reduction in drinking in dry areas has been so small that the gain to the community in terms of saving from drink (of the order of Rs. 31 crores per annum) has been less than the loss to the government in terms of revenue losses and enforcement expenditures (of the order of Rs. 46 crores). Taking the government and the people together, the society as a whole has been involved in a net loss of about Rs. 15 crores per annum. It is obvious that no Committee which had a prohibitionist bias will say this; but the Tek Chand Team has.

Lowering of Taxes

And finally, the Team has recommended the reversal of the long standing policy of high taxes and high prices on liquor which dated from British days. The bidding system, which forces liquor contractors to pay very large sums to the government and in turn leads to an increase in the price of drink, is sought to be substituted either by a system of tenders, or continuation of licenses during good behaviour, or by public sector production of alcoholic liquors. Duties on liquor are sought to be reduced so that when prices come down, licit liquors will compete favourably with illicit brews and consumers will be won over from the illicit market. The Team has found the price elasticity of demand for liquor to be relatively small and has thus shown that if liquor prices were reduced, consumption would not increase very much. On the other hand, consumers will shift to the illicit market and thus the business of licit distillers will receive a body-blow.

Books

TEK CHAND VERSUS BACCHUS

'No mortal but is narrow enough to delight in educating others into counterparts of himself.'

Statement from Wilhelm Meister

The Tek Chand team's terms of reference were to assess the magnitude of illicit distillation and to advise how better to implement the prohibition programme, but this did not prevent it from stepping outside its terms and moralising in a general way on the evils of alcohol and the virtues of abstinence. On its own admission, only the last 18 chapters out of a total of 45 'are addressed more directly and

narrowly to the terms of reference.' The rest are supposedly devoted to an analysis of such issues as the drinking habits of ancient and modern societies, the history of prohibition in America and basic facts about alcohol, but, instead of making a scientific analysis, the Team has lapsed into sanctimonious propaganda against liquor.

In certain cases, the members have allowed their critical faculties to be subsumed under the requirements of their propaganda. For instance, they cite example after bogus example of military disasters which are supposed to have resulted from alcohol. They state: 'the fate of many a skirmish or a battle would have

been entirely different if liquor had not entered the lists. The death of Alexander the Great on 13th June, 323 B.C., before he completed 33 years of his life, was caused by excessive drinking. The battle of Waterloo was lost on 18th January, 1815, on account of Burgundy wine. The turning point of World War I which heralded the collapse of Germany was attributed to their lack of resistance to French wines.

'In World War II, the French army drank their favourite Red and White wines lying behind the Maginot Line... Field Marshall Montgomery who had been a total abstainer was brought to the scene in Africa when General Rommel was driving the British to Egypt and the tables were turned.'

Apart from such slipshod inaccuracies as printing that Waterloo was lost on 18th January when it was fought on 18th June, calling Montgomery a Field-Marshal when he was a General and calling Rommel a General when he was a Field-Marshal, the passage displays so naive and jejune a view of historical events, that one could only be trapped into taking such a view if one were determined to make the facts fit into a preconceived theory. Alexander may have died of Bacchanalian orgies, although it is generally believed that he died of malarial fever in Babylon, but it is surely prostituting one's intellect to suggest that the turning point of the First World War was the inability of the Germans to resist French wines or that the Maginot Line collapsed because the French were drinking away.

The evidence which is cited in support of this theory is in each case the pathetic excuse of the defeated leaders, in the former, the German Crown Prince and in the latter, Petain. As for Montgomery—his famous remark on fitness, 'I do not smoke. I do not drink, I go to bed at 10 o'clock except when duty forbids and I am a hundred per cent fit' is quoted, but Churchill's equally famous retort that he smoked and drank all the time and was 200 per cent fit is forgotten. Churchill's contribution to the war effort is generally reckoned to be greater than Montgomery's; so, one should perhaps drink and smoke continuously at least if one's ambition is to be a great politician.

Besides this bottle theory of military history, support is sought from religion to condemn alcohol. Once again, the evidence is flimsy, tenuous and sometimes inaccurate. Absurd hyperboles like, 'There is no religion which has blessed the bottle...', 'Prohibition can serve as a common platform for all religious denominations...' are frequent and as an example of the Christian attitude to drink we are told that 'Jesus Christ who refused to drink alcohol even to relieve the agony of the Cross could not have recommended drinking.'

One does not wish to be pedantic but the evidence that Christ was offered alcohol before his crucifixion is conflicting. Mark says he was given 'Wine with myrrh' but Luke says it was vinegar. Probably, the correct version is Mathew, Chapter 27 verse 24, which

reads: 'They gave him vinegar to drink mingled with gall and when he had tasted thereby, he would not drink.' It is for the reader to judge whether or not members of the Tek Chand team could be considered as reasonable men capable of assessing evidence accurately if they conclude from this verse that Christ could not have recommended drinking.

At the end of 200 pages of this sort of twaddle, at the end of 26 chapters of didactic nonsense, the Tek Chand team has alienated any sympathy which it might have had from an unbiased reader. One feels justifiably grieved that the members have gone out of their terms of reference and one is not interested in reading pompous rubbish like: 'The lives of most people are not free from tensions, frustrations, anxieties, consuming jealousies, abiding hatreds and deep resentments which keep accumulating. Such a person takes to alcohol as a crutch and avoids deep contemplation. Self-control and self-restraint are the only legitimate safe ways of relieving mental stresses.' One is, of course, grateful for the advice, but psychiatrists are not yet convinced of its validity.

Nor is all this much of an argument for prohibition. Alcohol may be harmful for human beings, but human beings do not always do what is good for them: they do human things like smoke, eat too much, are sexually promiscuous, have too many children, gamble, lust after money and hate their neighbours—none of these patterns of behaviour are desirable. Yet, one does not prohibit them from performing these acts. There is a limit beyond which no society has any right to interfere in the life of an individual; there is an area of private freedom which cannot, should not, and must not be disturbed in a free society. In his famous essay 'on liberty', Mill saw and stated this with the utmost clarity. He said: 'that the only purpose for which power can rightfully be exercised over any member of a civilised community against his will is to prevent harm to others. His own good either physical or moral is not sufficient warrant. He cannot rightfully be compelled to do or forbear because it will be better for him to do so, because it will make him happier, because in the opinion of others to do so would be wise or even right.'

In a nation where political democracy is still in its infancy, the area in which the State should or should not interfere is undetermined and often hard to determine; there is so much to be done, so much that is blocked by stupidity, ignorance and tradition. That those who are in power rapidly lose patience with the people and exercise their power in areas which are exclusively reserved for the individual. Yet, if freedom is to have any meaning, if liberty is to be given substance, one must at least have the right to pursue one's happiness in one's own way without being told by a series of people for whom one may have scant respect that the wiser thing would be to do something else.

In India, prohibition has gained currency because powerful leaders have supported it and even those

who have opposed it, have allowed it to pass as a minor infringement of one's freedom. Yet, one is reminded of that very great and courageous leader, Motilal Nehru, who on being chided by Gandhiji himself for taking a casual drink replied in a devastating letter that while he was prepared to abstain as a good social example, he was not willing to accept the judgement and narrow-minded criticism of others on this issue. It is interesting to read the words he uses: 'I had for the reason already mentioned fully made up my mind to revert to total abstinence even before prohibition was moved in the assembly. But I am going to do nothing of the kind now. I simply cannot bring myself to yield to the puritanism affected in Congress circles. I may or may not drink at all. That is my concern.' There could not be a more powerful claim for personal liberty than these last four words.

At least to this reviewer the real objection to prohibition is not the consequent evils in terms of illicit distillation, contempt of law and the breeding of vice, but that the individual is asked to sacrifice the right to judge for himself what is good for him in an area which is entirely his concern. A free political system does not mean merely the right to vote once in five years; if it did, it would have very little value in the day-to-day affairs of one's life. It does mean that certain rights are reserved in one's own hands and no one has the right to take them away. To those who are not such rabid defenders of private freedom this argument will have very little appeal. To the Tek Chand team 'prohibition is not a battle but a war against an age-old evil which has blighted the nations for generations and scourged the world since the beginning of the agricultural era. It has caused more deaths than war, pestilence and famine combined.'

Although, not many people will agree with Tek Chand's extreme view, there is a large section of our community which will argue that prohibition is a social problem; that individual and private drinking is collectively harmful and, therefore, the State cannot permit an individual to do such harm to himself as would also do harm to a society; that a society which consists largely of an ignorant, uneducated mass must eradicate the possible damages at its root, and even if this means sacrifice of freedom, the sacrifice is worthwhile for the good that it can do. This is the premiss on which the Indian prohibition policy is based, and the Tek Chand team was not asked to question or to affirm the premiss.

The terms of reference were not whether prohibition is desirable or not, but specifically the team was asked (a) to assess the magnitude of illicit distillation and to suggest practical measures for reducing it, (b) to advise how better to implement and legislate for the success of the prohibition programme and (c) to examine the administrative machinery and financial aspects of the prohibition programme. In

so far as the team has gone out of its terms, it has merely bungled in producing trite arguments for prohibition which alienates the readers' sympathies and thereby reduces the value of the findings, but where it has stuck to the terms of reference, the members have at least produced some informative and interesting facts.

Their findings on illicit distillation are a revelation even to those who live in the city where it is most rampant. Liquor is produced in most of the poor localities and is stored in unhygienic tins under layers of mud close to marshy areas, night soil and garbage dumps. In Matunga Labour Camp, municipal latrines were used to store the wash, and in Greater Bombay alone over 50,000 litres of wash are reported to be destroyed every day. In spite of this, illicit liquor keeps flowing in, and is sold openly in the centre of the city. Bombay is perhaps the worst offender, but it is evidently not the only one.

The magnitude of illicit distillation cannot very easily be determined as no statistical data is available; the Tek Chand team has arrived at some figures but it has given only very general arguments for its estimates; 'After a good deal of enquiry and scrutiny of such data as were available, we are inclined to think that leaving apart the extreme cases of rampant illicit activity in some areas such as Greater Bombay, illicit distillation on the average may approximately be three to four times as intense in dry areas as in wet ones.'

The main danger of prohibition is that it gives a virtual monopoly to illicit liquor thus making illicit distillation a highly profitable business. The Tek Chand team estimates that in 'wet' States the profitability is between 100 and 200 per cent while in dry States it is as high as 300 to 1000 per cent. The price of a bottle of illicit liquor in a 'wet' State is from Re. 1 to Rs. 2.50, but in a 'dry' State, it is as high as Rs. 12 although the average is around Rs. 6. Nor is the turnover in this business small; if production of illicit liquor is only three to four times greater in dry areas than wet, the money spent is much more.

While the total illicit liquor bill of the 'wet' area is estimated at only Rs. 9 crores, the comparative figure for the dry areas is Rs. 43 crores, and this in spite of the fact that the population of the wet area is 26.6 crores against 16.6 of the dry. Therefore, the average per head expenditure on illicit liquor is Rs. 2.60 per head in dry areas as against about 33 pP in wet areas. It would not be irrelevant to point out that illicit liquor is normally drunk by the poorer sections of the community. Therefore, the money goes out of the pockets that can least afford it. An increase in illicit liquor consumption is not at the expense of the richer classes but at the expense of those whom prohibitionists from Gandhiji downwards wished to protect.

This is not the only evil of illicit distillation. A continuously illegal business can only be carried on

by the worst members of a society and, with profitabilities as high as 1000 per cent, it is obviously easy to perpetuate the business by sharing the profits with the Enforcement Branch. The 'dadas' or the bosses who run this business have made enough money to buy their statues and have acquired 'power and prestige, and the police is powerless in protecting the victims of gangsterism'. Vice breeds vice; prosperity in one illegal business can lead to a proliferation of similar businesses like running brothels, harbouring criminals, and eventually establishing a reign of terrorism.

Yet, what solution does the Tek Chand team offer against this growing menace of illicit distillation? It has proposed a multi-pronged attack from mass education to deglamorisation of drink, the use of scientific appliances for detection, mass publicity programme and all other advertising paraphernalia. When soldiers go to war they have to beat the drum, but tom-tomming does not win wars, and even the Tek Chand team is aware of this. Therefore, reluctantly, cautiously under the guise of sophisticated titles like 'the economic containment of illicit distillation', the Tek Chand team is forced to propose a liberalisation of mild liquors for those over 30 and hard liquor for the over 40's.

Yet, such is the narrowness of their outlook, so wedded are they to their own views that they have been unable to praise the few steps which the courageous Chief Minister of Maharashtra has taken in the direction in fact recommended by them. Instead of approving the general philosophy behind the Maharashtra Government announcement, they have criticised it severely on the grounds that (a) liberalisation of mild drinks to persons over 21 (against the team's recommendation of 30) is not justified and (b) the free sale of mild alcohol (against a permit system recommended by them) is not desirable. But, the Team's basic difference with the Maharashtra Government is not in these minor details but in an approach; the Maharashtra Government recognises the need for the eradication of illicit distillation as a primary aim and is prepared to sacrifice the principles of prohibition to meet this need; 'while the Tek Chand team wishes to consolidate the gains already made'.

In spite of all its zeal, however, the team failed to evolve an all-India policy on prohibition. It plaintively states: 'If only enforcement could be effective and leakages few such a policy (total prohibition) could be shown to pay dividends which would compensate several times over the loss of excise revenue and enforcement expenditures. Under the (present) circumstances, however, realistically speaking, complete prohibition with immediate effect in all wet areas is not a feasible proposition.' It, therefore, recommends a phased programme gradually reducing the proof strength of liquor.

In the first phase, it wants all country liquors to be reduced from the strong local brew of Rajasthan to the more moderate hooch of Punjab, Uttar

Pradesh and Delhi; in the second phase, it wishes to reduce proof strength still further to about 10 per cent or less alcohol equivalent to wine strength. In the third phase only liquors with 5 per cent alcohol in bulk or brew strength are to be permitted and this also only to the over 30's. At the end of this phase a uniform policy can be followed.

The proposed scheme has merit to the extent that it is gradual and apparently indications are that it may be successful at least in the first two phases. Controlling the sort of liquor which should be produced is one thing, and banning it is quite another.

Yes, the success of this or any other policy depends on the State's willingness to implement it and this in turn depends on making up the revenues which the States would lose. The financial facts of prohibition are revealing.

The total licit and illicit haul of the country is about 146 crores out of which 94 is licit and 52 is illicit. Out of the 94 licit crores 56 or nearly 60 goes to the Exchequer in the way of taxes. Put in another way, for every Rs. 100 that go to the licit producers, Rs. 150 go to the Exchequer. The total revenue would be even larger if the dry States went wet. A British economist is said to have once remarked humourously that the British Government would come to a standstill if it was not for the revenue from smoking and drinking. The revenue from drinking in India if prohibition did not cease would be a minimum of Rs. 100 crores, and the cost to the Exchequer of total prohibition in India would be about 120 crores, a 100 from revenue and 20 from saving in enforcement.

Can a nation in which raising revenue is an extraordinarily difficult task afford this loss? The late Prime Minister is quoted as saying: 'In considering prohibition, the financial aspect is not important. A good thing has to be done even at a cost.' A good thing has to be done, but has prohibition been a good thing? What benefits has it brought so far? The Tek Chand team tells us that total liquor consumption goes down in a dry State to about 70 per cent of what would be drunk if there was no prohibition, but all of it is illicit. If one was to assume—and it is not an unreasonable assumption—that illicit liquor does twice the harm that licit liquor does, and if one was to draw up a simple balance-sheet of harm done it would reveal that 80 per cent licit and 20 per cent illicit liquor (the proportion of a wet State) will do 120 units harm while 70 per cent illicit will do 140 units harm.

If prohibition does more harm than good, if the consequent evils are a greater increase in evil, should one continue this policy entirely because certain leaders have wanted it? The country should not be asked to sacrifice either revenue or anything else to satisfy the whims and fancies of a few politicians and moralists.

It may be that if human beings stopped drinking liquor it would be to their good, but so far at least

there has been no sizeable abatement of liquor drinking in the 'dry' States. There are certain habits in human beings which cannot be changed so easily. Other nations have tried and abandoned the prohibition programme merely because it was impossible to implement it. It is a peculiar kind of arrogance to believe that we shall succeed where the world has failed—there is no evidence that we are the chosen people. The Tek Chand team might read with profit the prayer of Alcoholics Anonymous which they have so glibly quoted:

'God, grant me strength
To accept the thing I cannot change
Courage to change the things I can
And wisdom to know the difference.'

The Tek Chand team has certainly shown no wisdom in knowing the difference.

Sudhir Mulji

REPORT OF THE PROHIBITION ENQUIRY COMMITTEE: Planning Commission, Government of India: 1954-55.

Published by the Manager of Publications, Government of India, Delhi.

It is perhaps almost forgotten today that even prior to the Tek Chand Committee, the Planning Commission had appointed a Prohibition Enquiry Committee to examine the experience gained regarding measures adopted by State Governments to promote prohibition and to make recommendations for a programme for prohibition on a national basis. The fact that even several years after the publication of the report of that Committee, it should have been found necessary to appoint another committee bears testimony to the complexity of the problem. Even more, it calls attention to the need for examining whether the approach that has up to now been brought to bear on this subject is not fundamentally defective.

The Prohibition Enquiry Committee appointed in December, 1954, was headed by Shriman Narayan and included amongst its members Sucheta Kripalani, S. R. Vasavada, Dr. P. J. Thomas, P. Kodanda Rao and R. N. Samarth besides a number of other personalities. It submitted its report in September, 1955. In October of the same year a note of dissent was submitted by one of its members, Kodanda Rao.

What strikes one most of all in the report is the incredible naivete which characterises the approach of the Committee. There is very little objectivity in the report and it is assumed that the subjective desires of the members of the Committee will be translated into reality merely because they wish it to be so. Their main recommendation is 'that the target date for completing nationwide prohibition should be the 1st April, 1958.' The Committee lays stress on the fact that in recommending this date 'we have taken into consideration both the urgency of the situation and the practical difficulties which

have to be overcome by the State Governments concerned.' But, alas, despite all the wisdom and foresight of the Committee, today, more than six years after their target date, 'nation-wide prohibition' remains as distant a goal as ever. Meanwhile, another committee has sat and submitted an even more voluminous report on the subject.

Shriman Narayan's Committee begins by giving an historical background to the problem in which it points out that the 'use of intoxicating drinks and drugs in India dates back to ancient times.' But it hastens to add that 'there is sufficient evidence indicating that their consumption was looked upon with disapproval by Hindu scriptures and society.' It has not however felt it necessary to cite any portion of this evidence.

A brief account is then given of the Government of India's policy prior to Independence which was characterised by the expression 'maximum revenue, minimum consumption.' This was elaborated in a Government of India Resolution in 1905 which stated: 'The Government of India have no desire to interfere with the habits of those who use alcohol in moderation and it is necessary in their opinion to make due provision for the needs of such persons... The most effective method of furthering this policy is to make the tax on liquor as high as it is possible to raise it without stimulating illicit consumption to a degree which would increase instead of diminishing the total consumption and without driving people to substitute deleterious drugs for alcohol...'

Pointing out that the above policy was in operation in all the provinces for over thirty-two years until 1938 when it was replaced in several provinces by prohibition in selected areas, the Committee proceeds to give us its views on that policy. 'It was claimed for this policy that it aimed at promoting temperance...' It was laid down that government had no desire to interfere with the habits of those who used liquor or drugs moderately', says the Committee and argues that 'there was an inherent fallacy in this since it was difficult to draw a line between moderate and immoderate drinking; these shade into one another... It is generally easier to refrain completely from drinks and drugs than to practice moderation. A moderate drinker is perhaps as much a menace to society if not equally to himself as one who indulges in excessive drinking because both set a bad example to others.' While there are less chances of the hard drinker or the addict to do mischief after he is dead drunk, the moderate drinker is a greater danger to others because he is a very uncertain person.'(!) This is just a sample of the kind of thinking which lies behind this report.

The Committee has tried to draw upon foreign experience also. It has referred to the examples of the USA, Finland and Iceland where for some time prohibition was enforced. Giving a detailed account of the experiment in the USA when prohibition was

introduced (between 1919 and 1933), the Committee is forced to admit that it was not very successful. 'The progress of prohibition was thwarted by a number of causes; the chief amongst them were, deficiency in the law, lack of proper enforcement and lack of enthusiasm by the public after the introduction of prohibition... It is not necessary to dilate on the shortcomings of enforcement which became soon apparent. For several reasons prohibition became a plaything of political parties. Illicit liquor and the diversion of industrial alcohol appeared as problems so unmanageable that enforcement machinery could not cope with them. The assistance of the coast guard in the prevention of smuggling was found haphazard and un-coordinated...' After this, when President Roosevelt and the Democrats came to power, the Eighteenth Amendment was cancelled and 'the noble experiment was ended', the Committee tells us.

The rather damning evidence of the American experiment does not however daunt the members of the Committee. They hasten to remind us that: 'it is not to be understood, however, that after the repeal of the law some two decades back, the people of the USA have forgotten or abandoned the cause of prohibition. The struggle against alcohol continues unabated...' They also take comfort from the fact that 'in some States (in the USA) old prohibition laws still remain on the Statute book.'

In Finland and Iceland, too, prohibition was not a success and had ultimately to be given up for various reasons. In Finland the reasons were listed as follows: smuggling which was a common offence was not sufficiently prevented by the Customs authorities; higher classes of society were always opposed to prohibition; economic pressure of the crisis of 1930 and the economic pressure brought to bear on Finland by other countries.

But the Committee argues that the example of these countries has little relevance to India because these were small countries and since the surrounding areas were wet it was difficult for the experiment to succeed there.

The Committee's recommendations which are calculated towards the attainment of the target of complete prohibition in the country by April 1958, visualise the following steps for the realisation of that aim.

'Before the end of the current year (1955) the State Governments should declare their acceptance of prohibition as a policy and prepare the public to fully cooperate in the fulfilment of the prohibition programme. In States which have yet made no beginning towards prohibition and in the wet areas of partial prohibition States, drinking in hotels, bars, restaurants, messes, clubs, cinemas and in parties and functions should be stopped from 1st April, 1956.'

The Committee has also recommended that 'abstinence should be made a rule of conduct for Govern-

ment servants and should be incorporated as such in the Service Rules.' It also trusts that 'Defence Services will welcome complete prohibition and give it their valued support.' It has further been stated in the Report that 'the general policy of prohibition should be applicable to all tribal areas' although it recognises the need for further study of the problem in the scheduled areas of NEFA, Manipur and Tripura.

The note of dissent by Kodanda Rao which is highly critical of the methods of work as well as the approach of the Committee has stated: 'In its very nature the appraisal of the prohibition policy lends itself more to subjective pre-conceptions than to objective conclusions. In the circumstances it would be unduly presumptuous to dogmatise. All that seems permissible is to approach the subject as objectively as possible and treat every solution as tentative and subject to revision in the light of fresh knowledge and experience.'

The solution propounded by him is based on the views presented to the Commission by the Madras Government - Committee. This was the adoption of individual rationing for life. Explaining this suggestion, the Madras Government said 'that arrack addicts, should be registered, given ration cards and allowed a strictly rationed supply of licit arrack. The idea was that illicit distillers would be thereby deprived of their market and thus driven out of business; the further extension of the arrack habit can be prevented; and the consumption of arrack reduced from year to year through the registered addicts dying out.'

Looking back on the Report of the Shriman Narayan Committee from the vantage point of the present moment when we have before us the entire experience of the working of prohibition in the country during the years since the publication of this Report, one can see clearly that the members of the committee were singularly lacking in a sense of realism. They have attempted an oversimplification of the problem but unfortunately for them history has refused to follow the course they had expected.

J. M. Kaul

PROHIBITION By C. Rajagopalachari.
Kamala Prachuralayam, 1931/1943.

WHY PROHIBITION By Bharatan Kumarappa.
Navajivan Publishing House, 1952.

Rajaji's pamphlet on *Prohibition* was first published in 1931, and revised and published in 1943. In his preface to the first edition, Jawaharlal Nehru describes the author as the acknowledged expert in this domain and the unquestioned leader of the prohibition movement in India, but he issues one warning, and it is this. If prohibition is going to triumph, it will do so, not on religious grounds, but because of the reasoned conviction that it is necessary for the well-being and progress of a nation. The question must therefore be approached in a scientific spirit.

Over thirty years have since gone by, but can we say that the scientific spirit has prevailed? In 1931, Nehru wrote that Rajaji had built up an unanswerable case for prohibition. Is it as unanswerable to-day, or are there disturbing answers as well as disturbing questions?

Both the pamphlets tread well-worn paths and deal with the case for and against prohibition. Both the authors have made up their minds that the case for, is overwhelming and immediate. The evils of drink have been vividly and horrifyingly portrayed, on ethical, medical, and socio-economic grounds. They cannot be ignored and must move every sensitive mind. But this is 1964, and neither 1931, nor 1943, nor 1952, can have enough to tell us. To-day, we have to take note not only of the evils of drink, but also of the evils of prohibition, unless we want to close our eyes to grim realities at our peril. We shall leave out of account such aberrations as reveal that some of the nicest people do drink, enjoy it, and live to a ripe old age, and that some of the most offensive people are to be found among teetotalers and those who hate drink. What does it prove or disprove, any way?

To-day we are in a position to see the workings of prohibition and draw valuable conclusions from its evidence. If a policy of prohibition succeeds to a large extent in attaining its objectives, even those who do not disapprove of drink but are honest, will have to applaud and admit that it has worked. It will be more difficult for a vested interest to say that it has done much more good than harm. But the leading question to-day is—how much good has it done and how much harm? This has to be probed thoroughly, without any shrinking from objective conclusions.

The Tek Chand Committee had a wonderful opportunity for undertaking this very important task, but has disappointed in the discharge of its public duty. Firstly, its terms of reference were loaded. Instead of being asked to ascertain how far prohibition has succeeded and how far it has failed in fulfilling its objectives, and at what cost, the Committee has directed straightaway to aim at recommending measures for the better implementation of prohibition, which itself presupposes an extent of failure but without a directive to expose this failure. Secondly, the members of the Committee seem to have been hand-picked for their bias, which is a pity because it has frustrated an objective appraisal with an open mind.

Even this Committee has to admit that an immediate total ban on drinking will weaken the social fabric through crime, corruption and lawlessness. Yet, this is just what Rajaji and Kumarappa were strongly pressing for. But what about illegal liquor? The Committee admits that since the introduction of prohibition, illicit distillation has grown by four to five times, and the consumption of liquor has been hardly reduced. The failure to curb illicit liquor has not been due to lack of power in the hands of

the police or to difficulties in getting convictions. The secret of the obstinate survival of illicit liquor is that it is a most worthwhile business, both for those who carry on with it, as well as for those who are charged with curbing it.

Both the authors have gone out of their way to emphasise that India is different from the West in that the overwhelming majority of the population here is just not interested in liquor. In view of this, it is surprising how drinking has been blown up into a national problem by the prohibition-addicts. It is agreed that drinking in this country is more or less confined to a section of the people—the semi-westernised lot at the one end, and plantation labour, miners, urban workers, and some of the lower classes at the other. Drinking among the latter is admittedly a serious social problem, and the importance of socio-economic factors in the creation of the drink problem, has not been overlooked by either author. But experience all over the world has shown that prohibition cannot stop or even check the kind of drinking which creates a social problem or is the result of one. The only reliable solution is an improvement in the material conditions of life of these people. But there is no short cut to this, not even prohibition.

It is a misrepresentation to say that there are two camps in this issue, namely those who consider drink to be an evil, and those who look upon it as a virtue. It is not a moral question, but a serious socio-economic problem, and those who do not condemn drink, do not have to justify it as a virtue either in order to indulge in it. They merely say that no original sin is attached to it, and if they oppose prohibition, it is because they have seen its evils and been moved by it as much as by the evils of drink itself.

A. K. Banerjee

THE DRY DECADE By Charles Merz.
Doubleday, Doran & Co., 1930.

The US had temperance movements for generations, and 'three great waves of Prohibition' before 'bone-dry' national prohibition was introduced by law in January, 1920. Its supporters wanted to make it permanent by writing it into the Constitution as the Eighteenth Amendment. But prohibition failed in America and the Amendment was repealed after a ten-year trial. This book deals mainly with the story of its failure, with quotes from leading American newspapers, Senate Hearings, Congressional Committees and other official documents. Taking a non-partisan attitude throughout, the author brings out the blindness of the Wets and of the Drys. when it came to facing inconvenient facts, which led to national prohibition by law and its eventual repeal.

The Temperance Movement in America had a wide base and a Prohibition Party was organized in 1869. A few years later the Women's Christian Temperance Union began an active campaign to write prohibition into the constitution of various States. Kansas was first and twelve other States followed.

with their own methods of regulating the sale and consumption of liquor. But the author points out that these were agricultural States, with a completely different outlook from the industrialized north. These thirteen States accounted for more than a third of the area of the US but had only one-seventh of its population. Even so, the prohibitionists won by the affirmative votes of less than 4 per cent of the adult population of the country.' They admitted to having spent about \$-2,500,000 a year on propaganda and on trying to secure the election to Congress of as many Drys as they possibly could. Here the author counters the theory of the Wets who hold that national prohibition was foisted on the country without the slightest warning.

Even though the House of Representatives had voted for prohibition as early as December 1914, when one-third of the votes in the House could have blocked the Amendment, the Wets regarded prohibition as an empty threat. Another piece of blindness to facts was what the author calls the dogma of the Wets, which in the face of facts, said that national prohibition was forced on the country by arbitrary action of the State legislatures when in most cases the electorate was consulted through the initiative and referendum. The next allegation of the Wets contradicts this one. They blamed the women's vote for bringing in prohibition, when in most States prohibition came first and women's vote next.

Another factor which helped prohibition was the First World War. He shows how the prohibitionists made further gains by taking advantage of the need for conserving food. Figures were cited to prove that the amount of grain going into breweries and distilleries was equivalent to 11,000,000 loaves of bread a day, and in spite of a shortage of labour, workmen were engaged in manufacturing liquor. So Senator Sheppard, a staunch prohibitionist, moved two resolutions, one prohibiting the 'manufacture, sale or transportation of intoxicating liquors for beverage purposes' and the other granting Congress 'power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation'. Though these resolutions failed initially, prohibition was introduced on January 16, 1920.

The very next day came the news of the first four raids on illicit distilleries which were 'operating on a major scale.' Illicit distilleries, 'stills' as they were called, had become big business in the U.S. to keep supplies going. Later on in the book the author shows how the 'still' was the most difficult problem the Prohibition Bureau had to tackle.

There was a series of Prohibition Commissioners who started optimistically and thought they would be able to uphold the law. John Kramer was the first of these and he made the following statement on assuming office. 'This law will be obeyed... and where it is not obeyed it will be enforced... The law says that liquor to be used as a beverage must not be manufactured. Nor sold, nor given away, nor

hauled in anything on the surface of the earth or under the earth or in the air.' After a year in office, he changed his views and felt that prohibition seemed 'to some extent to have been forced upon whole States and especially upon larger cities in which people had no sympathy with the idea', which made it 'to my way of thinking, the most difficult problem that any State ever undertook to solve.'

There were many hurdles in the way of finding solutions, and the 'still' was the most elusive and most difficult problem for the Prohibition Bureau to solve. It was present everywhere, but could be seen nowhere. Commercial 'stills' never stayed in one place for more than a few days. If confiscated, another 'still' was ready to take over. There were smaller 'stills' too for the home, costing about \$6, and the formulae for making liquor were found in many and varied books and magazines. After seizing 29,877 stills by the end of 1925, the Prohibition Chief placed that at 'a fair percentage'.

Medicinal liquor was another obvious though comparatively unimportant source. Apart from a spate of spurious prescriptions, by July 1920, press reports revealed that more than fifteen thousand druggists and manufacturers of medicines applied for licenses to distribute intoxicating liquor. To cut this source off from the bootleg trade, the U.S. Government would have to engage enough agents to check every prescription containing whisky to see that it wasn't diluted. 'Near-beer' was another problem. Manufacturers were allowed to make beer with 1½-2 per cent alcohol. Again, enough agents were needed to see that the law was not flouted. Smuggling liquor was also prevalent in the prohibition era, and the long coastline and border areas were never able to have enough agents to prevent it.

By the end of 1925, the Chief of the Prohibition Bureau, General Andrews, estimated that 'about 5 per cent' of the smuggled liquor had been caught. But the most harmful effects resulted from drinking industrial alcohol diverted into the bootleg trade. It was never conclusively proved whether it was the need of the chemical industry or the bootleg trade that led to a 189 per cent increase in the production of industrial alcohol over five years during the prohibition era. Enforcement here as elsewhere was also difficult. The U.S. Government could not have enough agents to follow about 80,000,000 gallons of industrial alcohol all the way to the final consumer. It tried to solve that problem by making it undrinkable, by adding denaturants, some poisonous like sulphuric acid and wood alcohol. Deaths resulted and, in 1926, the U.S. Government was compared to Lucrezia Borgia.

Arresting offenders in itself was not enough. After the arrests came the problem of convictions. In Philadelphia, by the end of 1926, out of 6,000 arrested, 212 were convicted. In America, the elected judges did not want to lose the next election over a too-

rigid enforcement of an unpopular law. By the end of 1925, unfinished cases—two-thirds of which were over prohibition—on federal court dockets increased by 1024 per cent, so 'bargain days' were introduced as the only practical means. There was no other way. On certain fixed days, bootleggers, restaurant proprietors, smugglers and all others connected with the bootleg trade would plead guilty and were assured in advance that they would be let off with fines, some as low as \$ 5.

By the end of 1925, both the Wets and the Drys were agreed on one point. Both felt things could be better. But while the Wets felt, wrongly as the author subsequently shows, that law and order had broken down and that corruption was rampant everywhere, the Drys felt that the very difficulties in enforcing prohibition were 'the clearest proof of the need for its existence.' Time and again this diametrically opposite reading of the situation by the Wets and the Drys recurs throughout the book, and the author gives the reason why each camp could see only one side of the picture. The charge of rampant corruption in the U.S. Government he counters with the fact that reputations of the chief officials of the Prohibition Bureau and the Treasury Department remained untarnished. But he does admit widespread corruption among the lower cadre.

The book also makes a point rarely made elsewhere about the raids. Their frequency increased when the U.S. Government was exposed by the Press or the Church. But 'when the public's mind was more engaged with Wall Street or with summer sports...raids as a rule were at their minimum.'

The unwillingness on the part of the federal government to take up the entire work of enforcing prohibition and consequent disregard of that law when it was not liked, led to a review of that situation by 1930. Three successive presidents were unable to persuade the people to obey that law even though it had been in force for ten years. Those unsympathetic to prohibition thought in terms of a repeal. The book ends here—which is a pity—as the process of repeal would have made interesting reading.

The problems of enforcement in America would come up in any other country where liquor manufacture is in private hands. As in America, they would take every opportunity to break the law wherever and whenever possible, as they do in our blessed country. They could keep the trade going, illegally if necessary. But belief in prohibition amounts to an article of faith, and unable to realise or understand the real difficulties, the Drys made a vague demand for more time. Prohibition in America, they felt, was bound to succeed eventually. 'Ten years is but a little time with 100,000 years ahead.' But life is short, and to such excessively long term plans there is no answer. And popular vengeance, the author shows, has the last laugh on official intransigence.

Kusum Madgaokar

PROHIBITION: A NATIONAL EXPERIMENT—The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Philadelphia, 1932. Edited by James H. S. Bossard and T. Sellin.

LIQUOR LAWS: FORTY-EIGHT STATES AND DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA By Bertram M. Bernard. Oceana Publications, New York, 1949.

Prohibition is so closely bound up with emotional attitudes that a dispassionate and scientific treatment of the question is difficult. In *Prohibition: A National Experiment*, the authors have collected together articles by various writers, which evaluate the effects of prohibition on American life. They cover the historical, legislative and administrative aspects of prohibition; changing aspects of the liquor problem under prohibition; prohibition and certain phases of social life; the future of prohibition and the liquor traffic in other countries—Canada, Great Britain, Finland and Sweden. The concluding chapter is on the liquor regulation in Russia.

National prohibition has made no noticeable difference in the amount of alcoholic liquor consumed. There is just as much liquor being used today as before prohibition; indeed, the absolute amount of alcohol consumed in America is probably greater. Prohibition always increases the consumption of liquor: it turned America into a nation of hard liquor drinkers. On the other hand, prohibition 'introduced' in America 'Speak-easies' and bootlegging resulting in mass gangsterism which, in turn, upset the nation's economy and its social structure. For years, attention was centred on legislation, law, politics, violation, enforcement and 'bootlegging', so much so that the struggle of a hundred years in America about alcoholic drink is something more than a fight for or against prohibition.

As regards the communistic view of the liquor problem, one has to bear in mind that Soviet practise rarely departs far from the line of communist theory—'Alcoholism will disappear', wrote Lenin, 'as a social problem only with the complete destruction of the social conditions which gave it birth.' American prohibitionists have been surprised in Moscow by the unwillingness of Soviet specialists to treat these problems as the roots of human tragedy and distress. The reason is that the communist sees them only as the evil fruits of an evil system.

In *Liquor Laws*, the author, a member of the New York Bar, outlines the various regulations covering the sale of liquor in force in the different States of the United States.

In India, to drink or not to drink may very well be the sixty-four dollar question in the near future. The findings of the study team on prohibition have been published. The Report, complete with numerous pictures, charts, tables and maps, runs into 548 pages and is designed to 'cover problems with the enforcement of Prohibition and Excise Laws, measures intended to reduce illicit traffic in liquor, improving administrative efficiency and securing to

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Gangsterism and illicit liquor go together and bootlegging increases in direct proportion to the high official prices of liquor. The legal efforts and the restrictions imposed by ardent prohibitionists are largely responsible for the rapid increase in the number of people who switch over to narcotic drugs as a substitute for alcohol.

Removal of temptation to drink by total prohibition is impossible and 'true temperance is dependent not on the control by others, but on self-control', the value of which should be taught by effective propaganda and education.

S. M.

ALCOHOL AND SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY By Raymond G. McCarthy and Edgar M. Douglas.

Thomas Y. Crowell Co. and Yale Plan Clinic, New York, 1951.

Among the many problems associated with the use of alcoholic beverages, chronic drunkenness and complete prohibition are the worst examples. Together, these two extremes have popularised highly exaggerated notions about the effect of alcohol and the strength of alcoholics in our society. To restore balance, it may be mentioned at the very outset that those who drink beverages containing alcohol are not always alcoholics. Some drink only occasionally. Others more frequently but without apparent ill-effects. The effect of a mug of beer or a peg of whisky is neither poetic nor devilish as is generally portrayed by the heroes and villains of Bombay films.

Alcohol in concentrations of 15 to 20 per cent causes little irritation to the throat and stomach, and below 5 per cent, no irritation. A drink containing 10 per cent of alcohol, say, 1 ounce of 50 per cent (100 proof) whisky and 4 ounces of water, when consumed is greatly diluted by the body fluids, gastric juices and stomach contents. By the time it is absorbed into the blood stream, alcohol concentration in the body is reduced to a small fraction of 1 per cent only.

The alcohol in beverages affects the individual significantly only after it is absorbed from the digestive tract into the blood stream. The rate at which alcohol is absorbed into the blood—which determines how soon it can influence behaviour—depends on the kind of beverage drunk, on the percentage of alcohol it contains, on the speed of drinking, on the amount and kind of food present in the stomach and on individual constitutional factors. 'It is the concentration of alcohol in the blood, and thus in the brain, which determines the effect on behaviour' and therefore on one's sense of responsibility.

An alcohol concentration in the blood up to 0.05 per cent does not affect behaviour. At 0.05 per cent

there is a beginning of effect. 'Between 0.05 to 0.15 per cent the individual may be uncoordinated in his movements and speech, and from 0.15 per cent and above there is definite intoxication'. Stupor usually occurs only when the concentration of alcohol in the blood has reached up to 0.4 per cent.

Within limits, alcohol has its good points too. It is rich in calories, providing nearly 200 calories per ounce, which compares with 114 calories per ounce of carbohydrates and 270 calories per ounce of fat. In an urbanised society, characterised by tension, struggle and insecurity, it also provides a psychological relief and a sense of well-being. The higher the rate of urbanisation, the greater the consumption of alcoholic beverages.

This does not mean that there are no ill-effects of liquor consumption. No observant person will deny that there are problems, *serious problems*, associated with the use of alcoholic beverages in our society. The only thing being stressed is that objectivity and clear understanding of the nature and scale of the problems are required before measures to eradicate them can be planned or executed. *Alcohol and Social Responsibility* is a book which is primarily intended to serve these ends. It represents 'an attempt at identification and clarification of the portion of the basic data, with some analysis of conflicting points of view' and is based on the assumption that 'a better understanding of the variety of popular attitudes toward the issues may in time reduce some of the differences between various groups—differences which now retard the development of a unified, constructive approach toward effective solutions of the problems of alcohol and alcoholism!'

The book is divided into two parts. The first part deals with the *basic principles and facts*, like historical and contemporary drinking practices and attitudes, 'the development of attempts at social control and the rise of the organised temperance movement' in the USA, the physiological and psychological effects of alcohol on the individual and the significance of these effects on society.

The temperance movement and the US experiments with State prohibition offer several lessons and therefore deserve particular mention. Prohibition in the USA was enforced only when a popular movement of about 150 years had grown into such a formidable force that there was no other way out. Even then the results were so unsatisfactory that within a few years the policy had to be reversed and its impossibility admitted.

The movement against intemperance or drinking of alcoholic beverages arose as a result of the pioneering efforts of Benjamin Rush, a member of the Philadelphia College of Physicians, and Billy Clark, a clergyman. In 1776, Rush published a pamphlet, *Directions for Preserving the Health of Soldiers*, in which he attacked the theory that 'spirits relieve

fatigue or that they are beneficial in sustaining vigour during periods of hard labour'. In 1784 he published another booklet, viz, *An Inquiry into the Effects of Ardent Spirits on Human Body and Mind*, which aroused considerable interest against intemperance.

Twenty-four years later, Rush had published his second book. A group of 40 men, headed by Billy Clark, voluntarily agreed not to drink distilled spirit, except on the advice of a physician, for a year. 'At the end of this time they met again and reported... that not only had they been able to function without spirits but that their employees in heavy work were able to produce more work than in former years'. This group initiated a series of steps designed to promote temperance which became 'a pattern for later societies'.

In 1813 the *Connecticut Society for the Reform of Morals* and the *Massachusetts Society for the Suppression of Intemperance* were established. 'Within a short time similar State societies were formed in Rhode Island, New Hampshire, Vermont, New York and Pennsylvania'. By 1826, with the establishment of the *American Society for the Promotion of Temperance*, the movement acquired a national stature. In less than five years, this Society was able to set up 2000 local groups with a membership exceeding 5,00,000. Membership thereafter increased steadily — over a million by 1836 — and the movement spread even outside the US borders.

While the temperance movement was at its peak, it changed its course for the worse. Many temperance leaders began to exhibit doubt concerning the effectiveness of moral persuasion in dealing with the problem. 'In 1830 the 'American Temperance Society' had declared itself opposed to any attempt to legislate on matters of temperance... Within a few years, however, sentiment had changed. The leaders complained not only that the laws under the license system were inadequately enforced but that the public sale of intoxicants constituted an immoral traffic which the government ought not to sanction'. By accepting the philosophy of social reform through legislation, which became crystallized in the Maine Law of 1851, the movement paved the way for its own degeneration.

Between 1851 and 1855, State prohibition of the manufacture, distribution and sale of alcoholic beverages became effective in eleven of the thirty-one States. Although these early experiments were short-lived, the pattern for the future was set. In the beginning of 1880 'there was a second wave of activity for legislative control of the sale and distribution of alcoholic beverages. Eight States passed prohibitory laws. Again the experiment was short-lived. Most of these States had repealed the legislation by 1904.'

A third wave of prohibitory legislative action developed during the decade preceding the First World War. Prohibition laws were reinforced in

several States. The 'Anti-Saloon League' and the 'Women's Christian Temperance Union' called for a constitutional prohibition amendment which was introduced in the House of Representatives and rejected in 1915. 'In December 1917 it was passed by the House and the Senate. The Eighteenth Amendment to the Constitution was ratified by thirty-six State legislatures by January 16, 1919, and became effective one year later.'

By allowing the State to regulate people's consumption habits, the temperance leaders, however, lost the very support on which they stood. Public sentiment underwent considerable change, and there was widespread criticism of any effort at enforcement of prohibitory laws. An 'Association Against the Prohibition Amendment' was soon organised. It included several supporting organisations, such as the 'Woman's Organisation for Repeal of National Prohibition,' the 'Voluntary Committee of Lawyers,' the 'Authors and Writers Committee' and many more. The climax was reached with the presidential election. 'The presidential candidate of the Prohibition Party in 1932 polled only a few thousand votes'. Soon after he took charge of the country, 'President Roosevelt called on Congress to modify the Volstead Act so as to legalise beverages containing not more than 3.2 per cent of alcohol by weight'. On December 6, 1933, the Twenty-first Amendment was proclaimed 'the fundamental law of the land'. Thus ended the prohibition era.

Prohibition in the USA failed despite a strong, organised and popular movement. In India, there is no such movement. Yet the Indian experts and policy makers are convinced that they can solve the problems of alcoholism by simply making the sale and consumption of liquor illegal. Such convictions, howsoever pious they may be, are ill-conceived. That there are better ways of tackling the problem can be envisaged from the programme suggested by the authors of *Alcohol and Social Responsibility*. Their programme calls for: '(1) a realignment of social attitudes; (2) an expanded programme of education; (3) a nation-wide drive to reduce traffic accidents associated with drinking; (4) public responsibility for treatment of the alcoholic; and (5) improved administrative procedures for the control of the manufacture and sale of alcoholic beverages'.

The second part of the book deals with these issues. It contains a detailed programme for school teachers and students, alcoholics and prohibitionists, public officials and private organisations. Though the programme is typically American in content, it is built on the idea that the emphasis of public policies should be to disseminate scientific information about the physiological and social effects of the use of alcoholic beverages rather than impose legal control over the sale, distribution and consumption of liquor. This is basically a sound approach and therefore has greater possibilities of success.

Ranjit Gupta

Communication

To believe that pubs and taverns are a necessary evil is one thing; to get up at a public meeting and defend them is another. For this could easily mean disgracing one's party, or providing opponents with cheap ammunition, or being accused of financial obligation to wine-sellers. These without doubt are some of the weighty reasons for even a hardened wine-bibber to join, willingly or unwillingly, the chorus for prohibition.

Some of the sanctimonious pundits have had these reasons and others too to come to the conclusion that it is their business to save you from yourself. They have ranged over history from Alexander the Great to Dwight D. Eisenhower, apparently in a frantic search for sanctions for their humbug.

Perhaps they are not to blame if Clio's vastness and dynamic sweep have revealed to them only a partial view of her charms and detestations. It is possible they will find some kindred souls in pre-history with whom I have hardly any acquaintance. But then we have something to learn from the Vedic times. Believe it or not—obviously the preaching pundits would feel struck dead before believing—in the purest times this country had as many as 12 varieties of wine which suggests not perversity on the part of their producers but a highly developed connoisseurs' art. Am I to believe that I have to be unfaithful to my forbears in order to be faithful to prohibitionists?

As a student of history, I hold a clearly opposite view on the subject, and I have no doubt that others, with a historical perspective, will come round to mine. To me the story of the degeneration of man synchronizes with the malignant growth of the prohibition fad. When the Aryans drank *Soma Rasa*, they produced (or created, if you will) the holiest of the holy books, the *Vedas*. It is significant that after the birth of the idea of prohibition in the post-Vedic period, no work of comparable standard has been produced—except, perhaps, *Diwan-e-Ghalib*, described by the late Maulana Shibli Naumani as 'the only sacred book, besides the *Vedas*.'

But Ghalib was a great drinker, which explains.

The popularly-held belief that the drinking of liquor leads to rowdiness is groundless. I should like to quote, with your permission, an extract from the Abbe Raynal's *A Philosophic and Political History of the Settlements of the Europeans in the East and West Indies* (1813).

On pages 400-402 of his volume I, Abbe Raynal wrote: 'The coffee houses were no sooner opened (in Constantinople in 1600) than they were frequented to excesses. People spent their whole time in them. The Grand Mufti, exasperated to see the mosques abandoned, pronounced that the infusion of this plant was included in that Law of Mohammed which forbade the use of strong liquors. He later approached the Caliph, acquainted him with the sorry state of affairs, and requested him to order the closure of the coffee houses in the realm. The Caliph asked his Grand Vazier to investigate into the matter personally. The latter went in disguise to the principal coffee houses in Constantinople. There he found a number of malcontents, who, thinking that the affairs of Government were in reality the concern of every private person, spoke of them with warmth, and arraigned with great boldness the conduct of the generals and ministers. Horrified, he visited the taverns, where wine was sold. They were full of plain people, who considered the interests of the State as those of the prince (for whom they entertained silent veneration), sang lively songs, talked of their amours, and war-like exploits. The Grand Vazier came back and suggested to the Caliph that the taverns, which were attended by no inconveniences, ought to be tolerated. Soon an order was promulgated closing down the coffee houses in Turkey. It was in 1665, the year coffee was introduced in London.'

Twenty-three years later, in 1688, James II fled from England, under popular pressure. Isn't the lesson obvious?

NEW DELHI

SATINDRA SINGH

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
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
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61

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of 'The Statesman'

THE PLACE OF OIL

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NUCLEAR POWER

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FROM THE SUN

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FURTHER READING

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The problem

THE extent and types of energy employed condition man's material and social advancement. The nature of the contribution of energy to the dynamics of social change and its orientation of the economic, political, social and other disciplines is now being increasingly understood.

In the earlier sun, plant and man relationships, man consumed 3000 calories in the form

of plant food a day and converted one fifth of this into actual mechanical work. Where land was plentiful and population was sparse, man brought into service animals such as horses and bullocks. Thereafter, the utilization of wind and water power and the emergence of the steam engine, were great steps forward. If, for instance, a miner mined 400 lbs of coal per day of calorific value 3,500, he produced 400 times the energy that he actually consumed. Even if this coal was transformed into steam in an engine of one per cent efficiency, it produced energy equivalent to over 20 times the energy actually used.

Over the years, the efficiency of steam engines and other energy convertors continued to rise; and also the average production per coal miner (which today is 2,300 kg per mine shift in Germany, and 7.3 tons in the United States). So much so, that we are now using less than one pound of coal to generate a kwh of electricity whereas only 60 years ago we needed more than 7 pounds for the same purpose. Thus for every day's work which man performed, he received many more days work in return through the use of energy. The more recent utilization of gas and oil has further enhanced the efficiency of conversion.

The progress from low yield energy sources such as plant life and draft animals to high yield such as steam power and electricity was a long and continuous process. It brought about drastic changes in the economic, political and social organizations, and an important shift in power, favouring those regions which possessed and utilised the high energy of coal, gas, oil, hydro-electric power, against areas using low organic forms of energy.

Therefore, during the last century, an inter-relation of various factors—including the migration of population to wide new stretches of land, and the dispersal of unemployment, efficient conversion and increased utilization of energy, often forced trade protection and accumulation of surpluses in the hands of a few—helped in creating the advanced industrial and high mass consumption societies, which include over 30 per cent of the world's people today. These advanced communities with about 900 million people use 84 per cent of the energy expended during a year, while the remaining 70 per cent of the population, i.e., 2,100 million peoples residing in the underdeveloped and backward communities consume less than 16 per cent of the energy expended during the same period.

If we were to translate the energy in measurable concepts or terms, such as equivalent tons of coal, horse power, calories etc., and correlate the same with the tangible benefits which accrue to communities (at different stages of economic

growth), by its utilization, almost a straight line relationship emerges. For instance:

U.S.A.	uses per capita energy equivalent to 8 tons of coal per year and has a per capita income of approx.	Rs. 12,000
U.K.	5 tons of coal	Rs. 4,500
Japan	1.5 tons of coal	Rs. 1,540
India	0.28 tons of coal	Rs. 300

On a world wide basis the per capita energy consumption in the year 1960 was of the order of 1.16 equivalent tons of coal. Partially as a result of continued economic growth in the advanced communities and partially as a result of the development plans in the underdeveloped areas, the anticipated per capita energy consumption by the year 2000 is expected to be of the order of 2.62 equivalent tons of coal.

If the pattern projected above were to follow the known world deposit of fossil fuels (estimated at 30×10^9 equivalent tons of coal) at the anticipated rate of consumption in the year 2000, it would last less than 200 years. A further acceleration in the rate of economic growth might bring the energy resources near depletion by the time the underdeveloped areas succeed in building up an industrial complex around the existing resources.

Many countries, reasonably well supplied with energy resources, do not have these sources ideally located in relation to the location of the energy demands. Therefore, the transportation of energy or the source itself assumes vital significance and the costs vary considerably from one fuel to another and also by the mode of transportation used. In many instances, it might be far cheaper to meet the energy needs of large port towns by the trans-shipment of oil or coal from far off sources rather than by over-land transportation within the country itself.

Further, in underdeveloped areas, the capital costs of organising an adequate transport system, and maintaining a constant flow of energy, often make these resources grossly uneconomical in the context of the world energy costs. The recent transport bottlenecks, and the deteriorating coal energy and power position in India, are clearly indicative of this situation.

The pattern of world consumption of energy from conventional sources has been shifting progressively from coal to petroleum and natural gas. In the year 1930, about 80 per cent of the entire energy used was from solid fuels, while oil, natural gas and hydroelectric power accounted for about 15 per cent, 4.2 per cent and 0.8 per cent respectively. In the year 1959, the solid fuels accounted for about 53 per cent of the total energy consumed, while oil, natural

gas and hydroelectric power formed about 31 per cent, 14 per cent and 2 per cent respectively. As the plans for economic development advance, similar shifts are likely to occur in India and other underdeveloped countries.

The ease in handling and the transportation costs place oil in an especially advantageous position, when energy has to be trans-shipped long distances, particularly through bulk ocean transport from one country to another. This advantage made oil the most important item of commerce in energy commodities. The high cost of transporting natural gas has been a major deterrent to its use and has so far been confined to overland transport. Similarly there are serious cost limitations in the transport of electricity to very long distances and would continue to be so in the foreseeable future. Vegetable fuels and non-commercial energy sources, which form a significant portion of the energy used in India, would be severely restricted and localised in their use.

Another factor which cannot be lost sight of is the functional pattern of energy utilization. For instance, in the United States, about 55 per cent of the energy is used as heat and 45 per cent as power, and a significant proportion of the heat energy (about 25 per cent) is used for space heating. On a world wide basis, approximately 50 per cent of the entire energy used goes to industry, households use about 30 per cent, transport about 20 per cent. Urban India on its emergence from the Fourth Five-Year Plan would most likely follow the world wide averages (cooling replacing space heating).

In India, perhaps, the most important factor which deserves consideration is the nature and distribution of the hitherto unsatisfied energy needs of over half a million of her far flung, often isolated, rural communities. After fifteen years of planned intensive economic development, by 1966, India would have 350 million peoples, almost 80 per cent of the population still living in rural areas. If by an accelerated process of economic growth, the rate of population shift to the urban areas was to be increased, even then by the year 1982, 480 million peoples, or 75 per cent of the then estimated population of 640 million would still be living in small agricultural communities. By 1965 only 29,500 of the 557,000 villages and towns with a population of less than 5,000 peoples would have the use of electric power.

The bulk of the increase in energy consumption over the next 20 years would go to the new and the existing urban areas. It is estimated that by the year 1982, while 160 million people forming 25 per cent of the population might come close to enjoying the benefits of per capita energy equivalent to one ton of coal per year, the remaining 480 million people would still

be consuming less than 0.28 equivalent tons of coal. A significant proportion of this energy would constitute wood and cowdung.

In most of these communities, the average net cultivated area per head is less than an acre. The growth of the rural population is further reducing the size of the farm. The distribution of the land to the tenants would not contribute to the development of conditions for an intensified programme of rural electrification. Man power often becomes an essential economic factor in such communities and people multiply to a point where they can hardly produce enough for themselves. Cooperative farming in units of 25, 50, or 100 acres and the utilization of intensive cultivation methods with increased use of energy would necessitate the creation of employment opportunities for millions of surplus workers.

With the mechanization of farms, the extent of energy used to produce the same quantity of food rises rapidly. While the output per man hour may be highly favourable, unless the man hours saved can be employed profitably for other productive effort the results may actually prove detrimental rather than advantageous to agricultural populations. The operating energy costs work out about 10 to 1 against mechanised agriculture.

The Japanese wisely continued to use hand labour, while utilizing all the means of modern technology such as organic fertilizers, scientific seed and plant selection, cultivation and harvesting, and brought the per acre yield up to the United States level. Therefore, from the Indian point of view, as from the Japanese point of view, to use a large amount of energy which could otherwise be used in industry, while creating unemployment for the already under-employed agricultural labour, would not be an efficient use of the already meagre resources. While, on the other hand, in the case of advanced industrial societies, the energy surplus obtained from the mining of coal or the operation of the oil wells may be fifty to a hundred times more than farming rice.

Therefore, in relation to the needs of hundreds of thousands of these communities we have to set before ourselves certain rational economic goals and broad social objectives. The extent and nature of energy employed, and at what stage a particular source of energy should replace another already in use, must be determined in terms of these objectives. The energy consumption under the circumstances would be a local or at the most a regional matter, and the pattern of energy utilization would vary from one community to another, depending upon the population, the needs of agriculture, the availability of skills, the possibility of assuring markets for their crafts. All these considerations

would perhaps be served best by energy supply in small units.

The introduction of energy in the form of electricity or the other high energy convertors in these communities and the organisation of productive effort that would generate surpluses to any reasonable extent, would necessitate the organization of complex institutions. In most instances, such changes are introduced by the outsiders resulting in a better way of life for a few, while the rest of the community bears a disproportionate share of burdens. Such changes must, therefore, come in stages, and should tend to build centripetal forces in the economic and social structure so that the community can develop enough cohesive strengths and advance as a whole to a better way of life. In this process, it must continually develop a balance between population, energy production and energy utilization. In many instances, the introduction of energy might upset existing relationships and disturb the continuity of the prevalent way of life. The need for developing the inner strength of the community in terms of family unity, local pride and inter-dependence can therefore hardly be over-emphasized. Only self reliant, self sustained communities, would be in a position to withstand the mounting pressures of the fast developing, high energy urban areas.

The first and the foremost energy need of such a community is its minimum requirements of food. The satisfaction of this basic necessity would greatly affect the manner and the extent to which the transformation to the high energy society would be made. It is only when this community can create surpluses in food that the need and the compulsion for the community to bring into use the high energy convertors would arise.

It is generally believed that India's resources of fossil fuels and hydroelectric power are adequate in terms of her immediate needs, say for the next about 20 years. But even with the relatively low rate of development and polarization of industries near the sources of raw materials and power, the transport system has proved entirely inadequate to meet the needs of the economy.

A more widespread distribution of industries, and the satisfaction of the hitherto unsatisfied needs of the rural communities, is likely to make the energy supply situation all the more critical. It is, therefore, in the context of the energy requirements of her vast and growing population, and the need to distribute the benefits of energy and technology to all sections of the community, that the energy picture of India must be examined.

India has the largest known deposits of thorium in the world. This fact has naturally

turned the attention of the planners to the possibilities and prospects of widespread generation of nuclear power based upon the thorium cycle. Any developments in this field over the next two decades are likely to have far reaching effects on the power position in India.

The United Nations conference on 'New Sources of Energy' held at Rome in August, 1961, reported some of the advances in the fields of solar, wind and geothermal power. Of these, solar energy, both because of its abundance and widespread distribution is of special interest to us here in India. Although the conference did not report any major breakthroughs, which would make possible the immediate utilization of solar energy at any considerable scale, yet the sustained progress made over the years is likely to open up many fields of application. The direct conversion of the energy of the sun into electricity through small thermoelectric generators in sizes from 300 watts to 5 kilowatts would find a variety of highly productive applications in the backward communities in India. Similarly, the use of solar energy for air-conditioning applications, would help materially in reducing thermal stresses in heat producing industries, such as steel, textiles, mining etc. This would be a basic contribution towards maintaining a parity in production with the more advanced colder countries.

Most of the economic development in India so far has tended further to widen the gap between the urban and the rural communities. The problem of energy utilization—an important contributing factor to such development—has all along been assessed in traditional terms. A new approach to this problem would be necessary if the economic and social objectives, of a civilized society—that is to secure for all its members, a minimum level of well-being—are to be realized.

To achieve such a rational orientation, it would be necessary to have an assessment of India's resources of fossil fuels, hydroelectric power and nuclear energy; to serve her immediate and long term needs. It would also be necessary to know as to how far these resources can serve the needs of hundreds of thousands of her far flung, often isolated, rural communities? The place of new sources of energy in the process of rural uplift is being increasingly understood. How far has the research and development work progressed to bring the benefits of these sources to the backward areas?

To clear the perspective and to emphasize the human aspects in the introduction of energy and technology in the process of economic development is indeed the object of this presentation.

J. C. KAPUR

Hydro electric power

K. L. RAO

THE direct use of water power through mills is as old as civilization itself. Water-driven mills are still found in isolated mountainous regions. It was only after the means of conversion of water power to that most versatile form of energy—electricity—was perfected, that its exploitation on a large commercial scale, so common today, commenced at the turn of the last century.

Hydropower stations with individual capacities of several million kilowatts are now being constructed in some of the most remote and hitherto inaccessible regions of the world. Power from these stations is being transmitted over unprecedentedly long transmission lines at super high voltages, in order to convey the tremendous benefits of cheap power to distant industrial and urban centres.

At Krasnayarsk in Siberia, USSR, a power station is coming up across the river Yenisei with an installed capacity of five million kilowatts, made up of ten units rated at 500,000 kw each. Similar large installations are currently being planned in several other parts of the world, in Canada, Africa and elsewhere where large hydropower potentials exist. India, too, with its high mountains and large river systems has very large hydropower resources, which are of

particular importance in the overall picture of the most economic sources of energy.

India's reserves of high grade coal, estimated at about 6,000 million tons, are indeed meagre, and these should be conserved for metallurgical purposes. The proved oil and gas resources of the country are insufficient even to meet the numerous high priority requirements of the transportation and chemical industries. The country has sizeable resources—estimated at 130,000 million tons—of relatively poor quality coal, the utilization of which for electricity generation through large mine-head thermal stations has already been initiated. These will form the mainstay of future coal-based thermal generation. The coal resources are unfortunately restricted to a few coal bearing regions in the Bihar-Bengal area. Therefore, coal-based thermal generation cannot be expected to play the same predominant part in India's total power production as in some western countries like the U.S.A. and U.K.

Recent technological developments have no doubt introduced a new and important source of electric power, nuclear energy. A beginning has been made in the exploitation of this source of energy in India at Tarapore in Maharashtra. By the end of this

century, when hydel development will utilize almost all the estimated potential and when coal reserves will be considerably reduced, nuclear generation will have to assume a very important role in the development of power. The proved resources of uranium in the country on which the current nuclear technology is based are very limited—estimated at only 2000 tonnes. However, the country's known resources of thorium assessed at 500,000 tonnes can be expected to sustain massive programmes of nuclear power development, once the technique of utilising thorium is satisfactorily evolved.

While there is no doubt that an extensive programme of nuclear power development will have to be undertaken by the end of this century, the power requirements in the immediate future have to be principally met from the available coal and hydro resources, which India is fortunate in having in abundance.

Limited Demands

Apart from being a perennial, inexhaustible source of energy, hydropower enjoys a special advantage in India at the present stage of development. Being largely based on the use of indigenous material and labour, placing very limited demands on the country's scarce foreign exchange reserves, its development can be achieved with the least strain on the national economy. In the field of agricultural development (practically all the run-of-the-river irrigation potential through diversion of unregulated flows by weirs and barrages having been largely exhausted) further extension of irrigation depends on large storage reservoirs designed to conserve the huge monsoon flows of rivers. Hydropower generation at the storage dams helps to eke out the economy of the irrigation component of the project.

The assistance of hydro projects in future irrigation development has two distinct aspects. As at the Hirakud Project in Orissa, the Bhakra-Nangal in Punjab, the Tungabhadra Project in Andhra/

Mysore, the Parambikulam Project in Madras and the Chambal Project in Madhya Pradesh/Rajasthan, hydropower generation can share a sizeable part of the capital investment on common storage structures. In other cases, as at Rihand in Uttar Pradesh, the Machkund and Sileru in Andhra Pradesh, the Punassa in Madhya Pradesh, and the Pamba-Kakki in Kerala, the cost of reservoirs constructed in the upper reaches of the respective river basins, to utilise their power potential fully, have to be borne entirely by the self-sufficient power projects, which then bestow the gift of free regulated water flows for irrigating the vast plains downstream.

Flood Control

There is also the compelling need for flood control—a field which, even more than irrigation, benefits from storage for hydro generation. There are several river basins in the country like the Damodar valley, where the accumulated fury of flood waters collected from large watersheds frequently pour out devastatingly over their restricted valleys. Some of them, like the Baitarani, the Brahmani and the Godavari valleys, permit the construction of large reservoirs in their upper and middle reaches making possible more substantial power production and a large measure of multiple benefits. In this context a review of the basis of assessment of this resource and the magnitude of the economically utilizable hydropower potential of the country would be of interest.

Water power resources are constituted by the integration of the products of average river flows and the differences in elevation along the river courses, and this is commonly regarded as the 'theoretical' or 'natural' power potential. Only a fraction of the theoretical resources is, however, actually capable of exploitation because of various practical limitations on development. In India, since river flow is subject to wide fluctuations during different seasons of the year and with the

strength of the monsoons, continuous power generation depends largely on the extent to which these fluctuations in river flows can be 'regulated' or evened out by storage reservoirs.

For this reason, the topography of the various river valleys, which determines reservoir capacity, is one of the primary factors. Geological limitations of sites for construction of the regulating dams, and of water conductor systems for utilising the drops along river courses are also important, though most of them can be overcome by modern construction techniques.

A further limitation on reservoir capacity is set by the likely submergence of lands and established centres of habitation. Economic considerations too set limitations, depending on the relative capital and operating costs of alternative sources of electric power. Apart from these, there are certain other considerations which restrict development of water power resources, particularly in India.

Priority Claims

Irrigation generally claims first priority on available water supplies in this country, and to the extent that waters are diverted for it, the power potential suffers. The demands of irrigation and flood control often make competing claims on the limited storage characteristics of river valleys at the available dam sites, with the result that firm power generation may be further affected under certain conditions.

An assessment of the practicable power potential, taking all these limitations into account, is necessarily a long and arduous undertaking, since it has to be built upon the basis of specific schemes for development, indicating the location of dam sites, water conductor systems and power stations, and their salient features. However, it is only in this manner that a measure of the country's hydroelectric resources can be satisfactorily established and the exact nature, location and magnitudes of the various concentrations of hydropower in the various

river valleys of the country revealed.

The First Attempts

It is of interest to recall that a survey of hydropower resources was initiated by the Government of India as early as 1919. In a preliminary assessment in 1921, J. W. Meares, the then Electrical Adviser to the Government of India, assessed the 'minimum continuous' power potential in the territories forming the present Union of India at 3.5 million kw, the probable 'maximum' being about eight million kilowatts. Details of specific schemes were given only for a total potential of about one million kw. This work was transferred to the various States in 1921, as a result of the Montford Reforms, and very little further work was carried out thereafter.

There was such paucity of data in the field that post-war development schemes had to be chosen for detailed investigations and implementation, mostly on an *ad hoc* basis. The advent of central planning in 1950 further emphasised the need for a reliable appraisal of the country's resources, taking advantage of modern developments and construction techniques in the field of river valley development and in the light of prevailing economic criteria.

It was only in 1953 that a serious attempt was made by the Government of India in the Central Water and Power Commission to assess systematically the hydropower potential in the country. Ideally, an assessment based on specific schemes requires all the topographical, geological and hydrological data required to establish project feasibility at the stage of implementation. It was therefore considered that the only feasible step was a preliminary survey on the basis of readily available data, to be followed by more detailed studies. Since little systematic gauging of river flows had been done, actual run off data were not available. These had to be estimated by indirect methods, which are, in fact, in use for most

of the river valley projects at the present time.

Topographical studies were based largely on the available maps which have been found to be fairly accurate and reliable, and other data collected during the course of the various field investigations of projects and proposals carried out in different parts of the country from time to time. For the purposes of the survey, the country was divided into six contiguous regions based on similarity of geographical features and the potentialities of each region assessed on the basis of specific proposals for power development, taking all the limitations on development into account.

On this basis, the economically utilizable power potential of the various river basins covered under the preliminary hydroelectric survey has been placed at 50.346 million kw. at 60 per cent load factor, or 264,000 million units of annual output. Of these, 8.42 million kw (44,000 million units) representing the potential of the Kosi, the Karnali, the Gandak and the Teesta basins lie just beyond the boundaries of India, in Nepal and Sikkim. A further 1,542 million kw (8,000 million units) lie on the Sarda river which forms the boundary between India and Nepal. Assuming that half of the potential of the Sarda would be available to India, the economically utilizable hydropower potential of the territories of the Indian Union aggregates to 41.155 million kw at 60 per cent load factor, corresponding to about 216,000 million units of annual output. Refer to Tables I and II.

Seasonal Potentials

These estimates take into account only the potential which would be available on a firm basis nearly all the year round, and do not include the seasonal energy which would be available at various sites which can either be firmed up or sold to interested consumers at cheap rates. In peninsular India, such seasonal energy would be available at sites which can be developed for multi-

purpose benefits, the magnitude being small compared to the total dependable resources of the area.

In the case of Himalayan rivers, however, where the river flows are considerable during most part of the year and where firm potentials have been worked out on the basis of dependable discharges during the winter months, such seasonal energy would be available in large amounts during all but the winter months. It is not possible to estimate precisely at this stage as to how much of this energy can be firmed up or used. The cost of energy production at these sites would naturally be reduced to the extent that secondary energy can be utilized.

Variable Factors

An economic appraisal of the country's hydel resources is considerably influenced by the construction cost and other variable economic factors. These are further complicated where the generation of hydel power forms part of a multi-purpose development. The cost of hydro energy production, on the basis of annual charges at 7.5 per cent, works out roughly to 1.5 nP per unit per Rs. 1,000 of capital outlay per kilowatt of firm power at the normal prevailing annual system load factor of 60 per cent.

During the period 1900 to 1950, the capital outlays on various hydropower schemes varied from about Rs. 600 per kilowatt of firm power at the Tata hydro stations at Bombay to about Rs. 900 per kilowatt at Jogindernagar, the cost of other schemes, like Pykara and Moyar in Madras, Pallivasal and Sengulam in Kerala and Jog in Mysore, falling within this range. The cost of energy production from these schemes constructed at the low cost level of the early decades of the century ranged from 0.9 nP per unit at the Tatas and Jog Stations to about 1.35 nP at Jogindernagar.

During the period 1950-60, there has been considerable increase in the activities in the field of hydel generation, witnessing construction of a large number of schemes, both single-purpose and multi-

purpose. It would be seen from Table III that the cost would range from about Rs. 915 per kilowatt of firm power at Sharavathi to about Rs. 1,750 per kilowatt at Rihand, the representative average being about Rs. 1200 per kilowatt. The corresponding range of cost of energy production varies from about 1.4 p. to 2.6 p. per unit, the representative average being 1.8 p. per unit.

If the common cost of storage is allocated to the benefits conferred on other downstream projects and for other benefits like irrigation, the cost of power would be correspondingly reduced. The capital cost associated with multipurpose projects including common costs allocated to power are higher than those of single-purpose projects, mainly because they are constructed at sites more suitable for multipurpose development.

Favourable Costs

A study of the relative economics of schemes constructed prior to 1950 and those implemented during the last decade indicates that the prevailing range of capital cost per kilowatt of firm power of single-purpose schemes appear very favourable even at the cost levels of earlier decades, notwithstanding the substantial increases in construction cost in the intervening period. This is mainly attributable to the small size of these schemes, when the intrinsically more economic hydel resources—the larger schemes—could not be implemented. The cost of development of future schemes would be affected both by the characteristics of hydro schemes yet to be undertaken and by the general fluctuations in the economy of the country which would affect all developments alike.

The only data available today from which any conclusions regarding the future cost of hydro schemes yet to be undertaken is contained in the preliminary survey of hydro-electric potential of the country. An important fact revealed by the survey is that the bulk of future hydel development in the country would be derived from single-purpose hydro-electric

projects. On the basis of application of prevailing unit rates of construction and the magnitude of civil and other works involved in these projects, the capital cost of future schemes would tend towards the lower limit of the prevailing range of cost, that is about Rs. 1,200 per kilowatt, the corresponding cost per kw hr being about 1.8 p.

In this context it would be of interest to note that the capital outlay required for thermal power stations ranges from Rs. 900 to Rs. 1,100, the representative average being Rs. 1,000 and the cost of energy sent out even from large mine-head thermal stations is of the order of 4 paise per unit, at normal system load factor of 60 per cent. In foreign countries, the cost of energy production from hydro and thermal is about the same, and this serves to emphasise the economic advantages of hydel generation in India, at prevailing costs. The most important advantage, of course, is the low foreign exchange component of hydel development; this being barely of the order of Rs. 250.00 per kw against about Rs. 450 for thermal schemes.

Purely on economic considerations increased reliance would require to be placed on hydropower—at least in the near future. Increasing reliance on hydropower generation, in turn, necessitates adequate advance planning both in regard to investigations of hydro-electric projects on a basis which takes into account the prevailing distribution of resources all over the country. One of the bottlenecks in harnessing the vast potentials which has been experienced in the past is the lack of investigation of schemes. This results in long periods of gestation.

To obviate this problem, a systematic programme of investigations of hydropower schemes has been initiated and 62 schemes are being taken up for investigations under the assistance given by the U.N. Special Fund. In order to reap optimum benefits and develop water resources in a rational manner, it has recently been

decided to formulate plans for power development on a regional basis.

Although the hydropower developed so far is low compared to the available potentials, its utilization has been steadily increasing since the inception of planned development after independence. This is revealed by the fact that against a contribution of 44 per cent from hydel energy to the total energy production in 1956, its contribution has increased to about 55 per cent of the total in 1961-62, while the ratio of hydro-plant capacity to the total installed capacity in the country has remained more or less constant at about 40 per cent.

The hydropower potential expected to be actually harnessed at the end of the Third, Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Plans is of the order of 4.2 million kw, 9 million kw, 15 million kw and 22 million kw at 60 per cent load factor respectively. In view of its inherent economy and abundance, hydropower generation can be expected to play a leading role in the pattern of future energy production in the country.

TABLE I
BASIN-WISE DISTRIBUTION OF
HYDRO-POWER POTENTIAL

River Basin	Power Potential at 60% Load Factor (M.W.) Total in India
I. West-Flowing Rivers of Southern India	
1. Pambyar	276.0
2. Periyar	931.5
3. Chalakudi	297.0
4. Kundipula	78.0
5. Kuttiyadi	67.7
6. Barapole	200.0
7. Varahi	150.0
8. Chakranadi	20.0
9. Sharavathi	997.3
10. Tadri (Aganashini)	214.0
11. Bedti	420.0
12. Kalinadi	646.0
13. Mahadayi (Mandvi)	48.0
Sub-Total:	4,345.5 4,345.5

TABLE I (Contd.)

River Basin	Power Potential at 60% Load Factor (M.W.) Total in India
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II. East-Flowing Rivers of Southern India

1. Tambraparni	21.0	
2. Cauvery	758.5	
3. Krishna	1,636.0	
4. Godavari :		
i) Upper Godavari	62.5	
ii) Pranhita	1,023.6	
iii) Indravati & Kolab	2,458.3	
iv) Sileru	723.0	
v) Lower Godavari	1,943.0	
Sub-Total:	8,625.9	8,625.9

III. Central India Rivers

1. Mahi	33.0
2. Narmada	2,027.0
3. Tapi	90.0
4. Mahanadi	947.5
5. Brahmani	786.5
6. Baitarani	368.0
7. Subarnarekha	35.0

Sub-Total 4,287.0 4,287.0

IV. Ganga Basin

1. Chambal	232.0
2. Betwa	295.0
3. Ken	150.0
4. Sone & Tons	804.0
5. Damodar	20.0
6. Yamuna	559.0
7. Alaknanda	446.5
8. Bhagirathi	105.0
9. Upper Ganga	970.0
10. Ganga Canal	70.0
11. Ramganga	54.0
12. Sarda	1,842.0
13. Karnali	2,745.0
14. Gandak	45.5
15. Sun Kosi	2,360.0
16. Arun	2,365.0
17. Kosi	16.7

Sub-Total: 13,079.7 4,888.7

V. Brahmaputra Basin**(a) Tributaries**

1. Tista	940.0
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2. Jaldhaka	22.0	
3. Kameng	605.0	
4. Subansiri	166.0	
5. Dihang	4,055.0	
6. Dibang	930.0	
7. Luhit (Tellu)	3,270.0	
8. Kalang & Kulsi	946.4	
9. Kynshi, Umngi & Umi	1,064.0	
10. Barak (with Manipur Diversion).	1,034.0	
Sub-Total	13,032.4	12,092.4
(b) Manipur river	16.0	
(c) Tyao	378.0	
	13,426.4	12,486.4

VI. Indus Basin

1. Jhelum	810.5	
2. Chenab	3,256.0	
3. Ravi	158.0	
4. Beas & Sutlej	2,357.0	
Sub-Total	6,582.0	6,582.0
Grand Total:	50,346.5	41,155.5

TABLE II

STATE-WISE DISTRIBUTION OF POWER POTENTIAL

State	Power Potential at 60% Load Factor (M.W.)
1. Andhra	2,476.5
2. Assam	11,599.4
3. Bihar	609.7
4. Gujarat	677.0
5. Jammu & Kashmir	3,590.5
6. Kerala	1,539.5
7. Madhya Pradesh	4,582.3
8. Madras	708.2
9. Maharashtra	1,909.6
10. Mysore	3,372.8
11. Orissa	2,062.0
12. Punjab	1,360.5
13. Rajasthan	149.0
14. Uttar Pradesh	3,764.0
15. West Bengal	22.0

Union Territories

1. Himachal Pradesh	1,867.5
2. Manipur	865.0

TOTAL: 41,155.5

TABLE III

ESTIMATED COSTS OF SINGLE-PURPOSE HYDRO-ELECTRIC SCHEMES UNDER CONSTRUCTION/COMPLETION

Scheme	Capital outlay on Generation Rs. lacs.	Installed capacity kw.	Firm power poten- tial at 60% L.F.	Cost/ kw of instal- led capa- city Rs.	Cost/kw. of firm power Rs.
1. Pamba	2252.00	300,000	226,000	751	1000
2. Panniar	324.00	30,000	26,000	1080	1245
3. Idikki	4749.00	500,000	355,000	950	1330
4. Neriamangalam	299.75	45,000	27,000	665	1110
5. Sholayar	425.00	54,000	41,500	785	1002
6. Kundah	4946.00	420,000			
7. Periyar	734.85	140,000	449,000	1015	1265
8. Sharavathi	8163.50	890,000	890,000	915	915
9. Koyna	4067.00	540,000	408,000	750	1000
10. Rihand	3089.50	250,000	175,000	1235	1785
11. Obra	1197.52	100,000	55,000	1198	2176
12. Kuttiyadi	498.00	75,000	46,000	665	1080
13. Uhl—Stage II	472.28	30,000	30,000	1574	1574

Coal

DILIP MUKERJEE

INDIA'S massive effort to push her economy towards the take-off is underpinned by coal, which currently provides four-fifths of the commercial energy used by the country. The dynamic of planned growth has called for rapid advances in the output of coal far exceeding anything achieved previously.

In the eight years since 1955, production has risen from 38 m. tons to the current level of over 66 million tons—a growth of 11 per cent a year. The accelerating growth in output has been accompanied by a wider geographical spread of the industry, particularly useful in reducing transport leads in a large country. While India has had the benefit of much valuable assistance from friendly nations, a large contribution was nevertheless required from within the country in terms of managerial and technical skills, of basic faci-

lities like power and transport, local supplies, services and finance.

The difficulties have at times all but overwhelmed the coal industry, but the fact of accelerating progress provides convincing evidence that growth has now taken root. In a single year, 1962-63, output rose by over 8 million tons, about the same order of increase as achieved between 1947 and 1955, the first eight years of Independence. Last year, there was a slowing down in the rate of growth but this was not because of any shortfalls at the production end.

Energy production, in the form of coal or any other, will have to accelerate even further if the modest economic goals adopted by the country are to be realised. At present, energy consumption is about 530 kg. of coal equivalent per capita, but 60 per cent of it is supplied by non-commercial fuels like timber and farm wastes. It

is pointless to compare consumption figures with those for industrialised economies but one may note that even other developing nations like Brazil consume three to four times as much energy per head. The pursuit of economic growth will, therefore, require concentrating a significant proportion of the nation's investment into the production of energy for years to come. Some calculations suggest that the proportion in 1965-66 may be as high as 18.8 per cent but should come down to a more reasonable level of around 13 per cent in the three subsequent plan periods.

Long-term projections made for the period up to 1975 show that coal will continue to claim one-sixth or one-seventh of the investment. India has large areas of sedimentary rocks which may have mineral oil trapped beneath but exploration has as yet established only two workable deposits—one in the eastern-most part of the country and the other at the western extremity—which may together yield just over 10 million tons a year during the latter sixties. More prospecting is under way and other discoveries will doubtless be made but oil consumption will in the foreseeable future, remain dependant upon imports, which the country facing formidable balance of payments difficulties must attempt to restrict.

Domestic Reliance

It may well be necessary, however, to accept the fact that industry may switch from coal-burning to oil-burning in certain areas because of the high transport costs involved in moving coal to them. Responsible opinion is not averse to the switch where justified, but there is a strong feeling that balance of payments considerations require incentives to encourage the use of domestic coal or electricity in preference to imported oil.

A country of continental dimensions like India has a large energy potential in her many rivers. Preliminary studies show that some 240 hydro-electric schemes may be economically feasible with a total power potential of 41 million kilo-

watts at 60 per cent load factor, corresponding to 216 billion kwh. Of this total, only 4.5 per cent of the potential has so far been tapped. The uneven distribution of hydel resources is a major drawback, and also the fact that major schemes require very large investment in a lump. This notwithstanding, India will indeed have to make the most of the potential. Pre-investment surveys are currently in hand with assistance from the U.N. special fund.

Hydro-electric schemes are, despite the attractive operating economies, being given a lower priority in India than thermal coal-based generating capacity for a number of reasons. In the first place, a scheme cannot be properly devised without data on water flows etc., which take time to collect. Secondly, building a hydro-electric installation is a time-taking undertaking while the growing power shortage faced by the country requires quick results. Thirdly, the distance between possible sites and load centres constitutes something of a handicap. Finally, the fact that coking coal will increasingly have to be benefited creates a problem of finding an outlet for middlings yielded by washeries—40 to 50 per cent of the raw coal input.

Current forecasts place the availability of middlings at 13 million tons by 1970-71. In national terms, this is a fuel that is available at zero cost, and hence the strong case in favour of super-sized central thermal plants sited close to existing or proposed washeries. Given adequate investment on transmission, these stations should be able to meet power needs over a very large and industrially important area.

Reserves

Dependence on coal as the primary source of energy is, in the circumstances, well-advised. The total reserves—proved, possible and inferred—are placed at 50,000 million tons in seams one metre thick and above. Only a fraction of this total, however, is coking coal, for which estimates vary from 1500 million tons equivalent

after washing to the more recent figure of 3000 million tons. There are, of course, much larger deposits of blendable coals, 9000 million tons according to one estimate. Effort is currently directed to maximise their use for metallurgical purposes.

There are large areas of the country still uncovered by detailed geological mapping. There is, therefore, a strong possibility of the reserves being increased as a result of the work now in progress. In the last five years, a number of major discoveries have been made not only in virgin areas but also within the highly developed mineral belt in eastern India. Prospecting apart, there is much work still to be done on proving of known deposits. Of the total estimated reserves of non-coking coal, less than 5 per cent have so far been proved, the corresponding figure for coking coal being 24 per cent.

The Handicaps

As in so many other spheres, the handicap facing India here is the dearth of skilled and experienced manpower, and secondarily of equipment. There are heavy demands on available resources because of the work simultaneously in progress in respect of other minerals for which the need is equally urgent. One feature of the reserves is the concentration of better coals—coking and non-coking—within a small geographical area in eastern India. This gives the area a tremendous locational advantage which a federal government committed to balanced regional development finds embarrassing. Telescopic tariffs on the railways, which handle 90 per cent of the coal traffic, have, therefore, had to be adopted.

In the judgment of some, this solution is unsatisfactory because it distorts the locational pattern and throws a permanent burden on the economy. The coal industry, although not directly involved in the debate, gives its general support to any move towards rationalising movement, including the possibility of some imports of coking coal to feed coastal steel plants sited away from domestic

source of supply. These imports may even otherwise be necessary to stretch out Indian reserves and hence the emphasis in recent planning of steel capacity on coastal plants.

While the aggregate reserves of coal seem adequate to meet the likely Indian needs for many, many years, a major problem arises because of the generally high ash and moisture content. This is a serious handicap because the metallurgical industry is being obliged to use coal of 16 to 17 per cent ash, even after washing has been taken so far as economically feasible. This is twice as high as the ash content acceptable to steel plants elsewhere in the world. The impact of this factor on productivity of blast furnaces is seen in the high coke rates, which necessitate in turn much greater capital investment on mining, coking and iron-making facilities than is the case elsewhere.

Deterioration

With the increasing adoption of mechanised mining on large-scale, the effect is a general deterioration from the average quality attainable when mining was still manual and selective. Recent studies show that the average ash in coke used at steel plants has increased from 16 per cent in 1943 to 25 per cent to-day.

This problem can be overcome only through wider adoption of coal preparation and beneficiation techniques. This has indeed been the endeavour since the early fifties when washing of coals was introduced in India. Earlier, there were grave doubts whether Indian coals were at all amenable to washing but these were resolved by the pioneering work done by a British mining engineer for India's largest steel company. There are eight washeries already in operation with a raw coal output of over 10 million tons, five of them built within the last three years. Another three washeries will have gone into operation by 1965, with a further 11 projected for completion before 1970. From washing coking coal for steel plants, the idea has now been ex-

tended to non-coking coal for users who must be assured of a certain minimum quality, but progress is held back by the thought that cost will be prohibitive in the event of no outlets being available for by-product middlings.

Production End

While beneficiation may be relied upon to take care of the consumers' major difficulties vis-a-vis quality, there are equally difficult problems to be resolved at the production end. Indian coal seams are extraordinarily thick, some being more than 100 feet. This necessitates a technique of mining in which the coal taken out is replaced by sand to permit the full thickness to be recovered without letting the roof cave in. Mining has so far been done principally by the board and pillar method leaving the roof supported by pillars of coal which may contain as much as 70 per cent of the original deposit.

In a subsequent operation, the pillars are taken out by filling the void areas hydraulically with sand obtained from nearby river beds, working backwards from the boundary. The process, as will be obvious, is costly and is becoming increasingly so as the transport leads to sand beds are increasing with the exhaustion of sources close by. An average of two tons of sand is needed to recover a ton of coal.

Great importance attaches to sand stowing because of its significance in conservation. If the strata were allowed to collapse, there might be damage to seams above and below. There is also the danger of spontaneous combustion in sealed-in voids. For these reasons, sand stowing is being encouraged by a subsidy intended to reimburse the full cost incurred. In addition, seven central ropeways are being built at a cost of over Rs 15 crores in Jharia, the field in Bihar which is the principal source of coking coal, to enlarge the availability of sand. Experiments are also in hand to find acceptable alternative materials for stowing, a context in which the use of washery rejects

in a mixture with sand is being discussed.

At the same time, thought is being given to alternative methods of mining. India, with access to mining know-how from both western countries and communist nations, is borrowing technology without any inhibitions. Expert assistance has been obtained so far from the U.S., U.K., France, the USSR, and Poland, the endeavour being to utilise the special knowledge of each country for the type of mining for which it is suited. The United States, for instance, is helping to develop an open cast mine to produce 1.5 m. tons while the arrangement with Poland envisages the sinking of one new deep mine per year over the next years, each designed for an annual output of 2 to 3 m. tons. The French are to assist on an incline mine in the Karanpura field where conditions correspond to those met with in the South of France.

Assistance extends not only to planning and development of new mines but also to operational techniques. The endeavour in each case is to associate suitable Indians as understudies to the foreign task force as part of an on-the-job training programme. The success of this method of transmittal of know-how may be gauged from the fact that an Indian team associated with the Poles on shaft-sinking has now been constituted into a separate group working side by side on its own on a parallel shaft.

Rising Costs

In the last five years, the proportion of coal worked by machines has increased by 70 per cent. The quantity mechanically loaded has risen three-fold and there has been the same order of increase in the mechanical conveyance of coal. Yet machine-won coal still constitutes only 25 per cent of the total. As a result, the average output per man shift in India is about half a ton but 1.2 to 1.3 tons is being achieved in some of the newer mines. Further improvement is in prospect under the current phase of development which envisages an increase in the indus-

try's power requirements by 70 per cent in the five years ending 1965.

Rising aspiration levels are forcing up wage costs in the Indian coal industry, a trend which will continue. This is naturally pushing up the cost of production per ton as the rise in wages has tended to outpace productivity. The effect is to increase industrial costs in general, a serious matter for a country which hopes to attain viability in its international payments through larger exports of manufactured goods. Since an improvement in living standards of workers must be a primary aim of development planning, the solution is not in fighting the aspiration for a better life but in making ordered progress possible through an all-out quest for higher productivity.

Better Management

This calls for action on three fronts in the order in which they are listed. First and foremost, the need is for better management to ensure that available production facilities are utilised to best advantage. Like other developing nations, India has been faced with a severe shortage of managerial personnel. The main effort has had to be directed towards increasing the numbers available. Since 1955, the year in which planned development of the coal mining industry commenced, six new institutions have been set up for training mining engineering at the degree level. At the same time, polytechnic courses for mining diplomas have been expanded. Today, the output has risen so satisfactorily that no shortage of managerial personnel is now likely. Unfortunately, this progress has been achieved only at the cost of lowering the standards of examination. This is something which can now be corrected in the altered circumstances of today.

The second front on which action is needed is the technical equipment of mines. Some people think that developing nations should adopt, by preference, labour-intensive methods of operation because manpower is both abundant and

cheap. They may well be right in such spheres as textiles where handlooms operated on the side by the underemployed farmer may help to augment his income and increase the availability of cloth per capita. But this will not work in a basic industry like coal. First, the speed at which output must expand if coal is not to hold up the rest of the economy cannot be achieved except by large-scale mechanisation. Secondly, there are clear technical limits beyond which hand mining is not only ineffective but also perhaps impossible. Thirdly, the cost at which coal is won has a relevance for the rest of the economy, and the possibilities of cutting costs through mechanisation need, therefore, to be explored in the larger national interest.

These factors are making mechanisation an inescapable necessity with, of course, an obvious impact on investment per annual ton of new mining capacity. From an average of about Rs 20 per ton in the fifties, it now ranges from Rs 50 to Rs 100 because of rising equipment prices and the more difficult mining condition being encountered. The percentage of coal from deep underground mines which was about 5 per cent in 1960-61 may have to be doubled during the sixties with a corresponding fall in the share of shallow coal.

Scale of Production

Action on the third front follows from the second. It is obvious that mechanisation will not be economic unless the scale of production expands correspondingly. The future lies, therefore, with large mines whose output can absorb the higher overheads of modern equipment and still leave a surplus for reinvestment. The minimum economic size is difficult to define because it varies a good deal in light of the geological and other considerations obtaining. One may however generalise that the minimum will be much above the current average level in India.

There are 850 coal mines functioning in India, but of these only 184 have an annual output exceed-

ing 100,000 tons. The number in the 200,000 ton class is 52, with only 25 above 300,000 tons. There is a great deal of waste and duplication in these small operations. It is accepted not only by government but also within the industry that many of the smaller mines should be amalgamated to form larger economic units capable of mobilising the capital and technical resources required for expansion. These small mines have not been able to get at the deeper seams below those which they are working since this calls for a larger capital outlay than many can afford. This not only limits their future but also stands in the way of more rational exploitation of the country's resources. The idea of voluntary amalgamation has been a total failure, and it is becoming increasingly clear that compulsion may be necessary, raising some serious political problems. Union Minister Subramaniam appointed a committee to go into amalgamation in relation to the crucial Jharia field but nothing has been heard of it since.

One difficulty hindering mechanisation hitherto was the high import content. While some spares and general purpose items like cables and small motors were made within the country, the bulk of the equipment and spares had to come from abroad. Imports of equipment and spares, required by the private sector industry alone, came to an average of Rs. 10 crores a year in the latter half of the fifties. But imports at this level were well below the actual requirements, the exchange shortage keeping a good deal of equipment idle because of the lack of spares.

Reduce Dependence

A solution to this problem is being sought by developing local manufacture to reduce dependence on imports. In the private sector, firms which were acting as agents for foreign principals have taken the initiative to produce some of the equipment locally, often in collaboration with the same overseas firms. Items now being produced include non-flame proof motors of up to 100 hp, light duty pumps, conveyors, haulages. In addition,

the government is setting up in collaboration with the USSR a mining machinery plant which is designed to produce 45,000 tons of equipment a year by 1967/68. Its range extends from heavy items like coal cutters and loaders, scraper and belt conveyors to haulages, winders, fans, and pumps. By the time full production is achieved, India will be meeting 50 per cent or more by value of her requirements of mining machinery against the present 10 per cent.

The urgent need for further foreign exchange savings has impelled the government to consider setting up another plant, this time with Polish co-operation, to manufacture 30,000 tons of equipment. The solution of local manufacture is practical because of India's ability to absorb the scale of output necessary in order to break even. Costs will initially tend to be higher than the price which well-established manufacturing organisations abroad can quote. This is, however, a smaller disadvantage than having to do without imports altogether because the country cannot find the necessary foreign exchange.

Assessment of Demand

Our planners assume that the demand for energy will keep growing at about 10 per cent a year over the next 20 years. They also see coal occupying the centre of the stage throughout the period, which implies that the production of coal will have to rise rapidly in the coming years. In the current five year plan, the increase projected up to 1965 was 80 per cent above the level of 1960 but it now looks as if demand is building up much more slowly than assumed. This is the result partly of a slowing down of economic growth itself and partly of over estimation of demand in a period of acute shortage.

The shortfall in demand will provide no more than a healthy margin between the industry's capability and demand, which is all to the good since the economy, when it starts to swing up again, will not find itself held back by the lack of coal. The work to build

up the capacity of the coal industry must, therefore, continue, but with the pace set by a realistic assessment of demand.

Not all of the expansion will be needed to meet new industrial demand. In India, as in other developing countries, wood and farm wastes supply a very large share of the total demand for energy. With population growing at above 2 per cent a year, the rural population's increasing requirement of fuel is resulting in widespread deforestation at rates far in excess of the best that can be done by way of replanting. Monsoon torrents beating upon the denuded landscape, wash away the top soil seriously impairing the fertility of the land.

Alternative Fuels

In some areas, erosion is so serious that much cultivable land has been totally lost. It is likewise necessary to discourage farm wastes doing duty as fuel, because they can more profitably be used to manure India's farm lands. More is being taken out of them every year than is being put in, which is pulling yields down largely negating the many sided efforts now under way to improve farm productivity.

It is, therefore, a matter of the greatest importance to a food deficit country like India that the rural population should have an alternative fuel available to them so that the forests are spared from further destruction. Coal has thus a crucial role to fill in conserving land, India's most valuable asset. India's Central Fuel Research Institute has done significant work on low temperature carbonisation of coal to produce smokeless domestic fuel. This solution has now to be given practical shape by making enough coal available to work a string of carbonisation plants spread throughout the country.

If non-industrial aspects have to be kept in view in drawing up India's long-range energy plans, it reinforces the case for rapid development in coal. There is scope, however, for rationalising the demand for coal to make targets

more manageable. A recent study of fuel consumption in India has shown that savings of anything from 15 to 50 per cent can be achieved by most consumers by better burning practices. The matter need not be viewed only in terms of a reduction in the operating costs of the industries concerned, important as that is, but also from the wider national angle of saving unnecessary investment in coal raising and transport.

Policy of Conservation

A cognate problem is the imperative need to discourage unnecessary use of better grades of coal in which the reserves are far from abundant, and the annual output of which is on the decline. A wise policy of conservation requires incentives to encourage those users whose quality needs are not critical to switch to lower grades. It is necessary in this context to open out the spectrum of prices to widen the differentials not only in consideration of the higher cost of winning quality coals but also in the long-term interest.

In fact, it is necessary to go further and make a conscious effort to adopt, wherever possible, technological alternatives which either eliminate the need for better coals or substantially reduce the need. There is much thought being given in India just now to making iron without using coking coal at all. An iron-making unit is on the boards which will use lignite for pre-reduction and electricity (produced again from lignite) for smelting. In conventional iron-making, the endeavour is to use as high a proportion of blendable coals as possible. In railways, widespread use of electric traction is envisaged to replace the steam coal required for locomotive boilers with energy produced in modern generating plants using coals of up to 45 per cent ash. The same principle is being extended to industries as more electric power becomes available. Simultaneously, beneficiation and preparation will have to be extended to supply coal of a minimum acceptable quality to essential users.

The place of oil

K. D. MALAVIYA

NO systematic study of any survey for the energy requirements of the nation was taken up seriously until early last year when the Ministry of Irrigation and Power appointed a committee known as the Energy Survey of India Committee. I speak from memory as I do not possess the authentic documents which might give an idea of the progress made by this committee or the conclusions arrived at. I am told that one of the conclusions is that some sort of permanent organization should be created to collect relevant statistics and thereby enable the government continuously to review trends in the generation and consumption of energy.

Unless such records are kept and regularly studied, it would be difficult for government to formulate any policy, much less a pro-

gramme, for the future energy consumption of India. This seems a wise suggestion and I hope that government will act upon it and create a permanent department.

It is not easy to evolve any energy policy for India, particularly because of the rapidly changing economic situation and the pressures of demand in a short span of time. The distances are great; raw-materials for producing energy such as coal, oil, gas or water are located in nature chaotically and dispersed over the whole of the country. The imbalance and difficulties of the problem become more particular when these locations of raw materials are found at great distances from the big population centres.

For instance, the eastern region of the country, comprising 25 per

cent of the population, consumes about 36 per cent of the total electricity generated. The South and the West which include States from Gujarat up to the southern tip of India are reported to consume slightly less than half of all the energy generated and 47 per cent of all electricity. These areas were more in touch with the world outside and, therefore, got a good start in an economy based on modern energy such as coal and oil.

Total Problem

Let us, however, consider the problem in its totality. According to the latest assessment, our vast country is considered poor in natural sources of energy. This view may have to be changed. I say this because a decade ago our assessment of natural sources of energy was bleak and full of pessimism. The position has improved considerably with regard to coal, gas and oil.

The traditional and major source of energy in India, however, is timber burnt as fuel. This timber fuel along with dung cakes is the source of non-commercial energy used for domestic purposes throughout the length and breadth of the nation. In practically every advanced country, timber as fuel has been completely eliminated or is being used only in a very small way. But, as late as until 1961-62, India has been burning timber at the rate of 100 million tons and dung at 56 million tons per annum. We are using more timber per year as fuel than what we grow!

If India continues to consume so much timber in this modern era and in the midst of a rapidly increasing population, then our green fields will perhaps in 75 years be converted into desert land. All talk of 'Grow More Food' will be moonshine and we will be accused by history of having destroyed ourselves through the process of murdering our 'green field' motherland. No country in the world today destroys its timber and useful manure for burning its *chulhas* and keeping warm during winter. The curse of slavery and

colonialism in Asia and Africa has indeed worked remarkably well in keeping its people inert, poor and backward in every way.

The primary source of commercial energy in the modern world today has been, until recently, coal and now oil. Coal, oil or any other source of energy is known as primary energy. These forms are ultimately transformed for power consumption into secondary forms such as electricity or gas. But the transformation of primary energy like coal, gas or oil into electricity is dependent on machines involving a large amount of capital and technical knowledge. It is, therefore, bound to take more time than the average man can visualise.

Another important indigenous source of energy is the water-fall which produces hydro-electricity as secondary energy by harnessing the fall of water from a height. Hydroelectricity, however, requires capital, which we cannot spare in our present economic backwardness. The share of hydroelectricity to the total energy of the country, therefore, will continue to be very small. Today it is about 3 per cent. Two decades hence it may not be more than 6 per cent of the total energy generated at that time.

A study made of the pattern of energy utilization in the United States shows the following:

TABLE I				
Pattern of Energy Utilisation (Percentage)				
	1940	1960	1980	2000
Coal	50.4	24.5	19.9	13.3
Oil	31.8	39.1	37.2	40.5
Natural Gas	13.3	29.2	30.6	25.1
Natural Gas Liquid	0.9	3.6	4.3	5.1
Hydro-Power	3.6	3.6	3.4	2.0
Nuclear Electricity	—	—	4.6	14.0
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

It will be seen from this that there is a downward tendency in the generation of hydro-power and, further, there is a decrease in the production of coal also. This pattern, in my opinion, will in an overall way apply to world trends in the future. It will, therefore, be proper for our planners also not to attach overdue attention to hydro-electricity, more so because it is capital consuming beyond our capacity.

Coal

The most important source of energy in India is coal. Was the mining of coal started primarily for the sake of railway engines brought in the 19th century by the British? This coal was produced only in Bengal and certain parts of Bihar. The coal fields so far found in India are mostly on the western tip of West Bengal, South Bihar and the central part of Madhya Pradesh and Andhra Pradesh. Unfortunately, there are great distances between the coal fields and the centres of consumption. This complicates the problem of the consumption of coal as a cheap source of energy when industries are developing and its consumption is increasing in the densely populated area.

The transport system adds to the cost of carrying coal from the centre of production to those of consumption. If on an average the price of coal is Rs. 18 per ton at the mine, it soars to about Rs. 80 per ton in Gujarat or Bombay, mainly on account of freight and transport charges. Even this price would have increased by another ten to fifteen rupees per ton if the government had not taken a decision to move coal from Calcutta to Bombay by sea on a subsidised basis. This decision was taken in order to bring at par the price in the western part of India with railway-carried coal. The scheme was devised to release pressure on railways as well as to sustain coastal shipping.

Is it that our thinking on the production of primary energy such

as coal has still not crystallised; do we require a greater coordination with the production and development of other primary energies such as oil and gas with a view to contain the prices of energy within proper limits and to rationalize coordination between various primary energies? Recently, the Minister of Petroleum and Petro Chemical Industries has been saying that the policy of the government should be to have a large number of refineries within the next 5 or 10 years and also that there ought to be at least 15 per cent surplus production of petroleum products in the country over and above the actual need at a point of time. A student of fuel economics might say that this is defective thinking.

So far as I remember, I never contributed to such a view even when I had something to do with this question in my official capacity as a minister. Not only that; I have held a contrary view that so long as we have to depend on the import of crude oil to produce our energy, it would be better for us to be on the slightly deficit side rather than on the surplus. If, however, we develop the capacity to build our own machinery, our designing ability and the supply of crude oil from really free and competitive sources, the situation will change and I shall not join issue on the targets of installed capacity of refineries in my country.

Balanced Investment

Today, along with some others, it is a question of balancing the investment in coal and oil even though the latter has been accepted as a more efficient fuel for generating secondary energy. Further, a surplus installation of refining capacity invariably means more and more surplus of gasoline which is difficult to sell all over the world. The present estimate of installed capacity has the implication of more than a million tons of surplus motor spirit for which it will be very difficult to find a market unless we want to undersell it and lose heavily. If the proposal to have 28 to 30 million ton

installed capacity at the end of the 4th Five Year Plan is accepted, that will then have the implications of more than 2 million tons of motor spirit and that too only when we utilize the maximum quantity of Naptha for our fertilizers. The less we use of Naptha as raw-material for fertilizers, the more the surplus left of motor spirit. It will be a catastrophe. However, I will deal with oil later.

The production of coal has been rising rapidly. Within 14 years, production has risen from about 30 million tons per annum to 66 million tons in 1964. There have been some differences among experts as to how much coal would be needed by the end of the third plan period. According to one set, our target was put at 97 and later increased to about 100 million tons. This was disputed by another set of experts (mostly international financiers) who wanted the target to be lower than what the government decided for the end of the third plan period. The estimates have since been revised and we think that our requirements under changed conditions will in no case be more than (this is my view) 82 million tons in 1966.

No Perspective

The main causes behind this difference is the lack of a perspective policy aiming at making energy an integrated means to achieve a rapid growth of our developmental progress. Politics, external pressures and our inexperience have caused this confusion, but there is nothing unusual about it. A little more time is needed to correct our approach. The experts now forecast our requirement of coal in 1971 to be 126 million tons and in 1981 to be of the order of something like 190 million tons.

Conditions are changing so quickly and the so called 'take-off' stage is still so inconcrete in several respects that it will be advisable not to depend too much on any firm figure for a realistic study of our future economics. Scarcity of resources, conditions of fastly changing technology and political pressure make it difficult

to formulate a really effective and useful policy.

Further, the production of coal and its processing into coking coal could not be taken up in a coordinated way. Coal when produced from mines is raw. And in order to use it, it has to be washed in what we call 'washeries'. The main purpose of the washeries is to reduce the ash content of coal and to make it of proper size so that it can be used for steel and other industries. Raw coal, fresh from mines and transported at great distances is uneconomic to use even for non-commercial purposes. A programme of a chain of washeries seems to be as necessary for the processing of raw coal as, more or less, the refineries are necessary for processing crude oil.

State Control

When raw coal from mines is processed in washeries, plenty of small coal known as 'middlings' is left as subsidiary material. Washeries can treat coal conveniently and economically only when the left-over or middlings are removed from the washeries for ordinary consumption. If the middlings cannot be removed from the washeries for lack of demand they pile up like mountains and, if not disposed off, the washeries themselves become uneconomic and the cost of washing the coal, too, becomes prohibitive.

As coal in India at the mines is very cheap, hundreds of mines have sprung up under private control. These have their established markets. There is disharmony and chaos in the industry, and no government policy can for some time become effective unless we develop faith in a policy of control by the State. The steel industry must clean and wash the coal before they can use it for their purposes. They too, therefore, own their coal mines in many cases. In this process of washing, the cost of washed coal rises high and if transport cost is also added to it, the price element becomes further complicated.

For all these reasons, the coal mining industry and its washing,

along with the transport system, should be put under the public sector where the price policy both for coal and for steel and for other fuels like oil and gas have to be brought into one economic pattern leading to a smooth economy for our basic industrial programme. All these factors need urgent attention with a view to giving proper direction to our policy.

The approach of the World Bank, however, has not been very helpful in formulating and implementing our policy of keeping energy and fuel under State control. They have refused so far to give any aid or loan to coal or oil under the public sector. They help only the private sector. Thus the problems facing the coal industry have become very many ranging from (a) the necessity of greater efforts to find more reserves of coking coal; (b) striking a balance between production and consumption of low and high grade coal; (c) introducing a system of controlled distribution; (d) expediting the programme of coal washeries and finally (e) to formulate a price policy keeping in view the economic aspect of energy as one integrated means for increasing production.

Enough coal reserves have so far been found and the rate of the discovery of coal has recently been very satisfactory. Even though oil as primary energy is much more efficient and easier to tackle, coal cannot be neglected by a poor nation like ours until enough oil reserves are established in our country and, further, until our financial and technical abilities permit us to develop atomic energy as well.

General Background

Let us now briefly review the oil position of India; also the general background of world oil. One third of the country's total area is potentially capable of being searched for oil; except for about 40 thousand square miles of this potential area, the rest of the 3,60,000 square miles lies north of the Vindhyas. Practically the

entire area except for some in Assam is covered with thick alluvium.

India has done some good work on the oil side. A serious effort was made only from 1957-58 to develop a national industry under the public sector. During these years the government has covered all spheres beginning from the search for crude oil to the sale of finished products.

Local Sources

The indigenous source of all petroleum products is the crude oil found well below the bowels of the earth generally ranging from four thousand to twenty thousand feet. As is known, this indigenous source of energy was first discovered in Assam about 90 years ago. The small Digboi oil field was discovered by a British oil company known as the Burmah Oil Company. They still hold the concession of this field. Subsequently, after World War II they intensified activity and discovered some oil in four more areas to the west and south-west of Digboi, in Naharkatiya, Hugrija, Moran and the fourth small area known as the Naharkatiya Extension.

When the Government of India decided to initiate its own activities to develop the oil industry it negotiated a 50 per cent partnership deal with the B.O.C. for all areas held by them except for Digboi for which a concession had already been obtained. The partnership is now functioning under a company called the Oil India Limited with an Indian as its Chairman.

This company is scheduled to produce about 3.5 million tons of oil by the end of the third plan period for the supply of oil to two public sector refineries, one situated in Gauhati and the other at Barauni about nine hundred miles west in Bihar. These two refineries belong entirely to the Government of India and they function under an autonomous public sector corporation known as the Indian Refineries Limited. This Indian Refinery Limited is entrusted with the task of setting up further refi-

neries in India wherever found necessary and feasible.

The sustained effort to search for crude oil in the country was also initiated some time in 1956-57 under an organization called the Oil and Natural Gas Commission which was entrusted with the job also of developing oil fields if oil was found. Soon after, some oil was discovered in Gujarat by the Oil and Natural Gas Commission and the Indian Refineries Limited started constructing its refineries. The Government of India also decided to set up, under public control, another organization known as the Indian Oil Company Limited for the distribution of petroleum products not only from the sources of public sector refineries but also by importing oil in competition with foreign controlled oil distributing companies.

Public Sector Achievements

All these activities have been built up in competition with the private sector oil industry. The latter has much greater experience and 'know how' than the newly born Indian national industry. Nevertheless, the public sector has done very well in acquiring knowledge and developing a fervour to create its own industry. In a record time of five years one good oil field and two gas fields in Gujarat were discovered and a fourth small oil field in Assam. To these have recently been added oil and gas in two more separate oil fields in Gujarat and it is estimated that by the end of this plan period they will produce at the rate of 3 million tons of crude oil per annum out of which half a million is already being supplied to the Bombay foreign refineries and the rest is almost ready to be supplied to the public sector refinery at Koyali near Ahmedabad. Cambay has proved to be a fairly good gas field which is ready to supply gas to the State power house of the Gujarat government.

The Oil and Natural Gas Commission has further discovered a big sized structure under sea in the shallow, off-shore area of Cambay. If all goes well, this structure may also give some oil or gas. So far the public sector oil industry has

spent about 40 crores on the Oil and Natural Gas Commission and about 90 crores in refineries and distribution.

India consumed 3.3 million tons of petroleum products in 1950. Our up-to-date consumption in 1964 is ranging between 11 and 12 million tons. Out of these 12 million tons, 3 million tons are imported and the rest refined in India, at present mostly in private refineries. By the end of the third plan period, consumption is expected to be something between 15 and 16 million tons per year. The foreign oil companies, estimated the consumption at about 18 million tons previously. But now there seems to be no controversy on our estimate of consumption by 1965-66.

I hear that the Energy Committee of the Planning Commission forecast 16.3 million tons consumption in 1966, 27.52 million tons in 1971, 43.2 in 1976 and 64.13 in 1981. These projections have, however, to be accepted with some caution. Any firm forecast can be made only when many other factors are clarified. By and large, a 16 million tons consumption estimate by 1966 appears a little in excess. I would put it at 15 million tons.

Any exercise on estimates beyond 1966 will have to reckon with unpredictable factors. Further, we cannot and must not ignore the development programme of coal production. Both these commodities should act as integrated primary energies for our future.

The Private Sector

The difficulties that the public sector oil and coal industry face in its developmental phases are not commonly understood. The private oil companies which are the most powerful and mysterious bodies of the present age are interested in destroying the little reputation which the public sector oil industry might be establishing in the eyes of the people. It will not be out of place here to point out the colossus that these international petroleum cartels are.

Seven international oil corporations control the present oil

industry of the world. These seven together form the senior partners of a giant consortium which extracts nearly all the oil out of Iran, the world's sixth largest producing country of this modern energy. Two out of this cartel—the British Petroleum and the American Gulf—are in possession of the vast ocean of Kuwait oil which is the world's fourth greatest producer. Similarly, four of the American international petroleum companies out of these seven are masters of the wells of Saudi Arabia which is the fifth largest producer in the world. In Venezuela which is the third largest oil producer in the world, we find that the three corporation members of this cartel, namely, Jersey, Royal Dutch and Gulf, possess most of the oil of this country. Ninety per cent of all the petroleum in the world trade today is controlled by these seven international corporations, in association with some small French company. They produce about 10 million barrels a day which gives them a net annual income of 2,614 million dollars in one year.

Naturally, the countries of the Persian Gulf area which own the bulk of this oil can no longer bear this. All of them are agitating restlessly to free themselves from the clutches of these oil monopolies. Abdullah Tariki raised the banner of revolt in 1957 against the cartel and 'demanded that the company become an integrated concern in charge of oil from the well to the petrol station, with Arabia sharing in profits all along the line.' Tariki summed up at this conference: 'Saudi Arabia has nothing but oil. It is only money to the companies. To Saudi Arabia it is her life blood.'

Political Pressures

Oil as a source of energy is unfortunately also a source of international politics. What is needed now is a complete change in the outlook of oil cartels. One of these days they must start writing on a clean slate. Tariki demanded, 'If we want our government to go into the oil business it will be through an all-Arab company, not a

jointly owned government-foreign company'. He also said that Arabia could hire engineers and 'know how' and eventually will possess the experience to form a national oil company. Tariki appealed to the people of Arabia that they must feel that the oil industry is their own, and as such should act in their own interest.

At a critical time like this when the long range outlook for western oil companies in the international oil industry seems to be receding into darkness, the Government of India should be a little more careful in talking about future consumption of oil products in India. Who does not know that soon India, after China, is going to be the biggest consumer of petroleum products; but we should also know that the world glut of oil is resulting in a softening of prices everywhere. And in this situation we must not commit ourselves to any specifications in the development picture of our oil industry.

Caution Required

Remember our background; we are at present in economic distress. Our raw materials are drained out at depressed prices to feed the highly industrialised nations and in turn we have to purchase finished goods at monopoly created and artificially raised prices. Our economies are getting squeezed in desperation, and we have to seek assistance from the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund and many such agencies to survive in this peculiarly delicate situation. We have somehow or other succeeded in building a good nucleus for our own oil industry at a time when the international oil monopolists have realised that they may not be able to maintain their abnormal prices and profit structures.

The pressure from the underdeveloped parts of the world is mounting and this will certainly cause the price structure to sag further. Let us wait patiently for a few more years to know whether we have sufficient oil in our own sub-soil. We should until then not plan for too many refineries.

Let more planning not be rushed through. Whatever import of crude oil has to be made for the refineries cannot be avoided.

• An era of real 'freedom' for the oil industry is now visible. Let us not get dejected with a little delay here and there in the implementation of public sector programmes. We have to remember that the socialist countries which supply us with machines and the 'know how' do not possess commercial shops from where they can lift things to sell to us. They help us out of their own share and so whether it is oil or steel or heavy machines, the gestation period and the birth pang is bound to be a little prolonged one. But our gain is ownership and prolonged returns on investment.

Our bargaining power too can be effective only when we do not commit ourselves to surplus capacities in refining or to a rush for building petro-chemical industries in disharmony and out of context. Apart from giving us primary energy, the oil fields and oil refineries are a further source of incalculable wealth to us by developing petro-chemical industries in one lot. Oil monopolists are not interested in this pattern of utilization of raw material of an oil field or a refinery in a backward country, otherwise millions of cubic metres of gas a day would not have been flared in the Persian Gulf area ever since the oil fields were discovered there.

India has been saved from the tragedy of surrendering its heavy industry into foreign hands. If we make haste in the oil industry and ignore certain facts in connection with the development of the petro-chemical complex and also ignore the great initiative which is likely to come to us in future as a result of the discovery of new oil fields in our country and, further, if we fail to take advantage of new experiences gained elsewhere in planning the size of refineries and fail to link refining with a modern transport system, we will be facing a great failure in our economic programme.

Nuclear power

M. DAYAL

AS civilization develops, mankind needs greater and greater amounts of energy for its growing industry and agriculture and to provide comforts in living. For India, which is engaged in the gigantic task of raising the standard of living of its ever-growing population, the provision of adequate amounts of energy at all stages, assumes special significance.

Let us first deal with the problem in perspective. In view of the widely known relationship between the standard of living and the per capita energy consumption, we may examine some of the latest United Nations statistics for consumption of energy from commercial sources per capita for a

number of countries; these are given in Table I. (Commercial sources of energy are significant because as the economy improves, the trend must be away from noncommercial sources such as firewood, dung, etc., to the commercial sources¹). As expected, countries with a high standard of living also have a high consump-

TABLE I
Consumption of Commercial Sources
of Energy per capita 1961.

COUNTRY	in metric tonnes of coal equivalent.
United States	8.042
U.K.	4.925
West Germany	3.626
Sweden	3.523
Western Europe (as a whole)	2.602
France	2.514
Japan	1.278
Italy	1.223
India	0.150

Source: United Nations Statistical Year Book 1962.

tion of commercial energy per capita. In view of the correlation between the two, the Table also gives an indication of the targets towards which India has to work in the matter of energy production if it desires to reach levels comparable with those in the industrially advanced countries of the world today.

At the present rate of growth, our population will reach something of the order of 700 million by 1986. Assuming that it stabilises around that figure (which appears unduly optimistic at present) one can readily see from Table I that if our consumption of energy per capita is at that time the same as in the U.S. today, the total annual requirements will be of the order of 5,600 million tonnes of coal equivalent. Now India's biggest resource of conventional energy is coal. However, it has been indicated that the proved reserves of coal are about 43,000 million tonnes and if we include inferred reserves and indicated reserves the total figure may come to around 130,000 million tonnes.

1. Commercial sources include coal, lignite, oil, gas and hydroelectricity.

With an annual consumption of 5,600 million tonnes of coal equivalent the entire proved reserves would be exhausted in less than ten years and the entire resources including proved, inferred and indicated coal would be exhausted in less than twenty-five years.

The next conventional resource which we may consider is hydro power. However, of this, the total potential in the country is only about 43 million kw at 60 per cent load factor or 225,000 million kilowatt hours. This for a population of 700 million will amount to less than 325 kwh per capita or 0.04 tonnes of coal equivalent per capita². It is thus clear that the hydro potential can make no appreciable impact on the long range energy requirements.

Oil

Lastly, so far as oil or gas is concerned, India is not in any comfortable position. The vigorous attempts being made to locate oil deposits in the country have met with some success. Oil fields have been located in the Cambay, Baroda and Assam regions and production has started. However, the demand for oil for various sectors of the industry such as transport, lubrication, etc., is rising rapidly and indigenous oil production will at best reduce the present gap between demand and supply. The total demand for oil products was about 7 million tonnes per annum at the end of the Second Plan of which indigenous crude oil production supplied only some 0.4 million tonnes. At the start of the Third Plan the total demand for oil products was expected to go up to about 12 million tonnes by 1965-66; it is now expected that this figure will be exceeded.

In comparison, Indian crude oil is expected to provide some six million tonnes and this itself would be a big achievement considering the present production. Thus, six million tonnes or more of crude oil will have to be imported at a con-

2. The conversion factor used by the United Nation's Statistical Office is 1000 kilowatt hours = 0.125 tonnes of coal equivalent.

siderable cost in terms of scarce foreign exchange. At present there seems no prospect of any very large scale oil fields being found that could make any appreciable change in the relatively low contribution that indigenous oil can make to the long term energy requirements³. The import of vast amounts of oil would involve enormous foreign exchange liabilities.

Non-conventional Source

It is thus clear that India cannot achieve levels prevailing in the industrially advanced countries today without recourse in large measure to non-conventional sources of energy, which, in the present stage of development, really means nuclear energy. This has been dealt with in previous studies and is now widely accepted.

Fortunately, India is endowed with resources of nuclear fuels and while dealing with perspectives we may examine for a moment the situation regarding these fuels. The two naturally occurring fuels are uranium and thorium. India has the largest resources of thorium in the world. It has been established that the total reserves of thorium are not less than about 500,000 tonnes in ore containing 9 per cent thorium and above. Since each tonne of thorium or uranium, if completely fissioned, can yield as much energy as about 3 million tonnes of good quality coal, it is clear that the thorium resources have potentially an immense amount of energy in them.

The established Indian resources of uranium on the other hand are not so great, i.e., about 30,000 tonnes. Thorium by itself cannot be used as a fuel in atomic reactors because it cannot itself be easily fissioned to give useful energy; however it is converted when placed in such reactors into another form of uranium, Uranium 233, which is a concentrated fuel.

Our uranium can be used directly in present day reactors. Moreover,

3. In order to contribute even one tonne of coal equivalent per capita to the energy production in the country oil production would have to amount to about 500 million tonnes per annum by 1986!

during such use, it can produce plutonium which is a concentrated fuel and this can be used to start reactors which also use thorium. After irradiation in a reactor, the Uranium 233 produced from thorium can be used further to extract energy from additional quantities of thorium. The availability of plutonium also enables one to plan advanced types of plutonium-uranium reactors which improve the utilisation of the uranium.

Furthermore, it is possible to have smaller size reactors and also reactors which are lower in capital cost; this has considerable potentialities for use in the scattered rural areas of the country. Thus, production of plutonium in the early stages of the programme can give considerable flexibility in planning and enable us to develop and employ the most economical ways of bringing nuclear energy to serve the various needs of the country.

Concentration

Another basic factor that has to be borne in mind is the immense concentration of energy in small quantities of nuclear fuel. As a result, nuclear fuel is essentially freight free and the fuelling cost for a given energy output is generally less than for a conventional thermal fuel. Because nuclear fuels are freight free, they also reduce the need for investment on rail-road or pipeline facilities. As mentioned above, one tonne of nuclear fuel, if fully fissioned (consumed) would give as much energy as about 3 million tonnes of coal. In a given reactor of the types presently developed, the nuclear fuel is not completely consumed while it passes through the reactor and thus the ratio in terms of coal equivalent gets considerably reduced.

Even so, in the reactors of the type which are being set up in the first stage of our programme, each tonne of nuclear fuel during its passage through the reactor will contribute energy equivalent to about 40,000 tonnes of good quality coal (the potential energy in the unfissioned fuel can be extracted

in more developed type reactors.) This means that there is no transportation problem in respect of fuels for atomic power stations which can therefore be sited right near the load centres.

As a result of this, nuclear power stations would be very attractive in the areas far from the coal fields. Furthermore, in areas where it is necessary to import fuel to meet a specific or general need, it is more advantageous to import nuclear rather than conventional fuels due to the lower fuelling costs of the former and thus reduce the foreign exchange requirements.

Keeping in view the long term requirements for nuclear energy and the factors stated above, we can next address ourselves to the question of the timing for introduction of nuclear energy in the economy and its probable rate of growth. In this context it is instructive to examine the situation in regard to electric power since it is in this form that nuclear energy is being most directly applied to the economy even today in several countries of the world. Table II gives some of the latest statistics regarding electric power capacity and generation for various countries of the world. As expected, the standard of living is also

TABLE II

Installed Electric Power Capacity & Electric Energy Consumption per capita—1961.

COUNTRY	Installed capacity per capita in kw.	Electric Energy consumption per annum per capita kwh.
Sweden	1.3	5100
U.S.A.	1.07	4780
U.K.	0.74	2750
West Germany	0.54	2320
France	0.504	1660
Italy	0.372	1230
Japan	0.277	1405
India	0.0136	51.5

Source: United Nation's Statistical Year Book—1962

correlated to the amount of electricity produced per capita. The Table indicates the low position

occupied by India in the field of power production.

Perspectives

It is important in all fields of energy and power to have an indication of requirements fairly long into the future as planning and execution of power projects and ancillary requirements such as mining, processing, transport, etc., take a great deal of time and investment, and proper policies can only be laid down if the requirements are known for quite a long time into the future. We may, therefore, consider the situation that might exist in 1986, i.e., just twenty years after the end of the Third Plan.

According to the figures in the recently completed First Annual Power Survey of India, the electrical energy production increased by about 100 per cent during the Second Plan and is expected to increase by almost 175 per cent during the Third Plan and about 112 per cent during the Fourth Plan; the figure of electrical energy demand expected by 1970-71 is 95 TWH⁴. Since electricity is one of the basic commodities for industrialisation, its rate of growth has to be maintained at a high level and indeed it would be desirable during several future five-year plans to keep it at the same level as in the Fourth Plan. However, the rate of growth may tend to lessen slightly as development proceeds. Nevertheless, it may be noted that even if the average rate of increase over each of the next three five-year plan periods after 1971 is reduced to 75 per cent, the electrical energy requirements in 1986 will reach over 500 TWH.

With a population of 700 million this will mean a per capita production of 700 kwh. By comparison with Table II it will be seen that even then India will be far below the levels in industrially advanced countries today (Japan itself produced more than double this amount in 1961). Thus the target for production in 1986 should be in excess of 500 TWH.

Since hydro power, generally speaking, is the cheapest and also

4. 1 TWH = 1000 million kwh.

has other advantages we may consider the extent to which it might contribute. As mentioned above, the entire hydro potential in the country is around 225 TWH per annum. Moreover, of the total potential of 43 million kw at 60 per cent load factor, 7.5 million can be exploited best in Nepal and about 13.3 million are situated in the extreme eastern and north-eastern parts of India, for example, NEFA, Assam, etc., which for a considerable time to come will consume not more than a small fraction of this potential.

Of the balance, a fair proportion is again situated right on or close to the coal-belts and this would also be slow in being exploited for power generation unless it forms part of some multi-purpose scheme for both irrigation and power. For these reasons, it is unlikely that more than 150 TWH of hydro power will become available by 1986. There is thus a balance of at least 350 TWH which would have to be met from either conventional thermal sources or nuclear fuels.

Transportation Costs

Now, the position regarding conventional thermal sources in India is well known. As mentioned above, oil is in short supply and required for many other industries and any increase in oil for power generation purposes would mean additional importation and a drain on foreign exchange. So far as coal is concerned, the reserves are concentrated almost entirely in two areas, viz., the Bengal-Bihar area and Madhya Pradesh. The industrial regions of Bombay, Gujarat, Delhi-Punjab, Madras, etc., are 700 to 1000 miles away from these coal fields. Some deposits of lignite and lower grades of coal have no doubt been mined nearer but these could not support the growing demands in these regions for any length of time.

Transportation of coal to these regions is a problem beset with difficulties. About a year ago the problem of coal supplies had become so acute that several industries in these regions were on the

brink of a shut down. The position has somewhat eased just now but development in demand will soon catch up and the intrinsic problem of long distance transport will remain. This problem is further accentuated because India is short of the better grades of coal which are necessary for steel and other industries.

Thus, the coal that is now available for power production is of a low grade and the price of the energy content is therefore high. For example, the price in the Bombay-Gujarat region of energy in the coal available for power generation ranges between 2.6 and 4.4 rupees per million B.T.U. depending on the source for the coal and the mode of transport, and the minimum fuelling cost for a coal based station will be about 2.5 np per kwh. This will further increase as a result of the latest railway budget proposals. Similar costs obtain in the Madras and Delhi-Punjab-Rajasthan regions.

As against this, in view of the large amounts of energy that can be generated from very small quantities of nuclear fuel, the fuelling costs for nuclear power stations even at present, range between about 0.6 np and 1.25 np/kwh. This differential in fuel costs more than offsets the higher capital cost of nuclear power plants which obtains at present. Thus the Tarapur Atomic Power Station being built at Tarapur (some 60 miles north of Bombay) and the Rajasthan Atomic Power Station being built at Rana Pratap Sagar will both have a total cost of power that is fully competitive with conventional thermal sources in the regions concerned.

Moreover, nuclear power costs are going down more rapidly than conventional costs as nuclear technology is relatively young and improvements are taking place rapidly.

Economic Benefits

These factors make it obvious that there is already a demand on economic grounds alone for nuclear power and that this demand will increase particularly in the areas far from the coal fields. It can,

therefore, be reasonably expected that of the 350 TWH which is to be supplied from fossil fuel or nuclear power before 1986, at least 120 TWH will be most economically supplied by nuclear fuels. Even assuming that almost all of this will be base-load power, i.e., operating at 75 per cent annual plant factor, or an average utilisation of 6560 hours per annum, this means that the potential demand for nuclear power capacity in 1986 will be of the order of 20 million kw. A detailed regional analysis will confirm this order of expectation.

These are substantial figures to be achieved in a limited period, even though they will not make as much of a dent in our energy gap as we would like to. Nuclear power production of 120 TWH will add only 170 kwh per capita or no more than 0.02 tonnes of per capita of hard coal equivalent in accordance with the United Nations conversion factor. Thus, this order of magnitude may now be taken as the minimum target for nuclear power. Furthermore, by that time economically exploitable conventional resources would be nearing saturation: the costs of nuclear power are also coming down very rapidly and should by then be much lower than those of conventional stations. It is likely therefore that the bulk of additional thermal power requirements after 1986 may be met most economically by nuclear power.

Quick Beginning

To achieve the promise of nuclear power in providing energy economically and to build up to the levels indicated above, it is imperative that a substantial beginning be made now so that a fully developed nuclear industry may be built up in the country as soon as possible. It is necessary to develop the design, manufacture and construction skills as otherwise the country would have to depend for a longer time on importation; it is also physically not possible to make a sudden jump to a large target, but as in other sectors, to build up steadily.

Moreover, as mentioned above, it is desirable in the early stages

of the programme to start producing plutonium so that the country is in a position to make the best utilisation of its uranium ores and to open up the vast potential in the thorium reserves, and thus plutonium can be conveniently produced as a by product in nuclear power stations. For these reasons, it is necessary to embark on a substantial nuclear power programme even at this stage. However, as may be seen from the example of the Tarapur Atomic Power Station and the Rajasthan Power Station on which preliminary works have started, atomic power stations are now justified even on economic grounds alone in certain areas of the country as they provide the most economic source of power in these areas. For these reasons additional atomic power stations will be built in Madras (Kalpakkam) and other areas far from coal fields in the Fourth Plan.

Atomic Energy Programme

At this point, it may be of interest to note how the various activities in the Indian atomic energy programme during the last few years would contribute towards the nuclear power programme. First of all, it may be noted that the design, construction and operation of the various reactors and other facilities at Trombay, and the research, development and training programmes carried out there, have enabled a qualified body of scientists and engineers to be built up. It has thus been possible to handle all the complex matters relating to the planning and design aspects of nuclear power stations. As the nuclear power programme grows, there is no doubt that adequate staff can be found and trained to deal with all matters including future construction and operation.

Secondly, a number of facilities have been built up for direct use in connection with nuclear power stations. Developments in prospecting have revealed new deposits of uranium and thorium in various parts of India. Mining has started at one of the large uranium deposits in Bihar, (Jaduguda) and a mill is also being constructed there

for processing the mined ore. A uranium metal plant has been designed and built at Trombay to produce nuclear grade uranium oxide and metal.

Progress

Similarly, another plant for fabricating the fuel into fuel elements—a highly complex operation—has been designed and built at Trombay. These plants have been in successful operation since 1959, producing the fuel required for the operation of the research and development reactors built at Trombay; the plants also could handle the requirements of the power stations, although additional capacity would have to be built as the capacity of installed nuclear power in the country grows.

A plant for the production of heavy water as a by-product of fertiliser production is already in operation at Nangal (Punjab), and it is planned to build other heavy water plants too. Heavy water will be required for the CANDU type power station to be built at Rana Pratap Sagar.

A plant has been designed for the treatment of used fuel elements from reactors to extract plutonium and residual uranium from them. The construction of this plant has been completed and it is now undergoing trials with slightly irradiated uranium. Highly irradiated fuel elements are expected to be put through the plant in a few months. This is one of the most sophisticated type of chemical plants, and such plants are in operation only in the U.S.A., the U.S.S.R., U.K. and France.

As they treat highly radioactive fuel, all the operations have to be carried out by remote control behind several feet of concrete. Moreover, as plutonium is a fissile material, extreme care has to be taken both in the design and the operation of the plant to ensure that accidental accumulations of plutonium do not take place which would lead to an excursion or a minor explosion.

A large electronics division has been built up at Trombay. Apart from carrying out design and deve-

lopment of instrumentation and controls so vital in reactors, this division has been manufacturing many electronic instruments on a production basis. The costs of such instruments are much less than imported instruments. A considerable part of the instrumentation and controls even for the first nuclear power stations will be fabricated here.

There are now three research reactors in regular operation at Trombay. The first of these, *Apsara*, was designed and built by the scientists and engineers of the Establishment within a year; only the fuel elements (which contain enriched uranium) were supplied by the United Kingdom. *Apsara* has operated satisfactorily since 1956. Another, *CIR*, is a large reactor with a design power output of 40 MW (thermal) which was built with Canadian collaboration and is a versatile and powerful facility for the production of radio-isotopes, physics experiments and engineering studies. The third, *Zerlina*, is a zero energy reactor for physical studies on lattices relating to proposed power reactors.

These reactors have provided and continue to provide valuable training in reactor technology which is of great use in relation to the installation of power reactors. The reactors also provide means of testing and developing designs of power reactors and materials to be used therein. This is apart from the important uses made of them for physics research and radio-isotope production.

Radio-isotopes

It should be pointed out that power is not the only field through which atomic energy can make contributions to the economy. Great benefits can be obtained through the use of radio-isotopes which have been applied to industry, agriculture, medicine and other fields. Thus, isotopes are widely used in the foundry and machine building industries to check the quality of castings before they are machined, thereby saving the waste of effort and money that would result in machining castings that would ultimately turn out to be

defective. A large number of castings can be examined in a short space of time; moreover, intricate castings can be examined more efficiently than by other methods.

Similarly, isotopes are used as very efficient sources for checking the quality of welds during fabrication and erection of plant. In the steel industry, isotopes are also being used for measuring the wear of furnace linings and for the control of steel quality, notably with respect to the phosphor content. In the metal rolling industry, isotopes are used to measure accurately the thickness of rolled material and to control uniformity of rolling. They are also used as thickness gauges in the paper and paper board industry and as level gauges in chemical plants. They also enable quantitative data to be obtained on delicate processes such as the wear of a piston ring in an engine, tool wear, etc., thus leading to improved materials and designs. These are but a few of the uses to which radio-isotopes have been put in industry; the range of uses is in fact very widespread and constantly increasing.

Saving Possibilities

An important use to which isotopes have recently been put on a large scale is in the study of silt movements in the Hooghly River and harbours at Cochin, Karwar and Bombay. This will be important in plans for dredging and expanding our ports to meet the needs of the growing economy. The potential impact on the industrial economy through the use of isotopes may be gauged from the estimate of Dr. Glenn T. Seaborg, Chairman, U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, that in the U.S.A. gross savings from the industrial uses of isotopes are approaching a billion dollars per year (about Rs. 500 crores).

In medicine, radio-isotopes find important uses in the diagnosis of diseases—such as radio-iodine in hyper thyroidism, radio-phosphorous in certain blood diseases, etc. They are also widely used for therapeutic purposes such as radio-cobalt for the treatment of cancer. A recent application of interest

has been work on the sterilisation of surgical packs and dressings for use by the armed forces. In agriculture, radio-isotopes are used to study the growth of crops and uptake of fertilisers in order to improve crop yields. Isotopes are also used to irradiate seeds and plants and thereby develop improved strains of crops. Thus, work has been going on to develop an early flowering type of rice which would increase the annual production of rice.

Radio-isotopes produced at the Atomic Energy Establishment at Trombay are being used in all the industrial and other fields mentioned above and are being supplied regularly to over a hundred different institutions in the country who are equipped for using them. Large quantities have been supplied to the steel, metal working, paper board, engineering fabrication and other industries. Several hospitals receive isotopes supplies from Trombay almost daily. The value of isotopes supplied from Trombay in 1963 runs into several lakhs of rupees; the figure is increasing rapidly as more and more people learn about the uses to which they can be put. Radio-isotopes produced at Trombay are now being exported to many countries in Asia and western Europe.

Local Benefits

Another benefit of atomic energy work has been to provide experience to local industry in special precision jobs and new techniques of fabrication and manufacture required for the components of nuclear facilities. This has already helped to improve the capabilities of local industries and will assist them in the future tasks of industrialisation apart from enabling them to support the developing nuclear power programme.

Indeed, this aspect of work in atomic energy may be particularly stressed. Raising of the general technological level of skills in the country will enable our industry better to attempt catching up with modern developments and familiarity with the techniques of atomic energy puts the country in a position to make use of this latest

technology in solving the special problems of India, not only at present, but increasingly in the future.

Thus, not only is atomic energy being used in India today to push forward the boundaries of human knowledge, it is already contributing to present day needs in the economy and assisting directly in industrial development. With the installation of the nuclear power stations, the application of nuclear energy will be greatly accelerated; increasing utilisation of nuclear energy will help in ensuring that the tempo of economic development in the country is maintained and that the nation grows from strength to strength.

Important Achievement

In a country which is industrially underdeveloped, and where as a habit of mind one turns, whether in the public or the private sector, to foreign collaboration for setting up any new plant or industry, one of the most important achievements of the atomic energy programme, and in particular of the work done at the Atomic Energy Establishment at Trombay, has been to show that some of the latest and most complicated developments in technology can be carried out by Indians without any dependence on foreign assistance.

The production of sophisticated electronic equipment, the control systems of reactors and electronic computers, and the design and erection of plants for the production of nuclear grade uranium metal and fuel elements, and for extracting plutonium from used fuel elements, technological operations which are carried out in barely six countries in the world today, show what can be done by Indian scientists and engineers with proper leadership. They show what can and should be done in almost every other branch of industry. The Indian atomic energy programme has not only served to put India on the map of the world and to prepare the country for the use of this new source of energy, it has served to raise the general technological level and stature of the country as a whole.

From the sun

D. D. KOSAMBI

A TEXTBOOK very popular in the U.S.A. before World War II and perhaps still used widely in American high schools for the teaching of physics, says:

"The earth is continually receiving energy from the sun at the rate of 232,000,000,000,000 horsepower, or about a seventh of a million horsepower per inhabitant. We can form some conception of the enormous amount of energy that the sun radiates in the form of heat by reflecting that the amount received by the earth is not more than $1/2,000,000,000$ of the total given out. Of the amount received by the earth, not more than $1/1000$ part is stored up in animal and vegetable life and lifted water. This is practically all the energy which is available on the earth for man's use."

This statement is taken from pp. 214-215 of Millikan, Gale and Coyle's *New Elementary Physics* (Boston, 1936). Prof. Robert A. Millikan, the senior author, was among the outstanding classical physicists of his day and awarded a Nobel prize for his profoundly illuminating experiments. In spite

of the growth of the earth's population, the discovery of atomic energy in utilizable forms, and some variation in solar radiation, the facts given are true even today. The energy discharged by the sun upon earth still comes to something like 140,000 horsepower per each inhabitant, and surely much less than a thousandth part of that is utilised by man, though nearly a thousandth part may be stored up in some way by nature.

This storage is in the form of solar energy utilized in converting carbon dioxide from the air plus water vapour into vegetable matter. 'Lifted water' refers to water evaporated by the sun which comes down upon a higher level in the form of rain, and may be utilized as hydro-power. Animal life reuses the vegetable matter taken in as food, and some animals go a step further in eating others. Man derives his own physical energy in this way, and utilizes more solar energy in the process of cooking his food—though the energy of the fire is not thereby stored up.

Here, one has to make a sharp distinction between such commonly used terms as mental energy, spiritual energy, soul-force, etc.,

and the precisely measurable 'energy' of the physicist, with which alone this note is concerned. Man needs this not only for special muscular labour but even in breathing, in keeping his body temperature at 37°C and in all other bodily functions, without which he ceases to exist as a human being. This fact is clearly recognised in the measurement of nutrition by caloric content: '3,000 calories per day are needed for average labour in such and such a climate', etc. These calories have already been measured by prolonged physical experiments upon human beings fed various sorts of material. The rate of utilization of the caloric content depends upon individual digestion, palatability, vitamins, balance of diet etc.; but in the end, the maximum amount of energy to be derived from any given diet is a clearly measured physical quantity.

Horsepower

Men, and animals that are used to ease man's labour (oxen, horses, llamas) are rather inefficient in converting their food intake into mechanical work. Otherwise, slavery would have lasted much longer and we should not have to worry about replacing the bullock cart and tonga with something more suitable. Industrialization is not merely a fashion but a necessity, based in the final analysis upon the need for more utilizable energy. The horse and ox have to be fed whether they work or not, which decreases their net efficiency still further, apart from rest-periods, the non-working extremely young, very old, or non-working female animals (without which the species cannot be maintained). A horsepower as unit of work was measured as the work done by specially trained, powerful draft horses, accurately measured to fix the unit; but the average work done by the average equine animal throughout his whole lifetime is a small fraction of the rated horsepower.

It ought to be noted that when we talk of energy from coal, oil, etc., we still mean solar energy stored up in the past by living

matter. Hydro-electric energy comes, as noted above, from water raised by the sun. Millikan did not mention sails and windmills, which make very little difference to the total energy now utilised; but this is again solar energy, for the movement of air-masses is due to unequal heating by the sun which causes some air to rise and other to move into its place. The one possible exception to the statement that normally utilized energy is ultimately solar may be from tidal power-stations, possible in a few parts of the world (like the Bay of Fundy) with very powerful tides. This energy comes mostly from the drag of the moon upon the waters of the ocean.

The Main Question

The main question then becomes: what new methods are there for the utilization of all this wasted solar energy which costs nothing to produce at the source?

The sun does not discharge its energy in concentrated form, or life would have been impossible on this earth of ours. Nor is the energy equally available at all times. Nights and very cloudy days mean virtually no solar energy ready for the tapping, while the rate varies in summer and winter, tropical lands and the arctics. The main problem then falls into three parts: concentration, conversion, and storage—all of which is done, inefficiently or not, by plant and animal organisms. The main reason for wrestling with the direct problem is that all known sources of such ready-stored energy will be exhausted in the calculable future, whereas the cooling of the sun lies millions upon millions of years away.

Concentration is done by familiar means, e.g., the burning-glass which most of us know how to use. The most spectacular of such concentration is for solar furnaces. The reflectors of discarded army searchlights can concentrate enough energy from the sun to melt any known metal, and even to vaporize such refractory metals as tungsten. The flashing-up of a tungsten 'candle', once seen is

never forgotten. But, of course, this is a specialized use. Far more useful would be solar water-heaters which can easily and cheaply be made with no moving parts. The water is heated directly in a pipe-grid, rises (because warm water is lighter than cold) into insulated containers, and remains close to its maximum temperature for 48 hours. Such heaters are in actual use in Israel and other places for household purposes.

Boiling the water could give solar stills, most useful in parts of Rajasthan and Kathiawad where the water is brackish, useless for drinking and even for industrial purposes. They are used in other countries, but apparently not in favour with us. The easiest step is a solar cooker. With aluminium reflectors, these can be used by any household to boil some 40 litres of water an hour; or to do the corresponding amount of other types of cooking. I have seen them in very successful operation elsewhere. Finally, such boilers could and have actually run steam engines. One was used in Egypt early in this century; another ran a pump in Bombay in the 1880s.

Such apparatus needs some attention because the sun keeps moving in the sky. The cooker can be turned a little every half-hour by the housewife by hand. The same turning can be done continuously by automatic clock-work, nothing more complicated than the filling of sand which runs out, to allow the counterweight to rise, thus turning the cooker. Finally, fixed-position boilers exist for continuous water-heating on a large scale.

The Catch

The catch in all this is the variation in solar energy. One cannot run the solar steam engine at night. However, cooking during daylight and storage of hot water are certainly possible. The pump can be run all day for irrigation, except perhaps in the cloudy monsoon, when irrigation would be unnecessary in any case. It has even been suggested that the daylight pumps could raise water to

the top of 50-foot towers, and that electricity would then be generated by properly designed turbines which ran on the water released for irrigation at night. This is a solution of the problem of storage.

- Direct conversion is also possible. Most camera-users know the photo-electric meter which measures the light by measuring the electric current generated when the light falls upon alkali metal, sodium or potassium. Other such electric cells are possible and can be manufactured at lesser cost. Storage here would mean storage batteries of some sort. Booster cells which work by sunlight are already in use for telephone lines which run across the USA through desert area where the addition of extra current would increase costs beyond measure. The cells are put on top of the telephone poles and help out precisely when the load is at maximum.

Costs

As things stand, solar energy is costly, simply because it runs on a laboratory basis. The lands where technology is most advanced are just those which have very little sunlight as compared to India and Africa and where conventional forms of energy are highly developed. But mass-production is quite feasible and would reduce the costs enormously. The best such example in other fields is of aluminium, which is the commonest metal in the earth's clay. Pottery, the first artificial substance made by man, is possible only because of the properties of aluminium hydroxide. But extracting this metal was a most costly process and aluminium was, a century ago, costlier than gold. Technology has made the metal cheap—as no amount of technology could make gold or platinum cheap—and we use aluminium without further discussion as to its advisability.

There is a second economic factor involved besides cost. Solar energy has no evil by-products: no ash, carbon monoxide or other poisonous gas, noxious cancer-producing atomic waste or the like. Furthermore, there is a whole

economic cycle involved. Say a successful solar cooker is available in India, nothing more. Then it would be possible to reforest the land now denuded of all trees which no *vana-mahotsav* can make green again as long as the peasants are short of fuel.

Reforestation means a better climate, springs that flow for a longer period after the monsoon, clear water in the rivers, more timber for construction work, better agriculture. The sole proviso is that fuel should be available apart from growing vegetation. If we try to get this from kerosene oil, say, the very minimum needed for cooking, without much light and without hot water for the bath, is easily calculated. It comes to not less than 500,000 barrels of refined kerosene daily. Whether we can produce that much oil and distribute so much refined product over the whole country is a question anyone can ask—and answer.

The natural question at this stage is: what is holding things up? Why has nothing been done? The easiest answer to give is that all this is in some way impractical or it would have been done long ago by the advanced countries—which have not the solar energy, of course! But rather than go into an abstract discussion of what co-operation would be needed between private and public sectors, science, engineering, technology of mass-production, and so on, let us consider one case in point which may answer this final question.

Short-lived Experiment

Some years ago, an Indian solar cooker did appear on the market. It was shown in the news-reels in our cinema theaters. The President, the Prime Minister and others saw the demonstration and tasted a meal which was announced as having been cooked from scratch on the said cooker in just 30 minutes. The statement in itself was not improbable, but there is no cooker on the market now. Some specimens were sold quickly and the manufacturing company is reputed to have made its profits by selling off the stainless steel and the machinery, whether as scrap

or as useful materials. The cooker, when tried by ordinary mortals away from newsreel cameras, just refused to work.

Any scientist could have said why. The reflector which concentrated the solar energy was too small in area. In addition, the pot at the focus was just as bright, of polished stainless steel, as the reflector, thus turning away most of the heat concentrated upon it. Any high-school student could have said that the cooking pot must be black on the outside, and then calculated the necessary area for the mirror. Where were our world-famous scientists? The sole announcement that I have read was that the scientists of the national physical laboratory had designed the said cooker, inspired by a great thought that the then President had had during his *satyagraha* days. With this bit of gratuitous publicity, the scientists returned to their profound speculations. Some of them managed to represent India at international conferences on solar energy, nevertheless. The Planning Commission was too busy with philosophical and scholastic essays to bother about the question.

In the Future

These strictures seem rather harsh, but surely not undeserved. When, some years ago, the main ideas of this note were spoken out in a popular lecture, the matter roused some heat not due to the sun. The sole outcome was to question the facts—which appear in an elementary textbook written by a scientist of repute. Questions were asked in parliament and answered by high authority with the words that such projects are designed to keep India backward, in the bullock-cart age. This, in spite of the remark made during the lecture that the bullock-cart is inefficient, and that *India needs every form of energy it can afford*. A question of science, technology and economics was reduced to one of ostentation and prestige. However, the sun has not yet been abolished by decree, so that the matter may be taken up at some future date when common sense gets a chance.

Books

ENERGY AND SOCIETY: The Relation Between Energy, Social Change, and Economic Development
By Fred Cottrell.

McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc. 1958.

Like the aspirations of our foreign policy, this is the work of an analyst who wants to be non-aligned, but, neither non-involved nor negatively neutral. He is Professor of Government and Sociology in Oxford (Miami University, Ohio), and the study has been appropriately presented by the U.S. Government as an expression of friendship and goodwill of the people of the U.S. towards the people of India, enough to compel the attention of the Indian reader, who will not be disappointed nor find it easy going.

The expert is one who knows more and more about less and less. To neutralise that danger, the analysis follows no established academic field exclusively. As a result, concepts (both elementary and advanced) are taken from various disciplines. It is this interdisciplinary orientation, centering upon the concept of energy in measurable terms (calories and horsepower), that makes the author's approach to the dynamics of social change a significant one, particularly for developing economies.

The thesis of the book is simple; it is only the treatment which is complicated. What is sought to be established is that the energy available to man limits what he can do, and influences what he will do, but it is not easy to establish. The energy convertors man uses are embedded in a social matrix in which it is difficult to separate relationships affected by technical operations from those primarily of social origin.

Social progress is seen in terms of growth from low-energy technology to high-energy technology, from low-energy convertors to high-energy convertors. As the methodology adopted is geared to please neither the communist world nor the world free of communism (free world), it acquires a special non-aligned interest and, in anticipation of resistance from both quarters, the argument has been built upon widely accepted principles of natural science rather than 'self-evident' truths about human nature which are not considered immutable.

How is a low-energy society like India interested? We are told that, with only insignificant exceptions such as the limited amount of energy available on earth from lunar gravitation and from cosmic rays, the energy which is available to man has come, or currently comes, from the sun. One of the still unsolved problems of science is how to take full advantage of the sun's energy, and one of its unsolved mysteries is why a strong vested interest in its solution has not developed when it is obvious that it is

no lack of a source of energy which limits man's activities.

It is estimated that the amount of solar heat which falls on only one and a half square miles of the earth's surface in a day is equivalent to that generated by an atom bomb such as that used at Hiroshima. Thus, the amount of radiant energy is so far in excess of man's present ability to convert it, that it cannot be considered to limit human behaviour. It is Cottrell's argument that energy-imposed limits stem from the particular means by which energy is converted into the particular forms desired by man at a particular time and place.

It is clear that solar energy research is a matter of the utmost importance to under-developed tropical countries like India where there is abundant, continuous and free sunshine for nine months of the year. This will be a boom particularly in rural areas. Yet, there is no clear answer to the question why scientific research in this field is not being encouraged and supported as it should be, when interesting developments in the use of solar energy are already taking place in Japan and the U.S.A. Can any one explain what has happened to the solar cooker which our National Physical Laboratory was said to have designed some years ago? The result is out of all proportion to the publicity given to it.

How far will the limitless diffusion of high-energy technology help to provide the basis for the universal State, and freedom from the fear of war. This work claims to show that there is no such inevitability, at least not so far as having one world is concerned. Its future vision is based not on one world, but many, and we are reminded of Bertrand Russell's hope of a permanent organisation composed of three different groups—East, West, and neutral. It is Cottrell's contention that the changes which low-energy societies must undergo in the process of adopting that technology, affect everything from the functions of a family and the nature of personality to the rate of population growth, the ratio of land to population, and the character of groups in political control. Almost nothing which affects life in low-energy society is left undisturbed by the transition to high-energy convertors, and we have seen something of this happening in India to further as well as arrest progress.

For instance, the introduction of these conditions is a threat to some of the strongest and most deeply entrenched groups in the community. Since the traditional right to control lies with them and not with the would-be innovators, it is unreasonable to expect that they will teach respect for, and devotion to, those who are destroying them. Rather, they can be expected to exert great efforts to expel the disturbing agents of high-energy society and to re-affirm

all the values connected with the old way of life. Compare this with the rise in the influence of astrologers on our leadership and the offer of *sadhus* to help in the elimination of corruption. What is behind the astrologers and their power to shape crucial political decisions would make a fruitful subject of research.

The author goes on to argue that acts of government which repudiate these values will be rejected by the people with scorn and derision and, if there is thought to be the least chance of success, with armed rebellion. The comment follows that where peaceful transition is taking place, it sometimes means only that successful physical resistance is thought to be impossible. In these cases, instead of open, organised opposition the State may be confronted with anxiety accompanied by apathy and the complete failure on the part of individuals to take any action which they are not specifically ordered to take. The spontaneous and willing effort of the individual seeking to make a 'success' of himself in terms of internalised goals is completely lost, and the cost of change is increased by the inefficiency with which new roles are carried out and new convertors used. How familiar all this sounds.

Does this tool of analysis help to predict the course of civilisation? There is no question of 'heads I win, tails you lose' here, which is an astrologer's privilege. The author claims no more for his essay than a contribution towards suggesting whole areas of ignorance whose exploration might increase the accuracy of our thinking about the future development of human society. In spite of being an expression of goodwill towards the people of this country, the study comes to the conclusion that the industrialisation of India is a shaky enterprise and has little appeal to the private investor. But it also goes on to say that the future course of industrialism in China, Brazil or Japan is not as clear as further research may make it. Why Japan?

What of the future? Asia and Africa do not seem to have a major role in it. Immediately, the emergence is visualised of at least three geographically fairly well-defined systems using high-energy technology, with bases in North America, England and Germany, and Russia respectively. The rest will consist of groups of satellites. As no one system could be expected to dominate over the others, particularly with the coming renaissance of western Europe, there could emerge a loose federal system making arrangements which would obviate the necessity of war and provide for the implementation of such values as become universal. The explosion of atomic power began as a threat to the world in Hiroshima, because in it lay power also to create 'one world' by threat and domination. When retaliatory atomic power came into existence, this threat was eliminated and substituted by the threat of no world at all. It has helped to keep the peace so far.

A. K. Banerjee

NEW SOURCES OF ENERGY AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT.

A United Nations Report, 1957.

For different reasons, both industrially advanced and backward countries have had to study the problem of tapping new sources of energy directly and by efficient, modern methods. Industrially advanced countries face the problem of dwindling natural resources, especially of fossil fuels, and effective substitutes have to be sought. Backward countries on the other hand, need low-cost sources of energy to be able to take long strides towards economic advancement. So, a resolution was brought up in the United Nations by the Economic and Social Council, asking the Secretary General 'to prepare a report on the prospects for the practical utilisation of the five new sources of energy, namely solar energy, wind energy, geothermic energy, tidal energy and thermal energy of the seas.' The report was also to lay down ways and means by which to promote economic development in less developed countries, and indicate the direction of further theoretical and applied research.

Of the three issues raised, only the first has been thoroughly discussed in this report; the other two have been ignored. Following up this resolution, some European and American experts were asked to write about one of these five sources of energy. Based on these background studies, the U.N. Secretariat undertook research with the help of American universities. The background studies, along with the research, have resulted in the report under review which has been divided into three parts. The first is a comparative study and deals with the general aspects of all five sources of energy, the second studies each separately, and the third consists of an annotated bibliography.

At the very outset, the report admits that, except for the thermal energy of the seas, there is nothing new about the other four sources. They have been known for a very long time. But what is novel about them is the method of tapping them. Even before the U.N. produced this report, there had been some unco-ordinated research sponsored by manufacturing firms, universities, foundations and philanthropic organisations which seem to have been going it alone. So, the U.N. thought 'it would be useful if a few experimental schemes under practical conditions could be carried out in various parts of the world.'

The need for co-ordination arose because most of these energy sources need a great deal of capital for initial investment, although running costs are low, and in the present state of society, interest rates could bog down many proposals. For instance, ... considering sale of power only, without the by-products, thermal energy of the seas would be more economical as regards the cost per kilowatt-hour produced than power from modern conventional thermal units, *provided* (emphasis mine) that the rate of

interest on the investment was less than 5.50 per cent. In the case of a plant of considerably large size, the power would be more than competitive with that of conventional thermal stations, provided that money could be borrowed at the rate of less than 7 or 8 per cent.' But the report prefers not to discuss such mundane matters as the wherewithal to implement schemes utilising the sources of energy. It just discusses the five sources themselves.

Of the five mentioned in the report, solar energy, in addition to being the oldest known to man, also has the widest of uses. Modern methods of tapping the energy of solar radiation have been divided into groups, one dealing with heat and the other with light. Solar cookers, once so widely publicized in our country, are the most elementary form of converting solar heat into electricity. Food refrigeration on a small scale and cooling of houses are also fairly simple forms of utilisation. Thermal processes are now being developed for direct conversion of solar heat into electricity.

Around '63, the world's first high-capacity solar electric station was built in Armenia, with mirrors to focus solar radiation on a boiler, up on a tower, from dawn to dusk. Joliot-Curie had said, 'If we could use 10 per cent of solar radiation over an area the size of Egypt, with the aid of the necessary equipment, the energy obtainable would be equal to the energy now generated in all the countries put together.' Ancient Egyptians referred to the sun as the Giver Of Life, but unlike the United Nations Secretariat, they were not faced with the percentage of interest.

Although not as old as solar energy in the service of man, wind energy has been utilised for centuries. But utilisation of wind power today means its conversion into electricity by intercepting it with a rotor which transforms it into usable mechanical power. The basic elements for this conversion are the speed of the wind and the size of the area swept by the rotor.

Exploitation of tidal energy has also been studied with a view to converting the mechanical energy of the tides into electricity. The French project of La Rance, a phased programme, will, according to the report, set up a 342,000 kw plant. The underlying principle is rather like electricity. A basin is filled during flow tide and closed when the tide recedes. The water is then allowed to fall on the lower side of the barrage, which operates a turbine, which in turn drives a generator producing electricity.

Another source of energy discussed is geothermic energy. The report goes into detail about the experiences in Italy, where geothermic energy is utilised to generate electricity. Japan and New Zealand also have been utilising this form of energy. Geothermic energy comes in the form of natural steam or hot water, mixed with various chemicals, under pressure, in hot springs and volcanic crevices. If the natural steam has sufficient volume, temperature and pres-

sure, it could be led through a turbine driving an electric generator and then exhausted into air. More advanced plants can also manufacture chemical by-products.

The newest of the five sources mentioned in this report is the thirty year old thermal energy of the seas, obtained by exploiting the differences in temperature between two masses of water. It was tried out in France. Here the basic principle is that heat can be turned into mechanical energy when two heat reservoirs of different temperatures are available. The surface water must be 20°C hotter than the deeper water. The basic machinery consists of an evaporator, a turbine generator, and a condenser. Extraction of fresh water could also be a useful by-product. The efficiency of this method depends on temperature differences in the water.

Every one of these energy sources has the advantage of conserving conventional fuels. Besides, once they are installed, running costs are low. They do not create smells, noxious by-products or radiation problems. But none of these is a wholly dependable source of energy. The report admits that all five, by supplementing conventional forms of energy, can lead to saving resources in short supply.

Five not-so-new sources of energy have been mentioned here, but three new sources of energy have been left out. Thermo-nuclear energy is one. Since its utilisation would depend on the prevalence of peaceful conditions, peace, too, can be classified as a source of energy. The third source is avoiding wanton waste. For instance, industrial water could be utilised for heating houses. Energy could be conserved if electricity is not spent in advertising all kinds of superfluous goods in garish coloured lights.

Another important omission in the report is on the question of implementation. The report admits that the initial cost of the plant is high, but it suggests no methods which would bring it within the means of the under-developed countries for whom this report was primarily intended. Without means of implementation, the findings of this report serve no useful purpose. They are not fresh discoveries which would enable scientists to think on new lines, since the newest form of energy mentioned is thirty-odd years old. If the U.N. sponsored genuine research into the problem of really new forms of energy, along with means for their utilisation, it would be of service to the people. But publishing another report, which says nothing really new, is just another addition to musty, reference library shelves.

Kusum Madgavkar

DEMAND FOR ENERGY IN INDIA—1960 to 1975 By the National Council of Applied Economic Research. Asia Publishing House.

Energy is the modern Aladdin's lamp which is bringing into being what are known as the marvels of the twentieth century. The amount of energy consumed per head of the population is a fairly re-

liable index of the level of development attained by a country. To put the same thing in economic terms, there is a positive correlation between per capita income and per capita energy consumption.

It is only natural therefore that the National Council of Applied Economic Research (NCAER) should have from its very inception concerned itself with problems of energy and their bearing on the course of economic development in the country. In earlier publications, the NCAER has presented reports of its studies on 'Utilisation of Primary Energy in India' (March 1958) and 'Domestic Fuels in India' (October 1958). 'The present study', Dr. Lokanathan, Director General of the NCAER in his preface explains, 'is a comprehensive, but necessarily rough analysis of the maximum plausible demand for different types of fuel that the Indian economy may require to maintain a certain pace of growth in the coming decade and a half.' An attempt has been made to work out estimates of the probable demand for coal, electricity, petroleum and nuclear power for quinquennial periods beginning with 1960 and ending with 1975.

The study is based on certain assumptions regarding the future pace of economic development in the country. It has been assumed that national income will grow at the rate of roughly five per cent per annum and per capita income will have approximately doubled between 1950 and 1975.

The NCAER admits that the future is uncertain but expresses the hope that despite limitations 'the projections will provide a sound basis for planning the expansion of future energy supplies in the context of a general economic policy for the country.'

The method used in this study is that, first, an over-all projection of total energy consumption and total electricity consumption has been made. This projection is based on the assumptions already referred to about the economic development of the country as a whole. The over-all figure thus obtained has then been used as a frame of reference for dimensional analysis and as a guide for further sectoral breakdowns which are afterwards aggregated to give a more accurate estimate of total demand.

In arriving at an over-all estimate of energy consumption, the study has taken into consideration that between 1950-1956, for a ten per cent rise in national output, there has been a six per cent rise in energy consumption. In other words, the elasticity for energy was 0.6. But with the increasing pace of industrial activity, the elasticity will, the NCAER feels, gradually rise. This is because it has been found that for countries above a per capita income of about 250 dollars per annum the elasticity is of the order of 1.2, that is for every ten per cent rise of the national output there is a 1.2 per cent rise in consumption of energy.

Assuming therefore elasticities of 0.7, 0.8, 0.9 and 1.0 during the Second, Third, Fourth and Fifth Plan

periods, the energy estimates of effective demand would be 154,188,231 and 300 million tons of coal equivalent (mtce) respectively. This, however, represents the effective energy and does not take into account the energy required for extraction, processing and transport to the point of consumption. Allowing for this, the NCAER estimate for gross energy demand in 1975 is 345 mtce.

The growth in the demand for energy for industrial purposes is expected to be more than five-fold, while the requirements of transportation will increase less than three-fold from 12 mtce to 28 mtce. Because of the rapid growth of the industrial and transportation sectors, the ratio of primary (i.e. industrial or commercial) to secondary (i.e. non-commercial) energy is expected to go up from 0.47 in 1955 to 3.6 in 1975.

Discussing the question of requirements of different types of energy it has been pointed out that, while only about a third of the total net energy is consumed as a factor in production, over three-quarters of the total electricity consumption is in the productive sector. The consumption of electricity is therefore a surer index of the level of industrialisation. The demand for electricity not only tends to grow more rapidly than that of other types of energy, but also at a much higher rate than the net national output.

The NCAER's estimates of requirement of electricity have been worked out at 17,000, 33,600, 61,500 and 108,000 million kwh by 1960, 1965, 1970 and 1975 respectively.

Transportation energy has been subdivided into two main categories — rail and road traffic which between them consume 90 per cent of the total energy consumed in transportation. Total coal requirements for railways have been worked out at 17, 23, 31 and 42 million tons by 1960, 65, 70 and 75 respectively. But the NCAER considers it likely that at least half the total energy requirements would be met by electricity and diesel by 1975.

Coming to the gross demand for energy by source, it has been estimated in the study that the requirements for coal, hydro, petroleum and nuclear energies will be respectively 227.36, 40.20, 44.21, 7.52 mtce by 1975.

In per capita terms, primary energy is expected to reach 0.62 tce in 1975 from the current level of 0.20 tce. 'Considering that the level of consumption as recently as 1950 was only 0.10 tce, the six-fold increase in 25 years amounts to an energy "explosion" unprecedented in our history and is a measure of industrial and economic development that the future is expected to bring to India', says the study. But lest, we begin to congratulate ourselves too early, we are immediately reminded in the very next sentence that 'despite this considerable increase in con-

sumption the average per capita level in 1975 will only be one-fifteenth of the current per capita consumption in the United States.'

Long-term estimates are always liable to error and, in a country where the future course of economic development is so difficult to predict, the conclusions of this study can only serve the purpose of giving a very rough idea of what future requirements are likely to be. Judging from the performance of the first three years of the Third Plan, the basic assumption of the NCAER about a rate of five per cent growth per annum from 1960 to 1975 might turn out to be an overestimate. But plans to increase the supply of energy must be drawn up well in advance and even five year periods are too short where large hydro-electric or even thermal power plants are concerned. It is as well, therefore, that the NCAER has tried to give us projections of demands as far ahead as 1975 even if their estimates have a tentative character.

J. M. Kaul

**REPORT ON REGIONAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
AND NUCLEAR POWER IN INDIA** By Norman L. Gold.

National Planning Association, Washington, 1957.

Since India possesses large resources of low-cost coal and a great hydro-potential, is it at all necessary for us to have nuclear power? Can nuclear power speed up the development of India? Will it prove more costly than other sources of power? These are some of the important questions which Norman Gold seeks to answer in his Report. Although published seven years ago, it has not lost any of its relevance as the problems posed are still in the process of being tackled. A special merit of the Report is that it studies the question of nuclear power in the background of the economic situation in the country and presents a lot of useful data and material.

The scope of the Report is indicated by the chapter heading:

1. *India in the Next 25 years* is a brief discussion of the main economic forces at work in India;
2. *Current Energy and Power Production in India* shows how the country is now using its energy resources;
3. *Indian Power Requirements, 1955-80*, attempts a forecast of the power needs;
4. *India's Energy Resources and Future Needs* examines conventional energy resources and fuel transport in relation to the growth of power needs;
5. *The Competitive Threshold of Nuclear Power in India* sets up some benchmarks of conventional energy costs and relates these to possible nuclear power in India;
6. *Regional Development and Nuclear Power in India* looks at the development of western and southern India in relation to possible nuclear power use;

7. *Rural India and Nuclear Power* dwells on agricultural and small industry expectations of power needs in western and southern India;
8. *The Future of Nuclear Power in India* seeks to understand the probable development of atomic power in India and to estimate the cost.

Despite manifold problems, Gold is not pessimistic of India's continued progress. In fact it is because he realises that India's economic effort will become much more power-intensive that he examines the possible role of nuclear power in this effort.

With the help of facts and figures, the Report comes to the conclusion that our potential resources of commercial fuel will be adequate for the growing energy needs until 1980. A projected demand for 33 million kw of electric power, Gold feels, would appear to be well within the available energy resources. Even then, there are certain special problems. The pressure on energy resources may force a rise in costs. The remoteness of coal from the western and southern part of India is 'placing a heavy burden on the transport system, requiring substantial investment in transport facilities or threatening to hamper economic development.'

Again, in regard to hydro-electric installation also there are difficulties: 'The monsoon nature of much of the water supply requires substantial storage facilities. Low cost storage facilities appear to be limited by the geological structure of the rivers and valleys. . .'

In view of this, nuclear power even now becomes necessary in order to tackle regional and transport problems. In addition, aside from energy aspects, important economic benefits could be obtained through isotope and radiation work in rice and wheat breeding, in grain and milled product storage, and in soil and fertilizer response analysis.

Beyond 1980, it is generally recognised that India's conventional energy resources are limited and exhaustible. The application of nuclear power is therefore a necessity for India. Fortunately, India has the largest known deposit of thorium in the world, and the country's atomic energy programme is being developed in a manner which will ultimately enable it to be based on thorium. What about costs? The Tarapur nuclear power plant, 62 miles north of Bombay, is expected to produce power at a cost of 3.01 paise per kwh whereas the cost of a thermal coal-fired station would have been in the region of 4 paise per kwh. Similarly, power from the Rana Partap Sagar nuclear plant will cost 2.64 paise per kwh as against 2.53 paise per kwh from the Gandhisagar station of the Chambal Project. The capital costs are also not unfavourable to nuclear plants.

Gold dwells on the question of capital costs a good deal. He seems to think that for a long time India should remain dependent on the USA and other countries. But nuclear power in the next 20 years should be far more economical both because of technological improvements and the use of larger unit reactors of

350 mw and 500 mw. Already India is among the leading nations in nuclear technology.

If it pursues its atomic energy programme vigorously from now on, trains up the personnel required, in due course nuclear power would become an increasingly important source of power ensuring India's all-round continued development.

V. M. K.

ENERGY IN THE FUTURE By Palmer Cosslett Putnam.

D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., New York, 1953.

ENERGY AND SKILLS FOR HUMAN PROGRESS: Study-Guide Series on the United Nations and Related Agencies.

Oceana Publications, Inc., New York, 1963.

The concept of man's continued progress is the most powerful incentive for the scientist. Humanity may face many crises but the torch of science will always be held aloft. It lights the enticing future, and it is through its rays that many lines of progress in the future can be set down and (if God wills it) predicted.

For its bulk sources of energy, our civilisation is dependent upon fossil sunshine. Coal, oil and natural gas are the sunshine of past geological ages. We, in the 20th century (and coming into the 21st) are spending them profligately. Most of our food and a small part of our energy, in the form of wood and water power, is energised with relatively current sunshine.

In *Energy in the Future*, the author—a consultant to the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission—presents a study of the problem: 'Where can we find sources of low-cost energy in an abundance equal to the maximum plausible demands by the expanding and industrialising populations of the future?' He focuses attention on the specific question: 'What is the maximum plausible role that nuclear fuels may be called upon to play in the next 50 years or so?'

The author, with an exhaustive number of tables, graphs and photographs, presents a systematic analysis of the problem which includes a review of past population growths in search for answers to the question: 'Is population growth predictable?' Coming to the conclusion that it is not, he uses the device of a hypothetical Trustee of Energy who then asks: 'What are the maximum plausible populations of the next 50 to 100 years; and what are the maximum plausible demands for low-cost energy?'

Dr. Putnam reviews the reserves of low-cost fossil fuels to determine how long these 'capital' reserves will meet the hypothetical demands. The 'income' sources, principally sunlight, are also examined by the author, to discover if we can hope to meet the bulk of future demands for energy from these sources at low-cost. Estimating the maximum demands for power from nuclear fuels, the author concludes his immense range of enquiry based on much hard-to-

get and hitherto unrelated material, by holding that the economy of the free world depends upon abundant supplies of low-cost energy.

The greatest fundamental problem the world has to face today is the race between production and population. The control of population is a pressing problem for the future. Since the time has not come and probably will never come when the human population on the face of the earth can be planned and controlled in the same way that man regulates the hereditary future of animals and plants, there is bound to be a critical shortage of energy supplies. Without more energy, man will not be able to manufacture fast enough the supplies (food, clothing, housing) which the ever-increasing population demands, even at present levels of consumption. If living standards are to rise (they certainly need to in the so-called under-developed countries), the need for more energy will be even greater.

The world's fossil fuel resources are sufficient to last a long time, yet they are by no means inexhaustible. And so the discovery within the last few years of how to make use of the energy held in matter itself has raised the hopes of a bright future.

Atomic energy, in the shape of nuclear fission, is the answer for a most promising new source of power for the future. The energy content in the mineral ores from which atomic fuels are extracted is today considered to be potentially much greater than that available from all other resources. Once processed, atomic fuels are so concentrated that their cost of transportation is negligible. Nuclear power is the most promising, not only for the assurance of future supplies as a whole, but also to fill the special needs of underdeveloped countries.

S. M. M.

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

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national development

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
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
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



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
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
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


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
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62

THE CONSUMER

a symposium on the
measures necessary to
safeguard consumer interest

symposium participants

THE PROBLEM

An introduction by **Hari Bhagwan**
of the Indian Standards Institution

THE CONSUMER AT SEA

P. S. Lokanathan, Director General,
National Council of Applied Economic
Research

ROLE OF ASSOCIATIONS

G. D. Khosla, former Chief Justice of the
Punjab High Court and now President,
Consumers' Association of India

VICTIM OR VOLUNTEER

A. D. Moddie, business executive,
a student of marketing problems

QUALITY CONTROL FOR EXPORT

D. N. Saraf, General Manager,
Handicrafts and Handlooms Exports
Corporation of India

A LESSON FROM ABROAD

Eirlys Roberts, Research Director
and Editor of the British Journal
'Which?'

LOCAL ACTIONS

Prafulla Roychoudhury, Correspondent
of 'The Patriot' in Calcutta,

BOOKS

Reviewed by **Kusum Madgaokar**,
J. M. Kaul, **A. K. Banerjee** and **V. K.**

FURTHER READING

A select and relevant bibliography
prepared by **D. C. Sharma**

COVER

Designed by **Chowdhury/Grewal**

The problem

THE term 'consumer' recurs in different contexts—from consumers' cooperatives and consumer goods to the problems of the actual consumer around whose needs and desires has grown up a considerable body of thought and controversy. It is to fulfil these needs that governments plan their economies, set targets and work furiously to achieve them before the consumer may change his mind.

This should be very flattering to us because we are all consumers, you and I. It is indeed gratifying to know that we are the centre of a vast hum of activity. To satisfy us, not only are goods manufactured, but their merits advertised at every turn of our daily life. Containers, wrapping papers, colours, shapes are all experimented upon just so that we should not be disappointed.

But all this on some occasions turns out to be just a camouflage, bewildering in its capacity to confuse—to the extent that considerable significance is now attached to protection of consumers against such ills. It is being realized that consumers must be told explicitly what to buy and how to choose from an array of much publicized articles.

This is important because technological advance in the manufacture of consumer goods has been so considerable in the last couple of decades that consumers have been made much more vulnerable to exploitation and deception. To illustrate, when man-made fibres were unknown, experience over the centuries, familiarity with cloth of differing qualities, had made the consumer experienced enough to exercise his choice wisely. The advent of synthetic fibres has, however, made the behaviour of new clothes unpredictable. To take a second example, until the hydrogenation of oils was achieved, it was not easy to adulterate ghee. Other similar technical advances have opened up great scope for adulteration with the

result that one is not sure as to the quality of ingredients which are mixed into the final commodity.

These examples also indicate that now it is only in the laboratories that the exact nature of consumer goods and their serviceability can be ascertained. It is no longer the sensory methods or the experience gathered over the years which can be the consumers' guide. Only the technical knowledge of an expert can help and, what is more, one expert cannot possess all this knowledge.

The gravity of this problem can be realized by the fact that a few years back, the British Parliament set up a Committee under the chairmanship of J. T. Molony to report 'what changes, if any, in the law and what other measures, if any, are desirable for the further protection of the consuming public'. The Committee invited British consumers to send their complaints regarding unsatisfactory merchandise sold to them. An analysis of about 1,100 replies showed that 33 per cent of complaints pertained to textiles, their nature being: lack of information in respect of fibre content, absence of a suitable size nomenclature, use of deceptive sizing materials, bleeding of colours on washing, application of terminology not understood generally and undesirable effects of optical whitening agents.

The other category of goods in respect of which a large number of complaints existed was that of domestic electrical appliances. Some of the specific complaints were: weakness in quality control and inspection methods, absence of a standard colour combination in connecting cables, inadequate safety devices resulting in shocks and health hazards, repeated failure, etc. Other annoying situations to consumers were: inflammable toys for children, inadequate durability of carpets and foot-wear, excessive moisture content in fuels, etc.

If this be the situation in the UK, we can well visualize the situation which prevails in India at the present stage of industrial development.

Shopping problems of consumers do not originate only from the variety of goods made from new materials but also from the pressures of modern salesmanship and advertising. Even if one were not to subscribe to Professor Galbraith's thesis that 'advertising exists to create demand where none exists', it would be recognised that quite often exaggerated and meaningless claims are made in the advertisements. Sometimes, they play on our emotions, that is without describing or lauding, they present goods in association with some scene of domestic or romantic bliss so that they may be accepted for the blissful occasion. In all

cases, they try to push their message until the consumer is led to buy on the strength of an almost hypnotised reaction to the advertised brand. And for achieving this particular objective, huge sums of money are spent on research such as market research which attempts to find out *what, where, when* and *how* the consumers buy. In addition, there is motivation research which tries to explain *why* consumers buy.

The ill effects of irresponsible advertising have caused great concern to many. Some have been obliged to formulate a Code of Advertising Practice. A few others have gone to the extent of suggesting that a tax should be levied above a certain limit of expenditure on firms spending unreasonably large amounts of money on advertisements. The suggestion probably stems from the fact that in developed countries, advertising takes around 2.5 per cent of what consumers spend in the shops; moreover, there are firms which spend on advertisements as much as 7 per cent of their over-all turnover or about 90 per cent of their profits.

This situation has been summed up by the Molony Committee in the following words which may be regarded as classical: 'Technological advances have produced a bewildering variety of consumer goods to meet the old needs. A wealthier community with greater social mobility has developed new needs. Advertising whets the appetite which inventiveness aims to satisfy. The consumer has the means and the urge to respond to the offer of unfamiliar merchandise often of great technical complexity. The art of salesmanship has developed new and not always creditable subtleties. These considerations compel recognition of the fact that the position of the domestic purchaser has worsened relatively to the trader.'

How much the situation has worsened can be judged by a simple estimation made recently. It has been found that a truly discriminating consumer spends 15 to 20 per cent less on buying goods and services than an indiscriminate shopper.

The problem, therefore, is how can we make the shopper discriminate? Can we adopt some measures to help the consumer to get his money's full worth? This question has been asked by many in recent years and the following have been considered as suitable measures for consumer protection:

- a) formulation of standards defining quality in precise technical terms;
- b) certification ensuring that a particular product conforms to a specified standard;
- c) informative labelling, care labelling and issuing of instruction sheets to consumers

so that they know what they are purchasing and how they can best use the purchased goods; and

- d) availability of comparative test reports suggesting the best choice to consumers.

These are discussed below with special reference to the problems prevailing in India.

The question of defining quality and controlling it has been taken up by the movement of standardization which has now spread to most parts of the world. Manufacturers are, after all, not in some kind of conspiracy against consumers. In the long run, they too want to produce goods of quality and until they satisfy the consumer, they cannot hope to sustain their profits. This has led the more serious of the manufacturers to follow a definite standards programme. These standards are technical documents which are prepared in consultation with technical experts and other interests concerned including that of the consumer. They specify those acceptable levels of characteristics which a quality product should conform to, and also lay down suitable methods of sampling and tests to ascertain what is meant by quality.

The task of formulating standards valid for a country is handled by its national standards organization. Such organizations have been established in all those countries where some advance has been made towards industrialization. Such countries are now more than 50 in number.

In India also we have such an organization—the Indian Standards Institution (ISI). During the last 17 years of its existence it has already formulated about 2,600 standards. Of these, there are many which cover consumer products: biscuits and confectionery; cereal products; tobacco products; spices and condiments; coir; oil burning appliances; sports goods; utensils and cutlery; pencils, soaps, phenyl, cosmetics, naphthalene and other chemicals; paints; domestic electric appliances; and textile druggets and carpets.

The ISI has thus documented a good deal of knowledge which is vital in settling those recurring problems of a technical nature which are important during purchases of the articles concerned. But with the increased tempo of industrial development, the demand for standards for consumer goods has increased appreciably. To do justice to this work a separate department has been created in the ISI and it will now exclusively deal with the consumer items.

The task of issuing standards for consumer goods is, therefore, being handled. But one difficulty has been experienced, which is that the ISI cannot obtain a suitable representation of

consumer interest—a point to which we will revert later.

Though the ISI specifications have paved the way for better implementation of a standards programme by manufacturers, yet their direct utility to consumers is limited, for what a consumer wants to know is whether the article being purchased conforms to a standard or not. For this purpose, there is the ISI Certification Marks Scheme under which more than 500 firms are manufacturing more than 200 products. Consumer goods such as pesticides, maids, biscuits, corn flakes, milk powder, infant milk food, yeast, cement, a few paints, toilet soap, naphthalene, inks, 10-litre square tins, cables, electric motors, battery cells, batteries, bicycle components, oil pressure stoves, bear certification marks and they are available in the market.

While purchasing these goods consumers can be sure that they are dependable, for they are from manufacturers who follow a prescribed quality control. For this service, consumers are required to pay even less than one per cent of what the item costs. The Scheme does help the consumer but the fact remains that the above mentioned items constitute only a fraction of what the consumer needs.

There is another difficulty, namely, that there is no effective pressure from consumers to induce manufacturers to get the ISI Mark. Indian standards are voluntary instruments, as they have to be in our democratic pattern of society. And so long as there is no pressure from consumers, it is natural for manufacturers to continue in the path of least resistance.

For the time being, let it be recognised that because there is no strong voice of organised consumers, even the full utility of certification schemes such as that of the ISI Certification Marks Scheme is not being derived.

Another measure of consumer protection is informative labelling, that is provision by sellers of adequate information about their wares. When readily available, to-the-point and accurate informative labelling helps the consumer to: (a) assess the suitability of a particular article in relation to his personal requirements, (b) compare the article with those made by others, and (c) reduce the scope for oral deception. For instance, if the fibre content of textiles and actual dimensions instead of sizes, were to be indicated on the respective goods, it would be a great help.

Allied with this informative labelling is 'Care Labelling', that is issuing of instruction sheets by manufacturers. The object of this type of labelling is to ensure a certain length of service by educating consumers to protect the article from all possible harmful treatments. The examples of such labels are: washing in-

structions for textiles, do's and don'ts for electrical equipment, etc.

This can be of great help in India. But the problem is who should plead the cause of Indian consumers?

In all the measures discussed above for consumers redress, there is none which can guide consumers with regard to price. In this connection, invaluable service has been rendered by comparative test reports, the publication of which has become quite common overseas. For instance, in the United Kingdom, a Consumers' Association publishes a monthly journal, *Which?*. It has a circulation of 350,000 and a readership of over 3 million. The Association purchases articles from a shop anonymously, gets a series of tests carried out by specialists in independent laboratories, and publishes the reports of such tests periodically. These reports guide the consumers as to which brand is the best as well as the cheapest.

The other instances of services rendered by *Which?* may be illustrated as follows: 'Advertisements for a lemon juice drink claimed that it helped to keep women slim.' *Which?* pointed out: 'There is no justification for the suggestion that the addition of lemon juice to one's diet will produce a slimming effect.'

Hair shampoo advertisements claim to: 'Feed your hair. . . make them really healthy.' The fact is: 'All shampoos leave the hair equally healthy or unhealthy since none of the ingredients can influence the blood supply of the hair's owners. . . a shampoo cannot, by its very nature, feed the hair.'

Some moisture creams claim: 'Your skin gets thirsty. . . restores vital moisture to the skin and prevents dryness and ageing lines.' According to *Which?* they do not contain any substance for increasing the actual moisture of the dermis or otherwise rejuvenating the skin.

What is most remarkable about the reports published by *Which?* is that they are so objective that they do not necessitate any court cases between the management of *Which?* and the manufacturers concerned.

This type of campaign of consumers organised to help themselves is not only prevalent in the UK but in almost all other industrially developed countries. The leading example elsewhere is the USA where the Consumers' Union has been active for a quarter of a century. It has about one million subscribers with an annual income of well over \$3 million. It has its own extensive laboratory and testing facilities.

There are about 30 such consumer bodies and associations in different parts of the world with their activities co-ordinated and reinforced by the International Office of Consumer Unions. Countries where appreciable headway has been

made in this direction are Belgium, France, The Netherlands, New Zealand and Norway.

This rapid spread of consumers' organisations to help solve shopping problems has gradually led to the conviction that it is a necessary outcome of the industrial advancement of the country, and it is essential for the healthy development of the industry.

Even in India a small beginning has been made. It was in 1958 at a convention held by the ISI that a proposal was mooted to establish a consumers' organisation. Subsequently in 1959, the Consumers' Association of India (CAI) was established. It received a good deal of publicity and even organised a seminar with the financial help of the Planning Commission. The proceedings of the seminar evoked considerable interest. But during the past few years, the membership of the CAI has never reached a stage where a beginning could be made to start testing consumer goods and publishing the comparative test reports. It appears that the CAI has not yet overcome its teething troubles.

So, we have to ask ourselves: for how long is the Indian consumer to be denied the necessary guidance for his shopping problems? For how long are we not going to start an institution which is vital for the healthy development of our industry? And, for how long is the Indian consumer to remain an 'Affluent Sheep' showing signs of affluence while purchasing, but remaining a dumb, mute animal even when he does not get his money's full worth.

The answer to these questions has to be: the organization of consumers for a new dimension in the field of consumer welfare, that is guidance for shopping problems, is now overdue. We have seen that even full benefits from Indian Standards or the ISI Certification Marks Scheme are not being derived by the Indian consumer. Moreover, in many instances certified items are not sold on a large scale. We have also seen that there is no consumers' organisation to look into their grievances, to make just demands such as informative and care labelling, and to conduct and publish comparative test reports.

If experience of the CAI be any guide, then it can be stated that the problem has been recognised as such. The need has already been felt for a strong consumers' organisation with a very large membership. But there is no dynamic, sustained drive on the part of a few who will be remembered by many in the years to come.

It is hoped that this leadership will be forthcoming soon. Let us also hope that this 'Seminar' will help Indian consumers to achieve soon what they can ill afford not to get any more, that is the full worth of the money spent.

HARI BHAGWAN

The consumer at sea

P. S. LOKANATHAN

THE Indian housewife is a much suffering and harrassed individual today. Everything she has to buy gets scarcer and scarcer while her money is able to buy less and less. Whatever advantages may be claimed for planning, plenty is not one of them. The basis of Indian planning seems to be jam tomorrow and jam the day after tomorrow but never jam today.

To the common man, the economic system seems to have lost its meaning. The poor and the middle class family is feeling squeezed with mounting grocer's bills and the housewife is baffled in having to maintain the family on a daily diminishing basket. It is no longer a question of milk and butter but the stark fact of the scarcity of

ordinary food stuffs getting beyond the reach of the average consumer.

The basic causes for the continuous rise in prices are not far to seek. Production has failed to keep pace with the physical needs of the fast growing population and with the increased money supply injected into the economy. Government expenditures have been rising to levels out of proportion to the government's capacity to mobilise real resources or to make the most productive use of them. Government expenditure on development and defence was Rs. 1443 crores in 1961-62, Rs. 2400 crores in 1963-64 and it is now running at the annual rate of Rs. 2850 crores. This, of course, is the basic cause. There would have been some saving grace if the compensatory mechanism of savings had operated powerfully enough to offset the inflationary consequences of government's massive outlays.

The situation has been further greatly aggravated by the unsocial behaviour of the trading and business community which has sought to exploit the situation to its maximum advantage. A new élément has come into the picture. The very prosperity of certain sections of the agricultural community enables the richer and the middle level farmers to hoard their produce in order to push prices to exorbitant levels.

Below-the-Line

Since food is basic to health, its scarcity in relation to individual incomes is perhaps the greatest threat to health and living standards. It is probably true to say that more than a million out of the 460 million population are below the line and are not in a position to buy food to maintain themselves at a level of bare subsistence. To ensure that this below-the-line class is able to buy the necessary quantity of food stuffs would require a monthly income of Rs. 30 at 1960-61 prices, which is unrealistic even on the most optimistic assumption of the possible rate of growth of the Indian economy.

The problem No. 1 on a national scale is just this: the poverty of the submerged 100 million con-

sumers who have not the means to procure the basic food and other essential consumer goods. This is the grimmest fact today in India. It is not only higher and higher prices that beset the consumer. He is really no more sure of the quality or the weight of the things he buys than he or she is of her own knowledge and understanding. The consumer problem in India has many facets including the consumer's own ignorance and lack of organization, standards, quality consciousness, malpractices of manufacturers and traders, low level of manufacturing and trading organizations, poor level of integrity and honesty, partly due to the poor state of the organization itself, the loopholes in the law, the weakness of administrative machinery for enforcement, etc.

No Single Solution

It is obvious that no single or easy solution is in sight. The problems have to be tackled at many different levels and on many different fronts. There is no single road the pursuit of which will take us to the desired goal, nor is there any one sovereign cure for the *malaise* from which the consumer is suffering. Because the problems are many sided, the solution has to be sought in many different ways. The most serious problem is the ignorance of the average consumer in regard to the essential elements of sound nutrition. Because of this ignorance, even the limited purchasing power in the hands of the consumers is not put to proper use. Training and educating the consumers in regard to good food habits, the knowledge of the essentials of the right amount and quality of nutrients, the higher utilization of the limited purchasing power and the securing of the right type of food should be regarded as major parts of a programme of nutrition education.

While high priority should be given to educating the consumer, there is no doubt that in the present difficult situation in India, there are many external factors at work which render the position relatively difficult. The prices charged by the retailers are out

of proportion to the relative scarcity of consumer goods. The exploitation of the consumers by the retail shopkeepers is to some extent a reflection of the low level of trading organization in our country. In countries where there are departmental stores, supermarkets and other highly organized forms of retail trading, the kind of exploitation that is taking place in our country is unthinkable.

Not only are our prices arbitrarily fixed at unreasonable levels but the other more important factors of quality, standard specifications and hygienic packing, even information regarding the use of the products, are lacking.

In India, the position is bad all along the line. There are very many malpractices indulged in not only at the trading points, but even at the manufacturing stages because many of the agricultural and consumer products are handled by unorganised business and small manufacturers. The result is seen in the adulteration of food stuffs and use of low quality materials in consumer goods even at the producers' end.

Trading Malpractices

The malpractices are however more conspicuous in trading than in manufacturing and have reached proportions which do constitute a menace to the life of the community. Practically everything is adulterated and on a scale and in a manner that should be really shocking. Adulteration of food articles is said to range from 16 to 66 per cent, giving an all-India average of 33 per cent, judging from a study made in the line. Practically nothing escapes adulteration whether it is wheat or rice, milk or oil, tobacco, cotton or jute; and the ingenuity and perversity of it all are really lurid in their detail.

The same code of ethics is naturally carried back into the manufacturing lines, where positively injurious ingredients are mixed up (because of their cheapness) in the making for example of soaps and cosmetics. In several cases, trade and manufacturing

communities join up both for good and for evil and the burden of it all is borne by the consumers who are an unorganised community, easily amenable to every kind of exploitation, including short weights and measures.

General Advance

Since the malpractices at the level of manufacture and trade in consumer goods reflect the general imperfection and low level of organization in the economy, it may be stated that as the economy develops into a more mature one, and some social conscience develops, some of the worst malpractices that are now indulged in, might disappear. The general advancement of the economy therefore provides some answer to the present problems of malpractices of the manufacturers and traders and their exploitation of the consumer.

The development of the economy, however, will bring other problems to the consumer. The distance between the consumer and the producer will become still wider and the very rapid development of transport and communications which bring about widening of the market would make the consumer less able to distinguish between the spurious and the sound. The average consumer has neither the time nor the opportunity to compare quality and prices of the different types of the same product in the whole range of markets.

Production becomes so complex and is removed so far from the experience of most individuals that it would be impossible to recognise the special merit of any product. The art of analysing the quality of consumer goods has advanced to a stage of expertness which the individual consumer has neither the skill nor the facilities to exercise. Technology has enhanced the possibilities of high quality and low costs and also has widened the range of possible choices for the consumer. His capacity to judge has become less and less.

Action to meet these situations has to be taken by legislation, by

public opinion, by the enforcement of proper standards, by quality control and by organization of consumers themselves. Legislation, however inevitable, will not be of much avail unless it is properly administered and enforced. This has been the weakness of Indian legislation in respect of the Food Adulteration Act and other Acts of legislation.

No legislation can ensure a consumer that he will get his money's worth. At best, legislation can protect him against serious dangers and deception. To the extent to which consumers need protection, it is really amply covered by existing legislation, if we come to think of it. We have the Essential Commodities Act, the Indian Sale of Goods Act, the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, the Drugs Act, the Drugs and Magic Remedies (Objectionable Advertisement) Act, the Indian Patents and Design Act, the Trade and Merchandise Market Act, the Agricultural Product Act, the Indian Standards Institution Act and at the top of it all, the Industries Development and Regulation Act, to mention only a few of the instruments government possesses in its armoury, *if it means business*. In terms of law and regulation, quite a good deal has been done.

No Implementation

It is really not so much the lack of legislation that is responsible for the gross exploitation of the consumer in India. It is rather the lack of administrative machinery, the unwillingness to implement it and to enforce it that is the most defective part of our system of government.

A new approach has, therefore, got to be made to deal with the problems of the consumer. We should put more faith in consumer organizations of various kinds to protect and help themselves against exploitation and deception. It is not that other actions are unnecessary. On the contrary, simultaneously many other courses of action are essential. A rigid enforcement of the Food Adulteration Act, alongside provision of

adequate laboratory facilities for testing, a fairly large, competent and socially-oriented directorate of enforcement are almost immediately necessary.

Standardization

The Indian Standards Institution should be encouraged to extend the scope of its work into the field of consumer goods through establishment of standards in respect of essential consumer commodities. The biggest advantage of standardization is that it would enable the consumer to know exactly what he is paying for. Standardization also helps to reduce the cost of production through simplification of manufacturing processes, cutting down of needless varieties and promoting labour efficiency. Simultaneously, it protects the consumer against sub-standard and spurious goods. It is, therefore, essential that the work of the ISI should be greatly expanded and strengthened so that standards may be fixed for as many commodities as possible.

Equally essential and related to it is the enforcement of minimum quality. Quality specifications should be made compulsory and no goods should be allowed to be sold without a clear and concise description of the quality of the goods and the elements that have gone into the making of the goods. This is now done, to some extent, in the sale of drugs and medicines. But it should be extended to cover a large variety of goods.

Standardization and quality control must become more and more a normal method of trading in the country. If this is done every consumer who buys goods will have the knowledge that commodities which he has purchased have been inspected, tested and certified by any agency of repute and that he knows what he is paying for. The exploitation of the consumer through the levy of high prices can be checked by compulsory enforcement of the law relating to display of prices of all commodities.

The Board of Trade, in one of its recommendations, stated that

It was essential for all prices to be marked on the goods to be sold. Finally, however, this was left to the business community to do it voluntarily. As a matter of fact, the code of fair practices enunciated by the Board of Trade has been voluntarily accepted by the Indian business community, but as is often the case in respect of voluntary enforcements, there is no guarantee that many people do not try to evade responsibility and fail to observe the law.

Organization

While all this will help, ultimately, the consumer's strength would lie in organizing himself better. From this point of view, the consumer organizations in the form of consumers associations or consumers' leagues or more especially the cooperative societies provide the best means of protecting the consumer. In the U.K., the Consumer Cooperatives have been spectacularly successful. They have not only organized themselves into wholesale and retail cooperative stores, but they have also been producers of the various goods which the consumers need.

In fact, the structure of British industry has to some extent been affected by consumer organizations which have set up various production units so that some percentage of the goods handled by the Consumer Cooperative Stores is produced by and at the instance of consumer societies. *Production for the consumer is the basic philosophy of the consumer movement.* Any industrial structure organised to meet the special needs of the consumer is bound to be in a way a better type of organization than any other. Although the volume of production organised by the consumer movement is not of an order as to replace the capitalist structure of the economy, still it has done a great deal to revolutionise the methods of production in England.

In India, we are yet to organise the consumer movement on a large scale. Thanks to the Second World War, a number of con-

sumer stores were organised, but they had no social vitality in them. As soon as the War ended these societies came to grief. Today, however, on account of the inflationary pressures and the continuous increases in prices, together with a consciousness that something should be done to mitigate the suffering of the consumers, consumer organizations are coming up, with encouragement and assistance by government.

How far these cooperative stores will be run successfully and will continue to be a permanent feature of the distribution system will depend upon the way in which the stores are run as business or commercial undertakings. The efficiency of consumer societies is basic not only to their success, but also to their expansion. In the past, consumer societies have suffered because of a lack of understanding that consumer stores are essentially business concerns and they must be run on business lines and should make a reasonable profit. Today, there is a greater understanding of the purpose and scope of consumer stores.

Consumer Stores

On account of the present situation in India the government itself has undertaken the task of stimulating the formation of several consumer societies and affording them all help not only financially but in terms of providing essential supplies of consumer goods and food articles. These stores are linked to wholesale organizations which get their supplies both from the government and from the private manufacturers at comparatively lower prices. If only the cooperative societies and retail stores have trained personnel and good working capital it should be possible for the cooperatives in India not only to act as a brake on rising retail prices but they could as well make some profits and possibly introduce certain lines of production for consumers.

Consumer stores can also be a great educative force. They can educate the consumer not only in regard to the nutritional standards

but can also create in them a desire for better quality goods. They can organise themselves into voluntary consumer leagues with some organisation for enforcing standards through publicity, dissemination of knowledge regarding the quality of various goods produced in the country, etc. In England, an organization called 'Which' is able, through its periodical called by the same name, to enlighten the consumers through detailed analysis of the relevant quality specifications of the various consumer goods marketed in the country.

In the United States also, consumer associations and consumer clubs have come up. As early as 1928, a consumers' club established a testing station in New York and the necessary information regarding quality of goods was circulated. The organization acquired samples of manufacture and had them tested in its own or in commissioned laboratories and published the results in the *Consumer Bulletin*, grading the products as recommended, intermediate and not recommended. The present Consumer Union started as a rival and became the biggest consumer protection organization in the world. Its monthly magazine, *Consumer Report*, has a circulation of a million copies.

Women's Responsibility

Such consumer protection organizations are found throughout Europe and America. Some are government controlled, some are sponsored by trade unions and other interests, others are independent. The latest in the English speaking world is the Consumers' Association. This is the pattern that could be followed in India, namely, an established women's organization, deciding to take up work in the vital sector of consumer protection. Essentially, it is a task for women who have to face the practical problems, who have to run households and balance budgets at a time of generally rising costs and prices.

The Scandinavian countries are specially advanced in consumer

protection. In Sweden it is a part of the cooperative movement. In Denmark, a dissatisfied purchaser can go to the House-Wives Consumer Council, fill up a form and leave the offending product. The Council then takes it up; the consumer ultimately gets a refund or replacement or free repairs.

A Beginning

In India, a small beginning has been made. It was in 1958, at a Convention organized by the *Indian Standards Institution* that a proposal was mooted to establish a consumer organization. Subsequently, in 1959, the Consumers Association of India was established. It organized a Seminar with the financial help of the Planning Commission. The proceedings of the Seminar evoked considerable interest. But during the past few years the membership of the Consumers Association of India has never reached a stage where a beginning could be made to start testing consumer goods and publishing comparative test reports. The C.A.I., it appears, has not yet overcome its teething troubles. It appears essential that government should back it by all means at its disposal as an integral part of a radical anti-inflationary policy.

The problem of consumer protection has special significance for us. With the rising tempo of industrialisation and increasing restrictions on imports, more and more consumers depend almost entirely on indigenous goods and to our disappointment we find that our goods do not come up to the required and advertised standards of quality. In the international sphere, we have to compete with industrially advanced countries to retain our markets.

It has been the common grievance of our foreign customers that our goods do not come up to the required standard of quality, that goods supplied do not conform to the samples sent earlier and that the quality of goods is not uniform throughout. Only a few days ago (August 9, 1964) there was a report from Burma that groundnut oil imported from India was adulterated with grease and water! While

we are feeling distressed over the widening gap of our foreign exchange, the domestic consumers feel helpless, dissatisfied, unhappy over the purchase of indigenous goods. It is high time that this unhappy state of affairs was rectified.

In this situation, it becomes imperative to have recourse to standardization and quality control. Reducing unnecessary varieties existing in a product line and concentrating on fewer items will not only avoid industrial waste but would cut the material cost, increase productivity all round and reduce prices. A combined effort by the manufacturers, distributors, consumers and the government is required for promoting standardization so that as many consumable articles as possible are in the market, with their quality standards clearly specified.

Rationing

It is not easy to indicate any quick solution to the problems of the consumer. Given the scarcities which prevail today and assuming justifiably that they will persist for some more time, national policy demands that rationing of the essential scarce commodities should be resorted to at least in major cities and the necessary administrative and organizational arrangements should be speedily built up despite all the difficulties involved.

Considering the consumer problem in its over-all perspective, the answer obviously cannot be found in the short period: that would require a general all-round improvement in organization and ethical standards. This would come about partly through the process of development itself and generally through a long period of social evolution. It may be that with rapid economic development, competition will become more real and opportunities for graft and exploitation will shrink. But we need to lose no time on that account to build up the necessary institutional set-up that should bring manufacturers, traders and consumers in some sort of a reasonable balance of satisfaction and service.

Role of associations

G. D. KHOSLA

THE Vicar of Wakefield acted wisely when he decided to choose his wife as she did her wedding gown, not for a fine glossy surface but such qualities as would wear well, for while he remained occupied with spiritual and other-worldly matters it fell to her lot to keep the household supplied with consumer goods. If she showed discrimination and foresight in choosing her food, clothing and other necessities for their true substance and quality she would make the best and the most economical use of his limited income, but if she were led away by superficial glamour and sales talk, the

result would be unhappiness for the entire family.

There can be no doubt that not a few people are unduly influenced by the external appearance of consumer goods, or just cannot be bothered to take pains to see or examine a variety of articles before they decide to buy what they require. Indeed, there are three types of consumers. There is, in the first place, the man who is in a hurry to be done with the tiresome business of shopping and to get back to his book or his card table. He feels bored if he has to visit more than one shop and the moment he sees something that suits his purpose, something that is 'good

enough', he puts his money down and goes home with his purchase. As often as not, he later discovers faults and shortcomings in his hasty acquisition and blames the shopkeeper or the manufacturer for the deceit practised upon him.

He does not, of course, blame himself for being lazy and allowing himself to be thus imposed upon. If the razor blade goes blunt after the third shave or the pen leaks badly or if his shoes are padded with card-board, he rails against the dishonesty of industrialists and waxes eloquent on the fall in standards of commercial integrity. And, yet, the very next time he goes out shopping he displays the same lack of persistence in getting the best out of his money.

At the other extreme we have the choosey, discriminating woman who will go through every shop in town with a fine comb, ask to be shown the entire stock-in-trade of harrassed salesmen, examine and handle a vast variety of articles and come home carrying only some insignificant trifle and feeling elated at having spent a most rewarding morning, for though she has not bought much, she has learnt a great deal and collected useful information which she will docket and to which she will make similar additions in subsequent expeditions of the same kind.

Often she will speak of her exploits and communicate to her friends and relatives the knowledge she has gained. The shopkeeper may look upon her as a nuisance but her awareness of the quality and prices of consumer goods enables her usually to get value for her money, and she encourages a healthy competition among manufacturers and dealers.

The Grumbler

And, lastly, there is the inveterate grumbler, the unhappy long-suffering martyr who is for ever complaining of the dishonesty, greed and incompetence of manufacturers. For him everything of indigenous origin is inferior in quality and not worth the price asked for it. He must have American socks, Swiss neck-ties, French

chiffons, English electrical goods, German cameras, Japanese transistors; and while foreign tourists indulge in rhapsodies over Indian raw silk, Kashmir shawls, enamel and brass inlay work of Rajasthan, silks of South India and bleeding Madras, he must have terrydene and nylon of French origin. This type of consumer makes little impact on the market. He is really not interested in seeing an improvement in the quality of Indian made goods or agitating against a rapid rise in their prices.

The three types I have spoken of are not, of course, mutually exclusive or divided into watertight compartments. They overlap to a great extent and, indeed, represent attitudes of mind rather than distinct species of the genus consumer. The bored and indifferent shopper is often a grumbler as well, and the most assiduous hunter of consumer goods may disdain to experiment with an electric toaster of indigenous make.

Devising a Yardstick

But all consumers, whatever their personal pre-possessions or attitudes, are often faced with a serious and, I feel, a vital problem: how to devise a yardstick for measuring the quality and price value of consumer goods; how to choose out of a variety of tooth pastes, soaps, razor blades, tinned fruit, squashes, tomato ketchups, etc. We are told that most manufacturers of tomato ketchup use only pumpkin pulp, vinegar, spices and colour, and their produce contains no tomatoes; that almost every variety of vinegar is a synthetic product and jams contain only a small percentage of genuine fruit.

I know from personal experience that tinned food stuffs vary a great deal in quality, and the price-level is not always indicative of the true value of what one buys. Competition among manufacturers of similar goods has led to ingenious ways of advertising and packing in order to give a more acceptable appearance to what is being sold.

A glamorous label exaggerating the quality or size of the contents may be grossly misleading. There is, for instance, the story of a be-

wildered husband who walked into a store and asked for a small tube of tooth paste. The shopkeeper handed him a package marked 'Large'.

'I am afraid you don't understand', the buyer said. 'I asked for a small tube.'

'That's right, Sir,' was the answer, 'it comes in three sizes—Large, Giant and Super. Large is the smallest we have.'

A bottle of olives carried a label with an attractive picture of large-sized olives, whereas the olives inside the bottle were quite small. The label on a bottle of orange squash showed a fresh orange dripping into a glass which would make the product appear to be manufactured from fresh orange juice or comprised solely of fresh juice when the squash offered for sale in fact contained little, if any, orange juice.

Thus, the consumer is either misled by the glib sales talk of manufacturers or remains equally ignorant of the true nature and quality of what he buys, through lack of correct information on the subject. But he has only himself to blame for this state of affairs. The manufacturers and the tradesmen know the old legal maxim of *caveat emptor* (let the buyer beware) and are prepared to go as far as is legally possible in persuading the consumer to buy their particular goods. The law will not step in unless there is a case of clear fraud or misrepresentation, and exaggerated sales talk, however misleading, is very seldom actionable.

The Only Protection

So, it is for the consumer to protect himself and he can do this most effectively by combining with other consumers and forming associations, groups or co-operatives. In this way his voice will be more weighty and carry greater conviction and remedial power. It is only consumers who are and should be the ultimate arbiters of quality in the goods they buy. If the various types of goods are tested in a fair and objective manner and the results given wide publicity, the purchasers will be on their guard against the wiles and ava-

rice of unscrupulous manufacturers and dealers.

In a large number of western countries, such organizations and associations have already been formed, and they are working most effectively to protect the interests of the consumers. In England and America particularly, the consumers' associations have gained so much power and prestige that manufacturers have learnt to respect the uninhibited views on the quality of consumer goods expressed in *Which* and *Consumer Reports*.

Which, is the monthly magazine published by the Consumers' Association of the United Kingdom and sold only to the members of the association. It carries no advertisements, it is not on sale at news-agents and shops, and the information, favourable or unfavourable, contained in its test reports may not be used by the manufacturers without the written permission of the Association. The procedure followed by *Which* is quite simple. The articles to be tested, e.g., watches, razor blades, detergents, jams, squashes, cosmetics, refrigerators and even motor cars are anonymously purchased in the open market and subjected to a fair and objective test. The results are then published in *Which*.

Three million readers of the magazine know which soap, which make of jam or which electric toaster is good value for money; which manufacturers make false or exaggerated claims in respect of their products and which manufacturers produce quality goods. The *Consumer Reports* of the U.S.A. works on very much the same lines.

Awareness

What is necessary is to make the consumer aware of the true quality of what is available in the market. So far, the scarcity of consumer goods and rapidly increasing demand have hampered selective buying and insistence on good quality. The market has been flooded with all types of goods, and unscrupulous manufacturers have not hesitated to offer for sale sub-standard and even noxious pro-

ducts. What is described as salad oil is seldom true olive oil and some makes of foodstuffs may prove deleterious to health. The public has often felt helpless because nothing better is available and goods are bought up even at the high prices demanded for them.

The only answer is a powerful, active and dynamic consumers' association which will insist on a high quality of goods and value for money. An association of this kind must be self-supporting though it may be necessary to seek government aid at the initial stages. The Consumers' Association of India, formed some years ago, has not been able to achieve anything substantial since its inception. A few selfless persons have been trying hard to gather greater public support but they have not succeeded. This is a matter for a large number of consumers and not for a few enthusiasts, however willing and dynamic they may be.

Independent

For this reason, the members of the association should publicise not so much their activities as the fact that consumers must, in order to protect their interests, give active support to the association by becoming its members and offering their services in the matter of testing and making honest reports about the quality of the goods. An association of this type can never achieve anything substantial if it depends entirely on government financial assistance and so far the funds of the association have been drawn almost entirely from the government, and the membership fees have been almost negligible.

This is really a matter for many and not for a few. Once there is an awakening among the consumers and a keen desire on their part to insist on quality goods, their activities can branch out in other directions also. They can, for instance, organize co-operative stores, and once this type of activities start the private dealers will perforce reduce their prices and raise the quality of their goods. I feel that the time has come when something not purely nominal but really effective should be accomplished.

Victim or volunteer

A. D. MODDIE

CRUSADERS usually create more problems than they solve. The first trouble with them is that they divide the complex world in which we are all less than angels into Christian and heathen, and then assume that all the virtue is with them, the metaphoric 'Christians'. Not for them, in this context of consumers of goods, the fruit of modern social sciences which do not reveal human beings as knights and heathens, but as complex, unpredictable groups of individuals who have both physical and psy-

chological wants, and proceed to satisfy them, with a combination of rational and irrational actions as purchasers of goods. What would our knights-errant say of our good consumers who, market research shows, have marked preferences for foods in one coloured package against the same food in another coloured package? Why a preference when the foods are identical? So many simple 'Christendoms' have to be saved by good intentions in modern times in the name of 'the masses', 'the common man',

and now the consumer, who, incidentally, is all of us, and particularly our better halves!

The other trouble with such crusaders is that they are always looking backward, to a state of pristine purity; in the 'Christendom' of consumers, to an early age when all products were natural, when there were no synthetics and no adulteration. Heaven was attained with pure ghee, washable saffron, cottons, not drip-dry nylon, a brass 'lota' not plastic tumblers, and a mud and thatch ashram, not glass and aluminium structures. 'Bliss was it in that dawn to be alive' when natural resources could cheaply go round half the present world population. Our new knights will not live in or joust with the modern worlds' problems of scarce resources, mounting populations and a primitive technology over more than half the earth, the basic problem of the under-developed world.

The Problem

The problem is not one of raising mock standards of the past, but of tilting strong lances at the economic dilemma of the present and the future. How strong is the lance in the proposition of this issue of Seminar?

The proposition is that governments are planning 'furiously' to meet consumer demands: then a sudden switch to a host of things to meet the needs of daily life with experimented 'containers, wrapping, colours and shapes', as if this too is government's job. But if all this is done for the benefit of consumers, the horrible heathen, the manufacturer, must not be named, for a whole biased case of wickedness has yet to be built up against him; or else how will crusading virtue be vindicated in the trumped-up cause of the victim consumer? Anyway, some unnamed bodies do these things for consumers, but 'all this', (marketing and advertising presumably) is 'just a camouflage' to exploit and deceive. Are advertisers of goods any more prone to such things as the more seemingly respectable practitioners of the

law, politics, journalism or even medicine? How much more is the poor 'consumer' in the hands of these with little and distant hope of redress? On the other hand, he has a daily veto at every purchase against the manufacturer or advertiser of goods, a veto to buy or not to buy which he exercises far more freely and frequently than as a litigant, a voter, a reader of the press, or a patient.

The Repeat Purchase

Then the same hackneyed charge: the advertisement 'message' is pushed to a point where the poor, helpless consumer is compelled to buy on the strength of 'a hypnotised reaction to the advertised brand'. This gives advertisers more credit and more power than they would or could claim in reality. Many of those who have actual experience of marketing know the consumer is no gullible fool as his self-assumed protectors make him out to be. In the long run the consumer buys value for money, and, after the first purchase, which may be taken on trust, he will only continue to buy if he is satisfied that the performance of the product matches the advertising promise reasonably well. Every modern marketeer aims at getting the 'repeat purchase', without which all the effort and expense is futile. All the advertising in the world cannot make most consumers repeat purchases if the advertising is basically false or the product bad.

It may be that not all advertising is good or sincere, but nor is all of any human activity. It does not mean that advertising itself should be impaled as a fraud, 'a camouflage', a totally undesirable evil. And what outsider can claim valid reasons for saying that 2 per cent or 3 per cent or even 7 per cent of turnover is too high, and pronounce in such an omnibus verdict applicable to all products and markets. There is nothing more presumptuous on the part of an outsider than to assume he knows just the right figure, the right 'marketing mix'. Even those who use such yardsticks of advertising measurement know there is no inherent sanctity about them.

One of the greatest practitioners of modern branded advertising was once asked whether he was not wasting half his advertising expenditure, and he replied that he did not know which half!

If critics are seriously looking for real economies or real waste in contemporary economic organisation, in government or in enterprise, they are much more likely to find it in areas like overheads, areas of high expense and low productivity, rather than indulging one's outworn Victorian fads or lesser sinners like advertisers. When all is said and done, it is strange to find that critics of advertising usually criticise the advertising of brands and products others use, not those which they use.

Market Research

And because market research is linked with the supposed voodoo of advertising, even this modern marketing tool must come in for the purist's displeasure. The gravamen of the charge is that it tells these wicked men, the marketeers, *what* the consumer wants, *where* and *when* he wants it, and even *how* and *why* he wants it. Could there be a better economic purpose? Does this not help to eliminate baseless guessing, bad business decisions, wasteful production and advertising expenditures? If it is anyone's intention to say that market research is 'for achieving this particular objective' of 'hypnotised reaction', then it betrays a total ignorance of the main function of market research in a marketing operation. The 'what, where, when and how' make plain economic sense for a totally different objective to that of some silly hypnotism.

It is for the planning of the whole marketing operation of a product, of which advertising is only a part. It is to tell the marketeer before the operation where there is likely to be high demand with low supplies, or the beginnings of a possible new demand of the future; it is to tell him in what shape or size or colour or price most purchases are likely to

be made; it is to tell him whether demand will be seasonal or regular, regional or country-wide, upper, lower or middle income; and, not least, for what production capacities he should plan and, as a consequence, what will be the most efficient investment, the minimum cost, and the best return. After the operation is launched it is the function of market research to tell the marketer how far his earlier assumptions and judgements were correct, what changes in plans may be necessary, where there may be too much or too little expenditure; not least, to tell him how far his advertising has reached and how far it is credible.

So marketing, with its normal tools of advertising and market research, is not hypnotism or voodoo or camouflage, no Prospero's wand to make Calibans of consumers. It is the application of economics and the social sciences (inexact as they must be) to human judgement and experience for the satisfaction of physical and psychological wants by the creation and marketing of ever-changing products. (Mark the importance of the psychological, and there the standardiser is totally out of his depth). It is the true management function of an economy, planned or unplanned.

The Purists

But suspicion and obscurantism do not end with marketing/advertising. Just as there is a total lack of appreciation of the essential need for mass marketing methods to support mass production in a modern economy, there is a similar gap in the proper understanding of the part modern technology has to play in meeting the rapidly growing wants of rising populations. Our purists do not like synthetics. They too seem to them to be part of the new world of 'camouflage', of 'exploitation and deception' of the consumer. Oh, for grandmother's halcyon days when, incidentally, there was no need for quality control or standardisation or perhaps consumer protection in any form! But our contemporary purist forgets that grandmother has since produced a prolific progeny, about

two hundred million in India alone.

To make matters worse, after Partition, India was left with 82 per cent of the earlier population, but only 68 per cent of the cultivated acreage,—with more millions of refugees pouring in since, and with a birth rate exceeding the planners' hopes. From where will come more food and fats, more textiles, and many more materials to meet 'the revolution of rising expectations' which grandmother could not foresee; nor, if she were alive, could she meet them with the 'know-how' of her day.

Shortage of Resources

It can only be met, as has been done in the West, by a technology which not only raises the productivity of the old processes, but produces new substitutes and alternatives where old natural resources are short. These are not synthetics so much as supplementary resources. The real problem of today and tomorrow is not one of the imagined misdoings of advertisers, but of actual shortages of most resources, and, as a threatening consequence, high prices and inflation. If the world's cotton and wool cannot adequately go around for everyone's needs, let there be more rayon, nylon, dacron and other fibres; remembering too that fibres are required for industrial processes as well as clothing human bodies.

To the extent that a rich man wears a nylon shirt, to that extent a cotton shirt is spared for a poorer man. Let cheaper yet equally nutritive vanaspati come to the aid of that very mass consumer who increasingly cannot afford good ghee. If fats and oils are scarce and expensive and have to be conserved for human food in preference to human washing, let synthetic detergents grow. If natural rubber is scarce, must half the world do without synthetic rubber? How many of us would be prepared to have cars without tyres just because they are not made of pure rubber from the plantation which grandfather planted in Malaya or Ceylon? Or is purity only a pet theme for an obscurantist, ritual-minded society,

which, as Vijayalakshmi Pandit once said, makes ritual purity the concern of the kitchen and the alimentary canal only. In Britain, 1984, Ronald Brech has pointed out that the future metallic needs of mankind will not be met from pure metals; there will not be enough to go round; there will be alloys of mixed metal dust. In the new world where the physicist will be a better servant of man than the pandit, 'adulteration' will only be a subjective hang-over from the old lady's days. Science will mix, synthesise and substitute, —and that too with far higher standards than the consumers out of a jute sack knew.

There can be little doubt that the consumer in all ages will need some protection, like the citizen in all ages, but that protection will not come with old world suspicions of the new 'know-how'. In stating the problem, the Molony Committee of the U.K. Parliament is quoted to show the number of consumer complaints about textiles, domestic electrical appliances, toys, foot-wear and fuels. Yet, one has to read Brech again not only to see how rapidly consumption of such articles has gone up, but what phenomenal growth is envisaged in the next twenty years by the same complaining consumers of the same goods and gadgetry.

Consumer Acceptance

The irony of it is that the proposer of the problem, after tilting at wind-mills, after championing the cause of consumers, has himself become a critic of them. 'There is no effective pressure from consumers to induce manufacturers to get the I.S.I. mark.' Has the acceptance of these marks by consumers ever been tested by proper market research methods? Why was it that a government report on 'The Marketing of Milk and Milk Products' revealed that after twenty years of Agmarking only 4 per cent of marketed ghee was Agmarked? Whether we are selling products, or standards, or quality marks, surely we are all back at the old problem of consumer acceptance, the marketer's problem, the advertiser's problem.

Could the pious protectors take a practical leaf out of their book?

So, having gone to some lengths to show the fallacy and futility of the pandit's approach, let us seek more reasonable approaches to the problem of consumer protection.

The Responsibilities

Firstly, there is the responsibility of the state to frame protective laws and to lay down standards of manufacture. As in other fields, there is no dearth of laws on the subject in India—and the work of standards must grow with products, but the real rub lies in implementation. This is, therefore, clearly a problem of administration, and accountability can only be got through the people's representatives in local bodies and legislatures. If this does not work in a democracy for the people's daily needs, nothing else will.

Secondly, there is the responsibility of industry and the trade, and when that is said, it means the society from which the men who run industry and trade spring. Perhaps the most effective single answer to this aspect of the problem is to professionalise business, a process which is fast taking place and needs to be encouraged. The professional manager has a less direct stake in the highest possible profits of today, a more direct stake in steady long-term profits and goodwill—and he has the training to produce goods of a recognised quality, for which he is equipped with the 'know-how' of statistical quality control, standardisation, product and market research.

Lastly, there is the vast field of voluntary consumer associations. If, with all the backing and finance of the Planning Commission, the Consumer Association of India has not yet produced adequate results after five years, as the proposer suggests, an objective enquiry should be made into the reasons why. Too long have we merely placed our trust in well-intentioned bodies or idyllic

organisations to deliver the goods. The co-operative movement should have taught us how hard and long is the road to voluntary effort. It may be that the Planning Commission has begun at the wrong end of the stick by establishing one more resounding 'All-India' body. Does not world democratic experience and social psychology show that effective voluntary action can only take place within a local community, a town or ward or village or district, where detection is easiest, action more speedy, where the social sanctions of the local community are most effective? In this sphere, the all-India organisation can only grow out of the activities of local bodies, unless it remains a body in high suspension, as so many are in our large country.

The real function of all-India bodies in the voluntary action field is to stimulate with ideas, propagate new successful ideas and warn against the unsuccessful ones, to aid with contributory funds in specific spheres where local associations may lack money. How far has the Consumers' Association of India done these? How far have representatives of concerned industries, e.g., foods, pharmaceuticals, durable consumer goods, been asked to serve on local panels to give evidence and advice? Many would be glad to offer their expert knowledge, if only for their own goodwill and reputation. Bodies like the All-India Women's Council, Y.M. and W.C.A.'s, Clubs, might help to serve as catalytic cells to propagate the consumer protection movement.

A Suitable Publication

Which may be a useful publication in the U.K., but is such an effort premature in India to-day? The publishing trade may be able to offer useful opinion. If it is not premature, it would require more than a mere suggestion, it would require enterprise (i.e., marketing/advertising) to give it a fair trial in a combination of those industries, the consumers of which are likely to provide an adequate regular readership to

make the venture worthwhile. It would require at least a preliminary consumer research to find out the highest common factor of products likely to be used in families with incomes which are likely to buy the publication fairly regularly, e.g., electrical appliances, bicycles, radios, packaged foods, washing materials, cigarettes, textiles. Hints on cooking, diet, detergency, and shopping would give it a better readership. Perhaps a revived CAI may be the best independent sponsor of an Indian *Which*, with funds from government, which should inspire the consumer's confidence in its independence and integrity. In fairness, the appropriate manufacturer might be invited to defend his claims when disputed by the magazine, leaving the final judgement to the consumer.

Trade Marks

Another special sphere of consumer protection is in trade marks piracy. 'Pirates' can only be dealt with by law, but genuine trade-mark owners may be invited to draw the attention of consumers to the current dangers from spurious marks which may mislead them; and consumers, in their turn, might write in to a *Which* to seek clarification of their doubts about similar trade marks which may cause confusion in their minds. The Trade Marks Association of India may be invited to advise and assist.

And so a number of direct, practical ideas may emerge, which alone will gain the consumers' confidence. Consumers are, by and large, commonsensical people with both objective and subjective views, and they are not interested in tilting at wind-mills. They have lived through many causes to make the world safe for this, that or the other. To the extent that they may be victims of malpractices, some at least among them must volunteer to serve the movement for their own protection. Service, like democracy on the inscription on the gate of the North Block, New Delhi, 'cannot descend to a people'; they must raise themselves to it by their own effort and demand it.

Quality control for export

D. N. SARAF

TODAY, 'India Exports' is a slogan, a fact and a drive. A number of Export Promotion Councils, Commodity Boards and a few other organisations dealing with specific industries including the government sponsored corporations, are engaged in expansion of exports. As Indian business accelerates its emergence into world markets and in the present context of export promotion, quality control in all its aspects has assumed vital importance.

The figure of annual exports from India which stood at Rs. 648 crores at the close of the Second Five Year Plan reached Rs. 794 crores at the end of 1963-64. By the end of the Third Plan, exports are ex-

pected to be of the order of Rs. 870 crores. In their meeting held on the 19th August, 1964, the Board of Trade have proposed a target of Rs. 1,100 crores to be reached by 1970-71, the last year of the Fourth Plan.

While quantitative rise takes place in exports, the qualitative side has not to be ignored. Generally, the first casualty of a rising demand could be quality, unless sufficient attention is paid to maintain it. Anxiety to make quick money can sometimes blind even the intelligent members of the exports' community to the fact that quality is the bedrock for sustained export growth. Goodwill amongst foreign countries is an

inestimable asset and any effort to build it up more than repays itself. Quality and price are the two major criteria a customer goes by, and far-sighted exporters cannot afford to lose sight of this fundamental fact.

It is a matter of some satisfaction that while a very high priority is being accorded to the promotion of exports by the Ministry of Commerce (formerly Ministry of International Trade), considerable emphasis is laid by them on quality control, standardisation and pre-shipment inspection. Without any semblance of pessimism, however, it might be observed that although the value of quality control has been generally recognised by the trade and industry, a sense of urgency about its intensity and immediate application, on a national scale, is still to develop. The movement of quality control must take strong roots and make strides in order to win 'the battle for exports'.

Past Tradition

India has been in the export field from times immemorial. Indian products were known throughout the world for their unique quality and superb workmanship. Our handicrafts and handlooms, even our spices and raw materials which had been the main items of export over the centuries, had all won enviable reputations. As the years passed, we have not been quite on the top, at least, not in all spheres. With the tremendous goodwill that our products have, it is not difficult for us to maintain high quality standards in our traditional items for export. For instance, we have even today a large number of master-craftsmen who can and do make excellent products, and can also train others, to keep the light burning.

Apart from other items, India has been traditionally exporting large quantities of textiles, jute and coir products; they, too, must continue to aspire for steadily improving standards of quality.

India now has many new items of export—mostly light engineering

and consumer goods. They have to face intense competition with products from industrially advanced countries and therefore the need for very strict quality standards in this field is all the more imperative. Indian industry has the capacity to produce goods of the highest quality. Technical guidance at the production stage, accompanied by a continuous study of foreign markets will help weeding out bad or indifferent quality products. Our many new industries, especially in the small-scale sector, can begin from where others have reached, their products establishing a name for quality. They should refuse to export any product below a minimum standard. If our customers invariably regard 'Made in India' as another name for quality, we shall have succeeded in laying the foundations for a growing demand for our goods in foreign countries.

Consumers in foreign countries, as anywhere else, develop confidence in the products coming from other countries if they perform the functions for which they are needed and satisfy the claims about them. They prefer to be informed of any 'standards' to go by. The importers and dealers welcome 'standards' by which they can order goods and check them. The whole chain of manufacturers, exporters, importers, distributors, wholesalers, and retailers is involved in the process of creating increased consumer acceptance. The starting point of any marketing effort is, of course, production. It is here that seeds of successful selling are sown. Standardisation of grades for export is the first step in encouraging, or better still guiding, right production for exports.

First Steps

In order to foster quality consciousness among manufacturers and exporters and also to enable them to have greater receptivity in the varying demands of importing countries, a number of standards have been evolved by the Indian Standards Institution. As Dr. Lal C. Verman, Director of this Institution, says: 'Export Consciousness is a major factor in the

formulation of standards by I.S.I.' They have issued over 2,400 standards and work in close liaison with other organisations like the D.M.I. (Directorate of Marketing and Inspection) of the Ministry of Agriculture who prepare trade standards for agricultural commodities. Nearly 200 items now carry the ISI mark under over 600 licences for electrical, chemical and consumer items.

On the handicrafts side, the Technical Committee on Quality Control set up by the All-India Handicrafts Board, have in co-operation with the I.S.I., developed specifications for a dozen crafts.

The progress of marking schemes under the 'standards' developed could be faster even though lack of marking does not necessarily mean that certain standards are not being followed.

Wider coverage of products through the I.S.I. Certification Marks Scheme and other national standards would enhance consumer confidence in our products. Customers must be told what they want to know, what they have a right to know and ought to know about what is offered so that they may buy wisely and obtain maximum satisfaction from their purchases. The marking schemes should specially ensure fool-proof informative labelling.

Recommendations

The Government of India have already been seized of the problem of quality control for exports. They appointed a committee in November 1960 to study this problem. The Committee, inter alia, recommended that:

- (i) there should be prohibition on the export of articles which may affect the health and safety of persons, unless they conform to rigid quality standards. Items falling under this category are drugs and medicines, toilet articles, articles of food, etc.;
- (ii) when an overseas buyer stipulates certain specifications for goods ordered, export should be permitted

only when the goods are certified by an inspection agency as conforming to those specifications;

- (iii) in respect of items for which standard specifications have been or could be laid down, inspection and certification should be carried out through appropriate agencies at the time of manufacture or packing before export;
- (iv) in regard to commodities not considered important for export trade, provision may be made for certification under one or other of the schemes, though it may not be necessary to prohibit the export of non-certified goods until a definite need arises as a result of complaints or for other circumstances;
- (v) regarding certain other commodities for which standard specifications may not exist or may not be advisable to formulate, it would be useful to introduce a factual inspection so that the overseas importer could be made aware of the nature of the consignment.

The Central Government have since passed a legislation—the Exports (Quality Control and Inspection) Act, 1963, to give effect to various recommendations. An Export Inspection Advisory Council has also been set up to advise government on policy matters and to associate the industry and trade with the planning and execution of necessary measures. For an integrated approach, a special Directorate has been organised in the Ministry of Commerce. Its function is to plan and accelerate activities in the field of quality control for exports.

Quality Control

Commodities in respect of which compulsory quality control and pre-shipment inspection now exists include various agricultural products such as sunhemp, unmanufactured tobacco, black pepper, chillies and walnuts. Government

has also decided to bring in compulsory quality control for pulses, meat and sea foods by the end of 1964. Vegetable oils have recently been brought under control. Cashew kernels can be exported only if they bear the certification mark of the Cashew Export Promotion Council, i.e., the CEPC label.

Compulsory quality control is being exercised for food and vegetable oil products and drugs under respective control orders. In case of engineering goods, aluminium utensils and plywood panels for tea chests, they can be exported only if they bear the I.S.I. mark. Recently, compulsory I.S.I. marking has been extended to utensils and wares of various metals—cutlery, builders' hardware, locks and other consumer articles like thermos flasks, umbrellas etc.

Textiles

Rayon, art silk and pure silk goods, woollen yarn—hosiery and fabrics—are also being subjected to compulsory pre-shipment inspection. The cotton textiles—an important item of export—is only partly covered by the ITEX scheme operated by the Cotton Textile Fund Committee as a voluntary service to such Indian exporters or importers abroad as may desire to have their consignments inspected for quality. Only 10 per cent of some 600 million metres of cotton textiles are offered for inspection. The Textile Committee Act, 1962, envisages compulsory quality control on all textiles, besides textile mill-stores.

Kashmir namdas, South Indian druggets and Farrukhabad handprints are subject to compulsory pre-shipment inspection. Voluntary inspection schemes are operating in over 30 centres for other handicrafts including handprinted cotton textiles, printed silk sarees, gold thread and zari goods, brocades and artistic silk goods, hand-made crochet laces, himroo fabrics, ivory carvings and inlay, artistic brass and copperware, wood carvings and chikkan embroidery.

For carpets, being one of the major items in the export of

handicrafts, a compulsory labelling scheme, requiring some factual data to be given on the labels has also been introduced. The Handicrafts and Handlooms Exports Corporation of India, Ltd., of the Government of India, offers voluntary pre-shipment inspection service to exporters/importers of handicrafts and handloom products. Its services have been utilised by exporters especially for shipments to East European countries.

About 25 items account for 80 per cent of India's exports. Chief among them are: jute, tea, agricultural products, minerals, handicrafts, leather and leather products. 40 per cent of the total exports are already under compulsory quality control or pre-shipment inspection under one scheme or the other. It is necessary to expedite steps to cover the remaining field.

Normally, compulsion creates repulsion, but when it is in the national interest, compulsory measures must be taken firmly and without delay. Quality control, after all, is a service like that of the traffic police and is intended to be more in the nature of a self-regulatory measure. Costs, if any, on quality control are offset by lesser rejections and better prices which the products can fetch. A number of exporters, especially the new entrants in the field are likely to underestimate the importance of quality control and its long-term advantages.

Japan

False apprehensions of fall in business are also sometimes raised. Here we need to follow the example of Japan whose products as late as 15 to 20 years ago were considered cheap and shoddy. Today they stand with pride; the reputation of Japanese optical and electronic products has soared particularly high. Now Japan ranks as exporter No. 1 to America. Under the export inspection system in Japan, exports of practically all important commodities are authorised only in cases where the quality of each item is found in conformity with the requirements elucidated in the Export Inspection

Standard. They have the export inspection under law as well as special inspection which is of a commercial nature—that is compliance with the customer's specifications.

Enforcement of quality standards, of course, pre-supposes adequate arrangements for testing and pre-shipment inspection. Here, again, it would be interesting to note that the Japanese Government enforced the Export Inspection Law in 1959 by which export inspection organs were established to conduct export inspection on the quality and packing conditions of 145 important export items, in order to prevent poor quality goods from being exported. Japan has a number of governmental and designated inspection organs dealing with oils and metals, sewing machines, watches and clocks, telescopic cameras, bicycles, pottery, glasswares, plastics, toys, imitation pearls, glass articles, table-ware, etc.

Future Plans

In our country, we have about 500 laboratories of the Central Government, State Governments, quasi-government and scientific institutions and some such smaller private organisations which could be geared to inspection work. It is learnt that the Ministry has already taken steps to mobilise all the available resources. They have also plans to establish five central testing laboratories at Delhi, Calcutta, Bombay, Madras and Cochin. At each of these laboratories, most of the goods entering the export market would be tested. This scheme, too, needs to be implemented very early. In some cases, the existing small industries service institutes and centres set up by the State Governments could be recognised for this purpose.

Other conditions necessary for successful quality control are:

- (i) supply of standard raw material to the industry on a regular, uninterrupted basis;
- (ii) readily available technical guidance in the production of standard goods;

- (iii) training in and common facilities for packaging and packing (in most manufacturing establishments, packaging is probably the least understood and most poorly controlled function).

Extension of the above facilities is absolutely necessary for ensuring quality production and exercising quality control.

Proper Publicity

Whatever quality control and pre-shipment inspection schemes we have now, they are not very well publicised amongst importers, dealers and consumers in foreign countries. It is necessary to have proper publicity of the schemes within the country as well as abroad to make people aware of the existence of the schemes as well as of their benefits.

The importance of quality control particularly for exports has been adequately emphasised in a number of conferences, councils, committees and seminars. There could, perhaps, be no better time than the present one to move fastly from resolutions to actions and to build exports on the basis of quality and standardised goods.

Briefly, we could add to the interest of the overseas consumer in our goods and build a stable market for them by:

- (i) a rapid adoption of standards developed for export;
- (ii) application of compulsory quality control and pre-shipment inspection to all important items not at present covered;
- (iii) speedy extension of testing facilities, provision of standard raw materials and packing facilities; and
- (iv) enhanced publicity of the quality standards among the manufacturers in the country and exporters abroad, besides a sustained programme of consumer education regarding standardisation and quality marked goods.

A lesson from abroad

EIRLYS ROBERTS

IN the popular sense, standardisation is a derogatory word. It suggests too much sameness. In our sense, it is a good word, meaning something that gives us a certain amount of security about the goods we buy. We can be sure that a pound will contain sixteen ounces, and reasonably sure that certain tablets of aspirin will consist almost entirely of acetyl salicylic acid, that most life-jackets will keep you up in the water and that most electric fires will warm the room without giving anyone, even an inquisitive child, an electric shock. The more products we can have this security about, and the more nearly abso-

lute our security can be, the better.

We want, and need, standardisation.

Quality control is also a good word. When we buy a product and find it satisfactory, we expect to get the same satisfaction when we buy it a second time. If the manufacturer's system of quality control is not good, there is a danger that the second product we buy will not be satisfactory. If it is not, our security will be shaken. We shall not know whether or not to trust this brand name, or other brand names.

Even more important, if the manufacturer's system of quality

control is not good, some of his products—however good their design—may be defective or even dangerous. The customer who buys a dishwashing machine which left the factory with a 200 Volt control panel instead of a 240 Volt one, will have his time, temper and money wasted before the machine is put right. One who buys a car with a defect in the brakes, may get killed. The better the system of factory inspection, the more chance the customer has of being satisfied with what he buys.

We want, and need, as much quality control as possible.

Standards

In the United Kingdom, there is one standard-making body—the British Standards Institution. A joint enterprise of government and industry, it was concerned originally with setting up standards for industrial goods, and has only recently concerned itself with consumer goods. Out of about 3,700 standards, about 350 deal with consumer goods. Most of the standards are voluntary: they are worked out by a committee consisting of representatives of the industry concerned, government departments and consumers, but no manufacturer need adhere to them if he does not choose to. Goods conforming to the standard may carry the standard mark—BS with the number—but need not do so. And the standard usually deals with one or two aspects only of a product, not of its total quality.

Other countries differ in detail but not basically. Some are almost entirely financed by government (as in India), some are part of a government department (as in Japan), others (as in the United States) are a mixture. There are about 350 trade associations which prepare their own standards and the American Standards Association adopts those which are supported nationally. In addition, government agencies like the U.S. Department of Agriculture for food have developed their own and often excellent standards.

Standardisation at the international level is now becoming

more and more important. The International Standards Organisation works with all the national bodies and produces standards which have a majority of countries adhering to them, while the International Electrotechnical Commission concentrates on electrical standards for domestic equipment.

Electrical Goods

The most direct and important way, so far, in which standards have helped the consumer has been in ensuring the safety—and in particular, the electrical safety—of the goods they buy.

Electricity is still a mystery to many of us. We understand something about it, but not enough. Even a well-educated person has been known to stand under a tree during a thunderstorm, play a record player in a bathroom, or connect the earth wire from the mains to the live wire of a heater. So far as possible, people have to be protected from the possibly fatal results of accident or ignorance and, in this, the standards bodies of many countries have done a good job.

British Standards on electrical safety are strict. Live parts must not be accessible to a test finger. Insulation must withstand a voltage of, usually, 1,000 v. Any domestic electrical appliance must be earthed or double-insulated. Leakage current must not exceed usually 5 millions. Flexes must be correctly colour-coded—the earth wire green, live red, neutral black, in Great Britain. Northern European standards are similar. United States standards are similar—in some instances, more severe, in spite of the fact that the voltage in the States is half that of the United Kingdom, and the danger therefore less.

The standards have not eliminated deaths from electrical equipment in these countries. But they meant that nearly all the 60 deaths a year in the United Kingdom, for instance, come from old, or misused or wrongly assembled electrical equipment, and not from any which has been badly designed.

Other safety standards have helped the consumer. In 1960/61

there were 15 deaths from a type of oil heater whose flame spread dangerously when it was in a draught or got knocked over. A standard was brought out which required that the heater should withstand a 17 mile an hour gale.

1,000 motor cyclists are killed and 50,000 are injured, 25,000 seriously, every year. The standard on crash helmets ensures that motor-cyclists can, if they want to, get a crash helmet which reduces the chance of death or serious head injury by 40 per cent.

Car safety belts are estimated to cut down deaths and serious injuries in car accidents by at least half, every year, in Sweden, thanks largely to the exacting Swedish standard to which the belts are made. The British Standard for lifejackets ensures that anyone wearing a lifejacket made to the standard will be held face upwards in the water, even if unconscious.

Performance

Safety may be the first consideration but it is not the only one. The consumer has benefitted very largely from standards of efficiency and performance.

South Africa, for instance, is strict about its tinned fruit and sets exacting compulsory standards for quality of fruit and proportion of fruit to liquid. So is the United States. And British consumers notice the difference between tinned fruit imported from South Africa and fruit tinned in Britain, where there are voluntary codes of practice but no compulsory standards.

Hungarian and Polish standards require that jam shall be made only from the fruit in the jam's name, and sugar. The British requirement is that the jam shall consist of 38 per cent of fruit. Polish and Hungarian jams are becoming popular in Britain.

Frozen food saves the European housewife trouble in cooking and time in shopping. But until very recently there were considerable

differences between the temperatures in the frozen food compartments of refrigerators: she had very little idea of how long frozen food could safely be kept in the frozen food compartment of her refrigerator. Now, in the United Kingdom at least, the British Standard specifies various temperatures for the frozen food compartments and this, linked to a marking system, shows the customer which refrigerator she has to buy if she wants to keep frozen food for a given length of time.

These are a few examples. Other performance standards have guaranteed for consumers a wide range of certainty about the goods they buy, from the quality of food and drugs to the cleanliness of the filling for pillows, from the sizing of clothes to the robustness of furniture.

Testing Methods

Every important standard lays down a method for testing the product concerned, to see whether it complies with the standard. These methods are not only necessary for the standard-making body. They have been essential for the comparative testing organisations. The comparative testing organisation in investigating sheets, for instance, must find out which sheets are likely to be most hard-wearing, and, incidentally, whether or not any brands fail an accepted standard of wear, if there is one. If there is a standard method of measuring tensile strength, their work is made easier, and the result of the test likely to be more convincing, both to themselves and to industry.

Whenever there is an important standard for a consumer product, there is a standard testing method and consumers have benefitted indirectly by the testing methods of which these organisations have been able to make use, as they have benefitted directly from the standards themselves.

Standards nowadays are beginning to take quality control into account. They recognise that it is necessary not only that each brand in any particular category shall

reach a certain standard, but that each *example* of the brand should reach it also.

Quality Control

The innocent consumer reading an advertisement assumes—without knowing that he does so—that the manufacturer's quality control has been perfect. 'Trouble-free washing with our washing machine.' He assumes that this will be so, not that there is a one-in-five chance that it will, and that the other four machines will have screws loose, badly fitting covers, incorrectly coloured flexes or some other fault which will cause trouble and expense before it can be put right.

But, anyone who has bought a car or an automatic washing machine or a tape-recorder is likely to find that things do go wrong. The manufacturers say that if you have mass production, you get things cheaply and should be willing to tolerate its disadvantages: if everything were fully checked before it left the factory, prices would rise and the consumer would be the first to complain.

This is true and consumers are willing to tolerate a certain number of faults in a complicated piece of equipment. But they also point out that good quality control may sometimes cost less than bad. Some British firms estimate that the cost of putting things right after customers have returned them is as high as their profit margin. This has made many of them try to get them right in the first place.

The British firm of Marks & Spencer is one of the most notable examples of quality control which has benefitted the general public. This firm of chain stores, which sells mainly textiles, makes nothing itself but lays down precise specifications for everything with which various manufacturers supply it. They then have a vigorous system of quality control of their own, in addition to any system operated by the separate manufacturers. The result is that, on the whole, shoppers get good quality cheap.

British Nylon Spinners, which until recently had the monopoly of

manufacturing nylon in the United Kingdom, controlled the quality of their nylon filament sold to fabric manufacturers. This ensured a certain basic level of quality in nearly everything made of nylon and it meant that consumers found this new material, on the whole, very satisfactory. Courtaulds and the Imperial Chemical Industries have similar control over the quality of their raw materials.

The German Volkswagen's quality control is exacting and one of the reasons—though not the only one—for the reliability of the beetle Volkswagen.

Standardisation and quality control have been a great help to consumers so far. There is something to be learned both from their success, and from their limitations.

There is no doubt that standards for consumer goods are a good thing. They help to make them safer, and better. So far, there are far too few. Electrical safety is well covered; but the standards are voluntary, not compulsory. And there are few other safety standards, and many of the qualities which consumers need in what they buy, and most of the products, are not covered by standards. India has set a good example by pressing on with them fast, not waiting to be too perfectionist about each one.

Moreover, standards are usually partial, cover only some of the qualities in any given product, not the whole of it. Anyone who buys an electric razor, for instance, made to the British Standard, can be sure that it is safe and well-constructed but will have no idea whether or not it will shave him. The aim for consumer goods standards should be that they should cover all the qualities of the product, or at least all the essential ones.

Making it Obligatory

Many standards are not exacting enough. In countries where the standards organisation is a joint enterprise of government and industry (as in Great Britain for instance) or in whose councils industry is particularly powerful (as in the United States), the

standard has usually not risen much above the level of the industry concerned. In Great Britain, for instance, where the textile industry consists of a few very large, very efficient firms but many small ones, some efficient and some not so efficient, the influence of many of the small firms has often acted as a brake on the introduction and raising of standards. Somehow or other, standards must be accepted and kept high.

Few standards are obligatory. In Denmark, all manufacturers of electrical equipment are obliged to conform to any existing standard of electrical safety. In many other countries, they only conform if they want to, so the consumer is only partially protected. Safety standards, at least, should be obligatory as they are in most countries, in varying degrees, for foods.

The standard mark is not always obligatory. In some countries, it is. In others not. Manufacturers may not want to use the mark because they consider the standard too low. This means that the consumer is not justified in using the mark as a guide to quality: if he does, he may miss something good. So the standard does not get the publicity it should. Somehow or other, the standard mark must be made conspicuous, familiar to everyone, and regarded with trust and affection. In the United Kingdom, the Gas Council succeeded in making their Mr. Therm into such a mark. No standards body has done so.

Representation

Finally, and most important, consumers have never (except possibly in Sweden) been adequately represented on standards bodies. This is one of the chief reasons for standards falling short of consumers' full needs, and one of the most important problems for any standardising body to solve.

Standards organisations always pay lip-service to consumer representation and usually enrol one or two members of women's organisations. But members of women's organisations, particularly those who have the leisure to sit through

the long sessions of the necessary committees, rarely have any technical knowledge, so they are at a disadvantage when faced by the manufacturers who know what they are talking about. The experts can defeat them in any argument.

Somehow or other, this difficulty must be overcome. The standards body must enlist enough consumers not to be outnumbered. And the consumers must have enough technical knowledge to be able to argue with the representation of industry on equal terms.

Exacting Standards

The arguments for exacting quality control are strong—for the country which wants to improve the reputation of its exports, for the manufacturers who want to keep down the costs of putting returned goods right. The arguments from the consumer's point of view are even stronger. There is nothing that enrages him more than an expensive piece of equipment which goes wrong soon after he has bought it, because of a careless mistake in assembly or inspection. The history of firms with outstandingly good systems of quality control—and, therefore, reliable products—shows that there is nothing for which the consumer is more grateful.

He is not unreasonable. He realises that, mass production being what it is, faulty goods are bound to come out of the factory and get into the shops. But he sees no reason why he should pay, in inconvenience or money, for the manufacturer's fault. It is becoming accepted by a few shops and manufacturers that the most agreeable (and, often, economical) thing to do is to replace faulty goods without question, or at least, to put them right, for a certain time after they have been bought, without any cost to the consumer. This double insurance for the consumer—quality control as good as the manufacturer can make it and free replacement or repair for any fault that has escaped the quality control—is the policy which satisfies the customer and—in the end—is going to benefit the manufacturer also.

Local actions

PRAFULLA ROYCHOUDHURY

AT this distance of nearly fourteen months, one tends to think about it somewhat sadly, for it would seem that the freshness of mind and faith in community action are now no longer here. We are, if anything, a little more helpless today, and we know it.

Rice was selling at Rs. 45 a maund, prices were shooting up and within two days had reached Rs. 50. The government was aware of this but unable to do anything positive. Political parties were yet to wake up. People appeared to be helpless throughout West Bengal. Then, suddenly, one day a number of inhabitants in Dum Dum, Calcutta's airport locality, got together and in a body compelled the local retail traders to sell rice at Rs. 35 a maund. No, they were not angry. They were just irritated. Proof? They had asked the local police to accompany them when they approached the shop owners. Everything was peaceful. The retailers had to give

in to this demonstration of community exasperation. There were no clashes, no lathi charges, no tear gas.

The press and word of mouth carried the news. So, rice was there because obviously the retailers were not selling at a loss. For, otherwise, they would have gone out of business. Within a week, the Dum Dum spirit spread to Calcutta and its surrounding areas. Even in the heart of Burra Bazar, Calcutta's main market, retailers were forced to sell rice and wheat at lower prices. Newspapers kept on reporting the spread of the movement. There was not a single untoward incident. For two weeks people got relief. They seemed to have won a point. The trade evidently had been taken by surprise. And this method earned the sobriquet *Dum Dum Dawai* or Dum Dum medicine for the hoarders. Perhaps those who had so aptly named it felt that this was the medicine to cure the malady. They

were sadly mistaken. The respite did not last for more than three weeks.

The government was jostled out of inertia. Legitimately, it had to protect the interests of the trader and the consumer, and a gentleman's agreement was made. The traders, now under the psychological protection of the government, sold rice procured at the price of Rs. 18 to Rs. 21 a maund for Rs. 35 a maund. By the time the opposition parties realised that something could or should have been done, the decisive moment had passed. The wholly fragmented movement based on local initiative and enthusiasm had been disarmed. There was nobody to take it forward and give it shape and structure.

The Case of Fish

This kind of reaction, however, was not confined to the high prices of rice and wheat only. There have been remarkable instances of consumer initiative in other cases too. Take fish, for instance. A little town named Rahra in the 24 Parganas district of West Bengal showed the way to get fish at a reasonable price. One day, when the price of fish had reached an impossible level, a few young men of this town got together and got moving. They carried out their own survey and found that out of the 600 families in the place, only 16 were prepared to pay the price which was being asked. The next morning the market was transformed into a veritable debating society. The 16 families who were prepared to pay high prices were stopped from buying fish and the traders were compelled to sell fish at the fixed price.

Then the traders hit back. For three days there was no fish in the market. But the 600 families had found a way out of the situation. They set up a committee of their own, and hired some fishermen to catch limited quantities of fish every day from the fish ponds in the surrounding areas. The fish was then retailed among themselves. It is reported that this is still working today. The supplies are sold at fixed prices and the amounts rationed strictly. But

Rahra is not West Bengal, and this local initiative has not yet inspired similar initiative elsewhere.

The age-old joke about the Bengali and his fondness for fish must be reframed! The Bengali is learning to live without fish.

The consumer's utter helplessness was perhaps never more clearly seen as in the case of mustard oil. The oil mill owners did nothing secretly. They openly threatened the government to accept their terms or else they would adulterate edible oil! The government advised the people to change their food habits and to change the cooking medium too.

It was perhaps only in the factories where canteen facilities were available that the consumer was able to exert some influence. Almost all the Chambers of Commerce received representations from member companies to the effect that their canteens were finding it extremely difficult to buy parboiled rice at the controlled rates. The Chambers made representations to the Secretary, Department of Labour. A number of companies were thus able to obtain special permits for buying rice from government stocks. This probably explains the fact that despite a lot of spontaneous demonstrations against rising prices and shortage of food articles, there were few actual stoppages of work in the factories.

Consumer Cooperatives

While exhortations to people to change their food habits and substitute the cooking medium, etc., have gone on practically unabated, there are only a few examples of local foresight and unity which have flowed along constructive lines. The consumer co-operative movement has been traditionally weak in this State. But according to government figures, no less than 605 co-operative stores with a membership of more than nine million were functioning in 1962-63. Their total sales for that year were over 4 crores of rupees.

Wherever a group of selfless workers have harnessed local initiative, consumer co-operative stores have started up and have

done well. But they are very few indeed. Now, thanks to the Bangalore Labour Conference, this is becoming once again a part of the industrial fabric.

Positive Measures

The Union Government has prepared a scheme under which towns with a population of more than 50,000 will have co-operative societies and, according to reports, the government is prepared to bear the full cost of these consumer stores. Under this scheme, 27 new wholesale co-operative societies are reported to have come into existence in 18 different towns. Each of these wholesale societies is likely to have about 20 retail stores under it. This has just got going and in July such co-operative stores are reported to have sold articles worth over Rs. 2 lakhs. In August the figure jumped and the total reached three times that of July.

Whether this would or could become a State-wise movement to protect the consumer, only the future can say. In the course of the last six months the consumer has gone from pillar to post. Prices of every article, foodgrains, cereals, vegetables and other necessities have gone up continuously. Cereal prices have risen by nearly a hundred per cent in the course of the last eight weeks. What is more, the consumer has been bullied so much that now he does not know how much his money will buy. The trader is in a position to dictate. He picks and chooses his customers and decides how much they can buy.

It is against this background that over 4,000 people have courted arrest and have offered satyagraha. And they have been rebuked for doing so for were they not trying to use a distressing situation for political ends. And the common man's reaction to such demonstrations is equally characteristic. He knows that satyagraha and courting of arrest will not get him rice or bring prices down but, at the same time, he feels that somebody should protest even though nothing will happen. And as long as somebody is there to protest, *Dum Dum Dawai* will continue to be a sad memory.

Books

STUDIES ON CONSUMER BEHAVIOUR By Amalendu Ganguly and others.

Issued under the auspices of the Indian Statistical Institute: Asia Publishing House.

The adoption of the method of planning for national development has underlined the importance of studies in the field of consumer behaviour because of the need for predicting future consumption patterns in a community which is constantly advancing socially and economically.

The studies presented in this volume deal with different aspects of the problem of consumer behaviour and make use of various mathematical equations found in the works of economists abroad, notably Herman Wold, S.J. Prais, H.S. Houthaker and others.

All the papers presented in this publication base themselves on data collected by the National Sample Survey Organisation which has assessed statistics relating to a large number of family budgets from rural and urban regions of India in the course of fourteen rounds since 1951. Leaving aside a descriptive study about consumption patterns of different classes of rural families and a study on the applicability of discriminant analysis for classification of families, all others are connected with the measure-

ment of consumer behaviour culminating in the calculation of income elasticities for various items of consumer expenditure.

The first study dealing with differences in consumption habits among different occupation groups for certain selected items seeks to find out whether it is advisable to forecast consumption in terms of occupation groups. The occupation groups selected are (i) farmers and cultivators, (ii) agricultural labourers and (iii) other occupations excluding sharecroppers. The items for which consumption particulars have been studied are cereals, milk, sugar, gur and mustard oil.

The conclusion drawn by the writer is that the total consumer expenditure alone cannot explain the differences in the consumption habits of persons in different occupations. Households with the same per capita expenditure but belonging to different occupation groups will not necessarily have the same consumption habits. Different occupation groups display different consumption patterns even though they may belong to the same consumer expenditure group.

The next study presents projections of consumption in rural and urban India for increases in consumer expenditure ranging from an increase of five per cent to an increase of 100 per cent for thirty five selected

items of expenditure. The elasticity has been worked out in each case.

All the other studies take up the same problem and try out various mathematical equations for the purpose. The paper entitled 'Some Results in Consumption Studies' by Ashok Rudra and Bina Roy besides being the most detailed draws a number of interesting conclusions which are of general interest.

The writers pose the problem: 'can consumption study of the type we have undertaken be of any help to the planner?' Their answer is in the affirmative. Such studies, they feel, can be of great strategic importance in the formulation of planning policies. On the basis of their own studies they offer a number of suggestions regarding planning for the future in India.

One of the commonest bottlenecks in an industrialisation plan, they point out, is the short supply of foodgrains and other food products. How to tackle this problem? Apart from import of food which no country would like to make a permanent feature of its economy there are, say the authors, three ways in which excess food products can be obtained out of the producers and carried to the non-food-producing workers. These three ways, which they do not consider to be mutually exclusive, are: increase in production; increase in the pace of migration of population from the rural to the urban sector and introduction of gradual changes in the consumption habits of the urban and rural consumers.

As for the first, increase in production, it naturally needs no comment. But the other two suggestions, they feel, have not received mention in the Second Five Year Plan but are deserving of careful investigations. By migration from the rural to the urban sector they mean a changeover from agricultural occupations to industrial occupations or, in other words, urbanisation of areas which are at present rural. It does not necessarily mean a physical changeover from one region to another.

How does this help to augment the food supply? They argue that the removal of one consumer from the rural to the urban sector will not affect the production of agricultural (or non-agricultural) consumer goods in the rural sector 'as it is being assumed that migration is taking place from the under-employed rural force. 'The removal', they proceed to show, 'will then mean two things. There will be one less mouth to feed. Hence total consumption of food commodities in the rural sector will fall. But, as a result of the same removal, the per capita total income of the remaining population will increase. That will mean an increased consumption of food (as well as non-food) commodities. The net result of these two opposing forces will most probably be an increased surplus for the market; as far as foodgrains are concerned, owing to the inelasticity of demand for foodgrains.'

In explaining their third suggestion they refer to the fact that the demand curve for food for urban consumers is below that for rural consumers. Com-

pared to urban consumption patterns, the rural pattern is marked by the feature that, given the same level of living, a rural consumer consumes very much more of cereals and somewhat less of other nutritive food than his urban counterpart. This, of course, means that he consumes less of non-food items, especially such items as are industrially manufactured in the urban sector. Thus, in so far as foodgrains can be substituted by manufactured articles in the family budget of the rural households, there exists a potential source of supply of foodgrains to the urban sector.

How to affect the substitution? The answer given by the writers is the adoption of a suitable price policy. The procurement or harvest prices of foodgrains should be raised on the one hand and, on the other, a planned reduction in the prices of manufactured articles in the rural markets together with a planned increase in the supply of the same should be carried out.

In a note appended to the study, Professor Chakrabarty has contested one of the conclusions of Rudra and Roy, namely, the affects of an increase in the pace of migration from the rural to the urban sector. The problem of migration, he says, is not necessarily linked with the possibility of increased agricultural production. Past experience, he argues, even in a controlled economy such as that of the USSR does not warrant the conclusion that migration by itself increases the movement of the theoretical surplus to the required extent. 'In the case of a partially controlled system,' he concludes, 'the assumption that food may be expected to follow the migration of surplus labour has very little justification.'

Whatever view one may hold on the subject, the discussion makes clear that a survey of consumer behaviour is extremely relevant if our planning is to be realistic.

The studies in this volume are clearly of interest to the planner and the research worker though written in a style and manner that the lay reader would find difficult to follow.

J. M. Kaul

THE POWERFUL CONSUMER By George Katona.
McGraw Hill.

Earlier economists used to refer to the consumer as king, because in those days kingship implied power. The compliment, as undeserved then as now, has been brought up-to-date, and he is now called the powerful consumer.

Consumer studies are a popular pastime in the U.S. and, in this one, the author begins by defining the restricted scope of his book. 'Our interest lay primarily in studying the discretion in decision-making and in action of the consumers, the unorganised masses, who in the past have been considered passive factors, rather than powerful forces influencing the stability of the economy.' But even after reading the entire book and studying all the diagrams

and graphs so painstakingly collected, it is still not clear how, or whether, the American consumers of to-day have become 'powerful forces' in their country's economy.

George Katona concedes that from earliest times, taxes, duties, and public works undertaken by the governing authorities, technical innovations and new institutional practices by business leaders, have fundamentally changed the pattern of consumption. But Katona has kept those factors outside the scope of his book. Here we are concerned mainly with two propositions. 'Demand depends on income and confidence' and 'changes in confidence are measureable.' The second proposition, the author feels, goes a long way in understanding 'consumer sentiment', which in turn 'contributes to an understanding of economic processes and our ability to predict the future of the economy.'

To determine consumer sentiment, many sample interview surveys were conducted by research teams from the end of World War II up to the beginning of 1959. Efforts of economists, psychologists, and mathematical statisticians have gone into making up this book. Sales records maintained by various firms, the author feels, do not tell the whole story about personal preferences. Only personal contact with the consumers and their answers to the questions, who, how many and why, with reference to various forms of consumption, show the trends of the consumers' demands in their country.

Before asking these questions, the survey interviewers make an analysis of the consumers themselves, starting with some pertinent general information about the people to be interviewed. The growth and age distribution of the population, the enabling conditions like income, assets and debts of the people to be interviewed, make up the basic data which helps to evaluate consumer responses. Katona says that he has noticed that over a long period, the 'enabling conditions' vary greatly, but over a short period, say three months, they are more or less static.

In contrast, 'consumer sentiment' which generally precedes 'effective demand', sometimes undergoes rapid changes even though the consumers income remains constant. 'Short-term variations in economic activity represent our major... concern', especially when several factors like instalment buying have substantially increased the powers of the American consumers by allowing them to spend above or below their incomes, giving them a much wider margin of what Katona calls 'discretionary expenditure.'

Discretionary expenditure, which is the major question studied in this book, is defined by three negatives: it isn't absolutely necessary, it isn't habitual and it isn't made on the spur of the moment. The consumers' past experiences and the social group they belong to, both play an important part in the way they evaluate their circumstances and adjust their responses. 'It therefore becomes essential to study changes in motives, opinions, attitudes and

expectations in order to understand changes in discretionary expenditures.' Perhaps, that is why the book has been divided into four parts, the last two being devoted to psychological findings and economic fluctuations. A fairly long appendix explains the various aspects of survey research, its functions, methodology and difficulties.

But, surprisingly, advertising, which plays a very important part in influencing the consumers' discretionary expenditure, is hardly mentioned here. It has been treated rather like a poor relation of the disciplines in this book, though it is not. Advertising in its various forms is so closely linked with consumption that American consumers can't escape it for even a moment during their waking hours. Advertising in America is Very Big Business, so to mention it a few times in passing, for decency's sake, seems rather a strange omission in any consumer study.

Social surveys for the purposes of consumer study gained momentum in America at the end of World War II. The author talks about an income revolution after the war where the middle and upper middle income groups increased in number. He says that by 1957, over 38 per cent of American families had an income over \$6,000 a year in the aggregate, about two thirds of the nation's total income. This gave them an important place in the American economy. According to this book, consumers tended to be optimistic, which in concrete terms meant that they bought more durable goods like cars or TV sets. Katona notes that '... close to half of all American families made a major expenditure for durable goods in every year between 1950 and 1957. The lower the age and the higher the income of the buyer, the more frequent are these expenditures.' These expenditures are the result of a buoyant optimism, which is proof against depressing economic news and high interest rates on instalment purchases.

Another attribute of American consumers, according to George Katona, is that they are always well-informed, what with their radios and TVs. But during these surveys, 'toward the end of 1955, less than one out of every five upper-income men answered yes when asked, Did you hear any unfavourable (economic) news recently? In spite of this suggestive questioning, only relatively few people could think of such things as inflation, low farm incomes or a high consumer debt, which were quite frequently discussed in the Press at that time.' Katona does not say how, in spite of this conclusion, the American consumers could be called well-informed, or why they saw only 'good times' ahead.

'Good Times' were not restricted to buying more durable goods. Leisure too could, and did, become more expensive with 'great varieties of activities'. 'Instead of sitting at home with a book or a newspaper, the common pastimes became driving around by car, eating out, going on fishing trips, staying in motels. . . watching television was the least expensive of the leisure time activities.' But who 'stimulated' all these 'great varieties of activities', why and how,

Katona does not say, even though he has stressed in this book that the answers to 'why' and 'how many' form the most salient features of any survey.

Surveys were not always conducted when they were most needed. There were two occasions on which surveys could have used all those specialists to gauge unguessed motives. One was the buying spree in America during the early part of the Korean war, when buying spurts coincided with defeats on the Korean front. The other was the decision by a substantial number of consumers in 1951 to reverse the trend and to save instead. No surveys seem to cover these two contradictory trends, first in discretionary expenditure by consumers and then in discretionary savings, even though they fall within the scope of this book.

Savings, however, are not of much interest to the author. 'Consumers as well as business firms, through not spending some of their income may retard economic activity.' An article in *Fortune* expressed the same view in 1956—'As a normal part of life, thrift is near now un-American.' Insurance schemes and collective security plans, according to Katona, have done away with the need for discretionary saving. The wide prevalence of instalment schemes have made it possible to buy durable goods out of current income, and have eliminated the need to save for future purchases. Even so, some people do save, and survey teams found that motives for saving vary with income. Among the lower income groups, people still save for old age or retirements in spite of the collective security schemes. As the income goes up, many more motives for saving come in.

For the purpose of this book, American society, with all its variations, has been divided into two categories—the achievement minded and the security minded. The latter, poor things, are rather sticks-in-the-mud. They are less optimistic and buy much less of the durable goods. The achievement-minded, on the other hand, look ahead. They buy many more durable goods and also save more, perhaps to buy still more later. That is how they perform their patriotic duty of increasing the 'acceleration' of production. No sooner is one demand satisfied, another comes up. After being a one-car family, they aim for two cars, and after owning their home, they progress from a one-house family to a two-house one.

This increasing desire for more and more, which led to a colossal consumer debt in the fifties, made the Federal Reserve Board sit up and take notice. Thinking people became anxious as to what would happen in the event of recession. But such problems, even though they are very relevant to consumer expenditure, have no place in this book. Katona admits that 'instability of the economy is still one of our most pressing problems,' but he talks of 'waves of confidence' and 'waves of mistrust' as though they were some phenomena well beyond human control. But the American people have learnt that it is not so. During World War II, they saw how their government's expenditure kept employment at a

high level, and what happened during war could also happen in times of peace.

Within his own limited sphere, what Katona has said is interesting. But what has been left unsaid is vital.

Kusum Madgaokar

CONSUMER ECONOMICS By James N. Morgan.

Prentice-Hall, Inc., New York, 1955.

According to the author, this book could not have been written much earlier, for our knowledge of consumer behaviour, motivations, and aspirations, was limited until the development of the personal interview survey with a representative sample of consumers. Hence the growing importance of market research techniques.

This study concerns the consumer's behaviour in a modern capitalist society, which is the U.S. in this case and far removed from Indian conditions. The consumer has to know a great many things if he wishes to avoid mistakes he will later regret. This is not easy, because the facts change, nor do they speak for themselves, as they are supposed to do. Much interpretation is involved before facts become really useful, and this necessitates the understanding of some general principles. Such basic principles and distinctions are unavoidable, as even the direct economic choices a consumer makes which involve rather complex problems. The handling of abstractions is technical and can be heavy going.

In the context of the acute food shortage and ever rising prices in this country, this survey makes strange reading but has lessons to offer. The problem in the U.S. is not how to meet essential want but how to create artificial want to prevent an oversaturated economy from collapsing. Vance Packard brings this out with startling nakedness in his well-known book, *The Waste Makers*, which was reviewed in an earlier issue of Seminar. It is possible to have a buyers' strike there as a pressure on prices, and this was mentioned as a cause of the 1958 recession by many American businessmen. But over here we are being pressed to curb expenditure to check inflation when even the necessities are beyond the reach of many. Consumer economics assumes that the consumer has a choice. We have not yet reached the stage of choice, or of being the chosen. Before we take off, we must know how to come back.

What are the basic principles and distinctions, and how far do they apply to our society? The real cost of any decision is the value of what was given up—what the economist calls the 'opportunity cost'. The distinction between real value and monetary value is also important. A cynic is supposed to be one who knows the price of everything and the value of nothing, and we are living in a cynical age. The dichotomy between price and value is obvious in our country, but there is inflation even in the U.S., and depreciation is hidden by the inflation of property values, so that a 'capital gain' more than offsets the depreciation. How familiar all this sounds. But depreciation is relentless and independent of inflation. Next, time is money, and we waste both. However

uncertain the future, it has to be provided for, so it is as foolish to oversacrifice the present for the future as the future for the present. If savings continue to depreciate in value, where is the balance in this dilemma?

We come to the discrepancy between individual and social interests, for instance, the effect of too many people trying to do the same thing at the same time and causing an economic traffic jam. Economists call this confusion the 'fallacy of composition'. The behaviour of the consumer is unpredictable but not impervious, while the problem of the economist is how to regulate contradiction enough to stop it from getting out of hand. If everyone tries to save half his income, the resulting depression may make it impossible for anyone to save. On the other hand, if everyone tries to spend all his income, the consequent competition in spending will bid up the prices, and very few will be better off.

Next, we have to separate equity and efficiency, but this also is a contradiction. If the necessities of life such as food are cheap and luxuries are expensive, the poor will be better off than they would be with the same income distribution in a market which demanded high food prices but offered cheap Cadillacs. Economics is hard on value judgments, but the distinction is still useful analytically. Finally, we are all learning all the time, but not unlearning fast enough. Concentration on the same sources of satisfaction can lead to the virtual exclusion of others, equally if not more satisfying.

The chapter on the social consequences of consumer saving is more interesting and important. Economists have been aware of the basic dilemma for years, but it was not until John Maynard Keynes came out with a pioneering bomb-shell in 1936 in his *General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money*, that the nature of the problems began to be seen systematically. Since then there has been no world economic crisis of the severity and magnitude of 1929 and the years following, in fact there has been no such crisis at all apart from the crisis of civilisation. It was the answer to Marx, but the emergence of two world markets where there was only one before may have also helped.

There was general awareness that someone had to buy all the goods that were produced or a depression would come and, alternatively, that someone had to produce more than he consumed if any resources were to be available for investment in productive capital. Too little saving leads to inflation of prices, and too much saving, to unemployment and deflation. Instead of leaving such a crucial decision of where to draw the line to the erratic consumer, it became necessary to try and provide for more scientific and controllable regulators or built-in stabilisers, as the cognoscenti prefer to call them.

The Keynesian Revolution defines that, at any given time, with the amount of capital equipment and the labour force available; there is some total amount of goods and services which can be produced

if all resources are fully employed. The ideal situation is one where all these goods and services are bought at prices that provide a 'normal' level of profit, but without bidding up prices, or leaving unsold goods. It became clear by the later 1930's that if equilibrating forces were working, they were working far too slowly for comfort. During World War II and later, according to the author, it became clear that apparent self-interest would lead individuals and businessmen to action which made the situation worse, this time in an inflationary direction.

Within each of the three 'sectors' of the economy—government, corporations, and people, there will be some who are spending more than their incomes and some who are spending less, but it is instructive as a first approximation to see whether the goods and services purchased in a given sector equal the available income.

Before such a study on consumer economics can excite us, there must be enough to consume, because the position of the consumer in a society where basic wants have still to be satisfied over a large area, is different from the dilemma of the consumer in a way of life where the problem is not what to buy but what to leave out. Greed leads to envy, and the challenge before social justice is how to combine incentives with deeper satisfactions.

A. K. Banerjee

ADVERTISING IN A FREE SOCIETY By Ralph Harris and Arthur Seldon.

Published by the Institute of Economic Affairs, London 1959.

Ever since advertising became a major factor in modern marketing techniques, it has aroused a great deal of controversy. It has its protagonists and, it has its adversaries but, as advertising has continued to grow, it is obvious that it has a necessary function to perform and yields results. Otherwise, how can one conceive of hard-headed, calculating businessmen in the U.S.A., England and other West European countries allocating larger and larger sums under this head.

In an effort to find out how advertising arose and developed in the U.K., how it is working and should work, Harris and Seldon undertook this study. They carried out extensive research, examined the economic function of advertising, sought assistance from advertisers and advertising practitioners and from organizations that spoke for them. They wanted an objective and balanced assessment. Their findings are well-presented and their evidence quite weighty. They have tried to arrive at their conclusions from the standpoint of the consumer, and, on a longer view, are concerned whether advertising strengthens or weakens the forces making for economic advance.

Part I of the book is largely historical and descriptive. Advertising arose in Britain two centuries ago, when 'individual enterprise broke their ancient bonds of consumption', and a variety of goods began

In the room the women come and go

Talking of Michael Madhusudhan

Satyajit Ray

Rising Prices


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Handicrafts

(with apologies to E. Thomas Stearns)



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to be produced giving the consumer a choice. Advertising grew in importance as, with new inventions and discoveries, with new sources of power, with bigger and bigger export markets to exploit, large scale industry and mass production of goods developed. Consumers, with greater purchasing power in their hands, had to be told what new goods were available, how their living standard could be raised, how their daily chores could be minimised.

The need also arose for manufacturers to brand their goods and to build up confidence in the public in their respective brands. Then, competition grew with manufacturers striving to introduce better and newer products to get an edge over their rivals. Harris and Seldon note that there were quacks and mountebanks in the field of advertising and there were obscure and unfounded claims made for certain products.

But, since the early days, it has come a long way, great improvements have been effected in techniques, standards of efficiency and honesty have risen and the majority of advertising practitioners no longer regard it as 'conjuring with persuasive slogans and attacking rival products without much concern for truth or taste.' Now there is a scientific approach and advertisers are 'integrating their advertising campaigns into a comprehensive marketing strategy, designed to suit the product to price, packaging, sales force, customers and retail outlets.'

In this setting, Harris and Seldon describe how advertising is now organised, how media are evaluated and the role of the advertising agencies, which are no longer space brokers or representing one or another media but experts in the field, advising clients objectively. They go into the question of advertising costs which accounted for less than 2 per cent of the net national income in Britain in 1956, the U.S.A. spent 2.9 per cent, Canada 2.3 per cent, the United Kingdom 1.7 per cent, Japan 10 per cent. In discussing this question, they also point out that 'a large part of the apparent cost of advertising is returned to the public in the form of free or cheaper services (e.g. cheaper newspapers).

Part II reviews the criticisms made by economists and others and the claims made for advertising by its practitioners. This is an important part of the book for here the *pros* and *cons* are examined and a balanced assessment attempted.

The authors state that most of the criticisms 'derive either from ignorance about its nature and purpose or from specific abuses by short sighted or unscrupulous advertisers.' Advertising is necessary to sustain a free economy, 'where consumers and citizens have to be persuaded rather than browbeaten into accepting a product or a political party.' At the same time, they feel that 'the claims made by advertising agents must necessarily carry limited conviction: success stories are likely to be exaggerated and

campaigns that fail (yet from which valuable lessons might be drawn) to be ignored or played down.'

They point to certain abuses and distortions and suggest a number of remedies—pooling of experience by advertisers, ban on subliminal advertising, strict rules about television advertising to children, penalties against fraudulent advertising, independent investigation into the effectiveness of advertising, development of new media, avoidance of restrictive practices, independent consumer organisations, stricter codes of conduct and standards, and many others. All these are valuable suggestions, and action along these lines should be vigorously pursued if advertising is to be saved from degenerating into a tool in the hands of big business for greater profits at the cost of consumers.

Harris and Seldon have devoted a whole part to giving the evidence for advertising in support of the question 'Does advertising work?' This consists of several selected case studies showing the effectiveness of advertising.

One cannot get away from the fact that in a free-enterprise society advertising is an essential lever which cannot be discarded. But where advertising leads, at it is doing today in the U.S.A., to creating newer and newer wants, where it builds up false values of status, where it debases taste and culture, where it tries to manipulate through depth-probing and sex symbols the buying of citizens, it certainly gives rise to misgiving even among those who uphold free enterprise. Vance Packard's *Hidden Persuaders* was no alarmist warning.

Similarly, unrestricted production and making consumption the supreme duty of citizens leads to tremendous waste of a nation's resources, through built-in obsolescence in products, through adding unnecessary frills, like lengthening a car. Thus non-essential consumer goods are given preference over hospitals, colleges, libraries, parks, recreation grounds, and hedonism propagated as a national policy in neglect of the finer values of life and the development of a humanitarian culture. Vance Packard, in his *Waste Makers* has once again pointed to a dangerous portent in American economy which can be ignored only at the peril of rational human progress.

In India, in an underdeveloped economy, advertising has no doubt a place. But the time is gone when we can leave advertising to take its natural course. Just as we cannot afford to have an unplanned economy, we cannot afford to have unplanned advertising. In so far as it operates within well-defined social objectives it will serve a useful purpose. It must, for instance, try to divert the purchasing power of the people from investing in gold or lavish expenditure during marriages or funerals, towards buying a radio set or soap or some other useful commodity. It must educate, it must inform, it must persuade but must not create artificial wants or false values at the expense of the over-all development of the country.

V. M. K

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
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


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
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my Mummy and Daddy and work hard at school.

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

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symposium participants

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THE TRADITIONAL

C. Rajagopalachari, former Governor-
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A WORLD OF MAKE-BELIEVE

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Seminarist

A CASE STUDY

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BOOKS

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FURTHER READING

A select and relevant bibliography
prepared by **Dinesh C. Sharma**

COVER

Designed by **Chowdhury/Grewal**

The problem

VALUES pervade life. Every time you make a choice, it is because of, or at least in accordance with, some set of values.

The questions we can raise about value are numerous, inter-related and difficult. We can, to begin with, ask the question: what do we mean by value? How is this concept to be defined? This question itself was first clearly

asked in the twentieth century, having been previously confused with the question as to what things are valuable in themselves or what are the ultimate ideals which we should seek to achieve. Broadly speaking, modern philosophers have found three different types of answers to this question.

There is firstly the intuitionist school which holds that value or good is a unique, simple, indefinable concept. It is a special kind of quality called a non-natural quality to distinguish it from colour and the other types of qualities which we perceive with our senses. So, if I ask an intuitionist what value means, he will answer that he means a special type of quality which certain things possess. Like other qualities it is objective, it is out there in the object to be discovered by you and I. This was the view propounded by G. E. Moore at the beginning of this century.

In opposition to Moore, the logical positivists put forward the theory that value or good represents no concept at all. When you say 'X is good' you are not describing X in any sense. This proposition is what positivists call an emotive statement, not a descriptive one. An emotive statement reflects a 'pro' or 'con' attitude to the object. When you call something good you have a pro attitude towards it; when you call it bad you have a con attitude to it.

The third answer to the question, what do we mean by value or good, is a refinement of the positivist theory mentioned above. According to the neo-positivist, language has several uses. One of these is to describe things. Another is to commend or condemn things. Statements of the latter kind cannot be reduced to statements of the former. There is, for instance, an irreducible difference, according to the neo-positivists, between saying 'I like X' and 'X is valuable.' 'I like X' is about the person who makes the statement; it describes him. If the statement 'X is valuable' meant nothing more than 'I like X', then you would be unable to convey a meaning which this statement does convey. You would never be able to commend or recommend nor could you ever condemn anything. You could only describe your attitude towards it. Thus, to the question, what do you mean by value?, the neo-positivist would answer that by value he means to commend or recommend, by dis-value or negative value he means to condemn.

These theories themselves are of interest to philosophers. The layman need not worry about them over-much. From the practical point of view, all the three groups of philosophers have advocated something or the other which the individual ought to pursue. For the intuitionist the answer is simple. He recognises certain

things to be valuable and advises you to pursue them. The other two groups of philosophers would probably contend that nothing is good or bad in itself; it is all a matter of convention. Therefore, you might as well follow the conventions of the society in which you are born.

From the point of view of the common man, this is the fundamental question. What should I try to achieve? Does the good life consist in the following of certain rules such as telling the truth or *ahimsa*; irrespective of their consequences? Or is the aim of life the attainment of certain states of consciousness like knowledge, the enjoyment of beauty and friendship as the Bloomsbury group advocated?

In this connection a word must be said about the distinction between ends and means. In the past there were two schools of thought on this subject. The utilitarians, such as Mill for instance, believed that certain ends (in his case pleasure alone) were intrinsically valuable. If an action produced the desired end it was right. Actions considered in themselves had no value. The opposite point of view was represented by Kant, who maintained that certain actions were right in themselves. Duty was to be performed for its own sake; it was in his words, a categorical imperative.

In recent years, the issue has not been seen in quite as simple terms as it appeared to the utilitarians and the Kantians. It has been recognised, notably by W. E. Ross, former Provost of Oriel, in his celebrated book *The Foundations of Ethics*, that apart from certain ends, right actions also have some intrinsic value. He says for instance, that there is a 'prima facie obligation' to tell the truth and to keep your promises. The disvalue created by employing the wrong means, as in deception, will have to be more than off-set by the positive value of the object to be achieved. The rightness of means is extremely important in practical life: for the choice before us is between alternative actions to be performed here and now. The end is no doubt very important but between the means and the end lie many inponderables.

To the question, what should I set out to achieve?, there is an answer which is characteristically Indian: one which has been generally accepted through the ages. It is the view that the aim of life is the attainment of *moksha* or release. This view of the ideal is based on a metaphysic. Your imperfections not only create but, in a sense, constitute your individuality. Get rid of them so that you may become one with the infinite, the perfect. The Hindu ideal is essentially ascetic; the good things of this life are snares; avoid them. As a means to the attainment of this state of *moksha* or

release, the usual rigmarole of social life is permitted, in fact even enjoined, in the theory of the four stages of life. But in the end the good man must get beyond these things—happiness, love and knowledge in the ordinary sense of that word.

In India, we have continued at least to pay lip service to this ideal propounded centuries ago. The theoretical issues have to be squarely faced if tradition is to command more than conventional adherence. How shall we re-appraise in the light of subsequent thought, the metaphysical theory on which *moksha* is based? What validity can this ideal have for those who do not believe in souls, neither the individual nor the cosmic soul? If not for *moksha*, then for what else should I live and strive in this world? And if the ultimate end is release, why then should I surround myself with the material goods and comforts of industrial civilization?

Metaphysical theories are no doubt timeless: the old dogma can be given new garbs. Circumstances, however, do make a difference to practice. The theory of the four stages of life—the *brahmacharya*, *grihastha*, *vanaprastha* and *sanyasa*—may have been a practical possibility in a society based on agriculture. On the surface at any rate, some of these stages appear to have little validity or relevance in a modern industrialized India. This picture of the individual's stages of progress looks like an anachronism. Can the modern Indian set about loosening his bonds with life to retire into the forests at about the age of fifty? Is such a scheme economically feasible? Is it socially respectable?

Professor Erikson, a Harvard psychologist who recently conducted a seminar in Delhi, pleaded for a moratorium which would come between the *brahmacharya* phase and that of settling down into life as a *grihastha*. The argument was that the individual needs a little time in which to decide what he or she will make of life—a short period of withdrawal from the world, of inner searching, like Christ, going into the wilderness for forty days. According to the Indian scheme, the moratorium, the period of heart-searching, would seem to coincide with the *vanaprastha* stage. This may be due to the fact that the young person in ancient India did not have much choice in the selection of his profession, which was pretty well mapped out for him by his caste.

Be that as it may, the facts are not necessarily against the Indian scheme, for with the change from one's prime to the declining years there might well be need for a second stock-taking. Some western sociologists have noted signs of a growing impatience, a wanderlust in people in

their late middle years, possibly just for this reason.

So, the question arises: what should we make of the four stages in contemporary conditions? What about the pattern prescribed within each phase, the relationship between teacher and student, husband and wife and so on.

If the stages of life is the individual side of Hindu ethics, the social side is provided by the theory of caste. The hierarchy of the caste system reflected a set of values. Thus, pursuit of knowledge and religion were most highly regarded and the function of the other castes came lower in the scale. Incidentally, the suggestion that caste is now of political rather than social importance needs careful examination. If caste has indeed ceased to hold groups together, it is difficult to see how it can determine political alignments.

Recent studies of caste have tended to show that the caste system is not dying out, despite various legislative measures taken by the government. New and different values are however determining caste hierarchy. M.N. Srinivas gives examples of low caste groups in Orissa and other parts, who because of newly acquired wealth wished to improve their social status. In certain cases the desire to improve one's social status was fulfilled by getting the caste itself recognised as a high caste. This was achieved by what is described as 'the sanskritization of their (the caste's) custom, ritual and way of life, and all this was part of the process of stating their claim to be a high caste.

This method of improving one's status implies the acceptance of the traditional social values of Hindu society. On the other hand, we are told that there is a premium on backwardness because of the economic and political privileges accorded to backward castes. It seems that certain tribes have made a representation to government demanding that they should be recognised as backward. Here the operative values are evidently not those of Hindu society. A caste does not object to being called a 'low' caste. This is not looked upon as a stigma or at any rate it is more than made up for by what are recognised as the important advantages, namely economic and political preference. The actual working of the caste structure is an objective pointer to the values which actually obtain in Indian society today.

It is strange indeed that over the past half a dozen centuries or more, little has been added to the traditional scheme of values in India. This in itself might be a subject worthy of enquiry. Although philosophers may have chosen to ignore change, generally associated with illusion, Indian society could hardly be insured against it. The coming of Islam and,

thereafter, the opening up of the country to western science, industrialization, commercial competition in world markets and the democratic form of government, have shaken up the pattern of Indian life.

At one level, this conflict between traditional values, evolved to meet the requirements of a feudal society, and industrialization, came to the surface over the form of education to be adopted in this country. Was education to be conducted in Sanskrit and Arabic or should we change over to English? It was a choice between two different scales of Value—religion, traditional social organization and feudal economy were on one side and science, industrialization and scientific humanism stood on the other.

It is interesting to note that while the big names in the 19th century were ranged on the side of English and all which this implied, the position had undergone a significant change by the early decades of the twentieth. Thus the basic procedure of the scientific world scheme analysis is attacked by Tagore in his book *Sadhana*. He says: '...all the modern civilizations have their cradles of bricks and mortar. These walls leave their marks in the minds of men. They set up a principle of "divide and rule" in our mental outlook. We divide nation and nation, knowledge and knowledge, man and nature.'

Tagore's educational theory and practise and his emphasis on crafts were indications of a return to traditional values. In a more thorough-going and practical fashion this scheme of traditional values was asserted in the life and teachings of Gandhiji. The extent to which he affected the thinking of ordinary people, on matters ranging from sex to economic theory and religion, has yet to be measured.

Nevertheless, it is contended that he was responsible for a deep rift in the soul of India. While the majority accepted his scheme of values, a powerful minority, comprising the younger intelligentsia, rejected it in favour of the concepts of scientific industrial expansion and the welfare State. If there is a confusion of values in India today it is due to this fundamental cleavage in our thinking, represented by Gandhism on the one side and our five year plans on the other. What are the values implicit in our development plans and how they can be reconciled with Gandhism is a problem which awaits a solution.

The machine which has been progressively dominating western civilization in the last three centuries, has been firmly planted in the heart of developing India. Speaking of the machine in western civilization, Lewis Mumford describes it as a manifestation of faith and religion.

Technical development was looked upon as an end in itself. The machine took precedence over man. In a capitalist economy the machine was over-worked, over-enlarged and over-exploited in the interests of private profit. But today the West is realizing the need to integrate the machine in society. What is important are the needs of human beings to which the machine must be subordinated. Some loss in efficiency for example may be less important than the sense of purpose achieved by avoiding a mechanical activity on the part of workers.

In India, where we have jumped into the middle of a technical civilization, are we avoiding the evils of the machine age—the slums and the squalor, the loss of individuality and sense of purpose in living? Power, precision, cleanliness and order are aesthetic values which emerge from the machine. Colour and variety are associated with crafts, many and varied in India. To what extent are these values being combined in the planning of our cities, in massive development projects, in workers colonies and in the design and decoration of average Indian homes?

I said in the beginning that value affects every aspect of life. In education, literature, painting, music and sculpture, there is need for a scale of values and these values themselves must be subject to scrutiny and revision. For, while we recognise the existence of absolute standards of value, there is no reason to suppose that our particular judgements of value are final. A symposium on revaluation might, therefore, proliferate endlessly. I would like, however, to present one further aspect of this problem of value because it seems to affect our plastic arts in general and has repercussions on our daily living.

It has been said that Indian art is basically religious or spiritual. If we are to understand and assess it, we must employ standards which are not merely aesthetic. I would go further, and suggest that most often a work of art is treated primarily as an icon, a holy representation rather than a thing of beauty. This attitude explains the garlanding of sculptures or paintings of some of our distinguished men. The piece of sculpture or the painting is viewed as an object of reverence, not as something to be enjoyed. This would also explain how we come to produce and use as decoration in our homes excruciating representations of Netaji and Jawaharlal Nehru in uniform not to mention the entire pantheon of gods and goddesses. In an age not noted for depth of religious feeling, this release from purely traditional faith is essential for the development of a healthy scheme of values.

P. C. CHATTERJEE

Valuational standards

N. K. DEVARAJA

VALUES may be defined as the objects or states of affairs, actual or imagined, which are considered interesting and/or desirable by normal human beings. The definition emphasizes the relative or relational character of the values: there can be no values apart from and transcending the perception and imagination of the normal human being. This simply means that if there are any values which are actually transcendent with respect to the faculties of man, they cannot be of interest to human beings and form the subject matter of their discussion.

This does not imply that values are merely subjective, and so not quite respectable to merit scientific treatment. That values as known to us exist or subsist only in relation to man, does not imply that they do not also have an independent and objective status; for the so-called facts, too, as distinguished from values, do not enjoy

their peculiar existence and character without relation or reference to man and his peculiar faculties. The sciences of biology and physiology inform us that different living beings are endowed with different numbers and kinds of organs, with the consequence that the different species differ from one another considerably in their modes of apprehension and response in regard to the same kinds of objects and situations.

Long ago the scientist, Galileo, and the philosopher, John Locke, drew a distinction between the so-called primary and the secondary qualities, affirming that while the former inhered objectively in things, the latter were merely subjective, i.e., dependent on the constitution of percipient subjects. The distinction was vehemently assailed by Bishop Berkeley who argued, in *A New Theory of*

Vision, that the so-called primary qualities could not really be shown to be independent of the knowing minds. Russell remarks: 'Ever since Berkeley, Locke's dualism on this point - (i.e. in regard to primary and secondary qualities) has been philosophically out of date.' (*History of Western Philosophy*, p. 630.)

Relational Character

The conclusion is that facts and the physical objects which we see are as much *relational* in nature as the values, and the latter are no more subjective than the former. Human beings are driven to see values as irresistibly as they are compelled to face facts and different objects. As a matter of fact, no hard and fast line divides values from facts; facts, situations and objects become bearers of values when thrown into a certain relationship with the sensibility or awareness of the interested and purposeful observers.

Values may be conveniently classified as ultimate and instrumental. An ultimate value is one which is desired by sentient beings or by man for its own sake; instrumental values are those which are sought after as means to the realization of the first class of values. It has been contended that the ultimate values are identical with the states of mind or experience which are considered desirable in themselves. But here a qualification needs to be made: the ultimate values so defined must in some sense be sharable.

In many cases, what is sharable is the apprehension or knowledge that a certain state of affairs is desirable either as an end or as a means. The health of a patient is regarded by the physicians as being an end worth attaining, but that end cannot be identified merely with the states of the physician's mind. Similarly, a particular social or political legislation, or a state of affairs such as the independence of one's country, may be desired or sought after as an end in itself, though the state of affairs in question may also be a means to further ends.

G. E. Moore, the realist, thought that goodness or the good existed

as an attribute of things or situations in the external world. While attempting to bring about a situation or state of affairs, we are not primarily aiming at the production of a state of our minds. Therefore, it seems that ultimate values need not be identical with the subjective states of different observers. When people are not engaged in producing a certain state of affairs in the external world, they are trying to produce the state of mind which can be shared. States of affairs of the latter kind are produced by poets, artists and thinkers; these are embodied by them in different kinds of symbols. The symbolized states of mind are sharable by those who have received the training necessary for the understanding or interpretation of the symbols in question. Other states of affairs, regarded as being the bearers of values, are cognised with the help of the senses of sight, hearing, etc.

External Reality

According to our definition, then, ultimate values cannot always be identified with the states of mind; some of such values can be equated with the external states of affairs. When a political worker strives for the independence or prosperity of his country, it cannot be reasonably maintained that what he aims at is the production of a certain state of his mind. The independence and/or prosperity of the country is something capable of existence in the external world; it cannot be identified with a state of mind. Of course, the *apprehension* of the fact of independence is a subjective state, as also the feeling of elation or self-respect which may accompany the advent of independence.

But this and other feelings are not what are *directly* aimed at by the fighters for freedom. A delightful state of mind may be engendered by an illusion of a certain state of affairs, e.g., independence, but no patriot will be satisfied with such an illusion. Nor would a patriot be satisfied with having delightful states of mind produced through magical, hallucinatory devices. It follows that what the patriotic fighters for

the independence of their respective countries aim at is not merely a set of pleasant feelings, but a real, objective state of affairs. Some such states of affairs may deserve to be called the ultimate values.

In most cases, ends and means cannot be neatly divided from one another. Things like health may be looked upon both as ends and as means. Power may be regarded as a means for securing benefits for oneself or others, but it is also pursued by the politicians and governments as an end in itself. Similar remarks apply to wealth. Women seek to enhance their physical charms not merely because looking charming is something desirable in itself, but also because it contributes to their having power over their husbands and lovers.

Things or situations which are regarded as being valuable in the ultimate sense may be divided into two classes, sensuous and non-sensuous. Agreement in regard to the beauty or other kinds of ultimate worth attributed to visible, sensuous objects is difficult to attain. Persons of different temperaments and with varying equipment and training with respect to literature and other fine arts may not find a certain sunset or a face or a flower beautiful to the same degree at a particular moment of time. Nor is there any method known to us by which differences in regard to such objects may be ironed out.

Meanings

But, agreement in regard to the *meaning* and significance of a human situation, moral and social, economic and political, may be more easily attained. Not that differences in respect of these are either non-existent or rare, but the differences in question admit of more or less rational discussion, which shows that they relate to objectively present factors. These objective factors will be seen, in the last analysis, to be constituted by *meanings*, and not by sensory qualities. The very fact that we can intelligently and intelligibly discuss the consequences of such phenomena as a global war and

uclear bombardment, etc., is proof that the imagined situations have more or less the same meanings for all rational beings; or, in other kinds of cases, for all people belonging to a particular State, race or community.

The meanings of the socio-political phenomena may be ultimately analysed into *the possibilities as regards ends and means considered significant by those likely to be affected by them*. It is these meanings inhering, so to say, in objects and situations which constitute the objective core for all competent observers. These meanings, again, are what make it possible for men and women to communicate, sympathize and co-operate with one another.

Criteria

We shall now talk about the criteria or standards by which the value or worth of entities may be brought under the judgment of more or less. Is it possible to obtain any dependable, objective criteria for judging the relative worth of different artistic and literary productions and of the different kinds of moral action? The prevalence of large-scale differences of opinion in these and other such fields seems to suggest that there are no objective criteria available here.

The question whether the values and the criteria used to judge them are objective, and so capable of precise formulation, is a fundamental and difficult one. No method is known by which the objectivity of values and their criteria may be rigorously demonstrated; and yet mankind cannot help behaving as if it believed both the values and the standards used to judge them to be objective. As we observed earlier, the only proof that a phenomenon is objective is that men and women who are normally constituted find it possible to agree with regard to it. The fact truly disturbing to the upholders of the objectivity of values and evaluating criteria is one of widespread differences among men and women respecting the different kinds and grades of value. It is not possible for us here to consider all the matters

relating to these differences and uncover all the factors responsible for them. We shall content ourselves with making two series of remarks.

Objective Existence

(1) The very fact that people find it possible to argue and discuss about values shows that the latter have some sort of objective existence. The main reasons why people still disagree about them are the following. First, human beings cherish and seek a plurality of values. The values are generally interconnected, the pursuits of these are also linked together. In a moment of conflict a person is generally confronted with the following problem: which of the two values, both of which cannot be realised together, should be sacrificed? Should I stay safe at my home in obedience to the wishes of my dear parents and relatives, or should I recruit as a soldier or general to fight against the enemies of my country? Both the courses of action are calculated to produce values, but of different kinds; and the conflicting courses and the values linked with them cannot be chosen simultaneously.

Secondly, I may be faced with the problem of choosing one of the two evils in a situation where it is not possible simultaneously to avoid both of them. In a well-known Greek tragedy, a woman is required to choose between the death of her husband and that of her son.

Apart from this, different thinkers attach different degrees of importance to different groups of related values. To Mahatma Gandhi, the highest value consisted in the moral development of humanity; as a consequence, he could not see eye to eye with those who wanted to win India's independence at any cost and by any means which were expedient. The values which seem to be paramount to the worldly, are looked at with indifference by the man of religion. Similarly, artists, thinkers, scientists, etc., have each a different set of values to cherish and pursue.

(2) Some idealist thinkers have held that judgments of better and

worse in any field imply the existence of the best. The autological argument for the existence of God seeks to deduce the existence of a Perfect Being from the notion of perfection supposed to be present in the human mind. These arguments do not seem to be acceptable to us. We can judge two poems or two deeds relatively to one another without having the least idea as to what a perfect poem or a perfect deed is like. The compositions of the best poets as known to us are more or less ideal, but none of them could perhaps claim to be absolutely perfect.

Comparisons

In fact, we discover both the excellences and the blemishes of different compositions by comparing them with one another and with the works of acknowledged masters in the field. A well-trained and experienced critic may, indeed, be able to say of a particular play or sonnet of Shakespeare that 'it is a perfect composition'; but he cannot guarantee that a still better sonnet or play could not be written at all. Indeed, it may be difficult to choose between several excellent sonnets and plays of Shakespeare himself. Nor could a critic lay down, once and for all, the criteria for judging literary excellence. The reason is that great writers, including poets, novelists, playwrights, are always making new discoveries in regard to the methods and techniques by which ever new aspects of human experience are being revealed and recreated.

Some of the novels of Tolstoy and Dostoevsky are great masterpieces, but no critic who fashioned his criteria on the basis only of their works could probably do justice to the achievements of such later writers as James Joyce and Virginia Woolf. Similarly, a critic judging Elizabethan tragedy by the canons laid down by Aristotle in the light of the works of the Greek tragedians, would not be able to do justice to the former. The fact is that achievements in the realm of the arts and the

humanities, no less than those in the sphere of human action, admit of infinite creative variations, which cannot be comprehended under any set of rigid rules and formulas.

No Finality

This does not imply that there are no rules or standards applicable in the evaluation of human achievements in different fields. The truth is that these rules and standards can never be formulated with completeness and finality. All formulations of principles, ideals and criteria for judging man's attempts and accomplishments are incomplete and more or less tentative, even as all the formulations of physical principles by the physical sciences, howsoever precise-looking, are, in the last analysis, tentative and incomplete.

No set of criteria, no rule-of-thumb, can infallibly guide a critic to correct judgment of a work of art or thought, particularly the work of a contemporary writer, thinker or artist lacking the sanction of time and tradition—unless that critic, in addition to having a wide and thorough acquaintance with the masterpieces of the past, has the capacity to enter into the new variations in sensibility and mode of expression introduced by the new author. To say this, however, is not to deny the truth of Eliot's pregnant assertion that all writers from Homer down to the modern authors are, for the purpose of valuation, contemporaneous.

The truth is that the greatest achievements of man in the different fields of values are preserved by him, or by history, in the form of symbolized records. These records, which are rekindled into life under the contemplative gaze of each new generation and each individual, constitute the ever growing and developing 'cultural self' of mankind—a self whose impulses can be inherited or shared by later generations and individuals through proper training and willing effort. This cultural self of humanity may be regarded as truly immortal; it occupies the enduring continuum of man's cultural space-time, and so is un-

touched by the vicissitudes of physical space and time.

We can pass judgment on the diverse achievements of man as an occupant of the aforesaid continuum. While perusing a literary masterpiece or a work of thought, our total sensibility, the five *skandhas* constituting our personality, become largely identified with the awareness and feelings embodied in the work under scrutiny. We can judge the worth of that work only on the basis of our recollection of the total sensibility awakened by similar works, or works of the same class, enjoyed by us in the past.

Plurality

It follows from this that an act of judgment relating to the value or worth of a complex, existing either in a visible or symbolized form, involves some sort of comparison, contrast, etc. All judgments of worth are in the last analysis relational as well as relative. The real criteria involved in evaluative judgments are the complexes of cognitions and feelings aroused by the cherished specimens in a particular field of achievement. All formulations of standards are nothing but attempted analyses of the essential features (i.e. characteristics regarded as essential by the experts at a particular epoch of history) of the specimens under reference.

The advancing history of man in different fields of value-pursuit makes it necessary for him to examine and reformulate or modify the accepted criteria of valuation in the light of the experiments and achievements of his own time. The creators of value in different fields, like Tennyson's God, fulfil themselves in many ways; and man has to rest content with a plurality of standards or criteria, each of which can be formulated with only a degree of precision. The more successful critics of arts and morals, indeed, depend in their respective valuations not so much on formulated rules and criteria, as on the insight developed through the contemplation of a variety of art-works and of noble deeds.

The traditional

C. RAJAGOPALACHARI

THE comprehensive and learned poser-article furnishes by its very clarity answers to many of the questions posed. I am not a man of wide reading and, therefore, most of the great names and ideas

put up in the article were new to me and inspiring.

Recognizing and appreciating the heavy systematic thinking shown in the articles published from time to time in *Seminar*, the like of

which I could never hope to achieve, I did not dare making any contribution in spite of repeated requests and have been admiring the journal, so to say, from a distance. This time the editor's request has been renewed with increased force and I hesitatingly offer the following few words out of respect for his wishes.

I am a superstitious person in the etymological sense of the term, a revivalist, everything un-intellectual. I believe in some things not related to reason and rationality. I believe reason and rationality cannot cover all things and some of them are important and cannot be ignored. My irrationality is fairly well known now and therefore will not unduly disturb readers of *Seminar*.

Sunless Worlds

If one does not believe in a soul, individual or cosmic—I am taking a sentence from the poser—one must wander in deep darkness. The world for such a one will be sun-less.

*asurya naama te lokaa
andhena tamasaavrtaa
taanste pratyabhisachchanti
ye ke cha aatmahanojanaah*

Isha Upanishad

Those who do away with the soul die their deaths (by that denial) and go to sunless worlds, dense darkness overhanging. If man has only a body and no surviving soul, there can be no values—only pleasure and pleasure-producing objects remain. Shall we hang on to life and work for the good of humanity, that is, for future generations? Why must one do anything for them? What binds you to do it? And why should even they struggle and live if there is no soul but only body. Indeed, if there is no soul, all values disappear.

Let me get out of my superstitions for a moment. Let me talk the language of evolution, taking for granted that man came after millions of years through countless accidental mutations of the genes

during that period and that through natural selection, he became man as he is today. Values such as truth, fellow-feeling, respect for life, respect for contracts, the cooperative spirit, compassion, gratitude, etc., grew up and fixed themselves in man's mental make-up, because they had all great survival value. If we reject them, it would be like the lion and the tiger discarding their reckless ferocity, or like the birds throwing away their wings, or the bull its horns or man himself casting away his brains and his upright posture. The values men cherish are evolutionary products and it is well we stick to them. They are dreadfully important for man's survival and progress.

What go by the name of 'traditional values' are values prevailing all the world over but differing in degree from nation to nation. Where secular forces and institutions have come to cover the same values, the traditional character of some of them may have got blurred or forgotten.

Inscrutable Design

If destructive scepticism develops about these traditional values and a movement to discard them should succeed, man would go back to the condition he emerged from by the grace of accidents; and he will be but a poor and feeble wild beast and probably disappear from the face of the earth. What I have said must have been said by some people long ago although I have not read it. I guess Herbert Spencer must have said it and must have said it much better.

But as could be guessed from what I have confessed at the outset, I do not accept the Darwinian theory of blind blundering evolution. I believe there is design in it of some inscrutable kind and these values are therefore part of man's divinely designed being. They will not be given up by mankind although some men may discard them and suffer for it. Secularly enforced laws can never adequately take the place of traditionally inherited values.

A world of make-believe

M. K. HALDAR

THANKS to a type of Indology which follows from Max Weber's characterization of Hindu civilization, there is a belief that the Indians since the days of yore have given one particular answer to the question 'what should I set out to achieve?' and that answer is: *moksha*. It has also been held that this view of the aim of life is based on a special type of metaphysical doctrine which treats the world known through the five senses and the intellect as the product of a sort of cosmic illusion traditionally known as *maya*. It is further held that the golden way to snap the snare of this cosmic illusion is through a rigorous practice of a course of world and life negation, the life of an ascetic, which enjoins us to deny all worldly pleasures, especially the pleasures of love and sex and asks us to concentrate our consciousness on the indefinable Absolute so that our souls may attain oneness with something accessible only through

bodhi, *pragyan* or some such incommunicable and nugatory state.

When we want to discuss the traditional values in India, we should first try to travel from the field of mythology and legend to the field of history. We should ask whether throughout history Indians recognized *moksha* or *nirvana* (it is unnecessary here to go into the Talmudistic differences between *moksha* and *nirvana*) to be the most desirable end of life or not? Indian history between the days of the Harappan civilization and the Asokan empire poses almost an insurmountable difficulty. We do not find any substantial primary historical evidences of this period. What scholars have done is a conjectural reconstruction from literary material which was written much later.

From the archaeological evidences of the Harappan culture, it

is difficult to ascertain what exactly the Harappan people thought about the aims of life. But from the meticulous care with which they built their cities, we would not be completely off the track if we thought that they took life on this earth seriously and tried to make it worth living.

That the early Rig Vedic Indians enjoyed living is an acknowledged fact by all Indologists. The Rig Vedic Indians were a war-like people, who enjoyed their drinks and beef. They were not ascetics (though we get some reference to their knowledge of ascetics) and neither did they think that the ideal of world and life negation was a worthwhile pursuit.

Recorded History

The authentic and continuous history of India based on primary historical sources begins with the days of Asoka. From his edicts and inscriptions, it is evident that *dharma* was not inextricably bound with the ideal of *moksha* or *nirvana*. If *nirvana* was the key concept of the Hindu religion or of Buddhism of the days of Asoka, we would have found the word in his inscriptions.

'The virtues that Asoka desired to inculcate among his subjects were the following as referred to again and again in one or other of the Inscriptions, viz., mercifulness towards all living beings; charities and gifts to *Brahmans*, ascetics, friends, relatives and acquaintances; truthfulness, purity of thought, honesty, gentleness, gratitude, self-restraint, steadfastness, non-injury to animal life and fear of sin; moderation in spending and ownership; respectfulness towards parents, elders and teachers; proper behaviour towards *Brahmans*, ascetics, relatives, servants and slaves; avoidance of ferocity, cruelty, anger, pride and envy; exertion in good works; relieving the sufferings of the aged, the indigent and the sick; toleration of and respectfulness towards other's faith; avoidance of meaningless rituals; avoidance of sectarian bigotry, etc.' (*Asoka's*

Edicts by Amulyachandra Sen, pp. 33-34.)

It is also significant to note that Asoka talks of heaven and not of *nirvana*; he talks of an after-world and not of rebirth. 'His conception of religion (*dharma*)... is not of the sentimental, emotional, ritualistic or even of the metaphysical or meditative type but is essentially of an active, humanitarian and benevolent character, viz., to be good and to do good to others. The road to heaven recommended by him is not renunciation although with great wisdom he advises "spending little and owning little".' (*Ibid.* p. 34.)

It is significant to note that Asoka was not against all types of war. He declared himself against wars of conquest. It should also be mentioned that in the Asokan times the ascetics were held in esteem; but nowhere did Asoka suggest that their life was worth following in so far as the common people were concerned. This latent ambivalence between the ascetic ideal and the ideal of Asoka had profound influence on the later-day Indian view of life.

Our history for the next several centuries after the days of Asoka has enough evidence to show that for a considerable time the vigour of the Indian people was not lost in the quest for nebulous *nirvana* or *moksha*. The literature, art, science and history of this period are mostly concerned with the so-called mundane life of ours even though the ascetics continued to be respected. To say that the Indians started sliding down the path of world and life negation with the eclipse of Buddhism is not history. Until the seventh or eighth century A.D. we find that we were second to none in the fields of literature, science and art.

Rise of Decadence

It may, however, be pointed out here that the Indians seldom evinced a tragic sense of life. The absence of any tragedy, barring the exception of one one-act play, in the vast corpus of Sanskrit literature is something to be considered seriously. It seems to me that

decadence in Indian civilization began with the rise of Sankaracharya and the Islamic invasions.

In the field of philosophy and metaphysics, the rise of Sankar, who had scanty knowledge of the positive sciences known to the Indians, heralded the decadence in Indian civilization from which it has not as yet been able to extricate itself. Whatever evidence we have of occasional attempts to find a breakthrough were lost in the wilderness of the ideal of *moksha*. The last such attempt was by Raja Ram Mohan Roy. It is significant to note that Sankar, acknowledged to be the greatest philosopher of all ages by the Indians, did not even know the role of the father in biological creation.

His greatness as a metaphysician remains unchallenged by the Indian thinkers of today. Even a cursory perusal of the proceedings of the Indian Philosophical Congress will dispel all the doubts of a sceptic in this regard. Surprisingly enough, this continues to be the fact even when the major portion of the curriculum of philosophy in the Indian universities is concerned with the development of philosophical thought in western countries.

Infallibility

The attitude of most Indian intellectuals continues to be the same as that observed by Iswar Chandra Vidyasagar in the middle of the nineteenth century. He wrote, 'Any idea when brought to them (the Indian pandits) whether in the form of a new truth or in the form of the expansion of truths, the germs of which their *Shastras* contain, they will not accept... Lately a feeling is manifest among the learned of this part of India, specially in Calcutta and its neighbourhood, that when they hear of a scientific truth the germs of which may be traced out in their *Shastras*, instead of showing any regard for that truth, they triumph and the superstitious regard for their own *Shastras* is redoubled.'

Further, 'They (the pandits of India) believe that their *Shastras*

nave all emanated from omniscient Rishis and, therefore, they cannot but be infallible. When in the way of discussion or in the course of conversation any truth advanced by European science is presented before them, they laugh and ridicule.

Sham Mysticism

These learned pandits of India with their supporters in the western countries have given us an impression that worldly life, was despised and secular activities condemned by Indians in all ages. This is a very popular view with most intellectuals who seldom take the trouble to probe deeper into the history and civilization of India, so much so, that the positive, materialistic, secular, energetic and allied institutions and theories of the Indian people have often been left completely unnoticed. And this, despite the thousand and one wars of Indian history as well as the million instances of sensuality, luxury, corruption and what not prevailing in the Indian society, as in the West, through the ages.

We readily neglect the vast corpus of literature bearing on bloodshed, sex life, economic prosperity, domestic bliss etc., think that the Indians never thought of this world, never thought of the human being in the concrete, and declare that some type of belief in a pseudo-mystic transcendent reality was the only thing with which the Indians of the past were concerned. Even the wisdom of ancient India gets mutilated in the hands of our contemporaries. A half-hearted mysticism justifying India's failure to face life squarely leads the Indian intellectual to a sphere where the individual human being loses his significance in the mumbo-jumbo of a sham mysticism.

The deep-rooted apathy towards change and development (this may have some relation to the Hindu idea of change: change, according to the Hindus, is cyclical and in the ultimate analysis, according to the most influential Indian schools of thought is either an illusion or an appearance) born out of frus-

tration and the certificates that the pseudo-intellectuals get from their fellow-travellers in the West have jointly created a world of make-believe. To them the truths have been discovered once and for all by ancient seers. There is no need to realize them progressively through diverse social, economic and cultural activities. Even the patterns of all future activities of men have been set by the ancient thinkers and social mores.

Against any independent pursuit of knowledge especially in the field of sociology, the humanities and technological development, there is the inevitable reply that the Indians must toe the line set by the ancient seers. Thus, Indian spiritualism of which we are so proud preserves a narrow and conservative form of escapism from concrete responsibilities. Buddhist compassion has become a pretext for not practising justice which must precede all charity. And tolerance has become identical with a cloying paternalistic indulgence. This paternalistic indulgence is reinforced by the concept of *dharma* entertained by an Indian.

Value in the sense of free choice from among alternatives seems to be completely out of place in the concept of *dharma* as it is or was understood by the Indians of today or of the past one thousand years or so. Indeed, the Indians' excessive preoccupation with *dharma* may well work to blunt their appreciation of what the value of human choice may be all about.

Ruled by Rules

The life of the average Hindu is governed by what is stated in the *Dharma Shastras* and the *Panjikas* and not by what the ill-informed scholar wants to impress upon us to be the *dharma*. Even a cursory perusal of the *Panjika* will convince the unwary that every minute detail of a Hindu's life is governed by rules. There are rules for eating brinjals on a particular day and avoiding the same on another day. The days on which a husband should not go to his wife are also stated there.

The concept of morality is circumscribed by the rules stated in

the *Dharma Shastras* and the *Panjika* as interpreted through a philosophy of world and life negation. That is why an Indian can be perfectly acceptable to the society even if he is corrupt in his official work. There is a convenient hiatus between what he thinks and what he does. He does not try to find the solution of his moral predicament in a moral adventure even if any such thing occurs to his mind.

Escape Routes

If he is able to compromise his knowledge from the West with his superstitious belief he often goes to a *Guru* or *Baba* or *Ma*, who looks after the well-being of his tormented self. The rise of the innumerable *Babas* and *Mas* and their immense popularity even in the so-called sophisticated circles is significant. I am told on reliable authority that university professors, high government officials and even Ministers have their *Babas* and astrologers!

The English educated go to the *Babas* and *Mas* to find an escape route from self-torture and suffering. But for the ordinary Indian the escape route from such predicaments has also been given by the *Shastras*. In the ultimate analysis he can renounce the world and become a *sanyasi*. A *sanyasi* is not governed by the social codes. Thus, a view of world and life negation permeates the outlook of the average Indian. Every Indian, however crudely he may be attached to his material possessions, dreams and talks of the time when he will renounce the world and become a *sanyasi* as soon as he is able to settle the affairs of his family which, incidentally, he seldom settles to his own satisfaction. This yearning for making good in the next life is further strengthened by his excessive preoccupation with death and death rites.

No matter if time and again Indians have dismissed life as mere illusion—the product of that inexpressible cosmic power, *maya*—I still think that they are most stubbornly and crudely attached to life. Does the way they wail after the death of someone dear to

them show that they seriously consider this life to be the product of *maya*—baseless fabric of fancy? Take a look at the ever-recurring role of *Sapinda* (one who has the right to offer *pindas* to a departed soul is a *Sapinda* of the dead man) in our life. For instance, if one wants to marry as a good Hindu, one must take account of one's *Sapindaship*; if one wants that one's soul be liberated, one must pay one's obeisance to one's ancestors as a *Sapinda*; if one wants to lay claim on inheritance, one must establish one's *Sapindaship*, and so on and so forth. All this is included in the Hindu concept of *dharma*.

The vast corpus of literature known as the *Dharma Shastras* gives us the guide lines of the minutest detail of a Hindu's day to day life. There are set codes of individual, social and ritualistic behaviours. And there are also codes for absolving oneself from the sin which one may commit by infringing upon a rule or a set of rules. As a result, the Hindu scheme of life is characterised by an absence of ethics. Only axiology and casuistry reign supreme there.

Western Impact

With the impact of the West on India, a new awareness of values and society was ushered in at the beginning of the nineteenth century. But this awareness was completely lost in the welter of extreme politicalization of the Indian intellectuals. Gradually, intellectual pursuit and discernment were jettisoned in the name of the 'inner voice'. Western impact has up till now failed to stir the depths of the minds of the Indian intellectuals not to speak of the average Indians who continue to live in their age-old 'proto-plasmic apathy'.

The short-lived euphoria as a result of the western impact is tending to disillusionment, frustration and cynicism. In the case of most of the intellectuals and politicians it has left only a new dimension—the dimension of hypocrisy and intellectual dishonesty. The transfer of power to Indian hands instead of arousing

the Indian intellectuals from their stupor, lulled most of them back to a still deeper stupor of trying to gain official patronage by means fair or foul. They are now too eager to take their vendetta on the western intellectuals very often on imaginary grounds. The lure of official patronage often masquerades as the fundamental unity and emotional integration of India. To rub out the rugged edges of their spiritual bankruptcy, many Indian intellectuals entertain some make-believe picture of India and use it as a sort of spiritual sand paper.

Conservative Conformism

Whatever the reason, a sort of persecution mania seems to have taken hold of many of the Indian intellectuals. Under such a situation a large measure of conservative conformism can easily be discerned. Power has become the cornerstone of goodness. The collective will is assumed to be transmitted by some process of osmosis to the ruling clique, which supposedly governs for the individual's good. Indian intellectuals seem to have forgotten that true individuality lies in our power to exercise our judgments to the best of our discretion.

The attitude of frustrated escapism is a swing to the other extreme. It represents a move from the infra-red of collectivism and conformism to the ultra-violet of ego-centric particularism. In the name of the collective and of social good the conservative conformist is often too prone to sacrifice the individual. In his zeal to bring an omnibus solution to all human problems he tends to hypostatize the collective and the social and forgets Henry George's warning: 'Social reform is not to be secured by noise or shouting, by complaints and denunciations, by the formation of parties or the making of revolution; but by awakening of thoughts and progress of ideas! Until there be correct thought there cannot be right action and when there is correct thought right action will follow.'

The conservative thinkers want us to stop thinking. And the anarcho-escapists suggest that our

thoughts should never be translated into social realities. Consequent to all this, after an initial euphoria, Indian architecture following the monstrosity created by Le Corbusier in Chandigarh has acquired an air of unreality; Indian films and film music give us aping versions of Hollywood; painting is chewing either the ancient Indian or the late nineteenth century French cud; and literature mostly sings the glory of the politically powerful or is a mutilated version of some stale craze in the West.

In short, most of the Indians are living in an hermetic world of abstractions, blue-prints, paper resolutions and make-believe, or are busy in cashing in on India's poverty while feeling that all nations which help us should be obliged to us for giving them an opportunity to do so. But so far as we ourselves are concerned there is no need for us to feel obliged to any one as that may militate against our principle of all-out non-alignment.

For the development of any significant number of enterprising men it is, however, essential that the channels of communication between men be free and unhampered. For the last several centuries these channels in India have been mostly monopolized in a very subtle and clever way by the caste and ascetic hierarchy. It has been done so subtly that it is very difficult to find out where exactly the centre of this monopoly lies.

Impervious to Values

Through an almost imperceptible process of indoctrination, and by the preservation of a sham purity of knowledge, ideas, and peoples, the leaders of the Hindu society have made the average Hindu completely impervious to values. The Hindu thinks that obedience is essential for social organization. All decisions are made for him by his elders, spiritual or chronological, who always know what is good for the young and 'inferior'.

To think that the contemporary Indian's reverence for the political-

ly powerful is a release from 'purely traditional faith' and that this 'is essential for the development of a healthy scheme of values' is a travesty of reason. The ordinary Indian bestows respect on the powerful.

Even a cursory survey of the causes for the reverence for the *Babas* and *Mas* and astrologers will convince us that the average Indian does not respect them for any spiritual upliftment. He respects them for very mundane reasons—for getting promotions in his job, for being successful in business, for curing his diseases and so on and so forth. Today he is finding that he can be more benefitted by the politically powerful and that is why he has developed a reverence for them. There is hardly any latent appreciation of values in this.

There is a tendency to entrench the above more firmly in the Indian society because of the type of centralized planning which the Government of India with its zeal for that nebulous concept, 'socialistic pattern of society', is trying to pursue. Our politicians and intellectuals who dance to the tune set by the politicians tend to forget that planning is necessary, but over-planning is disastrous for the growth of the individual. It would be preposterous to think that the Indian civilization did not unfold itself through planned growth. As a matter of fact the decadence in Indian civilization started from the time when we began to think in terms of over-planning. We failed to strike a healthy balance between social planning and individual development—a thing of which the ancient Indians were capable.

The tendency to chalk out a national policy of education and of such other cultural affairs reflects the cult of illiteracy ascendent in contemporary India. It is not for naught that some contemporary thinkers appreciate the fairly obvious analogy between the pretensions of modern historicistic social scientists and the age-old desire for omniscience manifest in astrological practices.

Western contact -

A. K. SARAN

THE British conquest of India was, in many ways, unique in our vast, checkered and unfortunate history. Unlike any previous conquest, this signified a profound spiritual disturbance, a kind of 'schism in the soul' of India. If we leave aside such invasions as those of Genghis Khan or the Huns, which never succeeded in establishing any stable rule, all conquests of India were, in one sense, religious: that is, they were often anti-Hinduism but never anti-Religion. The latter, a radically new dimension, appears for the first time in our history with our encounter with the West through the British conquest.

Now, the West was by no means irreligious; and, in any case, it is not our intention to argue that the West was not 'really' Christian, or that the British conquest was not motivated by Christianity, though both points are important in many ways. Our main point, however, is that in spite of considerable missionary activity (partly successful too) associated with the rise of the British power in India, the essential impact on the Indian social system was not that of Christianity.

This was due not only to the nature of British imperialism, but also to certain important features of Hinduism. (For instance, its combination of a thorough-going dialectic and a transcendent Catholicity.) Another characteristic of the British conquest was that it represented the decay of one age and the emergence of another. Thus the acceptance of

the conquest involved the acceptance of a radically different system of ideas: political, economic, legal, ethical and sociological. This again sharply differentiates the British conquest from all the others, which signified no radical departure from the tradition. (This does not mean that Hindu civilization is not profoundly different from the Islamic; however, both are traditional, transcendent-center civilizations: just as the American and the Soviet are both technological-industrial civilizations in spite of important differences between them.) A third characteristic of the British conquest was that it was completed at a time when Hinduism was trying to assert itself by throwing out the Islamic rulers of the country. It, therefore, meant a second defeat for Hinduism.

Logically, we should first define the authentic Indian value-system and then analyse the processes leading to important changes in it. To carry out this logical plan is, however, a very difficult job. The greatest single difficulty seems to be to get an agreement on what would decide whether a model was authentic. On the one hand, a purely logico-philosophical model of the Indian value-system would be open to the charges of being unhistorical and even unrealistic; on the other hand, an historical model, apart from other methodological difficulties, already involves an analysis of a long series of changes and hence one does not know where to begin for a specifically Indian set of values.

Main Challenge

The most important single response to the challenges of British rule was, of course, the formation of the Indian National Congress and the struggle for independence largely under its leadership. However, the peculiarities of the British rule gave this struggle a characteristic pattern. Our freedom struggle was progressive from a socio-economic point of view; at the same time, it was revivalistic from a cultural standpoint.

The revivalistic strain of our freedom struggle has been usually

called a renaissance movement; and this so-called renaissance ('re-awakening') has been generally thought to be a natural accompaniment of a freedom movement. However plausible such a view may appear, it is quite incorrect: the 'renaissance' movement introduced a fundamental ambivalence, a basic axiological schism in the ideology of our freedom movement. While the imperatives and urgencies of the freedom struggle contained the corrosive power of this ambivalence, it persists in the post-independence era with all its sinister power.

Westernization

The fundamental problems posed for the Indian people by the British conquest may be formulated somewhat as follows: shall we fight against both: foreign rule and westernization of Indian values and socio-cultural system; or, shall we accept the westernization of our values and way of life and fight only against (British) foreign rule? This challenge was never faced straightforwardly and perhaps could not be during a rigorous freedom struggle. For, very few, if any, could accept foreign rule in principle; and hence, while opposition to the British power was a simple and almost unanimously accepted idea, rejection of westernization presented a complicated issue. It was clear that westernization did not necessarily imply foreign rule. Opinion was, therefore, divided on accepting westernization.

However, during British rule and our struggle against it, the issue could not crystalize, for it had to be recognized that any acceptance of westernization must strengthen British rule to an appreciable degree, and in consequence weaken our fight against it. Hence, even those who rejected westernization independently of its affiliation with foreign rule, were not at all clear in their minds.

Their problem was twofold: in the first place, they had to recognize that a certain amount of westernization was necessary in order to be effective in the struggle for

Indian independence. Subjugation to the British rule meant a certain degree of unavoidable westernization, and under the circumstance, one had to meet the British on their own ground. To remove the national feeling of inferiority and to build up a measure of national confidence and self-respect, one had to accept and promote many aspects of western culture, particularly the educational system—even though this finally worked to undermine one's self-respect.

But, there was a more important difficulty; rejection of westernization would mean little without a clear idea of what was being preserved and defended. In other words, the problem was to have a clear and coherent idea of the specificity of the Indian value-system which was to be revived and preserved against the challenge of the western system. And here it has been extremely difficult to achieve the required clarity of thought. The difficulty essentially lies in the fact that our traditional way of life has a long history, going back to immemorial, prehistoric times during the course of which many streams of thought have arisen, both from within and without: thoughtways that were conflicting, complementary, parallel, eclectic, eccentric.

Single Tradition

Besides, archaic Hindu thought is often extremely abstract, symbolic and dialectic; and hence a naturally rich source for diverse interpretations and divergent developments. The serious difficulty of getting an absolutely authentic version of the tradition was clearly recognized as early as the *Mahabharata*, in Yudhishtra's answer to the Yaksha's question: What is *dharma*? However, the possibility of knowing the true *dharma* is not denied and the postulate of a single authentic tradition amidst the vast diversity of Hinduism has all along been affirmed, down to the present day.

This fundamental difficulty, whatever its correct solution, was further complicated in modern times by the implicit necessity of solving it in a manner consistent with western rationalistic values which, oddly enough, were passing

through a serious crisis in their homeland at about the same time as the beginnings of modernism in India.

Thus, the urgencies of overthrowing British power in India obscured the absence of any consistent positive content in the idea of *swadeshi* during our pre-independence days. However, if even today we persist in the fond desire of achieving a synthesis of modernity and Hinduism without a clear or consistent notion of what Hindu culture is, one fundamental reason is the essentially metaphysical nature of the Hindu tradition. We cannot elaborate here on the implications of this characterization, except to explain briefly that in the sense intended here, metaphysics are necessarily transcendent; they are consistent, but not systematic; and hence a metaphysical tradition, such as Hinduism, is inherently catholic, allowing for an unusually wide scope for diversity; and yet, at the same time, preserving its orthodoxy at appropriate levels.

First Principles

By the same token, the basic value-system of such a tradition is unchangeable. The only principle of change in the Indian social system is that of application of first principles to contingent circumstances. This clearly means that there are first principles which are universally valid for all time and hence there can be no question of any modification of these. Accordingly, there cannot be any socio-cultural system which denies the first principles. In other words, while a reactivation and re-formation of traditional meanings is indicated and is in order from time to time, a replacement of the first principles by any others is wholly out of order.

Another point which should always be remembered in any discussion of changing values, is that the Indian theory of history is a cyclic one (that is, in so far as this could be true of a transhistorical thought-system). It is understood, therefore, that in the Indian view all social change however orthodox, is in the last analysis, a deterioration; regressive rather

than progressive;—again, in so far as these latter concepts can be meaningful within a cyclic theory of history.

Two Impulses

This is the background against which we will briefly review some phases of the process of change in the Indian value-system following its encounter with the West. The whole process can be seen as developing from two interpenetrating impulses: the need to rationalize Hinduism and the need to modernize the Indian society.

Among the earliest movements was the Brahmo Samaj established in 1828 by Raja Ram Mohun Roy and later led by Devendra Nath Tagore (1817-1905) and Keshub Chandra Sen (1838-84). The latter, however, with his doctrine of *Adesha*, started a split culminating in the formation of the Sadharan Brahmo Samaj.

The Brahmo Samaj typifies clearly a persistent trend of the Hindu response to the western encounter. It endeavours to go back to the Upanishadic sources, at the same time it is rationalistic and humanistic. It has a strong individualistic bias and, although not formally rejecting or eliminating metaphysics, its outlook is essentially philosophical.

The Brahmo Samaj was rightly regarded by many orthodox sections as basically heretical. Its founder, Raja Ram Mohan Roy, had, from the traditional point of view, no qualification for the restoration or reform of the tradition. Traditional Hinduism being essentially transcendental and dialectical, goes past and dissolves all kinds of humanisms, rationalisms and individualisms. Hence, any reform or syncretic movement centering in these latter ideas is bound to be essentially anti-traditional. The Brahmo Samaj was motivated by a defensive spirit against the joint forces of Christianity and western rationalism. Hence it tried to absorb what it thought best and valid in both. But incompatibles don't mix.

The truly symbolic figure of the modern age in India is Paramhansa

Ramakrishna who, however, founded no sect in the strict sense of the term. Nor did he expound any new doctrine or try to carry out any reform or reinterpretation of the Hindu doctrines. His historical significance has been on a different level. One can find in his life a number of departures from orthodoxy, including his experiments with foreign religious forms; but they were overwhelmed, neutralized, by his intense, pure spirituality which was firmly rooted in the tradition.

However, his initiation of Vivekananda and his belief in him as the prophet of Hindu Revival belongs to a different order. That this hope did not come true revealed not so much an error of judgment on the part of the Paramhansa as the irreversible destiny of Hinduism: the personal success (*siddhi*) of the Paramhansa and the historical failure of the Swami showed once again that henceforward there could be Hindu saints but no Hindu society: the West had won a final victory against the East.

The Arya Samaj

This was only repeated by the Arya Samaj movement founded by Swami Dayananda in 1875. It too aimed at a revival of original Vedic Hinduism through a radical reinterpretation of the traditional doctrines and a programme of basic social reforms. We cannot attempt here an examination of this doctrinal reinterpretation, but we may indicate how it stands to orthodox tradition. The Arya Samaj believes in the infallibility of the *Vedas*—the social and religious reforms it proposed must, therefore, be simply restorations of the original institutions: return to the true forms. They cannot be innovations, modifications or adaptations. In this, the Arya Samaj, as a socio-historical movement, ran into the inevitable difficulty: Vedic institutions can function only in a Vedic society. But the Arya Samaj not only failed to solve this difficulty, it did not perhaps have a clear appreciation of its fundamental importance.

The Arya Samaj remained a kind of protestant movement within Hinduism, even though its princi-

ples required it to be a movement primarily against modernism, of which, however, it was itself a product. It was perfectly right in going back to Vedic iconoclasm, but an inherently rationalistic strain prevented it from seeing that it was modern western thought which was essentially idolatrous. Its missionary character itself was basically anti-traditional and can be explained largely as a reaction to Islam and Christianity.

The Arya Samaj was eventually a failure, and once again it is important to see the true character of this failure. Its doctrinal re-interpretation, whatever its validity, was early reduced to being merely an ideological support for its programme of social reform. These surely represented a far-reaching change in the historically given Hindu values; but these reforms (position of women, their education, abolition of caste on the principle of birth, simplification of daily ritual routine, marriage reforms, widow re-marriage, etc.) were all required by modern industrial society and eventually did come and would have come. On the other hand, in any other field, where the Arya Samaj was not an historical ally of modernism, it did not make any appreciable contribution or achieve any lasting success.

Man in Society

It is in Mahatma Gandhi that we find a clear awareness of the anti-modern-character of the traditional Indian values.

Mahatma Gandhi was not directly interested in the interpretations of Hindu doctrine as such, even though like Tilak he also wrote a commentary on the *Gita*. In fact, his main concern was not the revival, revision or modernization of Hinduism. His chief concern was with man and society and the right conditions for their proper functioning. His struggle for India's freedom from British rule was derived from this fundamental concern. This, it seems to me, is the key to the understanding of Gandhi's role in relation to the Indian value-system, for it is here that we find not only his basic

but also some important deviations. (For instance, his undialectical emphasis on non-violence; also the moralistic and humanistic strains in his thought.)

Universal Principles

The search for universally valid principles of man's life is a traditional Hindu concern. And, in the true spirit of this tradition, Gandhi did not conceive of this universality in terms of the exclusive validity of any one tradition. Instead, he emphasised the fundamental unity of all traditions. Also, he followed the Hindu tradition in deriving his concern for man and society from a serious concern with his own Self, rather than with man in general. In other words, he is at one with the Hindu tradition in starting (and ending) with autology, instead of with anthropology or sociology. This autological starting-point saves him not only from falling into any fallacious dichotomy or antithesis between the individual and the society, but also from all modern emphasis on the individual or the person.

True, Gandhi constantly stressed the point that it is the right kind of men who make the right kind of society; but his life-long struggle to bring about a new Indian society, his never-ending endeavour to perfect techniques of moral resistance and revolt on a group level, his firm belief in the urgent necessity of constructive programmes of societal reconstruction, his relentless demand that the national struggle for political freedom must invariably be accompanied and supported by constructive work for the new society-to-come—all this makes it clear that he did not, for one moment, believe that right living could be at all possible in an evil society.

It is in Gandhi that we find the most uncompromising Indian opponent of modern technological society. This is of crucial importance in the present context: for the core values of the Indian tradition cannot survive in a technology-centered society. Gandhi realized this with unfaltering clarity. This is vastly more important than his attempts to reform and modernize many as-

pects of the surviving Hindu orthodoxy (his opposition to caste, his views on women, marriage, education, etc.) For, he was not only against the domination of modern technology; he was also, and equally vehemently, opposed to a consumption-centered competitive society.

It should not be difficult for any one to see that if his vision of a village-centered *aparigraha*-minded society had been realized, or were to be realized, this would be nothing less than the restoration of the traditional values; for in traditional thought there is no room for revivalism, there can be no going back to the past: the tradition can be only renewed through the reaffirmation of first principles, and not through any resuscitation of old institutional forms.

A Repudiation

Soon after its independence, India repudiated Gandhi completely and formally. Perhaps it could not have been otherwise—I do not know. However, in repudiating the Gandhian vision, our leaders adopted a set of values, a world outlook, a system of thought and knowledge which are, and have been, in serious crisis and under unprecedented threats. We could not have better-educated, more widely aware, more sophisticated leaders. But they made the bargain without adequate realization of its nature and implications, and today they are only dimly aware of the chaos enveloping the value-system of the developed nations.

This dim awareness is reflected in their constant endeavour to counteract the forces of chaos by trying for a synthesis of traditional Indian and our adopted modern western values. This is impossible. And the great failure of Gandhi only underscored it once again. If clarity is preferable to confusion, let us, the victims of contemporary leaders, forget the traditional Indian values and go forward to the values of modern technological society with a clear awareness of the mighty suicidal forces it has generated: forces which are constantly battering this society and its values.

Lack of change

C. CHANDRASEKARAN

IN the western countries, urbanization consequent upon growth of modern industry, transport and commerce brought in its wake certain fundamental economic, social and political changes. Growth of non-agricultural industries as a major source of earning was an important economic change. This was accompanied by changing occupational patterns, changing employment status and changes in the location of production. The growth of modern industry—technically superior and organised into larger units when compared to household industry—made significant impact on the social life of the community.

Preference for nuclear families as against extended or joint families, adoption of family limitation, desire for higher social status and larger employment for women, growth of industrialism, impersonal and detached relationships and loosening of kinship and family ties, increase in ambitions, aspirations and desire for higher material welfare were some of the major social changes urbanization introduced in the life of the community. The break up of village autonomy and village administration and centralisation of political power, executive authority and administration of justice were the major political changes. It is generally believed that these changes greatly assisted the process of economic and social development. Such changes have significance for countries like India which have

recently undertaken the task of raising the levels of living through industrialization.

Industrialization, in the sense of growth of modern factory type of manufacturing activity, is a comparatively new phenomenon in India. It was in about 1860 that large scale industry began to develop, chiefly with British capital. First there emerged the jute industry of Bengal and, much later, cotton mills were set up in Ahmedabad and Bombay. Mining came still later. However, faster growth was achieved particularly during and after World War II. The construction of railways can be traced as far back as 1853 when, for the first time, Bombay city and Thana—with a distance of 20 miles—were connected by rail. Development of road transport was particularly noticeable only after 1930. The transport system has thus grown gradually and now links almost all parts of the country.

The growth of commerce—inland trade and export trade—can be traced back much earlier than industry and transport, due to the deliberate policy of the British regime which endeavoured to export the indigenous raw materials and import large quantities of British-made finished products into the country.

The growth of industry, transport and commerce have been particularly fast during the past decade. However, India still remains predominantly agricultural.

Industry, transport and commerce still play a minor role as sources of livelihood. According to the census conducted in March 1961, hardly 12 per cent of India's workers were engaged in activities like manufacturing, construction and mining. Another 16 per cent were engaged in transport, communications, banking and services. As large as 72 per cent were still engaged in agriculture. Thus industrialization is still in its formative stages.

Population Movements

Although the pace of industrialization has been slow, it has been accompanied by the growth of urban centres. The proportion of population living in urban areas increased from 11 per cent in 1901 to 18 per cent in 1961. The proportion of population living in large towns of 100,000 or more population increased faster, from 2.5 per cent to 8 per cent during the same period. Rapid urbanization was particularly noticeable after 1941, when population movement from rural to urban areas experienced momentum. During the last two decades, 1941-61, it is estimated that nearly 14 million persons migrated to urban areas.

The developments brought in their wake certain social and economic changes in the traditional agrarian economy of the country. The first major impact was on the village handicrafts and industries. Village industries could not compete with factory goods and thus they had to be given up as a source of living. This resulted in large-scale unemployment in the villages. The land was already fully occupied and the dislocated labour had to look towards cities for their jobs. Transport made the movement of population from rural to urban centres easier than ever before. What were once the 'own-account workers' now became 'employees' and the relationship between the work and the final product became more indirect.

The British policy of trade and commerce had a vital and far-reaching effect on Indian agriculture, for it was no longer merely the production of food for internal consumption but also of non-food

crops for export. This revolutionary change in Indian cultivation occurred in the last quarter of the nineteenth century. Rice, wheat, cotton, jute and oil seeds crossed the borders of the village, to the distant towns and foreign lands. This change is generally styled as 'the commercialization of agricultural products.' The new facilities of transport and communication coupled with changes in the method of marketing made this transformation easy.

For the first time the autonomy and isolation of the village community was broken. Villages became more and more dependent on urban centres. The interaction between villagers and urbanites laid open the village community to the influences of an urban type of living.

Employment Structure

The most important characteristic differences between urban and rural areas can be found in the industrial structure of employment, occupational pattern and employment status. The proportion engaged in non-agricultural activities is definitely higher in urban areas. In 1961, 87 per cent of the urban workers were engaged in non-agricultural industries. The corresponding percentage for rural areas was 18 per cent. The proportion engaged in non-agricultural activities showed direct correlation to size. The larger the size of the locality, the more industrialized and more urbanized it was. Predominance of white-collar occupations is a characteristic feature of urban employment.

While most of the workers in urban areas are employees, most of the workers in rural areas are owners of land, farmers and own-account workers. However, this does not mean that the productivity of urban populations and their incomes are far higher than those in rural areas. In fact, nearly 30 per cent of the urban work force is engaged in 'services', which are of low productivity. A large proportion of urban employment appears to be but an extension of rural poverty to urban areas. It should be noticed that such employment does not in fact enhance the urban

way of life. In fact, it tends to retard urbanization. It is the technically superior large scale manufacturing that brings not only higher levels of productivity but also a higher degree of urbanism in the life of the community. Employment in such organised industries is still small even in urban areas.

A larger proportion of population was found to be literate in urban than in rural areas. In 1961, while 58 per cent of the males and 35 per cent of the females were found literate in urban areas, the corresponding percentages in rural areas were 29 and 9 respectively. The literary gap between males and females was less wide in the urban population than in the rural population. This characteristic is most important from the point of view of urban-rural differentiation.

However literacy—ability to read and write—alone cannot make the workers more skilled. Although employment in modern industry, commerce and administration is expanding in the urban areas of India, it is not enough to provide job opportunities to a large mass of unskilled labour. Large numbers of those who migrate from villages must seek living in fringe activities, live off relatives or return to their villages. The city-ward migration is typically unorganised and haphazard; the worker is typically unskilled and remains unskilled. Frequently he leaves his family behind in the village and retains close ties with them and a feeling of belonging to the land. . . There is a continual drifting back and forth between country-side and city by unskilled, unstable labour force, which brings no lasting benefit to industry, to agriculture or to the worker himself.¹

Relation with the Soil

It is this unwillingness completely to sever his relation with his village and land that prevents him from completely acquiring the urban way of life. The basic cause of absenteeism in India is the fact that the industrial worker is still part-time peasant and until he cuts his connexion with the soil, his

1. United Nations: Report on the World Social Situation, 1957, p. 129.

attendance will be irregular and his adjustment to modern industrialism irregular.²

The participation of women in work is far less in urban than in rural areas. In 1961, hardly 11 per cent of the females were engaged in economic activity while in rural areas the percentage was as high as 31 per cent. The reason is that in rural areas the work is organised into family units whereby all the members participate in the work while in urban areas the factory type of employment keeps them away from employment. One or two adult members generally earn the livelihood for the entire family in urban areas.

The Joint Family

As regards the social aspect of urban-rural differentiation, a comparative analysis of the differences in the type and size of the family in urban and rural areas is useful. Many of the surveys conducted in India have shown that the prevalence of joint families in cities is as much as in rural areas. There are some studies which even show greater prevalence of joint families in cities than in rural areas. Detailed studies of neighbourhoods in Indian cities have found much in common with rural social patterns.³ Gertrude Woodruff in her study of a Pariah slum in Bangalore found that this enclave, while not duplicating the complete social structure of the few villages from which it drew its inhabitants, retained enough of the rural base to serve as a 'resting stage' in the process of adjustment to city life.⁴

In a study of the rural family pattern, K. M. Kapadia compares family patterns in the town of Navasari in Gujarat, in five 'impact' villages within three miles of the town and ten 'rural' villages outside this ring but still in the same Taluk. In general, Kapadia finds that the joint family is more common in urban areas as compared

with rural areas and even the average size of the family is greater in the former. Town families have an average size of 7 persons, 'impact' villages of 6.2 persons and rural areas of 6 persons.⁵

Some of the studies have found that migration from the village does not destroy the joint family system, but rather a new type of joint family emerges whose seat is still in the ancestral village and whose urban wing is an integral part of both the ceremonial and economic unit. In time, the largest proportion of this kinship unit may be in the city but the extended kin ties persist and the system in the village remains intact.⁶ All these studies indicate that the urban family type and size have not been much different from their counterparts in rural areas.

Another important social variable in the urban-rural differentiation is the level of fertility and attitude towards family size and limitation. Detailed analysis of the fertility levels and attitude towards family size and limitation in the urban and rural areas of the Mysore State have been made in the *United Nations Mysore Population Study*.⁷ The most important finding was that there were no sizeable differences in the fertility levels between urban and rural areas. The mean number of children born alive per every married woman who had completed a reproductive life (i.e. aged 45 and over) was 4.8 in rural areas, 5.6 in towns and 5.3 in Bangalore city.

Family Limitation

As regards knowledge of family limitation and methods, nearly 40 per cent of the urban wives and their husbands in Bangalore city, in contrast to a little more than 10 per cent in rural areas reported as knowing family limitation methods. Attitudes towards family limitation were also quite favourable in urban areas. Nearly 12 per cent of the couples in Bangalore

city as against hardly 3 per cent in rural areas reported as having practised some method of family limitation, particularly abstinence.

Minor Differences

The overall picture which emerges from the above discussion is that the urban areas do not differ much from rural areas in regard to social and economic variables. Differences may be found between the giant metropolis and the most rural village, occupying the extreme ends of the rural-urban dichotomy. Economic differentials in terms of industry, occupation and employment status are found between urban and rural areas but since most of the non-agricultural employment in urban areas is even now of traditional type and unorganised, it does not contribute to a high degree of urbanism. Modern industry, which alone can bring about higher levels of living and larger economic and social changes, is a minor source of employment.

Differences with regard to social variables are still less perceptible. The family system has not changed in urban areas. The kinship ties, the authority of the male head of the household, the hold of the caste system have not been broken in urban areas. There are reasons to believe that the status of women might even have deteriorated because in urban areas the woman is more a house-keeper than a contributor to the earnings of the family as she is in the rural areas.

Major social changes require major economic changes in terms of industrialization, employment structure and level of urbanization. Given the standard of living at subsistence levels, only minor social changes can be expected.

During the last ten year period (1951-61), of planned economic development, the national income increased by 40 per cent but the major part of it was absorbed by rapid population growth, so that the per capita income increased hardly by 16 per cent. With such a meagre change in the level of living, it is unrealistic to expect any major social change in the life of the Indian community.

2. Ibid, p. 130.

3. A. Bopegama, *Neighbourhood Relations in Indian Cities—Delhi*, Sociological Bulletin, Bombay, VI, No. 1, March 1957, 34-42.

4. Gertrude Morvin Woodruff, *An Adiravida Settlement in Bangalore, India*, Doctoral Dissertation, Radcliffe College, 1959.

5. K. M. Kapadia, *Rural Family Patterns*, Sociological Bulletin, V, Sept. 1956, 111-126.

6. Richard D. Lambert, 'Impact of Urban Society on Village Life,' In: *India's Urban Future*, p. 134.

7. United Nations: *The Mysore Population Study*.

Attitudes and planning

A. K. SEN

IF the shape of Cleopatra's nose left a lasting mark on human history, the peculiarity lay not in the nose but in human gullibility that valued the object more than the loss of an empire, not to mention the lives of thousands of Egyptians and Romans. Modern

leaders are not given such freedom to choose what they like, and if they reveal an undue fondness for such an object, Macmillan accepts their resignation and then resigns himself. Times have changed and so have old values. The noble art of sacrificing others for the great-

ness of one's love does not any longer get applause, and is no more alive today as a virtue than are dinosaurs as animals. But some old values have remarkable staying power, particularly in our sub-continent, and scratching our minds is like looking at the collection of extinct animals in Conan Doyle's *Lost World*.

Just as an illustration one can cite the grief and shock with which so many people in India greeted the news, some time after the end of the second world war, that Netaji Subhas Chandra Bose had married, while in Germany, and had a child. Rather than jubilating at this merry news, many of Netaji's admirers were stunned by the shock that the great leader did not, after all, stick to *brahmacharya*. The shock did not seem to be particularly less for those who themselves had given up the spiritual advantages of *Brahmacharya* for a less wholesome marital existence!

Education

The mark of our value system, derived from our past, can be seen in most spheres of life in modern India. I am not referring to such obvious things as the roaming cows in the streets, which provides the joking interlude in the American tourists' letters to folks back home, but to things which are more subtle and a great deal more important. For example, our attitude to education has immense consequences on the direction of our economic and social change. Indian society has always been elitist, and this is reflected in the development of education in India. A contrast between India and Burma may be useful here. The broad base of the Buddhist religion reflects itself in a much higher proportion of literacy in the latter country; on the other hand, the value traditionally attached to higher learning in India reveals itself in a much higher pressure for university education in India.

By the way, in case it is doubted that Buddhism and high literacy in Burma have anything to do with each other, it may be pointed out

that much of elementary education in Burma is in fact directly imparted in Buddhist temples and monasteries. Also, it is worth recording that there is no Buddhist country in the world which does not have a much higher proportion of literacy than India, and at the same time there is none, except Japan, which can claim as much achievement in the field of university education. An Indian middle-class youth finds it difficult even to get a bride if he does not possess some official stamp of higher education, for what it is worth, but this does not worry his Burmese counterpart. On the other hand, the Indian at the bottom of the ladder does not feel deprived about not knowing the letters, but his Burmese opposite number would.

The consequence of our neglected base of primary education is often underestimated by the economists. Our field of relative success has been the industries; a network of modern urban communities has grown up. But our chief failure has been in agriculture, where in spite of applying a fantastic amount of labour per acre we get one of the lowest yields in the world. Ignorance with illiteracy is, of course, not the only cause of this, but is a very big contributory factor, and here the ruling values of the Indian society have not been a good influence.

Base for Communication

We are very fond of saying, these days, that planning must be done from the bottom upwards and not from the top, and we love to point out that the Indian planning authorities have not achieved much communication with the masses. But we do not seem to realize that our social background, our economic structure, our educational base, all militate against such communication. The remedy lies not in telling the Planning Commission: 'Go and communicate, and plan from the bottom upwards,' but in creating the conditions for the masses to be brought into the twentieth century, so that they can

see what has happened in the last two hundred years.

The main achievement of the U.S.S.R. in the early years of her planning was not so much the improvement of her material resources, but her success in getting education and awareness to the whole of the population of that big country. The only Asian country which has so far jumped the hurdle of the industrial revolution is Japan, and she had one of the highest proportions of literacy in the world even before her remarkable economic growth started.

Smugness

The emphasis we place on liberal higher education compared with the coolness with which we accept our literacy situation is something quite appalling, and the explanation lies very much in the kind of values we have been brought up on. In fact, any suggestion that we should try to get much more quickly towards universal literacy seems to produce certain stock reactions among the urbanized middle class of India. Three precepts loom large in this: 'literacy is not the same thing as education,' 'good things take a lot of time,' and 'we are already doing a lot.' All these have just enough truth in them to make them sound plausible, but their supposed justification of smugness about our current educational programme, is entirely hollow. That the rural sector of India has been the most slow-moving part of the economy and has been largely responsible for the failures of Indian planning, seems to be recognized, but we do not seem to appreciate its full implications.

We like to view our peasants as poor but contented, illiterate but wise, and forget that wisdom comes less often from the peace of the mind than from a restless search for knowledge. We have done very little to provide a base for such a search, and the peasant has remained contented with his poverty and disease, and with his low productivity and wholesale exploitation. Even our limited land reforms have resulted mainly from demands from the town dwellers, and

not from the just anger of the rural population, which has hardly expressed itself. And so far as modern methods of production are concerned, with which the rest of the world has raised the yield per acre to a figure many times ours, they have hardly fired the imagination of our rural population.

The educational policy of India is a good example of the grip of old values and attitudes. There are, of course, others that are no less significant for the direction of our planning today. The peculiarity of the brand of socialism that we champion in India is not unrelated to it. In our disapproval of the businessman, of the bourgeoisie, there is a strong element that smacks not of the proletarian revolt, but of the old aristocratic (almost Brahminical) disapproval of the money-makers. Indian socialism has, therefore, emphasized austerity rather than equality, strict controls rather than nationalization of means of production. Again I do not want to suggest that our value system, acquired from the past, is alone responsible for all this, but it is certainly a force which has worked in that direction.

Individual behaviour

So far the discussion has been confined to the influence of values on the direction of planning. But a no less important field is its impact on individual behaviour. All pre-industrialized, pre-capitalist societies share certain attitudes that have, to a greater or less extent, come in the way of successful industrialization. They are, to be sure, eventually overcome, but they can cause a lot of anxiety while they last. For example, industries require punctuality and a habit of regular work in a way agriculture never did, and this can be a headache in spreading industries to remote areas.

How the attitudes of different people in different cultures vary on this question came vividly to me in a seminar in the summer of 1962, where Eric Hobsbawm, the economic historian, was speaking on certain problems of early industrialization, referring in particular to the problem that the Soviet

Union had in getting workers to the factories on time. In the audience was a young man from West Germany, neat and efficient, who seemed to have some difficulty in seeing what the problem was about, and the exchange of thoughts went like this. The German participant: 'This must have been in some part of the U.S.S.R. where they do not follow Russian.' Hobsbawm: 'No, no, the problem was encountered in European Russia also.' The German participant: 'Oh, I see, then they must have been illiterate and could not read, so that they could not be informed by putting up a notice.' Hobsbawm: 'No, they could read all right.' The German participant: 'I don't understand, if they understood Russian and could read, why could not the factory authorities simply put up a notice asking them to come on time, say, at 9 o'clock?'

The problem that you might read a notice asking you to come at 9, and nevertheless not come at 9, had an air of improbability for this efficient Saxon. (How can one resist a notice saying: Come at 9!) I suspect that among the many reasons for which the Russian steel plant at Bhilai has worked so much better than the German one in Rourkela, is the experience of the Russians of some of the problems that we face in India today, which are really rather remote to the Germans.

Hygiene

These are common problems all over the underdeveloped world, but we have our special ones also. So much has been written on our attitude to animals, of the holy and the unholy ones, that I need not go into their economic implications, for example, for the leather industry. But our attitude to public hygiene seems to deserve some comment. Some Indians were shocked by the account of V. S. Naipaul, the famous West Indian writer (of Indian origin), of his visit to Calcutta, which came out in the *New Statesman* in 1963, where it seemed that the smell of the lavatory more or less overshadowed other aspects of Calcutta for this unfortunate visitor. It can, of

course, be disputed whether Naipaul saw the country or the city in its right perspective, but the fact remains that our cities show a deplorable state of our consciousness of sanitation and hygiene, beating records of practically all other cities of the world.

If the archaeologist's first impression of the ancient Mahenjodaro is that of a superb system of public sanitation, enough has been done in the last five thousand years to undo any tradition which might have existed. India continues to be one of the two remaining centres of cholera in the world (the other is Pakistan), and our record for other diseases certainly does not seem to indicate that we have been seriously planning for the last thirteen years. It is pointed out by experts making international comparisons that they have not often seen as appalling hygienic conditions in the factories as in India. This, of course, is partly due to poverty, partly to what our industrialists proudly call their 'sound commercial instincts,' but it is also connected with our general indifference to hygienic precepts.

Radical Interpretations

So far we have looked only at values which are part of our habit of thinking and action. There are other well-formulated doctrines that sometimes take the form of religion, and sometimes appear in the shape of secular morality. But, curiously as it may seem, these have contributed relatively less to the holding up of change in India than might have been expected. Part of the reason for this is that obsolete doctrines are quietly dropped, or what happens more often, radically reinterpreted to suit the requirements of the present day.

The success of the nineteenth century reformists in India lay mainly in this, and people like Ram Mohan Roy, Vidyasagar and Vivekananda reinterpreted aspects of Indian culture to make them look very different from what they were then taken to be. The scriptures were searched with the same zeal with which a Customs officer goes through one's baggage, and the relevant articles brought out

from the heap of other things. The whole interpretation of Indian culture, particularly of Hindu culture, changed. Gandhiji's derivation of lessons of non-violence from a document reporting Krishna's advice to Arjuna as to why he should fight, illustrates the point very well. No doubt there were elements in the *Gita* which allowed such an interpretation, but what gave this approach its force, was Gandhiji's own strength of moral conviction. While future scholars will write tomes on what Krishna 'really meant', the *Gita* has played the part it has in modern India's national movement mainly through Gandhiji's interpretation.

The grip of past values relaxes when the society changes, and people reinterpret old values in modern terms. Nehru's and Radhakrishnan's elucidation of the synthetic elements of Indian culture made even our policy of non-alignment look a natural outgrowth from it. President Nasser has read more Socialism in the *Koran* than Saudi Arabian rulers may like, but that is bad luck for the latter. What gives Nasser almost sure promise of victory in his broader interpretation is not his scholastic genius, but the fact that his interpretation fits into the twentieth century in a way the Saudi Arabian one does not.

No Cleavage

Continuing in the same line, I may be forgiven a small note of criticism of the poser of the problem for this issue, which I find otherwise very appealing. It is stated, 'If there is a confusion of values in India today it is due to this fundamental cleavage in our thinking, represented by Gandhism on the one side and our five year plans on the other.' I doubt that this is true. Mahatma Gandhi was passionately worried about human welfare and dignity, and the ugly face of early industrialism shocked him much the same way as it shocked Marx in mid-nineteenth century Europe. It took Marx to socialism, Gandhiji to the village industries, and the Indian National Congress to equivocation.

Some people may claim, and I certainly would, that there is a

contradiction between Gandhiji's love of human welfare, his hatred of poverty, ill-health and distress on the one side, and his desire to keep India confined to rather primitive methods of production, on the other. In contrast, Nehru could see the benign face of industrialism when properly planned, and so his support to five year plans was very much in line with Gandhiji's fundamental objects and aspirations. The object of machines is to save toil, not to increase it, and I refuse to believe that if the full economic and social implications of the different policies were held before Gandhiji, he would have chosen drudgery. This also explains why the respect for the basic values of Gandhiji has widened over time, while support for his specific economic recommendations has dwindled. For the very same reason for which Gandhiji's passion for human welfare and dignity will undoubtedly survive, his rejection of modern machines will not.

Ghosts of the Past

If there is a 'confusion of values' in India, it is not, I submit, because of a 'fundamental cleavage' between Gandhism and the five year plans. The enemy of the five year plans are not these doctrines, but the very social background which needs change, and the deep-seated, ill-formulated values which haunt our life rather like the ghost of the dead chief in Tagore's story of *Kartar Bhut*. The values which hamper successful planned development are the ones that cannot be examined because they are not stated, and cannot be easily challenged because their acceptance is almost imperceptible. I have tried to give some examples of these attitudes, such as that towards mass education, particularly rural education, but there are others which are almost equally pernicious for economic and social progress. The 'fundamental cleavage' is likely to turn out to be one between our well-formulated goals of economic development and social justice, and the ill-stated, ill-recognized forces which make us plan and act in a way which makes these goals so much more distant.

Corruption of consciousness

SEMINARIST

MODERN India stands for a way of life which is a major departure from traditional values. Not many have grasped just how revolutionary this change is. Conservative people try to show that the new values are not really new; they are all to be found in India's traditional pattern of life. Take for example the idea of a secular State. They argue that tolerance is very much a part of the Indian way of thinking and cite the cases of Asoka and Akbar in their support. But this is to miss the point; to confuse religious tolerance with a secular State. From such a confusion stems the blatantly paradoxical view, not a laughing matter, that India is a Hindu secular State. And on this ground we justify, among other things, religious rituals at the opening of a public building.

Refusal to accept uncomfortable facts; dodging the real significance

of others and placing false constructions on our achievements are some of the ways in which the new social order is being undermined. This is not always the result of a conscious process peculiar to our country. On the other hand, it is a fundamental form of self-deception which goes on in all societies at all times. R. G. Collingwood, a distinguished philosopher-historian, has described it as corruption of consciousness. Through corruption, consciousness permits itself to be bribed in the discharge of its function which is to face the facts.

Consciousness is directed towards a certain thing, then it takes fright at what it has recognised and seeks shelter in subterfuge. The unpalatable fact is thrust out of mind. 'No such thing occurred,' we say. Or on other occasions we admit the fact but try to white-

wash it. 'There was discrimination in this case', it will be said, 'but it was due to ignorance, not to caste bias.' Corruption of consciousness is a malaise which is always with us. It is something which we have continually to fight in our intellectual and moral life. For, as Collingwood warns us, 'By failing to know its own heart a community deceives itself on the one subject concerning which ignorance means death.'

Function of Art

How is corruption of consciousness to be exposed? According to this view, it is one of the prime functions of art, which in essence, is an attempt to break through cliché. The artist 'tells his audience at the risk of their displeasure, the secrets of their own heart.' Of course this is true only of good art. Bad art is itself an expression of a corrupt consciousness and helps further to debase public taste. In what follows, it is proposed to examine a few examples of art to see what light they throw on the operative values in Indian life. How far do these samples expose corruption of consciousness and how far do they themselves fall a prey to it?

Architecture today seems to be tossed between the need to find designs which are modern, because they utilise new materials and techniques, and are at the same time Indian, because they are suited to Indian climatic conditions and the Indian pattern of life. If one examines the scores of government offices and public buildings all over the country one finds a welter of confusion; architecture based on assumptions which do not hold and little effort to conceive of design in terms of function.

For example, the majority of government offices have been designed on the assumption that air-conditioning will be available. Ceilings are low and windows almost non-existent. There is no question of cross ventilation since the only door in the room is intended to be closed. Favourable conditions provided by such a thing as a sea breeze, are completely ignored. In these buildings,

however, there is no hope of air-conditioning today and with the shortage of power and foreign exchange, air-conditioning for the Indian clerk is a mirage. In such buildings air-conditioners and air-coolers are dished out to the influential; the unhealthy working conditions of the clerk receive no attention.

But, why build on the assumption of air-conditioning when every one knows that it cannot and will not be available at present? Why not, while providing for air-conditioning in the long run, build in a way which uses natural factors to ensure reasonable conditions of work and hygiene. Incidentally, the penchant of government architects for placing lavatories at the very entrance to buildings leaves me both intrigued and appalled.

When we come to residential buildings, we encounter the same failure to design functionally, although with a difference. A design which can be repeated is obviously economical. But then such a design can give rise to difficulties. If two blocks of identical design are put up facing each other, the direction of the sun and the wind has to be inconvenient for one or other of the two. This is the sort of elementary consideration which is ignored in the designing of Indian houses.

Living Patterns

Indian families tend to live their lives in compartments. Men and women rarely get together and the same tends to be true of parents and children. Nevertheless, this fiction of a living room has developed after the British or the western model. The fact is that generally speaking the family spends very little time in the so-called drawing room, which is furnished in mid-Victorian fashion, with heavy furniture and drapings and is kept locked most of the time! If this is indeed the pattern of living, why give up so much space for a room which is used only for ceremonial purposes?

In a country in which there is so much dust and dirt, furniture and fittings should be such as can be easily cleaned. Unfortunately

we have the orientalist's weakness for the florid and the ornate—all very well in more affluent and spacious days but hardly practical today when the housewife has to rely more and more on her own resources. If in these matters economy is a prime consideration, the Japanese or South Indian model is worth thinking about. People can sit and sleep on the floor. Chattais are both cool and can be not only simple but also elegant. Keeping out unnecessary furniture means more space and air which are important considering the size of families and the heat.

Whether or not the average Indian is a religious person is a debatable question. But one thing is certain: ritual, superstition and taboo play an important part in the lives of most Indian families. The effect of this on decoration in the Indian home has been appalling. Part of this stems from the lack of frankness. We like to pretend that we are rationalists and do not believe in rituals and ceremonies. So what is really a sacred object and is treated as such, has to be passed off as a work of art. In the evening and in the company of our friends it is just a bronze statue but, in private, in the morning, flowers will be placed at the feet of Shiva!

At lower levels of sophistication we have cheap pictures of gods and goddesses, sometimes on calendars, decorating our walls. Incidentally, although Jamini Roy has been much criticised for making copies of his paintings, his object has been to provide something within a modest budget, to be used as a decoration in the Indian home.

Values of the Film

If Indian life is a medley of differing and unreconcilable values, the picture of it presented in the Indian films is even more chaotic than the reality. Speaking generally, there is no effort to find a way out of the contradictions and to achieve a coherent set of values. The Indian films glamourize a false picture of Indian life and their success in selling this unreal image to the people is helping further to corrupt a depraved taste. While all this is too well-known to be

repeated here, it is worth seeing how far the outstanding Indian film is able to deal honestly with a problem.

Let us take, for instance, *Shehar aur Sapna* by K. A. Abbas which received the President's Award for the best film of 1963. The central problem is presumably that of housing for the poor man in the city of Bombay which boasts of the Taj Mahal and other luxury hotels, huge mansions for the Sethjis and even housing schemes for the lower income groups. The inhumanity of the capitalist, the greed of the middle man, the brutality of the goondas who must get their rake-off, in cash or in kind, are touched on.

Point of Unreality

But the stark miseries of the poor man who has nowhere to live, the indignities and the filth to which he is subjected, these are either non-existent or romanticized to the point of unreality. The heroine, a runaway from her village home who refused to marry her groom because he demanded more money at the wedding ceremony, is first introduced to us in a huge, empty, drain pipe. Her turnout is perfect, including an immaculate *bindi*. She evidently has no problem of sanitation or privacy, either in the drain pipe or in the other places she lives in!

The other chief characters, the homeless friends of the hero, seem similarly to be happy-go-lucky chaps who face no real problems. Three of the closest of these associates—a Hindu wrestler, a Muslim actor and a Christian musician—are no doubt designed to represent communal unity. But since these persons have no families, the problem of communal unity is scarcely touched. It is when persons of different communities start entering each other's homes, when the women make contact and when the young start getting interested in those of the opposite sex, that we get to grips with reality. Among men, meeting on neutral ground, the question of community does not arise.

Another important character is an Urdu poet, who, in keeping with tradition, has his head in the

clouds and his feet quite off the earth. One would be forced to conclude that he has a secret patron somewhere who keeps him going, although not in a state of affluence. Having a social conscience, the poet's conceits are not about wine and women; he philosophizes instead about man and the tyrannies of the industrial world. The horrors of poverty are indeed talked about, but they are not shown. Here if anywhere consciousness took fright at what it observed and sought shelter in easier tasks.

Attitude Towards Women

Satyajit Ray's film, *Mahanagar*, which received only a silver medal in this year's awards, is a sensitive handling of relationships within a middle class Bengali family. The whole thing turns on the attitude of the husband and his parents to the fact that his wife has to take up a job, to tide them over financial difficulties. Social prejudice has to bow before economic facts and so the young wife goes out to work. She is dogged by suspicion and jealousy on the part of the husband. While he values the money her job brings, he takes time to learn to respect her as an individual, as a being whose personality is enriched and fulfilled through her work.

For instance, at one stage in the development of the story, the husband hopes to get some additional part-time employment and therefore thinks that his wife need work no more. He has a letter of resignation typed out and tells her to sign it and hand it in to her office the next day. The wife's own wishes are never taken into account. She is used as an instrument; she is not treated as a person. Though thousands of women work in India, comparatively few men treat them as individuals who have to develop their own talents and realize their own potentialities. The equality of women still remains to be recognized in most male hearts.

It is significant that in the male dominated world of Indian films much attention has been paid to Indian woman and the virtues of the docile and obedient, tradition-

loving women have been extolled; comparatively few films have dealt with the problems of the young men who may wish to take unconventional decisions in a tradition-bound society.

For instance, the relationship of father and son does not seem to have attracted the attention of our film directors and story writers. If the Indian film is to be believed, the father still dominates the household. There is no real contact between father and son, the latter trying always to wheedle things out of his father through a sentimental and indulgent mother. How these relationships are changing in Indian life today needs further probing.

Incidentally, the award of the President's gold medal to *Shehar aur Sapna* is of some interest to us in the present context. It has been argued in the press that the committee of judges is not qualified to assess the artistic merit of films. They are not film critics. That is so. Here we are concerned with them as providing a touchstone for ordinary social values and in this respect we believe that they are fairly representative of public taste. Glamour takes precedence over reality; hence '*Shehar aur Sapna* over *Mahanagar*.

Theatre

Theatre as a separate art-form hardly exists in the country today. Apart from amateur groups in three or four big cities, there is a live professional theatre only in Calcutta. Amateur groups are confined, both in talent and for their audience, to the intelligentsia and they have tended to present in English *avant garde* western plays. Whatever the merits or demerits of these productions, they are not relevant to our theme. In the context of the corruption of consciousness, a study of the Bengali theatre however could be a revealing exercise.

One point of interest is the importance attached to certain aspects of production. Due to the inventive genius of Tapas Sen, miraculous stage effects can be produced by clever lighting. In

one play, *Setu* (the Bridge), you see and hear the railway engine coming on to the stage while the lights in the carriages as they flash past show up the face of the heroine who is attempting suicide. In another play, *Angar*, you see the water flooding a coal mine, slowly drowning the men trapped inside. The view has been expressed that these clever devices are being used by producers to cover up basic weaknesses such as incoherent plots, weak characterization and wooden acting.

The Conflicts

Many of the plays themselves are adaptations from Bengali novels by well-known writers such as Sarat Chandra Chatterji and Tara Shankar Banerji. Some of them deal with current social themes. Let us consider, for example, Tara Shankar Banerji's *Arogya Niketan* which was adjudged the best Bengali novel of 1956 and ran as a play for several hundred nights. The central character is a young doctor who sets up practice in a village where his grandfather has gained fame as a sage who can tell from examining the pulse of a patient, how long the latter has to live. The sage does not recognise his grandson since he had cast off the father of the young doctor for marrying a Christian. The clash of personalities and ideas of these two characters provides the framework of the play.

The interesting thing about the play is the resolution of the problem in the climax. Firstly, the young doctor falls ill and agrees to be treated by the sage. This is a triumph for Indian lore (or superstition) against modern medicine. But then, somehow, the grandparents discover the identity of the young man and are reconciled with him and his hitherto untouchable Christian mother is also accepted. But if this play was intended to represent the triumph of traditional values, then the untouchable Christian should have remained an outcaste.

Bengali theatre has among its adherents, Sambhu Mitra, his talented actress wife, Tripti, and their dedicated *Bohurupee* group.

As true artists they have done a great deal through their productions to reveal to the community the secret corruptions of their own hearts. Among their many notable productions has been one entitled *Chera Tar* (Broken String) written by Tulsi Lahiri which deals with Muslim peasants in North Bengal.

Faced with famine a young peasant, unable to see his beloved young wife starving, divorces her and runs away hoping that his departure will make it possible for this young woman to enter the household of the landlord as one of his many wives. This is what actually happens. Some time later the husband returns and tries to persuade his former wife to come back to him. This, he argues, is permissible under Muslim law and if she really loves him what is there to stand in her way? The conflict in the woman's mind is between her love for her first husband and her loyalty to her second husband who had taken her in when she was in distress. Unable to find a solution the woman commits suicide.

The vast majority of our plays, novels and films deal with the problems of the Hindu community. This, while inevitable, is somewhat unfortunate since it shows a lack of knowledge about communities other than that to which the author belongs. The popularity which *Chera Tar* has enjoyed shows that the Indian public is and can be interested in the problems which beset different communities.

Literature

Two novels which have won Presidential awards are *Chemmeen* (Malayalam) by Thakazhi Sivasankara Pillai (English translation by Narayana Menon) and *The Serpent and the Rope* (English) by Raja Rao. While the Malayalam novel is about simple fisher folk in Kerala, Raja Rao's story treats of a highly educated group. So, between them we have pictures of two very different segments of Indian society.

The heroine of *Chemmeen*, Karuthamma falls in love with

Pareekutti, a Moslem trader and a childhood playmate. They both realize that marriage is impossible. The girl's father exploits Pareekutti's affection for his daughter by borrowing money from him on the strength of which he becomes a prosperous boat owner. Misfortunes befall Pareekutti and he is reduced to penury. All this weighs heavily on Karuthamma's mind, who meanwhile is married off to an enterprising, young lone-wolf of a fisherman. There is a tradition among fisher people that the safety of the men at sea depends on the virtue of the women at home. One night Pareekutti visits Karuthamma while her husband is out at sea. They cannot resist each other. The husband never returns. He is drowned in a savage battle with a shark and days later the sea throws up the bodies of the two lovers. The vengeance of the sea-goddess is complete.

In this lovely story, related with naturalness and simplicity, our sympathy is with the two lovers. Their love rises above the barriers of caste and creed. The moral problem for Karuthamma, aware that her father is using Pareekutti's affection for her to extract money from him, and her struggle to solve it are dwelt upon. The machinations of the village elders and of village society are exposed. If taboo and superstition are used to build up atmosphere, it is appropriate, considering the psychological background of the actors. In any case, what is accepted as taboo and superstition can be justified by a rational morality. Essentially, it is a conflict between the values of love and loyalty.

Sophisticated Spiritualism

The characters in *The Serpent and the Rope* are a highly sophisticated group of people and it can be assumed that their values have been accepted from conviction. In this case it is not necessary to recapitulate the story to show the operative values of the chief characters—the 'story', if there is one, is a search for spiritual realization on the part of Rama and his French wife, Madeleine. In this

novel caste is very important. Rama is born a Brahmin, his ancestors were all devoted to Truth; his ancestors live in him. In his wanderings among the upper classes in London, Paris and elsewhere Rama no doubt violated a few minor taboos but he remained to the end a Brahmin. 'It was the Brahmin in me, she said, the sense that touch and untouch are so important...' 'I was too much of a Brahmin to be unfamiliar with anything. . . ' Phrases of this kind are to be found on every other page.

Added to Rama's hereditary importance in virtue of being a Brahmin, is one which he acquires by having a European wife. In British India, there was a snob value in having a European wife and possibly, as hangover, this idea is still cherished by some people. Rama's chief girl-friend, Savithri, comes from a princely family, a Raja of Banaras. A Brahmin could hardly have been expected to stoop much lower than a Kshatriya!

The Womanhood Myth

On women, particularly Indian women, the author has quite a philosophy. 'What a deep, reverential mystery womanhood is.' If you understand this, you will know why 'Indians gave such lovely names to their women,' or how 'the woman is the priestess of God.' But when it comes to marrying off Rama's half sister, Saroja, to a man she detested and whom even Rama found 'heavy and authoritative', his duty as the Brahmin head of the family left him no room for sentimentality. He did what looked like betrayal to Saroja. But then in the ultimate analysis there is the profound aphorism about woman: 'Bondage is her destiny.'

Some of the other values which are affirmed in *The Serpent and the Rope* can be gauged from the following views expressed by Rama: 'For all we do is really superstition' (p. 16). 'All science is tautology' (p. 131). 'India has no history for Truth cannot have history' (p. 164). 'Some one behind and beyond all living things gave us the touch, the tear, the

elevation that makes our natural living so tender. If there were no barbarian beyond our borders, the Hindu would have melted into his own nature, grown white as some women in the Zenana, and his eyes have seen the splendour of himself everywhere' (p. 38). 'Mahatma Gandhi fought against the Muslims by fighting for them. He died a Hindu martyr for an Indian cause. He died for Truth' (p. 104).

Perfection of Rottenness

The Serpent and the Rope brings to mind the remarks which William James made of the philosophy of George Santayana. He described it as 'the perfection of rottenness.' Reduced to its appropriate place in a minor key, James' remark would apply to this novel. If one considers this book in the context of the corruption of consciousness, the point worth pondering is this: the values which this book advocates are the very opposite of those for which modern India avowedly stands; yet this work is admired and judged worthy of the highest honours of the land.

This survey of the operative values of Indian life, viewed through the spectacles of some of the arts, suggests that corruption of consciousness is widespread. Does this mean that Indian society as it exists today is inevitably doomed? Or is it possible for Indian society to redeem itself? For those who do not believe in the inevitability of history, the answer in general terms is obvious enough. The occurrence of a crisis may shock us out of our complacency and may lead us to heart-searching and self correction. But, apart from action which we take in the face of crises, there is something small and unspectacular which must be done every day. We must learn to respect criticism and minority opinion. If an opinion is unpopular let us not brush it aside. Let us rather look for the prejudices in our own mental make-up which prevent us from seeing the other man's point of view. Only in this way can we cultivate an attitude of 'natural piety', of respect for facts.

A case study

ZARINA AHMAD

IN an Indian village there are two distinct systems of values regarding women as accepted among the families of a high and families of a low economic status. Families belonging to the first group are usually landlords; the others may be landless labourers and artisans. This categorisation usually coincides with the caste status, for invariably the landlords belong to the upper castes while the others to the lower castes. Thus, in examining the changes in values

which have occurred in the village, one must consider changes at the two levels pertaining to the two economic-cum-caste categories.

The value system of the landlord class conceives of woman in the role of wife and mother. As such she represents the popular notions of feminine virtues, such as purity, beauty, tenderness, modesty, self-denial, graciousness, sensitivity and devotion to the family. These virtues derive from the role assigned to the woman in which she upholds the honour of the family, she passes on to the coming generations, through examples and precepts, the 'noble' traditions and ensures the continuity of the lineage. In contrast, the lower classes conceive of woman not only as a wife and mother but also as partner in the struggle for existence. The harder the struggle the greater the importance of woman as a partner at work. The dominance of the necessity to fight poverty leaves little room for the leisurely feminine virtues to be accepted in practice, though they may be admired.

The Upper Classes

The change regarding women in an Indian village is also in two different and in a sense contrary directions. In the upper landlord classes the attitude regarding woman's participation in economic activity which adds to the family's income has become slightly liberal. Women belonging to certain families who some years ago would never have conceived of engaging in any paid work are to-day holding a variety of jobs. Perhaps the most important influence which has brought about this change is the much more intimate contact with the urban areas which the changing economic and political scene has brought in its wake. One of the immediate impacts of this contact has been the spread of education and the opportunity of using it both as a means for giving expression to the newly acquired knowledge or techniques and as a source of income. In the beginning, women generally took up jobs in

the urban areas away from the traditional environment of the village. To-day, even unmarried girls of these families are taking up jobs which are available even in their own villages. This change, although remarkable, is still hesitant in many ways.

Purdah

When it was not proper for a woman of the landlord class to work, a concomitant value was minimum exposure in the presence of menfolk. This inhibition was observed with much greater severity in the *purdah* system among Muslims, which also had the full sanction of religion. Among the upper class Muslims, the *purdah* system had taken roots to such absurd depths that it was not only confined to outsiders but was practised even among close relatives. It was said that a woman goes out of the house only twice in her life time, once in the 'doli' to her husband's house and again on a bier to the graveyard. Obviously this extreme limitation on movement could not remain once women sought education and desired to work. The erosion of the value was, however, not complete as contact with outsiders particularly in the course of work is still governed by certain criteria of 'prestige' and 'class'. For example, in Kasauli, a village where I have recently conducted a study, an unmarried daughter of the leading Muslim landlord family was working as a teacher in the village school. Another woman of the same family was a member of the U.P. Legislative Council. While the family showed little resistance to the candidature of the MLC, it debated for a long time whether the other girl could take up school teaching in the village.

This, notwithstanding the fact that the MLC was forced to mingle with all sorts of people on terms not consistent with the traditional values of her class. Such exposure was tolerated because to be an MLC is highly prestigious, but a similar contact with the village folk at the relatively non-prestig-

ious level of the school teacher was seriously resisted. This lingering hesitation in fully accepting the break is evident in many other ways as well.

To-day, the influence of urban social values which have been imbibed in different degrees by most landlord families is leading them to accept the worth of education for girls specially in English medium urban schools. While this practice is growing, in the matter of marriage the traditional values are still adhered to with the same tenacity. For example, girls are not allowed to make their own choice of husband but accept whoever is selected for them by the family. As a result, among the Muslims the majority of marriages among the educated girls are taking place within the close circle of relatives. In Kasauli any deviation from this traditional pattern has been strongly disapproved of.

The Lower Classes

The change in the values regarding women in the lower classes is more complex. On the one hand, urban influences are percolating to them both directly and through the upper classes and changing their tastes and values. On the other hand, a rising income and greater political and social awareness is giving them a more palpable stake in the village community and its traditions. The result of these two strands of change is rather curious. The lower class women are trying to imitate urban women in the matter of dress, style, manners and language. The imitation extends further to certain attitudes to education, religion, family structure, and even to family planning.

Women of this class are now desirous that children, even girls, go to school. Practice of religion has become more ostentatious. There is a vocal preference for the single family and very often positive pressure on the husbands is put to achieve this end. As a result of this, to-day in the village of Kasauli, 83 per cent of the Muslim families are single families.

Women tend to behave more freely with their husbands, and take pride in the symbols of their progress, e.g., smoking of cigarettes instead of the traditional *bidis* has acquired more prestige. But while these urban changes are induced other changes in values regarding women seem to be inspired by quite contrary influences. There is a marked tendency among lower class women, specially those belonging to families who have done relatively well in the recent past, to withdraw from the family's work force. This withdrawal is not the result of any value attached to leisure but rather it is in conformity with the negative values attached to work among the upper classes. Apparently the lower classes are acquiring the traditional values of their superiors.

New Conservatism

Strangely enough, the fact that the upper classes are also changing and giving a new freedom to the women to work, has apparently made little impact. Through the withdrawal from work other related values are also changing and again in imitation of those values which are being discarded by the upper classes. For example, women are beginning to take a new pride in the fact that they do not have to expose themselves. As a result *purdah* is acquiring value among them, which it did not have before.

Singing and dancing which were frowned upon among the upper classes but accepted by certain castes is now being discouraged even among those whose livelihood depended upon it. In Kasauli a boy of the Mirasi castes (professional singers) prohibited his fiancée from singing and dancing in which she was well trained, and had been dancing and singing before her betrothal to this boy, who had matriculated and was then working in Lucknow as a bus conductor. He regarded this traditional occupation of his caste as degrading.

It is now said in praise of a husband that he is able to put his

wife on a bed instead of letting her work in the field. In the village under discussion, a family of Telis (oil-pressers) made good and built a partly pukka house. Previously the women in this household used to assist in working the primitive *ghani* (oil press). Now the daughter-in-law has stopped working and taken to *purdah* while the mother-in-law still continues to work and does not observe *purdah*. Consequently the authority of the husband has also increased and now in well-to-do lower caste families too the woman's main job is to look after the family and particularly the husband.

The Dichotomy

There is also evidence of the diminishing authority of the elders. Quarrels between mother and daughter-in-law which have been a common feature of the joint family for ages are to-day leading to the break-up of these families much more frequently. There are significant indications of changing family relationships which represent contradictory elements. On the one hand, the woman by taking her family out of the joint family is becoming more free, and on the other hand, accepting a more traditionalised and dependent position in her own family.

Clearly, the change in the values regarding women in an Indian village is not a simple phenomenon. There are unmistakeable trends both towards the modern and the traditional. While the upper classes who constitute a small minority are acquiring somewhat modern attitudes, the bulk of the people have either not changed significantly or are disturbingly changing in some important aspects towards the conservative and restrictive traditions of the upper classes. It is indeed very difficult to say at this stage whether this is merely a transitional phase which will give place to the change that the upper classes are now undergoing or that this will be a prolonged stage yielding at some later time to a new wave of economic and social change in the more desired direction.

Books

VALUES & INTENTIONS By J. N. Findlay.
Allen & Unwin.

Values & Intentions sets out to discuss the general pattern of the ultimate ends of human endeavour. This is an aspect of value-theory which has been neglected in Anglo-American philosophy. When ultimate ends have been discussed, philosophers have been content to indicate a few states of affairs or of consciousness, which are intrinsically valuable but have not enquired whether these ideal ends are inter-connected or form some sort of 'kingdom of ends' as Kant described it. Findlay proposes to fill in these gaps.

What is the frame work into which value-decisions or value pronouncements fit? After a lengthy enquiry into various forms of consciousness, Findlay comes to the conclusion that there are certain 'fundamental drifts' whenever there is conscious experience.

One such basic drift of consciousness is the urge to impersonality. While all warm-blooded desires and wants are personal, there is a deep seated tendency for the extension of your personal wishes and desires to other people. If you have an enthusiasm for fishing, you want others to share it. But this extension of ego can proceed only through becoming impersonal. The aspiration towards the impersonal is achieved through the elimination of what is concrete and particular in given situations. The expression of this urge towards the impersonal in the region of practice gives rise to the value-judgment. Valuations are abstract, repeatable and general. They are characterised by a certain measure of fixedness.

What then are these relatively fixed valuations? Findlay claims no great originality in enumerating seven, which he believes have not varied much in human history. These are (a) values and disvalues attached to human satisfaction, otherwise known as hedonic values or the pleasure-pain pole; (b) the values/disvalues attaching to contemplation or aesthetic values; (c) values/disvalues attaching to knowledge, that is the epistemological or logical values; (d) values/disvalues attaching to understanding or fellowship with other human beings.

These four are grouped together as the values of welfare. Three other values which Findlay takes to be distinct are those attaching to freedom and power; values or disvalues connected with justice and fairness and finally moral values which attach to the effort to achieve the other values.

It is not possible within the scope of a short review to examine in detail Findlay's treatment of the values of welfare. The following points are, however, worth

mentioning in passing. In regard to pleasures and pains, our author remarks that no augmentation of happiness will suffice to nullify certain profound pains. Satisfactions are more precious and pains more atrocious if spread over many dimensions and concerned with many objects. For an object to be aesthetically valuable, we are told, it must be arresting and poignant. Objects lose the power of poignant consciousness through being obvious and multiplication cheapens aesthetic values. The aesthetically feeble therefore must have a place in life especially if the truly poignant is not to be cheapened.

The values of fellowship, of power and freedom provide a natural bridge to those connected with justice and fairness. Power and freedom, Findlay notes, are closely connected. 'Every deficiency in power can be regarded as a curb on freedom and every curb on freedom as a depreciation of power.' When there is power and freedom and an equal respect for the freedom and power of other individuals, justice comes into being.

One of the longest chapters in the book is devoted to 'Injustice and its Disvalues.' Findlay points out that there is something negative in the value we attach to justice. Injustice is regarded as a positive evil which we are called upon to remove, but of justice itself we deprecatingly say 'it is only proper' or 'it was simply his due.' The distribution of welfare must be just and in this context justice means equality. But what constitutes equality? This has been a vexed question. The problem is created by the fact that persons are individual, unique and exclusive.

To avoid injustice we think of equality in the distribution of goods. But since the individuals themselves are different, the equal distribution of goods will not lead to equal welfare or even to equal satisfaction. Findlay makes an interesting and true observation here. He says 'where profound love and understanding exist among persons, it no longer matters that A should have different functions, privileges, insights and enjoyments from B.' This is all very well. But in the political and social contexts where the concept of justice comes most into play, it does not help us very much and no clear definition of equality emerges at the end of a long discussion.

Values & Intentions is a significant book. It marks a departure from the search for basic definitions which has dominated the philosophical literature of the English speaking world. The book takes some effort in reading. Professor Findlay is long winded; his thinking somewhat loose and untidy. For instance, the words *etcetera etcetera* recur with annoying frequency, even within a paragraph. Nevertheless,

the effort is worth making for the many suggestions that he has to offer.

P.C.C.

IS THERE A CONTEMPORARY INDIAN CIVILISATION By Mulk Raj Anand.

Asia Publishing House, 1964.

MAN IN THE NEW WORLD. By K. G. Saiyidain.

Asia Publishing House, 1964.

INDIAN CULTURE By S. Abid Husain.

Asia Publishing House, Bombay, 1963.

The mysterious world of values, so illusive and yet so intensely real, is the frame in which we essentially fit ourselves and look at the universe both within and beyond us. It shapes our views about life and living, man and society, nature and reality; provides purpose and meaning in our existence; directs our course of action and; sets the norms and modes of our conduct. When values change, which they do in a cyclical and not evolutionary manner, the frame of reference changes and therefore a different pattern of living begins to emerge. The older norms are disrupted and in the process newer forms begin to grow, take stronger roots, gradually settle down and eventually, when the source-energy withdraws or dries up, linger as dead weights.

It is at this stage when the life-source of a culture is almost exhumed, when forms merely cling as shackles and a moribund society begins to stink, that the said culture either fulfils its mission and dies an ignominious death or else gets a fresh lease of life through an extraordinary upheaval called a renaissance. Indian society has often fallen from its cultural heights to points of near decay. But the most remarkable thing which has happened in this country is that, unlike other cultures of the world, whenever its own culture degenerated into worse forms of decadence, it received a big jolt from within and soon acquired a fresh and a vigorous span of life.

Mulk Raj Anand may be reluctant to accept such a reading of history. It may nevertheless be stressed that the nineteenth century renaissance was only one, and the last one, of a series of renaissances which India has enjoyed in the long course of her history. We know of at least five previous major periods of momentous changes bearing all the signs of new life: the Vedic-Aryan; the Buddhist; the Gupta, the Harsha and Vikramaditya; and the Muslim, which included the medieval saints and mystics of the Bhakti cult. Each such period brought about an expansion of the best of the preceding culture and the values enshrined in it; created work and scholarship in arts and crafts and other fields of knowledge; collected disparate sects and schools of thought into working syntheses and; regenerated and revitalised the elite.

Each such epoch proclaimed the adequacy of Man, his competence, his resourcefulness and sufficiency in all spheres, including the religious. Every time Man acquired youthful confidence in his own powers. He felt that he could master the elements, create gods and works of art in their image, dissent from traditions, frame new codes, discover self and soul, ride the course of events; plunge into action, fight,

preach, trade and traffic, and yet keep the poise that was the token of his god-linked aristocracy. He would carry every mental endeavour to its extremity and still possess the desire and energy to come back to the centre or point of intersection between time and eternity, and gain fresh accession of strength for reaching new levels of equilibrium.

In all these symptoms the pre-British Indian renaissances were similar to themselves and therefore maintained a continuity in the flow of cultural values. The last renaissance, however, originated from a different source and therefore acquired features of its own. It came with our contact with the West at a time when it was at its best and Indian society at its worst, having relapsed into another phase of cultural and political frustration.

The first friction sparked off a new wave of intellectual tension. It shook Indian society out of its torpor. Raja Ram Mohan Roy was the first to absorb the shock and let it radiate through him. His emphasis on rationality was not quite the rationality of Hindu logic or of Buddhist disputations. It was more akin to the western rationality of the eighteenth and early nineteenth century in its faith in natural laws, in reform and the greatest good of the greatest number and in progress to be achieved perpetually through the new logic of reason and rationality.

Our Changing Values are the end-results of the type of synthesis Raja Ram Mohan Roy had sought to effect. His stress on the creative qualities of the *new order* was genuine. But the strains of an order lacking a genuine base arrested, rather than released, the creative forces. A sociological study of the last renaissance thus reveals that the original quality of spirituality, which the founders of the sects and systems possessed in abundant measure, soon exhausted itself in social reform and ideas of human progress by inadequate radiation through the new elite.

The irony lay in the idea of social good without a conception of the people. The tension which resulted from this vacuum led to a cleft culture and split personality of the type we now have in our midst. Looking at this cleft culture one can easily realise how miserably the experiment to force a synthesis between values emanating from two radically different cultures has failed. It has not led to the emergence of a new set of vigorous or self-stimulating values. Cross breeding as a means to improve the quality of the stock may be a biological reality. In the realm of values the theory simply does not work and the practice only results in a partial man, a smaller man, a shrunken man.

Excepting Abid Husain who seems to be vaguely aware of this tension and its consequences, the two other authors are either not much concerned with the issue or not willing to face it. Saiyidain's indifference, though unfortunate, is understandable. His audience mainly includes university students to whom a discourse on general education, its importance and place, is being given. He has necessarily to simplify his statements and present a lucid, even

if over-simplified, account of how best the students could adjust themselves with the changing times.

With Mulk Raj Anand it is, however, a different story. He not only refuses to accept the reasons which have brought about a cleft culture in India but actually wants to split it further by accelerating the tension to great heights. Being too much concerned with a Marxist interpretation of history and Darwinian theory of evolution, he forgets that tension without cosmic pulsation to animate it is the transition to nothingness, that it is erroneous to transform world history into a conception of a *linear progress*, and that every culture has its own civilisation and its own possibilities of self-expression which arise, ripen and decay.

The failure to recognise the essence of these historical truths compels him to move himself from one extreme to another. Eventually, he finds an easy way of consoling himself. From Mohenjodaro down to the Chinese aggression, he suddenly realises that history needs an ideal type which can be simply created by promoting a philosophy which enshrines the values of non-alignment and dialectical materialism.

While Mulk Raj Anand claims that his is an enquiry into *what is*, the stress is actually on *what ought to be*. The desire to say too many things, all at once and with Marxist overtones, however, blurs his vision and prevents him from presenting a systematic or a coherent picture of even his own image of an ideal society. Much care and still more patience is therefore needed to realise what is being said about Indian history or its *contemporary civilization*.

In contrast to this confusing account of Indian history, Abid Husain's narration, though over-simplified, is much more readable. Like Saiyidain, he too is catering to the needs of the university students and that too only for general reading purposes. Exploration and a review of Indian history is therefore necessarily restricted and circumscribed. In less than 70 pages, he however succeeds in presenting a lucid and, at times, thought provoking account of Indian history and the accompanying cultural change. His concern for *what ought to be* leads him to conclude that the promotion of a Hindustani culture, embodying the best of Hinduism and of Islam, can alone solve the cultural problems of India and fill the present void with life-giving symbols.

Ranjit Gupta

STUDIES IN ISLAMIC CULTURE IN THE INDIAN ENVIRONMENT By Aziz Ahmad,
Oxford University Press, 1964.

There are several historical studies dealing with particular aspects of Muslim rule in India but no systematic study describing Islamic culture as a totality as it is to be found in the Indian sub-continent has been attempted so far. Aziz Ahmad's book is the first authoritative discussion of the Indian Muslim culture and one of the very few studies dealing

with this prejudice-ridden subject in an objective manner. It treats Indian Muslim culture as a regional formulation of the universal Islamic culture conditioned by its fear of submergence, its persistence for survival and the compromises it had to make from time to time in the non-Muslim surroundings of India.

The book is divided into two parts. In the first part the author analyses the religio-political pull of *dar-al-Islam* as it was felt in the various phases of its history and Indian responses to it. The second part describes the problems of environmental tensions in Muslim culture in India, trends of synthesis and antithesis in various political, cultural and religious fields and mutations, divisions and antagonisms. The author's underlying thesis is that though Hindu and Muslim religions, civilizations and ways of life have coexisted together for well over a thousand years, undergoing alternative or simultaneous processes of mutual attraction and repulsion, neither the attraction nor the repulsion constitutes the whole story: the story of Muslim culture in India is interwoven in an infinite pattern of points and counter points.

The book has been written after a painstaking research into Arabic, Persian, Urdu, English, French and German sources, and it provides considerable fresh historical evidence on many controversial issues. The account of the arrival of Islam into India and the conversion of Hindus, the development of Sufi movements and the influence of Kabir and Nanak are extremely valuable contributions. It is, however, difficult to agree with all the points made.

In surveying the distinguishing features of Hinduism and Islam, Aziz Ahmad mentions that Islam is an egalitarian religion. This is a popular misconception among scholars who have attempted to study the institutional framework of the Muslim society on the basis of the scriptural evidence alone. There is, however, considerable evidence to show that Muslim societies have highly developed systems of social stratification. In a preliminary survey of Muslim societies I have found that the social stratification in Muslim societies varies from rigid guilds to social classes based on birth, wealth, religious prestige, and political power, etc. If the author had taken empirical evidence into account he would not have supported the common theological myth regarding the egalitarianism of Islamic society.

It is a popular impression among the historians, especially those belonging to India and Pakistan, that the religious revivalism was essentially a post-Mughal development and was largely encouraged by the British in keeping with their policy of divide and rule. Aziz Ahmad has also taken this impression as the basis of his analysis of modern separatism. It may be said however that all effort to cultural synthesis between Hindus and Muslims came to an end with Dara Shikoh. The roots of the revivalist trends in Indian history should be looked for, therefore, in the religious movement of Shaikh Wali al-lah.

The author argues that Urdu is essentially a language developed by the Muslims in India who were

either converts to Islam or had settled down in India and inter-married, and that only in a larger sense can Urdu be called a language which developed as a synthesis of Hindu and Muslim cultures in India. He completely overlooks the valuable contribution of the various regional languages and of Hindus who composed in it. In fact, at the local levels in the Punjab, Urdu is even today the popular language. Furthermore, it is still commonly used by the Punjabis, particularly Sikhs along with Gurmukhi despite the fact that in the nineteenth century the hostility of Sikhism to Islam had greatly increased.

The author makes sweeping statements in many places without any factual basis. Thus, he writes that centuries of Muslim rule had helped Hinduism to shed its shell of insularity and infused it with an apparatus of eclectic receptivity by which it could adapt itself to comfortable co-existence with the influx of western ideas which education in English brought necessarily in its wake. Was it actually contact with Islam which had infused in Hinduism the eclectic receptivity? The author himself admits elsewhere in the book that it is a characteristic of Hinduism that it has an unusual capacity to absorb new ideas. It may be said that the Hindus who had, under Mughal dominance, tended to accept as their own much that was glorious in Indo-Muslim civilization, found their loyalty to it seriously undermined by the new interests and allegiances in the British period. They naturally responded to the new situation with an eagerness to learn from the British whatever could contribute to their advancement.

Indian Muslims, on the other hand, clung tenaciously to cultural traditions bound up with the practice of their religion and to the memory of a brilliant civilization which, in their eyes, was irreplaceable by anything the West had to offer.

The book is a valuable contribution to the study of Indian Muslims. Its chief merit is its objectivity and a scientific approach and it should be expected that in the future it will serve as a model for historians dealing with this prejudice ridden subject. It also provides a good understanding of the problems involved in forging a cultural unity in India today.

Imtiaz Ahmad

THE INDIAN MIDDLE CLASSES—Their Growth in Modern Times By Dr. B. B. Misra.
Oxford University Press.

What is the middle class? When, how and whence did it emerge in India? If one seeks answers to these questions from Dr. Misra's book, one is likely to be disappointed. The author himself regards his work as, 'historical, not sociological' and herein lies the limitation of a work of this nature. It may, however, be pointed out that the author does indulge in sociological theorising and interpretation and a good deal of economic 'obiter dicta'.

Dr. Misra avoids 'a meticulous definition' of the middle class and uses the term in the broadest pos-

sible sense; excluding only the capitalists, the small peasants and unskilled workers. He begins by recognising the economic basis of social differentiation which arises out of 'relationship which a person or group bears to property or the means of production and distribution.' But this is soon discarded. Marx was wrong about the development of capitalism. 'Instead of a growing concentration of wealth, the progress of technology and capitalist enterprise brought about a gradual diffusion of its ownership and control' (p. 6). Again, it was 'the principle of human dignity which formed the basis of struggle against feudalism.' It was 'self-consciousness' which brought about the emergence of the middle class in Europe.

The rise of the middle classes in Europe is described as a consequence of 'economic and technological change', but in India they 'emerged more in consequence of changes in the system of law and public administration than in economic development.' Two obstacles stood in the way of the rise of the Indian middle class. They were, 'the caste organisation and the despotism of bureaucracy.' The British rule ended them by importing into India, 'ideas and institutions of a middle class social order.' The author regards caste organisation as sanctioned by religion, based on the theory of karma. He ignores the class and exploitation aspect and, perhaps, the essence of the caste system. Moreover, one fails to see any connection between 'despotism' and the rise of the middle classes. The middle classes of Britain entered into an alliance with the Tudors. German despotism did not prevent the rise of the bourgeoisie. The author does not regard the rule of the East India Company and later of the crown as despotic!

Dr. Misra's assessment of early British rule shows his unconcealed admiration for the role it played in transforming Indian society. 'The development of the country's economy thus long remained the main concern of the Europeans because of the upper class Hindu being averse to industrial occupations' (p. 11). The Company's profits mainly came from the 'cheapness and excellence' of Indian artisan production. Its policy 'at least spared the inconveniences of large scale colonisation and this also saved the Indian merchants and bankers from undue European competition' (p. 13). The expansion in India's foreign trade created capital resources for 'industrialisation'. A few other benefits of the Company's rule: 'the mild and constitutional character of government and the rule of law, the security of private property and the defined rights of agricultural classes, a national system of education and a period of continued peace, an economy of laissez-faire and a liberal policy of employment and social reform' (p. 69).

The early European planter, 'set examples of industry and perseverance, of philanthropy and integrity of conduct. Thanks to this the people were better clothed, housed and fed' (p. 115, 116). The construction of the railways was 'in fact the first tangible step towards industrialisation' (p. 116). 'The Com-

pany acted as a barrier against the influx of British goods and protected the finer produce of India's rural industries' (118). So, Dadabhai, Gokhale and Ranade failed to appreciate such noble services rendered by the Company and ungratefully talked about the 'drain'. Dr. Misra informs us! 'But even in the beginning the inflow of foreign capital contributed to the development of India's internal resources, which more than balanced the outflow of wealth from the country' (p. 119). The eulogy continues in the assessments of the land policy, education and social reforms, etc. In fact, one often wonders whether Dr. Misra is not caricaturing the 19th century imperialist historians.

The Indian Middle Classes abounds in historical anecdotes, the relevance of some of which may be dubious. There are far too many facts leading to too few conclusions substantiated by historical evidences. One may be forgiven the impertinence of pointing out some of the many historical inaccuracies in a work which bears the stamp of the Royal Historical Society. The Asutosh Mukerjee who opposed the Bengal Rent Bill of 1885 was not the same Asutosh Mukerjee who later became the Vice-Chancellor of Calcutta University. The first one died young before the century was over. Of course, the less said about Dr. Misra's sources the better.

A work which purports to deal with the Indian middle classes and the nationalist movement mentions in the Bibliography the writings of only one Indian leader of the early nationalist movement—Dadabhai Naoroji and that too of only one of his publications. Even the reports of the Indian National Congress are not consulted. In fact, even Congress resolutions are cited from the private papers of the Viceroy! All the same, Dr. Misra's work is quite useful for a study of 19th century British attitudes towards different new classes and groups of Indian society which arose in the 18th and 19th centuries. Dr. Misra has thus imposed upon himself, starting with the choice of sources of study, conditions which prevent him from making anything more of his work.

O. P. Kaushik

INDIAN PHILOSOPHY: A Popular Introduction by
Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya.
People's Publishing House. 1964.

Idealist Indian philosophy has been better-known than the Materialist. The latter, for a long time, was either maligned or ignored. In his *Introduction to Indian Philosophy*, Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya, as a Materialist, tries to right the wrong, and in the process gives a lop-sided view of both Idealism and Materialism. The ancient Materialists are supposed to be harbingers of progress for the millions, while the Idealists are Forces of Darkness, ranged against progress, holding people in eternal bondage. Materialists, according to Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya, struggle with the world around them in order to master natural forces, while Idealists prefer to ignore the

world around them, dubbing it as being illusory or at best transitory.

Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya does not attempt to prove these propositions and their applicability to ancient India. His purpose seems to be to denounce Idealism as such. But unfortunately Idealism hasn't always been the villain that he thinks it is; nor Materialism always the good angel. Even according to his own admission, Buddhist philosophy, a form of ancient Idealism, released forces of progress. Similarly the mechanical Materialism of the era of capitalist expansion was impeding social progress and a new Materialism, dialectical and historical, came into being.

For some years now, Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya has been concerned with the *Lokayata* philosophy with its four basic elements which he seems to think is the direct ancestor of modern Materialism. Much can be said in favour of *Lokayata* Materialism. But the fact remains that the *Lokayata* yielded place to *Advaita* and other idealist schools—a frank admission of its failure to reflect the needs of its times. Besides, Idealism was not just a mass of unrelieved blackness. Later-Materialists could and did put to good use the laws of thought and systems of logic developed by Idealist philosophy.

Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya has accused Idealist philosophers of turning their back on science and progress. But it does not look as though Idealist philosophy did really rule out scientific progress. For instance, Europe professed different forms of Christianity, all of them Idealist, but this belief certainly did not prevent progress in mathematics or astronomy, branches of science so vital to her trade. Europe produced a Copernicus and a Galileo irrespective of a powerful church, armed with an equally powerful Inquisition. Darwin's theory of evolution was a direct contradiction of the Bible story. In India too, for all the idealist philosophy, metallurgy, mathematics, astronomy, medicine and surgery took long strides. The need for other sciences did not arise anywhere in the world until the rise of capitalism.

Our social backwardness itself is the source of Idealist philosophy, which played sometimes a progressive and sometimes a reactionary role. If after the seventeenth century India lagged behind Europe in the economic sphere, the causes of stagnation must be sought not in our Idealist philosophy but in the nature of our economy and the class-caste structure. Idealism could not stamp out progress any more than Materialism could enforce it. Both have played their part in developing society.

'Withdrawal' of the philosophers from 'active participation in social labour', says Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya, was the root cause of Idealist philosophy. This is an assertion not borne out by facts. Few materialists including Marx and Lenin were engaged in 'the labour of production'. Even otherwise, militant workers engaged in 'the labour of production' remain. Idealists in their philosophy. The implication in the author's theory is that if there had not been

any leisure, Idealist philosophy would not have arisen. Perhaps—but in that case there would not have been any progress in society either. For, so far, no progress has been made without classes and their struggle, and leisure was possible only in class-societies. In a future classless society, leisure is possible too as a result of the full-development of productive forces and techniques, but that does not mean that people would be Idealist philosophers.

Karma did not seem to have played an entirely negative role as Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya maintains. *Karma* blurred the distinction between different tribes. One could be re-born into any tribe, or for that matter, into any other species, animal or insect. As D. D. Kosambi puts it in his *Introduction to the Study of Indian History*, 'it i.e., *Karma* could grow and ripen like a seed planted in the previous season, or mature like a debt, while it never failed to pay in exact proportion. It can be seen how this would appeal to the peasant and trader, even to the *sudra* who might thus aspire to be a king.'

The old tribal society was yielding place to one where agriculture and trade were practised, new institutions like private property and the family were coming in, and the new philosophies of Buddhism and Jainism reflected the needs in the new social situation in their injunctions against stealing and encroachment, adultery, and their stress on truth and justice. But on these points the author maintains strict silence.

Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya tries to prove the drag extended by belief in *Karma* even today, by giving the instance of the Indian peasant. 'We cannot expect our peasants to be genuinely enthusiastic about the land reforms and the advanced agricultural technology offered to them without at the same time weeding out from their heads the law of *Karma*, which for generations taught them that their miserable lot was the result of their misdeeds in the previous births rather than because of a backward technology and an equally backward social set-up called Feudalism.'

Peasant philosophy doesn't impede their agricultural operations. Peasant struggles in different parts of our country and at different times, do not corroborate the theory that belief in *Karma* is really so deep and strong. In times of unforeseen disaster, the Indian peasant does invoke his *Karma*, but he is ready to fight for what he feels are his legitimate rights. He has done so even under the leadership of an idealist, Gandhiji, who was himself a firm believer in the *Bhagwad Gita* philosophy. To follow Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya's theory, it would look as though we should fight the *Karma* philosophy of the peasants first, and other things would take care of themselves. But he forgets that the material basis of the *Karma* philosophy must itself be abolished in order to free the peasants from it. In other words, it is not the *Karma* philosophy that should be fought against, but its very basis.

Social revolution has come through very many stages, and superstition belonged to an earlier stage.

But Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya comes down on superstition in one sweeping statement. 'Superstitions, thus, are not only the products of backwardness but also the instruments to enforce stagnation and backwardness by resisting social progress.' Superstition had its positive aspects too. Kosambi rightly says, 'In decrying the role of superstition when it kept India backward, it must never be forgotten that priestly ritual and magic also helped bring civilization to any given locality. Such belief turned into fetters when the class structure hardened. Superstition had its roots in sympathetic magic, which is found in all societies with primitive means of production, and it is one of the earliest steps to civilization.'

For Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya, Indian philosophy came to a stop in the seventeenth century. He is strangely silent about the contributions of *Sufism*. Nothing has been said about Akbar and his *Din-e-Ilahi*, which sought to unite Hindu, Muslim and Christian. Though Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya concedes that during medieval times the world over, social reform movements found expression in religious movements, they have not been discussed either. Again, nothing is said about modern Indian philosophy, the late nineteenth and early twentieth century contributions like the *Brahmo* philosophy of Ram Mohan Roy, or Radical Humanism or the Non-Violence of Gandhiji.

The trouble, I suppose, is that the author begins his study with a set of preconceived, unverified general propositions like Idealism is reactionary and Materialism is progressive; separation of the philosopher from 'labour of production' is the source of Idealism. Secondly, he accepts uncritically what western scholars like Winternitz said about Indian Idealist philosophy. Thirdly, since his method is generic and not historical, he does not distinguish the differences in meaning that certain philosophical terms acquired from time to time. Fourthly, sometimes he takes only the meaning that he can fit into his theory. An instance is the meaning of *Syadvad*. '*Syat*' means 'perhaps' and so he concludes, it is a philosophy of agnosticism. But *Syat* also means 'become' and it could be interpreted as the philosophy of becoming. When there are more meanings than one to a word, one should be more careful in interpretation and should question the academic interpretation before accepting it as Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya does, for example, in regard to the word '*vridhhi*'. According to him the word means 'activities of production' or 'labour of production'. But actually it means 'increase', 'interest' or 'usuring', which was condemned during ancient and medieval times. Finally, Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya does not see the logic behind the systems of philosophy. For example he interprets *Bheda-hedavada* as the doctrine of duality-cum-non-duality, whereas it actually means the theory of difference-cum-non-difference, a theory of the unity of opposites. All these and many more failings tell grievously upon the book.

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


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
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
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
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

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THE BOMB

a symposium on the
implications of the demand for
an independent nuclear deterrent

symposium participants

THE PROBLEM

A short statement which
sketches the range of the debate

WHAT DIFFERENCE DOES IT MAKE?

A. D. Moddie, business executive, a student
of public affairs

ARRANGEMENT WITH THE WEST

H. M. Patel, former Secretary, Union
Ministry of Defence, and member of the
Indian Civil Service

A LIMITED PROGRAMME

Raj Krishna, Senior Research Fellow,
Institute of Economic Growth, Delhi University

STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS

Analyst, a foreign research scholar
now in this country

BREAK WITH THE PAST

Sisir Gupta, Research Secretary of the
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THE DIPLOMATIC ARGUMENT

Seminarist, a student of India's
foreign policies

TO BE OR NOT TO BE

Romesh Thapar, Editor of
'Seminar'

CONTROL AND DISARM

R. K. Nehru, former Secretary-General,
Union Ministry of External Affairs

DOCUMENTARY

Some statements pertinent
to the debate

FURTHER READING

A select and relevant bibliography

COVER

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The problem

The cost of one new prototype bomber with full equipment is equivalent to the combined cost of one year's salary for 250,000 teachers, 30 science faculties with one thousand students each, 75 fully equipped 100-bed hospitals and 50,000 tractors or 150,000 harvesters. Many such equations can be presented. And, every year, some 130,000 million to 140,000 million dollars go down the drain of military spending throughout our world. Yet, we in India have been forced by a developing situation into a debate which will determine whether we too commit to the most costly of armament expenditure — the nuclear. The debate covers questions pertaining to our survival, our dignity, our power as a people, our influence among the nations who constitute our world. A great deal hangs in the balance. An unthinking move, a faulty decision, can profoundly influence the future. This issue of SEMINAR is part of the debate which has been joined.

What difference lop nor?

A. D. MODDIE

ABOUT a century ago, one of the intrepid surveyors of the Survey of India reached Lop Nor, Sinkiang, in the heart of Asia, a quiet intruder on a secret surveying mission into what was then one of the world's terra incognita. Today Lop Nor poses a new problem, not of geography but of national security and world peace.

In a free society all fundamental questions should be open ones, no matter how technical the details. The consequences of the Chinese bomb on India's defence needs is one such question. It has already roused some public controversy. Letters have been written in the press. The matter was raised in the AICC at Guntur. Dr. H. J. Bhabha, Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, has

put out a few statements, including some estimates of the cost of Indian atom bombs. In a statement in Parliament, the Prime Minister has somewhat modified his earlier categorical stand against an Indian bomb, in so far as he made a general admission that policy may change with changing circumstances. But the Government of India is still committed to the earlier policy for the purely peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and no bomb.

This is an open question. It is a very difficult one, much more difficult than the problem to arm or not to arm in the earlier years between 1955 and 1962, not quite as categorical as Krishna Menon's 'murder' or 'suicide' alternatives. Whilst there must be secrecy at

the heart of the problem, there is no secrecy about much of the surrounding technical and geo-political facts of it, and the debate must now turn to a sound, serious study by thinking people in India and abroad, by Parliament, and ultimately by the Prime Minister and his government. In the absence of a clear, penetrating insight of a genius into such a complex question, the majority of thinking citizens have no alternative but to take it logically, realistically, and as factually as possible, considered step after considered step, from an area of heat and darkness to the cold light of clear, hard choices. This is only one modest, tentative attempt to do so.

One must begin with the basic question, 'What difference does Lop Nor make to our previous defence plans?' In attempting to answer this, the only assumption that we can safely make with some degree of national unanimity is that thirteen years of experience has taught us that the Chinese threat is a real and continuing one to our borders, to our way of life, and to such of our neighbours who have not yet been swallowed up. This has been acknowledged, at least by implication, in many statements of two Prime Ministers, and also by the Defence Minister's recent speech to the Army Commanders Conference (*Statesman*, 1st December), when he said that the Chinese forces on the border were even larger today than they were in October, 1962.

To the major question, 'What difference Lop Nor?', come two answering questions:

- (a) Does it give China real new diplomatic strength?
- (b) Does it give her a new armoury of nuclear military strength which will be more than a potential danger, a major new lever in world politics?

To the answers to these lie India's choices of countervailing policies and actions.

The Diplomatic

Let us first consider the essentially diplomatic, to the extent

that one can theoretically separate the two. Despite the Prime Minister's repeated assertions that the Lop Nor explosion has isolated China, it is surely beyond doubt that the bomb has added that much extra dimension, and that much extra nuclear weight to China's future importance in world affairs. There seems little sign of isolation; not a single Afro-Asian nation has raised even a verbal protest at Cairo. Is that importance confined only to prestige, or does it constitute a more tangible threat than before? It was hard enough for other world powers to restrain China earlier. After Lop Nor, Chinese leaders will see through the dispersing nuclear cloud the reality of an old historic vision; that the 'Central Kingdom' is once again a world master. The bomb is likely to give it that much more confidence and that much more energy in pushing its policies of promoting revolution through Asia and Africa to the central political councils of the world, whether in or outside the U.N., a revolution directed from Peking for Peking's interests. The first sign of it is the clear unprecedented Chinese intention to 'fight' if the U.S. should attack North Vietnam.*

Real Threat

Earlier, the Chinese nuclear threat was discounted as a 'poor man's bomb', a primitive Hiroshima device based on plutonium. A New York report of the 27th October from American scientists and military experts has since 'upgraded' communist China's atomic capability and its danger to India. These experts say that 'China's use of enriched uranium and their use of the implosion method to trigger the atomic explosion indicates a broad-based and more efficient industrial management capacity.' Ralph Lapp, a Washington physicist**, estimates

*Statement in Hanoi by Mr. Liu Ning Yi, Chinese Representative, at an international conference on 29th Nov. (Report from Tokyo in *Statesman*, December 2).

**Also former Executive Director of U.S. Defence Department's Atomic Research, and Scientific Adviser to War Department's General Staff.

that China can produce an atom bomb a month and that it could be carried either by a propeller driven TU-4 or a jet-powered IL-28.

The threat is, therefore, more than a matter of prestige.

Possible Postures

If so, one may then ask, does India need an atomic bomb or a balance of terror to counter China diplomatically? Some think that the bomb is not a weapon for use, it is a political force. One school of thought may point to strong countries like Japan and West Germany who have had no need for nuclear armaments so far, and who have concentrated on economic growth. Should India not follow the Japanese course of taking 'a low posture' in international politics and a 'high posture' in economic development and international trade. There is more than temptation in it; there are far more compelling reasons than those of the Japanese with our poor, mounting millions to persuade us to adopt the Japanese postures.

The other school may well argue: how long could you adopt such postures in the face of even conventional military threats to the northern borders, including the neighbouring States of Nepal and Bhutan? How long, one may ask, without even the backing of the Afro-Asian world after the collapse of the Colombo proposals? The Japanese and West German analogies are hardly applicable to India. The Chinese have several possible courses of action on our very borders: another NEFA type assault, or another Viet Nam or Cambodia in one of the northern Kingdoms, or a pincer movement with Pakistan to crack the Kashmir walnut. Such prospects might be considered in more detail when we come closer to the nature of the military threat. For the present, we are confining ourselves to the diplomatic.

Perhaps the major and very tempting answer in the diplomatic field would be some kind of understanding for nuclear protection from the US and/or USSR for the

integrity of India. But how dependable could such an understanding be? The chances of their cooperating against the Chinese threat are practically nil, especially after Kennedy and Khrushchov. There may just be a chance that the USSR may be prepared to adopt a neutral position with the possibility of a US umbrella, especially if the Chinese pressure on the USSR from Sinkiang and in the world communist movement continued. But in what circumstances could the US umbrella be more than a probability, a real deterrent of which China would be conscious? Even in far deeper and more protracted involvement in Viet Nam, the US has hesitated so far to use nuclear weapons.

On the other hand, it could be argued that the use of nuclear weapons in Viet Nam would involve far graver consequences of American military occupation in South Asia, than the use of nuclear weapons against Chinese bases in Tibet, Sinkiang and China proper from the surrounding seas to prevent aggression against India. In the case of the first, military occupation and involvement with Chinese ground forces will be inevitable; in the case of the latter, it would only serve as an air strike deterrent without involving any land penetration or engagement with Chinese land forces.

Moral Choice

Again, in the diplomatic field it may well be argued that India could not morally produce a bomb after being a signatory to a nuclear test ban. Surely, some of those who have signed possess nuclear armaments themselves. The ban is only a stalemate in a relative equilibrium. Therefore, where lie standards of nuclear morality? All war is madness, and nuclear war is the extremest form so far developed. We may well have to choose the lesser madness of armament, conventional and/or nuclear, to prevent even a conventional arms clash. We could do this and yet be *bona fide* partners in any nuclear disarmament programme to which China was a consenting party. In the absence of such 'a consummation devoutly

to be wished,' we may only be posturing and wishfully thinking, living in the unreal world which even Nehru recognised after Sela.

Economic Choice

It may also be argued that if we adopt the Japanese 'low' and 'high' postures, we could compete against China in industry and trade as an industrial power and as a source of trade and aid with Asian and African countries. Already a beginning has been made in Africa and Nepal. It could be extended there, and a similar beginning made in South Asia, in Burma, Ceylon, Malaysia, Cambodia and Thailand. It could be argued that such a course in the diplomatic field would be far more productive, and far more beneficial for economic growth and international goodwill in the long run. It is one thing to reason logically that the cost of preservation must come first, and so we must have the bomb. It is arguable with almost equal force, particularly in our serious economic situation in 1964, and with another impending explosion of population internally, that without a minimum rate of economic growth of 6 or 7 per cent, it may well be that China's best bomb is the Indian baby, especially if it can divert us long enough from a single-minded concentration on economic growth. The relatively minor aggression of 1962 seems to be achieving similar ends. The practical problem arises as to how far India's economic means allow the Japanese course to be followed, even without the costs of an Indian nuclear deterrent.

Let us now consider some relevant questions of the military aspect of the question. One clear change which Lop Nor should make is a clear transition from the conception of defence to the conception of the deterrent. Military thinking should not only prepare to repulse an attack but also to deter it, for this is the best guarantee against an engagement, the escalation of which may lead down more hellish roads than the possession of nuclear bombs. In the discussion on the diplomatic aspect, we have already considered the possibility of a U.S. umbrella with

USSR's neutrality. To the extent that is possible, we may forego the extravagance of a bomb and concentrate our resources on the most effective conventional deterrent; but, once again, in what circumstances can one expect a U.S. Polaris deterrent based on the Indian ocean to operate? Surely not for another NEFA type aggression, nor even for the occupation of the whole of Aksai Chin, or in the event of political infiltration in Nepal and Bhutan. Such limited land advances may well be attempted until such time as China's nuclear striking power grows to the Polaris stage for counter-attack against the American continent.

An Effective Deterrent

In the circumstances, the defence of the Himalayan wall will continue to depend on purely conventional means for many years to come. We have so far considered five mountain divisions* and three bomber squadrons adequate. Do we need more for an effective deterrent? Do we need a far greater concentration of conventional fire power supported by far greater mobility behind the forward areas? Do we need a much heavier bomber force to knock out bases and concentrations in Tibet and disrupt lines of communications? These are purely military questions to be answered by military men. But if the military men have even reasonable doubts about the deterrence of mountain divisions and conventional land/air fire power, then India is faced with the hard choice of either seeing the Chinese power penetrating to the foothills and threatening the home lands where there is India's substance, its rice, coal, steel, plantations and electricity; or think in terms of a deterrent which will stop the Chinese from moving forward in any strength, which our forces would find hard to roll back.

Does such a deterrent lie with larger bomber forces with conventional bombs? If India threatened to use such a force in the event of a land push, would not China threaten to retaliate with far greater aerial force? Did we not keep our air force out of NEFA and

Aksai Chin skies in 1962? In such situations, the U.S. may not find another ready Cuba answer with missiles pointing to their home shores. Nor do they have another Kennedy as President. Nor, indeed, can India expect to have someone else's nuclear weapons on tap at the time and circumstances of her own choosing. The story of the Atlantic alliance should be enough to point to that.

On the other hand, a serious Chinese threat to the cities and arsenals of India to knock it out as a military and economic power, may well bring in the U.S. nuclear arm. But by then, if the strategic parts of the Himalayas are penetrated and lost, the set-back may be a serious psychological one, a few heads in government may roll; political coherence may be lost; and in geo-political terms only a rear-guard action may remain in the most important of Asia's four southern peninsulas, Indo-China, Malaya and Arabia being the others.

The Two Extremes

What effective deterrent may be foreseen between two extreme possibilities; between a western deterrent to be used when they choose, which is likely to be only when the Indian heartlands are threatened and not the strategic Himalayan approaches; and at the other extreme, Indian conventional forces of the present order. None that one could point to with any confidence.

Meanwhile, Shastri is reported from London to have suggested the most nebulous idea of all, a 'joint nuclear shield for the non-aligned.' (James Cowley, *Statesman*, Delhi, December 6, 1964). If it is hard enough to conceive of a satisfactory nuclear shield—satisfactory as to when and who will pull the trigger—for just India's Himalayan border, political imagination is stretched far in seeing how it could operate in a host of other quite complicated circumstances in South Asia alone. To the extent this proposal introduces a labyrinth of problems all over the world, aligned and non-aligned, to that extent the prospect of such a shield for India remains too remote and

impractical for her immediate needs.

The Apparition

Is India then left staring at an apparition which appears to become more real the more one looks at it; an apparition which will not be denied or spirited away easily, an Indian bomb? A small nuclear deterrent at something like Dr. Bhabha's costs may deter any aggression based on Tibetan bases by a concentrated strike against those bases and China's growing industrial and military power in Sinkiang, China's Assam, out on a limb, but valuable and vulnerable. Sinkiang is a suitable target for India's deterrent arm. It is Chinese big new investment, a threat to the USSR deep in the Eurasian heartland, an economic and military base for the forces in Tibet also. A strike there would hurt hard; it may also please the Russians; and it would give the Chinese more problems to think about with its none too happy Muslim Uighurs, the victims of the mass 'cinisation' of Sinkiang. This smaller deterrent may well be in the category of the U.K., one where there is a combination of self-reliance as well as reliance on the U.S.; self-reliance up to a point, the backing of a larger power beyond that point. Even neutral Sweden has had to maintain air power of deterrent force. Are the U.K. and Sweden the best examples for India to follow in preference to Japan and West Germany?

What about India's competence, technical and financial, to produce the bomb? Dr. Bhabha's costs seem so low as to rouse suspicion, but who has any better figures? If there are better ones, they have not yet been published. It may be that Dr. Bhabha's are near reality, because India has already developed at least a part of the infra-structure for a nuclear bomb, and the enormous developmental costs of the Anglo-Americans in World War II may now be obsolete. Each technological advance may make it cheaper. If Dr. Bhabha's costs are anywhere near the true ones, they are well within India's financial capabilities. We

do not need more than a small arsenal with carriers for the bomb of effective range and altitude.

In a report from G. H. Jansen (Beirut, Nov. 30) General Gallois, a French expert, considers that India's Canberras are capable of delivering a bomb better than the Chinese Ilyushin, as their normal cruising height is twice that of the Ilyushins, which means that the latter is twice as vulnerable to defensive ground or air action. We probably then need only to augment our bomber force with an adequate fire power with a limited nuclear deterrent. But is the range of the Canberra far enough to strike at the nerve centres, if not the heart of China? All Tibet is well within range, but what of the Sinkiang oil refineries of Kolayalun and Tushantzu, the thermal plant in Urumchi, the triangular rail and road communications between China and Tibet and Sinkiang? For these a range of 1500 miles will be necessary. Strikes at these targets will make China think harder than in 1962 before another Himalayan adventure.

Capability

There lies the last, perhaps the first question of all. Can India make the bomb? Robi Chakravarti thinks not, in a good article on 'The Bomb Debate and India's Foreign Policy' in the *Economic Weekly*, Nov. 28, 1964. His first argument is that, even with some nuclear know-how, we lack the special metals for an atomic bomb, 'being virtually in the three metal (iron-steel, aluminium and copper) age.' But one has it on fairly high metallurgical authority that we do have or can develop them in the near future. We have Uranium, Thorium, Titanium, Zirconium, Berrilium and Graphite, to mention only a few. But even Robi Chakravarti, who thinks we are not in a position to make a bomb denied foreign aid to do so, distinguishes between finding it 'easy' to produce a bomb and not being able to do so at all, for if, in the ultimate analysis, it is decided that India needs the bomb for its own independent decisions on survival, it will not do to say it cannot be done without foreign aid. How did

China do it? Not with its militant millions.

One major argument in favour of a limited Indian deterrent is that, as with experience of the peaceful uses of atomic energy, India can remain relatively up to date with nuclear military technology, with limited force and limited expenditure. World politics is an unstable thing, and who knows what the power alignments may be ten or twenty years hence. We cannot count on other people's umbrellas indefinitely. We must make the Chinese leaders believe that, even though our military strength may be smaller, we have the power and the will to strike back damagingly, and that is all that we may need in pure military terms.

If this is to be the final conclusion, a limited but effective Indian nuclear deterrent, we may well ask ourselves what will be its repercussions.

Economic Cost

The first, and perhaps most important, will be the economic cost. If Bhabha's figures are near the truth, they are then within our capacity to pay. If not, let the national debate throw up better figures. The second important repercussion may be the risk to foreign aid. Such a risk there will undoubtedly be, as the present nuclear club does not favour any extension of its activities; but it will call for effective diplomacy to convince aiding powers that the whole purpose of aid is survival, or else all the dollars, sterling, deutch marks and other currencies may flow down the earlier Kuomintang and later Viet Nam rivers. The real problem before the West and the USSR is whether India will be another Kuomintang China or a better risk. If the latter, what is it ultimately worth and what price would they be prepared to pay for its survival as the major containing force in Asia of China?

There will also be the question of the risk of the spread of nuclear arms to other smaller nations, specially the UAR. In the long run a nuclear striking force is, in fact, a smaller nation's best answer to the eternal threat of a large ag-

gressive one, an answer which smaller nations did not have in the days of Napoleon, or Chengiz Khan, or Caesar. The only way the large nuclear powers can ultimately prevent the spread of nuclear arms is to put restraints on themselves.

Our Image

Yet another repercussion may be on India's image, specially amongst smaller Afro-Asian nations. After the fate of the Colombo proposals and the Cairo Conference, a simple question provides its own answer: what diplomatic support is there to lose? The sooner Afro-Asian nations realise the Indian let-down, before and after the Chinese bomb, the sooner they will see their policies are driving India closer to the bomb, and a possible U.S. umbrella as well. These are almost as much their choices as India's. If they failed to give effect to the Colombo proposals, if they failed to utter even a whimper of protest after Lop Nor, what collective guarantees for peace or support for the aggressed have they to offer, even moral and diplomatic, if not material and economic?

In Afro-Asia there is for India the choice of the image of a pusillanimous giant, on the one hand, one which adopted 'high postures' in international politics and 'low', ones in economic growth in the previous decade; and, on the other hand, the image of a chastened India determined to build its economic and military strength at any cost, and determined to preserve its integrity. Afro-Asian nations respect strength as much as they may respect any other quality, and some of them in Asia may even welcome India's acquisition of nuclear power as a factor making for their own security. Now that the old imperial powers have largely gone from Afro-Asian lands, real politik will drive them too, like the earlier Europeans and the modern Americans and Russians to balances of power which minimize aggression and war. India, in fact, may combine the acquisition of nuclear arms with the solemn declaration that they will never be used against any other Afro-Asian

country which does not possess them, and in all circumstances, they will never be used except in defence against aggression by another nuclear power.

Finally, what tentative conclusions can one draw from what has gone before?

The first is that even though the decision to use nuclear science in defence is basically a political one at the highest level, that decision hinges on the purely military opinion, land and air, of the effectiveness of deterrents short of Indian nuclear arms. It is for the military men to pronounce on this after the most careful study, without any political influences at all. The political aspects of the decision can be ultimately left to the Prime Minister, his Cabinet and Parliament.

Keeping Abreast

Next, even before that decision, one way or another, there is more urgent need now for the Atomic Energy Commission and defence science to keep abreast with the technology of nuclear weapons, and to make a preliminary assessment of India's needs in terms of nuclear know-how, materials and costs, if this is not being done already. Like aviation, we may not at present be in a position to reproduce the most advanced technology, but we should be adequately informed of what that technology is in its essentials. Whatever the political or military reasons for the final decision, one way or the other, we cannot afford to be left far behind in the race of nuclear knowledge in all spheres, because science is an inter-dependent whole in its fundamental and applied aspects.

Meanwhile, let the nation debate its future and weigh the risks both ways, for this may well be the hardest single decision which India may have to make politically, economically and militarily since Independence. Let it be made with cold, brave calculation; without posturing sentimentally or morally, without flabbiness of thought or complacency of spirit, without the cynicism of nuclear or non-nuclear deaths.

Arrangement with the west

H. M. PATEL

THERE is a feeling that the advance of Communist China to nuclear capacity has radically affected India's defence problem, even if it is only nominal capacity which China has attained. From the general trend, it appears that a powerful volume of opinion is in favour of India herself going in for the manufacture of nuclear wea-

pons. There are persons who advocate closer arrangements with the United States of America. And there are, again, others who contend that no change of policy is called for. It is not without meaning that, though the theory of inertia is officially propounded by the government, the most vociferous opinion comes from those who commend non-alignment and non-manufacture of nuclear war weapons; and those who give expression to it, again, are individuals who, one assumes, can communicate their views more easily than most to India's policy-makers.

Need for Discussion

The decisions which are involved in this question are not best reached by public discussion. But it is essential in a democracy that the decisions taken have a large measure of public support. In other words, whatever policy is adopted, it must be supported by cogent reasons and more practical arguments than the discrediting of critics, the reiteration of faith in political abstractions and the belittling of China's achievement.

A country's defence policy is closely knit with its foreign policy objectives. It is limited by the resources, domestic and external, which that country can tap. It is something that must subserve the independence and territorial integrity of a nation. There is nothing in the nuclear threat which alters these basic conditions. There is everything in it which makes their being ignored a dangerous folly. Nuclear weapons, I need hardly say, go a long way to increase the power of conventional weapons, for the fear of plunging the world in nuclear war could restrain other nuclear powers from interfering when one of them pursues expansionist policies through the use of conventional weapons. With the Chinese in possession of large parts of Indian territory, this is a very practical issue for us. Because nuclear weapons strengthen conventional arms, it follows that they have a certain political importance which cannot be bypassed. It is not only what India thinks about

China's bomb that matters but, also, what impact it has on other nations that must be considered—specially other nations in the region.

There can be no two opinions about the economics involved in modern weapons of war—which cover not only atom bombs but also the means of delivering them. In the conditions obtaining in our country, it is beyond our means and to become involved in a programme of effective arming would be seriously to retard our economic development. We have already experienced the strain of repairing our fences which we were forced to undertake as a result of the Chinese aggression in 1962. The over-optimistic expectation that the Indian economy could bear the joint burden of industrial development and increased defence expenditure, has given place to more realistic assessments.

We must not forget that, rightly or wrongly, effectively or otherwise, we have accepted the task of combining economic growth and social welfare. If we do decide to make a bid for nuclear capability, then inevitably we shall have to accept considerable modifications in our programmes for economic progress and for social welfare. We cannot afford to do this and, until we decide that it is absolutely necessary, I do not see how we can involve ourselves in heavy expenditure of the magnitude required in modern warfare.

The Alternatives

Therefore, it is essential to explore thoroughly the alternatives which might be available to India. Here we might rule out the long-term policy of nuclear disarmament. There are too many obstacles in the way and the passing years only prove, if anything, the impracticability of the ideal. It is also unthinkable that India should do nothing about the increased threat and just trust to the interests of the older nuclear powers to restrain the new ones. It follows, therefore, that the only course for India is to explore every possibility of coming to some arrangement

with the western powers, who came to our assistance so readily when we were attacked by the Chinese and who have shown every willingness to help us to build our defences. We have nothing to lose by such an arrangement.

Shed Non-alignment

It will, of course, mean giving up our policy of non-alignment which long since has lost any meaning it might have had; and will require working in with the British and Americans on a defence policy for this region. If this involves certain adjustments in foreign policy, they will have to be accepted. The Government of India, for example, is committed to clear the Chinese from Indian soil. In implementing this promise, it will have to work to a common programme with the western powers. There is every reason to think that common consultation for defence between India and the West is feasible because both sides have everything to gain and nothing to lose from it. It must be made clear to the West, however, that less than complete understanding and close cooperation will be inadequate for India's needs and there must be every effort on India's part to convince the West that it accepts the natural commitments without any reservations.

A factor which makes for the easier conclusion of an agreement of the kind I envisage, is the recent political developments in the communist world. The downfall of one who was as powerfully placed as Khrushchov was in Soviet Russia, indicates the limits to national policy which even communist countries cannot ignore. Whatever reasons there might have been for imagining that Russia could hold back China, they have been dislodged by, firstly, China's aggression against India and, secondly, by Khrushchov's overthrow.

We have learnt to our cost that we cannot count on China's pursuing a peaceful policy. We have learnt, or we have had enough to teach us, that Soviet Russia's support cannot be counted upon. We might learn much more if we studied the case histories of Com-

unist China and of Cuba, both of whom have found from personal experience that Russian assistance is governed and regulated by its own policies. If I may be permitted to anticipate an experience for which we are heading, I would predict that with the completion of a technical aid agreement between Russia and China, the commitments Soviet Russia has already entered into with India will come up against serious difficulties.

It would be desirable, therefore, to adopt a less optimistic outlook towards Russian assistance and, where it is a source of misunderstanding with the West, to abandon it altogether. We shall lose nothing but our false hopes. I would reiterate that non-alignment had ceased to have meaning. The evidence for this is in the end of the cold war position where the two blocs regarded each other as solid, opposing masses. If this was true at any time, it was true only in the limited sense of the impression that the West had of the East and vice versa. As problems of international relations became apparent, the two major protagonists began to appreciate the difficulties they had within their own camp and the differences that obtained in the other camp.

Non-alignment in fact ended with alignment and the return of the world to the old multi-nation condition. In this state, it matters less that a country is equidistant from the two bloc leaders than that it is able to ward off troublesome neighbours and look after itself. As a matter of fact, India has never really been in a position of equidistance — the figures for external assistance will bear this out. They are the more significant when one considers that the public utterances of prominent leaders have been sometimes inclined the other way.

National Prestige

There remains the question of national prestige. If it is felt that there is something derogatory in a workable arrangement for defence, then we have no option but to enter the nuclear arms race. To talk of creating a free-zone in Asia, of keeping out the western powers from Asia, and of uphold-

ing peace by refraining from acts 'provocative' to China, is in the circumstances of today to argue China's case for expansion. Besides, it is not consistent with the eagerness with which we have been pursuing other countries to help us to manufacture non-nuclear weapons of war.

No question arises of our surrendering our sovereignty or even of allowing bases on our soil to foreign forces. All that is asked for is a clear understanding on a number of points, which would enable the Indian armed forces, in cooperation with the forces of assisting powers, to operate effectively against the enemy. The first concern of a country's defence policy, as well as of its foreign policy, is the security of the country. This is not a matter which can be subordinated to any other consideration.

The Common Interest

Therefore, I for my part am not prepared to rule out for all time recourse to nuclear weapons. If we consider nuclear war as possible, then it follows that India must have the weapons to defend herself. In the present conditions, they cannot be bought. They can be made at tremendous cost; or their protection can be secured by agreement. It would be extravagant folly to go in for manufacturing nuclear weapons which we can ill afford without thoroughly exploring the possibilities of the nuclear umbrella. But it would be politically criminal to neglect such exploration. There is some excuse for the public being confused on this issue but there can be none for the government's obvious indecision. I am aware that military arrangements are not publicly announced and that, even if the Government of India had pursued the policy I have outlined, it would not have been in a position to lay the details before the people. But foreign policy calls for the widest publicity and, as I have said, foreign policy and defence policy must have a common interest, that is, the security of the country. And there is nothing in our foreign policy to indicate that an adequate defence policy is being pursued.

A limited programme

RAJ KRISHNA

IN this paper I attempt to examine the implications of the three major alternative policies—viz., (1) the present policy; (2) alignment; and

(3) the acquisition of an independent deterrent—which are being proposed by different sections of public opinion in India; and indi-

cate a fourth course which I would myself prefer.

The nature of the present regime in China,¹ and its actual international conduct in the last few years make it an axiomatic objective of Indian policy to try to balance its power. Like all good concepts, the concept of a balance of power has been and can be abused. Nevertheless, the concept has a valid hard core. The unbalanced power of an expansionist nation is a real menace to which a genuinely defensive balancing is the only real answer in the absence of an internationalisation of all power.

The differences between the real alternatives available to India today are differences only in regard to the means to be adopted for realising the aim of balancing the power of China.

The First Plank

In the present situation, the advantage of non-alignment is simply that it facilitates a build-up of our conventional forces with aid from many quarters. Facilitating our armament in this way was not the most important original intention of the policy of non-alignment, but it has now become its most important advantage. Credit for this development must be given more to the recent East-West thaw and the Sino-Russian rift than to the foresight of our policy makers.

The first plank of our present policy—that we shall continue to remain non-aligned—therefore means little more than that we like to fuel our armament from many pumps. Naturally, as an Indian I like the arrangement, but let us not pretend that in its military aspects non-alignment has any idealistic music any more, if it ever had any.

Another military aspect of non-alignment which has always impressed me is that every non-alignmentist, without exception, is relying on the forces of some other powers to come to India's aid if and whenever she is threatened either by conventional forces far

in excess of her own defensive capacity, or by nuclear blackmail or attack. In short, I find *non-alignment to be, in reality, an informal, unstated, unilateral alignment with unnamed powers*. Many nations and many Indian rulers in history have followed such a policy willingly or unwillingly; and we might again do so. But it cannot be described as an *adequate* policy, adequate for balancing the power of China at different levels. And a state of such inarticulate but real dependence on unknown powers can never be boasted of as a state of independence.

World Opinion

Regarding our effort to mobilise world opinion against Chinese policy, we can perhaps get some vague and general resolutions passed in various international gatherings. But it would be folly to believe that these resolutions will suffice to alter the basic Chinese policy—which is the only thing that really matters for our security. Nor will the passing of resolutions alter the facts of power. Nations which subscribe to the resolutions will nevertheless maintain their basic respect for the power of China, and try to come to terms with it in their own separate ways. For in international relations power commands much more respect than mere virtue.

Similar reasoning applies to China's entry into the U.N. We should not object to her entry. But I have never been sure whether China is as keen to enter the U.N. as her sponsors assume. For, by remaining out she has enjoyed an enormous freedom of action and built up considerable power and prestige for herself. Nor should anyone assume that mere entry to the U.N. will ensure a drastic change in her behaviour. She may only use the U.N. as one more instrument of her national policy as Stalin did.

Much more concrete than the programme of mobilising public opinion or getting China into the U.N. is the recently announced proposal to persuade the nuclear powers to issue a declaration jointly guaranteeing the security of the non-nuclear nations against nuclear

blackmail or attack by China. This proposal may be pursued for what it is worth. But as far as one can foresee, the four great powers are not likely to be very enthusiastic about it. For it involves for them an incalculable commitment to plunge the whole world into a war whenever any small country is blackmailed or attacked. A joint guarantee means automatic escalation. If the guarantee sought is not forthcoming within the next few months—as it very well might not be—it would be wrong just to keep hoping for it.

Let us consider next the alternative of alignment with the U.S.A. proposed by some people. The alignmentists assume that America is prepared to enter into any commitment for our defence if only we indicate our willingness to enter into an alliance with her. But no one seems to have ever taken the trouble to find out exactly what the Americans are able and willing to do for us in different contingencies.

The American Attitude

The publicly known facts indicate a rather cheerless situation for the believers in alignment. The simple fact is that presently Americans have no clear-cut China policy at all. To quote one formulation of the American problem:

"The balance of military power between Communist China and the United States is quite different from that between the United States and the Soviet Union in Europe. The Soviet Union has thus far been deterred by the retaliatory nuclear power of the United States, but can China, in its particular position and with its particular tactics, be so deterred? . . . the United States has been caught in a contradiction between what it wants to achieve and the measures it is willing and able to apply in order to achieve it."²

Conventional Chinese military doctrine³ is that Americans should

2. H. J. Morgenthau, *China Quarterly*, No. 10.

3. As revealed in Mao's writings and some secret military papers found last year. See *China Quarterly*, No. 18.

1. 'China' to denote the communist government of mainland China.

be challenged at levels of warfare in which they (the Americans) are relatively weak and not at levels of warfare where they are strong. The Chinese also exploit the fact that it is not easy for the Americans to raise the level of warfare in Asia by their own choice for they are much more afraid of escalation than the Chinese are.

Logic of Experience

The experience of South Korea and South Vietnam has demonstrated the effectiveness of Chinese strategy. So long as the Chinese concentrate on infantry warfare and guerilla warfare, it is always possible for them to get the defendants into a long-drawn battle of attrition. The alternative to such a bog is a full-scale war with Communist China, starting with a bombardment of bases, sanctuaries and supply lines. But getting into a full-scale war with the Chinese has never been and will never be an easy decision for the U.S.A., for it involves, *inter alia*, the commitment of masses of infantry against the flood of Chinese infantry—a prospect which evokes infinite horror in the western mind.

Nor is it easy to respond to infantry and guerilla actions with massive air bombing of the Chinese mainland when European or American territory, lives and interests are not directly threatened. It is difficult to visualise Europeans and Americans bombing China just for the sake of a few thousand South Asian lives or a few thousand miles of South Asian territory. The Chinese on their part will be realistic enough not to resort to naval or air action and thus evoke the naval and air power of the U.S.A. in the near future.

Extending the logic of the conventional Chinese military doctrine to the nuclear level, it seems that the Chinese are bound to concentrate in the near future more on the development of atomic artillery weapons than on long-range delivery. This is obviously one reason why they have tested a uranium device rather than a plutonium device. Their capacity

to deliver atomic bombs in their 300 Beagles over short ranges can be taken for granted. And they may also try to develop intermediate range missiles.

But there is a basic reason why they may not try to have long-range delivery capability in the short run. The reason is that the limitations which now apply to a U.S. response to infantry action will apply *mutatis mutandis* to a U.S. response to atomic artillery action. While any intermediate range delivery of atomic weapons from aircraft or missiles may evoke a corresponding U.S. response; the use of tactical atomic weapons in field warfare against a third country may present the U.S. with the usual dilemma: full escalation or partial acquiescence in Chinese advances.

The upshot of these considerations is that the naval, air and nuclear power of America is by itself no answer to subversion or guerilla warfare; no answer to an infantry push by the Chinese; no answer to a limited use of tactical atomic weapons by the Chinese artillery; no answer to scare raids (without bombing); and no answer to blackmail or demoralisation of the defendants based on the mere threat that the Chinese can deliver atomic devices over short distances. But these precisely are the contingencies which the Chinese are likely to create in the immediate and intermediate future. They will not create contingencies in which U.S. power is a relevant deterrent, namely, naval action, air action or nuclear action.

Superficial Reasoning

The implication of this reasoning is that the faith of the alignmentists in the capacity of America to defend us in all contingencies is dangerously superficial. In fact, on the basis of their present thinking the Americans can do little more for us than to give us hardware for fighting the mass of Chinese infantry with our own infantry if we have the will and keep their ultimate strategic powder dry. This is what they are already doing. And no al-

liance is necessary for them to continue to do so.

There has been much loose talk in India about an independent deterrent. It is loose because it is not based on any conception of the total defence system that we need now. The possession of atomic weapons makes any sense only as a part of a total defence system, and only if it is shown that there will be a real and serious gap in our apparatus of deterrence which mere alignment cannot fill.

If an independent deterrent means total nuclear capability, strategic as well as tactical, i.e., having a large stockpile, long-range supersonic heavy bombers, IRBM's, ICBM's, interceptory and second-strike capacity, naval power etc., it is absolutely beyond our capacity.

But on the other hand, as we have seen, total dependence on the West including Russia will be hopelessly inefficient. It will leave dangerous gaps in our defence against many real contingencies which the Chinese are likely to create.

Divided Responsibility

The only real choice therefore is that the West including Russia provides strategic long-range cover which it alone can do and we have tactical, short-range capability which we can and must have to match similar capability on the other side. The NATO Powers and Russia cannot fail to see this once they realise that they cannot and should not try to do everything for everybody. They must carry the burden of strategic nuclear deterrence, and strategic naval and air deterrence. But the burden of deterrence on land, the burden of defence against tactical and short range atomic warfare on land and in the air must be regionalised as soon as possible.

Such a division of labour in deterrence is what we must work on and persuade the West as well as Russia to accept and implement. It is in our interest as well as theirs. It will complete the struc-

ture of defence in Asia without placing an excessive burden on them or on us, and without linking total escalation with every limited engagement. What is required for it is not full alignment with anybody but the negotiation of a series of limited agreements for getting short-run cover and aid of specified kinds from Russia and the West.

In the field of conventional armaments we are already having such agreements. But now it is necessary that these agreements must include technical help to enable us to acquire some independent nuclear capability (a) to match Chinese tactical atomic weapons and (b) to have a small stockpile and an aircraft delivery system. Such limited capability will establish a regional diplomatic and tactical balance. It will insure us against blackmail; and give us a genuine right to be a participant in all the deliberations of the nuclear powers affecting our security.

Tactical or Strategic Abstention

Non-alignmentists as well as alignmentists who say that we should not try to have *any* atomic capability seem to be asking not only for strategic abstention but also for tactical abstention; not only for short-run dependence on the West but also for long-run dependence. I am, on the other hand, suggesting that while we may practise atomic strategic abstention even in the long run, we need not practise tactical abstention.

It is necessary to emphasise the time factor in this connection. The acquisition of even tactical atomic capability is bound to take a considerable time—say three to five years at least. Therefore, those who refuse to launch any programme to develop nuclear military capacity are, in fact, denying even limited nuclear independence to India, even in the long run. Conversely, if we want a certain military capacity five years from now, the time to take firm decisions and allocate resources for building it up is *now*. The need for advance perspective planning is much more imperative in the

military field than in the economic field.

Financial Resources

There is no space to consider the difficulties of a limited nuclear programme. But I would just like to mention the following considerations. Thanks to the facilities already created for the peaceful use of atomic energy in India, for which financial resources have already been allocated, we will soon have plutonium enough to produce at least 50 plutonium bombs a year. But for the kind of limited capability we need, we should also have a gaseous diffusion plant to produce more uranium; we must redesign and acquire suitable bombers; and we must acquire some technical knowledge of missile systems. My rough estimate of the annual capital cost of these projects is about Rs. 200 crores. It is unconvincing to argue that Rs. 200 crores cannot be allocated out of, or added to, the planned public expenditure of Rs. 3100 crores a year (in the Fourth Plan) for the security of the nation.

The whole historical experience shows that armament *increases* the rate of growth and the growth of employment. It is a mischievous double-think to admire the high rates of growth in communist countries which were invariably associated with armament and to raise a scare when India makes her modest effort to defend herself against real danger.

Foreign objections to a limited atomic programme can be overcome if we have the will to make and execute our own policy. The situation has been changed by Lop Nor and all agreements restricting us can be renegotiated. No objections or agreements are absolutely final in diplomacy.

Like other nations we must work for disarmament but until it comes the responsibility to defend ourselves is strictly ours and we must measure up to it.

History has excused our rulers for neglecting this responsibility once. But it may not do so again. Metaphysical humbug is no answer to a grim military situation.

Strategic considerations

ANALYST

IN any important decision involving military or defence policy, several viewpoints and positions must be taken into account. Whether or not to enter into a programme of atomic weaponry is such a decision; and its component elements will be made up of various political viewpoints, economic considerations, moral standards, and military and

strategic principles. It is only right and appropriate that ultimately the decision will be made in India, as it should in a democracy, by the political leadership, presumably after due consideration of as many of the relevant factors as is possible.

Yet, the newness of the problem, its technical aspects, and the re-

I. relative lack of expertise among politicians about military matters may cause the ultimate decision of to build or not to build, to be either made in a political vacuum or turned over to the military for their disposal. Neither course would be desirable, and neither is necessary, and it is the purpose of this article to pinpoint some of the crucial strategic problems before the debate is concluded.

To get down to fundamentals, an hypothetical Indian atomic capability could serve one or both of two analytically distinct functions; it could be used to *deter* an enemy from attacking, or it could be used to *defend* Indian territory once a ground attack had begun.* In the former case, possession of atomic bombs may deter either a Chinese land or atomic attack, or a Pakistani land attack. For the moment we will disregard the possible threats from the latter country, although this will be taken into consideration later. Indonesia is a more remote threat, but what is said here may one day apply in part to her as well.

Deterrent Role

In the case of deterring a Chinese atomic attack India must have the capacity to ensure that in the Chinese' eyes the initiation of atomic war will cost it more than it could gain: here it is reasonable to expect that only a direct attack on major Chinese cities would serve as a sufficient deterrent. India is at present capable of doing this only with great difficulty: even assuming the capability of manufacturing, say, ten or fifteen megaton 'city busters,' they would have to be of a compact enough size to be carried either by her Canberras (which might not have the range to reach crucial urban populations) or her small Boeing 707 fleet, which would have to undergo modifications for such a mission, and either plane would have to slip through an alerted Chinese fighter

defence screen in large enough numbers, of the magnitude of five to fifteen.

In other words, for India to be able to deter the Chinese from a major atomic attack, she would have to become an atomic power of the rank of France, and would have to maintain the deterrent, either by more sophisticated weaponry (intercontinental missiles) or by more numbers.

There are those who feel that India might jump the stage of sub-sonic carriers and begin constructing cheap unsophisticated missiles which could reach major Chinese cities. Undoubtedly this could be done, the knowledge is in the public domain, and the technical problems are not insurmountable, although propulsion and guidance systems might have to be purchased abroad.

Vulnerability

However, the strategic problems raised by such a capacity may create other difficulties: India would be faced with the same problem that has doomed the airplane as an effective great power deterrent and has forced the U.S. to phase out its early family of missiles: vulnerability. Unless an Indian missile system could be well hidden, or 'hardened' by placement in very expensive underground silos, it would be vulnerable to attack by any other superior nuclear power. And, because of its vulnerability, it may create instability: an uncertain enemy may prefer to remove the threat first and ask questions later.

This is not fantasy: it has been a subject of serious concern, worry, and fear in American and British circles, and, undoubtedly, among the Russians as well. These problems of vulnerability and stability have been the main military and political reasons for the development of Polaris-type submarines and hardened or mobile missile systems, but the cost of such systems, even second-hand, and their limited use, gives one pause for thought.

The exact number of each type of strategic vehicle needed, and the

magnitude of the strategic defence forces required cannot be calculated independently of an estimate of Chinese intentions: the two are interlinked. If one is certain that as soon as they are capable of it, the Chinese will launch an all-out atomic attack upon India, one might attempt to develop a strategic capability for preventive war, destroying the enemy's atomic capacity before it can be employed. Of course, the same calculations would be made by the Chinese, and a mis-estimation on either power's side would lead to an 'unnecessary' holocaust.

There are obvious alternatives to an *Indian* strategic atomic capacity for purposes of deterring a Chinese nuclear attack: a fool-proof treaty with one or more atomic powers might serve the purpose. If, for example, a joint Indian-British (or U.S., or U.S.S.R., or Japan-Australian combination) Polaris submarine were delegated to perform such a strategic deterrent role, to be employed only in the case of a major Chinese atomic attack, the same deterrent function would be fulfilled.

But, the problem of reliability and control, not to mention political impact, enters here. Yet, if several European countries are satisfied with the idea, the Indian government might resign itself as well, if the threat of such a Chinese attack were great enough. The advantages of such an arrangement would be that it was free, and could be quickly arranged; its disadvantages in terms of the political problems which would arise are equally obvious.

Stronger Defence

There are other means by which India might deter a Chinese nuclear attack upon her territory. A parallel option to deterring a nuclear strategic attack is to build up a greater capacity of defending against it: if the defence is realistic enough the likelihood of its success will act as just as powerful a deterrent as a city-busting retaliatory capacity. Such a capacity—super-sonic interceptors equipped with

* For a detailed exposition of these concepts and an application to the Russian-American context, see Glenn H. Snyder, *Deterrence and Defense*, Princeton University Press, 1962.

effective air-to-air missiles, ground-to-air missiles, and, above all, an effective radar warning net —would undoubtedly be an expensive proposition were the Chinese a major nuclear threat, but as they are not, second-line equipment might do nicely.

A major advantage of such a strategic defensive system is that it is not provocative and building it will not start an arms race with anyone. The crucial calculation which must be made, however, is whether such a system would be an effective deterrent by itself, or might require a supplementary strategic nuclear capability to be convincing, at least in the Chinese' eyes. Another serious possible alternative to a nuclear deterrent is building up Indian conventional forces to the level where they are an offensive threat to China, and using this threat as a deterrent to a Chinese nuclear attack. This, while eliminating the need for strategic nuclear weapons may entail the use of tactical nuclear weapons, as we shall discuss below.

Tactical Use

All of these calculations for deterring a nuclear attack upon India apply in part to the problem of deterring a massive land attack. In this case, however, it would mean that once the deterrent failed, i.e., once the Chinese attacked, India would have to initiate atomic warfare if her deterrent was to remain credible for future occasions. And, of course, the moral burden of initiating an atomic war would be inversely proportionate to the magnitude of the invasion: one would hardly expect an atomic retaliation for a small border conflict, but between this point and a massive attack upon the Indian land-mass, where does one draw the line? Were India to develop an atomic capacity and attempt to use it for this type of deterrence, she would only be facing the problems which other nuclear powers have had to grapple with for years, especially in Europe, and they are no less difficult for being shared.

The use of atomic weapons as a deterrent against a land attack

leads directly to the second major possible function of a weapons system: defence. Those who tend to dwell upon the horrors of nuclear war usually ignore the defensive usage of atomic weapons (that is, their tactical, battlefield employment, to help the land army retain or regain territory). Yet, tactical nuclear weapons have been in the arsenals of all of the major atomic powers for years, and because of geographical considerations, their use in South Asia and the Himalayan region should be given special consideration.

India's Advantages

While there are grave dangers to Indian urban centres in atomic war, because of their proximity to Tibet, India may, paradoxically, have an advantage on the tactical atomic level. Chinese ground forces in the Himalayan regions must rely upon very extended lines of communication, back to Tibet, and then to China proper. Also, Chinese tactics involve very large troop concentrations in the final stages of attack. Further, in Himalayan conditions it might be possible to block key passes and troop routes with nuclear weapons, perhaps as much by radioactivity as by blast. At these points the Chinese are most vulnerable to tactical nuclear weapons.

But, were India seriously to consider such a defensive use of nuclear weapons, it would encounter as much difficulty as in the establishment of a respectable strategic capability. Firstly, the weapons would have to be even lighter, smaller, more reliable, and there would have to be more of them. This type of atomic capability also means more very highly trained crews, better air surveillance and intimate Air Force-Army liaison.

And, even then, ground troops would have to be carefully instructed and trained in the special requirements of nuclear war, and special detection and protection equipment provided. The re-equipment and increased mobility of the Indian Army alone would

present formidable problems, but just as necessary would be the development of tactics, doctrine and specialized technical skills.

The same advantages and disadvantages of foreign atomic help which relate to the problem of developing a strategic deterrent force apply to that of a defensive atomic capability. However, in this case, the disadvantages take on an even more objectionable character, for the problems of control and command over tactical atomic weapons are so intricate that it is hard to envision the development of the unified two- or three-nation staff which will be required to conduct such a war. A limited foreign contribution is feasible, however, say on the basis of destroying supply lines or a few major troop concentrations, but even here it would be wise to eliminate some of the political risks by developing a pre-arranged plan and a commitment to back up the plan.

While, as we have pointed out, atomic weapons could conceivably play a deterrent role or a land-denial role in India's defence arrangements, there is no reason why the same weapon could not play both simultaneously. A deterrent capacity which failed to deter can be readily used defensively if the targets exist: thus if China launched an all-out atomic attack and a simultaneous land attack, India could utilize the ineffective deterrent for territorial defence.

Conversely, defensive weapons, whether they be hand grenades, tanks, or atomic bombs, *by their very existence* contribute to the deterrent function, at least in so far as they are relevant to the form of attack (hand grenades may not deter an atomic city attack, and atomic bombs may not deter a bayonet charge; the one because it is no punishment, the other because it is not a credible response).

The Economics

Thus, a vital consideration in the adoption of any atomic strategy is whether some other weapon might not serve the same func-

tion, at a lower political, financial, or technical cost to the nation. Instead of relying upon atomic weapons to deter another massive land attack, it might be more economical to utilize the proposed expenditure on more divisions, and, up to a point, increased divisions might deter a small nuclear attack.

Another important consideration in the adoption of an atomic strategy would be the likely reaction of Pakistan. The Pakistanis will naturally feel threatened by any Indian capacity, whether it is a strategic ten or fifteen bomb arsenal or a tactical arsenal of 50-100, or a mix. Her reaction will undoubtedly be to build herself, and India must then calculate not only the nuclear stock and delivery system necessary to meet China, but she must add in the Pakistani figures.

Tactically or Strategically

In summary, atomic weapons might be used defensively and tactically by India, or as strategic deterrents. It will be vital for civilian and military leaders to work out—so far as is possible, mathematically—the *probabilities* of the types of Chinese attack which would call for either or both uses of the bomb, the possible *substitutes* for atomic weaponry (political and military, internal and external) for these uses, and the net costs, economic, moral, and political, involved in each calculation. Probably, the optimum choice would be a mix: buying some protection against every contingency, but concentrating resources and effort on the major threats.

Obviously, political-military decisions *should* be made this way, but, in fact, rarely are. The debate raging at the moment seems to be made up of several partial analyses. Some see the bomb as a way of recouping lost ground in the international political system, or of reviving a supposedly lagging domestic *esprit*. The more ruthless advocates of this view argue that the bomb may never be used, but that it would be worth the cost if it could contribute to the unity of

Indian politics and provide a focus for a national renaissance.

The Military View

Some, taking a narrow military point of view, argue that India and China must be matched one for one in terms of weaponry, regardless of the uses and possible consequences of the weapon: they regard the problem of the destruction of Indian cities as out of their purview so long as they can trade nuclear blows with the Chinese in the Himalayas. Many of the anti-bomb advocates regard cost as the prime reason for not building: citing the marginal character of Indian development plans, they reason that any disruption would mean disaster. A very few oppose the bomb because of the unstabilizing effect of the proliferation of nuclear weapons on the international atomic system, and a few emphasize the moral question of mass death, and the health of future generations.

While each of these viewpoints are important enough to have gained many adherents, and seem convincing enough in their own contexts, whether any of them should be overriding is another question. As we have tried to illustrate, an atomic strategy has a logic of its own, a logic which can and must be worked out clearly beforehand lest huge sums of money not only be spent, but wasted, or conversely, not spent and the country's security endangered. There are many variations and intermixes of atomic strategy which we have barely touched upon above.

There are also intermediate steps to a full-fledged atomic capacity (the explosion of an atomic earth-moving device would be 'peaceful' and would still demonstrate national virility) and there are substitutes for it as well. It is to be hoped that while governmental planning and preparation proceeds, the atomic debate itself concerns itself with a wider range of goals and alternatives, lest the cumulative results of several piecemeal decisions leads to a situation in which there is no security, and from which there is no retreat.

Break with the past

SISIR GUPTA

THE lopsided emphasis on the cost aspects of the atom bomb in the current debate over the advisability of reviewing India's declared nuclear policy is a measure of the disproportionate importance given in India to the economist's view in the determination of all major State policies. Several factors may have resulted in this situation. In the first place, the national movement itself in its later years shifted the focus to India's economic problems as the only major tasks for free India to tackle. Secondly, the simplified view that economic growth is the key to social and political stability has been for long accepted as Gospel in this country, thanks to the influence of the western Left on our ideas.

Thirdly, the predominantly *bania* outlook of many Hindu minds paves the way for the elevation of the immediate economic issues as the most important issues in public life. Lastly, of all the social scientists of India, the economist's have been the most sophisticated and most articulate and have been accorded a role in the policy formulating agencies of the country which others have been denied if only because they are crude, unsophisticated and underdeveloped.

Nation-building, however, has many more dimensions than the purely economic one and it is almost certain now that to view the economic problem in isolation from the larger problems of making an over-all approach to the task of nation building in the formative years of a State is not

even the best way to deal with the economic problem as such.

So far in this country there has been no systematic thinking or approach to foreign policy and foreign relations as an ingredient of nation building; external problems have been viewed only as extraneous matter. In practice, Jawaharlal Nehru made some use of foreign policy in the domestic sphere. In curbing the potentialities of the various opposition parties in India, in building up a sense of dignity and prestige about the Indian State in Indian minds, he had made full use of the few glorious years of his foreign policy. But these aspects of the role of India's foreign policy were never clearly spelt out.

When the advantageous position of India in the international field was lost, the attempt was made to turn the focus inwards and pursue the policy of withdrawal from the earlier expansive role in world politics. We have now come to a stage when the process of relegation of foreign policy to a position of relative insignificance in the list of national priorities is almost complete.

Before an attempt is made in this article to note some foreign policy considerations regarding the atom bomb, it is necessary to state the view that far from being an embarrassment for a nation dedicated to the task of economic growth, foreign policy and relations are essential ingredients of nation building. For one thing, it has been the experience of free

India that it is only a foreign policy issue or an external threat to the country which is equally relevant for all Indians at the same time. It is, therefore, obvious that bold internal decisions can be legitimised in India only in terms of India's external problems.

The scale of values built up in our minds by the impact of British liberalism on the Hindu view of life is such that unorthodox and determined action on the part of the State in dealing with internal problems is not permissible because it might infringe on our concepts of law, justice and so on. It is only in terms of external situations that such internal radicalisation would be permitted. It should be remembered that in this country, even starvation acts as a sedative and there is hardly any internal situation which can legitimise bold and radical steps towards internal reorganisation.

Power Factor

A second important consideration to be noted is that Indian nationalism is relevant only in so far as it has external manifestation and, for the varied national groups of this country, the most relevant argument for belonging to a single political entity is that thus alone can they aspire to have prestige and power in the world. If India is to be guaranteed safety, security and the consequent insignificance in international affairs, the separatist tendencies within the country might well assert. It has also to be noted that in approaching the problems of nation building, most of the neighbouring countries of India have systematically used foreign policy and that there is no possible reason for India being left alone.

Finally, even the most developed and stable nations have accorded much greater importance to problems of power and prestige. It is doubtful if the economists would ever consider the United States good enough economically to waste money on space ventures so long as Harlem and Mississippi are there. Likewise, how could the Soviet Union develop her

luniks and sputniks when so many and so much of fundamental economic problems are yet to be tackled in that country.

The unpleasant fact needs to be recognised that the low level internal equilibrium which has been built up in India has too many elements of stability and the inadequacy of this particular level of existence can be underlined not by any conceivable internal situation but by a continuous confrontation of India with hard external realities. The role and function of leadership in Indian society today is apparently one of just to keep the country going and at best to tinker with institutions; stability and order, rather than progress through dynamism, being the major concern of the leadership.

In this sense, there is a great deal of truth about the observation that an Indian attempt to make the bomb would be a negation of India's past. But for that very reason, perhaps, many would consider it essential to do so. The point to be made here is simple: that even if an effective device could be found of ensuring India's security and safety by getting external assistance, through alignment or non-alignment, it cannot be an adequate policy for India from the point of view of her internal requirements.

The conclusion, therefore, becomes inescapable that India has to pursue a foreign policy which is activist and which keeps this country as a significant factor in global politics. The fact must be stressed that nationalism remains the only viable passion and urge among the Indian elites which can force them or push them towards a bolder approach to the problems of nation-building and it is not possible to convert India into somebody's trusteeship territory (even if it be the United Nations) and hope to build a modernised economic and social structure in this country.

Joint Nuclear Guarantee

It is in this light that the question of a nuclear umbrella or a joint nuclear guarantee by the Great Powers should be viewed.

In one sense, a policy of seeking joint guarantee by all the Great Powers is worse than a policy of getting India's frontiers guaranteed by one of them. The advantage of an American or a Russian guarantee, as against a joint guarantee by all the Great Powers, is that it can be invoked at short notice and without any fear that a joint decision by such diverse powers would come too late if at all it comes. For that very reason, however, no country is likely to be brave enough to give India the guarantee which she wants.

It has now been revealed that when the late Prime Minister asked for bomber squadrons from America and Britain for air operations against the advancing Chinese troops in 1962, the reaction in Washington was less than enthusiastic. It is not easy to persuade the United States to commit itself totally to India. What is possible is to get a guarantee that in case a nuclear bomb is thrown on India, someone will care to throw a bomb on China also. Here again, a joint guarantee is of little use.

Failure of Perspective

The only argument in favour of the joint guarantee is that it is in conformity with India's past policies and helps to keep up what we have called the policy of non-alignment, namely a policy of simultaneous friendship with the Soviet Union and the United States. But it is one thing for India to try to emerge as an area of agreement among the two Great Powers of the world and get full support and sustenance from them in keeping India going; it is an entirely different thing to expect a Soviet-American or a Soviet-British-American guarantee to India *against* China. This hope, indeed, symbolises the failure of the present Indian policy-makers to view the Chinese bomb question in particular and the China question in general in its proper perspective.

The nuclear guarantee idea assumes that there are many countries of the world which feel terribly threatened by the Chinese bomb and that the non-aligned countries will welcome a Soviet-

American - guarantee against nuclear attack when no such guarantee is needed. Therefore, to assume, as some Indian newspaper commentators have done, that India by pleading for a joint nuclear guarantee is doing something good to the rest of the world is a very dubious assumption. Secondly, Indian policy-makers seem to proceed on the assumption that there is a common urge among the Great Powers to curb China or limit her in this region by upholding India and other smaller neighbours of China.

A China Policy

It is certain that all Great Powers of the world have what may be called the China problem, but it is wrong to think that each one of them has a China policy today. The response to the China problem from the various world capitals is not likely to be as uniform as the Indians imagine. Another hard fact to be recognised is that the major problem posed by the Chinese bomb in the capitals of the world is not what will happen to India but what is to be done with China. It is not India but China which is the major policy problem and India will be accommodated only to the extent that the broad policy towards China leaves room for such accommodation.

In Moscow and Washington, not to speak of London, the inadequacy of the erstwhile China policy has now been demonstrated. Of the many policy alternatives available to the Great Powers individually and collectively, containment is only one. At one extreme, of course, would be a policy of bombing out Chinese nuclear installations and reducing China again to a militarily insignificant nation. But on this there is likely to be no agreement among the Great Powers, or even among the policy formulating agencies of a Great Power.

At the other end would be a policy of taming China by 'appeasement' or by gradually recognising and accommodating China's rights, claims and aspirations, and hoping all the while that she will be meliorated by the burden of the pri-

vileges she would enjoy in the world. The French policy and to some extent the British approach, belong essentially to this category of response to the Chinese problem. It is the safety and security of Australia and New Zealand which is vital enough for the western nations to want to go to war with China. (Hence perhaps the present concern about the Indian Ocean in London.) But the passing away of some un-viable Asian countries under the hegemony of China may not be that great a catastrophe for the West as we in this country imagine.

The United States in its present mood is different but there are already many exponents of that policy of masterly inactivity in the United States, and the future of American policy towards China is uncertain, particularly in view of the fact that at the moment the United States seems to be in a blind alley so far as its China policy is concerned.

The case of the Soviet Union is different because of geo-political considerations which Soviet State policies must take into account. But even the Soviet Union's China policy is in the doldrums and various policy alternatives must certainly be under review in Moscow. The Indian search for a joint guarantee against China assumes a firm China policy on the part of the Great Powers when none exists.

The Chinese bomb has many implications. One of them certainly is that it exposes the countries of South and Southeast Asia to nuclear blackmail and particularly it adds to the menace to India. But viewed from other capitals, the meaning of the Chinese bomb may indeed be quite different. The *status quo* for the preservation of which the two Great Powers had striven and to which India also was largely committed by the pursuit of her erstwhile policies has come to an end.

New Power Balance

The problem today is of evolving a new level of stability for the world political system, a new

world balance of power and a new status hierarchy. The restoration of the *status quo* demands a series of bold actions and use of force to crush the new claimant to a status, namely China, and it is unlikely if not impossible that such policies would be thought of.

It is one of the rules of the game of power politics that if you have failed to prevent the rise of a nation to power, it is necessary to accept the fact of its power and accommodate it in a new power balance. The Chinese bomb has announced with a bang to the world the emergence of China as a Great Power. It is not that a vital difference has been made to China's capabilities by the development of one nuclear bomb but it has demolished the mental resistance in other parts of the world to the acceptance of China as a Great Power—a status for which she has been pressing her claims by successful military ventures in the form of guerilla and sub-limited wars, by her defiance of the Soviet Union and by extending the range of her interests to such distant parts of the world as Africa and Latin America. The immediate impact of China's power is felt round her borders in Asia but she has a global posture and her power has a global connotation. The identification of China with the under-developed and coloured world has permitted this to occur.

The Big Five

What makes it likely that the alternative of accommodating China as one of the Great Powers would ultimately prevail is that only 20 years back, the victorious nations of the world had in fact envisaged a privileged position for all these Great Powers when the right to veto was given to five. In the world today, five nations have got the veto and the bomb; and, what is more, each has a sphere of influence.

To be sure, a great deal of conflict and discord will exist among the Great Powers over the precise lines of their respective spheres of influence. The delimitation of a sphere of influence for China is sure to prove difficult and all kinds

of problems, even violent conflicts, may occur in that process. But the principle that those who have the veto and the bomb may also need a sphere of influence is not likely to be resisted. As it is, France has its little empire in Africa, Britain its special relationship with at least the white countries of the Commonwealth, America its special position in Latin America and the Soviet Union its big brother status in Eastern Europe.

Even China has its North Korea and North Vietnam and hardly anyone hopes to liberate those areas from Chinese influence. A policy of denying China the status of a Great Power implies a policy of trying to demolish the central authority in China by taking advantage of the discontent in the outlying areas like Tibet and Sinkiang. This is too bold and painful a policy for countries which are convinced of the need to avoid a major confrontation in this nuclear era. At any rate, such a policy is not relevant for India's needs.

The Choice

The choice before India today is precisely the choice that China had before itself at the time of the Moscow Test Ban Treaty. There is no doubt that the treaty was basically a mechanism of preventing China's rise to eminence by denying her the right to make the nuclear bomb. The Moscow treaty was indeed a frantic, belated attempt on the part of the three signatories to exclude China from the nuclear club. The pattern of Chinese response to the treaty was typical of the style of the Chinese leadership; but it is difficult to see what other policy the Chinese could have pursued. Fortunately for her, China had already gone a long way in developing her own nuclear capability and the worst that could have happened to China out of a policy of defiance of the Great Powers had already happened.

With the explosion of the Chinese Bomb, the Moscow Test Ban Treaty is nothing but a scrap of paper so far as its original purpose and intention is concerned. But the principle that further nu-

clear proliferation should be prevented at all costs remains. It is also probable that the Moscow Test Ban Treaty has in effect one more powerful signatory today, namely China. In the sense that China is already a member of the nuclear club, it is in her interest as much as in the interest of other members to see that no further addition is made to its membership.

At the Crossroads

Faced with this situation, India as the sixth power in a world where only five are recognised to be great, is obviously at policy cross-roads. It can either enter the club by defying the world and making a bomb or see to it that the bomb as a status symbol loses its significance because of effective progress towards disarmament. A policy of just seeking a guarantee against a Chinese bomb and of continuing to play the role of an apologist for the Great Powers, who are now five in number, is obviously inadequate and wrong.

The least that India should expect under the circumstances is not a guarantee by the Big Powers but a joint attempt on their part to reopen the question of permanent membership of the Security Council.

It must be recognised that in the world of today, it is only a pious hope to expect early disarmament. Apart from other reasons, military capability remains the most important source of a country's status, prestige and power, and unless a different set of status symbols can be conceived to keep the present hierarchy intact, it is hardly likely that any of the armed nations will agree to disarm. This is not to say that there can be no progress towards arms control but only to point out that even after control, arms will remain the determinants of a country's status. For India to try to persuade the world to disarm is to take upon itself an impossible task and the fact should be recognised that even in the movement towards disarmament, the initiative lies with those powers who have the arms.

For this country, therefore, the question of making or not making

the bomb is of great and utmost significance. It is almost certain that an Indian decision to go ahead with the manufacture of the bomb would be detested in many parts of the world. It should also be remembered that when China was making the bomb, all kinds of attempts were made, all the levers were used, to dissuade her from doing so and the actual act of the explosion of the bomb was preceded by a break with the Soviet Union and total isolation of China from the other Great Powers.

Policy of Defence

A policy of making the bomb in India would essentially be a policy of defying the Great Powers—a policy which would indeed be a total break with past policies and postures and which would expose India to the wrath of the powers who are our present benefactors. It may indeed deprive us of what is now our major source of sustenance, namely, foreign aid. An entirely opposite policy is the one now being pursued of further underlining India's dependence on the Great Powers.

It should be noted that any deterioration of relations with the Great Powers can only be temporary and if India can withstand a phase of sustained pressure on her, she might well be considered mature enough for more serious diplomatic dialogues than the present application for 'guarantee' entitles her to. Whatever importance India had in the past in the minds of policy formulators in Moscow and Washington is only likely to be further underlined by the emergence of India as an independent power factor. In fact, India's diplomatic efforts today must be concentrated on persuading the Great Powers that it is ultimately in the interest of world peace and stability that India emerges as a strong and powerful nation with a vital role in this region. Finally, the emergence of India as an independent power factor may permit her to begin a meaningful effort at the development of normal friendly relations with China also.

The diplomatic argument

SEMINARIST

THERE may be many good reasons for the Government of India refusing even to consider the production of nuclear weapons; but the diplomatic reason is not one of them. Jawaharlal Nehru with his equipped sophistication, mobile and receptive intelligence and his feel for the nuances of international relations would have understood this straightaway. Let it be remembered that when asked to outline what India's reactions would be to any nuclear explosion by China he never committed himself; he was always unwilling to allow his dedication to peace to damage India's cause. But his successors have not even begun to be aware that there is a diplomatic argument in the context of the Chinese explosion, let alone understand it.

The diplomatic argument has to start with the reactions of the world to the Chinese action. The Soviet Union has more or less ignored it. Khrushchov may have condemned it; after all, Chinese damage India's cause. But his the production of nuclear devices was meant as an act of defiance in face of the Soviet refusal to give China nuclear weapons or to help them, after 1958, to produce them. It was also a rebuff to Khrushchov's total commitment to peace.

But Khrushchov's successors have no such strong feelings in the matter; it is revealing that Gromyko in his latest speech at the United Nations has made no reference to the Moscow Test Ban Treaty. Nor will the Chinese explosion colour in any way the future development of Sino-Soviet relations. That will be determined by the ideological differences, the political necessities and the territorial rivalries rather than by the

progress of China as a nuclear power.

So far as the western powers are concerned, there is a new respect for China. So long as France, their military ally, refuses to sign the Moscow Treaty, there can be no severe condemnation of China; and nothing has brought home to public opinion, even in the United States, the facts of life about recognition of China and her representation in the United Nations, so much as her advance in nuclear technology. There is a new willingness to bring China into talks on disarmament and to give her the status of a power that matters. Membership of the nuclear club obviously carries with it, in the eyes of the older members, certain rights as well as responsibilities.

The reaction of the countries in Asia and Africa, particularly those which are non-aligned, has been more than one of respect; it borders almost on a wondrous delight. To most of them, adherence to the Moscow Treaty had been little more than making a virtue out of helplessness; and they find it hard to conceal their secret pleasure at a 'non-white' nation, working without external assistance, breaking into the closed circle of military might. The nearest parallel to this in history is the wave of satisfaction which swept across Asia in 1905 when, in the Russo-Japanese war, an Asian State for the first time humbled a leading power of Europe.

There is no doubt that if the Chinese explosion had occurred at any time before 1958, reaction in India would not have been very different. One can imagine the speech Nehru would have made in the Lok Sabha on this subject. Of course, Nehru would have said,

it was deplorable that one more State should have exploded a nuclear device; but what else could the western powers expect if they wrong-headedly insisted on ostracizing China? Now at least they should accept the inevitable and admit China into the comity of nations; and now at last they could see that Asia could no longer be suppressed and ignored.

In fact, the reaction of the Government of India has been so unrealistic as to be beyond belief if it were not true. An attitude of moral *hauteur* and disdain has been adopted and China has been condemned for sinning against humanity. It was unthinkable, it was added, for India to do anything similar; we would not do anything that would risk world peace and we would rather commit suicide than murder.

One can understand Gandhi, who had no use for any form of physical force, adopting this attitude. For a warrior of non-violence to renounce atomic weapons, even when his enemy is arming himself with it, is heroic. It would be meaningful even for Nehru, who was a dedicated world citizen, to adopt this stance. But it is ludicrous for the rabble that rode to power on their shoulders to strike such poses.

Mental Escapism

Such pitiful piffle, however, is not confined to the leaderless Gandhians. What is bewildering is that even the spokesmen of the Left, the hot-gospellers of revolution, have been speaking in the same strain. It makes no sense to hear them renounce atomic weapons as instruments of mass destruction. It makes no difference in ethics whether you are willing to massacre a few thousands or a few millions. You adhere by your principles and either throw down your rifles and bare your breasts to the enemy or fight with whatever weapons are required. To do anything half way is to be guilty of physical timidity and mental escapism.

It is not surprising, therefore, that no one has taken seriously India's assumption of moral superiority and everyone is anxious

to discern, behind the fervent incarnations of renunciation, the unwritten premises of India's foreign policy. The western powers are pleased with the refusal of India to meet the challenge for they believe that it implies a tacit acceptance of their protection—call it umbrella, shield or what you will.

For all practical purposes it means that India is their camp follower without the mutual obligations of a formal alliance. It is aid not with strings but with hawsers, for it enables the western powers to twist India's arm on such issues as Kashmir without India being in a position to demand some reciprocity in exchange for her reliance on the West. No wonder that the western governments and the press have been loud in their approval of India's stand.

Moscow's Bewilderment

If the United States and Britain are happy, our old friend, the Soviet Union is bewildered. One can hardly blame her if she regards our attitude on nuclear weapons not as indicating a last-ditcher's support of the Moscow Treaty but as a papering over of a swing to the West. For it comes to the Soviet Union as but the latest of a series of steps—the rejection, as report has it, of the Soviet offer of the latest type of submarine in return for a vague promise by Britain, the disclosure (astonishingly by the British Prime Minister and not by any Indian spokesman) of the Indian suggestion for what can only be described as a western multilateral nuclear force for India, the feeble vacillations on the question of Chinese representation in the United Nations.

Small wonder if the new men in the Kremlin conclude that India's non-alignment has ceased to exist, if they regard India as expendable in the Sino-Soviet contest and if they are willing even to shift their attitude on Kashmir in order to improve relations with Pakistan.

Nor has our attitude on nuclear weapons gained us respect in the non-aligned world. For a long time we have been losing our in-

fluence among these countries; and our latest position of 'get thee behind me, Satan' has only raised another laugh. It is hardly convincing for a weak nation, confronted by an unceasingly powerful neighbour, to adopt a moralistic attitude after it has failed to whip up opinion in its favour. The non-aligned countries too are certain that our non-alignment is not worth speaking of and that we are no better than puppets of the western powers.

Defending Sovereignty

In fact, if we wish to strengthen our non-alignment, to regain our influence among our fellow non-aligned countries, to carry conviction to the Soviet Union about our *bona fides* and to win the respect of the western powers, we will have to recast our thinking on atomic weapons. We will have to show the world that while we would like to live in peace we cannot but take into account the nuclear explosion in China. We have no wish to upset the priorities we have given to the building of our economy; but we wish to maintain our independence as against both China and the West.

We will, therefore, have to continue, without sacrificing our plans to strengthen our military sinew; and we will, if it becomes necessary, have to consider the development of atomic weapons, cost it what it may. Such a mental attitude of willingness to consider nuclear strength can alone protect our sovereignty.

Indeed, such a mental attitude alone can create the conditions when it may not be necessary to manufacture these hideous weapons. Only thus, and not by pathetic references to the Moscow Treaty, will we be able to isolate China. The diplomatic argument for the decision to make nuclear arms is that it alone may make their actual production superfluous.

It requires, of course, courage to take such a decision. Courage, as Dr. Johnson told us, though it is not the only virtue, is the virtue that makes all others possible. Jawaharlal Nehru knew this; is it too much to expect the same knowledge from his successors?

To be or not to be

ROMESH THAPAR

AT the best of times we are apt to be Hamletian in our attitudes. ambivalent, relishing the idea of indecision. Now, the hard-headed men who rule China have given us an issue which we can go on debating until Doomsday. Let us then start at the ground floor, and move upwards into the murky realms of mushroom-shaped clouds.

To begin with, even as the controversy mounts, we have to clear our notions about what actually is involved in the decision to produce what we imagine to be the ultimate weapon of destruction. The concept that all that needs to be done is to explode a *single* nuclear device is absurd. This call for a costly demonstration is assiduously projected in the knowledge that it calms the frustration of those who would 'match' China's abilities. But the truth remains that one bomb must lead to many more.

The reasoning is quite simple. Even a single bomb, or a dozen, to be effective, must have a delivery system, particularly against a country like China whose cities are not within the range of our bomber aircraft. The development of a delivery system involves considerable expense, expense which can only be justified if there is an adequate supply of bombs—in other words, what is demanded is a total system of nuclear attack and defence.

So, when we speak of making nuclear weapons, let us be candid

enough to admit that production in quantity is envisaged. Indeed, in such quantity as to match the estimated (sic!) striking power of those nuclear nations whom we consider to be a potential threat (primarily China, perhaps Pakistan, and possibly, in a changed situation, Indonesia). The business of matching striking power is a game which two or three or more can play. The so-called nuclear club, once joined, demands constant and exhaustive competition with other members or with the factions and groups of these members—that is, if membership is to be effective. And I presume that those who would have us produce the ultimate weapon desire that we gradually forget the demonstrative aspect and begin to think more of effectiveness!

If my argument is valid up to this point—and I know it is—then we must address ourselves to the problem of cost. Now we enter a specialised scientific field which is highly complicated, an area of enquiry over which we, by and large, have to accept the yardsticks of the scientist-technocrat. Even in the U.S.A., with all its considerable expertise and its system of checks and balances, many shrewd observers, failing to get at the facts of nuclear development, have warned that the scientists and technocrats are becoming the dominant moulders of policy, that their specialised skills make it impossible for the politician to challenge their projections of needs and resources. President

Eisenhower also declared in 1961: 'We must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military industrial complex.'

If this has happened in the U.S.A., what could we in India do to challenge the projections of the Atomic Energy Establishment? Practically nothing. Cost structures could be varied at will, mixed up with essential military spending, with supposedly vital scientific research, and even with investment in industrial and agricultural production. Nuclear science is by its very nature all pervasive, and the funds which feed it could escalate under various hidden or disguised heads. The politicians would have to pass the estimates. But only the scientist-technocrat would really know which 'in-put' was yielding what 'out-put'.

Costs

In this matter of costs, there is little point in working out estimates on the basis of the ramified statistics provided by the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. The statistics, as I have explained, must be treated as suspect. They vary rather sharply from country to country. What's more, we cannot compare the situation of advanced war machines with our own. If we desire some rudimentary expertise, we must turn to the knowledgeable nuclear cost accountants in the United Kingdom, France, Yugoslavia and such nations which have played or are playing with these bombs and are aware of the implications.

The opinion of military publicists notwithstanding — opinion which tempts us with the thought that ordinary jet bombers can deliver a nuclear attack on China's major cities—several experts belonging to these countries have made it known to the Government of India that involvement in an effective nuclear bomb project would demand the sacrifice of one to two five-year plans, and nothing less. Yes, China is doing it. But it is conveniently forgotten that China's people have been rigidly organised by a dedicated communist elite and do not exer-

cise the kind of free vote we do every five years!

Incapacitated as one is in the matter of costing exactly the various inter-locked stages of nuclear capability, it is only natural to exercise common sense on the question, to discipline runaway thoughts by the grim facts which are available to the ordinary citizen. On a rough estimate, our world now spends every year some \$ 130,000 to 140,000 million on military expenditure—that is over one-half of the capital invested in the world or more than two-thirds of the combined national income of the underdeveloped world. In the seventeen years before 1962, for example, it has been estimated that the U.S.A. sank some \$ 900,000 million in direct and indirect military expenditure. It is agreed that a large proportion of these expenditures by the U.S.A. covered the nuclear programme. The same is true of the U.S.S.R. An estimate in 1962 claimed that stockpiles in the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. were of the order of 250,000 megatons of nuclear explosive equivalent to 250,000 million tons of TNT or an average of 80 tons of explosive for every inhabitant of our planet. The statistics, in short, are meaningful in more ways than one. And they are very precise in one respect. An underdeveloped country cannot but damage its economic progress by undertaking a nuclear armaments programme.

False Salvation

The 'neat' budgeting of nuclear bomb manufacture in India, on the basis of U.S. statistics, is an attempt to fuddle and confuse the policy-makers in the hope that they will abandon what is called their 'moralist' attitude and give the country the chance to test its 'muscle'. This testing of muscles, it is argued, will dissolve the general apathy which has destroyed our ability to act. It will restore the *elan* of the people, give them back their dynamism, their confidence to deal with sly neighbours, wily enemies — and doubtful friends. It will make a 'power' of India. This is a familiar thesis. Militarism—the engine of progress! The country is to be spiritually

revived *via* the nuclear bomb, even though it be famished and starved in the process.

To use the old cliché, there is method in the madness. The building of the cult of power around an independent nuclear capability will demand a very special political sanction which can curb the people's economic appetite. The political sanction in India for such a cult can only be provided by the propagation of a militant Hinduism, with all the fully worked out dimensions of religious revivalism, national chauvinism and medieval ravanchism. In under-developed areas, these trends invariably sharpen in a period of economic crisis. These will be geared to the nuclear programme.

We have many examples of this kind of 'tonic' being fed to the peoples of Asia and Africa by ambitious power groups who seek short-cuts to what they call 'national salvation'. Various countries of the western world too, despite their veneer of sophistication, have also resorted to these very obvious stratagems.

The Militants

Not without reason, therefore, is the Hindu militant in India in the forefront of the demand for an independent nuclear capability. Significantly, he draws sustenance from the not-so-hidden revivalists, chauvinists and revanchists within the ruling party—now increasing in numbers because of the growing realisation that further democratic economic advance must disturb the quiet and comfort of the privileged sections of our society. The denunciation of ideology, the stress on pragmatism, the avoidance of perspective thought and the frantic search for short-cuts are pointers to a carefully coordinated operation to wreck the coherent planning of policies. The shrill debate on the bomb, sparked by a demoralised intellectual elite and spread by the militants, captures the essence of the crisis.

This vociferous group which demands 'our own' nuclear muscle as the answer to our problems argues that those who are opposed consist mainly of cowardly pacifists, moralisers, and believers in

the efficiency of alien or multi-lateral nuclear umbrellas, that they wish to reduce this great country from a position of power and eminence to one of peripheral importance, that even a Gandhi or a Nehru would have seen the logic of building our own nuclear capability. This is unadulterated nonsense.

Let us assume that a still under-developed India has made the ultimate weapon in three months or three years. What then? An explosion, perhaps, in the Indian Ocean (Indonesian, according to Jakarta!). Or would we do the triggering on the rocky wastes of Ladakh? Maybe, 'legally', underground! This demonstration of our ability to manufacture the bomb properly staged, what then? An invitation to join the company of the Big Five as the sixth partner—but only if we have the purposefulness to produce more bombs, and build a reserve. And what if little Israel does likewise? Then what do we gain in power or prestige?

Let us assume that the nuclear stockpiles of China, India and Pakistan are equal—and China or Pakistan pushes forward along a particular front. What then? Do we launch the nuclear attack? Or do we wait patiently for the enemy to move first? And if the enemy does not use the nuclear weapon, would not the fighting be as before—on land, between men and equipment, between the military skills of opposing sides? What special advantage, then, do we command by the mere possession of the nuclear weapon?

Tactical Nuclear Weapons

The only advantage that could develop would be to apply nuclear know-how to the manufacture of tactical weapons—cannon, mortar and rifle. This, however, is for most nations a far-fetched dream. The introduction of such weapons would demand immense investment and would change the entire approach to military organisation and to war. Some such 'refinements' are taking place in the armies of the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R.—the only two really nuclear powers—but even their experience confirms that tactical nuclear weapons transform pre-

sent-day concepts of war and military strategy. In this context, it is most unlikely that any of our potential enemies would ever reach the technically sophisticated level to introduce such tactical weapons. The nuclear bomb, in our situation, will remain for many decades essentially a weapon of strategic destruction or mass terror.

Of course, there remains the prospect of a non-nuclear India in collision with a nuclear power. Would the nuclear bomb in enemy hands destroy our resolve to fight? Inevitably, if our cities were being obliterated and there was no hope of retaliation. But can we conceive of such a situation?

Collective Sanctions

After all, it is possible to build collective international sanctions against the unilateral use of nuclear weapons—more horrifying than the banned techniques of gas and germ warfare. Some such sanctions are already being sought and will ultimately have to be forged jointly by the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. or through the United Nations—the first step towards effective disarmament. A massive sentiment is developing throughout the world in favour of such sanctions. Even the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. know that in the event of a nuclear war, no matter how minor, they would willy-nilly be involved in an escalating confrontation.

Even as efforts are made to give this movement for effective control and disarmament the direction and drive it needs, there is nothing to prevent us keeping abreast of nuclear technology, or making every effort to build an effective military deterrent along our frontiers (including an interceptor force to destroy or minimise a nuclear attack). And, if all our efforts fail, and we are finally compelled to resort to the law of the jungle, there are cheaper weapons of mass terror and retaliation in the armoury of our civilisation. I do not have to detail them. And they could be 'delivered'!

It is only when we reduce the argument to this level of sublima-

tion that the truth dawns. In the final analysis, human survival does not lie in the proliferation of nuclear weapons—a process which could spark the atomisation of our world. Survival depends on collective action, for a *control system is as necessary to the non-nuclear powers as it is to the nuclear*. In this reality lies our ultimate hope of avoiding disastrous military expenditures and getting down to the job of catching up economically with the advanced nations of the world. A panicky commitment to a nuclear programme will only rob us of the chance we have to end the poverty and suffering of our people. No advantage would result from such a commitment, for it is now widely recognised that as a *defensive weapon* the nuclear bomb is practically useless in our conditions.

Crucial to these calculations is the strategic geographical position of India in the emerging balance of nuclear power. The more we dissect the fundamental national interests of the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R., the more it will be realised that both these dominating nuclear powers would not welcome any disturbance to the stability of this sub-continent. This 'commitment', if it may be so-called, will increasingly persuade Moscow and Washington to safeguard the region from any unilateral disruption or dismemberment. I say this more than conscious of the possibility of a limited *rapprochement* between the U.S.A. and China and the desire of the new Soviet leadership to end Khrushchov's favoured-nation treatment given to India as against other leading elements of the non-aligned world.

Heady Ambitions

Only China's present ambitions dictate that, somehow, India's stability and unity be disrupted, for then Peking fondly believes that its writ would run unchallenged throughout Asia, even unnerving industrially advanced Japan. These heady ambitions stem from a traditional desire to command a sphere of influence, a desire which has yet to be tamed

by the rationality of Marxist thought and its perspectives. Hence, the military adventure in NEFA to humble India, the shrill controversy sparked with the Soviet Union to win the leadership of the communist world, and the glorification of a primitive national chauvinism which is sought to be installed as a new egalitarian religion.

These ambitions, left-overs of a tumultuous past, are certainly aberrations in the modern context—but we are likely to be forced to live with them for some time. For, even in our society there is talk of India's 'power status' and of 'spheres of influence' as if modern political development is going to permit the existence of these special rights for these supposedly super powers. We tend to forget that in the decades ahead a people will be judged by their level of development, their civilised state—not by the never-to-be-used bombs at their disposal. Spheres of influence will be disrupted by those who are sought to be influenced. Super-powers will increasingly become an anachronism. These are possibilities inherent in the immediate future.

Plan of Action

India, therefore, must fashion her policies in a rather complex and ramified situation. We have to act cogently, coherently, at different levels, to convince ourselves and also the peoples of the world that our refusal to be pushed into a nuclear armament programme is based not on easily mouthed moralist principles (which are very often the excuse for an apathetic dependence on the patronage of the powerful) but on certain crucial economic and political considerations which compel us to concentrate our whole energy on the war against poverty and degradation, a war which involves a persistent struggle within the country and without, against those who would subvert our independence or compromise our sovereignty. What does this mean in tangible terms, in terms of a programme of action?

1. Carefully formulating proposals, in close consultation

with the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A., *the only two real nuclear powers*, to secure the non-nuclear nations from nuclear attack—a determined initiative which should be launched at various diplomatic levels to demarcate and guarantee nuclear-free zones and help build the responses for effective control and general disarmament.

2. Taking immediate steps to pool and publicise the results of the considerable, independent nuclear research being conducted by non-aligned countries in the same predicament as ours—such as the U.A.R. and Yugoslavia—steps which would reduce the waste involved in duplicatory research and help speed the growth of our expertise in this field of science and technology.
3. Examining the defensive military strength available to us, to assess its efficacy along our sprawling frontiers and to devise unorthodox, less expensive solutions to these problems in keeping with our needs and resources situation—a survey which should also locate facts about unutilised capacity to produce urgently-needed military hardware.
4. Ordering the mobilisation of certain age-groups for one year's compulsory military service so as to build a permanent reserve pool of some two to three million men, capable of handling small arms and trained for the most hazardous operations—a reserve pool that is continuously replenished.
5. Carrying through a programme which ensures minimum national self sufficiency within the ambit of the Fourth Five-Year Plan, a programme which cuts across sectional interests and demands the strengthening and consolidation of the

Centre's complementary power.

A programme of action has to be spelled out even as we move internationally to counter the nuclear threat. So far, the Government of India has failed to apply its mind to the implications of such a programme at home despite its obsession with the aggressiveness of China, a failure which weakens our international initiatives and creates the impression that we are content to be a kind of protectorate of the two nuclear powers, the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. Indeed, our non-alignment policies stand or fall depending on the urgency and single-mindedness with which we pursue such a programme.

The Drift

The political and economic drift at home, the present heavy reliance on foreign food imports, the faith we place in western military expertise in the reorganisation of our armed forces, the inhibitions we express in taking military aid from the U.S.S.R., the fears we have of involving ourselves at certain levels with the defence efforts of a number of non-aligned nations which are anxious to cooperate, the puerile attempts we make to commit friendly powers to our China involvements, the fear we have about expressing ourselves on the critical questions which divide the two major nuclear powers, and our lack of firm objectives at home and abroad, have created the impression that we are exhausted and only too willing to submit to the blackmail of the powerful. This state of affairs must be ended—or else the lobby which agitates for an independent nuclear capability, no matter what the cost, will have its way.

For us, this is certainly a moment for grave decision. Do we go forward confidently to complete a revolution which is sought to be shelved by unscrupulous politicians. Or do we forgo the perspectives which have inspired us these seventeen years in a vain striving for power and prestige which we know to be meaningless? To be or not to be—and there is little time left to wonder and wander.

Control and disarm

R. K. NEHRU

CHINA'S explosion of a bomb is widely regarded in India as a challenge and a threat. Public concern over the explosion is justified as the safety and security of India are involved. The question, however, is: what steps should India take to meet the challenge? As a nation State and China's neighbour, India has some special interests and concerns. As a responsible member of the world community, she has some larger interests and obligations. In any consideration of India's policy, both these aspects must be kept in mind.

The challenge to India is not to yield to a sense of fear, but to assess the situation coolly. Any such assessment must be based on answers to several questions. What are the interests and obligations which India shares with the world community as a whole? What is the significance of her basic policies of non-alignment and peaceful use of her nuclear capabilities?

Why is there some demand for a change in these policies? What are China's nuclear capabilities and what kind of nuclear status can she acquire in the foreseeable future? What are the political and military objectives she can hope to achieve by acquiring such a status? If her objectives, taking into account her capabilities, are a threat to India, would India's interests be better served by changing her present policies, or by using them as a basis for a more collective approach which, while not detracting from her capacity to meet any immediate threat, would also make some contribution to the strengthening of world security?

Some of these questions cannot be easily answered, as there is not enough contact between India and China. India has to depend on assessments made by foreign experts. In any case, in this short article, the answers must be brief. No attempt will be made to elaborate the main arguments. The larger aspect of world security

may be considered first. China's explosion of a bomb has created the threat of proliferation of nuclear weapons. This is a matter of concern to the world as a whole. Existing stocks in the hands of the four nuclear powers are already large enough to destroy humanity. How to eliminate these weapons and to prevent proliferation is the gravest problem facing the world. Fortunately, an effort is being made to find some solution through an agreement on arms control and disarmament. In the nuclear age, there is no alternative to general and complete disarmament, under effective international control, with the progressive development of international peace-keeping institutions.

This objective has been generally accepted and disarmament negotiations are now taking place in Geneva. Lack of agreement on verification methods and the preservation of balance in the process of disarmament has, however, led to an impasse. Political and other differences between the major powers are a further obstacle to progress. Thus, in spite of the growing danger and the desire to reach an agreement, the nuclear arms race is continuing. The continuing race is not only expanding the dangerous accumulation of nuclear weapons, but is also a temptation to others to join the race. The first to follow the lead of the major powers was the U.K. Then came France, and now China is making an attempt to gain entry into the nuclear weapons club. Proliferation is, in any case, a grave danger, but if a country which has been excluded from the world organisation and has unsatisfied ambitions, were to become a nuclear power, the danger would be infinitely more acute.

India's Position

In this larger context of world security, what is the significance of India's policies? As a responsible member of the world community, India shares the general concern in regard to the accumulation and proliferation of nuclear weapons. From the very start, in spite of her nuclear capabilities, which are considered to be higher

than those of China, she has pursued a peaceful nuclear policy. Her policy of non-alignment with military blocs has also a larger significance. It is designed, not only to strengthen the country's independence, but also to enlarge the area of peace and to contribute to the easing of world tensions. An easing of tensions between the major powers would help to bring about agreements on arms control and disarmament. For this and other reasons, India has steadily adhered to her basic policies. These policies are now being followed by the newly independent nations generally and have gained the appreciation of the major powers also.

The New Situation

A new situation has, however, been created by China's nuclear ambitions. Two years ago, India suffered a military reverse at the hands of China, due to lack of preparation and China's superior strength. Although India's defences have been greatly improved, China continues to enjoy certain advantages over India. To these advantages, it now seems, may be added the supreme advantage of possession of nuclear weapons. Why should China, it has been argued, build a nuclear arsenal except for possible use against an adversary? And who could the adversary be except a non-nuclear and non-aligned India who, unlike her other major adversaries, is not equipped for nuclear retaliation?

Thus, a demand has inevitably grown for a reconsideration of India's basic policies. In Europe, the threat of nuclear retaliation by one side against the other has helped to preserve peace. At best, this is a precarious peace, but a sense of common danger has led to more rational attitudes on both sides. Why should India, it has been suggested, not follow the example of the other powers? India cannot accept the risk of a nuclear attack on her civilian population, or on her soldiers guarding the frontiers. Therefore, according to one school of thought, she must revise her peaceful nuclear policy and build a nuclear defence, based on the threat of retaliation. Ac-

cording to another school, instead of building an independent defence at heavy cost, she must seek western nuclear protection and, in effect, give up her policy of non-alignment.

Both these demands have been rejected by the Indian Government and the basic policies of India have been reaffirmed. Some assurance has, however, been given that the nuclear policy will be reviewed, from time to time, according to changing circumstances. The assurance has been generally welcomed, but there is a continuing sense of unease at the possible threat from China. It is necessary, therefore, to make a fuller assessment of the threat, in the light of China's capabilities and objectives.

So far as China's capabilities are concerned, it is not known whether Indian experts have made any detailed assessment. In any case, no such assessment has been published. There have been useful assessments, however, by foreign experts such as Doak Barnett of the U.S.A. and Beaton and Maddox of the Institute of Strategic Studies in London. Their studies were published some years ago and later developments may have made some of their assessments invalid. However, they were able to make a generally correct forecast of the approximate date of the first Chinese explosion. More explosions may now follow, but does this mean that China is on the point of becoming a major nuclear power?

China's Capability

In 1962, according to the experts, India was in a position to explode a bomb a year earlier than China. She had also the capability of producing more nuclear weapons faster than China. But the explosion of a few bombs does not make a country a nuclear power. The country must build an arsenal of nuclear weapons and an effective delivery system. It took the UK, with its highly developed industrial base, 13 years to attain its present position of what has been described as 'comparatively modest nuclear strength.' China's

industrial base is much weaker and it is considered unlikely by the experts that even a maximum effort on her part, possibly at the cost of her general industrialisation programme, could achieve the same results before 1970.

As regards an effective delivery system, without which bombs are useless against a major power, the prospects for China are regarded as poor. China is relying at present on Soviet aircraft of relatively old vintage. Nothing is known about her missiles programme, if she has any. On the basis of British experience, which is not wholly applicable to China, because of her less developed industrial base, it is considered unlikely by the experts that, without Soviet assistance, she could have an effective delivery system, consisting mainly of a modernised Air Force before 1975 or even later.

China might, of course, concentrate on tactical nuclear weapons. No assessment is available of her capacity to produce them. There does not seem to be much prospect, however, of China becoming a major nuclear power in the foreseeable future. Not even the U.K., or France, with their superior capabilities, have acquired such a status. If China continues with her nuclear weapons programme, the probability is that the disposition of U.S. nuclear weapons directed against her will be strengthened. Why, then, has China decided to embark on such a programme? What are her political or military objectives? Normally, a country may be expected to embark on such a programme for purposes of defence, or for aggressive purposes, or for acquiring prestige, or great power status. So far as defence is concerned, the threat to China, in her own eyes, is from the U.S.A. China's desire to rely on her own defence capabilities against the U.S.A. is understandable.

Defence Capacity

However, defence against a possible nuclear attack implies some capacity to retaliate on enemy territory. China has no such capa-

city and is not likely to have any in the foreseeable future. She must continue to rely for her nuclear defence on the Soviet Union. Self-sufficiency is, therefore, probably not her main objective in aspiring to a nuclear status. As regards aggressive use of such a status, at some future date, when she has nuclear weapons, the possibility undoubtedly exists. The present Chinese leadership has always attached great importance to military power. Power, as Mao Tse-tung has said, grows out of the barrel of a gun.

However, the leadership has also shown great caution in the use of military power. Conflict with a stronger enemy, where there is a risk of defeat, has generally been avoided. It has been suggested, therefore, that China might use nuclear weapons to terrorise her weaker neighbours, or confine their use to local conflicts. She could not use them against the Soviet Union, or in any area defended by the U.S.A., without risk of massive retaliation. The Indian border area might, from her point of view, be a less risky area. In this area, however, China's conventional strength is greater than that of India. It is hardly necessary for her to use nuclear weapons, whether big or small, in any future conflict on the border. The use of such weapons will inevitably lead to an Indian demand for outside support and, in any intervention by a major nuclear power, provided the other remains neutral, China will be a heavy loser.

Motivations

As regards terrorising her other weak neighbours, if such is her objective, she can easily do so with her conventional strength. Why should she go to the trouble of adding nuclear weapons to her armoury for such a purpose? Thus, while aggressive pressure of her neighbours cannot be ruled out as a possible motive, this is probably not her principal objective. The principal objective is probably to acquire political prestige, or great power status. One may criticise China for carrying out tests and building a nuclear arsenal for such a purpose. However, the

same motive inspired France and, at an earlier stage, the U.K. in seeking entry into the nuclear weapons club. China may have had some additional provocation as even her international position has not been generally recognised. She may have hoped to gain prestige in the Afro-Asian world by breaking the nuclear monopoly of the four white powers. To some extent, her prestige has increased and this is probably her main objective in attempting to gain entry into the nuclear weapons club.

The Main Threat

India must be prepared for a possible use by China of nuclear weapons in any future border conflict. The chances are that they will not be used, but defence planning must take such a contingency into account. There is a potential threat from China which may or may not materialise after some years. For the present, however, the only threat is from China's conventional forces and this will continue to be the main threat. If the military situation has been correctly assessed, what action should India take to ensure her security? Should she revise her peaceful nuclear policy and start building a nuclear defence? There has been a public debate on this subject and the objections to a change of policy are well-known.

The moral objection is important, but it need not be over-emphasised: if India's soldiers, or civilian population, are under a threat of nuclear attack and there is no other safeguard except a threat of retaliation, would it be an act of morality to allow them to be destroyed, rather than to build a retaliatory defence? For building such a defence, if there is no other alternative, India would have to take the lead in denouncing the Moscow Treaty. She would probably have to carry out tests for which she has no suitable terrain. She would have to take the risk of contaminating the atmosphere. Obviously, other alternatives must be considered before such a course is adopted. The economic objection is also impor-

tant, but it has not yet been fully examined. More information will be available when the cost of production of nuclear weapons has been investigated. The general assumption is probably correct that the cost would be such as to impose a heavy burden on the country.

Militarily, it appears that in any nuclear exchange, China would always enjoy some advantage. Both sides would presumably, for many years to come, use aircraft, or primitive means of delivery. Chinese aircraft would be able to reach essential targets in India, while similar targets in China would be relatively immune to Indian attack. All these objections have been discussed, but the main objection to a change in India's policy is the political objection. Economic and moral objections are also important, but a major factor which India must keep in mind is that safety and security, both for India and for the world as a whole, lie in the elimination of nuclear weapons as part of the disarmament process. Any change in India's policy is likely to set up a chain reaction, leading to the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Apart from the strong reactions which may be aroused in at least one neighbouring country, the negotiations on disarmament would be made much more difficult.

Future of Non-alignment

If India is not to change her nuclear policy, should she seek western nuclear protection and, in effect, give up her policy of non-alignment? This question has also received full consideration in the public debate. The USA has already offered to come to the assistance of any country which is threatened by China. Is it necessary, or consistent with India's dignity, to ask for a more formal western guarantee, or to make some attempt to join the western military alliance? It is hardly likely that the USA would welcome such a move. One of her objectives at present is to reach some accommodation with the Soviet Union, so as to reduce the risk of a nuclear clash. It is in her interest that countries such

as India maintain their policy of non-alignment.

However, even if a change of policy is welcomed by the USA, would it be in India's interest to make such a change? India's interest obviously lies in encouraging healthier trends which are developing in the world. She has particularly welcomed the Soviet policy of peace which is bitterly opposed by China. So long as India remains non-aligned, with friendly relations with both the sides, these trends are likely to be strengthened.

The position might easily be reversed, leading to a closer alignment between China and the Soviet Union, if India were to become part of the western military alliance. In effect, India would be lining up with the western powers against the socialist countries as a whole. Even from the narrowly national point of view, the consequences would be wholly to India's disadvantage. From the larger international point of view, the consequences might be disastrous, as any weakening of the non-aligned area must inevitably come in the way of the healthy changes that are taking place in the world and lead to fresh conflicts and tensions.

Must India, then, do nothing, apart from reaffirming her basic policies which have been widely acclaimed throughout the world? As China is not likely to become a nuclear power for another few years, can India take the risk of allowing the situation to drift. Such a course would be neither in India's national interest, nor in her larger interest as a member of the world community. The Chinese explosion is a potential threat, but it also provides an opportunity for a new effort to be made to strengthen world security and to reduce some abnormalities in the world situation.

Internal Stability

India must, of course, continue to strengthen her conventional defences in a balanced way so as not to disrupt her development plans. Security for India lies not only in military defence, but also

in internal stability and progress. India's efforts in the field of peaceful use of nuclear energy must be intensified. Her nuclear capabilities will stand her in good stead if, at some future date, some change of policy becomes necessary. India's policy of non-alignment which is sometimes questioned because of the Chinese threat and the apparent indifference of the other Afro-Asian nations must also be strengthened. Politically, this is India's greatest asset as it helps to preserve an area of peace, or an area which is relatively free from great power conflicts. It also enables India to make some contribution to the reduction of great power conflicts which is a necessary condition for an advance towards peace and disarmament.

Disarmament

It is in the disarmament field that some new initiatives can now be taken. In fact, India's efforts in this field need to be intensified. Three important questions which are being discussed in the Disarmament Conference are: (a) an agreement on reduction of existing stocks of nuclear weapons, as part of the disarmament process, (b) an agreement on cessation of production of certain types of nuclear weapons, and (c) a non-dissemination agreement which would exclude both transfer of control over nuclear weapons to a non-nuclear power and the manufacture of weapons by a non-nuclear power. There are other important questions which have not yet been discussed, e.g., measures for bringing about the peaceful settlement of international disputes. Unless some measures are devised and every country makes some effort to settle its own disputes peacefully, the arms race is likely to continue.

A major question which is not even on the agenda, but is very much in every one's thoughts is, how to deal with China. The situation in regard to China is abnormal. There can be no disarmament without China's participation, but China has neither been invited to the Conference,

nor has been allowed to take her seat in the United Nations.

Reduction of Stocks

The key question is how to reduce existing stocks. If the major powers cannot reach an agreement on this question, how can they expect further production to cease? Cessation of production, without reduction, might leave one side stronger than the other. If there is no reduction and no cessation of production, the nuclear arms race is bound to continue. There will always be some nations which will refuse to accept the monopoly of the nuclear powers. They will assert their right to produce nuclear weapons and make an attempt to gain entry into the nuclear weapons club.

On the question of reduction of nuclear weapons, India has made a proposal in the Conference. She has proposed the setting up of a working group with clear terms of reference to study this question. The proposal has neither been rejected, nor accepted, by the nuclear powers. Discussion on this question will be resumed when the Conference meets again. Discussion on non-dissemination will also be resumed as the nuclear powers have a common interest in preventing further proliferation. Non-dissemination raises two important issues: (a) does transfer of nuclear weapons to the joint control of a number of States as envisaged by the USA in the MLF project, amount to dissemination? (the Soviet Union has given notice that if the West Germans are given a share in the control of nuclear weapons, the disarmament negotiations will be disrupted); (b) if a non-nuclear State, e.g., India, agrees not to produce nuclear weapons, under a non-dissemination agreement, what guarantee will she have for her security against States possessing nuclear weapons who have not signed the agreement?

These are important issues which will come up in the next session of the Disarmament Conference. India will be expected to play a leading part in the negotiations. The MLF issue will require careful handling as the USA's fear is

that if the West Germans are not given a share in their nuclear defence, they might produce weapons of their own, or join hands with France. As regards a guarantee for non-nuclear States, it is essential that there should be some collective guarantee for their security. What shape the guarantee should take and what conditions should be attached to the guarantee are matters for negotiation. Without some collective guarantee, it may not be easy for some non-nuclear States to sign a non-dissemination agreement.

China's Participation

There is also the question of the stage at which China should be invited to the Disarmament Conference? Without her participation, a disarmament agreement will not be of much value. She has refused to attend the Conference unless she is allowed to take her seat in the United Nations. This raises a difficult issue, but the issue will have to be faced. Perhaps, the best course would be for the major powers to reach some basic agreement on the more important disarmament issues first. The question of inviting China to the Conference, whether or not she accepts the invitation, could then be taken up.

The next two or three years in the Disarmament Conference will be important. After that, progress may slow down again because of the American elections. If there is no progress in the next two or three years, China will have a longer respite and the possibility of her becoming a nuclear power may be strengthened. It is necessary, therefore, that India should exert every effort, when the Conference meets again, to bring about agreement on the more basic issues.

India's position is strong as she has unilaterally decided not to produce nuclear weapons. Her voice will carry greater weight and she can play some part in ensuring progress towards disarmament. The challenge from China is a potential threat, but if progress is made in the disarmament negotiations, the challenge may be successfully met.

Documentary

NUCLEAR TEST BAN TREATY

Extract from the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty signed in Moscow, August 5, 1963. (Preamble and Article 1)

THE Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America, hereinafter referred to as the 'original parties.'

Proclaiming as their principal aim the speediest possible achievement of an agreement on general and complete disarmament under strict international control in accordance with the objectives of the United Nations which would put an end to the armaments race and eliminate the incentive to the production and testing of all kinds of weapons, including nuclear weapons.

Seeking to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time, determined to continue negotia-

tions to this end, and desiring to put an end to the contamination of man's environment by radio-active substances.

Have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE I

1. Each of the parties to this treaty undertakes to prohibit, to prevent, and not to carry out any nuclear weapon test explosion, or any other nuclear explosion, at any place under its jurisdiction or control:

(a) In the atmosphere; beyond its limits, including outer space; or under water, including territorial waters or high seas; or

(b) In any other environment if such explosion causes radioactive debris to be present outside the territorial limits of the state under whose jurisdiction or control such explosion is conducted. It is understood in this connexion that the provisions of this sub-paragraph are without prejudice to the conclusion of a treaty resulting in the permanent banning of all nuclear test explosions, including all such explosions underground, the conclusion of which, as the parties have stated in the preamble to this treaty, they seek to achieve.

2. Each of the parties to this treaty undertakes furthermore to refrain from causing, encouraging, or in any way participating in the carrying out of any nuclear weapon test explosion, or any other nuclear explosion, anywhere which would take place in any of the environments described, or have the effect referred to, in paragraph 1 of this Article.

The full text of the official statement on the explosion of China's first atomic bomb today. (Peking, October 16.)

CHINA'S VIEW

CHINA exploded an atom bomb at 15.00 hours on October 16, 1964, and thereby conducted successfully its first nuclear test. This is a major achievement of the Chinese people in their struggle to increase their national defence capability and oppose the United States imperialist policy of nuclear blackmail and nuclear threats.

To defend oneself is the inalienable right for every sovereign State. And to safeguard world peace is the common task of all peace-loving countries. China cannot remain idle and do nothing in the face of the ever-increasing nuclear threat posed by the United States. China is forced to conduct nuclear tests and develop nuclear weapons.

The Chinese Government has consistently advocated the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons. Should this have been realised, China need not develop the nuclear weapon. But this position of ours has met the stubborn resistance of the US imperialists.

The Chinese Government pointed out long ago that the treaty on the partial halting of nuclear tests signed by the United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union in Moscow in July, 1963, was a big fraud to fool the people of the world, that it tried to consolidate the nuclear monopoly held by the three nuclear Powers, and tie up the hands and feet of all peace-loving countries, and that it not only did not decrease but had increased the nuclear threat of US imperialism against the people of China and of the whole world.

The US Government declared undisguisedly even then that the conclusion of such a treaty does not at all mean that the

United States would not conduct underground tests, or would not use, manufacture, stockpile, export, or proliferate nuclear weapons. The facts of the past year more fully proves this point.

During the past year and more the United States has not stopped manufacturing various nuclear weapons on the basis of the nuclear tests which it had already conducted. Furthermore seeking for ever greater perfection, the US has during this same period conducted several dozen underground nuclear tests and thereby more perfecting the nuclear weapons it manufactures.

In stationing nuclear submarines in Japan, the US is posing a direct threat to the Japanese people, the Chinese people, and the peoples of all other Asian countries.

The United States is now putting nuclear weapons into the hands of the West German revanchists through the so-called Multilateral Nuclear Force and thereby threatening the security of the German Democratic Republic and the other East European Socialist countries.

US submarines carrying Polaris missiles with nuclear warheads are prowling the Taiwan Straits, the Tonkin Gulf, the Mediterranean Sea, the Pacific Ocean, the Indian Ocean, and the Atlantic Ocean, threatening everywhere peace-loving countries and all peoples who are fighting against imperialism, colonialism, and neo-colonialism.

Under such circumstances, how can it be considered that the US nuclear blackmail and nuclear threat against the people of the world no longer exist just because of the false impression created by the temporary halting of atmospheric tests by the United States?

The atom bomb is a paper tiger. This famous saying by chairman Mao Tse-tung is known to all. This was our view in the past and this is still our view at present.

China is developing nuclear weapons not because we believe in the omnipotence of nuclear weapons and that China plans to use nuclear weapons. The truth is exactly to the contrary. In developing nuclear weapons, China's aim is to break the nuclear monopoly of the nuclear Powers and to eliminate nuclear weapons.

The Chinese Government is loyal to Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism. We believe in the people. It is the people who decide the outcome of a war, and not any weapon.

The destiny of China is decided by the Chinese people, and the destiny of the world by the peoples of the world, and not by the nuclear weapon. The development of nuclear weapons by China is for defence and for protecting the Chinese people from the danger of the United States launching a nuclear war.

The Chinese Government hereby solemnly declares that China will never at any time and under any circumstances be the first to use nuclear weapons.

The Chinese people firmly support the struggles for liberation waged by all oppressed nations and people of the world. We are convinced that, by relying on their own struggles and also through mutual aid, the peoples of the world will certainly win victory.

The mastering of the nuclear weapon by China is a great encouragement to the revolutionary peoples of the world in their struggles and a great contribution to the cause of defending world peace. On the question of nuclear weapons, China will neither

commit the error of adventurism nor the error of capitulationism. The Chinese people can be trusted.

The Chinese Government fully understands the good wishes of peace-loving countries and people for the halting of all nuclear tests. But more and more countries are coming to realise that the more the US imperialists and their partners hold on to their nuclear monopoly the more is there danger of a nuclear war breaking out. They have it and you don't, and so they are very haughty.

But once those who oppose them also have it, they would no longer be so haughty, their policy of nuclear blackmail and nuclear threat would no longer be so effective and the possibility for a complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons would increase.

We sincerely hope that a nuclear war would never occur. We are convinced that, so long as all peace-loving countries and people of the world make common efforts and persist in the struggle, a nuclear war can be prevented.

The Chinese Government hereby formally proposes to the Governments of the world that a summit conference of all the countries of the world be convened to discuss the question of the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons, and that as a first step the 'summit' conference should reach an agreement to the effect that the nuclear Powers and those countries which will soon become nuclear Powers undertake not to use nuclear weapons, neither to use them against non-nuclear countries and nuclear-free zones, nor against each other.

If those countries in possession of huge quantities of nuclear weapons are not even willing to undertake not to use them, how can those countries not yet in possession of them be expected to believe in their sincerity for peace and not to adopt possible and necessary defensive measures.

The Chinese Government will, as always, exert every effort to promote the realisation of the noble aim of the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons through international consultations.

Before the advent of such a day, the Chinese Government and people will firmly and unswervingly march along their own road of strengthening their national defences, defending their motherland and safeguarding world peace. We are convinced that nuclear weapons, which are after all created by man, certainly will be eliminated by man.

Broadcast By H. J. Bhabha over All India Radio on United Nations Day. (October 24, 1964.)

DR. BHABHA

United Nations Day comes this year after a number of grave events which should make us turn all the more to the United Nations as the only sane way of solving the political and international problems of the world, and replacing the law of the jungle among nations by the law of reason.

I have been asked to speak on nuclear disarmament. Let me say straightaway that in the opinion of many who have devoted much time and study to the problem, nuclear disarmament cannot be separated entirely from general disarmament. Even if it were possible to achieve complete nuclear disarmament while leaving

conventional armament untouched, we would only be returning to a world as it existed before 1945, and we know that that world was not free from the horrors of war on a mounting scale.

What we have to achieve is the rule of law among nations, and an organization, the United Nations, strong enough to enforce that law and to deal with those who break it and the peace. For this purpose the United Nations, with the help of its members, will have to be armed with a security force strong enough to maintain peace in a relatively disarmed world, and such a security force may well have to be armed with nuclear weapons to a limited extent. One must remember that it is not any object that is intrinsically good or bad, but the use that is made of it.

A minimum supply of nuclear weapons coupled with an adequate delivery system confers on a State the capacity to destroy more or less totally the important cities and industrial centres in another State. There appears to be no means of totally intercepting such an attack, and if even a small fraction of it gets through, entire cities and regions may be totally devastated. The only defence against such an attack appears to be a capability and threat of retaliation. It is clear that if State A has acquired the capacity completely to devastate all important centres in another State B, the possession of a manifold more destructive power by State B would not put it in the position of making an attack on State A profitable, since it itself would be devastated as a result. Indeed, even if State B had much less nuclear armament than State A, but sufficient to inflict a few serious wounds on the attacking State such as, for example, the total destruction of a few of its principal cities, that alone might be sufficient to prevent the much stronger State A from launching an attack.

In short, atomic weapons give a State possessing them in adequate numbers a deterrent power against attack from a much stronger State. Indeed, the importance of nuclear weapons is that they enable a country possessing them in adequate measure to deter another country also possessing them from using them against it.

Nuclear power stations with an electrical output of 200, 250 and 300 megawatts per reactor are under construction in the world today, and much larger sizes are being planned. Atomic power stations automatically generate plutonium in their fuel, and a 300 megawatt electrical power station would provide enough plutonium for the production of between 20 to 35 atomic bombs a year, depending on their size. Thus, it seems quite within the capacity of a number of countries to produce nuclear weapons in this measure within the next five to ten years. A considerable misconception exists about the cost of doing so.

At the Third International Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy organized by the United Nations in Geneva in September this year, there was a paper (Engineering Applications of Nuclear Explosives: Project Ploughshare, by Gerald W. Johnson and Gary H. Higgins, Lawrence Radiation Laboratory, Livermore, California) by the United States on the peaceful uses of atomic explosions for excavation for water diversion, irrigation or flood control, for construction of canals and harbours, or for blasting passages through mountains for highways and railroads, and for several other peaceful uses. In that paper the cost of nuclear explosives was given. A 10 Kiloton explosion, i.e., one equivalent to 10,000 tons of TNT, would cost \$ 350,000 or Rs. 17.5 lakhs—that is an explosion of the same order of magnitude as the Hiroshima bomb—while a two megaton explosion, i.e., one equivalent to 2 million tons of TNT, would cost \$ 600,000 or Rs. 30 lakhs. On the other hand, at current prices of TNT, 2 million tons of it would

cost some Rs. 150 crores, making the use of that much explosive in one event totally impossible.

This shows that atomic explosives are some 20 times cheaper and thermo-nuclear explosives more than 500 times cheaper than conventional explosives. Thus, on the basis of the figures given in the paper I have quoted, a stockpile of some 50 atomic bombs would cost under Rs. 10 crores and a stockpile of 50 two-megaton hydrogen bombs something of the order of Rs. 15 crores. These expenditures are small compared with the military budgets of many countries. We may, therefore, well have to reckon with a number of countries possessing nuclear weapons within the next five or ten years, unless some important and tangible steps are taken towards disarmament.

Much has been said about the difficulty of acquiring a delivery system. The effectiveness of the delivery system depends on the strength of the country against whom it is proposed to deploy nuclear weapons, and its defensive capabilities. The delivery of nuclear weapons against either of the two super-powers, namely, the United States and the USSR would be much more difficult, because of their much stronger defences and because of geographical factors. On the other hand, it would not be difficult to deliver atomic weapons against a country not possessing a modern air force and ground-to-air missiles. Even against a country having such modern defences, if it were near, a considerable part of the attack would go through, and with nuclear weapons the devastation would be terrible. Capability of retaliation appears to be the most powerful deterrence.

Current problems of disarmament and world security were discussed at the Twelfth Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs which was held at Udaipur in January this year and which was attended by eminent scientists from 25 countries, including all the industrially advanced ones. This is not the occasion to go into the detailed analysis of the effect of a spread of nuclear weapons, and those who are interested in the subject could refer to the published proceedings of that Conference. I may, however, mention a couple of tentative conclusions to which I came regarding the spread of nuclear weapons.

There are two super-powers today, and it seems improbable that any third country is likely to acquire within the next ten years a nuclear force and the delivery system sufficient to give it a position of absolute deterrence against either of them. The position would however be entirely different if countries were free for a decade or more, as at present, to develop nuclear weapons on their own. At least a few countries, and especially the very large ones, could then get into a position of having a deterrent nuclear force against any other. The situation would be a very complicated one and it seems not unlikely that it would be less stable than at present. It would, therefore, appear to be in the interest of everyone to see that substantial progress towards general disarmament is made as soon as possible, and in any case within the period of a decade before more countries have time to develop into major nuclear powers.

The explosion of a nuclear device by China is a signal that there is no time to be lost. Neither the United Nations nor the great powers have yet succeeded in creating a climate favourable to countries which have the capability of making atomic weapons, but have voluntarily refrained from doing so. Steps must be taken to create such a climate as early as possible. The great powers under the aegis of the United Nations must take concrete steps towards nuclear and general disarmament within the next couple of years in order that they may act more effectively in

detering a spread of nuclear weapons. We have to strengthen the United Nations in order to replace the law of force by the law of reason in international relations, and so to build a safer and peaceful world.

**Article in Swarajya on Nuclear Deterrence by C. Rajagopalachari.
(November 7, 1964.)**

C. RAJAGOPALACHARI

As soon as the Chinese atom bomb exploded, Mr. Frank Moraes sent three questions through his Chief Reporter in Madras and asked for my views. Here are the questions and the answers that I gave :

In the context of China emerging as an atomic power in the East, in the light of the relation between India and China, is it an absolute essential of defensive strategy that India should also make use of her resources to produce and stockpile atom bombs?

In the context of Indian economy, can manufacture and stockpiling of atom bombs be undertaken as part of defence build-up without affecting our planning in other directions?

Ans : I am clearly of the opinion along with most of the enlightened men and women of the world, that we should not seek to become a nuclear power and produce atomic bombs. Neither does our economy permit such an undertaking, even if it were sensible.

What is the best deterrent that India should think of in its defence strategy against China?

Ans : So far as I can think and see, the best and only deterrent that India should think of in its defensive strategy is a clear Treaty Alliance against China with those Powers of the world who are firmly ranged against Communist aggression. This means that we should reverse our fatuous policy of 'non-alignment' which only amounts to standing alone in our defence, contented with hire-and-purchase arms from the West. We should also no longer think of undertaking experiments of building up our military strength by means such as would involve infiltration in our defence establishments of dangerous elements pledged to communism. We should no longer imagine safety in the distinction between Russia and China after the exit of Khrushchov. This exit is explainable only on the ground of a determined plan, on the part of Soviet Russia, to reunite, ideologically as well as strategically, with China. We should therefore reverse our agreement about MIG production, which, I am sure, will not be objected to and may even be welcomed by the new Soviet Government.

If we do not take immediate steps for entering into Treaty Alliance with the West, we may escape Chinese aggression by reason of China's own unilateral decision to abstain from it now; but we will surely have to accept Chinese hegemony in Asia.

These are my considered answers to the questions put by Mr. Frank Moraes. Dr. H. J. Bhabha, our nuclear expert, says among other things what as reported in the press means this : that the best deterrent of aggressive thoughts in a nuclear enemy is the possession of power to answer with a retaliatory nuclear bomb. Dr. Bhabha also gives a tempting, cheap estimate for acquiring a bomb of comparatively low power. This reasoning and these estimates have to be supplemented with a psychological element of importance. The possession of nuclear power by itself will not act as a deterrent on the mind of an enemy when he knows that the people against whom he is plotting will not be willing to commit mass murder and destroy civilization, though

they may have the power to do so. A desperate enemy has thus an advantage in being reckless, over-populated and hungry.

The only true and safe line for India to take is not the acquiring of some third-nuclear capacity to brandish against China, but to think out the far more effective and silent deterrent of co-operative world power, acquired by treaty with the West. What China would then face is not partial loss or damage to which it may easily reconcile itself, but something more terrible, which it would really not like or want. We should give up idle anti-Americanism and think things out more realistically, applying not only arithmetical and physical truths but taking into account the far more important psychological elements. All that has happened hitherto, and the danger that China means to us, can lead only to one policy in respect of our defence—to a firm Treaty Alliance with the Western Powers. It is only this that will act as a deterrent of Chinese aggression and also restrain, if not resolve, Pakistan's adverse attitude towards India.

It may be easy enough to make a bomb or two, but it will surely lead to a race in nuclear armaments which our economy cannot support. It is unnecessary to go into the moral aspect of such a policy, which is contrary to all our sworn principles.

Extracts from Prime Minister Shri Lal Bahadur Shastri's speech in Lok Sabha on November 24, 1964. The original was delivered in Hindi.

PRIME MINISTER SHASTRI

It is natural that when China explodes an atom bomb, our mind and heart should prompt us to manufacture an atom bomb immediately and to reply to atom bomb with atom bomb. I can understand this feeling. I understand the concern in the country and amongst Members of Parliament. But we have to come to a decision after taking into full consideration all the aspects of the question and what the Members have said about the change in policy.

I do not want to take my stand on idealism. I want to assure Shri Nath Pai that at present there is no Gandhi here who can think of carrying on the administration. A Gandhi does not come near administration. It is weaker people like us who take upon themselves this burden and who in their weakness seek to derive strength and support from these great men.

I do not want to drag in Gandhi's name nor take my stand on non-violence and urge that we should follow the path of non-violence and, therefore, should not think of manufacturing the atom bomb. I would not like to bring in the moral aspect, though it does not mean that I undervalue it or minimise its importance. We may not be strong enough to live up to these values but we should try never to lose sight of them. Leaving apart the moral aspect for the time-being, we have to consider the question from a practical angle. What we will gain by manufacturing the atom bomb; how far it would be able to increase our strength and to what extent we may be able to gain parity with the nuclear powers and what burden will it impose on the country? and whether at the same time, would we be able to work more for peace or to raise a stronger voice against nuclear warfare and nuclear weapons, as India has been doing upto now.

Under the leadership of Jawaharlalji it has done something to maintain peace. There is no doubt that the lead which Jawaharlalji gave in the matter of peace, co-existence and disarmament was based on practical considerations. He worked for this cause in his capacity as administrator and Prime Minister and saved the world from wars many times. We have to pursue the policy,

which we have pursued since Independence, so that we may be able to surmount the danger which threatens the world.

I do not want to go into the cost aspect of the atom bomb. I am prepared to concede that I have not got an exact idea. . . . Opinions on this matter differ. Some say that the cost would be 21 crores, some say 14 crores, some say 30 crores, some 40 crores and some 50 crores. Therefore, I said that it is difficult to get a clear opinion in the matter. I have also asked for Dr. Bhabha's opinion, who is the Head of the Atomic Energy Commission. He says that he cannot at present give definite figures. He is right in saying that we are exploring the matter. He has made some calculations on the basis of nuclear devices in the U.S. He used the word 'nuclear devices'. I do not know its full implications. He has said that the latest technique in nuclear devices in the U.S.A. do not involve a very high cost. But kindly do not forget for a minute the great development in nuclear science which has taken place in the U.S.A. The plant, the machinery, the raw materials—everything in the U.S.A. is on the highest level. Therefore, if we calculate on the basis of all these things, the cost would be considerably less. But a nation which is yet to develop nuclear devices can never come in that category. . . .

I do not say that our knowledge is meagre. Atomic energy has made great strides in our country and. . . we have the capacity to produce the atom bomb. It is not impossible to do it. We can do it. But what are its implications. We should realise that we will create obstruction in our development work if we panic at such a small matter and take a hasty step. We may think about other remedies. I do not deny that we should study the problem. We should know everything about it, whether it is a matter of cost of manufacture. There is no objection in getting information and we will get it. But I would like to appeal to you that Parliament should take this decision after thinking deeply on the matter. Parliament is sovereign and can take any decision, but its responsibility is equally great and, therefore, it should take a decision very calmly.

It is not a political controversy that you demand the production of the atom bomb and we say we cannot produce it, and then you exploit it and say that we are weak. This will not be permitted. Whatever one may say, we do not want to permit this.

I submit that it is not only a question affecting India. It affects humanity as a whole and we should go into everything and think deeply how to guard against calamity and protect our country from dangers, maintain our security and, at the same time, continue our modest contribution to world peace and amity. It is not easy to strike such a balance. I do not say that the present policy is rigid and can never change. An individual may have a policy and a conviction for which he can live and die, but we cannot take this attitude in the political field. Here the situation changes constantly and we have to adapt our policy to these changes. If some amendment is needed to what we have said today, we shall make it. . . .

Both atom bombs and conventional weapons using nuclear devices are being produced. Therefore, we have also to see whether our conventional weapons are not getting inadequate. Our policy will change with the situation. If one says that our policy is static and rigid we can understand it on a purely intellectual level, but we cannot take such an attitude in practice. As I have said, we should consider all its aspects and then take a decision after due deliberation. This is my personal view.

There are newspaper reports about Indonesia or some other country trying to produce atom bombs. It would be childish to

attach importance to this. Countries which produce atom bombs would be atomic powers. Some may have 10 bombs and some 20... If a country lends nuclear bombs to another country, it is possible that in place of conventional weapons atom bombs would be used to settle small differences, like those between Indonesia and Malaysia.

The United Nations Organisation should pay attention to this danger, because it represents all the countries of the world except China. There is a great danger before the world and if the U.N.O. does not take up the matter seriously and does not think upon it, it will fail in one of its vital functions. After all, the U.N.O. was organised to maintain peace in the world and restore peace wherever it is disturbed. Therefore, it should promote coexistence. Therefore, apart from India, if countries of Africa and Asia and other undeveloped countries do not think upon this matter in all seriousness and do not raise this question in the U.N.O., then, I submit, peace would be imperilled and we do not know what will happen.

But, I am sure that the importance of this question, its difficulties and complications, will be understood, because the question does not affect India alone. It is a terrible question for all the countries of Asia and Africa and for all developing countries who want to make economic progress and create a new social order. If we devote our resources to the production of the atom bomb, we will have to sacrifice the good of our country. Even when we were in the midst of a great calamity, Jawaharlalji stood by coexistence. Therefore, we should not give it up in panic over a small matter. There are testing times for nations and we should face the tests with fortitude. . .

I also become afraid but when the first impact and panic is over, a human being rallies his mental faculties and realises that if we panic at a small danger, take a wrong step, we shall lose what little good name we have earned in the world and what little influence we have been able to produce. The impression which we created in Cairo was not my personal impression. If it was an influence, it was derived from India and from the history which is behind it. It was an influence of Pandit Jawaharlal's leadership and his standing in international affairs.


Therefore, I want to submit, that though for some time some people may be angry with us, people still have a respect for India and the countries of the world realise that we will say fearlessly what we consider to be right. Therefore, I say that if we decide to produce the atom bomb, in my opinion, we would not be able to create any impression on the world and I see little chance of being able to face this danger by this. I think we shall weaken ourselves to some extent by taking this decision. Therefore, we reiterate our policy in the matter and the whole Government stands by me. I believe that, leaving apart some differences of opinion, generally the people realise that this policy is good for the country. It will do us good and, in my opinion, also do the world good.

Extract from V. K. Krishna Menon's speech during the debate on the international situation in the Lok Sabha. (November 24, 1964.)

V.K. KRISHNA MENON

Now we come to one of the more difficult parts on which one may speak about, that is, this atomic explosion. There is little doubt that the test explosion carried out by China adds to the menace to India, but it should be said at the same time that it

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adds to the menace to the world and adds to the menace to China; that is to say, it is not a question of a Chinese explosion only, but the proliferation of these weapons . . .

I think, it is necessary for us, on the one hand, not to influence people's minds or browbeat them by merely speaking in terms of the bomb. I think, it is necessary for us to understand what an atomic weapon means. Here, I regret to say, I think it is a bad day for a parliamentary government—when permanent officials are allowed to make speeches on matters which go very near policy. Policy is a matter for Government and not for anyone else. I have said it at another place also and I still appeal to the Prime Minister to restrain his officials, whether people go to Nagaland or to the Atomic Energy Commission, and tell them that whatever information they have is not their private property. It is not even the property of this Parliament. It is the property of the Government. The reason is a very simple one. If a civil servant makes a speech, we cannot attack him. He is not answerable to this House; he is only answerable to his minister. Therefore if they must have protection, if they want to have the advantages of remaining in *purdah*, they must accept the responsibilities also.

The general reaction in certain parts of the world is that a non-European, non-white nation has exploded a bomb and has, therefore, broken the monopoly. I submit that this is rather not a very realistic or a very highly intelligent way of looking at it. Why break the monopoly of burglary, crime and things of that kind? China has committed one explosion—committed is the right word because it is a world crime—France five, the United Kingdom 24, the Soviet Union 126 and the United States of America 330 since the time of the atomic explosions. . .

Then we come to the test explosion question. The main consideration in people's minds is that if a neighbour has got a strong weapon, then it is only cautious to be armed with a similar weapon. That would be so if the weapon were either a weapon of war or a weapon of defence. There is no defence against the atomic bomb on a large scale. It is then said that it could be a deterrent.

Now, the deterrent power of the atomic bomb comes from two considerations. Firstly, if it has to be a deterrent, it must have the capacity of annihilation. That is to say, one little bomb would do nothing of the kind; it may create panic but it can't do anything more. It must have the capacity to destroy a country. That is to say, this country must have enough atomic bombs to destroy whatever country it wants to destroy. That is not enough. The atomic bomb is potent unless you use it first. That is to say, we have to adopt the doctrine of preventive war and civilised nations would find it difficult to adopt that.

But its more immediate troubles for us are as to what would be the reaction of Ceylon—I am not referring to the immigration question? Then, what will be the reaction of small countries, these neighbours of ours? What will be the effect in regard to Pakistan? She has now two sources of supply. She can get bombs from China—if China makes the bomb—or she can get bombs from the United States of America as she has a military alliance with that country. So, there will be another nuclear armed country.

The second main difficulty is this that we have now come to a state of affairs in technological development in the atomic weapons where it is possible to produce atomic weapons of much smaller dimensions with the result that—people have spoken about it—it might become from the point of view of portability a conventional

weapon. And that means, two small countries acquiring them can have an atomic border war. It looks like a border war but in no time it becomes a war of radiation throughout the world. . .

Mr. Speaker, Sir, various methods (of control) have been suggested. My submission is this that if the Chinese explosion has proved anything, has made any demands upon others, it is this that this country and other countries must now enormously increase their energies and everything else to have the atomic weapon completely abolished. That is to say, unless there is a prohibitive policy of this country against the manufacture, the stock-piling, the utilisation or the traffic in atomic weapons, the world will not be same for anybody to live in. There are other countries—one may not give their names—which are capable of doing it.

The United States and the Soviet Union are two big countries with great responsibilities, irrespective of what we think of them. They are not likely to use them in a big way. I am quite sure that Mr. Lyndon Johnson has spoken about this. There is no doubt that everybody feels that we are up against a very serious difficulty. Any amount of speaking, any amount of our expression of opinion or excitement, would not add very much to it.

It may well be for other reasons that some people have mentioned that we may not have to make a bomb at all or we may fail in doing so. But by giving in to all this feeling, that we are inclined that way or doing that way, we are breaking the promises that we have made to the world for the last 15 years. For the last 15 years, you have said this—that is another matter—but we signed the Moscow Ban Treaty only six months ago and only three months ago our Government asked our representative at Geneva to proclaim to the world that we shall not use them. This is what Mr. Lyndon Johnson said in the middle of the election campaign:

'Before I start dropping bombs around . . . I would want to think about the consequences of getting American boys into a war with 700 million Chinese.

'In a world such as this—a nuclear world—there is no room for bluster and bluff and belligerence. There is room only for courage, intelligence and reason.

'The world's hopes for peace cannot be left with those who have no faith in the possibility of lasting agreements and who really predict war.'

We have made international commitments. Not only has this Parliament passed resolutions but we have signed the Moscow Ban Treaty—we have affixed our signatures on it—and what is more even in Cairo we invited all other people to sign it. Now, if we are going to tell the world, having affixed our signature to the Moscow Ban Treaty six months ago, proclaimed it afterwards and say, 'We are going to break it', what will be our capacity to bring down the atomic weapon?

Finally, I would submit that the possession of one of these small bombs or nuclear devices is a danger to us, for if China takes it into her head to drop a bomb on us in order to create panic, then she can easily tell the world that we dropped it on them, just as Pakistan does things to us and then says that we attacked them.

Therefore, the whole philosophy of this nuclear-free zone is partly based upon this. So, in no circumstances is either the interest or the security or the economy or prestige or morality or anything else of this country served by our entering the atomic race.

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
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

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
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
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
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
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The problem

THE criticism of 'Asian Democracy' which one frequently hears is supported by the still-birth of parliamentary institutions in some Asian countries such as Thailand, and their breakdown in others like Páakistan and Burma. These developments have made some critics highly pessimistic.

It is argued that most Asian political leaders and thinkers are deeply sceptical about the relevance of the western parliamentary system to Asian conditions. In passing global judgments, Solomon Bandaranáiké, Jawaharlal

Nehru, Ayub Khan and Ne Win are assembled under one roof and scepticism is expressed on prospects of parliamentary democracy in Asia by all of them. Indeed, people like Jayaprakash Narayan and S. S. More are also cited on the wastefulness of the party system and of the constitutionally-ordained opposition in parliament.

One may excuse Narayan and More their doubts, for they are utopians, but the educated analyst ought to know better. The discussions on 'Asian' democracy suffer from two basic defects. They analyse Asia and discuss 'Asian' democracy as if Asia was all of one piece. It is not—neither the whole of Asia nor any part of it. Neither non-communist Asia nor the communist is homogeneous. Traditional culture, social structure, geographical conditions, economic resources in each country in Asia are vastly different from those in others. Geographers and historians have long underlined the striking diversity of the parts as the hallmark of Asia.

A global discussion of prospects of democracy in Asia is bound to be misleading. India, in any case, is unique; it must be discussed as a separate case if we are to make sense of the political developments here, for India cannot be subsumed under broad categories such as 'developing societies' or 'the Afro-Asian nations.' Other countries in the region must also be recognised in their uniqueness. To talk of 'Asian' democracy is to talk in thin air.

Political leaders, whose thinking is motivated by the urgent search for ideal solutions and who are for this reason to be counted as utopians, are bound to condemn political parties as unethical and wasteful. Verily, one must pay homage to the moral earnestness of the utopian leader, but can one accept him as a serious political analyst? If politics is understood as the art of the possible, it excludes utopianism.

Political parties and the parliamentary system are witnesses to a practical approach to public affairs, based upon acceptance of limitations of individual and of social conduct. No organisation can represent the different social interests in society. Multiplicity of interests marks the industrial social order and no individual or group or party can adequately represent or do justice to all of them. It is necessary that there should be different parties to represent different interests, whereas altogether they represent the whole.

The Achilles heel of the utopian leader is his attitude to social and, particularly, political conflict. Escape from conflict is what really motivates him. Yet it was recognised even before Hegel and Marx that social conflict is creative, that conflict is essential to healthful society. The fear of political conflict may spring

from many sources. There is anxiety that one's interests might be jeopardised in an open clash. The utopian no less than the brown sahib may fear that social and political conflict would harm his interests or destroy his illusions.

But cultural tradition plays a big part in determining one's attitudes. A quiescent and passive society inhibits systematic social action, which cannot proceed without conflict. To be sure, Mahatma Gandhi produced a synthesis of the passive and the activist attitudes in his method of non-violent *satyagraha*, but the utopian haze tended to stultify it. The utopian believes that what he represents is all-inclusive. Systematic political action requires that one should accept one's limitations.

The great function of parliamentary democracy is to bring social conflicts into the open and to modulate them in a non-destructive, creative manner. Unless this fact is grasped, those who mourn the inevitable passing of democracy or lose their faith in its future at the first eruption of social unrest will continue to inject their environment with pessimism.

The parliamentary system of government, which grew up alongside the commercial and industrial revolution, is a fit instrument to deal with the problems of industrial society. It is intended to provide dynamic stability—stability combined with a highly dynamic process of social change. Thus the parliament is not merely a legislative body which sanctions and legitimises the laws or rules and regulations issued by the government nor does the parliament merely serve as a check on the executive, attempting at all times to scrutinize its actions and guard against its transgressions against the citizens; nor yet is the parliament simply a body of ombudsmen looking into, and seeking to remedy, the grievances of citizens against the acts of omission and commission of the bureaucracy. More important than all of these is that where the parliament fulfils its functions, it serves as a reservoir of political leadership.

Like the Hindu trinity, the parliament has to perform the threefold function of creating, preserving and destroying the political leadership of the country. This involves a number of activities and presupposes a number of attributes in the members, individually and collectively. A most important function of parliament is to be efficient in turning out a leader (or leaders) who proves inadequate or falters, becomes tired or worn out. The same must happen when the policies of the leadership prove inadequate or wrong.

Parliament must be relentless in probing the weaknesses of the leadership which is in office and equally of leaders out of office. It must not only expose but also eliminate the weak, the inefficient and the wrong. This negative

function of the parliament is the obverse of its positive function which is to draw from society and to train and sustain a political leadership which is vigorous, efficient and which has a nose for political judgment.

The negative or destructive function of parliament is to provide a continuous and vigorous challenge to the leadership, i.e., to put the Prime Minister and the other Ministers through their paces. This is the sort of challenge that members of parliament present to one another and especially those aspiring to lead the country.

In this respect, the parliament is the arena for political battle in which the weak and the faltering are exposed and turned away, but those possessing the right mettle thrive and are tempered, developing qualities of leadership such as vigour and alertness; for to them the challenge of parliament is a stimulant. Political exercise keeps the leadership in good fettle. The parliament must be so rigorous a taskmaster that those who pass through it successfully would have to fear no greater test elsewhere either inside the country or abroad. The political clash, which it is the purpose of parliament to stage, is a creative act: out of it emerges a vigorous and wise political leadership fit and ready to govern the industrial society with its perpetual tensions and conflicts.

Two further qualities of parliament, essential to this purpose, follow from the foregoing. Firstly, the parliament must attract to itself a large quantity of political talent available in the country (and it must serve to generate and engender the talent). It must offer rewards—psychological, social, economic and political—so that the individual with a talent for politics does not only want to enter the parliament (and finds it possible to do so) but he would wish to continue to devote the major part of his time and energy to parliamentary activities.

This may involve sacrifices for the parliamentarian financially or of family life or of health, but there must be compensations. Any member of parliament, even the politically talented, may have to wait for a long time before gaining office. In some cases, even highly talented individuals might never become ministers nor receive other material rewards. The parliament must, therefore, provide incentives for the ordinary member to stay in it even without expectation of office.

These expectations, however, would not satisfy the ambitious who might be the more valuable in terms of quality for political leadership. For them, there must exist a fair chance of coming into office and thereby testing their abilities. Relatively frequent changes in minis-

terships are necessary to keep a parliament vigorous and alert. A ministerial team which stays in office too long will become stale and, what is worse, it will spread a feeling of frustration, of lack of hope and purpose among ordinary members. Similarly, alternation of the parties occupying office is conducive to a vigorous parliamentary life: no party except a splinter group should be condemned to remain in opposition too long.

The tempo of change of industrial society is such that any leadership is likely to be used up rapidly. The more efficient and successful a leadership, the more rapidly it may outlive its usefulness. Hence, it is necessary that the parliament should be able to bring about frequent changes in the composition of the ministries. But it can do so only if alternative leadership is plentiful within its ranks. An abundance of political talent forms the very heart of the parliamentary system of government. If parliament contains only one set of leaders capable of holding the reigns of government effectively, then it will not serve its purpose: it will be a parliament in name only.

Paucity of political talent in the country is fatal to the parliamentary system, but political talent is not a fixed quantity. It may be increased and developed. A vital function of the parliament is to breed political leadership in the nation and to draw it to itself. Political parties are a means to this end. The parliament should have available within its ranks several alternative sets of leadership; it should be an ample reservoir and an active training ground.

Parliament must be the political mirror of society and, nowadays, of the world. Significant viewpoints on any issue should find expression in it as also the feelings and, indeed, the passions of the people. Nor by mischance should the wisdom of the society be excluded. Parliament is symbolic of diversities in, and of cohesion of, society; it reflects the feelings, anxieties and passions of the people as well as their collective wisdom and sense of justice.

Indeed, the parliament dramatises, sometimes accentuates, the conflicts that beset society. It draws out deep-lying tensions or resentments and brings them into the open. Parliamentary proceedings provide each party a full hearing—its day at the court, as it were, and in the end brings satisfaction to the contending parties to no small extent through the full airing of their views.

The immunities of parliament enable members to raise and to discuss issues and problems with an openness which is impossible elsewhere. This freedom must be used with vigour. Parliamen-

tary conventions and rules of procedure enable a dramatic re-enactment of actual or potential conflicts in society. The articulation of tension and hostility is facilitated within the limits of overall friendliness and mutual courtesy among the members. In this respect, parliament is like a dramatic company in that the roles are not taken literally but are acted out by members. The roles are not carried over into personal lives; the parliamentary role or the parliamentary personality is kept separate from the individual.

But parliament does not act out a script written by someone else; it writes out its own or extemporises as it goes along. Creative 'acting' enhances the symbolic quality of the proceedings. Traditions act as a strong moulding force in parliaments which are well-established; the types of characters to be played or the situations to be enacted are mostly inherited, although every new body of members will want an area of creative freedom.

The industrial society is dynamic, crisis-ridden. One may call it the crisis society. India is now undergoing transformation from the relatively static life of an agrarian society. The crises we experience are not merely those of transition but will be built into the new order. The conflicts and tension we witness today provide a foretaste of the upheavals to come. But as society generally, and particularly the political and economic leaders, adjust to new conditions, acquire the skill to master new problems, learning to ride the storms and turn conflicts to good account, a new security and stability could be attained which may be deeper than anything the present or the past had to show.

This dynamic security lies in the distant future, where success will rest upon the approach to the emergent problems and tensions as well as on the ability to exploit the potentialities of the new situations. During the current period of transition from the agrarian to the industrial order, one is often helpless. The leadership has not gained experience in handling conflicts, far less in anticipating them; it cannot grasp the magnitude of problems awaiting solution. Hence it lacks the means to tackle difficulties as they arise. We are not concerned here to analyse in detail the nature of existing and emerging crises which have been discussed in preceding issues of this journal. Suffice it for us to mention two characteristics.

First: industrial society is as a stormy sea, turning and tossing restlessly. Every now and then a typhoon sweeps across the waters or an upheaval deep down shatters the surface. The structure of industrial society is mobile, at times

explosive. There can be no permanently dispossessed or repressed strata in such a society. A social revolution is always in progress, at times in a dramatic manner.

'Liberation' of society is accompanied by the liberation of the individual. He repressed impulses or drives are set free progressively and seek fulfilment. This process lies at the root of socio-economic problems and causes much of the visible confusion. But social trends of industrialism are irreversible. One has to build upon, and, indeed, with the new forces. The stability an industrial society will attain is dynamic: its equilibrium shifts perpetually. Stability appears in the midst of rapid change and rests upon it.

This brings us to the other main point of the present socio-economic and political crisis in India. The hankering after the changelessness of agrarian society is a major factor in the inability to meet the challenge of the transition period. Not only the general mass of people but intellectual, business and political leaders believe that disturbances during the transition period are also transitory, mere lapses from normalcy. One yearns to return to the quiet and the unchanging peace of agrarian society; therefore one deals with disturbances in an *ad hoc* manner; one hopes of each crisis that it would be the last. A faith attuned to the past has to suffer many hard knocks before it becomes reoriented to the realities of the present and the emergent future.

We have to assess the potentiality of the parliament of India to deliver the leadership, which the emerging situation calls for urgently. More concretely, the questions are whether our parliament attracts to itself a large body of potential political leaders and, simultaneously, whether it takes pains to engender political talent in the country? Does the parliament of India provide the testing ground, the political arena, where political leadership may win its spurs? Is it relentless in putting ministers to the test, exposing the weak and helping to eliminate them but sustaining the strong and correct among them? Is our parliament a political mirror, a living symbol of the people which fully reflects their conflicts, tensions, anxieties? Does it set the stage for dramatic confrontation of significant points of view on the issues facing the country?

In this essay it was our purpose to formulate these questions but not attempt to answer to them. And the final question is this: is our parliament aware of its suitability in providing leadership to the rapidly-emerging and new India, which bears many dangers but is laden also with some hope.

Pattern of membership

SURINDAR SURI

THE parliament, although in its third incarnation, is only seventeen years old. The first Lok Sabha, elected in 1952, was without precedent: it was the first one to be elected on the basis of universal adult suffrage. Inevitably, however, it reflected the socio-economic structure of the population more closely than the older legislatures, which were based on limited franchise. But it is notorious that even the most democratic parliaments do not reflect all the

characteristics of the populations which they represent.

To begin with, there is difference in age distribution. Members of parliament are older than the population as a whole because the lower age groups are excluded from seeking election. Moreover, women are almost everywhere seriously under-represented. But other characteristics distinguish the representatives from the electorate. Everywhere, members of

TABLE I
Education of M.P.s in Provisional Parliament and First, Second and Third Lok Sabha

Level of Education	Provisional Parliament		First Lok Sabha		Second Lok Sabha		Third Lok Sabha	
	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%
Foreign Educated	39	12	45	9	46	11	52	9
Graduated in India	171	55	246	49	202	52	261	51
Undergraduate Education	35	11	66	14	35	9	71	14
Matriculation	23	7	60	13	50	12	54	10
Less than Matriculation	12	4	15	2	30	8	55	10
Religious or Vernacular	11	4	16	3	13	3	28	5
Privately Educated	9	3	8	1	15	4	6	1
No Information	13	4	43	9	6	1	—	—
Total	313	100	499	100	100		100	

parliament are better educated and belong to higher social and economic strata than does the population. Hence, we cannot expect that the parliament in India would ever attain a mechanical reflection of the socio-cultural characteristics of the people.

Looking at the changes which have taken place from the time of the provisional parliament to the third Lok Sabha, we are struck by the decline in levels of education and economic attainment (Table 1). The foreign educated formed twelve per cent of the total membership of the provisional parliament, but their proportion declined consistently and in the present parliament they form no more than nine per cent; yet this change is somewhat deceptive because the absolute number of the foreign educated has increased from thirty-nine in the provisional parliament to fifty-two in the present one.

Similarly, the proportion of under-matriculいたes was four per cent in the provisional parliament but it has gone on increasing and it is now ten per cent. The increase in absolute numbers is even more striking, having gone up from twelve at the earlier period to fifty-five at present. It is not easy to assess the political significance of this numerical change. To begin with, the present situation is not

necessarily as bad as the figures would show. The number of those who received graduate education has gone up in absolute terms and, compared to the first parliament, also proportionately.

The situation is that the absolute numbers of the better educated and of the lesser educated have both increased, so the parliament has become better educated and worse educated at the same time. The question is whether the former are able to exert greater influence than the latter. We cannot entirely ignore the fact that, in any parliament, the number of active members is small: in India, the number has been estimated variously at between fifty and a hundred, excluding the ministers.

This circumstance has remained unchanged over the years. Members of the House of Commons also emphasized this point as much as their Indian colleagues, although the British were somewhat less concerned about it. They acknowledged readily that the British Parliament functioned smoothly because over eighty per cent of the members did not exercise their right to participate actively in the proceedings. In India, also, a great number of parliamentarians willingly surrender their right to speak, en-

abling the small and active elite to contribute to the proceedings.

Looked at from this point of view, the increase in the relative proportion of the less educated is not so disquieting but, besides participation in parliamentary proceedings, there are other considerations to be taken into account. Each member is expected to look after his constituency. He receives complaints and petitions from his constituents which he must press upon the government in order to secure redress.

It is obvious that the less educated member might not be very effective in promoting the interests of his constituency. Moreover, the important point is not merely that brilliant members should talk in the house; it is equally necessary that they should have a perceptive audience and it is here that the decline in educational standards would tend to pull down the level of the parliament as a whole. Yet the degree of change may not be drastic, for the Lok Sabha has maintained the proportion of at least sixty per cent who have obtained a university degree.

The fears expressed at one time of the deleterious result of introducing universal franchise in a largely illiterate society have proved unfounded. Yet the intellectual distance between parlia-

mentarians and the masses is not wholesome. For, members of parliament address not only themselves but the people. The tendency in parliament is for the elite to try to impress its own peers and to neglect those who are unable to follow its language and thinking. Perhaps a larger proportion of less educated members forces ministers and others to talk in a language which the people could understand. It is this that makes a parliament effective as a representative organ.

The shift in distribution of members' occupation follows a similar trend (Table II). The striking feature has been the growth in the proportion of agriculturists from six per cent in the provisional parliament to twenty-five per cent in the second Lok Sabha and to a somewhat lower figure of twenty-two per cent in the third Lok Sabha. The agriculturists were seriously under-represented in the past; even today their numbers are not commensurate with their numerical preponderance in the population.

To some extent, the figures are deceptive. Occupations in India are not sharply separated, so that even those who pursue commerce

and industry or practice law are likely to be connected with agriculture. Nevertheless, the agricultural occupation has now obtained a sufficiently strong representation in the parliament to ensure that its interests do not suffer by default. It is difficult to assess whether the marginal decline of two per cent in the proportion of agriculturists in the third Lok Sabha compared to the second is of much significance, but it may be noted that the proportion of members engaged in commerce and industry has gone up over the years. It was eight per cent in the provisional and has risen to twelve per cent in the present one.

Although the figures involved are small and it is difficult to judge how much it is a matter of electoral luck and how much a permanent trend, the figure is of significance when read in conjunction with economic and social change in the country. Business is growing; business interests are growing more powerful. It stands to reason, therefore, that their representation in the parliament should increase.

More surprising is the continuing decline in the absolute number and proportion of lawyers in the

parliament. They formed a third of the membership of the provisional parliament, but the proportion has now slipped to less than one fifth. Not only lawyers but other professional groups have suffered a numerical decline. For example, journalists have slipped from eleven per cent in the provisional parliament and eight per cent in the first Lok Sabha to a mere four per cent today. The proportion of teachers has decreased by half in the same period, but the trend is not difficult to explain.

The parliament is increasingly a collection of different interests, especially economic interests. Lawyers particularly, but professional individuals generally, often do not represent any specific economic interest directly. In so far as the parliament is becoming more representative, the professional individuals find that they have a diminishing role to play. What is important is that the professionals, especially the lawyers, will continue to exert a significant influence in the foreseeable future. We have noted that the proportion of professionals in the parliament has been declining; but their role among the active members and as

TABLE II

Occupation of Members in First, Second and Third Lok Sabha

Occupation	Provisional Parliament		First Lok Sabha		Second Lok Sabha		Third Lok Sabha	
	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%
Agriculture	20	6	93	19	121	25	110	22
Commerce and Industry	25	8	49	10	52	11	63	13
Law	100	32	127	25	110	23	99	20
Journalism	33	11	38	8	20	4	20	4
Teaching	26	8	34	7	20	4	20	4
Government Service	16	5	10	2	6	1	18	3
Social Work	44	14	85	16	131	27	146	29
Other Professions	16	5	24	5	5	1	26	4
No Information	33	11	39	8	19	4	8	1
Total	313	100	499	100	484	100	510	100

Table III.
Age Distribution of Members of Provisional Parliament and of
First, Second and Third Lok Sabha

Age Group	Provisional Parliament		First Lok Sabha		Second Lok Sabha		Third Lok Sabha	
	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%
Under 30	6	2	28	6	13	3	12	2
30 to 39	54	18	112	25	151	31	99	20
40 to 49	96	34	142	31	135	28	158	30
50 to 59	76	26	140	30	146	29	147	29
60 to 69	50	17	39	8	37	8	85	17
Over 70	8	3	1	—	4	1	8	2
Total (known)	290	100	462	100	486	100	509	100
No Information	23	—	32	—	19	—	—	—
Total Membership	313		494		505		509	

members of government remains high.

In other words, while the trend is towards increasing representation of economic interests, it is unlikely that the professionals will ever be eliminated for they are indispensable as spokesmen of other interest groups. To be sure, constitutional issues and legal matters have receded in importance: the heyday of the great legal brains who shone in parliamentary debates is over. The younger lawyers, who are beginning to make a mark in the parliament, distinguish themselves by their knowledge of concrete economic and social problems, rather than by sheer brilliance of advocacy.

The agriculturists are not playing a role anywhere nearly commensurate with their numerical strength. They act as a veto group. In fact, the importance of the different professional and occupational groups lies not so much in their own special fields as in areas outside their own. Agriculturists in parliament are important for what they say and do about general economic and social policy. The driving force of socialism in the parliament, stems from the agriculturists because they are critical of the growth of free enterprise in commerce and industry. The agriculturists are likely to be joined in this attitude by members representing the professions.

Similarly, the drive for land reform comes from business interests supported by the professionals. Members belonging to legal or other professions act as mediators because their own material interests are not involved directly in the big policy issues which are debated in parliament.

The most elusive group is that of the social workers. Members of this group are generally without a definable occupation but professional politicians mostly belong to it. Not having any particular interest to represent, they are susceptible to appeals to idealism and many of them lead contending factions within the parties and sometimes cutting across them; their manoeuvres engage members of parliament most of the time. They act as cement, uniting different interests and factions.

The social workers generate the political dynamics of the Congress Party and of the parliament as a whole. They hold the balance of power on many issues. The comparison of the occupational distribution of members in succeeding parliaments indicates that a certain stability has been attained. The great change followed the first general election based on universal suffrage in 1952. Since then, the change has been gradual, yet there is no stagnation. No sudden shift would seem to be impending, but gradual change will continue,

especially the number of representatives of commerce and industry will undoubtedly grow. Engineers and scientists have yet to make something more than a token appearance on the parliamentary stage. Even economists, as distinct from businessmen, are conspicuously missing. The parliament, a fair mirror of the society, is not a harbinger of the future which, even in India, belongs to science, technology and economics.

The parliament is aging. The proportion of members less than fifty years of age amounted to sixty-three per cent in the first Lok Sabha, but it has decreased to fifty-three per cent today (Table III). On the other hand, the proportion of those more than sixty years of age, which was only eight per cent in 1952, has now increased to nineteen per cent (which is almost what it was in the provisional parliament). The middle group of members in their fifties has remained relatively constant. The strength of this group was thirty per cent in 1952; it is twenty-nine per cent in the present parliament.

The centre of gravity in terms of age has moved upwards, and the shift has taken place in the face of a great upturn in membership. At each election more than one half of the members are replaced, yet this does not affect members in the upper age group so much as the younger ones. The

largest number of youngsters under thirty years entered the parliament in 1952 and their number has been going down in the succeeding parliaments. Even those belonging to the next higher age group, namely those between thirty and thirty-four years, have become less numerous.

The age distribution has flattened out in the middle. Even though the extremes of youth and old age remain weak, no age group is dominant now. In the first Lok Sabha, members in their fifties constituted one third of the total. In the second Lok Sabha, this distinction passed to members in their thirties. But the present Lok Sabha has no single dominant age group. Members between forty and fifty-four form the high plateau without a peak. The number of members who were more than seventy years of age increased from one in 1952 to four in 1957 and to eight in 1962.

Similarly, the number of those between fifty-five and sixty-nine years of age grew from ten in the first Lok Sabha to twelve in the second and to twenty-four in the third. Members in their early sixties multiplied even faster—from twenty-nine in 1952 to sixty-one in 1962. The aging of parliament should be a sign of growing conservatism. But the younger gene-

ration in India is not more radical than its elders.

Table III a, gives a comparison of the distribution of age groups in the population as a whole and in the third Lok Sabha. The most striking aspect is, of course, that virtually 60 per cent of the population, namely all those under twenty-five years of age, is excluded from the active franchise (namely, the right to stand for election). Only 40 per cent of the population is entitled to direct representation in the parliament. But this is not all. The age group 25 to 29 is under-represented in parliament, where its strength is only one fourth of its proportion in the population. The next age group, 30 to 34, is represented in the parliament in almost the same proportion as in the population. From then on the parliamentary representation is greater than the proportion in the population, until we reach the septuagenarians, whose strength in parliament corresponds approximately to their proportion in the country.

If we exclude the people under 25 from the calculation of age groups, the figures we obtain are those in Table III b. The percentage points give the proportion of the age groups in the population of those 25 years of age or older. This is the universe which the Lok Sabha reflects. We find that the

age group 25 to 29, which makes up 19.5 of this universe, is represented to only 10 of its strength in the parliament. The next two age groups are also under-represented, although to a diminishing extent. Over-representation begins with the population in its forties and older.

The strange thing about the population structure of India is that it is a pure pyramid: the largest number and highest proportion is that of the recently born; the size of the age group decreases as we ascend. The distribution of the age groups in the parliament does not follow this pattern: it has a 'normal' distribution of the bell-shaped curve. The largest quinquennial group in parliament is that of 40 to 44 year olds. There is a rough plateau until 50 to 59 year olds. 65 years is apparently the outer limit of the plateau. Thence there is a sharp fall in the higher age group. The active parliamentary age span is 35 to 65 years, with two peaks at 40-44 and 50-54. The survival rate of the M.P.s compared to the population at large is higher until the 69th year; then it is significantly lower.

The most dramatic change in the structure of parliament is in the accumulation of legislative experience. In the provisional parliament, two thirds of the members

TABLE III A
Age Distribution in Total Population (1961) and Third Lok Sabha (1962)
(In Percentage)

Age Group	Upto 24	25-29	30-34	35-39	40-44	45-49	50-54	55-59	60-64	65-69	Over 70	Total
Percentage in Total Populace	59.6	7.8	6.9	5.9	4.9	4.1	3.4	2.6	1.9	1.3	1.6	100
Percentage in Third Lok Sabha	—	2.0	7.1	11.5	16.5	14.3	15.5	14.3	12.5	4.7	1.7	100

TABLE III B
Age Distribution of 25 years old and older Population (1961) and of Third Lok Sabha (1962)
(In Percentage)

Age Group	25-29	30-34	35-39	40-44	45-49	50-54	55-59	60-64	65-69	Over 70	Total
Percentage in Total Populace	19.5	17.0	14.5	12.0	10.0	8.5	6.5	4.7	3.2	4.0	100
Percentage in Third Lok Sabha	2.0	7.1	11.6	16.7	14.1	15.7	14.3	12.7	4.8	1.8	100

TABLE IV
Prior Legislative Experience of Members of Provisional Parliament and First, Second and Third Lok Sabha

Prior Membership in	Provisional Parliament (1950-51)		First Lok Sabha (1952-57)		Second Lok Sabha (1957-62)		Third Lok Sabha (1962-67)	
	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%
Central Legislative Assembly (pre-1946)	39	13	18	4	15	3	16	2
Constituent Assembly and Provisional Parliament	—	—	108	22	125	25	85	17
State Legislatures	82	26	124	25	145	35	182	34
First Lok Sabha	—	—	—	—	205	41	132	26
Second Lok Sabha	—	—	—	—	—	—	207	41
Rajya Sabha	—	—	—	—	15	3	23	5
None	207	66	280	56	134	27	60	12

had no prior legislative experience (Table IV). They were necessarily parliamentary virgins because the total number of members increased and general election based on universal adult franchise took place for the first time in 1952.

Thus, the vast majority of members were newcomers to parliament. This enabled the few experienced members to dominate the proceedings, leaving behind the impression that the standard of debate in the provisional parliament was much higher than in those that followed it. The picture was not much different in the first Lok Sabha: fifty-six per cent of its members were inexperienced as legislators.

But the pattern had already started to shift. Whereas thirty-nine members of the provisional parliament had experience in the central legislative assembly prior to independence, their number decreased to eighteen two years later when the first Lok Sabha was elected. Proportionately speaking, however, the first Lok Sabha had less legislative experience at its command than the provisional parliament: in addition to 56 per cent with no prior legislative experience, twenty-two per cent of its members had only limited

experience as members of the constituent assembly and the provisional parliament.

But, the accumulation of legislative experience is reflected dramatically in the steep decline of members who come to parliament without any previous legislative experience. From sixty-six per cent in 1950, this proportion declined to fifty-six per cent in 1952 and dipped to twenty-seven per cent in 1957. Finally, the proportion of absolute newcomers to parliamentary activity has sunk to a mere twelve per cent in the present parliament.

Interestingly, the number of those graduating to the parliament from state legislatures has increased. It was twenty-six per cent in the provisional parliament, growing to thirty-five per cent in the second Lok Sabha and thirty-four per cent in the present one. The proportion of those who survive from the preceding parliament has kept steady at forty-one per cent while the number of those descending from the upper house indicates a small, but healthy, increase.

The accumulation of legislative experience is the most significant factor in the strengthening of

parliamentary democracy. A corresponding growth of the members' self confidence is evident in interviews over the past four years. Parliamentarians' self confidence is not measurable, although few members from whatever political party in the present parliament expressed a doubt on the suitability of parliamentary institutions to Indian conditions. A characteristic answer given by members to this question was: 'What other choice do we have!'

This does not necessarily express a profound personal commitment to parliamentary institutions. However, politics is the art of the possible. The strength of the politicians in India lies in recognizing that only parliament is possible: it is perhaps the most significant fact of Indian politics since attaining independence. Initially, there was uncertainty as to the political institution suited to Indian conditions, character and aspirations. The debate on the formulation of the constitution indicated that parliament was considered an alien plant. There were serious doubts whether it would prosper in India.

These doubts have now largely been dissipated. There is no alter-

native to the parliament even though there is as yet no certainty that it will 'deliver the goods'. Parliament is still young and relatively inexperienced even though its political position is unchallenged and the members are devoted to it. Leadership is needed to develop it into an effective instrument of government.

Nehru provided leadership and the parliament may be said to have grown up in his shadow. His death removed not only the most effective political leader in the country but, more important, it deprived the parliament of its major defender and teacher. Even the parliament does not grow by itself. Its development is dependent on many factors, some of which are external, e.g., public attitude toward it and the treatment given to it in the press. But we are concerned with factors that are internal to the parliament.

Responsibility

It is a reason for concern that members are treated in certain matters as if they were not fully responsible. Some years ago the secretariat produced a brochure on the pay and privileges enjoyed by members of parliament in different countries. But the brochure was not made available to M.P.s in India on the ground that it might provoke them to demand for themselves the same privileges as those enjoyed by their counterparts in other countries.

Similarly, a study of the treatment of matters relating to defence in the House of Commons was withheld from members of the Lok Sabha for fear that it might create dissatisfaction among them about the manner in which defence questions were debated in India. Clearly, if members are not to be trusted to act responsibly in such matters one cannot expect that they would master the vastly serious issues of domestic and foreign affairs. If people are not trusted, they tend to be irresponsible.

Back bench opinion in India is not organized. Yet, the essence

of parliamentary government is the activity of back benchers. India lacks back bench leadership; therefore, a kind of parliamentary oligarchy tends to develop. This pattern must change if the parliamentary system is not to wither away. The process of activation must generate inside the parliament, whose natural leader is the speaker. But the secretariat has an equally important responsibility. If the secretariat came to consider itself alienated from the parliament, as if it were defending the interests of the country against members of parliament, an unhealthy situation would develop.

Government's and bureaucracy's attitude toward parliament is a reflection of their attitude toward the people. Their misgiving that information provided to members of parliament would automatically reach the public may be justified: after all this is one of the purposes of parliamentary government. Government everywhere tends to be secretive, shrouding its decisions and activities behind a thick veil. The parliament is engaged in cutting through the veil, forcing government to reveal its hand. In India, the parliament is not always insistent enough to reach this goal.

Sense of Purpose

No less important is it to infuse a sense of purpose into the parliamentary life of even the least important members. Today, many members suffer from a sense of purposelessness. They do not know how to make use of the parliamentary machinery. It is worth noting that even in Britain, with its centuries-old tradition of parliamentary government, new members receive instruction from the secretariat staff on matters of procedure and parliamentary activity. Such instruction is all the more essential in India with its relatively brief tradition of parliamentary democracy. Even the staff of the parliament secretariat is not yet well enough versed in procedure and legislative techniques to instruct the members. It is necessary, therefore, that an institution to study parliamentary

activities be created, in order to develop means of communication with its members.

Sleeping Tiger

Some Lok Sabha members described parliament as a 'sleeping tiger' — it awakens to life infrequently but with a voracious hunger. It may be essential for the success of parliamentary institutions that the 'tiger' is not always fully awake, but it should sleep lightly. A parliament constantly raging might disrupt government administration instead of keeping it on its toes. But it must establish convincingly that it is liable to spring into action when necessary. One of the functions of a member of parliament, as pointed out by British M.P.s is to influence a government by supporting it. This probably conveys the essence of parliamentary government. The art consists in giving conditional support and waging a creative opposition.

The parliament in India has grown in maturity. This is proven by the facts and figures we have adduced. But the problems that the parliament must master have also grown more serious. Therefore, the prospect of the success of parliamentary government remains problematic. The weakness now is less of the parliament than of the government. A powerful parliament does not require a weak government, but a strong one.

Today, there is no alternative to parliamentary government visible on the Indian political horizon. This does not mean, however, that parliamentary government must necessarily prosper or even survive. The political situation in India is dynamic. New potentialities emerge and new perspectives may open suddenly, if the drift continues. The parliament today is a good instrument, but it can be effective only if competent leadership knows how to use it, and trains it further in using itself. This presupposes that parliament is treated by its members, by the secretariat, and by the press and public as something more than a diverting showpiece.

Guarantee for the future

K. SANTHANAM

IS the Indian Parliament a true guardian of democracy? Is it a vigilant watch-dog of the Constitution and the fundamental principles embodied therein? Has it conscientiously been shaping Indian economy in accordance with the Directive Principles laid down in the Constitution? Has it been able to ensure good, honest and economical administration? In passing laws, how far has it been able to insist that they are necessary, precise and capable of effective implementation? Have the two Houses functioned smoothly, efficiently and with a minimum waste of time and labour? Is the

Rajya Sabha an effective revising chamber? Finally, has parliament been able to grip the attention and secure the confidence of the Indian people?

These are among the most important aspects of the working of the Indian Parliament which deserve to be carefully considered. Before I proceed to discuss them and point out the successes and failures, I wish to make it clear that, whatever may be the weaknesses and failures of the Indian Parliament, its mere existence is of paramount importance for the freedom and well-being of the country. It has been the trick of

dictators and totalitarian parties to exaggerate the defects and failings of democratic parliaments and delude the people that, if they were superseded by irresponsible autocratic governments, the people would be better off.

Merit of Democracy

Wherever and whenever any people have fallen victims to this malicious propaganda, they have suffered terribly. There is one supreme merit of even the most incompetent democracy which the best dictatorship or the most efficient totalitarian government cannot have. In a democracy, one government can be replaced by another through open, honest and peaceful means which is not possible in any other regime.

Although recently Malenkov, Bulganin and Khrushchov have been replaced in the U.S.S.R. without open violence, it has been through a process of secret conspiracy of which the Russian people were not aware until the replacement had been accomplished. It has also resulted in large-scale dismissals and replacements of officers in key positions. No one can predict when such a conspiratorial method will break out into widespread and violent revolt. It is bound to create an atmosphere of fear and suspicion which will neutralise any good that such a regime may be able to achieve. So, the Indian people must refuse to listen to any proposal which would supersede the Indian Parliament for a personal or party dictatorship.

Three general elections have taken place on the basis of adult franchise and it is a matter of immense gratification that the elections were all free and peaceful. There was no attempt to interfere with the propaganda of the opposition groups and parties or criticism of the government. At times, such criticism was unfair and even malicious. That is the case in all democratic countries. The ruling party in India must be congratulated on its wholehearted acceptance of this basic principle of unfettered criticism. The election machinery, supervised by the Election Commission in India, has

functioned with efficiency and impartiality and it deserves all praise. Thus, the basic mechanism of periodic elections without which there can be no real democracy, is functioning satisfactorily. The proportion of voters taking part in elections has varied considerably from State to State and even within each State. But the average voting has been fairly high.

It must be confessed, however, that the expenditure of parties and candidates has been steadily rising and caste and communal considerations have been playing an increasing part in the selection of candidates and the results of elections. The first is partly due to the spending of hundreds of crores of rupees every year for plan projects. A considerable part of this money has gone into the pockets of contractors, speculators and middle-men. On account of tax evasion, black marketing and other anti-social practices, large sums of unaccounted money are in the possession of these people, who are willing to contribute to the expenditure in elections, hoping that it will help to mitigate the rigours of administrative and legal action against them.

As for the influence of caste and communal feelings, it is an evil which would disappear only with greater education and industrialisation which will bring about the mixing up of castes and communities to a degree that these feelings will cease to count politically.

One of the unfortunate results of the operation of these factors is that the average calibre of a member of the Lok Sabha is not as high as it can be; yet, a large number of able and patriotic men belonging to all parties have been elected and the general level of debate has been comparable to that of other democratic parliaments.

The Congress Party

The overwhelming majority of the Congress Party in parliament has helped to provide stability and continuity to the infant democracy of India. But, it is an essential weakness in our politics. While

considering this issue, it should be remembered that in the 18th and 19th centuries, the Whig or Liberal Party was continually in power for sixty years at first and it was followed by the Conservative Party which retained power for an equally long period. It is only during the last hundred years that there has been more frequent alternation of the ruling party.

The continuance of the Congress Party in power for the last fourteen years is, therefore, neither novel nor anti-democratic. The weakness of the opposition and its division into many groups and parties which show no tendency to coalesce is very disappointing. The Communist Party has become divided into two groups, each bitter against the other. Recently, the PSP was split into two sections, of which one has joined the Congress. The Swatantra Party in Bihar had to be dissolved and numerous defections are taking place in the other States.

As against this, it may be pointed out that the Kerala Ministry was defeated by the dissidents in the Congress Party and the Congress parties in many States are riddled with factions. All these create a great deal of confusion and tend to spread distrust among the people of the parliament itself. This is a pity; but, there is no obvious remedy. We have to trust to time and the rise of new leaders.

Undemocratic Departures

Frequent changes of the Constitution without urgent necessity, the unjustified prolongation of the proclamation of emergency following the Chinese invasion and frequent imposition of Presidential rule in the States indicate that, while the forms of democracy are being observed, the Indian Parliament does not resist undemocratic departures. This is a grave weakness of the Indian Parliament which may, if prolonged, bring the entire system of parliamentary democracy into contempt and disrepute.

By and large, the fundamental rights are intact and the Supreme Court of India has proved itself a

stout defender of those rights. But, they are being slowly eroded both directly and indirectly. So far as property rights are concerned, they have been largely nullified in the interests of land reforms and nationalisation. Shortage and control of distribution of newsprint is affecting indirectly the independence of the press. In the matter of foreign travel, the Indian citizen is practically deprived of the right enjoyed by the citizens of every other country and it has become the privilege of ministers, high officials and favoured businessmen.

This is done apparently for conservation of foreign exchange. But, as the scarcity of foreign exchange is itself the result of government policies, the deprivation of this essential privilege of a free citizen to go abroad for pleasure and instruction cannot but be regretted. The assumption that economic progress as conceived by the ruling party is more important than the elementary privileges which are enjoyed by people of other countries is as false as it is dangerous. In the last analysis, it becomes an argument for totalitarianism.

Poor Administration

It is in the matter of good administration that the record of the last fifteen years is the poorest. It may be argued that it is due to inexperienced ministers, the sudden withdrawal of higher and senior administrative personnel on transfer of power and the need for hasty recruitment of a large number of officers at various levels to fill that gap. These are undoubtedly some of the causes; but, I think, the most important cause for this deterioration is the hasty extension of governmental functions in an anxiety to usher in the welfare State as fast as possible. The parliament must take full responsibility for this extension and introduction of innumerable controls, licenses and permits which have brought about almost an administrative chaos, leading to delay, inefficiency and corruption.

Even now, there are periodical demands in parliament for na-

tionalisation of banking, general insurance and the extension of the public sector to cover numerous fields of industry and trade. Side by side with this demand for extension of governmental functions there have been bitter public complaints and denunciations from all sections of parliament including the ruling party against bad administration. This mental schizophrenia is at the root of many of our national troubles.

Quality of Legislation

In a modern State, particularly one aiming to march towards democratic socialism, a great deal of legislation is unavoidable. In terms of quantity, the Indian Parliament can boast of as much legislation as any other democratic parliament. But, if one enquires about the quality of legislation, the manner in which Bills are scrutinised in parliament and the level of debates, it has to be confessed that matters require a great deal of improvement.

There can be no doubt that the quality of legislation was much superior in the old Indian Legislative Assembly. Though it was an irresponsible House and legislation was in the hands of Executive Councillors who were appointed by the Secretary of State for India, they had a wholesome respect for legislation and there was thorough preparation before Bills were introduced. After such introduction, there was good discussion and all points made by the opposition were carefully considered. Often, the Bills were radically amended to get the support of the opposition.

Unfortunately, in the present parliament, Bills are brought in hastily, often the ministers themselves do not study them carefully and merely read from the notes prepared by the secretariat; opposition criticisms and suggestions are ignored and even constructive amendments from members of the ruling party are not given fair consideration. As a result, almost every Act requires to be amended frequently.

The Constituent Assembly expected that the Rajya Sabha would

be an effective chamber, somewhere between the Senate of the U.S.A. and the House of Lords of the U.K. Unfortunately, it has been more and more approximating to the House of Lords except for the difference that there are no hereditary peers. The members are generally party nominees, the State legislatures having little voice. It is true that some senior and experienced politicians get elected and the general level of debate is, perhaps, superior to that of the Lok Sabha. But the Rajya Sabha is being reduced to impotence and insignificance by the way in which it has been forced to function.

Bills passed by the Lok Sabha are taken up immediately and rushed through the Rajya Sabha in a few hours. It has not been allowed to function as a true revising chamber. If it has to perform this function, there should be a convention that not less than fifteen days should lapse before the passing of the Bill by the Lok Sabha and its consideration by the Rajya Sabha. In practice, this will amount to the consideration of all legislation by the two Houses in two successive sessions. This will ensure proper scrutiny and the Rajya Sabha will be able to suggest amendments in the light of public criticism.

Discussions of foreign policy and other matters by both the Houses in the same session involve a meaningless repetition of the same arguments and points of view both of the government spokesman and the opposition members. A convention that when a report or a problem has been discussed in one House, it should not be discussed by the other in the same session will make for economy of time and better appreciation by the public. As changes would have occurred between two sessions, discussion of the same problem in the other House during the next session will have more value and enable the government to bring its policies up-to-date.

Rajya Sabha Nominations

Above all, the members of every party in the State legislatures

should consider it their duty and privilege to have a voice in the selection of members to the Rajya Sabha. Nomination by the party chiefs is quite contrary to the spirit of the Constitution; it reduces indirect election by the State Assembly to nepotism and personal favouritism.

This article will become too long if I were to deal with the role of the Indian Parliament in regard to the economic policy pursued by the Government of India. It is enough to say that its part has been mainly one of abject submission to the confused and often contradictory policies. Though planning had the general approval of the ruling party, as also of the opposition parties except the Swatantra, there was no enthusiasm for the actual plans. The part taken by the Members of Parliament in mobilising public opinion for the plans has been negligible.

The State legislatures have practically sabotaged the land reforms and this has had the approval of a considerable proportion of Members of Parliament! The fact is that the present party affiliations have no clear economic basis. In the ruling party itself, successive ministers of Food, Industry and Education have been able to put forward and implement different policies without any opposition from their party in parliament.

Owing to the various defects and limitations mentioned above, the Indian Parliament has not yet been able to obtain the active and enthusiastic support of the people. As the proceedings have been given plenty of space in the newspapers, there has been no lack of publicity; but the intelligentsia has been highly critical and the masses rather indifferent. Thus, it will be seen that the Indian Parliament is yet far from being the true voice of the Indian people or an effective guardian of their interests. But, as I have said at the beginning, in spite of its defects, its mere existence is an invaluable guarantee of true democracy and good government in the future.

Is it adequate?

TRIDIB CHAUDHURI

ANY discussion of the role of the parliament in India as the central institution of Indian democracy and its relevance to the problems of our transitional society, which takes an abstract archetype of a smoothly functioning parliamentary democratic system as the norm, invariably conceals a very large element of wishful political thinking tending to take the 'rational' for the 'real'. The usual practice in any such discussions in our country is to select the 'mother of Parliaments', viz., the British Parliament, and its adjunct, the British party system as the model. This is but natural because in India the political intelligentsia of the immediately previous generation, from whom most of our constitution-makers came, were not only nurtured on the lore of British parliamentary traditions, but sought deliberately to fashion our political system on the British pattern. Unfortunately, it did not occur to them at any time adequately to size up the inherent his-

toric and institutional limitations of the British type of parliamentary government. Nor had they any inkling of the practical obstacles against which it could come up in the concrete historical and political set-up of a country like India.

Placed as they were in their times, always smarting under the dead weight of an alien bureaucratic rule which was seldom responsive to national public opinion in the country, a system of responsible parliamentary government—where elected representatives of the people could at will change the government of the day, where every government had to warily watch out for the wishes of the parliament and the parties represented there, lest they lose the confidence of the majority, and where the party in power could be dislodged from its positions any day by its rival or rivals no sooner it lost the support of the majority—seemed to them to be the acme of political freedom.

The Great Chance

Through the system of representative government and elective parliaments and the rule of ministerial responsibility, they thought, it was really the supremacy of the people—the nation at large—which was established in the last resort. If this could be achieved in India little else would be needed by way of political freedom and to get the country started on the path of independent national development.

When, therefore, the historic chance came—a chance for which they fought and waited so long—and it was given to them to frame the constitution for the governance of their own country, they were inevitably led to the conclusion that nothing could be better for India than to introduce here the identical system of parliamentary government as it obtained in Great Britain. It was readily assumed, once the system as such would be written into the fundamental law of the land in the shape of a constitution, everything else which ensured its success in Great Britain and such other countries would also follow

automatically without any great hitch.

Suitable Leadership

The only thing that would be needed was to find the right type of leadership to run the show, skilful parliamentarians who could put forth their views across the floor with force and persuasiveness and with the required tact and acumen for managing an ever alert and watchful assembly, to head the parties represented in the parliament and to take their turn in due course for assuming charge of the country's government with the sanction of the majority there. Some time may have to be allowed for that—they may have imagined.

But there was no real cause for worry. For already the country had a large reservoir of experienced leaders of the required sort who had proved their mettle in the central and provincial legislatures in the British days and led the governments of large provinces under provincial autonomy. There was, therefore, no cause for undue alarm or apprehension for the future. As things settled down and the country got started on the political tracks laid down in the Constitution, new generations of leaders would be sure to come up and take charge as they have done in Great Britain and other democratic countries.

It was not sufficiently appreciated at the time that it was easier to draft the constitution of a country on the pattern of another than to reproduce or transplant the wider socio-economic and political set-up which ensures the success of that particular constitutional and political pattern from one country to another. What was overlooked in our wonted preference for a parliamentary democratic government of the British type—in which the national parliament would be the repository of all political power and policy-making, as well as the central arena in which, and through which, national political leadership would find power and the fulfilment of its purposive role in steering the ship of the State,—that successful instances of the working of a political system of this type were

found in a rather limited number of countries even in the western continents.

All these countries without exception were advanced industrial societies based on private property and the modern system of exchange economy with everything else that these two things connote. In other words, they were developed bourgeois societies with an advanced industrial base and social structure attuned to it. The ethos of personal and social life and the accepted notions of rights and freedoms with corresponding duties and obligations in such societies go a long way to contribute to the success and smooth working of the parliamentary democratic system of government, *provided* the internal social and class conflicts generated by industrial economy and the prevailing private property relations do not upset the existing social and political equilibrium attained by them.

It is worth noting in this context that in the western countries, outside Great Britain and the older British Commonwealth countries like Canada, Australia, New Zealand, etc., parliamentary democracy can be said to have functioned with any measurable degree of success only in the three Scandinavian countries of Sweden, Norway and Denmark and the smaller West European countries like the Netherlands and Belgium. It has also functioned with some success, although with an uneven periodicity, (of course leaving out of count the fascist years under Mussolini) in Italy.

Unsuccessful Experiments

Nobody would perhaps claim the phase under the Third Republic in France prior to the last war, or that under the post-war Fourth Republic, or else the phase of the Weimar Republic in Germany before the advent of Hitler and Nazism as successful experiments in the working of parliamentary democracy as we understand it. It is well-known that the Weimar Republic in Germany really paved the way for the rise of Hitler, while in our times the Fourth Republic has produced the Bonapartism of De Gaulle. We do not

know as yet how the present parliamentary system in the Federal Republic of West Germany would fare if the political pressures which have been generated by the artificial division of the country are allowed to work themselves out in an uninhibited fashion.

The presidential system of democracy based on the concept of separation of powers, as it functions in the United States, may be taken as a variant of parliamentary democracy in another form. But, the way it has functioned in every American country outside of the United States (and even there) would hardly allow one to ascribe to the American variant of democracy the virtues and political potentiality (of evoking and drawing out into the open the country's latent talent for political leadership) which we tend to associate with the archetypal pattern or ideal pattern of the democratic parliamentary government of our mental image.

The Limitations

It is felt necessary to draw pointed attention here to these limitations set by history, geography and the social set-up, upon the political experiment of the British pattern of parliamentary democracy, not so much in order to question or to repudiate the appositeness of the system as introduced in India. Nor is it intended in any way to lay the basis for the thesis that parliamentary democracy is unsuited to the traditions and political genius of the Indian people or, for that matter, of the Asian peoples.

The introduction of parliamentary democracy in India has been in every respect a political experiment worth trying and an historically significant experiment at that. But in order not to lose an objective historical perspective and not to see in the parliament and the parliamentary system as we have adopted it in our country, the panacea for all the crises and social stresses and strains which would inevitably come in our way in the present stage of the country's development and in our efforts to raise it from a nearly pre-capitalist and pre-industrial

age to the modern technological and nuclear age, we would do well to remember that the political possibility of parliaments and parliamentary democracies have very well-defined limits.

It is only in the context of specific historic and social circumstances that they can play a creative and dynamic role in evoking the right type of political leadership for a country and in canalising and moulding the political urges of its people. If that particular context does not exist, the national parliament by itself, howsoever democratic its constitution may be and howsoever much free play for party and political talents it may afford, would be incapable of playing that role. It goes without saying that it will not be possible for the parliament in that case to confront success in any measure or provide any political solution to the emergent crises and strains with which the social situation might confront it inevitably, especially in a country like India.

There is hardly any necessity or any rational basis for introducing an element of racial mystique in a discussion of the relevance of parliamentary democracy and the party system in India or for that matter of that in any other country in terms of 'Asian' or 'Western' democracy. It is true that in many Asian countries the introduction of the parliamentary system has been still-born. But we have seen above that a majority of the so-called 'western' countries have found the parliamentary system wanting and have sought to find political fulfilment in other kinds of political dispensation.

Suitability to Socialism

It is also pertinent to remember here—especially in the context of the declared national goal of socialism in India—that of the professedly socialist countries of our day all, without exception, have rejected parliamentary democracy and the party system. It may be contended that this is true only in regard to communist countries, and the socialism in which we have proclaimed our faith is not the totalitarian communist brand of socialism, but democratic socialism

which is conditional upon the preservation and maintenance of parliamentary democratic institutions and a freely functioning party system within the framework of parliamentary democracy.

That is correct so far as it goes. The principal point to note here, however, lies not in the contrast between the variety of socialism which we have chosen for ourselves in this country and its intimate relationship with parliamentary democracy, but in the fact that many countries belonging both to the West and also to Asia and seeking to build up a socialist form of society have realised their socialism under a political system which is totally different from and alien to that of parliamentary democracy. The failure of the parliamentary system in some of our neighbouring Asian countries has nothing mysterious and unchangeably 'Asian' about it, just as the failure of democracy in Germany in the Weimar regime or under the Fourth Republic in France had nothing specifically mysterious and Teutonic or Gaulic or Latin.

Meeting the Challenges

In discussing the role of the parliament in India and the possibility that lies before it for successfully meeting the challenge of social crises and imbalances to be inevitable thrown up in the process of gigantic social and economic transformations which are already under way, by providing a forceful, judicious and imaginative leadership in the political sphere, we have to look less for any incompatibility of parliamentary democracy with Asian character and traditions. What we have really to search for are the limits to the political potentiality of the system which we have chosen for ourselves. We have then to judge for ourselves whether the system as it is would at all be adequate to meet the challenge of the emerging social situation and the stresses and strains which are accumulating.

We have often tended to overlook the fact that parliamentary democracy in this country uptil now has been nothing but a super-

imposition from the top of the system of an elective parliament and cabinet government upon the same colonial-bureaucratic administrative machine which was left behind in this country by its former British rulers. In the British days, this huge and top-heavy administrative machinery (it has proliferated many times more now and, if anything, has become much more top-heavy) was wielded by the Secretary of State for India acting for the British Cabinet and, in the last resort, by the British Parliament.

The only significant change is that instead of the British Parliament, it is now the Indian Cabinet and in the last resort the Indian Parliament elected by the people of India, which controls this vast machinery. There is no necessity here for our present purpose to minimise in any way the profound historic and national significance of this changeover.

The question we should ask ourselves in the context of our present discussion is—how far can we expect this hybrid system to endure under the impact of the crisis and conflicts we envisage? A situation may arise in which the superficial integument of parliamentary democracy which we have put on the hard bureaucratic core of our government and administration may burst and may be swept away.

The permanent services and the army may in that situation be tempted to project their own claims of leadership. Or new movements may be thrown up from below by the now submerged and seemingly dormant 'internal proletariat' (we may not reckon here the impact of possible 'external proletariats' from China or elsewhere) with their as-yet-unheard claims for leadership and political power. The role and relevance of parliament and its political possibilities to provide adequate leadership to the nation in the coming crisis should be judged from that objective point of view. The crucial question is, therefore,—is the parliament, as we have it in this country today, enough by itself for our national requirements?

Appraisal

L. M. SINGHVI

PARLIAMENTARY institutions make up the central theme of the process of government in India. The balance sheet of the working results of these institutions is crucial to the democratic enterprise in our nascent Republic.

If one is permitted to generalize, it could be stated that parliamentary institutions in India have to their credit a reasonable measure of success. A generalization such as this is of course valid only generally, and is subject to certain inherent limitations because the evaluation extends only to a period of seventeen years and because the straining experience of trials and tribulations is somewhat limited. The testing time of our parliamentary institutions and our democracy will perhaps extend to another two or three decades.

India had the trappings of parliamentary institutions even before the advent of independence. The central assembly, the provincial legislative assemblies and legislative councils had been in existence under British tutelage and these served as so many parliamentary grammar schools to inculcate parliamentary mannerisms and to impart parliamentary vocabulary, even though the substance of power was lacking.

It must be mentioned that the educated middle class of India, which has been the politically

dominant sector of Indian society, took to parliamentary procedures with relish and it is to this class that the success of the democratic experiment in India, such as it is, with its inherent and incidental imitations, is largely attributable. It is noteworthy that neither the princes nor the leading capital owners nor those belonging to the proletariat have made any significant impact on the working and the deliberations of the parliamentary institutions in India. The leadership is drawn mainly from the educated middle class and naturally, therefore, the main currents of politics in India have an unmistakable imprint of middle class psychology.

The Middle Class

This is of course not to suggest that the aristocracy of birth and the oligarchy of riches do not operate as important factors in Indian politics. Doubtless, these factors are far from having been obliterated, but the basic fact is that it is the middle class which strikes the keynote in the working of Indian democracy. To a large extent, therefore, the parliamentary apparatus in India epitomises the triumph as well as the tragedy of the middle class in the throes of the mid-twentieth century.

The Indian Constitution represents the high water mark of eclectic, open-minded idealism in the image of western orientation. It is the blueprint of the aspirations of India's educated middle class, as it is the juridical and political sheet-anchor of the organization of State and society in the Republic of India. The Constitution enthrones the people of India on the seat of sovereignty, guarantees a generous measure of fundamental rights to its citizens, enunciates certain directive principles of State policy, fundamental in the governance of the country, and provides an institutional framework based on a quasi-federal distribution of powers between the Centre and the States of the Indian Union, on a parliamentary form of a collectively responsible cabinet government and on an independent judiciary

entrusted with the task of interpreting and upholding the Constitution itself. The Constitution represents the formal foundation of the stability of the Republic; at the same time it contains in itself the seeds of social revolution.

By no means a piece of class legislation, the Constitution is nevertheless a conservator of fundamental rights which are justiciable in law and which therefore effectively protect certain interests. The fetters which the Constitution has forged on the exercise of executive and even legislative powers of the State for the preservation and maintenance of fundamental rights are in a way expressive of a distrust of democracy. These fetters make the governmental processes in India a rule of laws as contradistinguished from a rule of men, although the facility and the frequency with which the Constitution has been amended seventeen times in less than fifteen years leads us to reflect that the Constitution would only be as strong, durable and protective as the legislatures would let it be.

Congress Party Dominance

In the extra-constitutional affairs and legislative deliberations, of actual administration which intimately and pervasively affect the lives of our countrymen, the human factor plays in India, as everywhere, a pre-eminent role. Most of all, the impact of party organization, its composition, its quality and its operational dynamics is profound and far-reaching. This is particularly so, because the Congress Party commands an overwhelming majority and its sensitiveness and responsiveness to public opinion are to a considerable extent the main determinants of democratic functioning in India.

The parliament and the party organization have necessarily to coordinate their working to a certain extent, but the party in parliament for all practical purposes operates without interference and with full autonomy. For the enunciation of party programmes and policy objectives, the All India Congress Committee is the primary forum but, by and large, the

parliament is not only the source of all Central legislation but is also the matrix in which the all-India policies are shaped and fashioned. Ever so often the party platform is employed only to elucidate these policies and to secure the endorsement and the ratification of the party.

The decisive force of personal equation and the phenomenon of the federalisation of Indian politics were evident in the manner in which the President of the Congress Party wielded his position in consultation with State chief ministers and members of parliament in coming to a consensus in the matter of choosing a successor to the late Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru.

The resolve to elect Lal Bahadur Shastri was formally that of the party in parliament but the resolve had been made by Kamaraj and a majority of State chief ministers, and was merely adopted by the party in parliament under a directive from the head of the party organization. In this the party in parliament was made to yield to the superior leadership of the party organization, although this is not to suggest that the choice of the Congress parliamentary party would necessarily have been any different.

Split Opposition

The party system is generally considered a necessary adjunct to modern parliamentary institutions, and not without good reason. In India there is a multitude of political parties and splinter groups, unlike the bipartite competitive pattern obtaining in the U.S.A. and U.K. and this means that optimum results cannot be obtained from the parliamentary form of government. A two-party system has failed to emerge in India in spite of the fact that India has a majoritarian instead of a proportional system of representation and although it is crystal clear that the Congress Party cannot be ousted from power except by a broad-based combination of the bulk of opposition forces.

This is due partly because habits of compromise and adjustment are

publicly condemned and discounted, and partly because the policies of smaller groups and parties suffer from lack of pragmatic appreciation of political situations as well as from immaturity. The absence of a real party system in Indian politics may be taken to be conducive to a stagnant kind of stability, but this deleterious shortcoming in the Indian parliamentary system cannot be gainsaid nor can it be explained away either by academic generalities or by cautious semantics.

All the political parties in India tend to recruit their leaders as well as their rank and file members from different strata of the educated middle class. The ideological commitments, the complexion of the predominant voting block in the constituency, the party affiliations and the individual training and background of those in politics furnish the whole range of variation in the political spectrum. After Independence, the quality of entrants to legislatures, particularly under Congress Party sponsorship, has been causing serious concern, because it is felt that in the Congress Party selections, mediocrity rather than merit is at a premium.

General Quality

Qualitatively, the composition of State legislatures is particularly depressing for the conspicuous lack of ability, acumen, aptitude and integrity, and this is a major factor contributing to the falling standards of public administration. It appears that the fierce internal struggles of party politics and electoral vicissitudes are strong deterrents for the professionally successful to venture into politics. The almost ubiquitous illiteracy of the electorate, the unyielding exigencies of mass communication, party finance and large scale field-work and the lack of public awareness of the great issues of contemporary politics permit confusion, mediocrity and equivocation and obscurantism to flourish with impunity.

The Indian parliament is more than a mirror of the nation. It not only reflects the resilience as well

as the infirmities of Indian society; it also leads the nation. The ruling (Congress) party is a miscellaneous conglomeration and heterogeneous entourage, but in the absence of a party system, it is as well that the party does not impose excessive rigidities of party discipline (at least in so far as Congress MPs are not inhibited in making highly critical speeches or putting embarrassing questions).

The Opposition

The opposition in parliament, although numerically insignificant, is articulate, adroit and generally well informed, so that the parliamentary dialogue is not only a shock-absorbing device but is also an instrument of vigilance and a guide to the formulation and modification of policies. The elaborate modalities of parliamentary procedure and the overall financial control of parliament over the purse strings have substantially enlarged the scope of parliamentary discussions and today the parliament is not preoccupied merely with the tasks of legislation. Parliamentary proceedings in India embrace a vast panorama of activities and the scope is as wide as life itself. But as in all 'adversary' proceedings, the debate in Parliament also lends itself not infrequently to the broad sweep and flourish of exaggeration and attitudinization.

It would appear that if the dialogue of democracy at the parliamentary forum is to be made more meaningful, parliament would have to reorganize itself into joint working committees drawn from both the Houses and to make the administration more intensely and precisely accountable. Similarly, parliament would have to create its own agency of investigation and redress of public grievances on the pattern of the Swedish Ombudsman, because specific instances of administrative injustice or dereliction cannot be adequately dealt with on the floor of the House or through a Committee such as the Lok Sabha Committee on Petitions. Without such an arm, parliament cannot rise to its full effectiveness, and the bureaucracy will be without proper reins.

New leadership wanted

GIRIJA K. MOOKERJEE

ALTHOUGH the expressions of disbelief in the proper functioning of democracy in India and Asia by European and American critics are common and continuous, they cannot, however, be said to have any foundation in fact for several reasons. First of all, democracy, even parliamentary democracy in Europe and America, is not of a uniform variety. It differs from country to country, from people to people and from climate to climate.

The tradition of parliamentary democracy built up by the people of Anglo-Saxon origin differs in some fundamental respects from the tradition of parliamentary democracy of the Latin people. Although the election system, for instance, has been based more or less on the same principles both in France and England, yet even the methods of electioneering and the basic system of representation (not to speak of the fact that France is a Republic and England a constitutional monarchy) are vastly different in these two neighbouring countries demonstrating a wide divergence in the functioning of parliaments themselves.

The two party system which is the very backbone of the British parliamentary form of government has very seldom been in practice in

France, even in the early days of the Third Republic. On the other hand, if we consider the cases of the U.S.A. and England—two countries deeply embedded in Anglo-Saxon traditions—we find a large number of vital and basic differences, not only in the appointment of the Executive but also in the relationship of the Executive with the legislative organs. A cabinet system of the British type subject to dissolution by a vote of no confidence of parliament has not developed in the U.S.A. The presidential system of parliamentary democracy which has obtained in the U.S.A. and of which General de Gaulle is so enamoured, has no appeal to the British public, and, even during emergencies like wars, the British Parliament has remained faithful to the cabinet system of joint responsibility.

We cannot go into all the details here of differences which characterise some of the more important democratic countries of the world. It is enough to say that the parliamentary systems in most of the democratic countries of the world are not identical and they are not likely to be identical. Since the Proclamation of the French Provisional Government of 1848, denying the existence of any pro-

letariats in France, (because every Frenchman has the vote) we have known many types of democracy, such as liberal democracy, social democracy (German variety since 1864) and the people's democracy of the communist States.

Popular Myths

On the other hand, the oft repeated and almost platitudinous remark that parliamentary democracy is more suitable to countries whose people are of European descent cannot also be substantiated, if we include in this category all the countries whose people are basically of European origin but who live in different continents. They include all the countries of South America, and also, South Africa, Rhodesia, Australia, New Zealand and others.

In some of these countries, especially the countries of South America, not even the rudiments of democratic ideas existed, say, at the time when the Government of India Act of 1919 was introduced in India. Although the Act had restricted franchise yet the kind of legislative organs which developed as a result did not exist in any of the South American or East European countries.

When we consider, for instance, the case of a very important country in Europe like Italy, which realised her unity in 1861 and became a State as recently as 1871, we see that it did not have anything like a fullfledged democratic system until the beginning of the 20th century and then also this system did not survive the First World War. The fascist system of government was established in the 20th century not in an Asian country but in an ancient European kingdom like Italy and it lasted for a quarter of a century until its overthrow as a result of Italy's military defeat in the Second World War.

Similarly, one of the most advanced and highly civilized countries of the world, namely, Germany, did not have a widely based franchise system as far as 1890 and for all practical purposes the Reichstag had no more power of controlling executive action at the time

of the outbreak of the First World War than our Imperial Legislative Council although the Reichstag was more representative. Judging from the other fact that India was under a foreign rule and Germany was not, the restricted franchise enjoyed by India was made better use of by the Indian representatives for furthering the democratic process than it was the case with the members of the German Reichstag.

In fact, since the Legislative Councils were established in three Indian provinces (Bengal, Punjab and U.P.) in 1862, 1897 and 1886, the nominated Indian members (nominated without statutory provision at that time) fully used every opportunity to make the executive action subordinate to the directives of the legislature. As regards the Government of India Act of 1937, it can be unhesitatingly said that the degree of autonomy introduced in Indian provinces was in no way less than the autonomy in provincial matters enjoyed by many East European and South American countries.

The Reality

It is quite well-known that in most of the countries in Eastern Europe, except perhaps in Czechoslovakia, elections before the war were so rigged that the parliaments were mere mockeries. The succession States of the Austro-Hungarian Empire were ruled mostly by financial cliques and that was the reason why practically all of them slid into dictatorial forms of government before the outbreak of the war.

We need not go here into the question of elections and their methods as well as the parliamentary practices in South American countries, but even superficial knowledge of the present history of these countries demonstrates to us that even today, in the mid-twentieth century, there is not a single country in South America, except perhaps Uruguay, where the system of parliamentary democracy, as we understand it, is practised with some success.

One can go on multiplying instances to show that the number of

West-oriented countries which possess what is known as the parliamentary form of democracy is not very large. It is, therefore, no wonder that in Asia their number would be often smaller.

Colonial Exploitation

The conditions for democratic development in the traditional societies of South East Asia, Far East and West Asia were not favourable because, firstly, they were subjected since the pre-industrial period in Europe to European domination for the purposes of commercial exploitation and, secondly, because the growth of a wage-earning middle class was retarded both by the feudal aristocracy in these countries as well as by the European powers who dominated them. The result was that a very big country like Indonesia which became independent in 1947 did not possess more than one thousand graduates, according to Tibor Mende, the French publicist, who in his study on South East Asia was astonished to ascertain that when the Dutch left the country after more than two hundred and fifty years of colonial rule, there were so few educated Indonesians.

Similarly, China, the bone of contention of all the mercantile powers in Europe since the 18th century remained strictly feudal, backward and dominated by warlordism on account of the silent consent of the western powers and the acquiescence of the ruling Chinese dynasties. The absence of a strong middle class in China had made it easier for that country to move from medieval feudalism to communism of the Stalinist variety. The same historical parallels apply also in the case of many West Asian countries where the authoritarian system of Islam was an additional factor in retarding the introduction of parliamentary types of democratic governments.

The case of India, as I have shown in the beginning, is different. We had the continuity of a legal system of government since the passing of the Regulating Act

for controlling the action of the East India Company. Since then, constitutional reforms granted to India by the British Parliament from time to time, were instrumental in creating in our country the habits of popular election and popular votes, resulting in the establishment of corresponding institutions to further the democratic process. This process has filtered down even to all our social activities so much so that even a village club is never founded without a democratic constitution, a system of election, not to speak of innumerable public institutions for charitable and educational purposes.

Thus, when we compare our democratic institutions of the early twentieth century, i.e., before the First World War, we find that we were quite a bit ahead of the countries of Eastern Europe, including Russia. Besides, the system of Local Self Government introduced in India for the first time by Lord Ripon's Resolution of 1882 not only provided training for politicians and electorate as asserted by Hugh Finker in his book, *The Foundations of Local Self-Government in India, Pakistan and Burma* (London, 1954), but it gave India also more civic rights than existed in many countries of the world at the beginning of the twentieth century.

Our Tradition

The form of self-government or the electoral system which existed in ancient India may still be a matter of dispute. It may or may not have been of great importance. But the degree of self-government which we have enjoyed since the end of the 19th century has certainly made the Indian society accustomed to the habit of the democratic form of government for nearly one hundred years. There are not many countries in the world and certainly not in Asia, which have as many years of experience in the functioning of the democratic system, at least at the level of local self-government, as we have.

But does this mean that our parliamentary system is so well

rooted in our soil that we need not be afraid of its being attacked by anti-democratic forces within our country? Some French and American political scientists say that no country, however democratic, can make itself totally free, in the ultimate analysis, from the forces of disorder or fascism, which may arise owing not to one set of circumstances but to different sets of circumstances in different countries. Ours may not be free from them for all that we know, but by giving ourselves a truly democratic constitution after independence we have indeed taken all the steps necessary to anticipate such forces and to eliminate them.

Our Merit

The supreme merit of our constitution was and is even today, as Dr. Ambedkar very correctly said at the time of its adoption by the Constituent Assembly, that it was a dynamic and flexible constitution which would be able to hold our country together 'both in peace time and war time.' It has already done so. Our constitution has withstood its teething trouble of the first fifteen years and has survived the Chinese invasion.

India has held together in spite of all the pessimistic prognostications of her ill-wishers. And although our constitution was amended nine times during the first ten years, it has by this proved only its dynamic nature and these amendments have also shown that the Constitution of 1949 was not unnecessarily rigid and too inflexible for the changing society it was meant to serve. The reorganisation of the States and the rapid political evolution of our country had necessitated certain changes in the constitution and unlike our pandits who consider our *Shastras* as absolute and immutable, our parliamentarians accepted those changes in an empirical and revolutionary spirit.

Thus the Lok Sabha has indeed to a very large extent reflected the revolutionary mood of our post-independent society although in certain other respects it has not

been able to free itself from some of the shackles of the past which we had acquired because of our long association with Britain and the British institutions. One of them is the electoral system which our constitution-makers based on the British model. It was not, however, quite new to us when the constitution was being drafted. The British system of voting by constituencies had existed in our country also before independence.

The Failure

Of course, in this regard, our representatives at the Constituent Assembly were more influenced by the question of 'political right' than by the question which has been posed by *Seminar*, namely, the question of political leadership in parliament. There was also the issue of communal electorates before them; an issue which had poisoned Indian political life for half a century and which had led eventually to the partition of our motherland. But the end-result of the adoption of this system has been that although our parliament is probably the most democratic in Asia and far more democratic than parliaments in many European countries, yet it has failed to serve as a 'reservoir of political leadership.'

This failure has nothing to do with the actual practice of the electoral system. On the authority of international observers, it can be said that voting in all our three elections has been fair, free and impartial. There is also no doubt that the provisions of the Representation of the People Act, 1950, and of the Representation of the People Act of 1951, have been meticulously observed and in the Election Commission, we have a superb institution for the superintendence, direction and control of elections in India as envisaged in Article 324 of our constitution.

On the other hand, in spite of fifteen years of its functioning, and functioning superbly, it has not thrown up leaders our country needs most. There is no doubt that in Jawaharlal Nehru we had a leader the like of which India will probably not see in a century,

but the very fact that no one was able to second him in his task with the same brilliance, showed that our best talents could not be attracted to parliament or that they were unable to get there.

The Real Leaders

This is precisely the question which I want to raise in discussing the role of parliament as a reservoir of national leadership. It is also important to emphasise that the nature and character of national leadership go on changing as the society advances. In our case, at least, the structural change has been revolutionary but the leaders of this change who could have made our supreme law-giving body aware of the process, were unable to do so because they were not in parliament. They were the planners, the engineers, the political scientists and the economists who unfortunately have no say in the matter of legislation or of planning because power is denied to them. They, however, represent our post-independent society more truly and they are also the people whom we need most to give our nation a new visage and a new ideal to live for.

It was, however, clear that unless this new mood (itself the result of independence and progress made by the country since then) finds an outlet in parliament, our law-making body will cease to reflect the hopes and aspirations which characterised our struggle for independence. Already we find that the professions, trades and social groups represented in parliament have not very much varied during the last fifteen years and instead of men who run factories, design houses, build towns and educate the youth, our parliament is filled with men and women who won elections because of local influence and whose functions after election generally consist of lobbying for local interests and voting for the party they represent.

Our parliament which used once to reverberate with the rich diction and oratory of a generation of great public men, was no longer to have more than a few good speakers who are able to express them-

selves with clarity and who understand the significance of the role of parliament in building our nation.

These shortcomings can of course be remedied. There is no dearth of talent in our country. In spite of the fact that we are passing through a period of transition, our educational standards have not fallen so much as some people would like us to believe. The truth is that the emphasis has changed. Unlike the time when we grew up, the youth of India today, like the youth in Europe and America, value the acquisition of greater and more detailed scientific knowledge, because the world in which they live has been radically transformed as a result of new dimensions created by new scientific achievements.

While travelling round the Department of Jura in France some time ago in the company of a prominent French politician, who was campaigning for election, I was astonished to find that the young people crowded the meetings where lectures were given on technical subjects, but not the meetings where political speeches were being delivered. If that is the case in a country where the people are so politically-minded, is it a wonder that our young men too do not respond to party squabbles indulged in by our national leaders?

The Urban Elite

The need, therefore, has arisen that we should begin to think in new categories regarding the proper and veritable function of parliament in a changing society. Most of our national leaders have grown up in the period when the mid-Victorian political ideas were just being popular in India. They are still not aware of the change in the function of parliament which has taken place even in traditional Britain.

The depository of people's political rights—the British Parliament—has in a welfare State to legislate much more quickly and has to function in continuous preparedness for an emergency. Bills are disposed of far more rapidly

and the vulnerable and august body where once the word 'laissez faire' was the motto, has to move with the times, and we wished that our parliament did the same. If our parliamentary institutions are to be more effective, it is necessary that in our parliament, the thinking of new generations should be continuously focussed. And even more. It should be they who conduct our national affairs in the light of new requirements of the India which came into existence in 1947.

This, however, can be done only if we make it possible for some of our urban elite to be elected to parliament. Under the present electoral system, involving huge sums of money and the necessity of fixed domicile in a particular region, it is not likely that men with special knowledge of administration, finance, law and planning would ever succeed in either contesting elections or getting elected to the central parliament.

Proportional Representation

If India adopts the system of proportional representation as it obtains in most of the West European countries, with at least half the members being elected from a list, there will be a chance then for a good number of our bright young men to prove their ability in the supreme seat of power in our country. It will also be required of us that we modify the emphasis on villages as the take-off point of our national development. The villages will profit from urbanisation, but not from ruralisation of the cities. It was this that Dr. Ambedkar had in mind when he criticised at the Constituent Assembly the Indian romantics of the village and referred to the villages as 'a sink of localism, a den of ignorance, narrow-mindedness and communalism.'

And thus, if we want to face squarely the industrial society which is rising in our country, we will have to reverse some of our political thinking and relate it to the change in our society which is already upon us so that we can face the greater changes which are yet to come.

Books

PARLIAMENTS

Inter-Parliamentary Union. Cassell and Company, London 1962. pp. 321.

THE INDIAN PARLIAMENT — Edited by A. B. Lal.
Chaitanya Publishing House, Allahabad. 1956. pp. 296.

The first book is a study, submitted by the 70 year old Inter-Parliamentary Union to its members on the occasion of its 50th plenary conference in 1961. It is a comparative study of 41 parliaments including those in socialist countries. The comparison is not with any model or ideal, but in the matter of their respective structures, organisation, legislative functions, powers in financial matters and control over the Executive.

In the matter of structure, when a non-federal State opts for two chambers, it is generally to curb the 'democratic aggressiveness' of the first chamber. Two tests are suggested in the book to see whether the conservative or the radical elements have the upper hand in the country. One is the way of appointing members to the second chamber, and the other is the extent of its powers as compared with the first. Equal or greater powers would be a sign of conservatism, especially if it goes together with undemocratically elected members.

Most parliaments today are based on universal franchise, although the methods of election differ. But there are exceptions to this rule, and the author has cited them. The Spanish Cortes is one—Spain has not had a real parliament for years now, and neither Switzerland nor Monaco allow women to vote.

Parliaments differ on many points, but they are all agreed that the voter must be a national, and over a certain age. Again, interpretations of the term 'national' vary from a domicile of some years in the older democracies to States like Israel and the socialist countries, both of whom '... carry the theory of universal suffrage to its logical conclusion', by dispensing with domicile or residence qualifications. The author also notes that '... governments of a revolutionary type are the most apt to grant the

franchise at an early age, as in the Peoples' Democracies ...'

Criminals undergoing sentence are deprived of their right to vote in most countries. But socialist countries tend to take a broader view of democracy and don't deprive them of the vote when they are undergoing sentence. In some countries the armed forces and the police are also denied the vote, the theory being that professional discipline and political opinions should not clash, but this theoretical disability has not raised any obstacles to hinder the armed forces from organising coups, or of the police from letting loose a reign of terror against people working peacefully to free their country from foreign domination.

Not all governments take the same attitude to exercising the vote; some regard it as a duty, others as a right. But the real test of the franchise is how many people do exercise this right to vote. 20 per cent absentees is quite normal among the older democracies. In India, the absentee rate, according to this book, is as high as 40 per cent, probably due to inadequate transport facilities and a long distance to the polling booth. In Russia, absentees amount to only 0.22 per cent and the rate is almost as low in other socialist countries. A convincing assurance of the secrecy of the ballot would also go a long way in reducing this absenteeism.

Once parliament is in session, law-making begins. Committees play a leading role and the book shows how they are made up in different countries, their scope and functions, and how the main business of committees is to prepare bills for parliament. Committee Chairmen have also grown in importance as in the U.S.

Parliaments are at no time insulated from the views of the people who voted them in. Not only are non-parliament members included in parliamentary committees, but in some countries like India, Pakistan and Burma, Members of Parliament can propose a motion for the 're-circulation' of a Bill, in which case it goes to experts and interested organizations. But by these methods only a small section of the people can be consulted, while the referendum,

referring the matter to the people, is preferred by socialist countries.

Parliamentary agenda, procedure, rules of debate and modes of obstructing business are the spheres in which the Speaker is the final arbiter. The Speaker can refuse motions 'going against the spirit', even if they are in accordance with the rules. Needless to say, the Opposition and the Speaker don't always see the spirit of parliamentary procedure from the same angle. If the Speaker is not as impartial as one hopes he is, his power could easily culminate in an infringement of democratic rights; for, the right to move amendments, is '... an essential feature of democratic practice.' Socialist countries give the widest scope for moving amendments, and in Russia sometimes non-members, too, can move amendments.

Parliament originally came into being in self-defence against a monarch who was in no way responsible to the people. According to this book, the need of the king for money was the one major factor that contributed to the growth of parliaments. But, of course, any student of history knows that parliamentary democracy rose out of the needs of the bourgeoisie to deal a blow to feudalism.

The second book under review discusses various aspects of the Indian Parliament. But that doesn't mean it's a study in depth. For the most part, it's inadequate rambling and has some astounding statements. One is about the East India Company, which is credited with having laid the foundations of parliamentary government in India! No reasons are brought out in support of this statement; perhaps there are not any. Among the topics dealt with are the growth of parliamentary institutions, the Opposition, parliament's relations with the cabinet and the President, and parliamentary democracy in India.

As usual, the writers in this book, too, trace our parliament to British influences. While talking about the growth of parliamentary institutions in India, the author of this article, a university Reader, discusses the Morley-Minto Reforms! In praise of these Reforms, he says that '... the bureaucracy felt that this scheme meant a considerable advance', but he coyly refrains from comments of his own. It is only later, when he comes to the Montford Reforms that he admits that the franchise was 'very restricted'. How restricted we can only infer by comparison with the Act of 1935, which raised the franchise to cover 14 per cent of the population. None of these Acts or their implications have been discussed. There is no critical evaluation of the various steps taken towards parliamentary government under the British regime, or of the popular movements that forced the pace. And besides, he completely forgets how parliamentarism has grown within the national movement itself.

In the chapter on parliamentary organisation and its functions, the conduct of business is summed up in two paragraphs, the first being the MP's oath and the second the need for a quorum. Not a word about parliamentary committees, the rules for governing

amendments, motions for re-circulation of bills, or the procedure in the event of disagreement between the two Houses.

The topic entitled 'Parliament and the Cabinet' discusses irrelevant issues like the passing of Bills in Parliament, resolving the deadlock between the two Houses. The nearest he gets to the point at issue is when he says that '... the Parliamentary Executive or the Cabinet provides for governance with popular consent'—and that is not saying much either.

The relations between the President and parliament are discussed by another teacher who does not ramble quite so much. He discusses the method of election, with a table comparing the votes cast for Rajendra Prasad and other candidates. He also discusses the President's powers under the constitution quoting article and clause. What's more, he does not rule out the possibility of future difficulties should the President and the Prime Minister belong to different parties.

The article on parliamentary democracy in India scores in that it has more irrelevancies packed into it than most of the other articles in the book. Views on political parties, Bhoodan, linguistic States, all are clumped together under this head. It would be rather difficult to form an idea from this article as to how parliamentary democracy works in India.

One of the few articles in this symposium which makes interesting and informative reading is A. K. Gopalan's, on the Opposition. Being in the Opposition he knows just when the self-confessed democratic practices of the Congress fall short of standard requirements, and gives examples to illustrate his point. But Gopalan feels that the Opposition cannot be silenced so long as the policy of the ruling party fails to fulfil the needs of the people, and that neither the Czarist nor the Nazi regimes could do so. He then discusses three kinds of Opposition flourishing in India—the Right, the Left and the third, which opposes in word and supports in deed all important issues. Gopalan explains the lack of an Opposition in Russia, but never strays from the point.

In most cases the authors of the articles stray so far from the subject that they seem to lose their bearings. A comparison between the earlier book and this is impossible—the first has been a painstaking job, connecting and presenting disparate facts. It is a pleasure to read, while the other seems to have been written mostly with the sole aim of filling blank sheets of paper with what did not matter.

Kusum Madgavkar

THE FOUNDATION OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN INDIA, PAKISTAN & BURMA By Hugh Tinker.

University of London, 1954.

CONTINUITY & CHANGE IN INDIAN POLITICS

By K. P. Karunakaran.

Peoples' Publishing House, 1964.

The two books under review are concerned, broadly speaking, with India's independence movement and the methods adopted to achieve it during the late

nineteenth and early twentieth century. Though they study the problem in an historical perspective and present the subject matter as a descriptive history of the events, they, nevertheless, attempt a qualitative assessment of the events and an analytical review of the merits and demerits of the approach adopted.

The two books, however, do not cover the same ground, although the broad aim is the same. The first deals with the history of local government in India (Pakistan and Burma during the major period covered by the book were part of India) in the belief that here was an excellent opportunity for India to train her politicians and public men who could, with this experience, have easily taken over the higher organs of government after independence.

The other book attempts to find out if India made any original contribution to political philosophy during the years 1885-1921. The underlying assumption in this search is the belief that a systematic political philosophy and a coherent set of political ideas are important for the success and achievement of a political aim, which in India's case was the attainment of national independence. Thus the two authors start by posing two different questions, but in the context of the same situation.

Tinker attempts to find out how far the system of local government introduced by the British contributed to the political education and training of the Indian people to enable them to take over their national government. After surveying the development of local government institutions in India from 1687 to 1937, he comes to the conclusion that success achieved in this direction was meagre. The British policy was pedestrian and often out of touch with realities. It tried to impose a purely western system on India, which, naturally, conveyed little sense of novelty to the Indians. But Indian leadership in turn also showed little response to accepting or even utilising the institutions for its own purpose.

The British in the initial stages, i.e., in the late nineteenth century, were, according to the author, not laggard in endowing India with self governing institutions. Later, the policy became conservative, cautious and less certain of its objectives. The stress was laid on public works rather than on 'political education.' This was partly due to the comparative lack of success of the local government institutions and partly due to public indifference and sometimes hostility to the working of local government.

Yet, this was precisely the time when the local government institutions could have achieved some success. For, the political leaders of that period were men of liberal tradition and believed in constitutional methods and the gradual evolution of political life in India. But instead of being handled promptly as a matter of first importance, the British let eight years pass before they finally adopted the measures suggested by Lord Ripon and the Decentralisation Commission of 1909. By that time the whole attention of Indian public men was fixed upon the national stage. The Extremists who believed in political radicalism

had become prominent on the political scene of India and were demanding full *swaraj*.

Therefore, after 1921 their attempt was to isolate the British Government, boycott their institutions and cut off government revenues, in effect, to disrupt British rule. Consequently, local bodies were disorganised.

The author, however, feels that although the expectations of the value of local government as a school of political education have not been fulfilled, the local government institutions did achieve success in the sphere of primary education, health services, electricity and water supplies and slum clearance. That local government failed in other respects was due to an unwarranted assumption that if it had succeeded in England it would automatically work in India too. The political factors, the social conditions and aspirations of the Indian people were not taken into account. When difficulties did arise they were either ignored, or suitable action was delayed until it was too late and the situation demanded some other measure.

Karunakaran's study deals with the political philosophy of the Indian national movement between 1885 and 1921. It discusses in detail the major political thoughts which emerged during this period and influenced the future course of the political movement in India.

The author poses the question: has modern India made any original contribution to political philosophy? He then proceeds to find answers to it in the ideas implicit in different programmes and plans of actions adopted by the leaders of the national movement. These men were not political scientists in the sense of theoreticians interested in ideas for their own sake but practical politicians who reacted and moulded political events in a manner which suited their ultimate objective of achieving the political independence of India. Consequently, the evolution and flow of ideas was not a systematic and continuous process.

According to the author, four streams of political ideas are discernable in the national movement up to 1921—liberalism, political radicalism, religion as a basis of political philosophy and Gandhism. Each one of them gained ascendancy at different periods mainly because of the leaders who came to the top at that particular moment. The earliest of them was liberalism championed by Gokhale and his followers, who were influenced by western political thought and tried to adjust it in the context of the Indian political situation. Therefore, whereas their methods and aim in the political sphere remained constitutional in character, their aims in the economic sphere differed radically from the philosophy of *laissez-faire*.

The appeal of these ideas was, however, limited to only a small section of educated Indians, and therefore the national movement did not have a mass base. This was provided by the Extremists who adopted methods of political radicalism. Unlike the Liberals, who advocated a gradual evolution of India towards self government under the guidance of the British

Government, they wanted complete political freedom for India at once. Extremists, therefore, brought pressure on government by the economic boycott of British goods and passive resistance to authority. They aroused public enthusiasm by glorifying India's past heritage. The local government institutions introduced by the British were not allowed to progress, let alone function. Appeal was frequently made to religious sentiment, and religion, history and politics were welded together to stress India's own identity and revive her own glory.

Gandhi's movement of non-cooperation and satyagraha was in a sense the culmination of all the movements which preceded it. There were however certain contradictions in Gandhi's programme. On the one hand, he accepted Gokhale, a liberal, as his master, and, on the other, chose Nehru, a socialist, as his political heir. He often talked of *Ram Rajya*, a Hindu concept of State, and secularism in the same breath. The author believes that ultimately Gandhi's political activities strengthened the forces of democracy and liberalism in the country. But he also holds that Gandhi became a link between liberalism and socialism, the latter being now increasingly identified by various sections of political opinion in India with Gandhi's teaching. How the two statements can be reconciled is however not explained by the author.

The four ideas discussed by Karunakaran are not new to political philosophy, except perhaps Gandhi's concepts of non-violence and passive resistance in politics. But strictly speaking they belong to the sphere of political action. And therefore it can be said that India did not make any original contribution to political philosophy. The author's assertion that the legacy of the leaders of the national movement to modern India in the ideological field is the political philosophy of the national movement may be correct, but to call it a political philosophy at all is misleading.

The author does not have a standpoint of his own either on the political ideas of the period covered by him or on the political programmes of different leaders. Nor does he evaluate the different concepts discussed by him in terms of any definite political philosophy. It was possible for him to do so. For, the ideas on the State and the form of government held by political leaders like Tilak, Aurobindo etc., had an Indian background. In any case they were not western. The book therefore remains a fairly good collection of facts presented in a systematic manner without any claim to a study of the political philosophy of the national movement.

In contrast, Tinker presents his facts and figures convincingly to prove his contentions. The objectivity with which he reaches his conclusion is very refreshing. For, both the English and Indian scholars and writers have often been critical of the local government policy from their own point of view. English critics have blamed Indians for a lack of public spirit; Indians have called the policy a hollow sham providing no outlet for popular activity. The author has

succeeded in putting these conflicting opinions in proper perspective by analysing the causes of the failure of the local government policy. Nevertheless, he has his own stand point and judges the events in relation to it. It is difficult to disagree with him on most of his opinions so far as they are related to the reasons of the failure and success of local government. But his assumption that local government could have been a better training ground for Indian public men for the coming years is, however, debatable.

G. P. Srivastava

DEMOCRACY AND TRADITIONAL INDIAN VALUES

By Daya Krishna.

Centre for South Asia Studies, University of California, Berkeley, 1961 (mimeographed).

MODERN TRENDS IN INDIAN DEMOCRACY

By V. V. Giri.

Harold Laski Institute of Political Science, Ahmedabad, 1960.

POST-OFFICE SOCIALISM

By C. N. Annadurai.

D.M.K., Dravidian House, Bombay, 1964.

These booklets, though dealing with allied and inter-related subjects, are neither similar in content or scope nor in approach or analysis. Each treats its subject-matter from a plane of its own, poses the problem from altogether different points of view and accordingly attempts to tackle it. The first, 'a working paper prepared for the South Asia Colloquium', is an enquiry into the *value-content* of democracy and Indian traditions from a sociological point of view. It examines the values, beliefs and attitudes which run through the concept of democracy and make it a living reality and raises issues of deeper significance, such as, whether and how far the Indian mind fits into the western model of democracy; the likely consequences of enforcing a system not rooted in the value-structure of a complex society; the cultural traits and qualities of Indian society which limit the growth of democratic institutions, on the one hand, and those which ensure and promote the ideals and practice of democratic participation, on the other.

The second, a lecture delivered by V. V. Giri, covers a varied field, ranging from the importance of ethical conventions to the establishment of a World State. It reiterates the faith of a *democrat* in *democracy* without offering much by way of explanation as to what constitutes the essence of democracy or, in view of its title, why there are some specific trends in Indian democracy and what exactly do they signify? The author, as a matter of fact, says practically nothing about the subject under discussion. Instead of elaborating the *modern trends in Indian democracy*, he merely enunciates the practices which, he thinks, *ought* to be followed by a democratic polity and those which *ought* to be discarded by it.

The third, a collection of articles written by Annadurai, the D.M.K. Chief, in his own journal, *Home Land*, revolves round a theme which lacks substance but nevertheless helps to build up the

image of 'injured innocence' of the D.M.K. It represents, at best, an exercise in journalism of the sensational type which seeks to play up the emotions of the readers rather than their intellect. Under such catchy titles as *Post-Office Socialism*, *Steady, Sonny!*, *Steady*, *In League with the League*, *Making our Masters Merry* and the like the author portrays a picture of the D.M.K. which has been badly let down by the non-D.M.Ks since time immemorial and is therefore rightly itching for knocking the hell out of them.

All this sound and fury would have made some sense had he also explained what the D.M.K. Party really represents, what its programmes and policies are, and how exactly it proposes to 'liberate the masses' from the so-called 'alien domination'. As it is, the booklet serves no purpose other than acquainting us with the depth of bitterness which, rightly or wrongly, persists among a section of the Indian community.

Taken together, the studies under review reflect the limitations which political status, motivations and outlook impose on one's ability to understand a problem and comprehend its implications in comparison to one whose enquiry is not beset by any such limitations. V. V. Giri's political status (the lecture having been delivered when he was the Governor of Uttar Pradesh) and the consequent hesitation to go into the depth of any question which is politically relevant thus limit the scope of his discussion to a mere recitation of some generally known principles and platitudes of good behaviour.

Statements like 'the nurturing of the habits of co-operation among the general public in voluntary organisation' as a pre-requisite for 'the successful functioning of a democracy', are no doubt valid and unquestionable. But to stop the process of thinking and enquiry right there is to miss the essence of the very question posed. If the people have not inculcated such habits, which he feels they have not, merely the democratic order is not functioning successfully. And, if the objective is, as he says, to make it successful, apparently no fruitful action can be taken unless it is explained why the people have failed to do so; whether the concept of democratic participation is itself beyond their understanding or if it is due to a lack of the necessary institutional or organisational opportunities; if so, how best can they be created and if not, what exactly should be done to realise the objective.

Answers to some of these questions are, however, contained in the paper submitted by Daya Krishna. 'Democracy', he observes, 'is not merely a framework of politico-jural institutions but a set of values, beliefs and attitudes which underlies them, pervades them and thus gives them that living foundation—without which they crumble soon and vanish into thin air.'

The term 'democracy' can therefore be taken in a narrower or wider sense. It may be confined strictly to the political sphere alone or may embrace the other areas of culture also. 'There is a sense in

which a culture may be said to be "democratic" if, say, it is tolerant of wide differences in modes of behaviour in matters which do not affect the political structure of that society. On the other hand, a culture may be extremely "conformist" in its many areas and yet allow a relatively non-conformist behaviour in politics and even be solicitous to protect those who deviate in that field.'

Again, in the field of politics proper, 'the emphasis may be on the ensuring and safeguarding of individual's civic liberties against the possible tyranny of the State or on the *actual* participation of the people in the decision making processes at the political centre of the nation.' It is this emphasis on *actual* participation which tilts the balance in favour of a non-party system of government. 'The talk is more of "community" than of "individuals", of "cohesion" than of "freedom" and the end envisaged is something like communism without its violence and coercion.'

Since, in the long run, it is the native genius which alone shapes the course of events and builds up its institutions, it is important to know to which of these categories the Indian mind really belongs. Looking at the history and stress of Indian politics, one can easily visualise the answer. The Indian mind, as Daya Krishna rightly points out, always feels more at home when the emphasis is on community participation than on safeguarding the individual's civic liberties. It has therefore not truly accepted 'the model of western democracy with its presupposition of a society essentially divided into interest-groups and where the individual's civic liberties are seen as always potentially threatened by the State.' The deeper values of the culture are 'against a structure that perpetuates conflict and opposition and self-seeking and so there is a persistent discontent and dreaming of a communitarian society where men are dedicated to service rather than the seeking of their own self-interest.'

Two other points which, he thinks, merit careful consideration in this connection are the rigidity of the Indian social structure and the dynamics of its spiritual end of life. The value structure of traditional India is 'socially rigid and conservative, but spiritually experimental and dynamic, the two standing in such relation that while the one provided almost too much stability to the social structure, the other provided plenty of innovation and change and mobility.'

The congruence of this complex but discernible structure of traditional values actively pervades the Indian mind even today. Traditionally, it is basically tolerant of difference and diversity, 'believes in the sincerity of those who differ from oneself, respects the individual as an end-in-himself and does not consider that any of the fundamental problems of man can be solved by a manipulation of external circumstances, however clever and ingenious it may be.'

The traditional values of Indian society are therefore favourable to democracy in the wider sense of

the term. But in its narrower sense, that of cherishing and protecting the individual's civic and political liberties, they are indifferent, if not apathetic, to the growth of political and civic institutions. The future of the western model of democracy in India is therefore unpredictable. So far it has functioned better than other newly independent countries. Even compared to such an old democracy as France, its performance is more creditable.

Yet, there is a widespread sense of failure in almost all groups, 'particularly in the younger generation of the nation.' At a deeper level, 'the sense of failure emanates from a widespread realisation of the failure of national character in terms of elementary integrity and honesty in public life.' The revulsion is therefore not so much economic as moral in character. The demand is essentially for infusing 'some of the qualities of the Indian spirit into the field of civic and political affairs'. If this is achieved, the future of Indian democracy is bright. Otherwise, there will be no end to the hankering for a strong but benevolent man till the wish is fulfilled.

Ranjit Gupta

BALLOT BOX AND BAYONET—People and Government in Emergent Asian Countries By Hugh Tinker. Oxford University Press, London, 1964. 126 pp.

ELECTIONS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES. A Study of Electoral Procedures in Tropical Africa, South-East Asia and the British Caribbean By T. E. Smith.

Macmillan & Co. Ltd., London, 1964. 278 pp.

Perhaps no other subject in the field of political science has attracted so much attention as the subject of speculation on the future of democracy in Asian and African countries. There is general agreement among some observers of these countries that the Anglo-American type of democracy has 'failed' or has 'failed to take root' in many countries in Asia and Africa. The political and economic ills from which many of these nations are suffering are promptly traced to this 'failure.' Clinical accounts of this failure in Asian and African nations have appeared in large number in recent times.

It should be mentioned at the outset that Hugh Tinker does not belong to the school popularly known as the Princeton Behaviourists who have done considerable work on these areas. In fact, Professor Tinker has been very critical of their work in his articles and reviews elsewhere. His objection to the behaviourist approach stems, not so much from a dislike of the application of sociological methods to analyse political problems, but from a firm conviction that their attempt to measure the Asian and African experience in the political field in terms of Anglo-American standards is basically defective.

In this slim volume, *Ballot Box and Bayonet*, Professor Tinker advances his views on the subject and tries to perceive 'whether new political patterns are emerging in the new States to provide an alter-

native to the conventions of North Atlantic democracy.' T. E. Smith's *Elections in Developing Countries* is a comprehensive account of electoral procedures in Asian and African countries.

Most of the nations discussed in these volumes attained their independence after the end of the Second World War. They attained their independence either by an agreement of governors and governed, as for example in the case of the Philippines, or by an armed conflict, as in the case of Indonesia, or through what Tinker calls a 'dialectic struggle', as in the case of India. The intensity of nationalism was strong in these areas. Analysing various aspects of nationalism, Professor Tinker convincingly argues that this 'Western, nineteenth century concept' of nationalism is quite inadequate to solve the problems of the new States.

He concentrates his attention on two vital issues, language and religion, which threaten to disrupt the unity of many new nations. In this he is considerably influenced by the experiments conducted in India, Burma, Ceylon and Pakistan related to these vital issues, and comes to the melancholy conclusion that problems rather than being solved are more intensified today.

Almost every new State, immediately after the attainment of independence, showed great enthusiasm for the formation of representative institutions. It may be that the various 'freedom movements' during their struggle against colonialism did not devote much attention to the forms of government. But the leaders, most of whom were educated on 'western' lines, were deeply convinced that representative institutions must be formed in their countries and considered perhaps that the formation of such assemblies took them a step nearer to 'modernity'.

The makers of the constitutions of the new States showed remarkable ability in drawing up electoral procedures as T. E. Smith ably describes in his book. Various techniques to suit local circumstances were devised and elections, many of them successful by any standard, were promptly held. But, sad to say, these institutions did not function well and were set aside as rapidly as they were formed. Representative institutions were discredited, political parties were blamed and military rule or some other form of personal rule was established. Since then the question whether Asian and African countries are suited for the successful developments of democratic institutions on 'western' lines is hotly debated.

The general argument of many, particularly some writers of the behaviourist school, is that they are not suited and until the countries are 'modernised' and a new class rises to manage the affairs of the State on western lines the Asian, African and Latin American countries are more or less doomed to instability. They have concentrated their attention on the presence of several factors—like illiteracy, slow and discouraging rate of economic growth, rapid rise of population,—which generally make it difficult to work democratic institutions. The absence

of factors which are peculiar to the Anglo-American countries and which apparently have contributed to the success of the experiment are stressed.

But does this kind of analysis reflect the Asian and African situation? Would it be correct to stretch the argument a little and state that the countries which are comparatively stable in Asia and Africa today are nearer to their goal of 'modernity'? Would it be correct to argue that in countries like the Philippines and Malaysia, which are free from many troubles, the Anglo American model has taken firm roots and hence the success of the experiment is assured? Professor Tinker disagrees with this kind of argument and logically concludes that to judge the experiences elsewhere on the Anglo-American model would yield surprising conclusions. Thus the erstwhile regime of Ngo Dinh Diem of South Vietnam would appear more 'democratically stable' than many of her Asian neighbours.

Professor Tinker rejects the elite/mass dichotomy of the behaviourist school as unconvincing or even misleading. He considers that to argue that the elite is a positive, active element in Asian and African societies and that the masses are passive, negative elements is not correct. In an interesting chapter, 'The People and Government,' Professor Tinker argues that 'the relationship between governors and governed is already one of interaction.' He argues that the new leaders, who have wrested the initiative from the earlier western educated leaders, have to 'keep in touch with their audience: and their audience is the people.'

People have been aroused during the freedom struggle and there is a 'Revolution of Rising Expectations.' They are no longer passive and as T. E. Smith demonstrates in his excellent survey of the electoral procedures and elections in developing countries, the 'backward peasant' in an under-developed country is 'as capable of casting his vote intelligently in favour of his own candidate as the working man in the western democracies.' Provided, of course, that a suitable system of voting is evolved and elections are regularly held.

Professor Tinker considers that given time and if the countries are free from internal and external pressures, the new States may evolve their own type of democracy, probably evolve the 'politics of consensus.' The evolution may take the countries either towards the 'Sarvodaya movement' or towards 'Soekarnoism', says Tinker. 'Between the two poles of Sarvodaya, the morality of non-violence, and Soekarnoism, the mystique of violence, many Asian and African States seek to find their true political character through consensus.'

S. Krishnamurthy

POLITICAL CHANGE IN SOUTH ASIA By Myron Weiner.

Firma K. L. Mukhopadhyay. Calcutta. 1963.

A feeling is growing that there is very little intelligent political discussion. Labels are used to choke

off debate, as if they were substitutes for argument, while emotion and prejudice are preferred to a calm and dispassionate exchange of views, which alone can clarify thinking and help to formulate policy. No wonder that foreign commentators tend to steal the scene and come out with significant commentaries on Indian politics. One such commentator is Myron Weiner, Associate Professor of Political Science, Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He is worth looking at with an open mind but not uncritically, for his study is backed by competent effort.

Indian politics since 1947 has been dominated by Jawaharlal Nehru until recently. If we are to believe Bertrand Russell, whom some consider a crank, and some, wily and wise in years, it would take a 1000 years to realise Jawaharlal's greatness. He was that much ahead of his time and age in his thinking. So, it is against this background that we have to view Indian and world politics if we want to give it depth and perspective.

This volume, consisting of a series of essays, is primarily concerned with political change in India although our neighbours, Pakistan and Ceylon, are not ignored. The main objective is to inquire into the processes of political modernisation, poverty and underdevelopment being the most overwhelming images, where traditional cultures are seen to have felt the impact of three distinct and highly developed religions—Hinduism, Islam and Buddhism. This is the background with which we are familiar but now we come to the more interesting conclusions.

One of these is that the role of religion in Pakistan is not yet settled. Why? It is the author's contention that India and Ceylon could utilise the religious tradition as an instrument of nationalism and as a cohesive force against foreign rule without endangering modernisation, but that Islam, with its tradition of joining religion and politics, could not be used as an instrument of nationalism without at the same time endangering the prospects of modernisation.

For instance, few voices were raised in the Ceylon or Indian Constituent Assemblies for a Buddhist or Hindu constitution, but the cry for an Islamic constitution in Pakistan was a powerful enough issue to help delay the ratification of a constitution until March 1956, some nine years after independence. Indian and Ceylonese politicians continue to exploit Hinduism and Buddhism with little fear that an organised Hindu or Buddhist clergy or church will displace them, but Pakistani politicians must handle the religious issue with great care. But what about the corresponding role of Islam in Arab countries?

The most burning question to-day is that of economic development and political stability in India, and a separate chapter is devoted to this problem. Weiner

refers to the widely held view that political stability depends on economic growth, that is, on narrowing the gap between aspirations and reality, between demands and resources, but questions it by suggesting that there is no correlation between such stability and either economic well-being or economic growth. He quotes the examples of Afghanistan and Ethiopia, or Yemen and Bhutan, which for long periods during the last half century maintained a high degree of internal political stability even though scarcely any economic growth could be witnessed, observing that whatever instability existed was induced from abroad, i.e., by aggressive encroachments or diplomatic action.

It is surprising that in this context he omits any reference to Tibet which was deliberately cut off from the rest of the world and encouraged to remain in a state of primitive survival for centuries for reasons of international strategy. However, not wishing to seem to justify that backwardness is bliss, nor of wanting to fall into the same pitfall of simplistic economic determinism as those who maintain the reverse proposition, Weiner does a bit of a somersault and turns around to make a concession.

In other words, the generally held assumption that economic development is a necessary *sine qua non* for the Indian Government is true, not because there is an invariable correlation between the rate or level of economic development and the degree of political stability, but because in India, instead of political apathy (whether this is a matter for regret or relief is not clear), a politically conscious public has become organised into economic and political interest groups which direct their demands at government. Also, it is in the Indian tradition of relations between government and the public for the government to assume responsibility for the public's welfare demands. The difference from the American tradition is not stated but strongly implied.

The alternatives to this policy are also examined and here one is reminded of what one tends to hear or overhear to-day. The first alternative, according to the author, is to replace democracy by some autocratic totalitarian system. Another alternative would be for the gap between aspirations and reality to become so wide that effective government ceases, and an anarchic or quasi-anarchic situation arises and holds sway, at least temporarily, to be replaced most probably again by a system of autocracy. The third alternative, and the one which the present government is determined to follow (is there implied disapproval in this?), is to cope with potential stability by accelerated economic growth, in other words to narrow the gap between demands and resources, aspirations and reality.

The concluding chapter on India's third general elections will interest the reader. Published the year before Nehru died, it notes that in the last few years the influence of Chief Ministers has been increasing in New Delhi, and draws the inference that the question of the Prime Minister's successor is in

their hands, since in the main they control the State Congress Party parliamentary delegations. We know now how this worked when the time came.

It is Weiner's view that none of the Chief Ministers, including the new ones in Madhya Pradesh, Mysore and Andhra, owes his position to the Central Government or to Nehru. He feels that the Hindi region, once the stronghold of the Congress Party, is now threatened with the possibility of five years of uncertain if not unstable government, but that there is still no prospect of an effective opposition party by itself being able to form an alternative government at the State level, except in Kerala.

Myron Weiner is a keen political observer and able analyst, but is apt to miss the wood in his anxiety not to miss the trees. He sees an emerging mass political culture in local politics, and an elite political culture predominant at the centre among India's planners, national political leadership, and senior administrative cadre. He has devoted two chapters to West Bengal, which shows his interest in the problems of the problem State normally avoided by foreign commentators.

A. K. Banerjee

CONTEMPORARY NATIONALISM AND WORLD ORDER By Dr. Carlos Romulo.

Indian Council for Cultural Relations, 1964.

This book comprises the 1964 Azad Memorial Lectures given by Dr. Romulo. The problem which these lectures are concerned with is as follows: nationalism is today probably the strongest single force in the world. But these different nationalisms must somehow be reconciled in the wider context of a world order or else nationalism itself will be destroyed.

'The Paradox of Contemporary Nationalism', Dr. Romulo's first lecture, considers the change this concept has undergone from that of a destructive notion to becoming a force of cohesion making for universalism. In the past, nationalism usually suggested aggressive action in order to render a nation dominant if not supreme amongst others and historical instances justify the apprehensions that may accompany our feelings towards this concept. But today nationalism emphasizes rather the fact that the underdeveloped countries impinge upon the consciousness of the world.

It was the Bandung Conference which established before the West 'the political fact as distinguished from the geographical reality that was Asia and Africa.' But there was also another aspect which the Bandung Conference (and subsequent conferences of the non-aligned and Afro-Asian countries) emphasized: the idea of cooperation between nations. The emergent countries of today are coming to realise their cultural and economic interdependence and are united in their desire for peace and security. Their common stand on the question of colonialism underlines their belief in freedom as a right which

is enforceable upon any nation which denies its exercise.

Afro-Asian nationalism therefore represents a cultural and political movement transcending the orthodox dichotomies of East and West, communism and democracy. It is loosening our 'ideological straitjackets' and making possible a freer intellectual atmosphere. Contemporary nationalism is thus justified in terms of commitments and responsibilities beyond the immediate context of the nation.

But has its character really changed that much? Is this not perhaps too sanguine a view? What about Paris and Peking where 'primitive' nationalism rears its ugly head? It is this 'exuberant optimism' that Dr. Romulo seeks to defend in his second lecture: 'The Politics of Skepticism.' This is the political doctrine based on mistrust in human nature and a loss of faith in man's intelligence.

Again, history is not without justification for this pessimism. Even the recent past has had its share of political perversities. But Dr. Romulo is undeterred in his faith in contemporary nationalism. Wars do begin in the minds of men but the minds of men today, he says, are becoming increasingly mature and politically conscious. Moreover, there is increased regional consultation and cooperation amongst the nations of Afro-Asia and Latin America taking inspiration from each other in terms of their common political experience and creating thereby an atmosphere which enhances social and cultural exchange.

The significance of this trend towards an international outlook is that a new foundation must be given to the concepts of international law. Problems such as the question of international personalities, sovereignty, obligation and security, must be resolved. Above all, there must arise the consciousness that neither freedom nor security can be guaranteed without an agency of power which can enforce what the community strives to preserve. But Dr. Romulo does not follow this line of thought to its logical conclusion. Freedom can be preserved. But liberty implies restraint and as Rousseau pointed out, we may even be forced to be free. Herein lies the rub!

In the final lecture—'The International Polity'—the relation between equality and the international community is brought out. Dr. Romulo considers a world order in the sense of an international democracy in which the units instead of being individual persons are nation States. The point here is that the community of nations in the world order must be able to respect each other's equality and it is, 'pace' Dr. Romulo, precisely this idea of equality which has come to present a problem in the attempt of all nations to integrate themselves into an international order.

But is equality the problem? The United Nations treats all its members as equal yet this has not brought us any nearer the goal of world integration. Is not the stumbling block rather the irksome question of sovereignty? Locke is quoted by Dr. Romulo

as saying that the governing body derived its existence from a social contract in which the contracting parties preserve their natural rights and equal status. But Dr. Romulo ignores the weakness of Locke's position for this theory of obligation rests on the 'tacit consent' of the constituting parties, a point which Locke himself studiously avoids elaborating.

In international politics, however, this point cannot be ignored. The author would have done better by quoting either Hobbes or Rousseau who are more forthright on this subject. Both realise that authority, to be effective, requires the surrender of sovereign rights by the individual members, in this case the nation States. The surrender is, of course, mutual so that equality between States is preserved. But the question is precisely whether they will agree to this surrender. So far they have not. For this reason Dr. Romulo's conclusion that we are progressively marching to the goal of a world order is perhaps too optimistic.

Kamalbir

CORRUPTION IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES By Ronald Wraith and Edgar Simpkins.

George Allen & Unwin, Ltd. 1963.

The subject of corruption in developing countries is not meant to imply that there is no corruption in affluent societies. Only the brand is different, the stakes are higher, and a developed economy is better able to afford waste and misappropriation of the tax-payers' money. But corruption in developing countries is of greater concern to us, for we can ill afford it.

This study deals with the problem of corruption in the newly independent African countries, but the greater part of it covers Britain, which is regarded as having been a developing country until 1880 and as having had more corruption in its public life until then than there is in the developing countries of to-day. But that is no consolation, as 1964 is not 1880. It is true, however, that subsequently Britain did come to acquire the reputation of having perhaps the cleanest administration of any country. The world has moved on, but where?

We have some idea now of what a developing economy is; but what is corruption? It is the corrosion of integrity, and the resort to bribery, which takes two parties to bring about. The available literature on corruption is extremely limited, for any investigation into this problem is not easy. What can be proved or disproved is not always the same as what we can suspect, see or believe, and there is the risk of defamation. Yet, it is a problem which is of growing concern in our own country, with serious implications for the future. The contamination of public life has gone pretty far and, even if its impression is exaggerated and unbalanced, there is still cause for wondering why such an impression should prevail and grow. It is dangerous.

Corruption is supposed to be the growth-pang of new independence and a developing economy. Britain

had it, Africa is going through it, but what about the Indian situation, where moral values are loftily preached and steadily breached? The published report of the Santhanam Committee on Prevention of Corruption throws much light on many obscure corners and injects darkness where there should be more light.

The Committee has recognised that the problem is essentially one of the entire system of moral values and of the socio-economic structure, so that no fundamental change may be expected until the system of values and the structure of society are changed. It takes time to build those institutions of opinion which are not afraid to speak out and can exert pressure when such pressure is necessary. In the absence of fear of punishment, or a sense of shame, what is an effective deterrent?

It would not be far wrong to say, according to the same Report, that the high water-mark of corruption was reached in India, as perhaps in other countries also, during the period of the Second World War, i.e., prior to the transfer of power in 1947. Two of the major contributory factors for the growth of corruption have been indicated as—(a) the partially acknowledged unwillingness to deal drastically with corrupt and inefficient public servants, and (b) the protection given to the services in India which is supposed to be greater than that available in the more advanced countries. Corruption can exist if only there is someone willing to corrupt and capable of corrupting.

The Committee regrets to say that this willingness and capacity to corrupt is found in a large measure in the industrial and commercial classes. No one who heard it can forget the stirring words of Nehru in 1945. Speaking of the calamitous Bengal Famine after his release from his final and longest term of imprisonment, he declared his wish to see profiteers and hoarders hanged from 'the nearest lamp-post.' However, nothing was done about it, and that may have something to do with the dimensions of the problem of corruption to-day. Such ruthlessness in other societies has not attracted the most opprobrium outside.

What is the way to deal with corruption among ministers and most political parties? The chapter on 'Power, Wealth and Status' has thought provoking observations on this point. It is the contention of the author that in Britain power, wealth and status always tended to be in somewhat different hands, and that although the desire of people to exchange one for the other was the cause of a great deal of corruption, it also had its beneficial side because it kept the classes who possessed them fluid, and was one of the reasons why Britain had managed to change peacefully and not violently.

It is pertinent to compare the example given with what obtains in this country, where the freedom struggle was won more peacefully than violently in a unique sort of way. Many professional people in Britain, and especially the clergy and doctors, have

little wealth or power but considerable status. Others, among whom are included various kinds of speculators and promoters, have considerable wealth but almost no status and little power. A few, like senior civil servants and higher technologists, have only modest wealth, their status is obscure as they largely work in the background, but they wield very great power. The number of people possessing all three is regarded as being very small. Here, 'The Establishment' and its mystery have been mentioned. Is it associated more with power and status, and not necessarily with wealth? There is plenty of room for debate in all this.

What constitutes stature and what constitutes status? The same authors argue that in the developing countries, with their highly disparate societies, there is a remarkable concentration of power, wealth and status in the hands of a few, among whom politicians are predominant, for the equation of politics with wealth is the outstanding, and terrifying, feature of these countries. In Britain, people enter politics today from various motives, not all of them necessarily commendable, but the motive of direct financial gain is not among them. How far is this contrast and comparison justified and true? The question is worth pondering over as we are going through the convulsions of corruption right now, and also wish to develop our economy fast, which is the only answer.

A. K. Banerjee

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
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Communications

Some thoughts regarding your issue on *Our Changing Values*. E. M. Forster has said somewhere significantly, 'There is something else in life besides time, something which is measured not by minutes or hours, but by intensity, so that when we look at our past it does not stretch back evenly but piles up into a few notable pinnacles, and when we look at the future it seems sometimes a wall, sometimes a cloud, sometimes a sun, but never a chronological chart.' So that value is when you not only just do a thing but think it is worth doing. 'I only saw her for five minutes but it was worth it,' Forster gives this example to show

one's 'double allegiance' in daily life, to time as well as to value.

What then does the average Indian think is worth doing as he plods through the unending imposition of his days? I will not go into what one thinks he *ought* to value. But merely to record what he does value will seem to the discerning a startling enough revelation of the inspirations behind our changing society. It is well to realise at the outset for those who glibly compare the slow transformation of India with the ease with which other emerging nations have adopted the modern mantle, that here



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the past never lost its hold, so the new had first to be reconciled to the old in the minds of the masses before it could be thrust upon them, or before they could bring themselves to accept it.

Even the success of Nehru's magnificent effort to inculcate amongst these anonymous millions a rational, independent outlook was terribly pin-pointed in effect because he had not only to deal with ignorance but with a national memory that could not clear itself of half-remembered myths and their half-remembered significances. He had no clean slate to begin with on which he as a figure of the modern age could leave an immediate and absolute imprint. He had to over-write on the hieroglyphics of a cultural reserve which had unfathomable beginnings.

As Professor A. L. Basham says in his *Wonder That Was India*: 'The ancient civilisation of India differs from those of Egypt, Mesopotamia and Greece, in that its traditions have been preserved without a break to the present day. Until the advent of the archaeologist, the peasant of Egypt or Iraq had no knowledge of the culture of his forefathers, and it is doubtful whether his Greek counterpart had any but the vaguest ideas about the glory of Periclean Athens. In each case there had been almost a complete break with the past. On the other hand, the earliest Europeans to visit India found a culture fully conscious of its own antiquity—a culture which indeed exaggerated that antiquity and claimed not to have fundamentally changed for many thousands of years. To this day legends known to the humblest Indian recall the name of shadowy chieftains who lived nearly a thousand years before Christ, and the orthodox brahman in his daily worship repeats hymns composed even earlier.'

The philosophical legacy turned to be that of the most amazing contradiction. Negation on the one hand and a cool, virile, earthy joy on the other. The caste system was an economic expedient, not a prejudiced ramification into groups. The division of a man's life into periods of learning, domesticity, spiritual inquest and renunciation seemed to follow nature rather than impose upon it. Who indeed does not want the intense involvement implied in the first two—the years of enthusiasm—and the opportunity for self-discovery in the next two—the years of objectivity?

But gradually the concept of continuous re-births, which must give to the true believer supreme confidence in the will to perfection, became for its blind adherents the reason for supreme inaction. The very plane of thought sank low. Whereas negation, even if disapproved of, had revolved round the

question of the denial of the physical in favour of a positive, spiritual, self-forgetting merging into the eternal, into the everlasting nothingness of a *Nirvana*, it was translated into modern terms into the petty theories of abstinence: prohibition, vegetarianism and sex-guilt.

That exultant affirmation, if not of life, at least of the living form, which one finds in ancient Indian sculpture and literature changed into the hunched in walk of a small town, middle class woman who is frightened of knowing that she has a body. And those contradictions I mentioned earlier, which might give temperament its depth and intellect its glory, turned to a philosophy of double-feel. Not even double-think, which has the advantage at least of a conscious assessment of right and wrong, but this peculiar alchemy of emotional reaction in every field of Indian behaviour which reconciles desire with ethical impropriety with the most facile ease. I'll give an example which left me astounded.

Religious festivals in our town are celebrated with great gusto. One straightaway gets the feeling that the gods and goddesses are invoked mostly as an excuse for mass get-togethers. However, there is this custom of showing *jhankis* which are elaborate and vividly decorated cameos depicting the many manifestations of our gods. Sometimes, when 'religious' enthusiasm is said to spill over, an artist from outside is called to augment the efforts of local talent. But the real reason is the rivalry between the organisers of various *jhankis* who have their appointed spots where they construct a pandal each year to seat a Durga or a Shiva.

This time, an outside artist was paid 700 rupees (alas, for poverty!) for doing one *jhanki* which of course outshone all the others. On either side of the Goddess Durga as it happened to be, you also saw Krishna killings Kans and Yashodhra milking the cows while Krishna steals the butter. An additional 'attraction' this time was a scene showing Nehru on the funeral pyre and Indira Gandhi, true enough, standing by the side. Very well-lit, dramatic and 'poignant', they said, and the people filed past with due respect. (Alas, for good taste!) On special festive nights during the seven or eight days that the *jhanki* is displayed, there are propaganda plays, skits and scenes from *nautanki* or other folk forms on a platform nearby.

In previous years, they had devotional songs, even qwwalli, to entice the crowds. But times have changed! 'The *nautanki* is vulgar, you know', said an organiser. I wonder what he was thinking of when he said that because what we were given as entertainment on the auspicious eves preceding the

ceremonial crowning of the *jhankis* into the tanks and rivers, were dancing girls! Specially invited from adjoining big towns, they had nothing to show for the art that is traditionally associated with their calling except titillating imitations of screen styles, even to their theme song, *Haye kya karoon Ram mujhe budha mil gaya!*

It could be gruesome even to agnostic eyes to see ugly, washed out women, with pretensions to coquetry, substituting for the Menakas and Urvashis of mythological lore in front of a garishly painted Shiva and Parvati or Kali spearing a lion. And how confusing, morally. The people broke all reserves in attending these *jhankis*, never before had such 'religious' crowds come out with such abandon, for never before (Oh shades of Devadasis!) had such women graced sanctity. But they didn't know that. Victims of double-feel, they saw nothing incongruous in the simultaneous enjoyment of religion and sin. 'I never miss a single day's darshan of a *jhanki*', I remembered my maid servant saying with all the exultant belief of a born Hindu, as I saw her sitting amidst the villagers in wide-eyed fascination of these pig-tailed prostitutes. 'But don't you think it odd to applaud a *tawaif* when you go to worship a Goddess?' I asked her later. Her naivete was complete. 'Oh, but they draw a curtain over Durga then!' she exclaimed. And then the 'worshippers' with their exuberant whistles and tempestuous reactions, almost crowded the women off the stage with their enthusiasm, and spread into the lanes and the highways with utter unconcern. But when the district authorities sought to remove the road block the citizens were up in arms crying vehemently that the 'religious sentiments' of the people were being insulted. Alas, alas, for hypocrisy!

To take a more general example: morality doesn't permit that there should be kissing shown on the Indian screen. But so ostentatious is the sexual suggestion through gesture, movement and expression that even the blase must squirm uncomfortably in their seats at times. Yet, a recent film made in English for export makes all the concessions, I believe, to popular western expectations so far as love-making is concerned! A professor once told me that when he asked some of his colleagues over to his house in the university campus and offered them a drink while they sat on the lawn outside, their reaction was so horrified that he thought they didn't drink at all. But they, soon assured him in nervous whispers that so long as they could do it 'in private,' in the drawing room, for instance, where nobody could see, it might be alright. 'But there's

no prohibition in this State', he said, surprised. 'Nevertheless, the policy... we're not expected to... you know.' He told me that he thought our image of the ideal had become distorted, that's why our values were all awry.

Some time ago, the chairman of the Praja-Socialist Party in what was probably its last meeting, said in an address to fellow workers: 'At one time we projected and popularised three symbols of our activity—spade, prison and vote. The spade is now almost forgotten, the prison comes into the picture occasionally, and the vote has become the real pre-occupation.' The observation is valid for almost any shade of political participant.

But how symbols can signify the change in values is evident from a naughty little comparison which has come to be bandied about from lip to lip to describe the rising affluence of the commercial classes. It is chance that the reference is particular: the five k's, *kes*, *kirpan*, *kara*, *kacha* and *kanga*, which are the ritual possessions of the Sikh, had turned, they said, into the five modern k's—club, car, cards, cocktails and *kuri* (girl): the application, I maintain, is general and relevant to all communities. It is part of a trend to adopt the western style without understanding the western value.

The surreptitious 'in private', for instance, has no conception of the role of privacy. A European woman who married an Indian and came to live here said that the one thing she could never adjust herself to in all her 30 years in this country was that whenever she went into her room to enjoy some cherished moments of solitude, her mother-in-law or sister-in-law would come bustling in with very sympathetic murmurs of concern, 'Tch, tch, you musn't feel depressed and sit alone like this. We'll keep you company, don't you worry.' Place that against the lone splendour of the individual search that Hinduism exalts and you find again that religion has gone soaring way above and beyond the brass tacks of living, as to make even life irrelevant.

This unconscious, well-meant busibodiness on a larger scale becomes a terrible imposition, sometimes even frightening because it remains unconscious. The way the film songs blare through loudspeakers in the market of a small town, so loud and bombastic and overwhelmingly everywhere that each area of personal thought becomes nothing, but a noisy field: you can't think. But worse is when there is a religious occasion (alas, alas, for religion!); then, temples and gurdawaras, great gregarious centres, break into an overpowering cacophony of sound. 'What's

this racket,' I couldn't help asking one day when I heard a loud, booming voice smothering the town, 'What on earth is this racket?' 'It's a lecture in the temple. It's Ganapati puja.' It was an over-confident, bumptious sound which seemed to presume upon the consent of all, that's what I couldn't accept. Why did they think that everyone should be a party to their private communion? Why should a loudspeaker be fixed inside a temple anyway? The lecture stopped, and then the bhajans began. But see what happens. Only two bhajans are played and they switch on to a song in praise of Nehru: *Karti hai pharyad yeh dharti hazaron saal Tab hota hai paida ek Jawahar Lal.* . .

It's an impatient stop gap, a sort of a secular preliminary to what must come inevitably: a film song. And in fact the next is Raj Kapoor's love lorn ditty: *Bol Radha bol sangam hoga ke nahin.* Even if one argues that Radha and Sangam might have been considered sufficient devotional references for the occasion, one is in for a rude awakening, for what you do hear ultimately issuing from the temple during Ganapati-puja—I repeat—is that frothy tit bit: *Hai kya karoon Ram mujhe budha mil gaya.* This time you can't argue that the word Ram is sufficient excuse.

It seems to me inconceivable now that any constructive realisation of what India is and therefore can be and ought to be can be arrived at without an immediate and personal contact with the representative reality of a small town. Most of our intellectual elite, or when it becomes the intellectual elite, lives in big cities: it is confronted therefore with the niceties of argument rather than with its fundamentals. Indian intellectual thought thus catches only at the peripheries of a problem and reform, consequently, falls on what is for the moment irrelevant.

Take for instance an enlightened woman in Delhi who explodes into righteous indignation because the public school which her children attend may make (as one did) an unfair claim in a circular to parents, or how widely the rising cost of education is quoted as an example of deteriorating conditions. Set this against the fact that a school or college teacher in a small town uses his personal whim to fail or pass an aspiring youngster, that what he has taken from tradition is the corrupted form of the *guru-shishya* relationship where servility is the qualifying mark for a student, that a student who is willing to dash around doing tasks for the teacher outside the educational premises is guaranteed to be the blue-eyed winner of every test, and where that teacher holds the trump card, like influence, even in a major examination,

and you realise that you have to rethink your priorities.

In fact, so prevalent is this form of patronage that in cases where parents learn of a case of unpleasant imposition on their child, they seldom dare to complain for fear that the teacher would retaliate with redoubled vigour on the poor kid. A woman who found that when her little daughter in school lost her pen and complained to the teacher, the teacher exclaimed wrathfully: 'So what! You can always lift another girl's, can't you!' although horrified, remained silent. An instruction to steal, however playful the interpretation you might give it, was not something that she at least had gone to school to learn and that was 30 years ago. *What on earth was the world coming to.* Were these the fruits of freedom indeed?

She knew also of examples where little girls of eight or nine were sent out during school to the ubiquitous market amongst *dhaba* shops, idle men and running trucks to buy *pakodas* for the teacher. If they didn't they'd get a lashing. Suppose you accept even that. But could you accept it that if children told their parents and there was a complaint they would be punished by *being failed*? That was the unbelievably heinous part of the affair. You can browbeat a student into doing your personal work—perhaps there might even be voluntary delight in doing so for a loved teacher—but if you are going to take that as the guiding principle for failing or passing him then you automatically train him to base his entire life on the belief that sychophancy is a rewarding creed.

A professor of a college related to me once how an ex-student of his pestered him so much to give some more marks in a paper which he was examining that he gave him five per cent extra. That didn't satisfy the student. He begged and wheedled and whined for another five, then another five and then another five and then another until he got him to give him a total of 80 per cent. In the final result he had only two per cent more than the boy who stood second, who had perhaps got 78 per cent through hard work and study! The boy with 80 per cent was selected for a post that both had wanted, and when I pointed out the shameful injustice of this to the professor, he on his side said with utmost casualness: 'Oh, he got a job later.'

But, the same professor, otherwise intelligent, well read and sensitive affirmed with a frustration that had become habitual with him, that teaching was no longer what it was 35 years ago. 'There was more freedom of speech, more provision for criticism of wrong and more regard for forthrightness even if it went against the British during British times than there is now. I could condemn the

British way of life with less risk than I can the Indian Constitution now.'

If one weren't so deeply involved, it might almost seem like a laughing matter. Who has left us these shattering legacies, The British? The Vedas? The very times that were? Would you blame the deliberate spread of 'babu' culture under the British or the seemingly inviolable role of blind obedience bequeathed us by our ancient pattern for the obsequiousness with which the weak, for instance, regard the privileged here? If a deeply ingrained, traditionally exalted sense of respect for age moves me, a woman, to stand up when an old gentleman enters the room (contrary to all that the western mode of etiquette implies) what is that other face of the coin which makes a trader fall at the feet of a Collector to beg for assurance where he could demand it as his right as a citizen?

On one occasion I had been embarrassed enough to see a young boy of fourteen wiping the dust off my husband's feet as were because he happened to be the Collector when he promised to get him re-admitted into a school from which he had been unfairly thrown out. But the boy also bent low in front of the District Education Officer who had been called in in the meanwhile, and imagine my surprise when instead of protesting as my husband had done at the gesture, the education officer accepted it so naturally as if it were due him anyway, that he automatically assumed a grandly eloquent benedictory stance, even to spreading his hands wide over the boy's head.

Where, I wondered, had tradition left off and a modern reappraisal begun? It was impossible to tell. If there was a class in India which clung to the older forms of behaviour, there was also this other which seemed consciously to cherish its heritage of superiority. The education officer, I thought, must be a Brahmin, but I didn't ask him.

'Get up, get up,' we said to the boy impatiently. So he stood up shakily. He had walked 45 miles, hungry and poor, but hopeful to have his case 'seen to'. What made him so intense?

'I want to study', he said.

'Yes, but what?'

'I could do my B.A.'

'After that?'

'I could even become a clerk!'

'That's all? Nothing else?'

'No, a-ah, sir,' said the boy, surprised. What more could he aim for?

It seemed so ironic to recall what Jawaharlal Nehru has said in an unforgettable,

lone voice: 'The mere act of aiming at something big makes you big.' Perhaps his tragedy was that he had always to speak to and for a people who aimed too low. The gap was incommunicably wide between a man who felt the impossible could be made real and those whose ambitions stopped at clerkships. It was in spite of him therefore that the basic trend that freedom seems to have spewed out these past 17 years—it is best to take that as the determining point in assessing what should be the impulses of free men—is a growing, blind and defiant emphasis on ends, without regard to the quality of actions which might be employed to achieve them. You may or may not sit for an exam but you must wangle a degree. You may or may not be concerned with values or prices as they affect others so long as you have friends to depend upon for favours and illusions to make you feel noble. Above all, you feel you must get rich and you don't care how. Is this the desperate stand of the weak, or the very poor? I wouldn't know. But can one feel with the primordial protest of all those *ganapatis* and *durgas* and *shivas* and *parvatis* and sigh, alas, alas, alas, for values, even as one's heart begins to trip a truant beat to the strains that waft across the land: *Hai kya karoon Ram mujhe budha mil gaya!* No, I wouldn't know.

Seoni. January 1965.

UMA VASUDEV

Your issue on Jawaharlal Nehru of November 1964 was the provocation for the following comments. Nehru was essentially an autocrat. He could not even be considered to have always been the benevolent sort. Mahatma Gandhi's Himalayan blunder was not what he considered as such but his having announced that Jawaharlal would be his political heir. The uncanny Gujarati erred for once in thinking that Jawaharlal would talk his language after his death. As events proved, Nehru talked an entirely different language. Like he said of himself (with a trace of pride, I am inclined to think).

Nehru was a curious mixture. He was neither here nor there. He loved power and wanted to hold on to it at any cost. Democracy (in form) was good enough for him in so far as it suited his purpose. There was good clay in the Indian people. They like lovely faces and are idol worshippers of one sort or another. Jawaharlal had the look of a Greek god and no wonder the people were swayed by his appearance. And after all, as a people, were they not more at home under dictatorship than under any other form of government? The times, the

situations, the opportunities and his personal charm, all these were a godsend in the hands of Jawaharlal. He made the most of them.

Jawaharlal loved the masses because in them lay his support. He could not trust the intelligentsia to like his ideas and policies. Nehru's mistrust of them was such that he belittled them on every conceivable occasion. He encouraged fellow travellers and the so-called Left for to them he was a kind of leader. If I may modify Hector Abhayavardhana, the Left, the Socialists and Communists, *could simply not afford* to reject Nehru, and they became involved with him and dependent on him.

Jawaharlal for his part used them as his tool to keep the Right in fear of a revolution and thus ensured his continuance in power without any serious challenge. The more intelligent among the masses were somewhat bewildered and thought that by supporting Jawaharlal they were rejecting rabid communists of the Left and the fanatic reactionaries of the Right and thus saving India for democracy! For the rest, Nehru preferred sycophants to serious thinkers. He wanted people to follow him, not to argue with him. It was thus that the rot was set in motion in the Congress Party.

So long as Nehru lived, no one in the Congress dared to speak out his mind critical of Nehru's policies. (As if to compensate everybody is shouting in every direction after his death.) Now and then a conscious few in the Congress raised their voices to question Jawaharlal but thereafter none ever heard of them. The critics were left severely alone to die a natural death.

In order to ensure continuance of and increase in the line of the Faithful, Nehru shielded and conferred encomiums upon even men of such utter corruption as Pratap Singh Kairon. Men of straw as Kamaraj and Bijou Patnaik had only to pay obeisance to him to make sure that their future was well taken care of. All of them whom Jawaharlal showered praises upon do not seem to count for anything today! Their prestige and position seem to have died along with Jawaharlal.

Leaders of strength and character like Vallabhbhai Patel, Acharya Kripalani, and Rajagopalachari who were superior to him in their political maturity and intellect, who preferred to question the wisdom of his policies and ideas were anathema to Jawaharlal. He managed to get rid of them. Using the charm of his personal magnetism he successfully confused the public and deluded them to imagine that he was their saviour. Thus did he ensure that the Left

could not afford to antagonise and the Right to throttle him. He pretended the whole of his political career to balance between the extremes, whereas in truth he was making his position more and more secure.

The proverbially short sighted and selfish Indian capitalists imagined Nehru to be their friend and backed his party with the funds at their command. Through the backdoor they asked for the *quid pro quo*. Some of them even pretended to be socialists to win Nehru's favour. They achieved whatever they did by corrupting the bureaucracy and the Congress, taking care at the same time to keep Jawaharlal happy.

It is difficult to believe that Nehru was not aware of all this seething corruption. It would be nearer the truth to say that he knew all about this but did not prefer to do anything lest the Faithful should revolt. In seventeen years he reduced the country to shambles. The crafty communists saw his sway over the unthinking multitude and preferred to take the line of least resistance with him. They occasionally talked of corruption but they blamed the bureaucracy, the capitalists and the Congress Party and not Nehru.

Jawaharlal in a subtle way was another Stalin. He didn't bother to touch the formal instruments of democracy but that was only because he knew that the adult franchise would allow him to have his way through by steam roller majority. Whenever the courts came in his way he promptly amended the constitution. It is significant that Lal Bahadur relied upon Nehru's ghost to get the ignoble 17th amendment passed through parliament, perhaps because he was afraid of a split of votes even within the Congress Party now that Nehru was no longer.

Such was the hold of Nehru on his party of self seekers. Nehru was a megalomaniac and wanted every stone in India to speak his glory and so he squandered public money over his grandiose schemes. Like Stalin he abused his critics, questioned their motives, never answered them. The Indian masses deserved him for that was the price they had to pay for their idol worship. Today, after 17 years of the Nehru era when they stand for hours on end in a never ending queue for a measure of rice they may spend the time usefully pondering over whether it was all worth while to have-so unthinkingly boosted up a megalomaniac. It is time that they faced realities and at least now understood the truth about Jawaharlal. It will be a good lesson for the future.

Madras, November 1964 K. S. RAMAMURTHY

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67

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a symposium on the
implications of a
national policy

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Harvard University

A LONG-TERM SOLUTION

Abu Sayeed Ayyub, philosopher,
Editor of 'Quest'

RELIGIOUS IMPARTIALITY

Ved Prakash Luthera, Lecturer,
Political Science, Delhi University

MYTH OF TOLERANCE

Ashok Rudra, Professor of
Research in Economic Planning,
Bombay University

IMPACT OF DEMOCRACY

R. V. Ramachandrasekhara Rao, Reader,
Department of Politics,
Andhra University

A MEANS TO AN END

Badr-ud-Din Tyabji, member of
the Indian Civil Service, Vice-Chancellor,
Aligarh Muslim University

POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS

Surindar Suri, Social scientist,
Visiting Professor, Heidelberg
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S. Krishnamurthy and Imtiaz
Ahmad

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COVER

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The problem

THE secularism of India is an aspiration, not yet a reality. It is an exceedingly important aspiration: the very fact that this country so aspires is already one of the most significant matters in current southern Asian evolution and if in the future it achieves its goal in this realm, this will be one of the most significant achievements in the long history not only of India but, I am bold enough to believe, of the world. By opting for secularism, India has decided to tackle one of the most persistently intractable of human problems and has affirmed its confidence that it can and will solve it, namely, the problem of how communities of men of profoundly differing preliminary convictions, of radically divergent outlooks on the universe, are to live together not only in harmony but in active and responsible collaboration, jointly running a democratic State.

For two or more communities to co-exist in peace and even amity is noteworthy, but is

not so remarkable when one of the communities rules, or when all are equally subject to some ruler. When all share equally in ruling, however, and participate together in jointly constructing a joint life—this is really an heroic vision. It remains to be seen whether India, or indeed anyone else, can achieve it.

It is a mistake to suppose that the West has solved this formidable problem. In fact, no western nation has seriously faced it nor has had to face it. Every western democracy is religiously homogeneous, almost, by Indian standards. Protestants and Catholics differ from each other roughly as much as does one Hindu caste from another. Christians and Jews differ perhaps as much as do Hindus and Jains, or Hindus and Buddhists—the latter analogy has also historical facets. Christians have much of which to be ashamed in the Christian treatment of Jews, even recently; if they have

also some reason to be hopeful regarding their democratic secular aspirations in this regard, one may remember also that numerically the Jewish group in no western democracy constitutes as much as three per cent of the population.

Let no one underestimate, then, the magnitude of what India is taking on in aspiring towards secularism. To transform this country from its present condition into one of functioning secularism will be a massive, creative task, requiring imagination, drive, understanding and goodwill in very large measure. We may note some of the problems involved under three headings: the question of meaning, the problem of moral and theoretical basis, and the issue of democracy. Let us look at these in turn.

To an outside observer, one of the alarming aspects of the present situation is the apparent insouciance as to what secularism means. Inquiry elicits an amazing array of interpretations, several of them held by men who seem to have little inkling that other people have quite a different view as to what secularism implies. Accordingly, each position tends to be blandly held without discussion or criticism or clarification, and without any realisation of how isolated and perhaps ineffectual are in fact the advocates of that particular view. That one understands secularism, and that 'of course' others understand it similarly, appear to be widespread fallacies.

The chief positions which seem to be held may perhaps be loosely classified again into three main groups: the western or negative view; the Hindu or pluralist view; and the nationalist or positive view. The western rests on a notion of separation between religion and politics or between Church and State. It affirms the negative point that political and social life should proceed without ecclesiastical involvement. In the West this idea can be reasonably clear, especially since the Church is a specific, concrete fact. Nonetheless, there are significant shades of difference even in the West between, for instance, the French term *laïque* (of the people, the laymen, as distinct from the clergy) and the English term *secular* (historical, temporal pertaining to time as distinct from eternity).

There are also continuing debates and discussions, for instance in the United States, as to just where and how the line is to be drawn. Many books and treatises are written by lawyers and political scientists and by theologians and many court cases studied. In the light of western history and of Christian doctrine and Christian practice, several general principles are accepted; but the application of these to modern life continues to be a subject of lively concern. Moreover, future developments are

today more uncertain than seemed the case until recently.

Some believe that this western concept can be transferred to India but have given little thought to defining the requisite modifications. The most conspicuous difference is that neither Hindus nor Muslims have a 'Church', in either theory or practice; so that a separation of it from the State begins by being meaningless. It is also sometimes overlooked that secularism in this dichotomizing sense presupposes a religious acceptance of the dichotomy as well as a political one. It is the same persons who are citizens, on the one hand, of a State which upholds the separation and are believers, on the other, in a Church whose scripture commands 'Render unto Caesar those things that are Caesar's and unto God the things that are God's' and whose theologians have been busy for centuries elaborating this. If a religious community's theology affirms the separation of religion and politics, this is different from a situation where some other orientation is religiously held. We shall return to this crucial point under 'democracy' below.

By the 'Hindu' notion of secularism I mean the attitude that rather than rejecting any or all religion, instead accepts all. In this view, a secular State is one which supports all religious communities equally, even subsidizing their religious activities and even regulating them (temple finance, etc.). In education, textbooks under this scheme do not omit religious references but rather include a great many, and even teach one particular metaphysical doctrine, namely, that of pluralism—even though this doctrine may be offensive to minorities.

The 'nationalist' interpretation of secularism envisages religious loyalties being misplaced, at least in certain spheres of life, by national ones. Thus the secularist here is one whose moral commitment, social idealism, and constructive energies are given, and it is felt ought to be given, to the welfare of the nation. Ideally, under this scheme it becomes a man's religious or at least moral duty to strive for the good of a non-religious group and he is expected to choose national goals in preference to religious ones.

Perhaps one might generalise that for several, thinking is in terms of the first, negative, idea for relations between the individual and the State (e.g., in distribution of government jobs); of the second, the pluralist, for relations between groups and the State; and of the third, the nationalist, for new projects like the building of dams, or for the relations between the individual and society.

Fairly little attention, however, is perhaps usually given to questions as to how compatible the ideas are with each other, or how compatible any one is with a given religious

outlook. Number one, for example, the negative, is probably compatible with the atheist, Christian, and some forms of Hindu thought, though not easily with Islamic (as appears, for instance, in Turkey) and not with other important Hindu inclinations. It is in part compatible with number three, the nationalist, but not with two, the pluralist. Number two is compatible with most Hindu views, though not all, and definitely not with atheist or Christian or Muslim. Number three, the nationalist, may go with all but not easily with any. And so on.

Under the laws of the United States, for example, it would be easy for a citizen to get in the courts an injunction against the use of most of the text books prescribed in the Delhi schools, and against many A.I.R. radio programmes. (Pluralism is seen by Christians and Muslims as a threat—an absorptive threat). Again, a westernising Hindu once said to me, 'we would need a strong secularist movement in this country even if there were no Muslims.' However, my chief point here is not to question the validity, wisdom, or applicability of my particular interpretation of secularism. Rather, it is to question a lack of clarification in this realm altogether. How is it that so few professors of philosophy or of political science have written books on the issue, and so few universities have established papers on it in their honours schools? How likely is an aspiration to be realised which has not been delineated?

The second major point regarding secularism in India has to do with the moral and theoretical basis for it. Why be secular? How to develop and sustain a faith in it that will stand against the obviously powerful, passionate forces which threaten to engulf not only it but society?

Western secularism has sometimes been presented, even in the West, as if it were purely negative: 'let's get rid of religion.' Yet it is a positive force, even a positive faith. At its best, it has historical and metaphysical underpinnings going back to the Greek streak in western civilization, rather than to the Palestinian; and it has had champions, and even martyrs, of great intellectual and moral stature—men whose ideas and devotion have been outstanding. I have previously had occasion to note that modern Egypt, for example, although it has many irreligious men, has not produced a Voltaire or a Tom Paine to argue that it is man's moral duty to fight against religion, that it is a cosmic imperative to strive for purely humanist goals.

Atheistic humanism can be a powerful force, but it has to be believed in. Secularism cannot be constructive unless it is a positive movement with its own inspiration. When Turkey began toying with secularist ideas, the first

terms used to designate them was the negative *la-dini*, but this connoted more or less 'dishonesty', so that champions of a secular State were thought to be advocating an immoral State. In so far as a moral tradition has been religiously-oriented, as in India, how is secularism to rise above being merely immorality?

Thirdly, secularism can perhaps be imposed on a people previously religious in their total outlook; as by a dictator like Ataturk, or by a new nationalist elite overriding the masses. But will it be chosen by such a people themselves? Can it be attained democratically? This point can perhaps be put most provocatively in this form: India may be secular, or it may be democratic, but is there any real possibility of its being both? If power is genuinely given into the hands of the people, to choose what they really want to have, is there any chance of their effectively choosing secularism?

Perhaps Hindus may be expected to choose the Hindu version of secularism, the pluralist form; but that form does not solve, and may rather exacerbate, Hindu-Muslim tensions. Otherwise, however, will communities not interpret independence and democracy as an opportunity for giving political and economic expression to their own inherent and traditional aspirations, for affirming their own (that is, Hindu) culture? One might be hard put to it to show cause why they should indeed choose to make use of their new political power to curtail the expression of their own tradition.

The summation of my argument is a submission that Indian secularism will either fail to emerge, or else will emerge as something new. What form secularism will take here, in order to be successful, has yet to be hammered out. Anyone who starts with a preconceived notion that secularism already exists somewhere just waiting to be applied in this complex country, or who self-righteously believes that his own group's ideal of secularism is the final ideal which others must perforce accept, is liable to obstruct rather than to advance its cause. Creative thinking is required of a high order. No one can define secularism in advance of some very hard and original excogitation, testing, colloquy. This much at least can perhaps be said to constitute an operational definition: that a secular State is a form of State so contrived as to win and hold and deserve the loyalty and warm allegiance of any citizen of whatever religion or of none.

At the moment no one understands the divergent presuppositions of the various groups sufficiently to produce an adequate pattern out of his own head.

A seminar to test this would, I suggest, be illuminating—and perhaps fruitful.

W. Cantwell Smith

A long-term solution

ABU SAYEED AYYUB

PROFESSOR Wilfred Cantwell Smith has done well to point out the deplorable confusion which exists in this country about the meaning of 'secularism'. He has classified the different meanings which are commonly attached to the word into three main groups. I shall say something about the first two, hoping that I shall not be adding to the confusion in the attempt to reduce it.

If the western conception of secularism rested solely on the separation of Church and State, it would no doubt be of little concern to us. It could, however, be made relevant to Indian conditions by simply substituting the word 'religion' for 'church'. The separation of State and religion can be conceived negatively as a principle of exclusion: the State must not interfere with any sphere of life which comes under the authority of religion. This is hardly practicable in a country like India where the major religions (or the social organisations and principles based upon them, like the *varnasramadharma* and the *shariah*) cover almost every aspect of man's life from birth to death.

It can also be conceived positively as the State's determination to observe impartiality and strict neutrality in its relations with the religious institutions and practices of the different communities of the land. This conception has high tradition behind it; it was expressed in the Asokan edicts and more elaborately formulated in

Queen Victoria's proclamation of 1858. This somewhat modified form of the western (or Asokan?) conception of secularism is currently favoured here and has found its way into our Constitution.

Of course, there is a difference between the British Indian conception of secularism and the form in which it has been adopted by the makers of the Constitution of independent India. The British Government in India not only abstained from 'all interference with the religious belief or worship of our subjects' (as had been enjoined by the Queen), but abstained also from interference with the religious practices, or practices arising out of religious beliefs, of the various Indian communities (apart from one or two notable exceptions, e.g., the 1832 act banning *suttee*) however repugnant they might be to modern ideas of morality and sanitation.

The Indian Constitution, on the other hand, guarantees the freedom to profess, practise and propagate religion 'subject to public order, morality and health.' This qualifying clause reserves to the Indian State the right to interfere very considerably with the existing religious practices. That right has been exercised so far in regard only to the Hindu community (the legal ban on the practice of untouchability, child marriage and polygamy, legalisation of divorce by consent, etc.). I hope this wholesome right will soon be exercised in regard to the other

communities, with the consent of course of their representatives in the parliament.

Donald Eugene Smith has justified such interference in religious matters by pointing out that the tremendous urge for effective social and religious reform in India can only be satisfied by State action, since 'Hinduism lacks the kind of ecclesiastical organisation necessary to set its own house in order' (*India as a Secular State*, p. 125). Whatever be the justification, this deviation from the western or, at any rate, the Queen's notion of secularism is all to the good.

In fact, we could do with a little more deviation. For instance, the offering of slaughtered animals to God or to one of the gods could be banned. And though the appeasement of the ghosts of our pre-historic tribal ancestors by slaughtering members of another community is a serious crime punishable by death under the law of both India and Pakistan, it continues to be practised extensively and with a fair amount of impunity in both countries due to administrative slackness in enforcing the law, particularly during the first two or three days of the outburst of communal murders. If widespread prejudices stand in the way of prohibiting the former kind of pseudo-religious slaughter right now, nothing should stand in the way of putting an immediate stop to the latter kind. No civilised government can tolerate such knife-and-petrol expression of religious fanaticism today.

Hindu Pluralism

The second meaning of secularism is called by Cantwell Smith 'the Hindu view' and described as pluralist. With excessive brevity he says, 'by the Hindu notion of secularism I mean the attitude that rather than rejecting any or all religion, instead accepts all.' This is of course not to be taken literally, for the Hindu does not accept Islam or Christianity in anything like the sense in which the Muslim or the Christian accepts his religion, viz., in the theoretical aspect as infallible

truth, and in its practical aspect as absolutely obligatory.

In what sense then does the Hindu accept other religions? It is often maintained that the Hindu, the enlightened Hindu that is to say, regards all religions as true. This could mean one of three things. He regards (1) all religions as equally true; (2) all religions as true in some degree, but his own religion as true in a higher degree than any other religion (this would imply a belief in degrees of truth instead of a sharp dichotomy between truth and error); (3) A's religion as true for A and B's religion true for B, and so forth (this would imply that truth is multiple like error).

Implications

I find it difficult to believe that Hindus accept the first of these propositions. One of the greatest and most enlightened of all the Hindus and moreover a staunch advocate of the universality of all religions, Swami Vivekananda, is on record as having said: 'Whether we call it Vedantism or any *ism*, the truth is that *Advaitism is the last word of religion and thought* (italics added) and the only position from which we can look upon all religions and sects with love. We believe it is the religion of the future enlightened humanity. The Hindus may get the credit of arriving at it earlier than other races.' Have the other religions yet arrived at the Vedantic notion of *Brahman*, or its identity with the self? The answer is no, and the implication is obvious.

Or let us consider in this connection S. Radhakrishnan's favourite quotation from the *Upnishads*: 'The real is one, the learned call it by various names—*Agni, Yama, Matarisvan*.' I should think it is not the abstract and transcendent real, but its actual expression in our hearts or realisation through our actions which is of the deepest concern to and significance for us. These are inevitably many, and surely one could be higher or completer than the other.

The Vedantists (S. Radhakrishnan included) hold that the impersonal

Absolute (*Brahman*) is truth on a higher plane than the personal God (*Iswara*). In fact, *Iswara* is an illusion although the highest of all illusions) from the higher Vedantic point of view. Is not the God of Islam and of Christianity, a personal God from any point of view acceptable to the learned upholders of those religions?

The Closed Society

I would not, therefore, interpret the Hindu pluralist view as accepting all religions or believing in the equal truth of all religions. It should be interpreted a little more moderately. Two elements stand out in this pluralism. The first is expressible in the third of my above propositions, but in fact goes beyond that. It not only says, 'the truth of my religion is true for me and of your religion for you,' but adds, please stick to the truth of your religion.' For there is no provision strictly within Hinduism to universalise its truth, invite others to participate in its own realisation of the truth.

No one can become a Hindu by merely accepting Hindu religious doctrines or moral codes; he has to be born a Hindu.* Hinduism is an ethnic religion and as such constitutes a closed society. Its own peculiar kind of intolerance is shown by the contempt with which it shuts its doors to those born outside its fold (regarded as 'unclean' by birth), just as a different kind of tolerance is shown by the eagerness and warmth with which open religious societies like those constituted by Buddhism, Christianity or Islam invite the outsider to come within their folds.

Force in such matters is always reprehensible, but the eagerness points to a sort of potential human fraternity in which they all believe. Each religion gives rise to its own brand of tolerance and intolerance, and to its own unique

* The *shuddhi* movement is a bit of an innovation. It has had little success not only because few non-Hindus want to be converted (or reconverted) to Hinduism, but because few Hindus are willing to accept them as full members of their community.

recipe for preparing a mixture of the two on which it puts its label.

Recognition of Multiplicity

The other and more important point in the Hindu pluralist view is the recognition of the multiplicity of religious truths. The Hindu of course prefers his own form of it for himself and regards it as the highest form, but is not intolerant of the other forms upheld by others. His attitude is more than merely tolerant: there is in it a distinct trace of respect if not of reverence for all other religions.

Not that this respect for the truth contained in other religions is shared by all the Hindus or even by all the enlightened Hindus; I could cite many distinguished names, but that is hardly necessary. What is important, however, is to remember that pluralism in this restricted sense is the view of the leaders of the present ruling party and of the present government; it is also the view, or rather one of the views (the other being the modified western view), which is embodied in the Constitution of India. And this could not be possible if it was not the Hindu view, by and large.

What I find most disturbing in Cantwell Smith's opening paper is the summary way in which he dismisses the practicability of this Hindu view of secularism for India by categorically affirming that it is 'definitely not compatible with atheist or Christian or Muslim (views).' Elsewhere he says that 'this doctrine may be offensive to minorities'. So far as I know, far from being offensive, this view has been firmly held by such eminent Muslims as Abul Kalam Azad, Hussain Ahmad Madani, Zakir Husain and a host of lesser but not insignificant men of thought and action belonging to the Muslim community.

It is true that their secularism and nationalism was defeated by the two-nation theory of Muhammad Ali Jinnah. Jinnah was distinguished for many things but not for his Islamic piety. His ignorance of Islam was equally profound; in all matters relating to Islamic theology, jurisprudence,

history, literature and culture, he was not fit to sit at the feet of men like Madani or Azad. And yet he made up his mind to carve out a State in the name of Islam in the teeth of opposition by men immeasurably superior to himself in any Islamic sense.

The causes of his success were multiple and complex; but a discussion of these would make an essay by itself. This carving was called by Jinnah and his successors *The Islamic State of Pakistan*, though the only Islamic element which Cantwell Smith has been able to discover in that State after a close and able study of its problems is a vague initial intention to make it Islamic—an intention which is wearing not deplorably but commendably thin in the face of the enormous problems posed by a stronger and more vital intention, viz., the intention to survive and develop as a modern State, i.e., a State with high living standards, modern scientific and technological education, and commanding some respect in the comity of nations.

The Only Alternative

Cantwell Smith's important and pithy conclusion on this question is worth quoting: 'It would not be absurd perhaps, to phrase this point by saying that Pakistan will flourish as a secular State only if its Muslims are able to persuade themselves that the truly Islamic State is a secular one.' (*Islam in Modern History*, Mentor, p. 254.)

And yet when the Hindus offer them a secular State in India, the Indian Muslims, according to Cantwell Smith, find it offensive. Why? And what is the big alternative idea in their heads? Are forty-five millions of them going to migrate to Pakistan, which has absolutely no room for them and is itself reluctantly groping its way towards secularism? Are ten per cent Muslims going to re-establish a Muslim kingdom in India, fighting a civil war not only against eighty-five per cent Hindu civilians but also against a soon-to-be well-equipped and almost entirely non-Muslim army of over 8,00,000? For the Muslims of

India there is absolutely no alternative to secularism, unless communal suicide be considered one. And if secularism, why not the pluralist form of it? What other conceivable form can be more acceptable to the Muslims?

Changing the Forms

The essence of Islam, it has been said, is the moral life, life according to norms which please God (*razi ba riza*—as it is expressed in Persian) not those which happen to please the individual agent. Muslims cannot deviate from this core of Islam without giving up their religion altogether. But the actual content of these norms were expressed thirteen centuries ago in the idiom of the time and place, and there is nothing unchangeable about this idiom.

There is something which is eternally valuable in Islam as in every other religion, but this value is to be realised afresh in every age and society. If Muslims ever believed that the good life, the higher life, must necessarily be lived in a community, and that this community must be organised according to a pattern set thirteen hundred years ago, then I am sure they are beginning to realise now all over the world that the details of that pattern have become inconsistent with our modern notions of the good society moulded by the economic, political and intellectual situation of our time.

Hinduism too had built up an elaborate social structure; the *varnasrama dharma* prescribed detailed rules for the life of the community. But the Hindus realised fairly early in their history that these rules were not laid once for all. The *asrama dharma* has passed into the pages of ancient history, and the *varna dharma* came under attack by their medieval saints and in the 19th century by their intellectual leaders; it is today being gradually demolished by their political leaders.

But, the task of transforming the Hindu society into a 'casteless and classless society' is not going

to be very easy, even though the machinery of the State has been yoked into service for that purpose. For, the caste system is supported by a still widely accepted dogma—belief in *karma* and re-birth. While half the Hindu mind recognises caste disabilities as a form of gross social injustice, the other half (I am speaking of the great majority) continues to look upon them as a cosmic dispensation of reward and punishment in accordance with the good and bad deeds committed in the previous birth. If the evil of caste has to go, it has to go root and branch—the theoretical root and the practical branch.

For the Muslims, the conception of life in a community organised according to sacrosanct patterns, played a central role in their early history. Hali and Iqbal resurrected this conception, and made good poetry out of their nostalgia for the past. Pakistan is making futile and not too earnest efforts to live up to its nominal claim of being an Islamic State.

Turkey's Experience

Turkey was until, the other day the leading Muslim nation of the world and the seat of the Caliphate. The new Turks, however, found that the old concept of an Islamic society, a society governed according to the laws of the *shariah*, was an obstacle to the development of their country as a modern State, and so swept the concept back to the lumber room of history. With rare moral and intellectual courage they set about the great task of not dissolving but reformulating the truth of Islam so as to be meaningful in the modern world. As the avant-garde Turks told Cantwell Smith: 'Turkey simply took the today necessary, salutary, and reforming step of making religion what it should be—an individual, personal matter, a thing of the conscience, a matter of private faith. The religious feeling is much too strongly embedded in the human soul for religion to be abolished. We have simply freed it.' (Op. cit., p. 181.)

Muslims in India must take this step, obviously even more urgent

for them today than it was for the Turks forty years ago. They have been fooled once by Jinnah; they simply cannot afford to be led into folly again. For we all know now that the cry for Pakistan had little to do with Islam and a great deal to do with the demand for a State-protected and State-subsidised expansion of the rising bourgeois and petit bourgeois sections of the Muslim community of the would-be Pakistan regions and of the would-be migrants to those regions.

The Great Challenge

The creation of Pakistan is regarded by the Hindus as a misfortune; for the Muslims whose home is and must remain India (and they number more than 45 millions) it was a disaster. The only interest that Pakistan now has in them is to make further capital out of their religious zeal and political naivete. Any lingering predilection for the Jinnah type Muslim League politics or for any kind of communal politics will endanger the very existence of the Muslim community in India. It must learn to separate religion from politics pretty thoroughly. That is the great challenge with which the modern age confronts every religious community. Amongst the Muslims, the Turks were the first to respond to this challenge; it is the Indian Muslim's turn now.

But the creative adventure of constructing new forms which may embody the perennial contents of Islam is not only more urgent for the Indian Muslims than it was for the Turks, it is in a way also easier. The Turks had the benefit of being close neighbours to the great western culture. The Indian Muslims are geographically remoter from the West but mentally closer through their hundred years of English education (I am speaking of the Muslim intelligentsia). But, they have an additional advantage: they are in still closer physical and mental proximity to another great but very different culture, the three thousand year old culture of the Hindus. It is these

contacts and comparative studies that make one realise what is great and what is small, what is central and what is peripheral, what is perennial and what is passing in one's own culture.

In their attempt to inwardise the religious consciousness, the Kemalist Turks banked heavily on the Sufi tradition which has been strong in Turkish history. They shifted the emphasis from the *shariah* (the way sanctified by the elaborate legalistic system built up by the *ulemas* on the basis of the *Quran* and the *Hadiths*) to *tarīqah* or *tasawwuf* (the way of the mystics). For the Indian Muslims the mystical tradition has been still stronger; indeed, according to some, sufism was imported from India to Turkey.

Liberal Traditions

Indian Islam is also not lacking in the liberal and rationalist tradition, but modern Indian Muslims have failed to make use of that tradition. Akbar deserves greater honour for the remarkably secular and liberal mind which he brought to bear on the affairs of the State at a time when dogmatism and bigotry were the order of the day all over the world. Sayyad Ahmad and Iqbal did valuable work in the reinterpretation and reconstruction of Islamic thought but failed to disturb the spiritual slumber of their Muslim fellow-countrymen; they gave a wrong lead in politics and that lead was enthusiastically taken up.

It is also insufficiently recognised here that Muslim thought at its height was not merely scholastic. Philosophers and theologians flourished side by side and carried on a lively debate. Al-Ghazzali, the greatest of the theologians, wrote a treatise in Baghdad demolishing the arguments of the philosophers (the Arab Aristotelians) which he thought weakened the pillars of Islamic orthodoxy.

Ibn Rushd replied to it from distant Cordova in a memorable but hardly remembered work called *The Demolition of the Demolition of Philosophers*. He rejected the two basic theological

propositions—that faith had primacy over reason, and/or that it could be reconciled with reason. Ibn Rushd maintained that faith and reason operated at different levels: the purpose of faith was to strengthen the moral will of the common people; what religion contributed to the course of history was the moral law and not knowledge. Those who seek knowledge must come to philosophy where alone one can find the highest form of truth.

Before him, al-Farabi and Abu Ali Sina had reached the conclusion that there is a single active intellect for all humanity. It was their conviction that the spiritual content and background of all religions are identical.* Sufis too adhered to the philosophical doctrine of a double standard. Law (*shariah*) was for the ordinary man; the highest virtue is love of God and his creation, and those who adopt this way of love can find the law in their own hearts.

The Correct Choice

As the Indian Muslim moves from ritual, dogma and theology either toward the great philosophers or toward the great sufis of Islam, he will find himself coming very close indeed to the seekers of truth and love amongst the Hindus, Christians, Buddhists and all the other great religions of the world. Not the westernisers alone but the traditionalist also can contribute greatly towards the sympathetic understanding and fraternal co-existence of faiths, provided they choose the right strands of tradition. The tradition of no religion, and not of Islam, consists of a single strand. Of the various strands of Islamic tradition, it is not the legalistic or theological and certainly not the ritualistic, but the mystic and the philosophical which are the most valuable to Indian Muslims today.

The modernisers and westernisers in India have undoubtedly a big role to play in transforming secularism, which (as Cantwell

Smith rightly observes) is yet only an aspiration, into a reality. Their work is very important, but not precisely in the shape many of them, and the tallest among them, would like to give it. They would like to, and believe that they will soon be able to, replace religion by science—not only for themselves but for their community as a whole. Kemal Ataturk, for instance, had his motto 'the truest guide in life is science' displayed on the main portal of the Faculty of Theology building in the University of Ankara.

The Function of Science

As a counter-challenge to the monopolistic claims of religion, this is very salutary; but as a proclamation of the function of science, it is somewhat misleading. Science is not a guide but a servant. It is not the function of science to deal with ultimate values, and so it cannot prescribe for us the ends of life. But once we have chosen our ends, it is science and science alone which can help us to find or forge the best means for realising them.

Jawaharlal Nehru wrote in his *Autobiography*: 'The real struggle today in India is not between Hindu culture and Muslim culture, but between those two and the conquering scientific culture of modern civilisation.' Although science will be the conqueror in this land as it has been in the West, it cannot fill the whole of man's mind, nor can we identify science with culture.

An eminent Indian scientist said the other day in the course of his convocation address: 'Science is the new humanism.' That was a careless statement. What then shall we do with our art and literature (let alone religion)—make them scientific, or drop them out of our new humanism? What conflict there is between the Hindu and Muslim religious cultures, and no doubt there is, cannot be wholly resolved by any outside or one-sided agency like science. Science and industry will no doubt provide a powerful unifying force; but that unity will be partial if sources of unity cannot be discovered deep within the rival cul-

tures themselves. I believe, and have tried to point out, that they are so discoverable.

Although science cannot replace religion, it can purify religion of much extraneous matter which clings to it. Apart from the chaff of primordial superstition which every religion carries in bushels along with its life-giving grain, a lot of pseudo-science or long outdated science has formed accretions round religious ideas which, backed by the authority of religion, continue to clog our thought and action.

A scientific critique of religion and the critique provided by philosophies based upon science are a very great desideratum in India. Unfortunately, they are practically non-existent; I know of nothing worth mentioning outside the writings of M. N. Roy. Jawaharlal Nehru could have done valuable work in this line if he had not been called to active politics soon after his Cambridge days. What was done in the West by the encyclopaedists, the Comteian positivists, the evolutionists, etc., vis-a-vis Christianity a hundred or more years ago, has to be done today by the Indian philosophical scientists and scientific philosophers vis-a-vis Hinduism and Islam.

Redrawing Frontiers

This overdue confrontation between religion and science will not demolish the foundations of religion, but it will push back its frontiers very considerably and help to redraw them where they should rightfully stand. At the moment the frontiers are vague and invisible, which means that religion extends its authority to almost every sphere of life and thought in India. This harms the usurper no less than the usurped.

What in religion is tragically destructive of the free spirit of man is its dogmatism and authoritarianism. And I particularly object to the way in which we unthinkingly preserve and inculcate this feature of religion from generation to generation. Little children with impressionable and uncritical minds are made to hold,

* Niyazi Berkes: *Ethics and Social Practice in Islam (Philosophy and Culture: East and West*, Edited by Charles A. Moore, University of Hawaii, 1962).

honour and obey certain rituals, doctrines and institutions whose import is altogether beyond their grasp. 'Worse still, they are at the same time taught to distrust and deride other religious doctrines and institutions. This is an evil practice anywhere, but more harmful and dangerous in India which is the confluence of many great religions.

Protection Against Sectarianism

I would advocate that every attempt be made to protect children from the harmful impact of sectarian religion. They may of course imbibe the broad spirit of religion (love of man and the sense of mystery of the world) from works of literature and art, but no recondite or sectarian doctrines should be taught them at school or before; although when their natural curiosity is aroused by watching a particular religious practice in the home or outside or by listening to some religious words, it may be satisfied to the limit of their understanding and to the limit of non-sectarian impartiality attainable by the parent or teacher. It is only at the college stage that the teachings and histories of the major religions should be placed before the students; the affinity and difference amongst their teachings, and between them and the teachings of the tribal religions, should also be shown.

It may be urged that since we do teach immature boys and even little children all manner of secular things, why should we not begin religious instruction also at a very early stage in their development? My reply would be that in the education of the very young, we normally observe two principles: we do not teach them anything which is definitely beyond their grasp, and we do not teach them anything about which there is no general agreement even among experts. There is no reason for departing from these sound principles in the case of religious instruction.

Whether God means a majestic power to be dreaded, a loving Father in whom we can put our

trust, or an impersonal Absolute; whether He receives offerings and grants favours, or is only a name for all our ideals or for a transcendent mystery; whether our virtues and vices are to be suitably rewarded and punished by an omniscient Judge in another world, or produce appropriate effects in this world on the reborn soul according to some cosmic law—are not points on which our religious experts are agreed, and are unquestionably beyond the grasp of little boys and girls.

Religion is too profound a thing for them to learn as easily as they learn arithmetic, cricket or etiquette; it comes, if it comes at all, after years of heart-breaking travail and desperate quest. I am amazed by the disrespect shown to religion by our dogmatists and ritualists who normally treat it as a mere matter of habit, cramming and conditioning, more or less completed in the early years of life.

Dangerous Results

The danger of forcing incomprehensible sectarian doctrines on immature minds is two-fold. When they grow up, the majority never learn to examine or question their early beliefs and so retain a dogmatic, closed and communal mind to the end of their lives. A small minority do come to realise the truth of the Socratic dictum that an unexamined life is not worth living. But when self-examination painfully reveals to them that much which they have been cherishing from early childhood is in conflict with the beliefs and practices of other sects, with the truths of science or with their own experience and reason, they become disgusted with everything which goes under the name of religion.

This is equally unfortunate, for religion can teach us some of the profoundest truths and values of our life—but only when we are able to see through its barbaric heritage and sectarian limitations. I recommend holding back religious teaching until adolescence and then the simultaneous teach-

ing of many religions as well as the psychology and philosophy of religion, in order to guard against the twin evils of sectarian narrowness and dogmatism on one hand, and religious nihilism on the other.

The Secular Temper

If we are to evolve a secular State, we need to produce secular minds. It is obvious that the constitution of a State does not make it secular; it only records a decision. It is the secular temper of mind of the citizens of that State, at least of its educated citizens, which alone forms the base on which the edifice of secularism can stand. For that it is necessary to adopt a secular policy of education. The kind of policy which I have tried to outline may run counter to the grain of current prejudices, but the closer we approach it, the broader we shall make our religions.

The formidable communal problem in this country cannot be solved without some evolution in our religious outlook. Secularism is an intractable problem anywhere, but for us it is an absolutely urgent problem. The solution will not of course be easy. Cantwell-Smith concludes by saying, 'Indian secularism, will either fail to emerge, or will emerge as something new.' The first alternative is unthinkable; it will mean the death of everything we stand for. With vast religious differences and considerable religious minorities, a non-secular State in India will be a communal State, and under existing circumstances, a Hitlerian State.

The second alternative, in my opinion, is not to wait indefinitely for the emergence of a new conception of secularism, but to accept one or more of the existing conceptions with some modifications (this is what we have already done), and to adopt a new method for its realisation. The new method, I suggest, is a new policy toward religious education. This is a long-term solution which should in any case supplement other short-term solutions which may emerge.

Religious impartiality

VED PRAKASH LUTHERA

'THE term (secularism),' says Edwin E. Aubrey, Professor of Religious Thought at the University of Pennsylvania, 'is in danger of becoming what Walter Lippman called years ago in his *Public Opinion* a stereotype, i.e., a word used without precise definition to furnish a convenient slogan for rallying the mind of a group.'¹

It has been, he continues, 'expanded to include a formidable list of objects of attack in the contemporary scene. Let me summarize that list: scientific humanism, naturalism and materialism; agnosticism and positivism; intellectualism, rationalism, existentialism and philosophy; nationalism and totalitarianism; democratic faith and communism; utopian idealism, optimism and the idea of progress; moralism and amorality, ethical relativism and nihilism; the industrial revolution and its divorce from nature; modern education in separation from religion; historical method when applied to

the biblical revelation; mass atheism and the depersonalization of man.'²

The recent thinking on the subject in India seems to make the confusion worst confounded. It is therefore necessary that a discussion of the subject 'India and Secularism' should start with a definition of the meaning and content of secularism.

Secularism was a movement—a social and ethical system—started in England in the middle of the 19th century.³ It was essentially a 'protest movement', an 'anti-religious reaction'—against the serious social wrongs prevalent at the time and had both political and philosophical origins. Politically, the 'selfishness of the wealthy and influential classes, the unreasoning opposition to political

1. *Secularism ... A Myth*, p. 11.

2. *Ibid.* p. 25.

3. See articles on Secularism in *Encyclopaedia Religion and Ethics* (ERE), *The Compact Encyclopedia* (CE), and *Everyman's Encyclopedia* (EE).

and religious freedom, the stolid dogmatism of theology were all powerful irritants' which gave birth to it.⁴ Philosophically, its roots ran back to the "associalist" school of James Mill and Bentham with an anti-theistic strain inherited from Thomas Paine...⁵ It was also influenced by Positivism through G. H. Lewis and J. S. Mill. Accordingly, the British Utilitarians are said to be philosophically the sponsors of Secularism.

Although the list of the champions of Secularism included persons like Charles Southwell, Thomas Cooper, Thomas Peterson and William Chilton, it owed its establishment and development to a large extent to G. H. Holyoake and Charles Bradlaugh, particularly the former.⁷

G. J. Holyoake, who may rightly be called the Father of Secularism, started propagating the movement in 1846 and laid down its principles in his two books, *Principles of Secularism* and *The Origin and Nature of Secularism*. He formed a society in London to popularize the movement. In 1850 he came in contact with Charles Bradlaugh and in the following years they 'coined the term "secularism" (for the movement) after some hesitation as to the merits of "nethelism" and "limitationism" as alternatives...'⁸ In 1858, Bradlaugh succeeded Holyoake as the president of the society.

The Content

Secularism was a 'materialistic and rationalistic' ethical system founded expressly for providing an alternative theory of life and conduct for those who had rejected Christianity.⁹ It was an alternative, not in the sense of being another religion. Rather, its relationship with all religion was that of mutual exclusion.¹⁰ Secularism sought to give a theory of life and conduct without reference to a

deity or the 'other world'.¹¹ it aimed, as its author said, 'to substitute the piety of usefulness for the usefulness of the piety'.¹²

It was a form of free thought and its fundamental tenet was that what was best for humanity would command the approval of the author of humanity.¹³ The 'best for humanity' was to be 'determined by human reason, tested in this life by the experience of this life'.¹⁴ The best way of arriving at truth was to repose full confidence in human reason.¹⁵ Only such moral principles were valid as would appeal to human reason and to the conscience of enlightened men.¹⁶

Code of Morality

However, secularism did not positively deny the existence of light and guidance elsewhere but maintained that there was light and guidance in secular truth, whose conditions and sanctions existed independently and acted independently.¹⁷ A principal aim of secularism was the establishment of a code of morality whose appeal was to principles of a secular nature.¹⁸

So far as Christianity (religion) was moral, secularism had common ground with it. But its reasons for being moral were not Christian (religious).¹⁹ Christianity teaches that salvation comes through belief. Secularism sought it in conduct. Christianity holds that inquiry must end in faith. Secularism held that whatever the consequences may be, inquiry should end in truth.²⁰ According to the principles of secularism, the highest order was attainable without reference to any religion which could be ruled out.²¹

Not only was Secularism an alternative to religion, it was

intended to be, by its author, an alternative also to atheism.²² This was emphasised by Holyoake several times. It did not seek to come into a direct clash with any religion and its tendency was agnostic—neither to deny nor to affirm the truth of religion or the existence of God.²³ However, Holyoake's successor, Bradlaugh, was an atheist and at least among the 'vulgar adherents' of Secularism, the movement acquired an atheistic bias.²⁴

Secularism as a movement did not survive for long. Its influence was the strongest in the middle of the 19th century and it coincided with a period of definitely anti-religious propaganda.²⁵ It was not long before the movement rapidly decayed and disappeared from independent existence.²⁶

It did not have the inherent strength to survive for long because, according to an author, 'the attempt to ignore rather than deny religion (was) impracticable, because religion embraces both secular and spiritual concerns. Religion denies the secular conception of life, and that conception cannot establish itself without defeating the claim of religion to control life... It (was) for this reason that Secularism which did not include a definitely anti-religious theory (was) bound to fail'.²⁷ It lost its independent existence and got merged into larger materialistic movements existing in Europe.²⁸

Exclusion of Religion

Today, the spirit of secularism manifests itself in various forms and through various ideologies and movements. But there is one thing essential about it and that is that in content it is materialistic—materialistic to the exclusion of religion. It inclines, according to Anson Phelps Stokes, 'to hold religion in intellectual contempt, or to be at least indifferent to it and to assume that the State

4. ERE.

5. Ibid.

6. Ibid.

7. Ibid.

8. Ibid.

9. EE; ERE; *The New Popular Encyclopedia* (NPE).

10. ERE.

11. Ibid.

12. EE.

13. Article 'Secularism', *Chambers Encyclopedia* (CE).

14. Ibid.

15. Ibid.

16. Ibid.

17. Ibid.

18. Ibid.

19. Ibid.

20. Ibid.

21. ERE.

22. Ibid.

23. CE; NPE.

24. EE.

25. ERE.

26. Ibid.

27. Ibid.

28. EE.

should give it no encouragement. . .²⁹

Consequently, it is not surprising, that Secularism has been a subject of stringent criticism by religious quarters. To mention a few instances among many, the Stockholm Conference (1925), the Universal Christian Conference on Life and Work (1937) held at Oxford, the World Conference on Faith and Order (1937) held at Edinburgh and the Assembly of the World Council of Churches (1948) held at Amsterdam, all condemned Secularism.³⁰

The Indian Tradition

In India, today, it is almost a fashion to say that the goal which India has set before her is secularism. The term is being used, one is constrained to say, as a trump-card both at home and abroad, little realizing that elsewhere secularism has already lost its independent existence and is not likely to be revived.³¹ Further, little is it realized that secularism, being materialistic and exclusive of religion is hardly compatible with the Indian tradition and culture which is deeply religious. Here, one is reminded of the oft-quoted statement of B. R. Ambedkar that in India 'the religious conceptions . . . are so vast that they cover every aspect of life, from birth to death.'³²

In 1947, in his book *Religion and Society*, S. Radhakrishnan in his chapter titled 'The Need for Religion', under sub-title, 'Secularism is the Chief Weakness of Our Age', had raised the question: 'What are the chief causes of the present distress?' and had answered that: 'What has wrecked the world so full of hope is the dominance of a false philosophy with its misleading assumptions, beliefs and values.'³³ In 1955, in his *Recovery of Faith*, he has warned that the

'religious impartiality of the Indian State is not to be confused with secularism or atheism. Secularism as here defined is in accordance with the ancient religious tradition of India.'³⁴

It is therefore evident that actually the subject to be considered is religious impartiality and not secularism, because, if the two are not one and the same—since they are not to be confused—how can religious impartiality be called secularism in relation to India?

Let us therefore consider religious impartiality. The first question to be considered is: whose goal or aspiration religious impartiality can be? Surely, it cannot be the aspiration of an individual or a group of individuals. For, an individual cannot be 'religiously impartial'. He can be either religious, or agnostic or atheistic.

Religious impartiality, so to say, is not a theory of life and conduct and cannot be an aspiration of the people as such. It is a subject relating to the nature of the State and its policy, i.e., whether the State treats various religions impartially or gives precedence to one or to some. It does not relate to the people. It relates to the State.

Western Origin

The concept of the religious impartiality of the State originated in the West initially more as a practical solution to a new situation than from any ideology. The new situation was the coming into being of the multiplicity of sects in the body-politic after the Reformation, which were perpetually at war with each other. This gave rise to the problem of how communities of different religious convictions would live together peacefully and jointly run a State.

The problem was more serious in the West at the time than at any time in Indian history. Before the Reformation, there was only one religion, Roman Catholicism, and the State was identified with

it. Now, complete identification with any one sect was fraught with dangers of civil war. In the interest of peace and order, it became necessary for the State to distinguish its own interest from religion and to refrain from enforcing any one.

Broadly, three solutions emerged. They were: (1) the establishment of a Church while granting freedom to the rest; (2) the religiously impartial State, i.e., a State which treated various religions equally and (3) the secular State i.e., a State which was separated from religion.

In modern India, the basis of the religious impartiality of the State are to be found both in the Indian tradition and the present situation. Traditionally, India has been a land of religious liberalism arising from the Hindu attitude—which was far from being any 'nation of secularism'—that all religions were different paths to the same goal. Even in 52 A.D., when Christianity was being persecuted in the land of its birth, St. Thomas who visited India to spread the Gospel received the patronage of the ancient Hindu rulers in Kerala. They aided him in terms of land and finance. St. Thomas converted the local people including, it is said, some members of the royal families, to Christianity freely.³⁵

The Sensible Solution

In modern India there is the multiplicity of religious communities and the observance of religious impartiality by the State seems to be the only sensible solution. Fortunately, the situation in India is not as difficult as in the post-Reformation West. Although the Indian communities have far more profoundly different religious convictions than the Roman Catholics and Protestants, their mutual attitudes are not as antagonistic as were those of the Roman Catholics and Protestants. It is not the difference in conviction

29. *Church and State in the United States*, III, p. 679.

30. *Aubrey*, op. cit. pp. 17-23.

31. *ERE*.

32. *Constituent Assembly Debates*, VII, 781.

33. Pp. 20-21.

34. P. 202.

35. Daniel I: *The Malabar Church and Other Orthodox Churches*, pp. 20-30; Kuriakos, Ramban M.C., *The Orthodox Syrian Church of Malabar*, p. 2.

tions but the attitudes arising therefrom which constitute the problem of how men of different convictions would jointly run a State. The attitude of the overwhelming Hindu majority in India is that of religious liberalism.

Is religious impartiality (or, in our view incorrectly called, 'Indian secularism') of the Indian State as yet an aspiration or is it already a reality? Our answer is that it is already a reality. It is a reality to the extent and in the sense in which it has been attained elsewhere. Perfect religious impartiality by the State is impossible to achieve and has not been achieved anywhere.

There is ample truth in what an official publication of the Roman Catholic Church, *L'Osservatore Romano*, editorially wrote, that: 'Historically and socially, it is absurd to consider all religions equal in all countries... It would be strange if a religion professed by 1,000,000 people should be judged equal to another professed by 40,000,000. In all manifestations of social and political life, the equalitarianism of religions and cults is an absurdity.'³⁶

The State can only strive to be, so far as possible, impartial to the various communities. The Constitution of India has not established any religion but has placed all on an equal footing to a great extent. It has separated the citizenship of the State from religious convictions, thus making it possible for men of different religions to jointly run the State.

So long as these differences are not deeply antagonistic and do not constitute a law and order problem, they are not related to the activity of the State. The ideals incorporated in the Constitution, in this respect, seem to have been faithfully carried out as is evidenced by the innumerable tributes which have been paid to India.³⁷ In this sense, the religious impartiality of the Indian State is already a reality.

³⁶, Cited *The Nation*, Vol. 167, p. 224.
³⁷, See Luthera, V.P., *The Concept of the Secular State and India*, pp. 4-5.

Myth of tolerance

ASHOK RUDRA

IT is a widely held idea that there is a foundation for secularism in modern India in a tradition of religious tolerance which is supposed to be a part of India's history. Donald Eugene Smith in his *India as a Secular State* writes:

"The religious liberty which prevailed in ancient India, however, does represent an essential aspect of the secular State. Government never sought to impose a particular creed upon the people. Various schools of thought propounded the doctrines of agnosticism, atheism and materialism.

Jainism, Buddhism, and later Judaism, Christianity, Zoroastrianism and Islam were permitted to propagate their teachings, build their places of worship and establish their respective ways of thought. The struggle for freedom of conscience in Europe has no counterpart in Indian history. From the earliest days this right seems never to have been denied.'

Then he goes on to quote Weber as saying: 'It is an undoubted fact that in India, religious and philosophical thinkers were able to enjoy perfect, nearly absolute freedom for a long period. The freedom of thought in ancient India was so considerable as to find no parallel in the West before the most recent age.'

If these are some views of western observers, it should not surprise anybody to find even more emphatic and self congratulatory declamations from the pens of Indian writers. That 'unity in diversity' is the characteristic stamp of Indian history is one of the most commonly accepted clichés among modern Indians. No less a person than Tagore drew self satisfaction from this vision of an India which has been the 'sacred pilgrimage' for all the different peoples of the world and it is this vision which India has chosen as the most appropriate evocation for its national anthem.

Fundamental Misunderstanding

It shall be my contention in the course of the following pages that this appreciation of India's heritage is based on a fundamental misunderstanding. The misunderstanding of the western observers has its root in the fact that they have never ceased to look at India through eyes trained to look at the European reality: they never seem to have quite grasped that the State in India never played the same role as in Europe, that the concept of the individual was never the same in the two civilisations and that freedom of thought is a term which ought not be used at all in the context of ancient India.

As to the Indian self-glorifiers, the explanation is even simpler.

We have never tried dispassionately to dissect and analyse our own past. In order to be able to respect ourselves as a nation, it has been necessary for us to hold on to a number of myths and when a myth has had an origin amongst western thinkers, it has been all the more readily accepted. We have never been much ashamed to quote western authorities to convince ourselves of our past glories.

National Illusions

We have thus had the myth of India's 'other-worldliness.' The failure of the Indian civilisation to keep up the development of the forces of material production and the consequent deterioration of the physical well-being of the people was conveniently interpreted as reflecting the lack of concern of Indians for worldly happiness. For a very long time we have successfully persuaded ourselves—and many of us still do—that we are the most 'spiritual' people on earth. Speaking of the westerners as 'materialists' has been one of the means by which we have tried to satisfy our national vanity in the face of the dazzling achievements of western civilisation during the last few centuries.

Another widely held myth—this time an entirely indigenous product, not fortified by any ecstasy of western Indologists—is that of the superior virtues of the Indian woman. There are, of course, many more westerners who are not at all taken in by these myths; who, on the contrary, exhibit a strong allergy to our system of values. For them the average Indian, far from being other-worldly, is more grossly concerned with the petty gains and losses of this earthly life than most other people. The Indian woman, far from being the most virtuous among females, is by far the most degraded, occupying a servile position and rejoicing in the constancy of servitude.

I have deliberately indulged in this digression to emphasise that we as a nation are lovers of myths about ourselves. This gives rise at least to a case for the careful scrutiny of the contention that re-

ligious tolerance has been one of the characteristic stamps of Indian history. It is all the more necessary to undertake such scrutiny, as we have tended to shy away from making any painstaking and dispassionate analysis of our past from this angle.

Take the case of the history of communal hatred and violence between Hindus and Muslims. With most of us, our thought process does not stretch beyond recognising and highly exaggerating the Machiavellian role played by our British rulers in the matter, our imaginative powers being put to painting an idyllic picture of communal harmony supposedly prevailing before their advent. When we do penetrate beyond that point and admit that the Hindu-Muslim conflict is a part of our history, we are content to trace its origin in a lateral fashion to the intolerance and violence supposedly embodied in the Islamic World view. Rarely have we tried to locate the seed of the dissension deep inside the folds of the Brahmanic civilisation of ancient India.

Coming back to the theme of religious liberty and freedom of thought in ancient India, I would like to argue the case that these are fallacious appreciations arising from the fact that suppression or curtailment of this liberty and this freedom in the western tradition have been effected by the use of brute force—massacres, inquisitions, pogroms etc., and Indian history, at least until the advent of the Muslims, does not show anywhere near a comparable proportion of physical violence devoted to the same end.

Brainwashing

I would like to put forward the opposite view that liberty has not been a value cherished by Indian civilisation at any stage of its history and this is as much true of religion and thought as of any other part of individual or collective life. I shall try to explain away the apparent contradiction between this view and the lack of evidence of the use of violence in the suppression

of liberty of thought, by putting forward an hypothesis of general applicability to Indian history, which is that much of the role played by violence in western history has been performed by non-violent means through a subtle, subversive technique of suggestions and persuasions (of 'brainwashing' on a national scale, to use an illuminating if somewhat vulgar phrase) giving a direct hold over the minds of men to the leaders of society. Before any further elaborating the thesis, let us consider some illustrative examples.

The European colonisers in Australia and America proceeded systematically to exterminate the earlier inhabitants and thus ensured their stable establishment as the new occupants of those lands. They did not resort to the same technique in Africa and India—they could not perhaps—and they have now been altogether thrown out from there. European civilisation could thus triumph over other civilisations only by the latter's physical annihilation.

Ideological Framework

The Aryan invaders of India, however, achieved a complete triumph over an earlier civilisation and over tribal groups of various degrees of civilisation without resorting to any extermination on a mass scale. The solution found by the Brahmanical leadership was to conceive of a social and ideological framework which would find a place within itself for all the earlier disparate communities and groups and their religions and myths and yet firmly ensure the physical and intellectual supremacy of the invaders without requiring the use of violence.

The ideological framework is the infinitely flexible Hindu pantheon wherein it was always possible to accommodate one more local god belonging to some community or tribe and relate it to the other gods through the concept of the varying and multifarious manifestations of the Supreme Deity. Here was a system of thought which could take up a snake or a monkey god of a forest dwelling tribe and relate it to the Advaitic Brahman

through strictly logical steps of a metaphysical character. Here was an intellectual process which could take up a lecherous and completely unscrupulous legendary figure—that of Krishna—and vest it with supreme divinity!

The Caste System

The social framework is the caste-system—the most brilliant, the most fantastic piece of social engineering which has ever been the product of human ingenuity, which pales into insignificance the monstrosities of any Hitlerite plans for the artificial creation of a superior race. It is not only that the scheme itself is of breathtaking audacity: the success achieved by it is even more stupendous. Millions of individuals have over thousands of years accepted various, strictly defined, inferior positions in relation to others, not only without protest but with great pride. If the history of Europe is one of class struggle, that of India is certainly not one of caste-struggle. There was, no struggle.

This brings us to the other great social purpose served by the caste system, that of having a clearly defined and planned system of economic classes and yet preventing class conflicts. In Europe, the classes were either not at all explicit but only implicit in the production relations, or when explicit were preserved by the direct application of physical and juridical force, as in the cases of slaves and bonded serfs. In India, an explicit system of brutal inequality was preserved without the use of force. There was never the necessity for slavery or serfdom—the same economic functions, under different conditions, were performed by the caste system.

While in European history there were slave revolts and flights of serfs, in Indian history there are no records of force being necessary for making the untouchables accept untouchability. The price Indian society paid for this absence of class conflict is, of course, that, to the same extent as the caste system became rigid, the economy lost dynamism. But then

that is not a failure of Brahmanism: progress was never a value in that system. Survival of a status quo was what was sought, and that one had with a vengeance.

Medieval European soldiers used to put iron chastity belts on the bodies of their spouses before going out on long-lasting campaigns to make sure of the faithfulness of their wives; and despite all such precautions the European husband never could be certain that while he lay with his mistress his wife was not doing the same with a lover. But the Indian husband's mental peace was never disturbed by any such suspicions: the ideals of Sita and Savitri instilled into the minds of the Indian woman through centuries of subtle, persistent persuasion, the horror for the notion of the 'fallen woman' inherited from countless generations of illiterate grand-mothers prevents the modern Indian woman from making any use of freedom even when it is offered to her on a plate. European social history is a history not only of class war but also of sex war. The sexes have never battled on the soil of India.

Avoiding Confrontation

The Brahmanic technique of subversion through subtle persuasion, when applied in dealings with rival religious systems, took the form of avoiding any direct confrontation; not only tolerating the details of the rival system but even making a place for them within the Hindu religious system and gradually, imperceptibly, robbing it of its essence by first supplementing and then supplanting its root ideas by those of Brahmanism.

This was not difficult, as Brahmanism has not laid too great a stress on the uniqueness of meaning: it has rather revelled in obscurities, ambiguities, multiplicity of meanings. The Brahmanic system is unified only at its foundations: the superstructure is nothing but a chaotic welter of myriad ideas and practices—somewhat like those Hindu temples which have a very definite and significant ground-plan hidden under an

exuberance of sculptured buildings without any architectural unity.

The classic example of this process at work is of course the complete neutralisation of the Buddhist challenge to Brahmanic orthodoxy, the culmination of the triumph being reached in the consecration of Buddha himself as an *avatar* of Vishnu! But the total effacement of Buddhism from India makes this particular confrontation less interesting as a case study.

Christianity

Very much more interesting from this point of view is the way Brahmanism has dealt with Christianity. Hindus have indeed been very gentle in their treatment of the early converts to this alien religion. But even after two thousand years of going to Church and reading the Bible the Indian Christian has remained true to the spirit of Brahmanism in his way of life and in his system of values. The supreme triumph of Brahmanism over Christianity gets its most characteristic expression in the continued adherence of Indian Christians to caste barriers erected by them on the traces of their pre-conversion identities. The Indian Christian woman gets married in Church but the absence of the sacred fire in this ceremony does not mean that she moulds her life any less on the ideals of Sita and Savitri!

It is true that there are communities among Indian Christians whose life and thought are based on the imitation of their western brethren rather than that of their Hindu brethren. But it is also true that these same communities have remained as strangers in this country, the object of dislike and contempt of the Hindus.

The Christian missionaries of modern times have refused to admit of any compromise with Brahmanic metaphysics and social values and to that extent the modern Indian feels strong antipathy towards them. The typical, educated modern Indian would seize the first opportunity to send his children to missionary schools, but his representatives in the par-

liament would call for early expulsion of all missionaries from Indian soil.

Again, Hindus of 19th century Bengal were far from being tolerant of the Brahmo challenge. The conflict has been resolved in the twentieth century in the Brahmos accepting to become, for all practical purposes, one more Hindu caste.

Islam

We have now prepared the ground for hazarding some comments on the phenomenon of Hindu-Muslim conflict. According to the hypothesis formulated by us, the underlying reason for this seven hundred years long history of hatred and intolerance lies in the failure of Brahmanism to swallow up Islam in the same way as it did Buddhism. If only Islam in India would have accepted, Brahmanism would have gladly extended to it the honour of being one more Hindu sect and Mohammed would have been ranged together with Buddha as yet another *avatar* of Vishnu. But Islam had deep roots in a different soil and it had become strong and resistant in a different climate; and far from permitting Mohammed to become a Hindu idol, it considered it a part of its mission to destroy idolatry wherever else it existed.

The fact that Brahmanism, far from being tolerant is basically intolerant of any independent way of life and system of values on the soil of India is borne out by the uncompromising hostility exhibited by Hinduism towards Islam. Muslims probably have given more violent expression of their hatred of Hindus; but they could never match the supreme contempt with which the holy Hindu refused to partake of water from the hands of a Muslim.

It is, of course, not genuine tolerance, genuine catholicity, to tolerate only such parallel systems which allow themselves to be robbed of their essence. It is my thesis that Hinduism has been tolerant only of such other ways of life and system of thought and values which consented to let themselves be Hinduised in their fundamentals.

Impact of democracy

R. V. RAMACHANDRASEKHARA RAO

AS we understand it, the terms 'secularism' or 'secular State' connote a state of affairs wherein the government of a country does not normally interfere with the religious life of its citizens, does not confer special status on any particular religion, but does see to it that the religious liberties of any section are not infringed by other sections. In a broad sense, this attitude is not so novel. Indian society is particularly noted for

this peaceful co-existence of religions, although a particular creed might have enjoyed official support at different periods.

Instances are not rare in other countries where diverse religions existed together. But in all these historical instances, religious diversity was a concession granted by the State subject to withdrawal if the State so wished and the principle of equal treatment to all

creeds was notably absent. It is only in modern times that religious freedom has been recognised in most countries as a right which the individual can claim against the State and the State has also come to realise the necessity of remaining neutral.

The Democratic Spirit

Both these developments are due to the growth of democracy. Democracy has doubly buttressed freedom of consciences: first, by proclaiming the individual's right to hold on to a religion of his choice against State attempts towards conformity; and second, by discouraging the State to maintain any Church at all. Democracy could influence the European Protestant tradition, and even the Catholic Church later on, to evolve the former right; and the democratic spirit which shaped American thinking has been the midwife of the latter liberty. The origins of modern secularism, thus, lie in the emergence of the democratic spirit, the vital constituent of which—the right to conscience—hammered secularism into its shape.

No doubt there were other immediate factors which led to the rise of secularism. For example, the explorations and discoveries of new lands opened up new systems of beliefs and ethical codes which made some Europeans doubt the universal claims of Christianity. This resulted in the emergence of a spirit of tolerant appreciation of others' beliefs and institutions. In a sense, this itself contributed to the birth of liberty of conscience. In this context, the idea of liberty of conscience primarily meant liberty to follow one's own religion. But, then, how about the right not to believe in any religion at all? Naturally, freedom of conscience included this too.

The emergence of anti-religious tendencies also played its part in the evolution of the secular concept. But the implications arising from this are widely different from those arising from a secular attitude born out of concern to preserve religious liberty. In fact, the anti-religious version of secularism

contributed most forcefully to the evolution of the modern secular attitude in general.

However, contemporary secularism tends to forget this aspect of the origins of modern secularism. It originated in the eighteenth century as one of the important off-springs of the Enlightenment. The Enlightenment saw the realisation of liberty and reason as the inevitable outcome of the operation of the Law of Progress. Thus came the conviction that religion is essentially hostile to the democratic spirit.

Even though many an encyclopaedist did believe in the Deity, the working out of the idea of disassociating religion from politics was more due to the influence of the atheistic and agnostic section of the 'philosophies'. The secular spirit was thus the result of an anti-religious outlook, and secularism was regarded as a pre-condition for the success of the democratic order. More or less, these 'philosophies' considered the issue in terms of *freedom versus the tyranny of religion*.

This rationalist tradition was championed by certain sections of the English thinkers also. While the Deists and the non-conformists provided the theoretical argument for disestablishmentarianism, the empirical and materialist scholars of Hobbes, Locke and Hume, helped to strengthen misgivings about the spiritual attitude itself. Of course, secularism, born out of materialism, was not always democratically oriented. We have the famous example of Hobbes, a materialist in philosophy, a secularist in conceiving of State control of ecclesiastical polity, and yet a thoroughgoing apologist of despotism, who gave no room for liberty of conscience.

Atheism as a Creed

A contemporary example of secularism without democracy is the Communist State. Here secularism is directly derived from atheism and is almost enforced as a creed by itself. One is also tempted to point out that in reality communist ideology has merely displaced another type of religious obsession and hence the Commun-

ist State is, in a sense, not entitled to be called secular. In any case, even if it is secular, it cannot be called democratic.

But, as a general rule the rationalists and materialists were champions of democracy. Later, in the nineteenth century, a full-blooded rationalism took over and secularism as a creed was popularised in the name of truth and democracy. Holyoake's and Bradlaugh's contribution is a standing monument to the English contribution to secularism and democracy.

Professor Cantwell Smith characterises western secularism as 'negative' and elucidates his position thus: "The western (view) rests on a notion of separation between religion and politics or between Church and State. It affirms the negative point that political and social life should proceed without ecclesiastical involvement." But it has been observed above how even the 'negative' conception evolved out of two distinct streams—one the fundamentally religious, and the other the rationalist.

The American View

It would seem that secularism as it emerged in the U.S.A. took more from the former stream. For, the American conception of secularism was something which was plainly more anxious to secure for religion a prime position in the lives of the individuals, within the limits of its democratic fabric. Here secularism is championed not to shun religion but to permit its diversity. *The American view is widely at variance with the Encyclopaedist position. The former thought in terms of democracy saving religious freedom through the means of the secular idea; while the latter thought in terms of saving democracy from religion through the means of the secular idea.*

The democratic ramifications of this American attitude are easy to grasp:

1. Democracy cannot deny the liberty of those who do believe in and practise their religion; hence secularism cannot mean the denial of religion but only the absence

of State patronage. Thus the 'Hostile State', of the rationalistic conception, became the 'Neutral State.'

2. If the democratic precept of freedom to be religious made secularism lose its anti-religious edge, the notion of majority rule led to imperceptible, extra-legal preferences being given to the religion of the majority community. A good example for this is the relative predominance of Protestantism in the U.S. It cannot be denied that until the election of the late Kennedy, one essential qualification for entry into the White House had been the membership of a Protestant denomination. Thus the practice of democracy could change a 'Neutral State' into a 'Patron State'.

Indian Experience

Indian secularism is the result of our determination to fortify religious toleration. The historical tradition of various faiths flourishing in this sub-continent naturally determined our goal. The political schism which led to our division only heightened this determination, in order to prove that religion can be separated from politics. But let us analyse our secularism in terms of western norms.

At one level, it resembles the American conception in the sense that the State is not only not hostile to religion but positively guards freedom of religion. But then the problem of adjusting competing religious systems becomes very critical. It has been noted how an inarticulate bias towards a majority religion develops, and this phenomenon might manifest itself in India also. Its manifestation seems to be even more inevitable and even more consequential. More inevitable, because of the disparity in numbers professing the faith of Hinduism and those professing other faiths; more consequential because of the wide variance in the doctrines of the diverse religious systems.

It is important to bear in mind that there may be no over-asser-

tion by the majority, and it is also probable that the majority may be genuinely disposed to recognise the freedom of other faiths on a footing of equality. But the point is that the minorities are prone to infer the above tendencies as the natural outcome of democracy, where secularism is clearly not regarded as a denial of religion. We have enough evidence that the leadership and the intelligentsia in this country do hold that the State should recognise the role of religion, although it should not patronise any particular creed.

This is the section which certainly rejects the Enlightenment's conception of secular polity. This conclusion can be supported by the analysis made by Cantwell Smith about the Hindu notion of secularism. 'In this view, a secular State is one which supports all religious communities equally, even subsidising their religious activities and even regulating them. In education, text-books under this scheme do not omit religious references, but rather include a great many and even teach one particular metaphysical doctrine, namely that of pluralism—even though this doctrine may be offensive to minorities.'

Indian secularism, though not styled as Hindu secularism, runs more or less on the lines described by Cantwell Smith. In this it would appear that there is really not much difference between the Hindu notion and western secularism, in its non-agnostic version. Essentially, both these attitudes exhibit a concern for preserving the role of religion, as distinct from the postures of the agnostic version.

The Agnostic Strain

But the legacy of the rationalist schools is not completely absent in the shaping of the Indian secular spirit. The view can be ventured that the late Nehru and the socialist vanguard did conceive of secularism primarily in terms of keeping out religion from the political sphere because of their agnostic and rationalist inclinations. Their intellectual make-up made them react adversely to

institutionalised religion and they were frankly sceptical about the goods which religions deliver. To these, the issue involved in secularism is one of making politics immune from the baneful effects of religion. It can even be suggested that their's is in approach identical to that of Ataturk in Turkey—one of elimination of religion as a force in political and social matters.

It has been suggested in a recent work on Indian secularism (*The Concept of the Secular State and India* by Ved Prakash Luthera) that the concept of secularism with its agnostic and rationalist origins should be distinguished from the concept of the secular State, wherein the creed is understood only in the sense of separating the Church from the State. While the two concepts are indeed distinct, all the same both these can rightly be treated as theories of secularism. For, the very idea of separating the State from the Church owes quite a lot to the agnostic and rationalistic critique against religion. Again, in its application to India we should realise that the agnostic roots have not been lacking, even though it is true that Indian secularism leans more towards the other conception.

Competing Solutions

Another interesting distinction is also made in the above work between a 'secular State' and a 'jurisdictionalist State', and it is held that India should properly be called a jurisdictionalist State but not a secular State. The distinction is made as follows: '... a jurisdictionalist State is distinctly distinguishable from a secular State with regard to fundamentals. They have in fact been described as two "competing solutions", of Church-State relations. Jurisdictionalism is a form of Erastianism which stands for the supremacy of the State in matters pertaining to the Church. It does not establish two spheres of action, one pertaining to the State and the other to the Church, but vests authority in the State over both the spheres. The State controls and regulates the affairs of all the churches. This is not what is

implied in the concept of the secular State. The concept of the secular State or the separation of the State and the Church establishes two spheres of action pertaining to two systems of authority, and the vesting of authority over both spheres in either the State or the Church is a negation of the principle underlying the separation.

But this distinction need not detain us for long. For one thing, it is adopting too narrow a criterion to say that the criterion given above alone represents the idea of a secular State. And it is not strictly correct to say as the above writer says, that in India the State asserts its supremacy in matters pertaining to the Church. There are instances when the legislatures in India have gone to the extent of exempting religious communities from the operation of social reforms for fear that the reforms might interfere with their religious injunctions. The concept of the jurisdictional State is not something distinct from the theory of the secular State. It is a variation on the same theme.

Mutual Impact

Thus two distinct conceptions are at the basis of Indian secularism: the agnostic and the religious, both of which ask for the disassociation of religion from politics in the interests of democracy. But, as already observed, the dominant influence is that of the non-agnostic view. And we have adopted the democratic way of life. What, then, is the mutual impact of this particular aspect of secularism which is dominant and democracy?

If by a secular society we mean a society in which the political authority does not recognise any particular faith as its official creed, but at the same time recognises the existence of different creeds, and at times even actively intervenes to secure for these conditions of development, then the prevailing democratic norms tend to influence the social trends in the following manner.

1. The democratic principle of the role of the majority operates, through which the

major community tries to assert itself.

2. Obviously, as such a tendency would ultimately cut into the cherished goal of securing freedom to other religious communities, constitutional limitations are provided to check the majority.

Dilemmas of Democrats

But these are only 'formal' and 'institutional' safeguards. The practical trends do not usually work out in the way indicated by these formal provisions. Indeed, a democrat's aspiration to be secular lands him in many dilemmas. This is more so in societies where the gap between the religious communities is wide, both in the quantitative and in the qualitative aspects.

There is the complaint from the majority that 'secularism' in effect puts their own position at a disadvantage. The efforts of a government determined to assure the minorities a sense of security only increases the complaint. In the name of democracy, the majority assails a policy of deference to the minorities, which it considers as one of unwarranted favouritism. This, of course, is not a novel tendency, for this is inevitable from a popular understanding of democracy. Although normal, this tendency in religious matters causes greater harm to the roots of democracy.

The reaction of the minorities to such vociferous claims of the majority obeys the accepted pattern. They become frightened, tend to interpret deviations in governmental policy as a 'capitulation', complain of persecution, and ultimately deny the secular nature of the polity itself. The feelings of the Muslims, after recent events in Bengal, Bihar and Orissa, are exactly on these lines, and these were so forcefully presented by Frank Anthony in the Lok Sabha.

It should also be borne in mind that the Muslims as a minority community were until recently committed to the belief that democracy means majority rule and that majority rule means Hindu domination. A community with

such built-in misgivings is apt to be very touchy and interpret the majority attitude as a manifestation of Hindu intolerances.

Thus, basically, the fundamentalist interpretation of democracy as majority rule contributes its share to the problem of secularism. No doubt, this factor is not left unattended to and, as already observed, constitutional limitations are there to hold back the vagaries of numbers. But here again a democracy cannot always be judged only by the constitutional limitations it imposes. Democracy is as democracy does.

There is also the consideration that the efficacy of democracy depends much upon the confidence that the minorities have in it. This is especially true of confidence in secularism. Viewed from this angle, constitutional limitations like fundamental rights may not always allay the fears of the minorities. These fears, fostered by a fear-psychosis, explain away the protection that fundamental rights afford, as of little consequence. It can always be argued that a determined majority will not find it difficult to do away with these fundamental rights. Nor is this argument incredible. The series of constitutional amendments so far effected, though done in a different context, tend to strengthen the argument that the sanctity of the Constitution has been a casualty.

Inherited Problems

There are other factors in the evolution of Indian nationalism which also play their part in the shaping of Indian secularism. The background to the Indian freedom struggle, the activities of some of the minority communities in the past, and the rise of a new type of local leadership, all these obviously connected with the rise of Indian nationalism, create a great psychological obstacle in the way of a peaceful co-existence of religious faiths.

The rise of Indian nationalism is to some extent connected with the increased confidence of the Hindu in his religious way of life. The secularism of Nehru and the universalism of Gandhiji may have

tempered the religious orientation of nationalism. All the same, both at the intellectually sophisticated level of national leadership and at the level of the rank and file of the nationalists, opposition to the British rule was partially based upon the idea that an alien cultural tradition was suppressing our heritage.

The influence of the Evangelical tradition upon the Imperial Policy provides the explanation for this reaction. And the subsequent role of the missionaries, who were allowed into India precisely because of the impact of Evangelicalism in the twenties and thirties of the last century, adds force to this plea. Add to this the tremendous self-confidence given to the Hindus by leaders like Vivekananda and Dayananda. Thus, a new found determination to save the Hindu faith, so ably renovated and defended, cannot but be regarded as an aspect of Indian nationalism.

This religious revivalism coincided with the rise of the separatist movement among the Muslims. The determination of nationalist leadership to divorce religion from nationalism and the common historical bond between the Hindus and the Muslims may have helped to blunt the edge of the religious factors. Yet the very foundations of Muslim separatist agitation (that democracy and Muslim safety are antithetic) helped to strengthen the religious factor in Indian nationalism.

Emotional Involvement

It must be understood that no responsible leader ever thought of denying religious freedom to the minorities. Rather, the role of Hindu revivalist influence was more in the nature of restoring to Hinduism its rightful place in Indian society, a place which many regarded as long denied. Thus, it was more at the emotional level that the religious factor operated among the members of the Congress, and such other nationalists who were not overtly committed to Hindu revivalism.

This trend is bound to become more pronounced now. Universal

franchise in the context of mass illiteracy produces parochial leadership and it is precisely this leadership which is given wider powers in the name of democracy, as is evident from the implementation of the programmes of democratic decentralisation and community development. The new leadership may not be avowedly intolerant but its intellectual potential is not adequate to balance its emotional involvement in the faith of the majority (of which it is, mostly, a part). This growth of parochial leadership is one of the most important products of Indian democracy.

Vicious Circle

Thus two tendencies—one, the majority's disposition to remind others that a majority also has its rights and the other, a sense of panic among the minorities, seem to operate in India. Together they have set in motion a vicious circle in the Indian body politic. The episodes relating to the allegations levelled against Christian missionaries in Orissa and Madhya Pradesh some time back, the attitude of the Indian Christians, the Aligarh University affair of 1961 and more recently the riots in Bihar and Orissa illustrate the havoc played by this vicious circle. The result of all this is a certain loss of confidence in the secular nature of our polity.

Another obvious cause for the periodic recrudescence of religious conflict in India is the unhappy state of minorities in Pakistan. It is largely true that the Hindus in East Pakistan are the victims of persecution, whatever may be the protection afforded by the letter of the law of the land. It has been a common feature that an exodus from East Bengal is followed by the rise of extremist rightist protest in India, in some cases culminating in bloody riots. The future of *Indian secularism* thus depends to a very important degree upon the events in the *Islamic State of Pakistan*.

A penetrating study by Niyazi Berkes about *Religious and Secular Institutions in Comparative Perspective*, while specifically

dealing with Turkish secularism, analyses the conditions necessary for the separation of religion from politics.

First an area of flexibility had to be gained in economic, political, and social life wherein specific norms could be determined by the exigencies of the situations of action; that is, by the functional requisites of social strata rather than by religious considerations. Second, the drives released by the secularisation of various areas of life from the direct prescriptions of the *Shari'ah* had to be channeled in a way to contribute effectively to the transformation of the society; that is, religion would withdraw from these areas and would become institutionalised separately, without connection with those areas that were in the process of transformation as a result of the changes already effected in various elements and aspects of social life. In other words, religion would try to fulfil its functions in an institutional setting differentiated from those institutions that were becoming secularized one by one. It would then operate through the individual commitments of the believers and would no longer get mixed into those affairs which dictated the decisions made in the secular areas of life.

Prospects

Following the lines suggested in the above analysis, we can study the prospects of secularism in India from two different points. How far does secularism guarantee equal treatment to the members of the various religious communities in the secular sphere of their lives and how far does it guarantee full freedom to these in the religious aspect of their lives?

Regarding the first point, the record of free India has been very encouraging indeed. At the higher levels of administration, the minorities have received adequate representation. But there are complaints that adequate opportunities are not given to these in the spheres of employment and education and a general sense of

insecurity is frequently felt by these sections. In this sense, the complaint made by the Muslim community since the last quarter of the nineteenth century still remains. However, it cannot be denied that employment and educational opportunities are being increasingly made available and the efforts of the State in this regard are sincere.

If the majority grudges such efforts, such grumblings are not primarily due to reasons of religion. The policy of reservation and preferential treatment in employment and education is also criticised by the majority, even though the beneficiaries of this policy are the backward sections of the Hindu community itself. Thus, even when the majority resents preferential treatment given to minorities, the redeeming feature is that the resentment is not primarily the result of religious hostility.

Constitutional Guarantees

Further, unfair discrimination against the minorities on grounds of religion can to a considerable extent be met with by constitutional guarantees. Thus, if these constitutional guarantees are really made sacrosanct such institutional safeguards can still go a long way in strengthening the confidence of the minorities in our secular spirit.

Secondly, when we come to the impact of our secular policy on the religious life of the minorities we observe different trends. The Hindu ethos is no doubt tolerant and history records a unique survival of diverse religions in this land. But are the other religions convinced about the prospects of their freedom under this Hindu tolerance? As noted before, Cantwell Smith is of the opinion that the Hindu view of secularism may be offensive to the minorities. The Hindu type of universalism might be regarded as heretical by the minorities and might even be interpreted as qualifying certain essential attributes of their faiths.

For example, the Hindu universal approach may not look with sympathy upon proselytization, as practised by Christian Missions in

India. Again, the Hindu approach that all religions are true would appear anathema to exclusivist faiths like Islam and Christianity. To be true to their doctrines, these cannot subscribe to such a pluralistic Hindu approach. All these considerations seem to create difficulties in the smooth working of our secular ideal, in so far as it seeks to provide for free and unhindered scope for the minority religions.

Possibilities of Change

Yet, inspite of the misgivings that our analysis warrants, the prospects are not necessarily dim. The following points leave scope for optimism. Firstly, the process of liberalization might bring about a genuine conviction in religious pluralism among the minority sections. This is not a mere hope. Instances are there when an insular religion innovated new norms to get adjusted to conditions ordinarily regarded as hostile to its creed. For long, orthodox Muslims regarded India ruled by the British as *Darul Harb* and in vain the Wahabi movement tried to convert it into a *Darul Islam*. But a time came when some Muslim divines boldly differed from the Wahabi interpretation and blessed the British rule by declaring that an India ruled by the British was still *Darul Islam*.

This acceptance of British rule was accomplished by the Divines at Mecca innovating a new definition of *Darul Islam*: 'as long as some of the peculiar observances of Islam prevail in a country, it is *Darul Islam*.' This is a far cry from the orthodox Wahabi interpretation that a country ruled by Infidels was *Darul Harb*. This affords us a classic instance of political and economic necessities ushering in innovations in doctrine. Similar tendencies might soften the doctrinal incompatibilities among the religions of India. Liberalization will also enable the majority community to be much more accommodative and understanding towards other communities.

Secondly, education can play a great part in blunting religious controversy. If the rise of semi-

literate leadership constitutes a great source of danger to secularism, the spread of education can help the secular spirit to sink deep into people's minds. The effect of this will be felt by all the sections of the community, resulting in a liberal approach to religion in general.

Difficulties

Thirdly, constitutional guarantees might also help to an extent in giving protection to religious freedom. But it must be realised that it is more difficult to spell out clearly a guarantee for religious equality than is the case with providing equality in economic, political and social matters. The concept of equality of opportunity in, say, education and employment is definitely more precise than equality of opportunity in religious matters.

What do we mean by the latter? Would it imply unfettered freedom to all religions to practise their religious creeds or would it imply freedom to religious practices subject to the right of the State to exercise more or less identical restraints on the practice of all faiths. If it is the former, then a considerable amount of friction would be inevitable. If it is the latter, then the charge of interference with religious practice is bound to be levelled frequently against the State.

Finally, the course of Indian history reveals the presence of an intangible spirit of mutual adjustment and conciliation between various sects, doctrinally hostile to each other. This may not be due to the operation of something like the Hegelian spirit of history, and may be because of political necessities overweighing doctrinal differences. Whatever be the reason, there has been harmony in Indian society which defies the conclusion of pure intellectual analyses of the religious systems. The present era, what with its acceptance of secularisation of many spheres of human activity and realisation of the futility of religious debate, may contribute all the more to harmonious relations among the religions in the country.

A means to an end

BADR-UD-DIN TYABJI

I accept Cantwell Smith's definition of a secular State: 'A secular State is a form of State so contrived, as to win and hold, and deserve, the loyalty and warm allegiance of any citizen, of whatever religion, or of none.'

To me, there appears to be no contradiction between this definition of a secular State and that of a democratic State or democracy. Therefore, the point posed by him subsequently, towards the close of his article: 'India may be secular, or it may be demo-

cratic, but is there any real possibility of its being both? If power is genuinely given into the hands of the people, to choose what they really want to have, is there any chance of their effectively choosing secularism?' seems to be begging the question. Here, serious doubt is cast on the validity of two cardinal tenets of the Indian Constitution; one of its being democratic, and the other of its secular character. I do not think that is justified.

About the functioning of Indian democracy one may argue; about

the perfect implementation of its secular ideals one may be even more sceptical. Nevertheless, to question the very existence of its democracy, or of its people's desire to so contrive a State 'as to win and hold and deserve the loyalty and warm allegiance of any citizen of whatever religion or of none' (Cantwell Smith's definition of a secular State) strikes me as being not only an outrage against the intelligence and good faith of Indian political and social leadership of the last one hundred years, and of its people's acceptance of it; but as the action of a person deliberately turning a blind, if not a biased eye on the significance of much of India's religious, political and social history from Vedic times to those of Lord Mountbatten.

Political Compromise

Secularism as such, for India, is not an end in itself. It is the means to an end—the end being the objective set out by Cantwell Smith himself in his definition quoted earlier. Secularism is not a religion in India—not even a religion of the irreligious as it was for Voltaire—nor a dogmatic un-deviating doctrine like communism. In political terms, it is a practical compromise, not the ideal or Utopian best, but the best possible. In religious terms, it is a projection of the tolerance which all great faiths have propagated, but which most of their protagonists, often enough, have failed to practise.

I would not deny that left entirely to themselves large sectarian groups among the Hindus might 'choose to exercise their new political power' to give full 'expression to their own particular tradition', through the form of a State which they may like to call a Hindu State, but which would in fact be only a Hindu Group State. Equally, I do not doubt that some denominations of Muslims in India left to themselves, might opt for a State which they think they would be able to construct more closely in conformity with their own particular notions of Islam.

That would make it possible for the trappings of their particular religious observances and attitudes to be given far greater prominence than is possible in a secular State.

We also know that the externals of particular religious beliefs are, in general, far more appealing to their followers than their essentials, just as their ostentatious display is far more offensive to those who belong to a different religion, and even more to those of a different denomination of the same faith, than the beliefs themselves. That is why the first best of such persons is always a Religious Group State of their own conception, and their second best a secular State; *not* a religious State.

The significance of the westernising Hindu's remark 'we would need a strong secularist movement in this country even if there were no Muslims', quoted by Cantwell Smith, should, I suggest, be seen in this context.

The Divisions Within

Hinduism even more than Islam, perhaps, is divided in groups, sections and communities with varying interpretations of the tenets of their faith: what appears essential to one is unimportant to another, what is appealing to some is almost intolerable to the rest.

To a 'westernising Hindu', the Hindu State, which some who call themselves Hindus would set up, would be far less palatable than a secular State in which both of them could live and let live under the general appellation of Hindus, without giving the right to either of them to accuse the other of anti-Hindu practices, or to penalise one for deviation from the straight and narrow path chalked out in accordance with the other's notion of what Hinduism demands from its followers.

Fortunately or unfortunately for Hindus, they have had no actual experience of living in such a State in recent times. This explains why some of the extremist elements among them are still

able to advocate it as a desideratum, without rousing a full apprehension of its consequences in those Hindus who would perhaps be among the first to suffer from it, if it ever came to pass.

Difficulties of Definition

Among the Indian Muslims, the general feeling for this, as it is associated more with power than with piety, was once strong. Pakistan was undoubtedly a product of it. Since partition, the very impracticability of it in India has destroyed it as a living dogma. It survives only in the dreams of the purblind; those who only see what they choose to see. To judge how difficult it is of achievement even in the most propitious of circumstances, and how frightful it would be for the Muslims themselves if it was ever achieved by one group of Muslims from among the large number that exist, one has only to study the attempts of Pakistan to give meaning and content to it.

Pakistan is a State of which 90 or more per cent of the population consists of persons who call themselves Muslims; and who all had once been enrolled under the banner of Islam to set up an Islamic State on this sub-continent. Yet this has not prevented the dominant denominations among them, at times of crisis or when a struggle for power or a dispute on a doctrinal issue arises, to deny the others their rights of membership of their chosen faith on the ground of doctrinal differences.

The official report on the Punjab (Pakistan) disturbances of 1953 made by Chief Justice Munir of Pakistan throws much light on this problem. Part IV of the Report deals exhaustively with important Muslim doctrinal beliefs as held and advocated by leading Ulemas in Pakistan. On the fundamental question of 'who is a Muslim?' the Report says: 'According to the Shias all Sunnis are Kafirs, and Ahl-i-Qur'an, namely persons who consider the *hadith* unreliable and therefore not binding, are unanimously Kafirs, and so are all independent thinkers.'

The net result of all this is that any change from one view to the other must be accompanied in an Islamic State with the penalty of death, if the government of the State is in the hands of the party which considers the other party to be Kafirs. And it does not require much imagination to judge all the consequences of this doctrine when it is remembered that no two Ulemas have agreed before us as to the definition of a Muslim.'

Lessons from the Past

These briefly are the main reasons, the sheer impracticability of the proposition, which deters religious minded people in India from pursuing the ideal of a religious State; and why even though the secular irreligion of Voltaire is repugnant to most Indians, they favour a secular State. The lessons of their past history warn them of the disruption that any other course would cause. India has almost invariably foundered when any one has attempted to set up a religious State. It is interesting to speculate to what degree the disappearance or, at least, the almost complete eclipse of Buddhism in India was due to its being pushed forward as a State religion. The rapid advance made by it during Asoka's reign was followed quickly by an almost total retreat.

We are all familiar with the decline of Mughal power in the real sense under Aurangzeb, as contrasted with the position under Akbar, when secular ideals were actively pursued and evolved. Even in British times, one may say that the Mutiny was a warning of what could happen if secular ideals were not kept constantly in the forefront of State policies. The British were able to survive as long as they did because they realised the significance of this. Their essential aim was of course not to create an homogenous or united nation, but to govern with the least degree of opposition.

They, therefore, manipulated their secularism with just the right degree (from their point of view) of religious opportunism or

favouritism, shifting the balance from time to time this way or that, so that the various disparate religious elements in India might never find a via-media or balance of secular tolerance between themselves, but should always seek weightage through the intervention of the alien power and at the expense of the others. This came to a climax in 1947. The balance then was over-tilted and Pakistan had to be jettisoned.

Such is the political background but it has also a deep undercurrent of religious inspiration behind it, welling up from the almost unfathomable recesses of Hindu consciousness stretching back to its remotest past. It would take too long to trace it here, but it has always to be kept in mind. It is only because of its existence that India could become the birth place of many of the great religions of the world, that so many of them have flourished here and that it still remains the great religious laboratory of the world.

To denigrate this deep rooted respect for different faiths, this instinctive tolerance for contrary beliefs to one's own, provided they are genuinely held and are constructive, not destructive, to those of others, by dubbing it as 'Hindu Pluralism' seems like—to use a vulgar expression for what seems to me an unworthy thought—throwing the baby out with the bath water. Much dross has undoubtedly collected round this ideal. It has undergone many submergings, but it has always emerged again; sometimes in full splendour, as when Gandhiji paid the supreme price for its cleansing, sometimes only dimly. It is an essential element in giving meaning to India's secularism.

The Pakistan Experiment

The Islamic historical tradition of tolerance is much more pragmatic and practical. In a way, it illustrates the difference in the attitude of Islam to human existence from that held by Hinduism. The way in which it works, almost by the force of its own momen-

tum, can perhaps be best seen in Pakistan where everything possible seems to have been done to obstruct it.

Jinnah himself was too intelligent a man not to have grasped this as soon as he had wrested full political power in Pakistan. Addressing the Pakistan Constituent Assembly on August 15th, 1947, he declared:

'Everyone of you, no matter to what community you belong, no matter what your colour, caste or creed, is first, second and last a citizen of this State, with equal rights, privileges and obligations...While you may belong to one religion, caste or creed, that has nothing to do with the business of the State. We start with the fundamental principle that we are all equal citizens of the State. We should keep that in front of us as our ideal. In course of time, Hindus will cease to be Hindus, and Muslims will cease to be Muslims; not in the religious sense, because that is the personal faith of each individual, but in the political sense as citizens of the nation.'

Basic Compulsions

Gone was the Two Nation theory. Gone was the ideal of an Islamic State for which Pakistan had ostensibly been amputated from India. Unfortunately, Jinnah did not live long enough thereafter to give substance to this reversion to the ideals of a secular State which he had championed in his prime as an 'Ambassador of Hindu-Muslim Unity.' He only created confusion in the minds of his followers, and chaos followed his death.

An Islamic State was eventually set up, but with so many compromises and so many evasions that one can only say that it is as much an Islamic State as Pakistan's basic democracy constitutes a democratic State. Pakistan is inevitably working towards a secular State, not because it has any ideological leanings that way, but through the sheer compulsion of the facts of life. Regarding this phenomenon, one may well

remind oneself of Dr. Johnson's aphorism on a woman preacher: 'Sir, a woman's preaching is like a dog's walking on his hinder legs. It is not done well, but you are surprised to find it done at all.'

Why is it being done? I have tried to throw some light on this earlier, and I must leave it at that.

We may now deal with the rest of Cantwell Smith's conundrums. He starts off by saying: 'The secularism of India is an aspiration, not yet a reality.' From what has been argued above, I would rather say that 'The secularism of India is a reality, not yet a conscious aspiration.'

Without Dogma

He complains of the 'amazing array of interpretations' that his enquiries about it have elicited. How could it be otherwise? There is an amazing array of religious groups in this country, many of them far larger than those forming separate nations elsewhere. And as it has been said earlier, secularism has no dogma of its own in India.

He classifies the chief positions held about it into three main groups; the western or negative group; the Hindu or pluralist view; and the nationalist or positive view. Something on the first two has already been said. I need only add that the conception of the separation of religion and politics prevalent in India as connoted by the term secular has little to do with the French term *laïque* (the layman as distinct from the clergy), but everything with the English term secular (concerned with the affairs of this world, not sacred, not monastic, not ecclesiastical, temporal, profane, lay) as defined in the *Oxford English Dictionary*. This being so, does it really matter that Hindus and Muslims do not have a 'Church', but lots of 'churches'?

The allied problem of theology where a religious community's theology does not affirm 'the separation of religion and politics' is more real. This is probably one reason why in India, secularism,

although a reality and an accepted necessity, has not yet got its scripture.

Third Dimension

The main reason for it however seems to me to lie elsewhere. It is due to the artificial relationship which exists between the divided halves of the two great religious communities of the sub-continent, the Hindus and the Muslims, as a result of a territorial partition which took no account of its psychological, social or long-term religious consequences. This has added a formidable third dimension to the problem of Hindu-Muslim relations and, therefore, to that of secularism itself.

If it had been a problem which either India or Pakistan could have solved by themselves, it might have been solved by now. But this is a problem which for ultimate solution depends on their joint efforts and joint agreement. That is what is delaying it; though the inexorable pressure of the facts of life in both countries is inevitably drawing them closer into seeing where their salvation lies.

About the third, the nationalist or positive view of secularism, I agree with Cantwell Smith. Industrialisation is hastening it; but it will be a long time before it can really take its place alongside the other two as an ideal with anywhere the same degree of appeal to the conscience of the Indian people.

Finally, therefore, while I disagree with the first part of Cantwell Smith's conclusion that 'Indian secularism will either fail to emerge' (claiming that it has already emerged), I agree that 'it will emerge as something new' or rather that it has so emerged.

All that it requires now is to be dressed up properly and given its rightful position in the Warrant of Precedence, so that it might take its appointed seat on the high table of Indian morality and public good sense, and partake on equal terms with all the rest in whatever is being passed round there.

Political implications

SURINDAR SURI

‘THE secularism of India is an aspiration, not yet a reality’, writes Wilfred Cantwell Smith. The statement would be too severe a judgment if it were taken literally. But he may not mean what he says. What he may mean is that secularism in India is not perfect and not yet secure. Of course, one might counter that it is nowhere perfect and nowhere entirely secure. However, one may very well argue that secularism in India is less perfect and less secure than in some other countries, such as the U.S.A., Britain, Canada or France. Yet the point of departure of a discussion of the nature and prospects of secularism in India must be the acknowledgement that it is a fact and a reality, not merely an aspiration. If it were not a reality, then a discussion of the prospects for it would be illogical.

In fact, the situation is almost the reverse of that which Cantwell Smith makes it out to be. Secularism in India is a reality but it is perhaps not a sufficiently

strong aspiration. What he really wants to express—because this is the point which he discusses in his article—is whether secularism will become an aspiration in India. To be sure, it is already an aspiration of a few and he would like to know whether it will become the aspiration of the many. To put it in another way, the State in India is a secular State but individuals who guide its destiny and especially the masses who elect these individuals are not all secular-minded.

The State is secular partly because we have inherited it from the British who shaped it in the secular mould. Moreover, the leaders who took charge of the State received their education and political training under British auspices and acquired the secular philosophy. Nationalism, which is the ruling ideology in India, is essentially secular. The secular State exists. Institutional secularism is very much a reality in India. Many individuals who serve secular political institutions are

themselves not secular-minded but they are compelled to act in a secular fashion.

To be specific, certain leaders in the States are bigoted or they are such opportunists that they would make use of any handle which serves their political purpose. In Kerala, the Congress Party allied itself to caste and communal organisations and Kerala is no exception. But once in power, every State government has to take a secular stand: the State in India has not been overwhelmed by communal or non-secular forces. It has not surrendered on the ideological front. To be sure, much of the credit for the success of secularism goes to the central leadership, especially to Nehru.

Problems of Democracy

The situation in India then is that the State—if we visualise it for the moment as a superstructure—is secular but the sub-structure, namely, the masses of the people, are religious and even communal-minded. The distinction may not be so crass as stated above, for streaks of communalism are certainly noticeable at the top just as strains of secularism are visible among the masses. However, it is the contrast between the super-structure and the base which creates misgivings about the reality of secularism in India. The question then is whether a secular State may be supported by a communalist population in a democratic society.

'The western (conception of secularism) rests on a notion of separation between religion and politics or between Church and State. It affirms the negative point that political and social life should proceed without ecclesiastical involvement.' It is true that in some countries, notably in the U.S.A., the distinction between the Church and State has been drawn very clearly but it is exceptional. Religion and politics are not necessarily in conflict because the sphere of activities of both may be easily separated.

To be sure, the sphere may overlap, giving rise to conflict. Religion may overwhelm political life and institutions as it did in

Pakistan. Or the State may wish to penetrate into every sphere of social and individual life, displacing religion. This is the case in some totalitarian countries. But these are aberrations, which is proved by the fact that in most countries political stabilisation is reached in which the State assumes a more limited function. Its function is basically as an instrument of the self-government of a community.

Place of Religion

It might be argued that a people which is religious-minded and which, in other words, is not secular-minded, is incapable of self-government. In that case, the whole people would have to be secular-minded in order to be self-governing. This is perhaps what Cantwell Smith means when he writes: 'Yet it (secularism) is a positive force, even a positive faith. At its best, it has historical and metaphysical under-pinnings going back to the Greek streak in western civilization rather than to the Palestinian, it has had champions, and even martyrs of great intellectual and moral stature—men whose ideas and devotion have been outstanding.' A distinction has to be made between a secular philosophy (or philosophy of Secularism) and secular politics or the secular State. Secularism as an all-encompassing philosophy is not only not necessary as the under-pinning of a secular State but it may well be the negation of the State.

According to the Marxian exegesis, at least, self-dependent and free individuals cannot develop inside the State. The more free the State, the less free the individuals. The secular State on this line of thinking may well be held to presuppose religious-minded citizens. If they were not religious-minded, then they would not need the State. The secular State as a free State intensifies the religiosity of its citizens. One may not accept this line of thinking entirely, but this much may be granted to Marx: his insight into one aspect of political secularism has been confirmed. The emergence and consolidation of the

secular State has nowhere led to the elimination of religion as a social force or seriously reduced its wide acceptance by the people. Indeed, there has been some resurgence of religious belief even in the most secular of States, such as the U.S.A.

In order to grasp the significance of this fact, we must visualise the situation as it existed at the beginning of the modern political era. The modern State arose as a rival of, and antagonistic to, the Church. The French Revolution at one time enthroned reason as its goddess. Many philosophers of the modern State were biased against religion. They believed that the consolidation of the State would lead to the gradual extinction of religion among the people. But Marx pointed out that those very forces which had led to the rise of religious faith were also responsible for the development of the modern State.

There was no basic antagonism between State and Church, once they had learnt to co-exist. They would co-exist because they were similar in nature. Christ's dictum to render unto Caesar what was Caesar's (and unto God what was God's) was not necessarily a concession to Caesar. It might be seen as the necessary precondition of rendering unto God what was God's. Caesar and God are not rivals for the same domain.

A Question of Choice

The same may well be found to hold true in India. The fact that people are religious-minded does not mean that the secular State is not viable. Not even communal conflict or religious bigotry is necessarily destructive of secularism. Indeed, the State exists in order to manage precisely these kinds of conflicts. To be sure, the State might fail to contain social strife. It might be overwhelmed ideologically by religious fanaticism or fanaticism of some other kind. But these are the usual hazards of political existence. Lack of social conflict would be more dangerous than the frequent occurrence of acute social strife.

At this point, we should be in a position to dispose of Cantwell

Smith's major doubt: 'India may be secular, or it may be democratic, but is there any real possibility of its being both? Secularism can, perhaps, be imposed on a people previously religious in their total outlook: but will it be chosen by such a people themselves?' I suppose the provocative answer to this question is that secularism will be chosen by a people only if it chooses freely, for secularism can only be chosen freely; it cannot be imposed.

Cantwell Smith cites the example of Turkey but it hardly fits in with his definition of secular, i.e., a tolerant State. After more than four decades, Turkey remains a precarious dictatorship. It may sound like quibbling on the words 'chosen freely' but it does touch the heart of the problem of secularism in its political aspect. A State which is not sustained by the free and conscious determination of its people hardly deserves to be called a secular State or, for that matter, a State. A people who choose in such a manner as to surrender its freedom of choosing cannot be said to exercise a free choice. Conversely, if a people chooses freely, it is bound to choose in such a manner as to maintain its freedom to choose.

To return to India, the question is: do people choose freely? If they choose freely, then the question of what they choose is really of secondary importance, at least so far as secularism is concerned. The important task is to make real the freedom of choosing. In so far as freedom is real, the problem of secularism is solved.

No Contradiction

Muslims in undivided India feared that they would suffer in their religious faith unless they lived in a Muslim State. This indicated the erosion of their faith. Whatever else the Muslim community might have lost by continuing to live in the midst of a Hindu majority, it would not be faith. Some Muslims may have lost their predominant social position or economic power but faith,

if anything, might well have been strengthened. After all Christians in Germany point to East Germany—where the Christian Church is under pressure—as the place where there is a great revival of Christian faith. One may conclude, therefore, that the religious-mindedness of the people in no way contradicts or goes contrary to the survival of a secular State, and vice versa.

The Indian Context

Another point which Cantwell Smith raises is that of the nature of Indian secularism. He says that too little attention has been paid to the nature of secularism in the Indian context. He believes that the European or other foreign models would not suit India. Unless Indian thinkers discuss the nature of secularism which would arise in their environment, they might lose it by default. This poses a very tricky question. As a matter of fact, the struggle for secularism in India has been going on for about a century-and-a-half since the time of Ram Mohan Roy.

There is no place here to go into the interrelation between religion and politics or religion and nationalism in our country during the past hundred years and more. Let us take one example. Tagore accepted a secular philosophy in general but he was against nationalism and against politics. To him, politics was the negation of culture. Indians were a cultural people; theirs was a tradition of culture and religion. Their outlook was universal. If they became a political community, it would mean the sacrifice of their tradition of culture and religion. Their outlook was universal. If they became a political community, it would mean the sacrifice of their tradition of culture and the narrowing of their cosmopolitan outlook into a narrow and confining nationalism.

Gandhi, on the other hand, was religious through and through; at the same time he was a nationalist. Lest the equation be made to appear too simple, let it be noted that Nehru, the self-confessed

pagan, was also a nationalist. None-the-less, the religious inspiration behind Indian nationalism is unmistakable. No wonder that nationalism in India followed close upon the religious revival which developed in the second half of the nineteenth century. British writers in the early part of the present century blamed the rise of aggressive nationalism upon the religious revival wrought by Dayanand, Ramakrishna, Vivekanand, Aurobindo. Hence they were scared of Gandhi.

The Political Community

The question is that of building and upholding an autonomous political community. A community is political insofar as it is determined to govern itself, that is to say, to manage its affairs deliberately and self-consciously. It is a community determined to take its destiny into its own hands. This is the theory, but the practice is more complicated, for rarely does a political community come into being all of a sudden. Mostly, it grows into a political community, i.e., a people develops into a State gradually and by faltering steps.

In the course of development, a lot of compromises are made with the institutions which already exist; the Church was the most powerful of these institutions in the West, and in some countries it still is. Every State in Europe has developed its characteristic relationship to the Church. In Britain, the Church is subordinated to the State. Symbolically, the queen is Head of the State and Head of the Church. Even where this close relationship between the Church and State does not exist, there are varying degrees of symbiosis and also tension between the two.

The Church calls upon men to acknowledge their dependence upon a supernatural power but the State recalls them to self-dependence. The Church may evoke in the individual a sense of self-responsibility for his moral deeds whereas the State acts like a church when it evokes the feeling of dependence among its

citizens. Yet, the fundamental difference is there.

Is there a group of men willed to establish and to uphold a political community, i.e., a community of people which is self-governing? If they are so willed, they are necessarily secular-minded. If they are not so willed, they are not secular-minded: they may be theocratic or, like Tagore, simply anti-political. If their will is joined with capacity for political leadership and if the natural circumstances, such as geographical factors, are favourable they will succeed in establishing and sustaining a (secular) State.

When we ask the question whether India is a secular State and whether the circumstances are propitious for its survival, we are really asking whether the people of India are willed sufficiently to form themselves into a political community and whether the social, geo-political, cultural circumstances are favourable to their efforts. The will to form India into a political community was coterminous with the urge to free her from British rule. If Indians did not want to form a political community, then it would not have mattered who ruled them.

Momentum of Struggle

On the other hand, if they could not form a political community, they would not attain self-rule. This question was not posed consciously by those who struggled for freedom. Indeed, British rule was not seen in the perspective of a political challenge but more often as a threat or slight to India's ancient traditions and culture. This was the basic weakness of the nationalist movement. But Indians were led (or driven) to the formation of the political community even though there was no deliberate effort in that direction.

India became a political community through interaction with and struggle against British colonialism. It was the momentum generated by this struggle which has carried India to the present stage in its development as a secular State, i.e., a State whose citizens acknowledge that they are

responsible for upholding it. Two questions arise here. Can we maintain and develop the political community which has arisen in our midst without conscious effort on our part? In other words, must the people, or at least a considerable section among them, be secular-minded as a precondition for the survival of the State? If this is so, do the people understand the conditions for sustaining and strengthening the political community. The other question is: which are the forces that threaten the existence of the secular State?

Political Leadership

Foremost among the forces which sustain secularism is the determination of a substantial number of individuals separately and as organised political parties to uphold the State, to take whatever steps are necessary for this purpose—whether these involve personal sacrifices or compromises of principles. The individuals who are so determined form the political leadership. The unknown quantity which determines whether a society produces the required number of men who want to be political leaders and who are capable of acting as such is perhaps the most decisive condition. But, we cannot say whether a continuous supply of political leaders of the requisite calibre would be forthcoming in the future.

One factor in this is secular-mindedness. Devout and pious individuals are not likely to make good political leaders. On the other hand, politics does not exclude religion and an effective political leader need not necessarily be non-religious. Donald Eugene Smith misunderstood the nature of the secular State when he defined its essential characteristic as neutrality towards religion or, more particularly, towards the churches. On this score he refuses to call the Soviet Union a secular State because of its active hostility to religion; in the same manner he would refuse to call a State dominated by the Church a secular State.

But D. E. Smith's pro-Christian

(more accurately, pro-religious) bias misleads him about what is essentially a political issue. The attitude which a State adopts toward religion is really a secondary matter so far as secularism is concerned. The primary issue is whether men and groups on whose shoulders the existence of the State rests are willing to undertake whatever steps are necessary to uphold the State. It may be necessary to combat the church as Bismarck did during the Kulturkampf. A State may be hostile to religion as in Russia or it may appease the Church as in Poland. The one will be as much a secular State as the other.

Similarly, the question of religious tolerance is quite distinct from that of secularism. A secular State may be bigoted or intolerant in the treatment of religious minorities whereas one that is theocratic may be tolerant. The question of religious tolerance and intolerance has to do with the temper of a people. There is intolerance in Britain today about the religious practices of certain Indian immigrant communities. Anti-Jewish and anti-Catholic sentiments are widespread in the United States. But these do not destroy the secular nature of the State. True, if religious discord or persecution of religious communities reached a certain point, it would endanger the stability or existence of the State; but the inner conflicts which are dangerous need not be religious.

Internal Conflicts

On the other hand, some internal tension is an indispensable element in the existence of any community, especially a political one. A people which is free from internal strife and conflict and tension will not be able to hold together. The State is, among others, a mechanism for resolving internal conflicts. If there are no internal conflicts, the State is not necessary at all; it will simply wither away. The conflicts may be social but they may also be religious. Religious tolerance, or peace between different religious communities, may be a valuable

and worthy objective but we must recognise that it is not an inevitable or inherent feature of the secular State.

If religious passions are too strong or the Church is too powerful, the State may have to fight against these in order to maintain its secular character. Thus the Government of India had to take action against a militant revivalist organisation such as the R. S. S. Bismarck had to fight the Catholic Church, and his inability to gain a victory in the Kulturkampf greatly weakened the State. Eastern European countries have also been fighting against the Church not merely because the State is dictatorial and tyrannical but equally because the Church was too strong.

The Archaic Form

The important point to consider is whether religious bigotry, or communalism, is likely to be the main challenge to the integrity of the Indian State. There are enough warning signs to remind us that communalism is not dead but very much alive. It is also true that when the bulk of political leaders in India think of themselves primarily as servants of religions rather than of the State, the nature and perhaps the existence of the State would be jeopardised. In India, if political life decays, it might return to its archaic religious form.

Religion is the archaic form of politics not only in India but elsewhere. But politics in India has not matured; therefore, the danger of regression into the original religious pattern is not excluded. Nevertheless, India might well have traversed the point of no return in its growth from a basically religious to an essentially political community. If this be the case, the degeneration of public life in India need not lead to communalism but to perverse political forms such as a dictatorship. This is what happens in most West European States. The failure of the Fourth Republic in France did not extinguish political life but brought an authoritarian regime. In Spain, on the other hand, the debacle of the republic

was followed by a resurgence of power of the Roman Catholic Church, although power remained formally in the hands of the Falange.

Communal Parties

Perhaps the situation in India would be closer to that of Spain if there was an organised Hindu Church. In fact, there is none, although the R. S. S. resembles the Falange in some respects. At best, however, the R. S. S. is a small cloud on the Indian horizon. It is most unlikely that the big industrialists who form the most powerful pressure group in the country would support the R. S. S. as the German Heavy Industry during the great depression decided to support the Nazi party. But the parallels are ominous enough. As in Spain or Germany or Italy, the Indian Fascists (or their Indian incarnation) would have to prove that they control the mobs and that orderly social and economic life is impossible unless they are in the political saddle.

Significantly, recent communal riots occurred in industrial areas. If there was a long-range plan behind the riots, there must be rehearsals for serious attempts at disrupting life in the economic nerve centres. If an organisation such as the R. S. S. can prove that it could create perpetual unrest in the main industrial (or administrative) centres and that economic life would proceed on an even keel only if the Party is appeased, it would of course have won the battle for power. To be sure, every political party strives for or retains power on some such assumption. If the industrialists pay ransom to the Congress Party, the generosity springs from the recognition that the party could bring social and economic life to a stand-still. In turn, it must prove its ability to prevent any other political party from creating social and economic chaos.

It is this consideration which makes the Congress Party, even at the State level, a champion of secular government. There is deep rivalry between the Congress Party and other political parties. If the Congress Party allows other

parties to create social chaos, then it must abdicate power. The communists failed to arouse popular unrest on economic issues. Not all the misery and starvation provide powder enough for a social explosion. The communalist parties have a slightly better opportunity for creating unrest. They would not be human and they would not be political if they did not try to use the handle which seems to lie at hand. The question is, would they succeed?

It is not an easy question to answer. Demoralisation and disorganisation of the administration are preconditions for the success of the communalist parties but the morale of the administration itself is a function of many factors. Widespread discontent among the populace is bound to affect administrative morale. An unprecedented inflation ravaged Germany in 1924 and swept away the economic substance of the middle-class; it paved the way for the triumph of National Socialism, whose victory was sealed with the outbreak and seemingly endless duration of the great depression which started in 1929.

In India, the food shortage, growing unemployment and spiralling prices which widen the gap between the rich and the poor provide objective conditions for the demoralisation of the administration. But these objective factors would not suffice to bring about the collapse of the secular State and the rise of a theocratic State or a demented regime. Lack of vision about what is to be done on the part of secular-minded political parties and confidence on the part of the anti-secular forces that they know where they are going would suffice to complete the circle of destruction.

Danger of Insanity

A communalist party in power need not be non-secular. If it is imbued with determination to sustain and develop an autonomous political community, it would be compelled to adopt policies similar to those of the present ruling party. I say this not to minimise the danger of communalism nor to condone it, but to emphasize

my point that the political situation in India has its compulsions and that the main equation in India is not that between the secular and the non-secular. It is between self-dependence of a social group on the one side and subservience to a supernatural force or to an ancient but unknown tradition on the other side. The contrast between the Weimar Republic in Germany and the Hitler regime which followed it was not that of secularism and non-secularism or even of democracy against dictatorship but that of sanity versus insanity.

The danger in India is that the secularism of the present political order might be subverted by insanity. Events in France provide a salutary example. The Fourth Republic was secular and tolerant. In this respect, the Fifth Republic under de Gaulle is perhaps no less secular or tolerant in religious matters. In some ways de Gaulle has acted more sanely, especially in bringing the Algerian War to a conclusion. One might well claim that the determination of de Gaulle to make France into a nuclear power is not very sane. Yet it does reveal a determination on his part to prevent France from becoming a political or military dependency of the U.S.A. and Britain. The same reasons seem to motivate Communist China. The motive force of its quarrel with the Soviet Union is its determination to function as a fully autonomous political community, i.e., a sovereign State.

Determination and Wisdom

The question for India is whether there will continue to arise individuals and groups who would do all that need be done to weld India into a political community and to maintain and strengthen its sovereignty. This requires something more than military strength. It needs something more than economic might. Above all, it needs determination and wisdom—to compromise where compromise is necessary, howsoever unpalatable the conditions, but to stand firm where firmness is required.

French statesmen in the Fourth Republic were unable to part com-

pany with Algeria. They could not surrender their colony and years of heavy sacrifices were made willingly in trying to suppress the Algerians. But the result was increasing political instability at home until de Gaulle came to power with the avowed determination to bring about the decolonisation of the French empire. Tolerance is generally a necessary condition for the existence of a political community which must be voluntary and all-inclusive. It does involve the softening of many egotisms—individual, regional, linguistic and religious. It is not easy to soften these. They have to be overcome by force or persuasion or by gradual attrition.

Changing Attitudes

Perhaps, the most encouraging feature of the scene in India is the constant transformation of religious attitudes and of communal politics. The contrast may be seen more clearly in comparing the Hindu Mahasabha with the Jana Sangh. The former considers the latter to be a traitor to the cause of a genuine Hindu State in India. The basic value of the Mahasabha is Hindu civilization. According to its adherents, however, the basic principle of the Jana Sangh is nationalism and not Hinduism. Therefore, they regard the Jana Sangh as a secular organisation, not a truly religious one.

The Hindu Mahasabha may be less dangerous but it was more consistent and more reactionary. The amounts of traditionalism (or religion) and modernism (or secularism) have varied throughout the past decades and it seems that the forces of modernism have been gaining the upper-hand. It is not clear that they have won a decisive victory but the trend is in that direction and any seeming victory of the traditionalist or communalist forces is bound to be temporary but it might be bloody.

In sum, the picture in India is very complicated and the equation between secularism and theocracy covers only one part of the political picture. However, the State is a secular power but it may not

be secular-minded. The definition of secularism as independence of religion is derived from the historical accident of the emergence of modern States in Europe at a time when the Church was dominant and the State had to win its independence in struggle against the Church.

Self-Responsibility

Secular-mindedness in politics may be defined as the determination (and the ability) to sustain an autonomous political community. This involves the recognition of self-responsibility. Tolerance of different religious faiths (or of religion generally), howsoever worthy and necessary it may be, is a secondary issue. The overcoming of egotisms—personal, linguistic, regional and religious—is necessary if the political community is to flourish. This is a difficult task and it requires the acceptance of a political ideology which subsumes the egotisms and transforms them into something higher and more desirable. India has not yet produced or accepted such a new political faith or way of life. Communalism in India reflects the lack. Secularism is not a political faith, but the accompaniment or by-product of one.

Finally, what would be the impact of continuing political freedom in India upon the beliefs of the people? And no less important: what would be the impact of industrialism on religion? One thing is certain. Religion would certainly be transformed because individual and social life will be changed in all its aspects; but religion will not disappear. In some sense, religious faith may be strengthened.

To some it may appear that religious faith would become marginal or superfluous. Christians in the industrialised countries would hardly agree that industrialism, political democracy or the secular State have weakened their religious faith. There is no reason to believe that political secularism and religion would not flourish side by side in India in the decades to come.

Books

MODERNISATION IN A TRADITIONAL SOCIETY By
Wilfred Cantwell Smith.
Asia Publishing House, Bombay.

THE CONCEPT OF THE SECULAR STATE AND INDIA
By Ved Prakash Luthera.
Oxford University Press, Bombay.

Not so long ago, Wilfred Cantwell Smith delivered three lectures on the 'Modernisation of a Traditional Society', at Sapru House in New Delhi. Cantwell Smith doesn't define a traditional society, but equates it to Afro-Asian countries, thus, perhaps unwittingly, concealing the economico-political character of these countries. He seems to forget that every country in the world is traditional in that it has got its own traditions, and talks as though outside the Afro-Asian pale, no other country has any traditions. He treats tradition with Jehovah-like respect, as something permanent and for ever, an absolute category, which it is not; it changes with time and reflects the socio-economic and political changes.

When defining the term 'modern', Cantwell Smith 'demolishes' various views of what is modern. But what he 'demolishes' are only vague, popular notions. All that's latest, isn't modern and all that's modern isn't beneficial, are the homilies he lays down at the end of his demolition work. Israel and Pakistan are new, but a State based on religion is a concept centuries old. Cantwell Smith's amazing examples for the second homily are industrial slums and fascism, neither very beneficial to humanity. The Cantwell Smith definition is that modernity is a process of

consciousness of what is happening in one's own country, and of what is possible to achieve combined with a free choice of one or any of the alternative possibilities.

Modernisation is the achievement of the possible in a particular way, in a way 'that conduces to still more freedom and more knowledge', 'that leads to greater knowledge, greater freedom and greater mundane welfare.'

Being a self-conscious lover of human freedom, Cantwell Smith believes in the choice. But he doesn't notice that the free choice he postulates here is restricted, in general, to (a) the present knowledge, and (b) to the immediately possible alternatives, and in particular, (c) to the way that leads to greater knowledge, freedom, etc. By the time these restrictions are imposed, three quarters of the freedom of 'free choice' is gone. The remaining quarter of freedom is the freedom of decision to act or not to act. Once the 'free choice' of decision is made, even that quarter of the freedom of the 'free choice' is also gone.

One doesn't know what to make of Cantwell Smith's freedom and free choice. In contrast, Marxism stands for the achievement of the possible in a way that leads to greater mundane welfare of the entire people, by abolishing exploitation by increasing knowledge of the potentialities of nature and of man so that men are increasingly free from exploitation and material want and so free to realise their potentialities, i.e., their human being. And yet

Cantwell Smith comes down on Marxism. Being a scholar, he has to reveal his awareness of the existence of Marxism, however little or distorted it may be. He thinks that ideas exist before what he calls 'economics and technology', and re-affirms 'the primacy of ideas over matter, and of intellectual questions over economic and technological ones.' He then confidently adds, 'Marx was simply wrong in his dogma that matter precedes thought.'

As any serious student of Marxism knows, what Marx said was, that before thought can arise, there must be a thinking brain and senses to help the brain, and things for the brain and senses to act upon. Unless Cantwell Smith can demonstratively prove that he can produce his thoughts without his senses and his brain, and without things like economics and technology or society, there is no reason to accept his pronouncement that Marx was simply wrong. Marx, Cantwell Smith should note, never under-rated human thought, the force of ideas or ideologies. As Marx in an oft-quoted passage in *Capital* says, the bee builds its hive by instinct, but the architect has the entire building in his mind before it exists outside his mind.

Cantwell Smith should also note that Marx didn't talk of the primacy of 'economics and technology', but of the interaction of productive forces and productive relations of an epoch constituting its method of production and distribution operation within the context of all ideology accumulated up to that epoch.

Cantwell Smith should also note that thought, the moment it comes out of the thinker's mind, becomes an objective *material* fact, to be acted upon, like matter, economics, technology, etc. Followers of Marxism have understood the Marxist theory about ideas, and Cantwell Smith's admission that they have paid 'enormous, active attention to the role of ideology,' obviously contradicts what he has said about Marx.

This coil of contradiction is complete when Cantwell Smith says, 'And I think it can be shown both in theory and in practice that on this point the Communists are right and we have been wrong.' One could, perhaps, remind Cantwell Smith of one of his well expressed thoughts: 'any intellectual is pretty vacuous who does not recognise, first, that his ideas may be wrong, and, second, that if they are wrong, his society will suffer as a result.'

Cantwell Smith deals with the role of intellectuals and the moral and religious aspects of modernisation. Although at one stage he gives an all-purveying, all-determining, demi-god's place to the intellectual, at the end of his third lecture he says, 'No one may tell the moralist what to choose. Yet the intellectual may, by theoretical analysis, show the moralist in what direction he must look, if his morality is to be dynamically modern and free.'

What then is the role of the intellectual and the moralist in modernisation? Here's Cantwell Smith's answer for what it's worth: 'It is up to the country's

intellectual leaders to make people aware. It is up to the country's or villages' moral leaders to persuade them that the choice is an exceedingly important one morally; and to advise them on which of the many alternatives it is best to choose. The actual choice itself, however, is made not by leaders, but by every man.'

The author does not have much to say about secularism except this: '... the progress of secularism, will, so far as I can discern, move forward much more smoothly and effectively, and will perhaps move forward only if secularism and its problems are conceptualised, clarified, and intellectually wrestled with, and action taken in the light of a greatly increased awareness. What that awareness is to be, he discusses a little later: '... a secularism that is purely negative, irreligious, rejecting or setting aside the morality and faith of religion, will (as much modern history shows), prove pretty sterile if not destructive. The morality and the faith of India to accompany the material aspects of the modernising process and to vivify it, may be Hindu, and Moslem, and Sikh and Christian, or they may be secular in the Greco-Western sense or in some new Indian style. It is up to the religious and moral, including the devotedly secular, leaders of India to work this out.'

In the second book under review, Luthera examines the concept of the secular State to establish its precise meaning, and then shows how inapplicable the term is in reference to India. The long and short of Luthera's thesis is that India is not a secular State, cannot be a secular State, and can only be a jurisdictional State.

As is the norm in most Ph.D theses, Luthera examines first the origins of the concept of a secular State. According to him, 'the philosophical foundations' for the concept were laid in a sermon of Christ recorded in St. Mark's Gospel XIII: 7 which reads 'Render to Caesar the things that are Caesar's and to God the things that are God's.' This origin sounds far-fetched—it's like looking for atom bombs in the *Atharva Veda* and the *Mahabharata*. After all, the concept of the secular State, as is understood to-day, is not even two centuries old by Luthera's own showing. Since the first secular State in the modern sense was that of the USA, '... an almost exclusive emphasis has been laid on the example of the USA as a model and other constitutions ... referred to only ... where relevant.' Immediately Luthera competently adds, 'This does not, however, affect the soundness of the argument of his study.'

So far as the USSR, which also professes to be a secular State, is concerned, Luthera observes, 'It is difficult to say how the separation of the State and the Church has been interpreted, if at all, by the judicial tribunals in the USSR. No information is available on the subject. But ... it is apparent that the article aims at separating the State and

the Church in order to ensure freedom of conscience to the citizens.' But neither freedom of conscience nor its corollary, equality of religions, is, in Luther's view, the essence of the secular State. Consequently, the phrase 'separation of State and the Church' seems to Luther to have acquired an ornamental value in the secular constitutions, except, of course, in that of the USA.

Why this 'exclusive emphasis' on the USA? Because, let Luther speak: 'The Church is free of State interference in, or regulations of, matters like doctrine, dogma, laws, organisation, administration and discipline. This, however, is not to be understood to mean a limitation of the sovereignty of the State ... It is a restriction which the State itself chooses to impose upon itself in order that it may be secular ... Further, ... the State is not to promote religion through any of its instrumentalities.' Since these features are to be found in the US Supreme Court cases, Luther theorises that any Constitution that is without them is ipso-facto not a secular one.

Part Two of his book shows, again mostly through judicial interpretation, that the Indian Constitution is without these features. Moreover, the Indian Constitution permits laws applicable to different communities, permits financial aid not only for sectarian institutions but for all kinds of religious institutions including places of worship such as temples and mosques; interferes, in the name of social reform, with the laws of marriage, divorce, succession, etc., which have been laid down by Hindu or Muslim religions; allows for the protection of cows although they are useless, just because they are sacred to the Hindu community. For all these omissions and commissions the Indian State is not a secular State—that is Luther's first conclusion.

In arguing on these lines, Luther is only grappling with the tail, not with the horns of the problem. Instead of studying how the concept of the secular State is evolving under Indian historical conditions, he takes the U.S. Constitution for a model to judge India by. Using similar methods, one could take England to be the best model of democracy and then come to the conclusion that India is not a democracy because it has no Royalty and because it has a fully written Constitution, etc., etc. Concepts like the secular State and democracy are not immutable; they are processes differently emerging in different historical conditions, acquiring new meaning and content. When they are not examined in the context of these historical conditions, they result in lop-sided conclusions.

Moreover, the Indian Constitution is not even twenty years old. No new generations trained in the concept of the secular State have yet come to run the State and judiciary apparatus. And in a vast, backward and almost illiterate country like ours, it takes several generations for the secular State to

come of age. Even then, it need not and will not have the same features as the U.S. Constitution.

In order, probably, to justify his first conclusion that India is not a secular State, Luther draws a yet more damaging conclusion. He says: 'The fact is that it is neither possible nor desirable to have a secular State in India under the present circumstances.' This is impossible and undesirable because a secular State, in order to be secular, must have in it a well-organised Church, which is not the case in India. So India must always be jurisdictional as it is now. Thus has Luther divined the present and decided the future character of the Indian State.

Kusum Madgavkar

SOME ASPECTS OF RELIGION AND POLITICS IN INDIA DURING THE THIRTEENTH CENTURY By

Khalid Ahmad Nizami.

Asia Publishing House, Bombay.

In his Foreword to the book under review, Dr. Colin Davies says that the increasing output on Indian history by Indians since Independence is an encouraging trend. This is correct. But the quality of that output is quite another matter. History is being rewritten from a largely communal viewpoint for the edification of a particular communal group. For instance, some Indian historians have unduly exaggerated the use of force as an element in the conversion of Hindus to Islam. They have presented idyllic pictures of life in India before the arrival of Islam, while glossing over such facts of the Indian social life as the caste system. Others have denied the use of force as an agent for securing conversions.

In this see-saw of conflicting communal viewpoints, the very purpose of history is forgotten. History has long ceased to be merely a chronicle of events in which kings and emperors have loomed large. Instead, history has become increasingly the story of a people living in a particular society: the way in which they earned their livelihood; the inter-relationship between various groups in that society; their religion and beliefs, customs and traditions; their arts and crafts; their ideas and ideals; the stage of civilization attained by them; the social and political system under which they lived; and the response of the social organism as a whole and of its constituents to the problems posed before them. Elsewhere, every aspect of social life has been subjected to a searching scientific analysis. This as yet remains to be done for Indian history.

Judged by the test of a scientific conception of history, the volume under discussion leaves much to be desired. There is erudition and scholarship; there is an attempt at a rational approach to history; there are innumerable references to contemporary sources; there is the compilation of a vast mass of facts as if to overawe the reader. But, the book is weak in its analysis and interpretation of painstakingly gathered facts. Why? It is because there is no

underlying philosophy of history; no overview of the social phenomena under discussion.

In his introduction to the book, Professor Habib remarks that the author has prefaced his work by an excellent analysis of the Islamic Revolution. One really wishes it were so. As a matter of fact, this section is the weakest part of the book. Beyond a bald statement that the rise and spread of Islam was a world historic event, there is little else. One looks in vain for an account of the conditions which caused this epoch making phenomenon, and of the people in whose midst Islam was born. The origin of Islam appears like a bolt from the blue—so brusquely is it introduced without so much as even a reference to the conditions which caused its birth. Nehru and Wells have dealt with this question more competently.

One looks in vain for an answer to the question: why did Christianity and Judaism fail to make a headway among the Arabs? What was the specific attraction of Islam for the Arabs? Instead of explaining the origin and growth of Islam in the light of the then existing social conditions, there is a lot of talk about the revolutionary significance of the principle of Islamic monotheism and its unequivocal extension to social life. But monotheism is not the monopoly of Islam. Why did contemporary monotheistic religions—Christianity and Judaism—fail to cast their spell over the Arabs? The differentia of Islam was not its monotheism but its stand on human equality as far as it was possible under the then existing social conditions.

Was it the paucity of material or was it deference to the feelings of his co-religionists which prevented the author from presenting a rational, coherent account of the Prophet? Why does he seek a metaphysical explanation for the origin and growth of Islam? How can one account for the lack of sufficient explanation about the civil war which followed soon after the rise of Islam? Was the point at issue mainly theological?

There are examples of loose and confused thinking. 'The Prophet was not an Arab nationalist, but in the years during which he was in charge of the government at Medina he eliminated all Arab tribal conflicts and organized a fairly classless and egalitarian society.' (Professor Habib in the Introduction). 'Out of this crude society the Prophet evolved the political structure of Islam and established a *working class* republic in Medina.' The Prophet was born in a classless, egalitarian, tribal society. It was the social milieu in which he lived and worked. It had its opportunities and its limitations. The Prophet's achievement was that he succeeded in transforming it and giving it a new direction. By providing the feuding Arab tribes with the basis for an ideological unity, Islam helped in creating among them the consciousness of belonging to a common nationality.

It is in the creation of the consciousness of a common nationality among the Arabian tribes that the real significance of Islam lies. But the conditions

were not ripe for the creation of an Arab State. Soon the tribes fell apart and were engaged in a civil war. Was the main issue theological? It appears not to be so. Here was a conflict between the old forces of a tribal society and the new ones which arose as a result of changing conditions within the tribal society. This conflict resulted in the break-up of the old tribal society and its replacement by a different type of social structure, more responsive to new needs than the earlier tribal one. A social epoch had ended and a new one begun.

All history may and may not be the history of class struggle. But an understanding of classes is relevant to an understanding of history. The class struggle was not invented by Marx. Nor was he the first to recognize it. A nodding acquaintance with Marxism is not a sufficient qualification for an historian.

It is not quite clear what the author means when he says that the Islamic revolution was urban in character. The account of life in Medina under the Prophet has the same element of uncritical adulation which is to be found in some historians account of life in ancient India.

One of the merits of the book is that it traces clearly the rise of a landed aristocracy and the part played by it. In the section on the political structure of Islam, there is very little discussion on the political and social principles enunciated in the *Koran*. Perhaps this is wise. The empire which arose was as Islamic as the Holy Roman Empire was 'holy'. The Islamic medieval polity was as much based on the *Koran* as the ancient Hindu polity in India was based on the *Dharmashastras*. In each case, the State's policy was formulated mainly on political considerations and expediency rather than on any lofty ideological considerations.

Islamic law remained petrified because it was considered immutable and valid for all times. What was relevant in a tribal society fired with the zeal of a unifying ideology had ceased to be relevant under the changed conditions of a feudal society.

Of considerable interest is the account given by the author of the rationalist movement in Islam which has been correctly represented as having a popular and progressive character.

Discussing the *Iqta* system, the author states that it helped to liquidate feudalism in India. In fact the *Iqta* is nothing but a modified form of feudalism. The founders of the Sultanate made use of the *Iqta* system to keep the turbulent Turkish military ruling class in check. But this did not basically alter the feudal character of society in India under the Sultanate.

The Muslim *Ulemas* were certainly not an ordained priesthood. Poor teachers they might have been. But poverty and conservatism may co-exist. It is indeed difficult to hold a brief, as the author does, for these *Ulemas* who constituted the bedrock of Islamic conservatism. The author has also displayed

a considerable ingenuity in trying to explain away the *jeziya*.

The book provides a well-documented insight into the lives of the Muslim mystics and the organization of the mystic orders. The author is right when he characterizes them as a popular and progressive element in Islam for it was in the '*Khanquahs*' of the mystics that the spirit of free enquiry and debate, of free thought and protest was kept alive. But it is difficult to concur with his opinion that Islamic mysticism was purely Islamic in origin.

There is an element of evasion in the author's attempt to discuss the issue of force as an element in conversion. The issue is sought to be by-passed. The use of force is certainly underestimated. The Hindu under the Sultanate was at best a *Zimmi*. His life, religion and property were secure as long as he paid the *Jeziya*. He was a second class citizen. But so was the Indian Muslim. In this feudal society, it was the Turkish military-cum-landed aristocracy which enjoyed a privileged position. In the last analysis it was on the arms of this class that the fragile structure of a flimsy empire rested.

The author asserts that the religious literature produced by the mystics contains valuable accounts of the life of the common people under the Sultanate. It is to be regretted that we are treated with very scanty evidence from this source.

P. V.

INDIAN NATIONALISM AND HINDU SOCIAL REFORM By Charles H. Heimsath.
Princeton University Press, 1964.

In this book, which covers the period of the nineteenth century renaissance in India from the time of Raja Ram Mohan Roy to the First World War, Professor Heimsath discusses the history of social and religious reform and its relation to the emergence of nationalism.

India has throughout its long cultural history experienced many reform movements; the Bhakti Movements and Sikhism come to mind as obvious, recent examples. The distinguishing feature of the 19th century reform movement is that it originated from secular motives based on a rational criticism of society. It was essentially western in outlook, inspired by those who had through education or travel come into contact with western ideas.

The movement had its beginnings in the desire of individuals to reshape their personal lives according to western standards. People such as Ram Mohan Roy and K. C. Sen were men of flaming zeal whose motto was, in Voltaire's words, '*Ecrasez L'infame*'. Hindu social institutions, especially caste and enforced widowhood, represented the infamous whereas English society with its calm self-assurance and distrust of theology and speculation seemed an ideal which modern India should set before itself. Apart from education, there was also the influence exercised by the Christian missionaries whose insistent demands to enact social legislation to rid

Hindu society of its abuses, established a pattern of agitation for future reformers such as Ram Mohan Roy's campaign against *Sati*.

However, the social reformers who based themselves on the missionary approach, while they prepared the ground for the purification of Hindu society were, generally speaking, out of sympathy with the Indian mind.

But the struggle required to adopt reformed customs, e.g., widow re-marriage and the abolition of child marriage, which was much more difficult than the mere intellectual acceptance of new ideas. There was some truth in Sir William Wedderburn's observation that it was easier for an educated Indian to affect the thinking of the British Secretary of State than his own mother-in-law.

Professor Heimsath regards this as the first stage of the reform movement. However, by the 1880s a new period in India's intellectual life was emerging with the formation of the Indian National Congress and the National Social Conference. There was no single unified movement but rather several local and competing nationalisms. Thus 'The Mother', the spiritual embodiment of the country whose worship Bankim Chatterjee urged, was not India but Bengal.

During this period, there was a shift in emphasis from social reform to political reform. The liberal-democratic and secular approach of the moderate leadership, responsible for the founding of the Congress, was challenged in the 1890s by extremists such as Tilak and Aurobindo Ghose who believed that unity could be rapidly achieved among Indians who recognised their common heritage as a single religious community. The basic issue dividing the extremists from the social reformers was that of the proper source from which the nation should derive its ideals. Should the standards defining the goals be western or Indian?

The answer given to this question ushered in the third stage in intellectual development: the reconstruction of nationalism under the leadership of the Hindu revivalists. One obvious characteristic of this reconstructed nationalism was an increasing disenchantment among educated Indians with western inspired social and political ideals.

Social reform began to mean a regeneration of the traditional spirit of the nation, a regeneration political as well as social, founded on religious revival. Criticism of society was based on the failure of national social life to realise its own potentialities and not in its inferior performance in comparison with western society. 'National' in any context now meant exclusively Hindu and the formation of the Muslim League in 1906 bore witness to the success of extremists such as Lajpat Rai and Tilak in exercising dominance within the Congress movement.

These are the three stages into which Professor Heimsath divides the period. Throughout, he em-

phasizes the major contribution of Britain to India's life. English education brought with it new ways of thinking and revived the spirit of criticism. Even where irrational institutions like caste, untouchability or the inferior status of women were defended, it was significant that such justification was no longer on the basis of old texts but in the language of the new thought.

But this vehicle of reform also had its limitations; it was the exclusive preserve of a small intellectual elite. Even 'national' movements such as the Congress failed to reach the masses. The democracy it visualized was no doubt a government by the educated upper classes, the new aristocracy of intellect and wealth. It was for this reason that Aurobindo's warning to the Moderates that the nationalists would come knocking at the door of Congress with a nation behind them failed to materialise. The masses were to remain dormant for another decade until Gandhi infused them with the spirit of unity.

Reformers in the 19th century strove for the emergence and success of nationalism and social reform, the latter being regarded as an essential pre-requisite for political advance. The first decades of the 20th century saw the broadening of participation at all levels of Indian life culminating in the spreading awareness of national identity and a step forward towards the realisation of the aspirations of the social reforms.

Professor Heimsath traces clearly the development of social reform and its increasing importance in political life during the last century. In particular, he brings out the regional differences of each of the major provinces in which reform flourished. His book gives a valuable account of an important intellectual scene, the effects of which we are even today experiencing.

Kamalbir Singh

MUSLIM COMMUNITIES IN GUJARAT By S. C. Misra.

Asia Publishing House, Bombay.

The advent of Islam wrought the most epoch-making change in the warp and woof of Indian life. While it stirred the placid waters of the birth-determined, caste-ridden, Hindu society, it underwent in the process imperceptible indigenisation, presenting a mosaic of symbiotic communities. 'What factors led to the formation of these communities, especially of communities which were converted from Hinduism? What were the changes which Islam wrought in the life and manners of these people? How far were the neo-converts Islamised? . . . How and in what manner did Indian Islam shape itself not only in its ideational and cultural spheres but in the social and personal spheres?'—questions such as these in the context of a given region are posed and sought to be answered in *Muslim Communities in Gujarat*.

The first part of the book sketches in brief the historical background of Islam in Gujarat. The

Hindu rulers were tolerant, catholic and secular in their treatment of Muslim immigrants and local converts to Islam. During the reign of Siddharaj Jaysingha (1094-1143), for instance, a mosque demolished by 'fire-worshippers' was re-built at State expense and the miscreants were severely punished. Such was the charisma of Siddharaj Jaysingha's personality among his Muslim subjects that three of the prominent Muslim communities, namely, the Bohras, Khojahs and Sunnis, claim to have converted him to their respective faiths.

Strange as it may seem, the first spell of the persecution of community started at the hands of a Sunni convert, Ja'far. 'Mosques,' in consequence, 'were closed for lack of attendance and harassment of the faithful mounted in intensity.' (p. 22). In 1518, about three quarters of a century later, the *wali*, Mulla Raja, was executed by the then Sunni Sultan. Until the fall of the Sultanate of Gujarat when it gave way to Mughal rule, *namaz* could not be read openly in mosques.

Aurangzeb's rule as *subedar* and later as emperor brought a fresh wave of persecution for the community. Syedna Qutab Khan was executed and his successor, Syedna Pir Khan, humiliated in prison. Bohra women were asked 'to wear ivory bangles and their menfolk to smoke tobacco pipes and trim beards, like the Mughal nobles. For mosques, Sunni *Pesh-Imams* (prayer leaders) were appointed and those who failed to attend were punished.' (p. 34).

In addition, 'teachers for educating the Bohras, both old and young, were to be appointed in every *pargana* and town and they were to be compulsorily taught the tenets of the Sunni faith—monthly tests were to be given to them. . . Regular progress reports of this educational campaign were to be forwarded to the Emperor.' Every care was taken to see that 'prohibited practices were forced upon the Bohras and the enjoined ones prohibited.' (p. 38).

The Sunni persecution of the Bohras, the proliferation of Islam into endogamous communities, the fear of plebian infiltration among the high-ups in their hierarchy, the conflicting loyalties to schismatic *pirs* and communal mentors and the retention of time-honoured customs, costumes and rituals by Hindu converts to Islam made wide breaches in its egalitarian, monotheistic ethos. The doctrine of propinquity transcended the caste configurations in matrimonial matters, but it was more a homage to power and pelf than an adherence to democratic brotherhood preached by Islam.

While the caste system crept into Muslim communities, it is incorrect to say that it got entrenched into them as among the Hindus. Social mobility among them was quick and more easy, for they did not recognise any clear-cut contours of a stratified hierarchy nor was caste sanctioned by religion or tradition.

Three processes, the study concludes, are working simultaneously upon the Muslim communities in

Gujarat, viz., Islamisation, rationalisation and westernisation. These communities are thus seen to be discarding non-Islamic doctrines and practices; are veering round to simple ceremonies which entail frugality; and the educated among them are taking to western dress and mode of living.

The book is a solid piece of research in the historico-sociological spectrum of Muslim communities in Gujarat. It provides a rich introduction to depth studies which may yield rewarding information not yet known. Its value thus lies in exploring a field that is promising for researchers in history and sociology and not in what it itself says or describes. Some of the possible lacunae may also be briefly recorded.

Part II of the volume is in the nature of an anticlimax to Part I. While Part I is obviously the product of a painstaking research by an eminent historian, Part II seems to be a descriptive account based on the socio-economic survey of a College Planning Forum.

The study stresses again and again an unmistakable trend towards Islamisation among the Muslim communities in Gujarat. With the bonds of religion loosening in the world, and for that matter in India too, this seems rather incongruous and, therefore, calls for a convincing explanation. While we find some sporadic attempts at explaining it, the reader is not provided with a coherent and systematic body of reasoned thought to justify this paradox.

The study was undertaken between July 1959 and March 1961 and yet we find little, if any, reference to the impact of partition on the individual psyche of the communities under study. The last chapter, 'Social Change in Recent Years,' ignores the socio-political perspective and is at best an academic exercise.

The contingency for 'additional notes and corrections' on pp. 185 and 186 should better have been avoided. The few printing errors, not yet noticed by the publishers, too, fall in this category.

The 'Glossary of Indian Terms' might have served its purpose better if it were given at the beginning of the book, for that would have ensured its use by even an unwary reader.

H. S.

INDIAN MUSLIMS, A POLITICAL HISTORY (1858—1947) By Ram Gopal.

Asia Publishing House, Bombay, 1959.

BRITAIN AND MUSLIM INDIA: A study of British public opinion vis-a-vis the development of Muslim nationalism in India, 1857-1947. By K. K. Aziz.

Heinemann, London, 1963.

These two books deal with a subject which has never ceased to interest scholars in India and Pakistan since the days of partition. Partition, which has left a legacy of problems to both the nations and which caused considerable misery to millions, has attracted the attention of numerous writers from

both sides. The nearness of the events often cloud the judgment and perhaps no account is completely free from bias. The authors of the two books under review realise the delicacy of the task of narrating the events very soon after they had taken place. Their studies are confined to a very important period in Indian history, a period during which the Muslims emerged as an important political factor after their eclipse in the 1857 Mutiny.

The approaches of Ram Gopal and Aziz differ fundamentally. Ram Gopal attempts to emphasise that Hindus and Muslims were closer to each other till later events separated them and holds the view that at various stages of the Indian national struggle they had come together. Aziz, on the other hand, considers that the two communities were never closer together and it was a 'myth' to talk of the Indian nation. Thus, while Ram Gopal argues that pre-1947 India was a battlefield with communalism arrayed against nationalism, and with nationalism losing all along the line, Aziz questions the very basis of this argument.

Long before the Muslims came as conquerors in the north, they came to southern coastal areas as traders. They settled down quietly and were even able to gain considerable following among the local people. As it happened later in Bengal, their methods of peaceful persuasion gained a larger number of followers than the forcible conversion attempted elsewhere in the north later. The importance of the Muslims in the political sphere begun with the establishment of the Mughal empire. Understandably, they dominated in every sphere, but the edifice of the Muslim nobility was violently disturbed with the rise of the British power in India.

A series of events, beginning with the introduction of the Permanent Settlement in 1793, the replacement of Persian by Bengali as the official language and, later, the replacement of Bengali by English steadily undermined Muslim influence everywhere. The new system of education introduced in the second half of the 19th century, failed to attract the Muslim aristocracy; but, as Ram Gopal points out, Muslim commoners went in for English education. 'They were not averse to receive secular education with Hindus.'

Curiously, the aversion of the Muslim aristocracy to the new system of education was interpreted as an aversion of the entire Muslim community. A number of causes have been attributed to this aversion. In the ultimate analysis, jobs were the cause of differences over language and script. Ram Gopal argues that the rift which was caused between the two communities towards the end of the last century gradually widened.

Leading Muslim leaders were themselves aware of the fact that the attitude of the Muslim aristocracy would have to change and a high school for Muslim boys was begun at Aligarh in 1875. Sir Syed Ahmad Khan had taken the initiative and he succeeded ad-



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mirably. Aligarh became the centre of Muslim education and later developed into a centre of political activity.

What was the general attitude of the Muslim community to the national movement in the initial stages? Aziz in his book argues that it had nothing to do with the Indian National Congress. The Muslim delegates were present at the annual congresses but their strength steadily declined. But Aziz does not describe the reasons for the decline. Ram Gopal points out that the strength of the Muslim delegates had been steady, except for two or three years, and this in spite of the intense activities in Aligarh to have a separate organization called the Moham-medan Political Organization. The fact was that until differences asserted themselves later the Muslim community continued to be attracted to the National Congress.

The turn of the century saw several developments which led to the stiffening of the attitude of the two communities towards each other. Revivalist movements like the Brahma Samaj and the Arya Samaj, participation in the Ganapati festival and Shivaji festival, all had their role in widening the gulf between the two communities. Ram Gopal further adds that the 'government had a hand in the mischievous propaganda. By 1905 the number of Muslims in the annual Congress session had fallen to 17 out of 756 delegates. Till then the National Congress was able to attract the Muslim communities. But by that time the Muslims were seeking a "purely Muslim all-India organization."' And this was provided by the Muslim League which was founded in 1906.

The story of the founding of the League and the introduction of reforms by the British to placate the demands of the nationalists is too well known to be repeated. These reforms however did not satisfy the Muslim communities nor the Congress. Congress leaders were still trying their best to prevent the two communities falling apart and were bent on bringing them together in the national struggle. Their efforts, particularly the efforts of Gandhi, bore fruit and the two communities came together in the Khilafat movement. For a time the extremist wings in the Congress and the League forgot their differences and were prepared to cooperate under Gandhi.

But, as Ram Gopal points out, 'the nationalist organizations and Muslim organizations had come together as two distinct parties, with Gandhi as the common link, but with the old background of communal politics; the adherence of Muslims to Pan-Islamic and other communal concepts and the pronounced antagonism to these of Hindus, were causes of future differences. . .'

The attitude of several Muslim leaders and, later, the activities of the Moplas in the Malabar coast, the Muslim communities' attempt at organizing *Tanzim* as an answer to the Shuddi movement preached by the Hindus, all led to the inevitable breach between

the communities. As Ram Gopal points out: 'Gandhi was undone. His comrades of the movement had degenerated into watch dogs of narrow communal interests. Muslims were fast leaving Congress, and since the Hindu Mahasabha never grew to be a match for the Muslim League, Muslims thought of the Congress as a Hindu organization and of the League as a Muslim organization.'

From that day it was clear that unity between the two organizations would never be possible. In the thirties the breach was complete. The 'Congress and the League now entered the decisive phases of their careers, the one for freedom and the other for Pakistan.'

The political history of the last three decades before independence was one of rivalry between two powerful organizations and the British attempts at exploitation of this rivalry. Aziz analyses the attitude of the British from the Right, the Centre and the Left. He says that the conservatives (the Right) favoured the Muslim communities since they 'seemed to find more in common between themselves and Islam as a religion than between themselves and Hinduism,' and because 'they had a better knowledge of India.'

Aziz puts people like Sir Henry Cotton, who opposed partition and Sir John Rees, who favoured it, and other such officials who had served in India for a long time and held different views, in the Centre group. Ramsay Macdonald, Fenner Brockway, H. N. Brailsford are placed under the Left and criticised for their views on India. Aziz says that the British Left always supported the majority against the minority in colonial politics. In India, it supported the Hindus, in Ireland the Roman Catholics and in Cyprus the Greeks. He charges the Left for creating the 'myth' of a united, secular India. In Aziz's view, India in the pre-independence period was neither united nor secular.

Events of the twenties and the thirties are well known. Ram Gopal ably describes them and points out the factors that led to partition. Whether partition has solved the problem of the Hindus in areas which were predominantly Muslim provinces once and now part of Pakistan, and whether it has solved the problems of Muslims in areas which were once predominantly Hindu provinces and now part of India is still a matter of dispute. Perhaps India is not yet a country which is secular in the classic sense.

S. Krishnamurthy

THE IDEA OF A SECULAR SOCIETY AND ITS SIGNIFICANCE FOR CHRISTIANS. By D. L. Munby. Oxford University Press, London, 1963.

This book is a collection of three essays on the idea of a secular society in contrast to the idea of a Christian society as propounded by Eliot nearly a quarter of a century ago, and the earlier views of Coleridge on the ideas of Church and State. The

first essay considers the conception of a secular society and seeks to answer the question whether such a society is desirable from the Christian standpoint. The second essay discusses a secular society in the context of a dynamic world where clashes occur in the distribution of income and status. Finally, the third essay deals with the problems of a specialised Church in a secular society, with reference to the apparent irrelevance of religion and theology and the clericalization of the Church. These essays were delivered as the Riddle Memorial Lectures at Kings College in the University of Durham.

The term 'secular society' has been used to convey different meanings at different times. For example, in the nineteenth century, secularism, in the continental countries of Europe, was identified with an anti-clerical attitude, and the Secular Society of England was an association of confirmed atheists who denied the values of organized religion and carried out active propaganda against a belief in God. As a result of this tradition the idea still persists that a secular society is an irreligious society. The author, however, shows that there are five distinctive elements of a secular society.

In the first place, a secular society, though not necessarily irreligious, explicitly refuses to commit itself to any particular view of the nature of the universe and the place of man in it. Secondly, in contrast to the sacred societies which enforce, either by State coercion or by social pressures, a uniform attitude or behaviour in important matters of human values whether or not they are religious, a secular society is pluralistic and heterogeneous. Thirdly, a secular society is a tolerant and open society where there is no attempt either to impose beliefs or to limit the expression of beliefs.

Fourthly, while a secular society, like all human societies, has its own politico-economic institutions which impose their particular pattern on individual lives and social groups, the aim and influence of these institutions is greatly limited in it. Finally, the secular society has no common aims or a common set of images reflecting the common ideals and emotions of everyone; it is a society without any official images. The conception of the secular society is a significant contribution of the book.

The author makes a distinction between a secular society and a secular State. He says that society is wider than a State and its operation, and cites the example of English society to illustrate this distinction. In England, he says, the establishment of two Churches and the requirements of Biblical instruction in schools, as well as the favoured position of the established churches in the universities and the favoured position of all the churches in the broadcasting system make Britain a Christian State. It does not, however, necessarily follow from this that the English society is a Christian society.

The author argues that the establishment of the two Churches in England is only a vestigial survival

of the past and the place of religion in education is of more moment. In practice, there is no attempt in British society to cover up the actual divergences of beliefs and behaviour which are as evident in schools, universities and the broadcasting system as in any other sphere of life. In effect, the author concludes, for most important purposes British society is a secular society, where it makes little or no difference in what one's religion or morality consists.

The author believes that the distinction between society and State is a real one, and argues that a Christian society could indeed exist with a secular society which did not express Christian beliefs in any organized way, but today there certainly is no Christian society. It seems to me, however, that this can only be a conceptual difference and, in actual practice, society and the State cannot be completely separated.

India is, for example, a secular State because there is no official religion in India, no one is prevented from exercising his religion or professing it publicly, and there is no disability in respect of public office or power based on religion, but the society has an undoubted religious orientation. As a result, the emergence of a secular State in India is riddled with difficulties. First, there is the question of protecting the rights of minority communities which prefer religions other than Hinduism. Second, there is the problem of dealing with the more extreme adherents of Hinduism who, in their fanaticism, might jeopardise the security of the minorities. The latter inevitability necessitates some kind of guidance. In a country with a large illiterate majority, the task of educating the people in selected values of tolerance and equality etc., can be performed effectively only by agencies which are directly or indirectly sponsored by the State.

The author concludes that a secular State and society which accepts the clash of different views about ethics and patterns of life as they in fact exist, conforms to the Christian view of human life as much as any more uniform pattern. The author is a Protestant and it is not surprising that he should have reached this conclusion. The Protestant Church is an open society where there is place for the clash of opinion and pursuit of truth in diverse forms.

The Catholic Church, on the other hand, is a monolithic structure and many of the higher clergy and bishops in the Catholic world still have an instinctively authoritarian state of mind, thinking in terms of repressions, banning and censorship. Although the Catholic Church is also increasingly becoming an open society, it will be a long time before the ideas and attitudes of the new-style Catholic intellectuals filter down to most of the clergy and the mass. It appears premature, at least at the present stage, to suggest that the Catholic Church is a secular society although the description is certainly true of the Protestant and other liberal churches.

Imtiaz Ahmad

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Communication

My congratulations to you on your 66th issue on Parliament. I was particularly impressed with the statistics presented in the Article : 'Pattern of Membership' by Surindar Suri. It will be useful if a similar statistical analysis is made of the membership of the various State legislatures in our country.

One significant feature which stands out from this analysis is the increase in the number of persons giving 'social work' as their profession. There is a progressive increase of their absolute number as well as of the percentage of the seats occupied by them in the Lok Sabha according to Table II given in the article. It may be useful to analyse further what 'social work' means in this context.

The author of the article says: 'The most elusive group is that of the social workers. Members of this group are generally without a definable occupation but professional politicians mostly belong to it. . . many of them lead contending factions within the parties and sometimes cutting across them.' In the same para it is further mentioned that 'they act as cement, uniting different interests and factions.' Is there not a contradiction in these two statements occurring in the same paragraph?

The article goes on to say that the social workers generate the political dynamics of the Congress Party and the Parliament as a

whole. The question I would like to pose is to what extent the social workers begin their public life out of devotion to social work for itself, and how many of them take to social work as a step towards climbing the political ladder which may end in a ministership! While the social workers who do social work out of love for humanity deserve to be honoured, the question arises whether the destinies of the country are safe in the hands of people of this group who 'are generally without a definable occupation', and some of whom take to social work as a means to political advancement.

Idealism is good so far as it goes. But it would end in frustration of the people if it cannot be followed by the creation of resources in the country, and many talents besides 'social work' are required for this purpose. As the future of India lies in science, technology and economics, it is high time that more interest in politics is taken by members of other professions particularly those engaged in commerce and industry; engineers, scientists and economists.

I would also suggest your publishing articles similarly analysing the pattern of membership in the Legislatures of other democratic countries.

Bombay, February 22.

R. G. Saraiya

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DA 64/637

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
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INDIAN OXYGEN LIMITED

SEMINAR, MARCH 1965



LANGUAGE

a symposium on the
issues involved in the
language controversy

symposium participants

THE PROBLEM

A short statement which introduces
the issue

PERTINENT FACTS

S. Natarajan, journalist, at present
working with the Council of Economic
Development, Bombay

ENGLISH FOR UNITY

C. Rajagopalachari, former Governor-General
of India, now leader of the Swatantra Party

HINDI—HERE AND NOW

Ram Manohar Lohia, Member of Parliament,
leader of the Samyukta Socialist Party

HISTORICAL SURVEY

Pravinchandra J. Ruparel, a teacher
by profession, has studied several
Indian languages

POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS

Hector Abhayavardhana, editor and
writer, now resident in Ceylon

A SINGLE SCRIPT

Punya Sloka Ray, philosopher,
has made a special study of the problems of
Romanisation

A POSSIBLE SOLUTION

George Verghese, Assistant Editor of
'The Times of India', Bombay

COMMUNICATIONS

From C. Rajagopalachari (Madras) and
Vipin Chandra (Meerut)

COVER

Designed by T. A. Balakrishnan

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

To 'Opinion' for S. Natarajan's
article, to 'Swarajya' for C. Rajagopalachari's
article, to 'Organiser' for Ram Manohar Lohia's
article and to 'The Times of India'
for George Verghese's article.

The problem

The problems of language again spark violent passions among the many communities of India, particularly between the North and the South. Involved in the debate now joined is not only the future of one or two link languages but other crucial questions : how thinking India is to find its channels of communication ; how the creativity of a whole people is to be freed from the shackles of inadequate expression ; and how the unity of a sub-continent is to be cemented. This issue of SEMINAR, to capture in full the nuances of the debate, gathers together and reproduces some of the more significant comment which has appeared in its pages and elsewhere.

Pertinent facts

S. NATARAJAN

THE Government of India's approach to the subject of India's official language has been frustratingly pedantic. Its policies have been governed by considerations of expediency. The Constitution in its articles relating to this matter is concerned more with the difficulties of achieving results than with the necessity for doing things effectively and promptly. Broadly considered, the Constitution lays down:

- (1) that the official language of the Union shall be Hindi in the Devanagari script with international numerals;
- (2) that, for a period of fifteen years running from the

adoption of the Constitution, English shall continue to be used for all the official purposes of the Union;

- (3) that the States of the Union may by legislation adopt a regional language or languages for transacting their official business;
- (4) that two or more States may legislate for the use of Hindi as the official language for the conduct of business between themselves;
- (5) that the official language for communications between the Union Government and the States shall be the

authorised official language of the Union, i.e., English for the period up to 1965 and Hindi thereafter.

Transition To Hindi

There were two reasons for the transition period. First, that it was necessary to spread the knowledge of Hindi over the whole country. For this, the Constitution relied on a system of education which was to be established within ten years from 1950, of free and compulsory education of all children to the age of 15 years. Secondly, it was accepted that Hindi was inadequate to serve the needs of modern administration and would require time to be equipped with a new terminology.

The first of these considerations is reasonable enough. The second grew out of the psychological barrier to learning Hindi which had been established during years of dependence on the English language for the subtler and more involved aspects of all-India communication. Since the growth of language is directly dependent on its common use, the creation of terminology ought logically to have been left to the ingenuity of the users of Hindi and not deputed to committees and boards of linguistic pedants watched over by the Union Cabinet.

Some expert statistician with little better to do set the target of 'new terms' needed at 300,000—a number which has been accepted unquestioningly by politicians, officials and expert language committees. Somewhat naively, the government applied itself to this task—the processing moving through scientific committees, linguistic boards and the Union Cabinet at varying rates from 5,000 to 23,000 words a year. Nothing could be a more pathetic demonstration of academic bumbling combined with political fatuousness.

The Union Government had to admit that its ambition of making elementary education free and compulsory for the age group 6-14 within ten years was beyond achievement. From present indi-

cations, it is reasonable to conclude that the completion of the programme might be expected around 1985, even allowing for acceleration as interest and experience in education spread. When one turns from the general picture of education to that of Hindi education in the non-Hindi regions of India, the diversions of political considerations play a greater part than a balanced pursuit of an objective.

The oddities arising out of the government's apologetic attitude towards Hindi are brought out in the following 'lucid' explanation of the constitutional arrangement: 'Hindi at present is only one of the languages of India of the Eighth Schedule... A common name "Hindi" for both the official language of the Union and for a regional language of North India creates confusion in our thinking, leading to mistaken decisions. If we say that Hindi will be an alternate medium in all-India services competitive examinations with English, it will only mean that it will benefit those only in the North whose regional language is Hindi, because Hindi as a common Union language has yet to come into existence... The Union Hindi has only titular and prospective existence. What exists as a working proposition is the regional Hindi which has begun to be used as the medium of instruction and education in North India. Such use of Hindi is on a par with the use of Gujarati, Marathi, etc., in their respective regions, though, I am afraid, universities in the North perhaps do not see it that way.' (Maganbhai Desai's note of dissent in the Official Language Commission Report, 1956.)

Nehru's Ambivalence

Jawaharlal Nehru's contribution to the language question was typically ambivalent. He, too, drew the distinction between regional Hindi and the official Union Hindi, explaining that, like other regional languages, the Hindi spoken in the North would develop to a rich fullness while the official language would be simpler, more easy to

grasp by peoples of the non-Hindi regions. Then, further to gild the pill for them, he proclaimed that every language in use in every State in India was a national language of India, and, as such, on par with Hindi. An impression was sought to be created that within fifteen years an 'Indian Hindi,' distinct from North Indian Hindi, would come into existence in administration which would be adequate in vocabulary for modern purposes and at the same time widely understood all over the country.

Article 351 and the Eighth Schedule of the Indian Constitution sketch in broad outlines the character of official Union Hindi. It deserves quoting:

It shall be the duty of the Union to promote the spread of the Hindi language, to develop it so that it may serve as a medium of expression for all the elements of the composite culture of India, and to secure its enrichment by assimilating without interference with its genius, the forms, styles and expressions used in Hindustani and in the other languages of India specified in the Eighth Schedule, and by drawing, wherever necessary or desirable, primarily on Sanskrit and secondarily on other languages.

Eighth Schedule

The Eighth Schedule is a bare enumeration of fourteen languages, including Sanskrit, Hindi and Urdu, and, according to Nehru's explanation, the list is not exhaustive of the languages of India—in other words, is quite meaningless. This erosion of the Constitution was an accommodation to the pressures to include other languages in the Schedule like English and Sindhi. However, the use of the word national for any language used in any State in India was unfortunate, specially coming from those who had engaged in a losing battle over Jinnah's two-nation theory. Nehru could not have been unaware of a spreading opinion since the mid-fifties in

Madras State that Jinnah's strategy of carving out a nation from India was the only escape from the 'Congress stranglehold.'

An Indian language, a language spoken in India, is not a national language of India. A language chosen to be the official language in inter-State and all-India communication cannot be the national language of India, particularly so when it is so chosen to replace English because it is Indian and therefore more easily understood by Indians and more easily learnt. From this position, there can be no retreat, no compromise to accommodate those who would stake national claims for other languages. On the other hand, the acceptance of a transition period with the open admission that an altogether new language must be created was a piece of monumental folly, particularly when the obligation on the Union to do this was interpreted as an administrative responsibility.

Original Clause

B. N. Rau's original language clause was far more sensible because it confined itself to saying that Hindustani (Hindi or Urdu) and English would be the languages in which Parliament would conduct its business, other languages being permitted by the Speaker to members unable to express themselves adequately in either of these languages, with a translated summary for inclusion in the proceedings. Since summaries are inadequate and members of Parliament wish both to be understood and to understand what is being said around them, this would have been a strong impulse to learn Hindustani in all members.

Nothing was said regarding the official language because the language most commonly used in Parliament would in the natural process have become official. There was nothing here to rouse serious antagonism but the adoption of Article 343 in its place amounted to a rejection of the Gandhian formula of one language and two scripts and to concessions to the Hindi element with palliatives for the non-Hindi people. In the light

of this, the insinuation of the word, 'Hindustani,' into Article 343 called for some serious thinking. To me, it seems to be a warning which has been ignored.

Commissions & Committees

The Constitution envisaged a phased programme for the supplanting of English by Hindi as India's official language in fifteen years. It required the President to constitute a commission to consider the progress of the Hindi language after five and ten years respectively and provided for a committee of both Houses of Parliament to formulate recommendations on the commission's report. The first of these Official Language Commissions was constituted in 1955 and the parliamentary committee submitted its proposals in 1959. The Report made it very plain that the Union Government had no definite policy as regards language but that in North India there had been considerable progress in implementing a Hindi policy which in itself created certain problems in recruiting for the all-India services. No thought had been given to working out a phased programme for Hindi; moreover, the Union Home Ministry, without adequate consideration, had announced a policy of conducting the all-India services competitive examinations in English as well as the regional languages, and, when asked how it proposed to implement this, had admitted that it had no idea at all.

Again, having been told that some 300,000 new terms would need to be coined to 'develop' Hindi into the official Union language, the government had set about the task in a ponderous manner, the final process involving approval for each word by the Union Cabinet. The Report recommended a policy of getting on with the use of Hindi as it is and using, where necessary, terms from English; of speeding up the work of terminology; and of official participation in the work of spreading the Hindi language in non-Hindi regions.

It observed that the progress made by the States and universi-

ties in North India with regional Hindi necessitated provision for examinations in that medium for the all-India services and hoped that, before other regional languages attained a similar position, the general knowledge of Hindi would spread over the non-Hindi areas to the extent of obviating the provision of tests in those languages. On the question of placing a restriction on the use of English in certain official transactions, the Commission and the Committee both declared their disapproval. At the same time, they both favoured the use of Hindi as an additional medium during the transition years as a preparation for the final change-over, adding that it might be necessary to retain English even after 1965.

A Peroration

The Committee's report is a terse and effective summary of the Commission's bulky and rather discursive volume. It is difficult to resist the temptation to quote the Commission's astounding peroration. It concludes:

We shall shape the pattern of our languages and then the pattern of our languages will shape us!... Language is in a sense profoundly important and in another sense of little or no consequence! It is important at the level of instrumentality. It is a loom on which the life of a people is woven. It is, however, of no intrinsic consequence in itself because it is essentially an instrumentality; the loom, not the fabric; only a vehicle of thought and not the thought itself; a receptacle for the traditions, usages and cultural memories of a people, but not their substance. It is not language but education that is aimed at in the schools; it is not language but good government that is aimed at in public administration; it is not language but justice that is sought in the law courts. That which lends itself to the most convenience is the correct solution of the language problem in the various fields. Surely, there does not have to be heat and passion over the

issue of language, ever the instrumentality and not the substance!

There were three dissents to the Report and a rejoinder lamenting the Commission's inability to secure unanimity despite the appeals of its persuasive Chairman, B. G. Kher. Seven of the thirty members of the Parliamentary Committee dissented from that report, the majority of the dissenters bemoaning the lack of enthusiasm for Hindi of the two documents. And between them, there was any amount of heat and passion. As a matter of fact, the vehemence with which the Official Language Commission applies itself to argue the case for Hindi while reiterating that the Articles of the Constitution have said the last word on the subject and so the matter is closed, suggests that there was considerable objection to the slightest hint of implementing the constitutional directive.

Comment on Madras

There is, too, a strange querulousness in the Commission's reproof to the Madras Government for not making Hindi compulsory because some 80 per cent of the students were learning it voluntarily: 'It is not known,' observes the Commission, 'who the 20 per cent odd pupils are who do not avail (*italics in original*) of the benefit of optional Hindi instruction. It is possible that these are from the educationally backward classes. If so, the voluntary character of this instruction apparently prejudices a section of the community who have the greatest need for help and encouragement in educational matters... Those educationally advanced are capable of looking after their interests without being compelled to do so.' This extraordinary admonition loses none of its sting by being set in a long homily concerning the wisdom of the Constitution, the weight of numbers of Hindi-speaking people and the folly of not falling into line.

The mills of government grind slowly. At the same leisurely pace at which the new terminology was being framed, the Commission's

Report which was submitted in 1956, was published in 1957; considered by the parliamentary committee for eighteen months; and submitted with recommendations to the President in February 1959. The President's second Official Language Commission, due in 1960, appears to have been abandoned though the 1956 Commission and the 1958-59 Committee have left many matters over for its consideration.

Two Developments

In 1963, two significant developments occurred. First, the Hindi word-builders presumably finished their task of framing 300,000 terms though we are not told at what stage how many of these words are. *India 1964*, the government's annual reference book, observes a discreet silence on this subject.

Secondly, Jawaharlal Nehru assured the country that English would be retained as an additional official language until the non-Hindi States felt it could be given up.

It is necessary to bear in mind that (1) Hindi has been the official language of India and was supposed to be used as an additional official language for at least the past five years as a preparation for the change-over; (2) in a number of departments of the central government work would be seriously hampered if Hindi replaced English as from January 26, 1965; (3) the pre-requisites, particularly in the groundwork of education, for switching on to Hindi are far from being fulfilled; and (4) English, though it might have been continued to be used all these years for official purposes, was not recognized after 1950 as the official language of the country. In other words, Hindi had the status without the function, English the function without the status.

After the appointed date, the position is as broadly sketched in the two reports and the assurances of Nehru—i.e., Hindi takes on its functions without restrictions being placed on the use of English. The Official Language

Act passed by Parliament allows for the continued use of English and the Nehru formula envisages the retention of English until the non-Hindi States themselves are ready and willing to give it up. But certain automatic and unconsidered incidents occurring on January 26, 1965, evidently to carry out the constitutional directive, roused a frenzied agitation in Tamilnad and, apart from the distressing spectacle of violent civic disturbances accompanied by damage to public property, the consequences threaten to muddle the language position even more.

I agree with Indira Gandhi that it is necessary to think out our language policy afresh and to frame a consistent and well-phased programme of implementation. For this, it is necessary to understand why these manifestations of undisciplined passion exploited by obviously organised groups should have taken place. The sudden subsidence is as much an indication of calculated effort as the widespread destruction of property. It will also help if the relevant part of the Constitution is read again carefully and with some intelligence.

Apprehensions

It is nothing new that there is in Tamilnad a smouldering apprehension of exploitation by North India which is for the largest organized group in Madras State associated with Brahmins. There is an irony in this prejudice affecting the attitude towards Hindi when one considers that in the North itself Hindi is a regional language. The Brahmo leader, Keshab Chandra Sen, influenced the Arya Samaj founder, Dayanand Saraswati, to preach in Hindi rather than in the Sanskrit which Dayanand favoured. Moreover, the more energetic parts of North India have little respect for the Brahmin, and Sankaran Nair once cited scriptural authority to support his assertion that no Brahmin could preserve the purity of his caste by sojourning long in the Punjab. However, the fact is there that Hindi today is looked upon as the vehicle of

North Indian imperialism, very much as Sanskrit in the thirties was by the Self-Respect Movement in Madras.

The second point that needs serious consideration is a suspicion often expressed by Bengali writers that the State of Uttar Pradesh with its strong political block is seeking to underpin its ministerial domination by establishing an administrative foundation beneath it. It is not without interest that Bengal seeks to effect a corrective by dividing that sprawling State into two. This is often put forward also as a measure to rescue Urdu and the Muslim leadership of Uttar Pradesh. It is relevant here to mention that the insistence on Sanskritization of the Hindi enthusiasts, the rejection of the Gandhian formula of a national language written in two scripts by the Constitution-makers, and the implied preference for literary Hindi over colloquial Hindi contained in the terminology methods are all calculated to add to the apprehensions of the non-Hindi regions.

The third point is the matter of central government employment. The broad facts are that, with the increase of difficulties in securing employment in the State services, there are distinct classes in the non-Hindi regions of South India pressing for employment at the Centre. It is not inconceivable that, as a consequence, the feeling against the central government in the South is intensified which again will react in reinforcing the demand for regional language parity and quotas in the all-India services' examinations. This, as the Kher Commission observed and as the Government of India strongly endorsed, would be destructive of the very character of these services. Illusions die hard. Nevertheless, I mention for what it is worth the hard fact that, in Delhi, over 80 per cent of the central government employees are North Indians.

Recent Lessons

Fourthly, because of the nature of the South Indian political

climate, it is irrational to look to a political solution there of the present impasse. This has been demonstrated both by the resignations of C. Subramaniam and O. Alagesan and the advocacy by the Madras Chief Minister, Bhaktavatsalam, of a permanent place for English as a second official language. C. Rajagopalachari's plea for annulling the language section of the Constitution is another indicator.

These are difficult complications. But there can only be one solution and it is as well that we accept it at once without straying into compromises and policies of appeasement. That is, the pressing forward with Hindi as it is now, without waiting for the development of a special Union Hindi equipped with a set of words which will depend for their very existence on popular acceptance over several generations. The words will come as the necessity for them is felt and it is less important to strive after the ideal than to reach a working arrangement. There need be no serious fears now of administrative standards falling because we have little at the present moment in this respect to be proud of.

Clear the Mess

But, the first requirement before we proceed to plan for the future is to clear up the present mess. Obviously the Bhaktavatsalam Government has been culpably negligent or incapable of law and order. Kamaraj Nadar has a reputation as an able administrator. It was unwise to have removed him. At any rate, he has fulfilled whatever could be expected of him as Congress President. He might be asked to take the helm again at Madras in the interests of constitutional government, as Rajagopalachari did in 1952. If this is done and a phased programme on language adopted which would obviate the kind of surprises which were sprung upon the country on January 26 and for which somehow no one is quite able to fix the responsibility, there is no reason why there should be any abdication of decision to the non-Hindi States. The

recent flare-up must be regarded as an emotional, unreasoning outburst and not be blown up into a symbol of Tamilnad aversion to the North.

An Earlier Argument

Finally, on the subject of the South Indian units of the Republic learning Hindi, the argument in favour of the South learning Hindi seriously was never put better than by Rajagopalachari in the introduction to the *Hindi-English Self-Instructor* (1928):

'Of the 30 crores that live in India, 14 crores speak Hindi or some very near dialect of that language. Bengali, Assamese and Uriya may be grouped together and are spoken by 6 crores. Marathi and Gujarati are spoken by 3 crores. The Dravidian group, Telugu, Tamil, Kannada, Malayalam and Tulu are spoken by 6 crores in all. The writer of the general introduction in the *Times of India Year Book*, who may be expected not to exaggerate, says: "There is a common element in the main languages of Northern and Central India, which renders their speakers, without any great conscious change in their speech, mutually intelligible to one another, and this common basis already forms an approach to a *lingua franca* over a large part of India." To this should be added that for the Bengali and Western India groups, it is very easy to acquire a working knowledge of Hindi.

"The problem is a serious one only to South Indians. From the political as well as cultural and business points of view, it is imperatively necessary for the South Indians to learn Hindi. Whether and when India is going to have *swaraj* may be answered differently by different people. Whatever measure of autonomy may be given to provinces, if India is to stand external and internal shocks, a strong Central Government is inevitable, controlling many important all-India subjects, and exercising powers

of interference in all subjects, whenever grave occasions for such interference may arise. The intelligentsia of India must therefore undertake the duty of carrying out the will of the people and manage central affairs, as well as provincial matters.

'Can the deliberations of the Central Assembly and the transactions of the high officers of State and others exercising authority in the Central Government be permitted to be done in English? Obviously not, if we desire democracy to be true in fact as well as in form—if we do not want educated men to be appointed to places of power and influence and conduct their affairs apart from the people and the electorate. To make popular control real the State language must be one spoken and understood by large masses of people. Hindi is bound to be the language of the Central Government and the Legislature and also of the provincial governments in their dealings with each other and with the Government of India.

'If South India does not desire to be practically disfranchised in regard to the future Central Government of India and if educated men of the South do not wish to be disabled from taking part in all-India affairs or influencing the decisions taken in such matters, it is necessary that Hindi should be learnt by them. It is not possible or desirable to impose English for our sake on all and weaken the people's control over their representatives all over India. The Nehru-Report-Constitution has, it may be noted, adopted Hindi as the State language for India. This is the logical consequence of Self-Government of India. In educational matters, if we wish to avoid waste of energy and penalisation of a whole generation, we must anticipate things by a few years. The present generation of boys

should therefore immediately take up Hindi whether it be introduced in the school curriculum or not. Otherwise they would practically lose a valuable part of the rights of Indian citizenship and repent when it may be too late.

'No less important than political reasons, the cultural unity of India demands the knowledge of a common spoken language. The South will be a dead branch of the tree, if it is not in living daily contact with the larger India, and here too we cannot rest on the English medium, which is bound to recede into the international background as India advances towards its goal.

'But more obvious than either politics or culture is the problem of obtaining a livelihood. A knowledge of Hindi, sufficient at least to speak, understand and write, will at once widen the field in which educated men of South India can offer themselves for service. The pressure of competition in one's own province is driving many thousands of educated men abroad, and a working knowledge of Hindi would certainly better the chances of our young men in public or commercial services all over India.

'The arguments for Hindi do not mean the neglect of the mother-tongue. The importance of Hindi is in its being the only possible State Language of India, and therefore the need for the Southerners to learn it. It cannot and should not lead to neglect of the mother-tongue, any more than citizenship involves the neglect of domestic duties. The family rests on the State and the State rests on the family. Neither can be neglected. So also must boys and girls in India learn the language of India, while attending to the language of their own province and people.'

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English for unity

C. RAJAGOPALACHARI

PUSSYFOOTING and procrastination will not do. Part XVII of the Constitution must be repealed and the *status quo* maintained. The ruling party should make up its mind wisely and use its discipline to over-rule emotionalist opposition and save India's unity. Bilingualism is a trap, not a compromise or a solution. I once believed it might do but I am convinced it will lead to anarchy and discord, not unity. English maintained as hitherto will alone preserve our unity, nothing else. The *status quo* that has worked well all these years is no imposition on anybody. If Part XVII goes and there is no new Article relating to language in the Constitution, what will prevent Parliament imposing Hindi again, it may be asked. The answer is in human psychology—not in law. The attempt will not be made once Part XVII has been forced out of the Constitution as a result of agitation and further consideration. Gradual imposition cannot be avoided once we concede that English must sometime, near or distant, yield to Hindi.

This necessary implication of a beginning to be made and swift and steady progress towards the goal and all necessary steps to be taken for it is not properly realized by those who for one reason or another concede the ultimate inevitability of the abandonment of English in favour of Hindi. This concession is fatal and cannot be made. There is no reason why we should ever give up English. There is no dishonour in India carrying on with the English language as hitherto. There is no reason whatsoever, now, to touch or interfere with the medium of official work. The Government of India Act of 1935 consisting of 321 sections did not have any provisions about the

official language of the Federation. There is plenty to do, which we have not yet tackled at all successfully. Let us attend to those things, and leave language alone, as it was.

Hindi, speedy or slow, will be discord, and bilingualism will be anarchy which will land us where we do not wish to land. The Chief Minister and the Congress Party in Madras should get it recorded in the two Chambers of the Madras Legislature that after considering the feelings of the people of this State and giving full thought to the merits of the question, the Legislature resolves formally to withdraw the implied consent of the State to Part XVII of the Constitution and apprise Parliament of the withdrawal. If this procedure is pursued by other non-Hindi States also, it will have a quasi-Constitutional impact of great significance and help the Government of India to overcome the resistance of the misguided breakers of Indian unity who shout for Hindi.

The movement to replace English by Hindi is to lay the axe at the root of our unity and our progress. Our status in the world would gradually go down. Sensible people are veering round, seeing clearly that any disturbance of the present position of English means disintegration of the country. But the false patriotism that is behind the move to make India lose one of its most valuable assets is still active.

What is 'national' need not always be 'official'. Deepavali is a 'national' festival, but it is not an 'official' festival, although we may grant a number of holidays to satisfy all sections. 'National' goes with factual majority, but 'official' in true democracy as dis-

tinguished from totalitarianism should not go with numerical majorities but with even-handed justice to all, to the smaller as well as to bigger States and communities.

Waste

People may support an unjust proposal without fully realizing its consequences. But the clear-sighted can see what great injustice and *unconscionable waste* it would involve. It would be contrary to the basic principle of planning which is the *conservation of what we have* without being misled by selfishness or false sentiment.

The past history of education in India cannot be ignored in shaping our future. We can build justly and firmly on the strong foundation of history, but if we ignore hard facts and follow the mirage of unthinking prejudice, we shall come to grief. The best form of patriotism now is clear thinking, hard work and unselfish service, not running away with sentiment, ignoring the consequences of our acts affecting millions of people.

The 'Centre' is not a distant or thin affair. It is an octopus, though of a benignant variety, with its arms stretching and holding almost every branch of social and official activity everywhere in India. For example, the defacing stamps of even rural post offices in the South give the names of the places in Devanagari and sometimes in Devanagari alone.

Why should we throw away what we have? Do we not have English and hold it in freehold possession? Do we pay any tithe or tax on it to any foreigners? Is it not a valuable asset? Has it not a high, a very high foreign exchange value? Surely English is much more valuable than the articles we seek to make and export to countries for earning foreign exchange.

I wrote in 1956 what I then thought might bridge the gulf:

Let us bridge the gulf between pride and commonsense by saying that English *and/or* Hindi,

to adopt the secretariat neology meaning both or either, shall be the inter-State and Central official languages. Of course the two media will go side by side, so that no State anywhere in the South or East may be inconvenienced and it may choose English if it prefers to do so.

The language spoken in a State should be the language of official work in that State. If it is a bilingual State, both the languages there should be recognized as official languages. It should not be, it can never be, a matter of rule by majority. Official documents should be multiglot, irrespective of the relative sizes of the two or three language groups in the bilingual or trilingual State. We have on this question instructive precedents in Belgium, Finland, Switzerland, South Africa and Canada, which it would be wise for us to follow.

I have thought over this further and have come to the conclusion that it will not work and will lead to chaos and mischief. Official reports and documents have to be in a language which happens to be in fact the most convenient medium for such inter-State use. There can be no doubt that, as a result of historical causes, English is the best medium for such purposes. The persons now dealing with inter-State and Central Government papers in all the States are able to handle the English language with ease and precision, more easily and with greater precision than even their own mother-tongue as far as high level official work goes. The history of two hundred years which has produced this result cannot be wiped out by wishful thinking. It has nothing to do with the status of freedom.

Public Services

It is not wise to throw away an asset that we have acquired, on grounds of pride or prejudice. In all parts of India the people who are qualified for the public services, at all significant levels, have a very fair knowledge of English.

In many parts of India they have not a knowledge of Hindi at all or anything like what they have of English. It would be unreasonable and would amount to waste of a national asset to discard English for these purposes, on the ground that free India must change over from English to some one of the Indian languages.

Where an official document has to be issued to the public, it will of course have to be issued in the language of the people of that area, but so far as the departments are concerned, it would be absurd in the extreme to decree that inter-State or Central Government correspondence should originate and issue in Hindi in areas where Hindi is not understood or spoken. It would create confusion and be a source of annoyance and grave error. To turn out every official who has no adequate command of Hindi and employ only Hindi-knowing persons in the public services would be unfair and unjust, even if it were conceivable.

Not Fair Play

When we impose a language as the official language we have to consider many issues of justice and fair play and expediency. We cannot shut our eyes to these considerations and go by mere arithmetical majority when we directly or indirectly exercise statutory compulsion. If the people not speaking Hindi had been scattered all over, though a small minority everywhere, the position would have been different. But the fact is that in large and compact areas Hindi is not spoken, and the millions of men and women living in those areas speak other languages. The principle of overall majority would be misleading and cannot be applicable, under such circumstances, in the matter of language.

A law relating to language which by its effect relegates to a secondary and unequal status whole populations of many States would be a gross infraction of the fundamental law of democracy. A language may belong to one of the constituents of the population of India and it may be a big group.

But it would be undemocratic to raise it to an official position by which the other language groups would be consigned to an inferior position in actual practice. Any law or rule that tends to bring a great and continuing advantage to the people speaking a particular language and a great handicap and disadvantage to other populations, who have equal membership in the Union, is not a just law. What is not just must be scrupulously avoided. The will of the majority must prevail in democracy, but it would be a misinterpretation of democracy and amount to oppression, if democracy is interpreted to mean the *conferring of advantages* on the majority. The strength and vitality of a State would be weakened by such oppressive laws. The will of the majority should be exercised for the *equal benefit* as far as possible of all the people including the minorities.

Did you not learn English? You can therefore learn Hindi! Little do people who utter this argument realize what it means. Do they desire the Hindi-speaking people to be looked upon as the English people were looked upon? As alien oppressors? God, forbid. Group tyranny is much more painful than individual violence.

Profitless

I am saying and doing what I do in order to prevent a great error and to keep India together. Whatever the form of government a nation is under, injustice to large masses of its educated people, and the consequent relegation of whole populations to the condition of chronic unshepherdedness, is certain to lead to disunity, disaffection and disintegration. Soon we will have a terrible dearth of men who are able enough, good men enough, to hold India together. India will, by going back from English, go back to her past.

What returns will Hindi as an official language bring us against what we are bound to lose? Hindi as a *State language*, wherever it is wanted, is a sound policy, but not Hindi as the language of the Union. It is fallacious to count the populations of Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh and Bihar block

as against that of the rest of India. It is not a profitable or worthwhile investment, for the sake of which we purchase the disaffection of the South, not to speak of other areas equally opposed to the change. We should take risks for some definite profit, not for mere pride and that too for an illusory form of pride inconsistent with modern conditions.

The Madras Government's reported memorandum to the Language Commission agreeing to English *plus* Hindi was based on a consideration of superficialities in which the present secretariat staff is interested, such as examinations and studies and public service tests and not the root of the matter. Let us hope that popular opinion will compel the Madras Government to change its present approach and lead it to a more determined stewardship of the Madras case for continuing the *status quo*. It should ask for deletion of Part XVII of the Constitution altogether, and set at rest the language controversy once for all, leaving the *status quo* intact.

The one and only sound argument for a change is that we should bring about language unity between administration and the people to the largest extent possible. But this argument completely breaks down in respect of the people of the South, and they are not insignificant in numbers nor are they without title to national rights. The area outside of the Uttar Pradesh, Bihar and Madhya Pradesh boundaries is very large. We must fall back therefore on the regional languages and the State governments to bring about this language unity between administration and people. If every State makes the regional language its official language, this principle will have been fully satisfied in theory as well as in practice. We must keep fairness as the yardstick for all Union policies, for fairness is the rock bottom of loyalty.

Pride of Nation

The nationalism behind Hindi is out-weighted by other solid considerations of great importance. It would be supreme folly to change over from English. It should not

be done now or on any foreseeable date. There is no sound or just reason for it. Nor need there be any shame in conducting the affairs of modern India in an international language that has the greatest vogue in the present age. It will be fully consistent with our broad-minded outlook in all matters.

I do not despair of convincing my friends and fellow workers in Upper India that I am not a disruptionist. I am urged by a desire to maintain the very unity of India which is the slogan of the Hindi protagonists. I hope it will be permitted to an old servant of the nation to protest and shout when he feels convinced that a change that is impending is detrimental to unity and contrary to the principles of justice.

The Only Way

The deletion of Part XVII of the Constitution is the only way to achieve this. It is not an essential part of the Constitution. The *status quo* should continue without any interference as it has been until now. Part XVII need not have been enacted at all, but, as it has been done, it should now be formally repealed or indefinitely suspended. Such a decision would at once be a great and noble re-assuring gesture that will do really more for unity than what any kind of imposition of an artificially boosted official language can ever achieve. Often do men fanatically take measures with a certain object in view but, alas, those measures result in the frustration of that very object.

Over and over again, the incapable injustice of imposing Hindi is sought to be covered by a cry against the foreign character of English. English is no more foreign than our legal or parliamentary or administrative procedure, all of which have been firmly adopted and confirmed for future use also. And language is just a medium while all these are the very substance of our affairs.

The communists have a reason for wishing English to go. Their policy is to isolate India from the West. Communists, whether in

power or without, 'turn like the sun-flower to the sun', to the policies of their greatest State, viz., USSR. (I quoting from Djilas.) English is a bond between India and the West and they hope that the replacement of it in official life by Hindi, would remove one of the important strands that tie us to the West.

Progress and English

All the modern knowledge that we have imbibed and have still to imbibe is associated with the English language. If the process of modernization is to go on without deteriorating into shoddy imitation, it is necessary to maintain intimate contact with the progressive West and for this purpose it is necessary to maintain unimpaired the study of English language and literature. No one with a sense of realism would deny the intimate connection between educational incentive and the opportunities offered in the public service. The position that the study of English occupies at present in India is responsible, in the most direct sense, for such all-round progress as we have made.

If this position is adversely affected as a result of any policy that we adopt, the consequence will be a distinct deterioration in national progress. Some are unwilling to see it, and yield to the pull of an emotion which can be roughly described as national pride. Is not just and fair dealing by all the geographically distributed people of this great country as important at least as national pride? Justice is at the root of successful democracy and it is perilous to ignore it. The installation of Hindi as the Union and inter-State all-India language—the honour that now belongs to English by reason of the history of the last one hundred and fifty years—will result in inequality and injustice.

There is an argument couched in proletarian jargon that the objectors to Hindi are the intellectual and educated sections who have isolated themselves from the masses and that the Hindi protagonists are the friends of the poor and the unprivileged classes. This and many other like

arguments are sound only if the question was that Hindi should replace English in a Hindi area as the State official language. The argument is reduced to a cruel joke and an unreality in the non-Hindi areas where the masses are as ignorant of Hindi as the educated classes. There are a few people understanding English in any Tamil village but none who could interpret a Hindi notice or order or a Hindi money order form or a life insurance prospectus. When the Hindi protagonists are speaking of the masses they are obviously thinking of the masses of the Hindi area only; they ignore the masses in non-Hindi India who are no less in number.

Love of oneself may easily masquerade as love of language, and love of language as love of country. Let us not deceive ourselves or others with chauvinistic slogans. The plea of the South is a plea for justice and efficiency and it should not be put down as parochialism or disruption.

Specious Arguments

All the reasons that have been advanced to retain English as the official language of the Union and not to seek to replace it by Hindi—and they are substantial reasons—have been left unanswered, but two arguments are repeatedly advanced by the Hindi protagonists. One is that English is a language of foreign origin and not one of the Indian languages, and therefore it would be derogatory to national prestige to allow it to continue as the medium of official work in India. Our national prestige has not suffered during these fifteen years after Independence and it is not going to be adversely affected if we make no change but go on indefinitely with English. We should drop this superstition that some day we should give up English.

The other argument advanced for doing away with English in favour of Hindi is a doctrinal one. In a democracy, it is argued there should be identity of medium between government and the people. The language of the people must be the official language, otherwise it would be a failure of democratic

integration. I do not deny the force of this argument. But I claim that the doctrine of identity of language between government and the people is fulfilled if every one of the States in the Union functions in the language of the area. There are over a dozen languages in India and millions are the votaries of each one of them, and they are located in the territories of each linguistic State. If each State functions in the regional language, the doctrine of identity of medium is completely fulfilled. The whole is the sum of its parts, and nothing remains to be done to fulfil the demands of this doctrine. The linguistic reorganization of boundaries of States was done for this purpose.

On the other hand, if Hindi is made the language of the Union Government, there will be no identity between that and the language of the people of Bengal or Madras or any other non-Hindi State. It is not, be it remembered, a matter of consent or protest but a question of identity of language and we can devise no trick by which we can discover a language for the Union Government which will not leave tens of millions and vast tracts outside its vogue. The argument that Hindi will help us to fulfil the doctrine of identity of language between the people and government is based on a delusion, either that consent makes up for a deficiency, or that two-fifths is enough fulfilment. It boils down, if we get rid of the fallacies, to a simple preference for an Indian to a foreign language, even though in either case the doctrine of democratic identity with the people's language is not really satisfied. Once again therefore we go back to the sentimental argument against English.

English and Identity

But let us see whether and how far the same doctrine of identity between government and the people is fulfilled in the case of the English language. All the educated people of India in all the States, all the officials of the Union and State governments all over India, have a very fair acquaintance with and command over the use of

English, whereas the same is not true by any means with Hindi or any variant of it. So then it will be seen that, although there are a dozen languages spoken in India, the educated section in any part of India commands a knowledge of English and no other single language has this vogue.

And this will continue to be so, because it is admitted on all hands that a sound knowledge of English is an essential part and will continue to be an essential part of education in India in all the States, whereas a knowledge of Hindi is still only a desideratum in most parts of India, and is still a controversial subject in certain educational circles. The fact of the matter is that interest in language goes hand in hand with the modern knowledge it brings. The substance of knowledge, for which English books serve as medium, is the motive power behind the attention to that language. What modern knowledge now or in the future will Hindi bring? Can we be really dependent on translated material, translated not by men eminent in the science or the technology of which the book is an exposition but by mere translators of words? New knowledge brings its own language, the language of the men who have made and are making that science or other branch of modern knowledge. Anything else is second-hand and we have no time, neither we nor the young people in schools and colleges, to waste on prestige when progress depends on knowledge.

Breeds Disunity

The greatest fallacy of all is the notion that unity is brought about by the adoption of Hindi as the official language of the Union. What is brought about is protest, dissatisfaction and discord, not unity. Hostility can be overcome by political dodging or pressure but that way heart-rankling is produced, not unity. Where the principle of justice is materially ignored, we cause a wound which will not heal easily. He who points this out is not the offender, but he who inflicts the wound.

I appeal to my brethren and friends in the North to abstain

from this plan and to join with me in asking that Part XVII of the Constitution be suspended as an erroneous step taken when thought was not ripe. It would be a gesture of great value for the unity and emotional integration of India. Let no one imagine that I have lost my love for India or my concern for all its parts. Indeed it is greater than ever, and it is that very thing that makes me talk and write now in this unpleasant way. The Hindi-speaking people injure themselves in the long run by pressing that their mother-tongue should be accepted as the Union official language by those who do not speak it. I beg of them to concentrate on their work at State-level and declare the match drawn at the Union level and leave the *status quo* intact with no threats hanging over the heads of people. Let English continue to serve as before.

Sanskrit Parallel

The principal phenomena of any evolution go evolving together. They cannot be understood or dealt with separately. Once upon a time what bound all India together was the great Sanskrit language in which everything worth writing, knowing or remembering was written in all parts of India. This place is now taken by English. The political unity of India is paradoxically the result of British occupation and the language of this unity is English, even as it was the language of the foreign occupation. If we wish to preserve the unity that has resulted from the national disgrace, the language too must be kept and not discarded in irrational disgust. The idea that honour demands some one of our Indian languages to be enthroned in official sovereignty, will, if indulged in, be an error of the first magnitude.

History moves forward and can never be forced back to take a different line. What has happened directly or indirectly to the affairs to a huge population cannot be shoved about according to caprice. The mass involved is too big for such manipulation. If political

unity has arrived as a result of British occupation, what accompanied that double process, in the shape of language, must not only be tolerated but preserved as an essential protection for the resultant blessing.

Hindi through force, bribery, flattery, manoeuvring or undisclosed pressure of various kinds will only serve to teach us that linguistic success can be politically disastrous.

Lesson of History

Like places of pilgrimage and the roads leading to them, certain languages play their part in different periods of history to bring people together in mutual understanding and benefit, and help them to general improvement. Greek once did this in Europe and Latin performed this function in an extraordinary measure when Europe was torn by differences and distinctions in all respects.

History has recorded that universal enlightenment and knowledge spread in Europe through Latin. Sanskrit purveyed enlightenment and culture to all parts of India, although no tribe or community spoke Sanskrit as such and although the people spoke different languages in different part of the country. People in all parts of India who aimed at enlightenment and culture made it the means and the symbol of their ambition to acquire a knowledge of Sanskrit and thereby a common bond of spirit bound all parts of India into one community.

What Sanskrit did in India during her long and silent centuries in the past, what Latin did in Europe though divided into many States and nationalities, English is doing now in India. It may not be spoken in India, but it is the language that unites all the different regions of India into one and India herself with the rest of the world. It serves as the continuous vehicle that brings into its life the best from all parts of the civilized world.

If humanity is a single family, some means of communication, some common vehicle of enlighten-

ment and invigorating knowledge, must play its part. It is only ignorance heightened by obstinacy that would resist the part that English should play in modern times and treat the language as an enemy left behind by the British rulers. It is sheer folly to displace English in fields where it has struck root, in the administration, in the law and in the universities. Instead of welcoming the good that Providence and the laws of nature often give us along with shame and evil, some of us seek to cast off, with what was shameful and evil, the good also that came with it, thereby undoing the just economy of nature that ever mixes good with evil.

The Geography

There are regional languages in India, each spoken by millions and possessing a not inconsiderable amount of literature. Hindi is one of these, and one that serves a larger single group than any of the other Indian languages. On this latter ground it was thought possible to make it the official language of all India. If this could be done, it would remove the imaginary shame of a language of foreign origin being used in India as the supreme official medium. This was adopted in the Constitution of India. A distant date was fixed to give effect to this resolution, thereby helping to keep all difficulties and objections dormant for the time being. The distribution of languages and people is such that no one of the Indian languages could be given the honour of being the Union official medium without leaving a large mass of territory, and the people inhabiting it, outside the range of that language. Although Hindi or some dialect of it is spoken by nearly two-fifths of the population of India, this is confined to a contiguous mass of territory leaving three-fifths of India out of that contiguous region.

As the date fixed for the enforcement of the provision of the Constitution regarding the Union's official language approached and steps had to be taken towards that end, the objections to the measure

began to find expression. The other language groups, in particular Bengal and Madras, resist the Hindi programme. It is noteworthy that in spite of the constitutional provision about Hindi having been adopted fifteen years ago, the Government of Madras has not adopted compulsory instruction in Hindi, and even now dares not introduce such a measure in the schools. Even if there were no resistance or if it were successfully met by government measures, it is not wise to do something that is bound to result in inequality of opportunities. To continue English as the official medium as here and to let each region carry on its administration at State-level in the language of that region is the only safe, just and convenient alternative. And this would leave intact the nexus between India and the outer world which is no detraction but a high privilege.

Hindi is the language of the people of only a certain part of India and that is not even the larger part. The identity of the medium of administration with the language of the people will be attained only in that area which is limited by definite boundaries. In the rest of India the people do not speak Hindi, and the identity claimed cannot be attained by the adoption of Hindi. The Government of India must be evenly related to the *whole* of India. Official life at effective levels in more than half of the reorganized States of India will find Hindi stranger than English. If Hindi is made the Union official language, the people of the South will not see identity of language between them and the Government, but the domination of a language that is not theirs by birth or by education but which gives to a section of the people of India the position of a ruling race.

English is Rooted

English is no doubt the language of the foreigner who ruled India till recently. But must we harbour a feeling of hatred in respect of his language? Should we not examine the position without prejudice, keeping convenience and general advantage in view? Eng-

lish has rooted itself in all the branches of administration that make up modern India and distinguish her from the past. The pains and the inconveniences of a change are too great to be overlooked; the inevitable damage consequent on change would be great.

What is the real element in a foreign tongue to which we ought to object? Its strangeness, not anything else. English is not now a stranger in India by any means. On the other hand, Hindi is a complete stranger to the people of over half of India divided off by definite boundary from the Hindi area. To a substantial and not inconsequential part of India in the South, English is not a tenth as foreign as Hindi, in view of our history during the last 150 years.

English cannot be avoided by the acceptance of Hindi at the Union level. This is admitted. The needs of modern progressive life and the part that government must play in that field compel the retention of the study of English. Indeed, it is admitted that more attention should be given to English than has been given in the recent past. All university authorities have said this. Keeping in view all the arguments advanced, the case against Hindi taking the place of English becomes much stronger.

Single Language Hopes

The people speaking other languages than Hindi are never going to adopt Hindi in place of their own mother-tongues. If the movement for making Hindi the Union official language is based on a vague feeling that Hindi will one day become the national language of all India, it is based on a foundation that is not true, on a hope that cannot be fulfilled and which would be resisted and opposed if expressed.

There cannot be ever a single national language for India. The time is past for the achievement of such an object. We are many centuries too late for it. Each one of the languages in India claims a rich and growing literature and has vigour and beauty, and enough of every element to infuse equal

pride. We have missed the bus for making a single national language. What could have been done by compulsion and influence of all sorts fifteen centuries ago cannot be done now. All that we can have is an efficient *official* language, equally convenient for all parts of India which have all a right to share in the proper administration of the Union. English has been serving as an efficient official language, and Hindi has not the elements that make equal convenience for all parts of India, not to speak of efficiency or precision.

Imperialism

The Hindi people do not realize the difficulties of the non-Hindi people. They think Hindi will give them great advantages and self-interest blinds them to the rights of others. Officials are loyal and there is so little courage available these days to enable them to stand up to their political masters. They see the injustice clearly enough but they think it prudent to conspire with the Hindi faction. We have had many assurances of 'no imposition' and the like, but the practice is contrary to assurances as has been proved by complaints from those affected.

Linguism has split the country and has led to a tendency to erect solid walls isolating the States from one another. Every State government is determined to intimidate and overrule university opinion and insists on universities being run each in its own regional language. As a result of the intimate connection between higher education and the permanent services, the mobility of officials as well as of students seeking higher education will soon totally disappear.

The only way to meet this impending disaster is to get the college and the offices everywhere to accept English and continue the *status quo*. All change is not reform. To make this country into an archipelago of linguistic islands, educationally and administratively, is not a desirable thing. Linguism threatens to become a galloping disease which must be tackled by maintaining intact the vital circulating system of the body politic

of India. The part that the English press actually plays today, in spite of all the talk about Hindi, is a highly relevant fact. Invaluable as the local service of language papers may be, the all-India inter-State service of the English papers is incomparably great. Hindi cannot claim anything like what the English papers are doing. None but those who refuse to see can be blind to the inevitable inference from this incontestable fact as to what the all-India official medium ought to be.

I wrote the following in 1960 and, unfortunately, it becomes relevant, over and over again :

I am glad the issue of forcing English out and substituting Hindi in its place has once again come up to active notice. It was crude to put forth the threat of a far-from-decent demonstration at the time of the President's visit to Madras. But annoyance, discourtesy, disorders and riots, however greatly and sternly deprecated, do seem to be the only effective means to induce rethinking on the part of the present Government of India. This is unfortunate but, alas, true. The language issue has been brought into focus again in that way.

Realities

It may be good to remember in this connection that the Hindi-speaking people are not a majority as is commonly supposed. Indeed if the dialects of Hindi, among which there is not always peace and concord, be taken into account the numerical claim of the Hindi protagonists is much reduced. But this is irrelevant in the present context.

The unity and the smooth running of life in India with its fifteen or more languages require the continuance of the medium which the people have been managing with, for the last many progressive decades, viz., English. It is fallacious to mix up feelings of reverence, pride or classical love to interfere with a question of mere mechanical present purpose. Let us not choose the official language for Central and inter-State purposes,

as a young man chooses a sweetheart, but on more reasonable, if less romantic, considerations.

A Referendum

No referendum can give a truer answer than the present circulation of newspapers in India. The official report about the circulation of English language papers in all India must be a great blow to the protagonists of Hindi. Ten lakhs circulation of English dailies as against less than four lakhs circulation of Hindi dailies in all India proves what is the inter-lingua of India. If the Hindi and English circulations of papers in South India could be got at, the result would be a knock-out blow to demonstrate the microscopic status of Hindi in South India as against English.

And, South India is 100 millions of people. The English language dominates easily in that field and without any political or party interference. The papers published in the English language command by far the largest circulation, and this is growing every day and not diminishing, even when we are engaged in controversy over the imminent ascension of Hindi on the throne. All newspapers that may be classified as all-India papers are running in English. Not a single Hindi paper can claim to be of all-India character. What more proof can we find or demand for the concrete reality of fitness and expediency? That the most convenient and the most efficient medium for the discussion of policies of administration and State business is English, is proved conclusively by the newspapers test.

And so I beg of those who have the good of the country at heart, irrespective of party policies and local electioneering advantages, to vote for Truth on this grave issue. I stick firmly to the view that English and English alone should be the Central and inter-State official language, so long as politicians and other people interested in public affairs throughout India prefer to buy and read English newspapers.

The request of the non-Hindi people is just and is supported

further by the fact that English has worked and has been tolerated for over a century with no ill effects. Bilingualism is a good compromise on paper but not in practice. It can be indulged in for the purpose of proclamation, notices and laws being printed for the public. But to let people working in the same office run in chaotic manner, with a free choice between two languages, is not conducive to efficiency, speed, discipline or economy. It is impracticable and wrong, unless our very object is to create discord and inefficiency and introduce political quarrels in administrative offices. It is strange that this is not realized and people talk of this solution for the issue.

Bills and Acts of the legislatures and the ordinances of the President should of course be published in both English and Hindi and other languages. All promulgations of that sort should be bilingual or multilingual but not the actual work in offices. I repeat, the only commonsense solution is to let the *status quo* remain. We have eaten and found the pudding good. Let us not change and buy trouble. Let English continue as hitherto with the local languages at all those levels where they are necessary. The work in all the administrative offices and the courts have been running efficiently on this basis. They will go into complete disorder if anything new be attempted.

Force of Numbers

I was labouring for the right words to put it in when I wanted to say that there are some things in which the *whole* and *not* only a majority has the right to be satisfied, wherein a part has greater right to object to innovation than the majority can urge in favour of a change. A friend sends me, by a strange coincidence, the following passage (just as I was writing this) which he came across in the course of his study of the history of English literature :

Where security of person and property are preserved by laws

which none but the *whole* can repeal, then the great Ends of Government are provided for, whether the Administration be in the hands of One or of Many. Where any one Person or body of men, who do not represent the *whole* seize into their Hands the Power in the last Resort, there is properly no longer a Government but what Aristotle and his Followers call the Abuse and Corruption of one. This distribution excludes arbitrary Power in whatever numbers, which I look upon as a greater Evil than Anarchy itself.

This from one of Dean Swift's little known pamphlets puts the principle in impressive and clear language, such as only Swift and Dr. Johnson wielded among English writers. There are some things that must be authorized by the whole and not by a part, however big be the size of the latter, where the smaller part must be treated with the same respect as the larger part, without whose consent no innovation can be tyrannically introduced by force of numbers.

Bilingualism

In a debate in the Madras Council, it was very regrettable that the Madras Finance Minister reiterated his position in favour of prolonged bilingualism. 'We ourselves having put forward the formula and having got it accepted, it would be rash to throw away all the advantages and keep the whole thing in the melting-pot.' It was a mistake to put forward the formula and it was a mistake to reiterate it. Dr. Lakshmanaswami Mudaliar put the case for more realistically than Subramaniam.

It should be obvious to anyone conversant with official work that bilingualism is a trap. The official language is the medium of daily work in the office and two languages cannot operate together. It will split each section of each office into two factions. It will breed the acutest and stupidest kind of politics where politics should be totally eschewed and make for greater expense by unnecessary expansion of the establishment. It will greatly

contribute to a continued and harassing drive to penalize non-Hindi employees in all sorts of ways. Let us remember that the desire to impose Hindi has not been given up. It only made a temporary retreat under cover of the Prime Minister's formula. Bilingualism is not an implementation of the Prime Minister's assurance. It will be a cold war no more tolerable than what goes by that name in international circles. The Prime Minister's assurance in Parliament, which he re-affirmed again, was not an assurance of bilingualism. It was an assurance that the *status quo* will not be disturbed till the non-Hindi people desire a change.

English Imposition

Bhaktavatsalam argues that we cannot impose English on those who do not want it in the Hindi areas. We are not imposing English on anyone now. We wish to continue and we wish others also to continue as we were doing from 1947 onwards up-to-date even if we exclude the ten decades before 1947 as belonging to a benighted age. English is the natural protector of all the fifteen languages of India and it would be a sad mistake if our Tamil Government accepts bilingualism just because it was its own baby. As sure as night follows day, bilingualism will lead to confusion and imposition of Hindi.

It should be realized that the quarrel is not between languages, although men prefer to put it that way. Languages do not quarrel. The issues are between men, groups of men with ambitions and selfish hearts. Let us realize this fact and we shall then, if we try, be able to find the right solution. The pleas made on behalf of Hindi and the scorn flung at English—have these anything to do with the language issue? No, it is the ambition of Hindi-speaking leaders, their own and that of Hindi-speaking men in a lower tier. Swords and spears, and flags and flowers, and languages do not hate or love: it is the men who hate and love, that carry and use those tools to satisfy their feelings of jealousy, fear, hate and love. We must get behind the mis-

leading facade of lifeless instruments and understand and deal with the hearts of men.

Congressmen are suffering from two minds over this issue. Reason and judgment pull them one way. Obstinacy pulls them in another direction. They have almost arrived at the truth. But they shrink from it like a man who has decided on a plunge-bath in winter but shrinks from it when approaching the cold water. They have seen that English is the inevitable solution for the problem of effective integration of all parts of India into one understanding nation. But as they are making the discovery, they are frightened by it and add 'until Hindi is sufficiently developed' etc., etc., etc. To confess an error and retract requires courage—and only God gives that courage. These 'untils' and 'ifs' must go. There is no use burdening the truth with 'ifs' and 'untils'.

The illusory stigma of foreignness should be removed from English, a great international language, which for all the youth in all the universities in India serves truly as a mother feeding them with the life-milk of modern knowledge. English has been a true foster-mother and should be treated as such.

There is talk—some people indulge in—of making people in North India learn Tamil and to have Tamil *prachar sabhas* for that purpose everywhere. All this is nonsense. It cannot be done and will not be done, and there is no reason why this wasteful programme should be undertaken to deceive people.

Hindi must and will spread by its own weight. Commerce will push it all over without any political or governmental coercion, or show of superiority. But the function of Hindi will be different from that of English. The one can't do what the other alone can and should do.

An Explanation

I am getting a number of letters from friends in Upper India quoting from my introduction to a Hindi Self-Instructor published in

1928 by the Dakshina Bharat Hindi Prachar Sabha of Madras, and finding fault with me for my present attitude opposing the imposition of Hindi as the all-India official Language. Some use very harsh words; but I grant all the correspondents are sincerely surprised at my inconsistency. In explanation of my present attitude, I quote below from my preface to a booklet I published on this question in August 1963:

It would be futile and foolish for me as for any other active human, being to claim complete consistency over matters whose time-range extends over a period of more than fifty years. My present view about what should be the all-India Official Language has evolved over a long period of observation and experience. Many friends as well as opponents in this controversy, who have been defending and attacking my position, assume that one has no right to evolve or change. I do not believe I have greatly changed my views on this question. I feel there is a running thread of consistency right through, notwithstanding the changes on the surface. But I do not press that point. My consistency is not the issue involved in this matter. I claim that my present views are right and if my previous views were different they should be rejected.

In 1928

When in 1928 I wrote the introduction to a Hindi Self-Instructor, Swaraj was as far off as the moon is for present day cosmonauts. Yet I anticipated the present Upper India drive for Hindi. I tried hard to popularise Hindi in South India. I pointed out to the young men of the South the necessary consequences if they failed to learn what was likely to be enforced as the *lingua franca* of India. Ten years after I wrote the introduction above referred to, when I became the Prime Minister of Madras Presidency, I introduced Hindi classes in secondary schools and asked boys and girls to attend the classes, though they need not have to pass examinations in Hindi for promotion. This was

strongly opposed by a section of politicians, and a very virulent campaign was set on foot against it.

Thus I began as one intent on popularising Hindi in the South. Why do I oppose it now? Because I find the scheme of forcing Hindi in the South is neither just nor feasible. My own best efforts failed and I now plead for fair play and justice, in favour of which I must drop mere personal consistency.

Past and Present

In the old days when I first advocated the learning of Hindi, government and particularly government at the Centre was a very limited affair, not, like now, something that permeates every detail and nook and corner of life. An arrangement about the official language which would have been tolerable under one kind of government would be insufferable in another scheme of government, such as now prevails. The Central Government in those days could have been conducted in Greek or Latin or Sanskrit without much inconvenience. Not so now.

If people were condemned to showing themselves to be rigidly consistent on what they stand for, through half a century, dogmatism would be the rule in public life, which is not what we want. What I have said above in these few pages will disclose, I venture to think, an accommodating mind, but at the same time one that does not forget truth or the public weal at any point.

A fervent and patriotic resolution attracting the approval of a great body of people on the one side, and an unanswerable objection on the other side, with a mass of people behind that protest—it is not an easy issue on which one could take a decision and stick to it rigidly. With hope, at each step, I have moved from position to position and I trust my views as formed from time to time will not be misconstrued as mere political opportunism but understood in their true evolution.

From *Swarajya*, Feb. 20, 1965.

Hindi—here and now

RAM MANOHAR LOHIA

TODAY, Hindi is a hand-maid of English, and of the government. A majority of the general masses and some very few among the men of influence are unhappy about the present situation. But the men who shape our daily lives—such as persons working in the administration, in the realm of letters and thought, in the radio and in the press—all of these wittingly or unwittingly, or under some compulsion, contribute to making Hindi a subservient of English. In this action they have a protective armour. They may have donned this armour with noble intention but the result is the same.

The armour is beguilingly simple. 'Spread Hindi and develop Hindi!' This two-fold exhortation has a powerful appeal. Right at the outset one is impressed by the

seeming reasonableness of the appeal. After all, there are at least as many non-Hindi-speaking persons in the country as there are Hindi-speaking persons. Unless Hindi is spread throughout the country, how can it become the country's language? At the same time, Hindi lacks the modernity possessed by some European languages. So the emphasis on reforming and replenishing the Hindi vocabulary and books is also readily gobbled up. But there is poison in both these 'constructive' pleas. Maybe, they who have injected this poison knew not what they were doing.

Sometimes one begins to hate the very word 'constructive' when it appears as an alternative to 'destructive'. Construction and

destruction are complementary roles. Any one of these is incomplete without the other. But while destruction without construction may result either in good or in evil, in accepting construction without destruction, I see nothing but evil.

Spread of Hindi

What do we mean when we talk about the spread of Hindi in non-Hindi regions? Statistics are always being cited to show the increasing number of students who have passed in Hindi in this or that examination of such and such sammelan in Kerala or Bengal. These figures have no meaning unless at the same time we are told about the increase in the number of students who have passed in English. In India today the issues of English and Hindi are inter-related.

The number of students taking English has been growing rapidly—far more rapidly than is the case with Hindi. For high school and college education, English is compulsory, while Hindi is optional. There can be no comparison between the systematic studies imparted by a regular school and the casual instruction given by the various sammelans. There is no sense in pointing out that even though the number taking to English is increasing, the standard of English in the matter of grammar and pronunciation is going down. Truly, with my one year's experience of the Lok Sabha, I can say that 'Incorrect English' can certainly become the official language of the country—even though there may be difficulties in adopting it as our mother-tongue as many African States have done.

It cannot be gainsaid that Hindi is not modern—in the sense that not much modern knowledge is available in this language. The language has not yet been so equipped as to become a suitable vehicle for the purpose. I am not speaking about its potential. It's of the present state that I say this. In one sense it is the best language in the world. It has a larger vocabulary than that of any other language. But this vocabulary hasn't been chiselled to suit the requirements

of modern knowledge. No doubt this work must be done. Let philologists and lexicographers do that job. Let us have all the necessary translations, and more and more works in Hindi. But all this by itself is insufficient. Howsoever hard we exert in this direction, success will continue to elude us. There is another and more important—rather imperative—way of equipping the language.

Just as a child cannot learn to swim unless he plunges into the water and suffers a few duckings, an undeveloped language cannot develop unless put to use. Hindi must be put to use immediately and everywhere—for science and for law, in government and in public life. Maybe in the beginning it will waddle clumsily, and make mistakes. I can say however that the blunders committed in Hindi are likely to prove less damaging than those that are being committed in English today. But that is another matter. What I wish to emphasise here is that by actually using Hindi in their work, the men in government, the lecturers, the writers, the speakers, the scientists, etc., can contribute much more to its development, than the linguists or lexicographers can. It is through use that a language grows; not that a language is to be used after it has grown.

When these twin issues of spreading Hindi and developing Hindi are raised, the basic question of removing English is evaded. Let Hindi be popularised first; let it become developed first; only then can it be used in courts, in laboratories in universities, in government, etc.—that is the contention. But the trouble about it is that unless it is first used in these spheres, it will neither become popular nor can it develop. So the net result is that the issue is stalled.

Those Who Stall

Of course, the conscience of those who stall it thus remains clear. For some, evasion of the issue means a guarantee of their livelihood. For others, it is an assurance that their present prosperity continues unimpaired. Without hesitation, I would call all these persons mercenaries in Hindi. Whatever their inten-

tions, the outcome of their conduct is that English stays put with us for eternity, and Hindi is unable to spread, or develop, for ever. Meanwhile these Hindi merchants, posted in this department or that section, continue to ply their trade merrily.

Permit me a digression at this point. There is a very great drawback in Hindi—in fact in all Indian languages. There is a surfeit of honey in them. Some words have become so linked up that in appreciation or criticism, extreme language becomes unavoidable. There may be many reasons for this. One reason perhaps is the style of Hindi used by the *chaarans*—the court poets. Every *vani* (voice) is *amrit vani* (nectar-like voice), every *sandesh* (message) is an *amar sandesh*, and every *purush* (man) is a *maha purush* (great man)! This style militates against logic and critical analysis and so against the truth. The advent of the *shair* and *ghazal* (of Urdu) made matters still worse.

Variety

Language is a vehicle. A vehicle's job is to carry loads without discrimination. That vehicle is best which serves all equally well—the pure as well as the base. I have been prompted to say this because some people have interpreted 'Banish English' as meaning 'Banish Anglicism'. If by 'Anglicism' they mean just artificiality and affectation, I have no objection to the interpretation. But if they mean thereby that ladies should not apply lipstick, or that there should be no ball-room dancing and just Bharat Natyam and Kathak, or that there should be no divorce, etc., I must point out that language should be a medium capable of expressing both the attitudes, or rather all attitudes, orthodox as well as heterodox.

Of course, I detest impurity. But opinions can vary as to what is pure and what is impure. Maybe, only one of these opinions is the correct one. As for example, it is not proper to ride a man-pulled rickshaw. And I think there can be no two opinions about this. It is also my view that the practice in the Hawaii Island of the

United States to greet a stranger with a light kiss, or to start acquaintances in that way, is quite right (the practice is now spreading to the rest of the United States and in practically all art assemblies). I feel that there ought to be no two opinions in this matter also. But I know that many good persons in this country would strongly disapprove of the idea. They ought to have an opportunity of holding that opinion. Therefore, even where in one's own mind one sees not the slightest scope for a difference of opinion, one ought to allow variegated views in most matters.

Lucid and Precise

So Hindi should be such as can be availed of by all types of people. It should be lucid, colourful, capable of expressing subtle nuances of thought, and at the same time precise, forceful and interesting. A developed language means nothing else. The question as to how many books a particular language has is a secondary question. If Hindi is made lucid enough and variegated enough for all subjects, it wouldn't take time to have thousands of books in the language. When in the context of the need to banish English, people talk about the paucity of Hindi books, one feels amused, even angry. One wonders: are they fools, or knaves? If it were made compulsory for all college professors to translate one book each during the vacations, there would be with us a mountain of books in three months. The problem which would remain would be only of lucidity, and preciseness. But this problem is not going to be solved by preparing technical terminologies and lexicons. The only solution is to start using the vehicle of Hindi immediately, and to make it bear all sorts of loads, and in all fields.

The question of Hindi and of other Indian languages does not depend on any extraneous factor. It is a question simply of resolve, just of decision. Public decisions are always political. Whether English is to go or to remain, whether Hindi is to come, and if so when—this is a question to be determined purely on the political plane. It has nothing to do with the question

of literature, of terminology, or of any subjective argument. It is simply a question of wishing to do a thing. If the wish to banish English and adopt Hindi or Tamil becomes strong, even the dumb would start speaking. Everyone would speak and everything would be spoken.

Attempt to Kill

Nothing has been spared to kill this resolve. Let us survey the depressing situation in the coastal lands. There are provinces where you can muster lakhs or even a crore to shout '*Hindi Murdabad*'. Maybe they don't mean it, and are made to say so because of some misconception. But no efforts are being made to remove this misconception. So the situation doesn't seem to be changing. Even in those coastal States where the anti-Hindi atmosphere is not as vicious as it is in Tamilnad or Bengal, there is an attitude of indifference. There is not one amongst these States where a majority of the people are warm about having Hindi, or seem likely to become enthusiastic about it in the near future. Half of our population lives in these coastal provinces.

If this is the attitude here, the resolve to adopt Hindi may well be deemed shattered. They who in such a situation talk about developing Hindi to make it acceptable in the future are only fighting shy of facing the truth and are trying to imagine a spark in what is dead cold ash.

In Shivaji's durbar, things were different. Even Netaji Bose accepted Hindi. Our entire tradition, from Jayasi to Gandhi, is there before us to show that the really great man in this coastal zone has accepted Hindi. The great Maratha and the great Bengali accepts Hindi. He even makes it his mother language. But the petty coastal—the petty Bengali and the petty Maratha—rejects it. I am not referring to the common man. The common man is never petty. Greatness and pettiness—both are attributes found essentially in the powerful men. In a democracy both these possibilities exist. For the men of influence,

both the ways are open—towards greatness, towards pettiness.

It would be interesting to see why, in the matter of language, many powerful men in the coastal lands chose to tread the path of pettiness. Perhaps it has been the same in all matters. But in regard to language, it is undoubtedly so. The rulers have certainly been petty. In a relative way, all those too have been petty who have been connected with spheres of day-to-day activity like science and education. Greatness has been visible in traditional matters—like music, or dance. This difference can be an interesting subject for research. Whatever power an individual gathers in life, has been through the medium of some European language, mainly English. A direct contact has thus been established between the languages of the coastal States and English. After the province, it is the world; the nation is missing. The result is that the Indian doesn't become a real friend of the world—he is just a flirt. Having forgotten to look backward he is incapable of looking forward either. He can just throw glances sideways — at Europe, and imitate. He refuses to look back at old India and its unities. And he finds it troublesome to look ahead.

I have seen an all-India language and script used even in the Ikshwaku and Shaka capitals. These capitals were situated in the far south—on the banks of the Krishna. And that was more than 1,500 years ago. So what I have said about Bengal and Maharashtra applies more or less to Tamilnad and Andhra too.

The Tradition

What is Hindi? It is the language born out of this all-India tradition. Just as we had Sanskrit at one time, or later Pali, or then some or other variant which enjoyed countrywide recognition. I do not propose to go into historical details here. Broadly speaking, Hindi may be regarded as the universally accepted *prakrit* at a given time. This is its origin and this is its character. And in

this basic character of the language lies an explanation of the ups and downs of its fate. This language has been current in the army cantonments. In the cantonments of the south it was described as Dakkini.

Nowadays much discussion has been going on as to the form of Hindi. Some want it to be Sanskritised, others Arabicised. Some would like it to be colloquial and others would relish it mixed with a good measure of the idioms and usages of the coastal languages. That it should have so many shapes is a strong point with Hindi. Some or the other of these forms will come to acquire uniform acceptance. The government's pleasure can sometimes aid, and sometimes hamper, giving currency to its proper form.

I think it is foolish to fritter too much energy over this debate about its form, because in that case the question about our basic resolve recedes into the background. Let all these suggested varieties compete with one another. Which ever wins, it's fine with us. We have no objection. Our objection is to the suggestion that the *swayamvar* will take place after the winner is decided. We say the *swayamvar* has already taken place. As to its form, we can only say: whatever the form, what harm is it to us?

The Pettiness

Let us return to the original question. In the matter of language, the powerful in the coastal provinces are petty. But no less petty are the powerful in the midland provinces. If there were greatness here, matters would have been solved. Greatness can be of two kinds—either of superior strength or of superior understanding and humility. The important men in the midlands have been lacking in both kinds of greatness. Their pettiness has been pettier than that of the coastal region, and so more galling.

When British rule ended, the question of language was a burning one. If the prominent men in these central States had the greatness of Shivaji or Subhash Bose, there would have been no question

of accepting or even contemplating to defer the adoption of Hindi and banishment of English. To fix the date-line of 1965 in the year 1950 seems to me the height of foolishness and extreme pettiness. The rulers at that time could very well see that with the passage of time, English could become more entrenched and the position of Hindi would go on weakening. They started swearing in the name of Hindi, but mentally pledged loyalty to English. The oaths in Hindi's name therefore became formal and superficial. In action, they did everything that violated the oath.

Implementation

Either there should have been no pledge to have Hindi as the country's Official Language, and if the pledge was taken, it ought to have been implemented immediately. What was the meaning of fixing a date-line? Let us analyse why they did it. Two reasons were given. Number one, Hindi needs to be developed first. Number two, by publicity and propaganda, Hindi must be made acceptable to the coastal provinces. The first reason given meant that Hindi today was not developed, and after a certain time, when it became developed, it would be made the Official Language. Carefully seen, one would be able to see the dangerous snag in the argument. He who accepts that Hindi or any other Indian language is undeveloped today, and on that account cannot become the Official Language of the country, can at no time even in the future hope to free himself from the stranglehold of this argument.

Whether a language is developed or not is after all a relative question. When one says that Hindi is undeveloped, he means undeveloped as compared to English, German, or Russian. Evidently, if the development of a language is to be measured in terms of the books it has or the technical terminology it has been able to evolve, by the time Hindi makes some progress, the other languages which already enjoy a great lead, will have gone farther ahead. Comparatively speaking, therefore, Hindi would be still undeveloped. Enemies of

Hindi would thus be able to use this specious argument against Hindi for all time to come, and Hindi's friends would feel stumped for an answer.

Does Hindi have any friends?

At least they are not its friends who are commonly believed to be the votaries of Hindi. They are mercenaries out to make profits. From the various Hindi departments, they receive either money or prestige or both. All of them are supposed to be engaged in the task of developing Hindi. Directly or indirectly, they condemn those who want to make undeveloped Hindi the country's language right now. Whether Hindi should become the national language forthwith or after development is a matter related to government and its determination. The status as well as finances of these mercenaries of Hindi depend on the government which wants development first and installation only thereafter and not on those who stand for installation first and development afterwards.

A Language's Growth

Only by flinging one's arms about in the waters, and dipping and ducking, can one learn to swim. A language grows rich only with currency. So if Hindi asserts itself in the legislatures, in courts, in laboratories, in trade, in army centres etc., only then will it grow. Not before that.

The second argument about acceptance by the coastal provinces is even more dangerous. As time passes, its acceptability in these provinces is dwindling. This is natural, because the knowledge of English, spurious though it be, is growing. Besides, it's difficult to climb, but easy to fall. Once you relax, it generally means hurtling down at accelerating speed. Those who have seen the Lok Sabha—where ordinarily the question of accepting or rejecting Hindi is settled—can well realise that only a miracle can have Hindi accepted.

It is said that the Tamilians or the Bengalis are not ready to accept Hindi. Who are these Tamilians and Bengalis? They aren't any incorporeal beings fallen

from the heavens! Looking at the present Lok Sabha a majority of these are Congressmen. Some are Communists or DMK-ites. These Congressmen, these Communists and these DMK-ites are not willing to accept Hindi. Nor will they ever be ready, except, as I said, by a miracle. The Congressites are clever people. They blame others for their own sins. After all, who are these Tamilians and Bengalis who oppose Hindi. Aren't they Congressmen? Why doesn't the Congress honestly implement its policy? Why does it want to stick to office? Why can it not carry out its policy even if it means some risk to its office, wholly or partly? Communists also should not be allowed to get away with their part in the crime. They talk a lot about championing the people's language. But in practice they serve to promote subversion to English.

A Stalemate

The situation today is like a stalemate in chess. There is a stalemate in the matter of language today. Hindi will not become the country's language until and unless the coastal provinces adopt it. And there appears to be no probability of their adopting it. How is this stalemate to be broken? There needs to be a new move. Only one move is conceivable.

Till now English has been opposed with Hindi. That has been past history, and that might be the future also. But in the present, the fact that the confrontation is English *versus* Hindi, makes the coastal languages appear partisan to English. The nature of the confrontation needs to change. It should be English *versus* Indian Languages. They who shout that Hindi is the National Language or will become so in the future are unknowingly indulging in deception. The cry is either meaningless or harmful. The real issue is: how is English to go?

As it is, even in the two or three colleges of Tamilnad where Tamil had been introduced as an alternative medium, no one now takes the Tamil medium. English reigns supreme. Tamilians who are opposing Hindi today are in fact ene-

mies of Tamil itself. But how to make them realise this? The only way is to ask the coastal provinces to agree to the banishment of English and meanwhile let the States of the midlands be ready to accept any solution in regard to language.

The Possibilities

The possibilities are as follows. Firstly, any of the coastal languages becomes the country's language. Secondly, the country accepts a multilingual arrangement. Thirdly, Hindi is accepted as the country's language, and there are reservations for persons from the coastal provinces. Fourthly, the provinces of the midlands decide to banish English immediately and completely, even if the coastal lands prefer to retain it. I do not see any other alternative. One of these four will have to be accepted.

Some people regard a multilingual centre or a non-Hindi centre as either loose or foolish. But as compared to an English centre, I would prefer passing through this 'loose' or 'foolish' phase. Maybe after this phase the coastal provinces will spontaneously accept a common language. And that common language can be only Hindi, none else. But those from the Hindi States ought not to say this.

All these questions depend on our will and resolve. I do not visualise any new resolve originating in the coastal provinces. A new resolve must stem from the midland zone. But the resolve should be such as does not provoke the people in the coastal regions and indeed inclines them to accept it. This resolve must be implemented with vigour after January 26, 1965. Let us not repeat the folly of fixing another date-line. Banish English, and banish it immediately. If English is to go, it will go not tomorrow, but today and now. After January 26, 1965, there should be no confusion about what is this today and now. The use of English anywhere in the midlands after this date is against the Constitution and so should be regarded as a crime and a sin. But the irony of it is that

those guilty of this crime are in power and those who strive to defend the Constitution, or are exerting to remedy matters, have to suffer on that account.

It is useless to cite the Language Act. An enactment which violates the Constitution is illegal. The Constitution permits the use of English only in spheres specifically and severally enumerated and accepted by Parliament. The act often quoted in this context is illegal and unconstitutional. Nevertheless they who have violated their pledge rule the country.

Two Suggestions

Let the people of the midland States solemnly resolve that they will not allow English in any sphere. The resolution is not simple. Who will bell the cat? But it is not so very difficult either. I shall give two examples. If the people in these areas—writers, students, workers, traders, teachers, etc.—decide that they will not allow anyone whose mother tongue is not English to speak in English at any public meeting or place, there will be a new climate all over. During the first two or three months let there be intensive propaganda in this regard. Then let notice be given, say, of two or three months, that if a person from the coastal provinces is to speak he should speak in his mother tongue and the organisers of the meeting should arrange to have the speech translated into Hindi. After this, no meeting should be allowed to proceed unless such arrangement is made.

Another suggestion I would make is in regard to official nameplates, be it milestones on the road, or sign-boards at railway stations. Many have gone to jail over this issue. I won't talk of satyagraha any more. Now, wherever you find them and whenever you find them, erase them. If need be, organise bands of young men specifically for this. These are just two examples I have given. There can be many others. A spate of meetings and conferences and study circles of the educated needs to be organised on this subject.

—From *Organiser*, Jan. 26, 1965.

Historical survey

PRAVINCHANDRA J. RUPAREL

IN India, with a history stretching through the centuries, with a culture reaching lands outside her borders, one is driven to ask the question: 'Wasn't there ever a national language understood by those at least who share a common

culture?'

One's mind naturally reverts to Sanskrit. It is true that, as a language both systematically developed and beautiful in structure, it was always revered by the people. It was supreme in religious

usage, and, judging from the spread of Hinduism, it must surely have reached all corners of the country. It was also the language of literature for a long period. But in spite of the respect it had gained in the mind of the sub-continent, the complexities of its grammatical construction, the innumerable rules to be followed, made it impossible for the people to use it in their day-to-day life.

No language can exist only through religious and literary expression and it is clear that Sanskrit was never spoken by the average man; father and child could not converse in it. At the height of its popularity, the people had their own language which, though borrowing excessively from Sanskrit, was much simpler in construction and had its own individuality.

The Only Unity

Then there was no political unity in the country as we understand it today, and very little contact between the peoples of different areas. The scholar and the pandit sought to preserve the purity of their language and guarded it from corrupting influences. But the social and religious reformers of those days, interested in influencing people in large numbers, gave emphasis to the spoken language in each region. To disseminate their views amongst the people, Buddha and Mahavir popularised Pali and Ardhamagadhi, and there was a flowering of literary expression in both these languages. They even became respectable amongst the very learned, who normally referred to the spoken languages of the people as Prakrit which meant 'low' or 'corrupted'. These early Prakrits were the forerunners of the North Indian languages to follow, the Apabhraṃś and our modern Bengali, Gujarati, Marathi, etc.

Apart from these languages with Sanskrit as a base, the South had its own group of languages. Indeed, we can never maintain that at any one period in our history

there was one dominant language all over the country.

We had extensive contacts with other countries at the time and traded with Iran, Arabia, Russia and Turkey. Our boats sailed to Africa, Iraq, Aden, Port Said, Sudan and there was considerable intermingling of languages on our shores. Added to this were the numerous raids on and invasions of our northern borders. It was only natural that our languages absorbed many foreign words.

A form of cultural unity, or rather, a religious unity did exist by which we were recognised on foreign shores. Even within the country, religious texts were widely known and the verse of men like Tulsidas and Kabir was carried on the lips of people to far-flung regions. But the content of this 'culture' was mainly religious and on no account could it be confused with the growth of a unified national character.

Early Beginnings

In the thirteenth century, with the establishment of the first Muslim regime, there existed over a considerable area in the north-west an intrinsically unified dialect with differentiations in shade from section to section. With Muslim influence, Persian and Arabic words were also incorporated as is apparent from the writings of Amir Khusro (1253-1325 A.D.). Khusro's work was also influenced by Brij Bhasha and his language is the first individual form of Hindi in existence. It was later to be used by Kabir and Jayasi with some alterations and innovations.

The sixteenth century saw the establishment of an efficiently organised Mughal Empire incorporating vast areas of the land. Communications developed and the unfamiliar language around Delhi, which was the capital of the Mughals, was carried on the lips of messengers and soldiers from camp to market place, up and down the highways. Dervish and

sadhu, shopkeeper and peasant in towns, small and large, adopted it as his own and, from being a language of communication, it became the expression of a large area. Even the Court which until now conducted its business mainly in Persian with a smattering of Arabic and Turkish was affected and infused this language with numerous Persian and Arabic words. It also found its way to the South and by the name of 'Rekhta' (fallen, scattered) it entered, to some extent, the literary expression of those days.

By the time of Shah Jehan and Aurangzeb, it was definitely known as the language of Delhi and its surrounding areas and had a variety of names amongst which were Khari Boli, Hindi, and Dikini; but it had not as yet acquired a literary status. In 1724, Wali Aurangabadi came to Delhi and his work, *Divan-e-Rekhta*, placed it once and for all on the map. As its use increased it finally took the name of Urdu (military-market place).

In the Rajput kingdoms, Rajasthani flourished for a time during this period, but its development was checked by the influence of the Muslim invaders. Brij and Avadhi were popular languages with the people. Soordas, Tulsidas, Bihari, Rahim, Jayasi, Raskhan and others less notable, Hindus and Muslims, poets and saints, had sung in these languages.

Open Attitudes

There was no undue sensitivity about the use of foreign words in any dialect, or rather, there was no objection to their use. All these dialects borrowed freely from Persian, Arabic and Sanskrit. Religious fanaticism had not affected the realm of the spoken word. Witness the words used: *gharib-nivaz* by Tulsī, *khoony*, *sabit*, *nazuk*, *izapha*, *dag*, *hamam* (Bihari) by Hindus and *shashi*, *trisa*, *sheesh*, *dhenu*, *maral*, *deepak*, *dam-pati*, *kul*, *kalank* by Muslim writers. As a language, Brij gained literary importance in many provinces of India. Even Bhalan of Gujarat and Tukaram of Maha-

rashttra both wrote in it. Arabic, Persian and Sanskrit became subjects of study as classical languages.

The British came. They conquered and settled. State affairs began to be conducted in English. To introduce the study of English, the British required the services of one main language or something which approximated to one main language. The Persian of the Mughal Court was useless for this purpose. Brij, Hindi, Urdu, Avadhi and Khari Boli were languages with a common structure. In reality, they were varying shades of essentially the same language. It is true that Brij, Avadhi and Urdu had a literature to their name but it was all in the form of verse; prose was practically non-existent. A settled form of education necessitated the development of prose forms; these would also give a common form to the different shades in the language.

The Split

The then Principal of Fort William College, John Gilchrist, commissioned known writers such as Lallu Lalji, Sadal Mishra, Mir Amman and Afsos for the initial work, and himself wrote nearly sixteen books. The language of these works was called Hindustani. All had a common prose style; the only difference was a difference in vocabulary. One drew from Sanskrit sources, the other from Persian. In a few years, these two trends of one language took on their individual names and came to be known as Hindi and Urdu.

This split of intrinsically one language into two, sowed the early seeds of a wider division in the future and also established the supremacy of English which, being a State language, assumed the airs of the rulers. It became a necessary passport to society and the most valuable means of earning a livelihood. There were some amongst our people who began to believe in the permanency of British rule and with it of the English language. On the surface this had some validity. English certainly

skimmed over from province to province as the new administrative link throughout British India.

But this situation soon suffered its major reverse. Nationalism began to seep into every layer of Indian society. In the 150 years of British rule English was never in popular use as such. It was merely utilised to conduct State affairs. It could never find roots and, what is more, it created a steep chasm between the so-called educated classes and the mass of the people. This was a negation of every democratic principle, for Mahatma Gandhi and other national leaders visualised the future India as a secular democracy in which there was no room for differences based on class, caste or religion.

Such a vision of the future could not approve a language which was neither spoken nor understood by the mass of the people. It is true that English is a developed language, perhaps the most developed in the world, but since, in spite of being the State language, it made no impact in its 150 years of usage in India, its continuation could be nothing short of disastrous.

Every nation has a distinct personality which is embedded deep in its emotional and cultural background and which can never find expression in an alien tongue however advanced and developed that may be. This is precisely what our leaders realised. They also realised that the national language must be one which is spoken by a majority of people, which can be learnt by the rest with the minimum of effort and which would not hamper or obstruct the day-to-day work of governing.

Rashtrabhasha

It was Mahatma Gandhi who first publicised the need and mobilised a movement for the adoption of Hindi as the national language or Rashtrabhasha. At the Second Gujarat Educational Conference in Broach in 1917, he clearly defined it: 'I call that language "Hindi" which is spoken by Hindus and Muslims and which is written

in Devanagari and Urdu in the North.'

Both languages became competitors as it were in the selection for a national language, and over the years the struggle was coloured by religious and political motivations. Together with this, the question of a common script was also raised. And the two forms of one language turned their backs, so to speak, on each other and began walking in different directions. Urdu words began to be consciously discarded by Hindi, and Sanskrit words or those derived from Sanskrit took their place. In the name of 'purity' and 'preservation' of each, both sides took umbrage at any wordy provocation and Urdu also introduced phrases and idioms which were strictly Persian or Arabic. It did not take long for the protagonists of both extreme viewpoints openly to seek the support of religion.

Open Conflict

This led to some entertaining changes. A word like *vakil* (lawyer, advocate) which was current in India in most Indian languages was Sanskritised to *abhibhashak*. There was no objection to *miz* (table) *kajoo* (cashew), *kamara* (room) of European origin and numerous words of English origin, but so-called Urdu words were not tolerated. This prejudice reached the zenith of absurdity when a word of Sanskrit origin, *do-pahr* (afternoon) which is in daily usage amongst practically all our peoples, was changed to *aparahna* perhaps because of its total absorption into Urdu. A misconception was sought to be created in the minds of the people that Urdu was a language of foreign origin. The Urdu script, its complete dissimilarity with the other Indian scripts and its use in Islamic religious texts, helped the cleavage.

It is not fully appreciated or understood in India that Urdu has no home outside this country, that it is spoken by no other people in the world except the Pakistanis,

who till recently belonged to India, and that its roots stretch as far back into our history as Khari Boli or Brij.* It is true that it assumed its modern form only after the advent of the Muslims, but it is clear from the writings of those times that both Hindu and Muslim poets kept their language free from religious prejudice. Aurangzeb, with all his religious fanaticism, had a knowledge of Sanskrit. Once, when his son, Muhammad Azamshah, presented him with two new varieties of mangoes requesting him to give them a name, Aurangzeb's suggestions were pure Sanskrit words such as *sudharas* and *rasna-vilas*.@

Undoubtedly, it was mainly Muslim writers who contributed largely to the progress of Urdu, but this was not due to religious prejudice. Kabir, Jayasi, Rahim and Raskhan wrote about Krishna and Ram and even modern Hindi writers, including Premchand and Sudarshan, to begin with, wrote in Urdu. Once religious and national antagonisms grew, the whole question of language slipped from the basis of rationality and the two languages were sharply divided.

Hindustani

Urdu posed no problem so far as the name of the national language was concerned, but the choice of the word 'Hindi' was unfortunate in as much as it restricted the original concept of nationalism, associating the national language with the majority religion and thus feeding the fanatic. Conscious of these implications, Gandhiji began to use the word 'Hindustani' in place of 'Hindi' and took every opportunity to clarify public thinking on the question of the national language. Such a language had to be as simple as possible so that it could be easily learnt by even the people of the South, whose own languages were completely dissimilar. Words from Sanskrit, Persian, Arabic, the regional languages of North and South, even English, which were in current

usage were to be absorbed and assimilated freely.

This language was to be written in both the Urdu and the Nagari scripts. At the eighth conference of the Hindi Sahitya Sammelan in Indore in 1918, Gandhiji mobilised support for his views; at the Kanpur session of Congress in 1925 a special resolution was passed accepting 'Hindustani' as the future national language. This was a great advance and though the extremists on both sides continued their incessant battles, the Congress organisation and the country as a whole had accepted Gandhiji's basis for the national language.

Unfortunately for 'Hindustani', independence came with partition and by then even the name was not acceptable to many. After much deliberation, the Constituent Assembly passed the resolution that 'The official language of the Union shall be Hindi in the Devanagari script'. A special directive was attached: 'It shall be the duty of the Union to promote the spread of the Hindi language, to develop it so that it may serve as medium of expression for all the elements of the composite culture of India and to secure its enrichment by assimilating without interfering with its genius, the forms, style and expressions used in Hindustani and in the other languages of India as specified in the eighth schedule, and by drawing wherever necessary and desirable for its vocabulary, primarily on Sanskrit and secondarily on other languages'.

Eager Revivalists

By now, the national language had travelled a considerable distance from its original concept. The name had been changed and this had immediate repercussions. Great violence was done to the language at the hands of revivalist fanatics. Words were flung out, others forced in artificially.

Hindustani as a language has had a tradition, a history and growth which cannot be summarily dismissed. In fact, because it fulfilled certain basic requirements it was chosen as the national language. We cannot throw out words from it which have been a

part of the language from its very inception. To object to over-Sanskritisation of the language is not to deny the importance of Sanskrit in the development of our languages. We all know that today it is the mainstay of our North Indian languages, but the degree to which it was sought to infuse the language with archaic words was absurd, to say the least. To coin *agnirathyantraviramsthan* (resting place for a chariot run by fire) as a substitute for 'station', when the latter had for many years been adapted to our languages, is an example of an extreme case but very symptomatic of the prevailing attitude. After all, words, such as *pet* (stomach) and *roti* (bread) are a part of our languages whatever their origin may have been. In fact, one of the characteristics of Persian and Arabic has been the ease with which their words can be assimilated, apart from the grace with which they can be spoken. In this way, *pista*, *rumal*, *chadar*, *baraf*, *chamcha* have mixed into our languages to an extent where replacements would be impossible.

Absorption

In this context, it is necessary to make clear that the national language must absorb words from our regional languages, including those of the South which are a different group altogether. This is the essence of any growing language: the power to absorb whatever is in current usage. By doing so, it does not lose its individuality or its purity—at least, so long as the words assimilated are adapted to suit the needs of its grammar and basic structure.

This becomes particularly important with reference to technical terms. In a phase of speedy industrialisation, we should not be unduly sensitive in the choice of words if we want the Rashtrabhasha to become a reality. Committees of five or fifty members cannot command changes in the language. They can only advise. The language must take its own forms.

From time to time, the very basis of Hindi as the Rashtra-

* It is interesting to note that the word 'Hindi' has been used in place of 'Urdu' (Shah Hatim, 1750 A.D.), and the word 'Urdu' has been used in place of 'Hindi' (Ustad Saiyed Inshalla Khan, 1817 A.D.).

@ From the collection of his letters: Rk kkr 8.

bhasha has been questioned by some. Others have questioned the validity of its existence. That Hindustani has been a language understood over the whole of northern India is a fact; and that it divided into distinct streams which, with a little sobriety, could come together, is also a fact. A form of Hindustani has been understood over this entire area. It has a literature of no small consequence and it could have developed into a genuine national language, given a free chance to follow its own momentum. Those who seek to set new rules would do well to study the works of Premchand and before him of Kabir, Tulsi and Nazir, to appreciate the fundamental laws of its development. Unconscious violation of this in the beginning has created a situation where the South is today rejecting the very basis of Hindi as the national language, and the problem has far exceeded the bounds of linguistics.

The Name

By stating in the Constitution that Hindi would be the name of the Rashtrabhasha, as well as the name of one of the fourteen regional languages, gave much cause for misunderstanding. Instinctive and immediate was the reaction from all regional groups; they feared the imposition of one regional language over their own regional language. If I remember correctly, at the time of the formulation, Nehru made it clear that Hindi as the national language and Hindi as a regional language were two distinct forms. The former would incorporate 'all the elements of the composite culture of India' while the latter would express a particular region of India.

Opportunities for confusion were immense, vast, and they were created and used by those who should have known better, who had already witnessed the effects of earlier cleavages. Surely, the language of England is English, that of France is French, of Russia, Russian. Hindustani would be the obvious choice for Hindustan, but since we call our nation not

Hindustan but secular Bharat (or India), why couldn't the national language have been called Bharati? It is a word incorporating a whole tradition.

The Script

The necessity of a single script all over the country is obvious. Since most of the North Indian scripts are derived from Nagari, Nagari was the natural choice at the time when the South had not rejected the national language. But the choice of a script depends, among other considerations, on its speed and fluency in writing, the beauty and distinctiveness of its character and today particularly on its adaptability to the press and the typewriter.

The present form of Devanagari is most unsuitable on all these counts. Its overhanging line is a constant check on speed and efficiency. Many writers have effectively abandoned it and Devanagari then tends to approximate to the Gujarati script, which, in my opinion is the most progressive of the Nagari variations. So vitiated is the atmosphere at the moment by provincial differences that I would rather quote a non-Gujarati to substantiate this view. Kaka Saheb Kalelkar, a veteran scholar and linguist wrote: 'So many modes of writing Nagari are in vogue these days. The one which is nearest to printed Nagari, but easier to write and beautiful to look at, should be selected as the national script. My definite opinion is that such a script is the Gujarati script'.

The change to the Rashtrabhasha implies concerted work of a gigantic nature. We can order a government language but not a national language. We must remember this in order to save the national language from the fate of English. At the moment it is not possible to replace English immediately. Intensive popularisation of the national language at every level must precede its implementation. It is to the credit of the film industry that it has contributed in the spread of the nearest approximation to a genuine national language. Government has been

active through the radio, but the activity has not been sufficient to create genuine interest amongst the people.

If it is to be the medium of instruction in institutes of higher study, as I believe it should, the work of translating and of producing text books requires greater application than at present, and a desire to get on with the job. It is only natural that primary schools and secondary schools should teach through the medium of their mother-tongue, but, if we want to lay the foundation of any measure of unity in the country, the national language should be the medium of instruction in universities. This will facilitate the movement of students from one region to another and prevent discrimination.

Permanent Indecision

Of course, the time and energy so far exhausted on exaggerating mutual differences on the basis of linguistics has led to alarming reactions. Provincial differences were never so sharp, never so sensitive. Provincial languages, afraid of the dominance of Hindi, are shielding themselves from its influences, good or bad. Yet, these languages could help each other—but the gesture would have to come from the national language which must adopt a gentle attitude and recreate the confidence it once had.

If the squabble continues at this pace, not enough work will be done to implement fully the use of our languages as well as the use of the national language, particularly at the university stage. English will have to continue. This will lead to the confusion of the student whose future in terms of language will hang like a never ceasing pendulum of indecision.

Whatever importance we may give to language, we must not forget that it is a means and not an end in itself. It must serve us in the tasks ahead. It is something we want to use for greater efficiency and progress, but we must not be used by it to change our diversity into animosity.

From Seminar 11, July 1960.

Political implications

HECTOR ABHAYAVARDHANA

LANGUAGE is a vital principle of nationalism everywhere. In the early stages of society, the ruling classes universally derived their privileges and exercised their authority by some form of divine right. Their very continuance was linked up with the perpetuation of the gap between them and the people. Not only was their culture different from that of the commoners, but they even spoke a different language. Quite often this language of sophistication was borrowed from abroad. French, for instance, was the language of the medieval English Court. More often, the Court itself was institu-

ted by some invading race which brought its language with it.

Nationalism was the ideology of the European middle classes. When the feudal Court and its retainers stood in the way of the latter's enrichment or denied them the recognition which their new status demanded, the Court had to be swept aside or, at least, the claws of its authority had to be pared.

The middle classes, therefore, had to question the sanction of divinity and could not claim it for themselves. Their own sanction could come only from the common people, whom they claim-

ed to emancipate. The cultural gap that yawned between the rulers and the ruled needed to be bridged. Unifying the nation, the middle classes also unified the medium of culture, language.

The countries of Asia, which were the victims of the consolidation of nationalism in Europe, were no less subject to the laws that seemed to determine the evolution of language in Europe. In the distant past, the elite scorned the language of the common people. In the greater part of India, for instance, Sanskrit was the language of government and refinement. With the institution of the Mughal Court, Persian and later, Urdu, moved into its place. The British brought with them their own language. After Sanskrit and Urdu, the people had to submit to the tyranny of English.

As in Europe earlier, nationalism in India was the natural cement of the middle classes. But India could not be compared to a single European nation. In her proportions and diversity, India was comparable rather to the continent of Europe, as a whole. Not only had the Indian middle classes to forge links with the masses of toiling people to win power from the British rulers, but they had to achieve their own consolidation. The unification of culture and language which the middle class revolution had to bring about in India was infinitely more difficult and complex than any that had so far been known.

Finding an Identity

The problem had two aspects. In the first instance, a common identity had to be found between the people and the elite within each of the administrative units that existed. It is true that these administrative units had been set up by the British, and on no known principle except that of their own convenience. But whoever ruled India, it was apparent that local administrative units of some kind would have to be constituted. It was also apparent that, in a democratic set-up, these units would have to correspond to actually existing cultural and linguistic differences among the people. They

would also have to be vested with immeasurably greater autonomy.

It is, perhaps, true to say that, on the level of the local cultures, there had seldom been a common language shared between the elite and the people. Not only was there a gulf between the written language and the spoken, the doors of knowledge were barred to the people by the caste system. Knowledge itself was confined in an esoteric language which was the instrument of the brahmanical intelligentsia. If now the middle classes were to derive enough support from the masses for their aspirations against the British, they had to move towards a junction of the languages of learning and government with the language of the common people everywhere.

Difficulty of Choice

This necessity led to the second aspect of their problem. The people spoke a wide variety of distinct languages. Government work and education in these languages would call for a common language between the different regional units. This was not merely a matter that concerned the future, when the British power would be ended and a national State set up in its place. The middle classes themselves needed a medium of communication. They had to maintain and extend their solidarity on the scale of the country. Their movement had especially to develop an adequate, representative and harmonious outlook as the condition of its own success. Which language should constitute their common instrument?

Even if there had been an intelligentsia which was bound together by a common cultural medium and social outlook on the scale of the country at any time in its history, this could not have been large or homogeneous. In a country so extensive and in conditions where mechanised transport was a matter of the distant future, there could not be either the necessity or the opportunity for countrywide intercommunication. Moreover, Sanskrit had long become a dead language and Urdu had not the slightest impact on large areas of the country. It

sounded ironical, but English was the sole cultural medium which the middle classes shared in all parts of India. And yet this was the language of the British rulers and the means of alienation of the Indian elite from the people.

Since the middle classes did not have a common indigenous language in India, it was natural that they should manufacture one. Gandhi and other leaders of the national movement made it clear that, in their view, India had to have a new national language. The Hindustani they stood for, and attempted to bring into being, was neither Urdu nor Hindi. Both these languages were inadequate for contemporary needs. Neither of them had reached that stage of maturity in which, it could be said, they had a standardised form throughout the areas of their use. This was more true of Hindi than of Urdu, since the latter had at least been in official use at one time. But the real need for a new language came from the religious and historical emotional implications of the use of the two languages. It was impossible to adopt either Hindi or Urdu without being accused of communal bias.

Failure of Compromise

The language solution of the national movement was actually no solution at all. It was a well intentioned attempt at compromise between rival pressures and interests. Unfortunately, compromises seldom prove successful in matters of basic importance. The Sanskritic tradition could have reconciled itself to accommodating the Arabic in the projected national language, if the two traditions had a desire to co-exist outside. But the Sanskritic tradition had long passed beyond the bounds of a cultural movement and had become a mask for Hindu revivalism. The Persian springs of Urdu had already become the source of nourishment of a highly dynamic Muslim communalism. The Hindustani experiment could only last as long as Gandhi. In fact it did not last as long. With the bitter communal rioting between Muslim and Hindu, culminating in the partition of the country and its

murderous after-math, the prospect faded finally of keeping communalism out of language determination by agreement.

The South

Before the creation of Pakistan, South India was a minor skein in the Indian cultural complex. Of the three main traditions in Indian history, the Dravidian, once it lost its pristine dominance, had been the weakest and the most consistently under-privileged. Even when the Sanskrit had been temporarily subordinated to the Islamic, its influence throughout the country continued to spread. In that sense the battle for supremacy in the new India had to be fought between the two northern traditions. If they could agree among themselves on the medium of the national culture, or at least of national administration and communication, the middle classes of South India would acquiesce. There was never much enthusiasm for Hindustani, the projected national language, in South India during the national movement. But only a stray voice here or there thought it necessary to protest.

After the partition, it was by no means the same situation. Generally speaking, in the first place, the entire national cement had been weakened, adulterated with plentiful doses of the foreign matter of Hindu communalism. Secondly, the Islamic cultural tradition having been shut out or reduced to impotence, the attempt was made to impose Hindi as the national language in conditions where the State governments were a pale shadow of the Central Government. This amounted to the elevation of one section of the middle classes into a position of privilege besides the rest. This might have been acceptable if the Hindi-speaking middle classes constituted the cultural vanguard of the nation. But Hindi was among the more backward of Indian languages with neither a literary heritage nor signs of any considerable literary activity contemporaneously. Nor were the Hindi-speaking middle classes cut out for the role of national leader-

ship. Essentially revivalist in orientation, they lacked even a genuine urban character. Incapable of developing a composite culture with the more forward-looking Muslim intelligentsia, they had driven the latter into the Muslim League or out of the country. The intelligentsia that remained was the cultural product, not of the modern city, but of the temple-town.

Middle Class Leadership

The national movement did, it is true, find its most solid backing in the Hindi-speaking areas. This was only partly the result of the deliberate appeal it made to revivalist forces. The village roots of the intelligentsia established a natural solidarity with a peasantry struggling desperately against the twin burdens of landlordism and government oppression. The spontaneous radicalism of such a combination also provided the largest base in the country for what was to emerge as Indian Socialism. Despite this, the national movement found its real leadership in the middle classes of the big industrial cities. First Calcutta and later Bombay were at the helm. Though they endorsed the demand for Hindustani and, especially in Bombay under Gandhi's brilliant inspiration, took to the new language with zeal and vigour, both were outside the Hindi region. Both had languages of their own which were, if anything more developed than Hindi. Only qualified support, at best, could be expected from them for the enthronement of Hindi as the national language after Independence. It was to turn out subsequently that the Bengali-speaking middle classes were among the most resolute opponents of Hindi.

The heterogeneity of India's middle classes had another peculiarity. The liberal and professional strata among them had no direct emotional links with the capital-owning or entrepreneurial stratum. Only in Gujarat could it be said that a modernised urban intelligentsia existed side by side with a considerable industrial bourgeoisie. It was also true in the case of the much smaller Parsi

community. Elsewhere in the country, even if an enlightened middle class had emerged, industrial units either did not exist or were concentrated in the hands of the British or the Marwari community. Like the Jew in the history of European national emergency, the Marwari had contrived to gather usury, speculation, trade and industry over a large part of India in his hands. Unlike the Jew, however, the Marwari lacked a liberal culture and, proud of the effectiveness of his traditional methods, scorned to acquire one. He could manipulate the governmental machine and exploit social tensions to consolidate his power and wealth. But he was totally incapable of leading a national resurgence. Essentially, he was no more than a compradore.

The strength as well as the weakness of the movement for the immediate adoption of Hindi as the national language derived from the support it attracted from Marwari capital. On the one hand, ample resources and powerful influences were brought to bear in the political arena on behalf of Hindi. The middle classes in the Hindi-speaking States were whipped up to a frenzied expectation of an immediate relief from their poverty, unemployment and unimportance once their language became the medium of the all-powerful Central Government, the universities and the law-courts. The dream was subtly propagated of a new Prussia, in the shape of the four Hindi States, consolidating the Indian nation around it.

Sectarian Appearance

On the other hand, what could have been a genuinely needed cultural movement was vitiated by the calculating monied elements behind it. Quacks and adventurers of various kinds gained control of the movement and soon brought it into ridicule. Where the Hindi which was being propagated escaped being absurd, it rapidly became unintelligible and foreign to the mass of the people. Most of all, it failed to evoke a sympathetic response outside the Hindi region. In wide areas of the country, especially in Bengal and in

South India, the brashness and impatience of its leaders generated actual hostility. The movement was further weakened by the rivalry of Marwari business interests in general with Parsi and Gujarati capital in Bombay. A composite Hindustani as the national language might well have continued to receive the enthusiastic support of the latter, had it been combined with increasing economic and political power. Not only had the Gandhian idea been killed, but paralleling the pressure for Hindi was the weakening of Gujarati and Parsi capital and the consolidation of the hold of Marwari monopolists over the country. The movement for Hindi, in these conditions, increasingly took on a sectarian appearance.

Selfish Interests

The fact is that, in projecting their selfish interests through the demand for Hindi as the national language, the Hindi enthusiasts have lost sight completely of the purpose it has to serve. The need of a language which all nationalities in the country can use for inter-communication and as the administrative medium of their Central Government is the consolidation and strengthening of national unity. In the conditions of India, where a number of large and advanced nationalities exist side by side, no one nationality can force its will on the others with blood and iron. The equality of all nationalities is the only principle on which the organisation of the Indian nation can receive its final shape. This inevitably means the equality of all the different languages in the usage of the State.

But it would be wrong to deduce from this that the Central Government of India must either use all fourteen languages for its official purposes or operate in a neutral language such as English. To govern would be impossible in the first case and no emotional integration of the mass of the people would be achieved in the second. Hindi alone can be the official language of India in today's conditions. But it must be purged of the ridiculous features that it has

recently acquired and it must approximate more closely to the other national languages.

Common Script

Before Hindi can be officially adopted by the Central Government, a common script will have to be found for all the languages of the country. Without such a script the fourteen national languages cannot be brought nearer each other, Hindi itself cannot be reconditioned and the unification of India will not be complete. The Devanagari script cannot fulfil this function. In the first place, it is unsuitable for modern mechanised purposes. Secondly, the principle of equality will be denied if it is imposed on the other nationalities, who in any case will not abandon their own scripts for Devanagari. Thirdly, the overwhelming majority of the world, including Asian nations like China, Indonesia and Malaya, have accepted the Roman script. A few million Hindu revivalists cannot sweep back the sea of human progress with their pitiful medieval broom.

There is an even more important condition of the adoption of a reformed Hindi as the official language of India. The principle of the equality of all nationalities must be consecrated by the Constitution. The various State Governments in India today are mere playthings of the Central Government. Their costly administrative set-ups serve little more purpose than that of window-dressing. Even for the execution of their statutory powers they have to depend on doles from New Delhi. The dangerous consequences of this increase from day to day. Under the five-year plans, the economic and administrative functions of the bureaucracy multiply steadily and overwhelmingly vest in the Central Government. To make Hindi the official language of a State structure that stands on its head will operate to the severe disadvantage of the non-Hindi nationalities. Drastic curtailment of the powers of the Central Government and the enshrinement of State autonomy in a Federal Constitution must precede the adoption of Hindi.

—From *Seminar* 11, July 1960.

A single script

PUNYA SLOKA RAY

THERE are many reasons why a single script for the whole of India should be worth trying. That the current diversity of scripts is a nuisance is felt most vividly when our situation is compared to that prevailing in Europe. The difference between Tamil and Malayalam or between Bengali and Oriá is not greater than the difference between Italian and Spanish or between Swedish and Danish. Yet there is in India nothing like a comparable ease of communication, and that in spite of the fact that we are, unlike Europe, politically one entity.

A German may not know English at all. Yet he can identify in an English journal the places or the dates or the names. Quite often he can even guess at the probable meanings, say that 'problematic' means 'problematisch' and 'line' is the same thing as 'linie'. He can also use a two-language or a twelve-language dictionary, such as are used by so many ordinary scientists, officials and businessmen all over the world. But when a Bengali is given a Malayalam or even an Oriá newspaper he can only stare at it helplessly.

This barrier to easy communication has consequences both for our economy and for our culture. Most people cannot afford to give too much time for learning languages. If the greater part of the time they can afford is threatened to be taken away by the script itself, they feel discouraged about

learning that language at all. This means that commercial and intellectual intercourse between different linguistic communities must to a certain extent be discouraged.

A necessary political consequence is that the emotional distance between two linguistic communities is greater when there is a script dividing them. One can easily compare the perceptibly lesser distance between Hindi and Marathi, which have a common script, and the relatively greater distance between Hindi and Bengali, which have different scripts. Yet, it cannot be said that in pronunciation, grammar or vocabulary Bengali is more different to Hindi than Marathi is. The diversity of scripts is exaggerating the differences between our constituent communities.

That a single script would be a good thing is already widely accepted and will not require a more elaborate pleading. There are disagreements, however, in regard to the method of finding a single script. Should we accept the Roman or the Nagari? To many, the demerits of both appear so great that they would rather prefer to continue the current scripts. There is thus a threefold division of opinion in the country. But before we go on to discuss their merits and chances we should have some clarification about the nature of a 'script'.

A script is only a system of arbitrarily selected, but conven-

tionally accepted, visual signs used for the purpose of recording and transmitting speech across the limitations of time and space. What I have written down at Cuttack on 18-2-60 can be read at Bombay on 20-2-60. A script is, therefore, the indispensable instrument whereby people of different times and different places are enabled to communicate with objective exactitude. Without a script one can depend only on memory and hearsay, and these do not go very far. It has been held with reason that speech is the beginning of humanity and a script the beginning of civilisation. A script is a means of bringing people together.

The other characteristic of a script is that, when many scripts are in use, a barrier is set up between those who use one script and those who use another. The most striking examples are those of Hindi-Urdu and Serbo-Croat (Jugoslavian). The scripts are used in their cases to write the same language and, furthermore, serve as the respective symbols for the separate identities of the two sections of the same people. A script is, because of its difference from other scripts, also a means of separating people from one another.

Union and Separation

This simultaneous union and separation by a script occurs at three different levels. At the first level we are concerned with a script in the strict sense of an inventory of visual signs. At this level, English, Polish, Turkish, and Indonesian use the same script, although the spelling, the pronunciation and the grammar vary immensely. Also at this level all the languages that use the Roman script belong together to form one community as against the community of Cyrillic (Russian, Bulgarian, Serbian) or that of Arabic (Arabic, Persian, Urdu, Sindhi, Kashmiri) or that of Nagari (Hindi, Marathi, Nepali) or that of Bengali, (Assamese, Manipuri).

At the second level a script means a scripture, that is to say, a common source of borrowings.

Because Urdu uses the Arabic script, it can borrow words from Arabic and Persian and preserve the original spellings. The same is true about English in its relationship to Latin or German or French. Two reservations must, however, be made in this connection. Firstly, original spellings can be retained even if the scripts are different, provided the alphabets are similar or suitably modified. English can borrow from Greek, Arabic from Italian, Tamil from Sanskrit. Secondly, the preservation of original spellings is not so necessary for a well developed literary culture as is sometimes believed. English and Danish are both dependent on Greek and Latin. Yet Danish spells 'fonetik', the word English would reverently spell as 'phonetic'.

Common Vehicle

At the third level, script means the vehicle of a common written language for people whose spoken languages differ widely. Spoken English varies from region to region, from decade to decade. But written English varies much less and much more slowly. Many interesting phenomena arise in this connection. There are spoken dialects of Bengal grammatically and otherwise nearer to Oriya than to the standard spoken Bengali. Yet, these accept the Bengali written language as their identification. Again, if one travels from Cuttack to Calcutta, examining the spoken dialect of each village on the way, one will nowhere find a sharp line of separation. Yet the two written languages are quite different and serve to mark off two communities. Also, it may so happen either in a region or in an entire country, that the accumulated discrepancies between the written and the spoken languages begin to be felt as intolerable and soon a new written language with a reformed grammar and spelling comes to be established. That is how the 'current' standard Bengali has developed out of the older 'decent' standard or Norwegian out of Danish.

If we now wish to substitute a single script for the existing many, we must be quite clear about the

level at which such a unification should be effective. Do we want to develop an all-India language in relationship to which the many spoken languages would acknowledge the status of unwritten dialects? That kind of unity is supposed to have been there in India about two thousand years ago. Though we should not perhaps forget that at the time there was quantitatively very little literature indeed and exceedingly few who presumed to hold a pen and, also, that even then there were separate Pali and Tamil literatures. India probably never had just one language, not even a written language and absolutely certainly will never have it in any foreseeable future.

At the second level, we can have at best a single spelling system. We cannot have a single scripture. There is Sanskrit for most of our languages. There is Arabic and Persian for Urdu, and through Urdu for Kashmiri and Sindhi. There is old Tamil for a modern Tamil. And of course there is English as a common source of borrowing for all our languages without exception. We cannot reject any of these sources without an impossible amount of cultural or political penalty. A common script, which will be able to preserve the original spellings of words from all these sources, is technically quite possible. Roman is already in use to print Sanskrit and English and to teach the pronunciations of Arabic, Persian, Tamil, etc. In this respect it has got a long start before any of our existing scripts.

The proposal for a single script will have real meaning only if we explicitly reject the idea of a single language and a single scripture. We have unification only at the level of the inventory of visual signs. This will be quite a useful kind of unity, though, of course, much less glamorous and much more humble.

The Contenders

The problem is now to achieve a single script even in this humble sense. There are, as everybody knows, two contending candidates in the field—Nagari and Roman. It

should be of interest to study the implications of each. Nagari is proposed for the job on three major arguments. The first argument appeals to technology and speaks of the inadequacy of the Roman script for the Indian languages. The second argument appeals to economics and speaks of the lesser cost of changing to Nagari as compared to that of changing to Roman. The third argument appeals to sentiment and speaks of Nagari as preferable because it is our own, whereas Roman has been brought to us by an alien invader.

Technological Argument

Let us discuss the technological argument first. The alphabet of the Roman script reads ABC... and not AAI... Roman does not provide the signs needed to distinguish the contrasts used by many of the Indian languages, say for the retroflex as contrasted with the dental letters. These and similar reasonings bring the discussions on to the level of technology. But once we are at this level, it will be difficult for us to avoid awarding the prize to Roman. A Maharashtra scholar, Dr. Bhagwat, has recently been able to confirm, by scientifically controlled comparisons, how decisive is the superiority of Roman over Nagari, Modi, Gujarati and Urdu on points of distinguishability, speed, flow, simplicity, etc. I can personally add that a comparison with Bengali and Oriā yields similar results. Comparisons with other Indian scripts will hardly change the general pattern of his conclusions.

More important, the Roman script is also the most flexible of all scripts. The alphabet can be rearranged in an Indian way. Supplementary signs can be provided for Indian distinctions in a simple way. The same orientalists who took the decision to use Nagari for printing Sanskrit had also settled an alternative Roman alphabet for the Indian languages. This alphabet was revised and finalised at a conference at Geneva in 1897 and has since been increasingly used by scholars both in India and outside.

An even simpler system, less burdened with dots and bars, can

be devised if necessary. In an article in *Quest* 25, Jan/Mar 1960, I have tried to show, with some illustrations, how easily such improvements can be implemented. This extraordinary flexibility of the Roman script is due partly to the simplicity and analyticity of its structure and partly to the already existing diversity in the ways of utilising it, used as it is by an immense variety of languages.

To come down to a sample technological criticism of Nagari, there is firstly that copy-book ruling line from which the letters hang. It has no function at all in helping to distinguish one letter from another. On the contrary it remains the same for all letters and thereby tends to de-individualise them. For this reason, most of the Nagari users have already discarded it in handwriting. It should be discarded also in print. Again, in a large number of letters, the downward stroke has no function in helping to distinguish one letter from another and is a de-individualising, merely decorative flourish. Then again, the major strokes in almost every letter are downwards. This makes it impossible to write without lifting the pen for almost every stroke. This hinders flow.

Complex Shapes

Again, once the complex shapes of the letters are granted, compound letters are inevitable. In consequence, a very large number of letters have one or two 'short' forms each. In these 'short' forms one uses the essential distinguishing feature of the letter and discards the decorative strokes, or quite often, uses an altogether different form. The compound letters economise on strokes but only at the cost of multiplying forms.

Further, unless they form independent syllables, the vowels are written by diacritics, some of which go below, some above, some to the right, some to the left. This was perhaps alright for that cousin of Arabic and Hebrew from which Nagari and other Indian scripts are derived, but it is unscientific for any language. Even Panini was quite aware of the independent status

of vowels in Sanskrit. But Nagari is unable to respect that status.

To be fair to Nagari, almost the same criticisms can be repeated for any of the other Indian scripts. All are equally unscientific about vowels. All use non-functional, de-individualising, merely decorative strokes. Tamil is written above the line, like Roman, but is just as inhospitable to speed and flow. Urdu is also written above the line, has both speed and flow, but lacks easy distinguishability. Bengali is written below the line, like Nagari, has flow, but is definitely slower than Nagari and also less simple. Gujarati has probably the most balanced combination of qualities. There are differences in the various abilities of our many scripts and there is plenty of room for further research. But I very much doubt whether the conclusion, that in all points of technological quality Roman is easily superior to the others, can at all be seriously challenged.

Idle Comparisons

But, in an important way, such comparisons are idle. Firstly, not one of the Indian scripts is so bad that it is unworkable or unlovable. Secondly, all of them can be improved by reforms. Of course, it is true that most of them have not been very willing to consider reforms. But Nagari, at least, has been progressive. It has already accepted a number of changes and may accept some more. Such changes will not perhaps make it an equal of Roman in technical efficiency, but they will bring it near the standard. Moreover, if the Japanese can get along so well in achieving mass literacy and science with their complex script (2 different alphabets plus over 3,000 ideograms), there is no reason why we cannot do with the far simpler Nagari. Even if Nagari is admitted to be technically somewhat less efficient than Roman, it is not on this ground that any decision will be taken against Nagari.

As regards the second major argument, I find that according to the 1957 report of the Registrar of Newspapers and Copyrights, the figures for daily newspapers are for Nagari roughly 20%, for Roman

32% and for others 48% and for books 30%, 31% and 39%. That means, if a single script is adopted for all languages, Roman will have to expand from 32% (for dailies) and 31% (for books) to 100% and Nagari will have to achieve the same 100% (since English is to be simultaneously replaced) from 20% (for dailies) and 30% (for books). This does not look like a case for Nagari. Changing to Nagari may even be somewhat more expensive than changing to Roman.

Sentiment

The most important of the three arguments is the one of sentiment. The Roman script has come to us with the English language and the English language has come to us with the British rulers. We have got rid of the British rulers. We should now be free from the English language and along with it from the Roman script. We should choose Nagari because it can serve as a symbol of the separate identity of India. The Roman script is, on the contrary, symbolic either specifically of British imperialism or vaguely of a semi-western (the outline blurred because of the inclusion of Indonesia, Philippines, Africa, South America, East Europe etc.) cosmopolitanism.

The difficulty in this symbol-finding, sentiment-rousing approach is that it generates not just one, but a plurality of symbols and sentiments. If Nagari is indigenous, so too are Tamil, Bengali, Oriya, etc. If a script is to be regarded as a symbol of separate identity, each of our many scripts is such a symbol and will be held on to with equal passion. Now, one thing a wise mother never does is to give an only or a best prize in any contest to the biggest child. For she knows that even if the biggest one really deserves that prize, the smaller ones will not see it that way. They will feel that bigness has triumphed over merit and each will consider himself a victim of blatant injustice. The biggest child always has to make the biggest sacrifices, however exasperating to him it all is. The way to peace is to avoid contest between unequal brothers and,

if it cannot any more be avoided, to give an equal prize to each, or, if there is only one prize, to give it to none, or if it must be given to one, to give it to a little one.

This is, indeed, how the Indonesians have solved their language problem. They are still plagued by many dissensions but language is not one of them. They have adopted as their national language a version of Malaya, which was in their country numerically quite minor, though for purposes of commerce and communication the most ubiquitous. Moreover, in spite of their fierce national pride and hatred of Dutch imperialism, they have accepted not only the Roman script, but also Dutch rules of pronunciation. Our languages are too different and too far developed for us to imitate the Indonesians all the way. We cannot have a single language and need not borrow the English rules of pronunciation. But at least a single script can perhaps be arrived at by a method similar to theirs.

Supra-national

Many other nations have been quite sentimental about the Roman script. The Chinese are using it to supplement their non-phonetic ideograms. The Philippines and Turkey have adopted it. Communist countries like Poland, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Hungary, Albania and Yugoslavia use it. Most of the new African nations have accepted it for their languages. Like the numerals from India and the printing press from China, the Roman script has become a world-wide habit. It is as supra-national as any piece of technology. A script is only a convenience of civilisation and the Roman happens to be, by the consensus of nations widely divergent in ideology, religion or culture, the most convenient.

Moreover, not all Indians associate scripts with sentiments. I for one do not feel that I am committing a sacrilege when I read the *Rigveda* in Aufrecht's Romanised edition. Is it because I have less warmth in my heart? No, it is only because many of us, especially those who are young or those who have some access to science,

prefer to find our symbols in other things. On this point we feel that we are in greater accord with our ancestors of 2,500 years ago. The evidence is decisive that they borrowed the habit and the system of writing from Semitic traders. Were our ancestors being unpatriotic?

Distinct Advantages

What has been accepted by so many different cultures cannot be connected intimately or indispensably with any of them. The Roman script is no more symbolic of British imperialism or western culture than the radio is. People who feel that Indian culture cannot survive in the Roman script ought to feel, by the same logic, that Sanskrit or Hindi cannot be spoken over the radio without becoming hopelessly westernised. They ought to stick to our ancient, indigenous method of sending a herald round the market places. The parallel is indeed exact. For the use of the radio discourages isolation of regions and nations as effectively as the use of the Roman script. And the use of a travelling herald or messenger discouraged communication between regions and nations as effectively as our current multiplicity of scripts.

Ultimately, the adoption of a common script would raise the question of accepting a lesser measure of social difference between communities in regard to their visible, external appearances. A common script would not abolish the distinctions between two languages. Differences would be manifest in the ways in which the signs are used, though not in the inventory of signs. They would be allowed to appear in pronunciation, recurrent sequences of letters, spelling of common borrowings, etc. Differences between two cultures would not be made indistinct. They would be only made less crassly discouraging to communication, less crudely tangible to would be enemies, less total, less absolute. English and Italian use the same script. But what sort of a primitive is he who would fail to notice the difference between the English and the Italian cultures? The difference is real enough for anybody who has the slightest

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taste of both. The process of civilisation is only a progressive shift of human differences from outwards to inwards.

Double Function

Any script has the double function of uniting and separating peoples. If Roman is adopted, one (not all) barrier between the different linguistic communities will be removed. Their separate identities will appear as less absolute, their common inheritance and interests more easily recognised. This will result in easier communication, more contacts, more exchanges, more influence. We will find it easier to live together. Moreover, one (not all) barrier between the outside world and our people will be removed. The world with its science, commerce, civilisation and prosperity will come nearer. We will find ourselves less isolated.

But the adoption of Roman will also set up a new barrier between the older and the newer literature. This will not affect that part of the older literature which people value most, nor that part of it which people value least. For the former will be reprinted by commercial publishers and the latter is not worth reprinting. We will not imitate Kemal Ataturk. We will not nationalise the publishing trade in order to prevent people from reading what they wish to read. The difficulty will be felt only for that part of the older literature which is valued by the pundits and yet neglected by the masses. Quite naturally, loud protests will be coming from scholars in the humanistic subjects. Subsidies from the State exchequer will be necessary to meet at least some of their demands.

And if we adopt Nagari instead of Roman? The first-mentioned advantage, that of an increased national unity, will be achieved. We shall be able to see more clearly how much the same people we all are. But the other advantage, that of a freer intercourse with the outside world, will not be achieved. A barrier will remain between the world and our country. And the disadvantage of Roman, that it will be a new script for our

languages, will still be there for all our languages except Hindi and Marathi. Half of India will still have to change the script. In this way, the decision for Nagari will place that part of the country in a position of greater disadvantage than the part which is already using it. And the only chance that these others would be persuaded to accept a minor disadvantage for the sake of the much greater advantage of Indian unity, is already being destroyed by the sentimental approach of the protagonists of Nagari.

If a script is symbolic of the separate identity of a group of people, then all these other scripts are also of that status. I am afraid that, if we insist on Nagari, we shall have to postpone the decision for script unification again and again.

Time Factor

I shall end this essay with a word of warning. Time is running out for those who want either script reform or script unification. The reason is based on economics. A big capital outlay may be demonstrated to be cheaper in the long run. But, however greatly advantageous in the long run an outlay is, it cannot be sanctioned if it is too big in size. The entire wealth of the English-using countries would not be enough at present to meet the bill for any change in the script or even in the spelling of English. It is proportionately far less difficult and, indeed, only possible for a smaller language which has a less bulky literature.

Although many of our languages already have a considerable literature I believe that at the moment the cost of the change would be within manageable dimensions. A very rough guess would place it around 10-20 crores. But our literatures are growing fast. The more we delay in making up our minds, the more difficult it will be to make it up for a single script. If we cannot have a single script within ten years from now, we shall never have it.

—From Seminar 11, July 1960.

A possible solution

B. G. VERGHESE

THE language agitation in a number of non-Hindi-speaking States and the grim riots particularly in Madras have shocked and shamed the nation. Seventeen years after independence the very unity of the country is threatened, no less. The lines of an immediate settlement have begun to emerge around the proposal to give statutory effect to Nehru's assurances. This implies indefinite bilingualism in respect of the official language, Hindi and English being used side by side till such time as the non-Hindi-speaking States themselves opt to accept Hindi exclusively.

The present Official Languages Act does not contain this assurance explicitly. It merely provides that 'the English language may, as from the appointed day (January 26, 1965), continue to be used in addition to Hindi. . .' However, 'after the expiration of 10 years

. . . there shall be constituted a committee on official language' consisting of 30 members of Parliament elected by proportional representation 'to review the progress made in the use of Hindi for the official purposes of the Union and submit a report to the President making recommendations thereon, and the President shall cause the report to be laid before each House of Parliament, and sent to all the State Governments.' But, thereafter, the President may, after consideration of the report and the views, if any, expressed by the State Governments, 'issue directions in accordance with the whole or any part of that report.'

The exact form that the enactment of Nehru's assurances should take is a matter for the Chief Ministers' conference and legal experts to decide. The Hindi protagonists would be ill advised to

oppose the translation of the late Prime Minister's assurances into the statute since the language issue patently cannot be forced. At the same time, it would be equally unwise for anybody to insist on the total and permanent displacement of Hindi by English. The 'English ever, Hindi never' slogan is as unreasonable in its extremism and narrow exclusiveness as the alleged 'Hindi imperialism.'

A suitable, agreed amendment of the Official Languages Act, however, is really no more than a short-term solution and it is therefore vitally important that the country should simultaneously apply its mind to the longer-term aspects of the language problem so that appropriate decisions can be taken now or in the near future. Unless this is done, the basic language problem may well remain unresolved even another 17 years from now.

The Lingua Franca

Excepting very few people, the majority in the country are not opposed to the propagation of Hindi as a link language. The objection for the most part is to the pace of change from English to Hindi for official purposes. Hindi is certainly the most widely spoken of any of the Indian languages and Hindustani is even, today the *lingua franca* of a growing section of the common people. Its status as a common link language will inevitably grow with the inexorable logic of circumstances and, as this happens, so will its acceptability as an official language for purposes of the Union increase. Both developments would be eminently desirable from the point of view of national integration and the strengthening of democracy. All the people in the different States, the governors and the governed would be brought nearer by a common language. This transition voluntarily accepted, would not displace any of the other regional languages which, with Hindi, are constitutionally recognised and authorised for use as official languages within the different linguistic regions.

If, however, this voluntary transition to a pan-Indian language is

to be expedited and even completed within the space of a generation it is necessary to redefine the concept of Hindi as a common link language. What is Hindi? It is a regional language with a number of forms like Maithili, Bhojpuri, Awadhi, Braj, Khari Boli, Pahari and Rajasthani though Khari Boli, which is the Urdu-influenced Hindi spoken around Delhi-Agra, had increasingly come to be adopted as the standard or nascent equivalent of 'King's English.'

The Congress Party in the constituent assembly adopted Hindi as the official language in preference to Hindustani by a single vote majority. Even so, Article 351 enjoins the State to develop Hindi 'so that it may serve as a medium of expression for all the elements of the composite culture of India and to secure its enrichment by assimilating, without interfering with its genius, the forms, style and expressions used in Hindustani and in the other languages of India specified in the Eighth Schedule, and by drawing, wherever necessary or desirable, for its vocabulary, primarily on Sanskrit and secondarily on other languages.'

Grave Disservice

The constitution-makers envisaged a broad-based, catholic language. Instead, a body of purists and word-coiners have driven out Hindustani and international terms in common currency like telephone and radio and have sought to replace them with exotic Sanskrit combinations. Far from widening the base of Hindi or Hindustani, the incipient *lingua franca*, to reflect 'the composite culture of India,' a grave disservice has been done to the cause that the Hindi protagonists themselves espouse by creating a narrow, artificial language that is not always intelligible even in the North. This has caused confusion and resentment. It has created a psychological barrier and is the genesis of the sentiment underlying the taunt of 'Hindi imperialism'. This must be rectified.

It will be simpler to achieve this if a distinction is made between

Hindi as a regional language as it is spoken in Bihar, U.P., Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh and part of the Punjab, and Hindi as a pan-Indian link language. The latter must be simple, direct, popular, and broad-based. It certainly should not exclude Sanskrit but it must embrace Hindustani and freely borrow words from other Indian languages, English and other tongues. Such a language will be readily accepted and will grow. It will have a greater vitality and will in due course develop its own idiom and style.

It should also be possible to establish a basic vocabulary of 1,000 words of pan-Indian Hindi and for the government and other official agencies to produce any amount of literature at all levels in basic Hindi. This should include textbooks, children's books, adult literature, technical literature of all kinds (using international terms for scientific and technical expressions), translations from all the other Indian languages, and translations from English and other foreign languages. Basic Hindi in other words should open the door to the literature and technology of all of India and the world. People would then want to learn it. It would be a key to knowledge and opportunity. Compulsion would hardly be necessary. This pan-Indian basic Hindi should be broadcast and taught over AIR and newspapers and magazines should be produced in the language. At present, however, Hindi is something of a dead-end even to those who know it. The literature is just not available in the requisite variety, quality or quantity.

A Common Script

If India needs a common link language, it also needs a common link script. Fourteen languages are listed in the Eighth Schedule. Between them these 14 languages have 12 scripts, Sanskrit, Hindi and Marathi being written in the Devanagari script. The Constitution provides that the official language of the Union shall be Hindi in the Devanagari script but with the international form of Indian numerals.

India uses more scripts than the rest of the world put together.

The desirability of a common script is obvious and has been a matter of interest ever since the turn of the century! Tilak and Gandhiji both favoured Devanagari. Netaji preferred the Roman script. The debate has continued fitfully but the subject has not really been pursued with the careful and studied deliberation it deserves. The Official Language Commission discussed this matter and in 1956 reported in favour of the Devanagari script. In 1961, a Chief Ministers' conference in Delhi, with Nehru in the chair, expressed itself in favour of a common Devanagari script. However, a year later the Sampurnanand Committee on emotional integration suggested use of the Roman script as an alternative to Devanagari for an interim period in order to facilitate the adoption of Hindi as a common language in the non-Hindi-speaking areas.

Again, early this year, the reviewing committee of the Sahitya, Lalit Kala and Sangeet Natak Akademis, headed by Dr. Homi Bhabha, suggested that the Sahitya Akademi should under-take research to adapt the Roman script for all Indian languages. The Roman script has also been individually recommended by such persons as Humayun Kabir, C. Subramaniam, C. D. Deshmukh, Dr. D. S. Kothari, Dr. S. K. Chatterji, Hiren Mukerji, Dr. D. D. Karve and others. Dr. Rajendra Prasad favoured Devanagari, but in a note prepared shortly before he relinquished office as President suggested the Roman script as an alternative if Devanagari proved unacceptable.

Devanagari

Devanagari might normally have been the best choice because it is Indian, linked to Sanskrit, and phonetic. The U.P. Government convened a Devanagari script reform conference in 1953 which recommended a standardised form of the script together with punctuation marks. Many of these recommendations were officially accepted but as a result of practical difficulties a second Lucknow conference in 1957 recommended further modifications. A Hindi type-writer keyboard has also been

designed. Nevertheless, Devanagari remains more complicated than the Roman script and does not lend itself so easily to transcription by mechanical means.

There should be a continuing effort further to simplify the Devanagari script and if possible to evolve a common form in the writing of Hindi and Marathi and other related scripts. Likewise, some years ago, a joint committee did set about the task of trying to evolve a common script for Telugu and Kannada. These endeavours are worthy of encouragement.

However, the main barrier to the acceptance of Devanagari as the common script is psychological. Non-Hindi spokesmen have expressed themselves against such a change, possibly because Devanagari is identified with Hindi and the opposition to Hindi has come to extend to its script. This is unfortunate but it may not be possible to overcome the prejudice for some time.

A Practical Alternative

The Roman script fortunately provides an alternative. It is known in the country and will continue to be taught with English in all secondary schools. Roman Hindustani is used by the armed forces and even today Hindi and other Indian languages are daily transmitted over the national teleprinter circuit in the Roman script without any difficulty. It is true that not all sounds can be adequately expressed in the Roman script. But this can be easily overcome by adding a few more alphabets to convey sounds peculiar to Indian languages or by introducing diacritical marks. The Scandinavians, Turks, Indonesians, Malaysians, East Africans, and now, the Chinese have done this. Certain combinations of letters too could, by usage, come to represent particular sounds.

The point is not that Devanagari or the other Indian scripts should be displaced but that the Roman script might be introduced as a common link script alongside the indigenous scripts in order to facilitate the learning of pan-Indian

Hindi in the non-Hindi-speaking areas and Tamil, Bengali, etc., in the Hindi-speaking States and elsewhere in the country. A change of script would affect neither the language nor the alphabet. It would however quicken the pace of linguistic assimilation within the country, make it easier to adopt international terms and enable the Indian child to learn three languages—his mother tongue, Hindi (or another modern Indian language for those living in Hindi-speaking States) and English—in two scripts.

Making it Easier

North Indians tend to bypass the three-language formula by learning Sanskrit as the third language. They do so partly because a common script makes it easier to learn. If they could learn Tamil in the Roman script perhaps more students would opt for Tamil. That script is not absolutely integral to language is proved by the fact that the heated debate as to whether Punjabi should be written in Gurmukhi or Devanagari was largely conducted in Urdu. There has also recently been a suggestion that Sindhi, which is written in the Urdu script, should switch to Devanagari.

The argument that the Roman script is foreign is absurd in a shrinking, inter-dependent world which has not hesitated to use Indian numerals. A further advantage, not without significance, is that the adoption of the Roman script for pan-Indian Hindi will make this a more easily acceptable language to the rest of the world.

Ye kathin/mushkil nahin hai (Hindi/Urdu); *Eta kothin noi* (Bengali); *He kathin nahin* (Marathi); *Eh koi mushkal nai haiga* (Punjabi); *Aa muskhel Nathi* (Gujarati); *Ha kashta muhen* (Oriya); *Idi kashtamu kathu* (Telugu); *Ithu kashtam illai* (Tamil); *Ithu prayasam alla* (Kannada); *Ithu prayasam alla* (Malayalam). Yes, this is not difficult. Pan-Indian Hindi in the Roman script can quite soon become an accepted national language.

—From *The Times of India*,
February 18, 1965.

Communications

I read Ashok Rudra's contribution to your Seminar on Secularism with surprise and much pain. It is a supreme example of intolerant distortion. I gladly agree to debunk a number of self-adulatory myths, and to a great deal of self accusation. But Ashok Rudra's logical distortion by which he reduces all spiritual inclusiveness and social success in that direction to a brain-washing trick is an illustration of extreme bias and intolerance. Tolerance and understanding are not inconsistent with refusal to extinguish oneself which apparently Ashok Rudra demands. The only spiritual and decent synthesis of all creeds which the Hindu sages from the earliest times discovered as if in anticipation of history does not deserve to be interpreted and treated as Ashok Rudra has done in his contribution to your 67th number. If Christianity has failed to alter its converts in India to Ashok Rudra's satisfaction, the reason must be found in the faults or deficiencies in what was propagated and in the assumptions of that theology; and in the relative merits of what refused to be wiped out in spite of every advantage which the proselytizers enjoyed, and not in the absence of tolerance in Hinduism or in the satanic cleverness of the fathers of Hinduism.

Madras, March 3.

C. RAJAGOPALACHARI

The number on 'Secularism' was rich both in variety and content. And the credit for this must go to Wilfred Cantwell Smith who posed the problem in a remarkably thought-provoking way and with much compelling logic.

How one wishes one could endorse the bold and spirited assertion of Badr-ud-Din Tyabji (Surinder Suri uses an identical expression) that Secularism 'is already a reality in India but is not yet a conscious aspiration' of the people? If rhetoric were the same thing as truth, Indian planning would by now have become a grand miracle! In fact, both Tyabji and Suri contradict themselves when they admit that secularism is not yet an aspiration in India.

A few legal imperatives (howsoever well intentioned) enshrined in our Constitution do not constitute a *reality*. Secularism is no doubt an important constitutional fact but not a living reality, if by reality here we mean that genial air of pure and uncontaminated humanism in which we should breathe in our daily conduct. The paper fact of secularism in India will be transformed into a reality only when the very being of an Indian citizen becomes its transformed reflection. It is in this area—the intangible emotional area—that secularism is far from a reality as yet. It is not so much the constitutional secularism but this emotional secularism which should constitute the bedrock of India's prosperity.

Frank Anthony and J. P. Narayan were only stating the obvious, if in a somewhat crude manner, when they complained that members of the minority community in India were living in the 'shadow of death'. They were pointing not to any imminent threat of extermination that the minority community was supposedly up against but to the incubus of categorical hatred on the part of the majority community that was weighing it down and that was slowly but surely creating an atmosphere conducive to minority-baiting not unlike the Jew-baiting that took place only twenty five years ago under that German megalomaniac—Hitler.

We live in an India where even after fifteen years of experimentation in secular living, an under-graduate Hindu student stands up in a class consisting of students of practically all the communities and asks with a feeling of self-righteous alarm: 'Sir, is not the election of Dr. Zakir Hussain as the Vice President dangerous for the country?' The teacher (the present correspondent) is shocked at the question but the majority of students sitting in the class are not. Their silence is ominously eloquent. The teacher is hard put to explain how inhuman and unscientific it is to attack virtues and vices which are, essentially, personal traits of individuals, to whole communities.

It is an India where, when I ask a Hindu chemist friend as to why he has not put up

an Urdu sign-board over his shop when there are English and Hindi ones, he turns to a Muslim standing near-by and replies: 'You know, it is *their* Pakistani language', and laughs. The Muslim friend joins in the laughter but his face betrays clear discomfiture. In my chemist friend's estimation, Urdu is a Muslim language and, what is worse, all Muslims are Pakistanis! He will never know what damage he has caused to the cause of secularism by his apparently innocuous joke.

Hobbes writes in his *The Leviathan* that 'the nature of war consisteth not in actual fighting but in the known disposition thereto, during all the time there is no assurance to the contrary.' It would be naive to assume that there is 'known disposition' among the large majority of Hindus to expel the minority community, lock, stock and barrel from India, as and when the opportunity comes. Even the avowedly secular parties have not been able to insulate themselves against the onslaughts of this disposition. In fact, on not a few occasions they have actively abetted such onslaughts.

It is this disposition that has to be fought against if we want to see Cantwell Smith's pithy definition of a 'Secular State' bloom into fruition. Our Constitution is one strong weapon in our armoury, but, as indicated earlier, its efficacy is limited, as every constitution's effectiveness is, by the force of extra-constitutional factors.

What are the other weapons, then? The answer has been provided by Abu Sayeed Ayyub who pleads for a 'new policy in religious education.' He has given a brilliant, though brief, account of the contents of this 'new policy' and his article should be read and re-read by all genuine lovers of secularism and by those whose task it is to further the cause of secularism at the governmental level.

In this connection, Dr. Zakir Hussain's recent suggestion that future writers of Indian history should concentrate their efforts on exploring and interpreting the brighter deeds—deeds which had the effect of strengthening religious harmony and emotional bonds of the cross-sections of our society—of the past rulers of India, and should avoid dilating on their darker deeds, is commendable. The protagonists of an ultra objective approach to the study of history will no doubt shudder at the thought, but let no one forget that the study of history, like the study of other social sciences, is only a means to an end—the large and all-comprehensive end of human happiness. To sacrifice a noble end for the sake of a means (which is

a pure intellectual pastime for a select few) would be tragic indeed.

Ayyub's suggestion for reform in Muslim personal law so as to free it from the shackles of *Shariah* and bring it in accord with the requirements of modernity is also praiseworthy. Let the *avant garde* intellectuals of the Muslim community give the proper lead. The Constitution enjoins the government to strive to formulate a 'uniform civil code' applicable throughout the length and breadth of the country. The government has rightly decided to wait until the demand for secularization of such laws comes from the representative leaders of those communities whose interests and beliefs are to be affected. The sooner the pioneers give this call the quicker will be the onward march of secularism in India.


The cumulative effect of all these steps, which are of necessity long-term measures, will be that in course of time the Constitution will *mutatis mutandis* become what G. D. Cole once said about a different thing in a different context, 'the registration of accomplished facts and a culmination of tendencies already in operation.'


A word about Ayyub's observations on science: to say, as he does, that 'it is not the function of science to deal with ultimate values and so it cannot prescribe for us the ends of life' would be to attempt the impossible task of erasing such names as Galileo and Newton and all that goes with today's atomic and space era from the realm of values. There is nothing 'ultimate' about values. They do not emerge in a vacuum. They are relative to the social, economic and political circumstances of life in a given area and in a given age.

With each shake-up science has brought about in these circumstances there has been a corresponding re-assessment of human values although the result of such reassessments have not always been universally accepted. The remark of 'the eminent Indian scientist' that 'Science is the new humanism' is, thus viewed, not a careless one but a highly responsible one. Modern science has exploded the myth of racial purity. It is gradually shattering the entrenched religious superstitions which have kept mankind divided into mutually hostile categories. It is steadily emerging as the mother of a new humanism that will be fortified by the inescapable facts of life and will not be based on the wings of perverse fancy.

Meerut, March 6.

VIPIN CHANDRA

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
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
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69

GOA

a symposium on the
many facets of this territory's
crisis of transition

symposium participants

THE PROBLEM

A statement which summarises
the challenges which have arisen
since the liberation of this territory

FACING THE REALITY

Berta M. Braganza, Chairman,
Frente Popular

INTEGRATION

Peter Alvares, Praja Socialist Leader,
Member of Parliament

AFTERMATH OF LIBERATION

George Vaz, Communist, active
on the working class front

AS UNION TERRITORY

Rudolf D'Mello, recently returned
from Oxford University, active in
Congress politics

A RECURRING PIMPLE

Frank Moraes, Editor-in-Chief of the
'The Indian Express'

PSYCHOLOGICAL ADJUSTMENT

Eric P. W. da Costa, Managing Director
of the Indian Institute of Public Opinion,
New Delhi.

BOOKS

Reviewed by Kamalbir, M. M. Sankhdher,
H. S., and A. K. Banerjee

FURTHER READING

A select and relevant bibliography
prepared by L. C. Kumar

COMMUNICATIONS

From D. C. Home (Ranchi)

COVER

Designed by Chandhury (Gyawal)

The problem

A PERIOD of stress and strain is apparently the unavoidable aftermath of such a major change in the life of a people as the passage from colonial to self-governing status. That is the crucial formative stage when not only new skills and techniques have to be mastered but the collective psychology needs to be thoroughly reoriented, and the process is invariably a trying and even painful experience. Goa is, today, passing through such a transitional phase and experiencing the birth pangs of a new era in its history. In Goa's case, however, this crisis of transition assumes a new dimension for here it involves, apart from the usual problem of acclimatisation to the responsibilities of freedom, the much more intricate exercise of integration into the larger Indian family.

The complexity of the dual process may be easily gauged from the fact that Goa had been.

cut off from the mainstream of national life. The territory and its people have been hardly, and if at all only mildly, affected by the developments which have, in the meantime, shaped the destinies of the rest of the country. At the same time Goa has had its own separate experiences and contacts with various other political, economic and cultural forces and influences, leading to the evolution of what, in the context of the national landscape, has come to be known as Goa's distinctive identity. It is obviously something nebulous and not wholly definable but, all the same, real and not a mere abstraction.

A carefree, and even lethargic, attitude towards life, a catholicity of outlook, a remarkable adaptability and aesthetic sensitivity and an intense love of gaiety and the good things of life are, perhaps, the chief characteristics of the Goan personality. The impact of Iberian culture is evidently one of the contributory factors but the influence of Christianity and emigration have had a large say in shaping Goa's outlook. It has been a very fruitful combination as evidenced by the achievements of Goans in various fields of activity. And the vital question that now arises is: how is Goa going to fare under the new dispensation?

A lot has been said about the need to preserve Goa's distinctive identity but it has remained a vague plea which is tending to grow into a meaningless cliché. It is necessary to be rational about it and realise that, after all, the personality of a people is not something inborn or static but the result of the way in which their native genius reacts to the various forces and influences which they encounter from time to time.

In assessing the personality of the Goan people one must not lose sight of the communal composition of the population and how various groups developed under the Portuguese. The Portuguese always prided themselves on being a Catholic State and even during the Republican regime of Salazar, when many inroads were made into the power of the Church, pride of place was given to this claim. Thus the 40 per cent or so of Christians necessarily became the instruments, within certain limits, of the Portuguese, while the Hindus, so long as they did not take part in any political activity, were free to develop their natural bent in business and commerce.

One, therefore, sees in Goa two powerful forces at work after liberation. First is the natural desire of the Hindus who had very little say in the administration of the territory to assert their authority in a democratic set-up where numbers count. Second, there is the reaction of the majority of the population

against the Brahmins, whether they be Hindus or Christians. For, one must not lose sight of the fact that the Portuguese in dealing with the Christians pampered only the twice born among them.

Then there is also an historical aspect when talking of Goa's distinctive identity. There is a tendency to talk of the Portuguese presence in India over four centuries, covering the entire territory. This is not historically accurate. Goa consists of the Old and New Conquests. It was in the Old Conquests, consisting of a strip of land along the coast, where the Portuguese ruled for over four centuries. The New Conquests extending Goa to the Western Ghats were under Portuguese rule for less than 180 years. The impact, therefore, of Portuguese culture and way of life found expression in the richer areas of the coast and had very little impact in the New Conquests where the people are poor and in no way different from their compatriots in the neighbouring areas of Mysore and Maharashtra. This particular aspect has been very clearly brought out in the recent elections and a close look at the results should be revealing.

Therefore, when talking of a Goan identity conditioned by Portuguese or, more correctly, Latin culture these realities should be kept constantly in mind. A failure to do so only results in making this an emotional issue, something which polarises the people on communal lines. The result would only harm Goa. Whether Goa is to remain a separate unit or merge with the larger contiguous units of the Indian Union is a matter for the Goan people to decide. What has to be guarded against is that this decision is not taken in an emotionally charged atmosphere fostered not only by outside forces but also by the inability of parties and groups in Goa to see where their true interests lie.

The only sensible course, of course, is that the people of Goa should be given the maximum latitude, consistent with the interest of the country as a whole, to adapt themselves to the changed circumstances. The Government of India is pledged to ensure that it shall be so but it is one thing to give pledges and quite another to honour them faithfully. New Delhi may be sincerely desirous of living up to the assurances, as in the case of Pondicherry, but the question is whether in the absence of any treaty obligations it will be willing to resist the pulls and pressures from various sources, including the highly vocal, but not necessarily representative, elements inside Goa, who wish to force the pace in one direction or another.

The Government of India's record soon after liberation was not very reassuring. Such measures as the abolition of the traditional land-

lordism in Daman through a Presidential fiat, the winding up of lotteries which helped to maintain charitable and social welfare institutions and, perhaps, even the formulation of a development plan without the association of any representative institution, howsoever necessary and expedient, gave cause for apprehension. More than these measures, which could have been motivated by the moralist and doctrinaire outlook of India, (for, have we not experienced the continuation of the policy of prohibition despite its failure only because powerful groups in the country would like to save souls rather than bodies) there was the creation by the Centre of a hydraheaded administration after liberation.

There was a Military Governor and one would have expected that he would be left alone to bring about the restoration of administration under an overall policy laid down by the Centre. Instead, the Centre decided to keep a pro-Consul to work behind the scenes during the military regime thus creating a *de jure* and a *de facto* authority. And as it happens in such cases the *de facto* authority had more say in what was to be done or not done in the territory. The frequent changes in senior personnel, the large influx of deputationist officers without any regard to their suitability or need caused further confusion.

Even the change from military government to civil government did not bring about a sense of direction in Goan affairs. Again, little thought was given to the suitability of the officials selected who were entrusted with the task of normalising the situation in Goa. The Union Government must, therefore, be held responsible for the earlier confusion. Having said this, it must also be acknowledged that the government, albeit slowly, realised its mistakes and has taken into hand essential changes which give promise of restoring a sense of direction to Goan affairs.

There is fear in Goa that in the face of pressure from the neighbouring States and the interested groups within, vital issues like the language question or the merger of the territory with neighbouring States may be disposed of without the people of Goa being allowed to look at these issues objectively. As has been said earlier, the Goans themselves must realise their responsibility in this regard and interested groups within must learn to understand each other's point of view. They should not permit these emotional issues to dominate the over-riding requirement of permitting the people of the territory to consolidate the political awakening and the industrial development which the Centre has now initiated.

The only remedy is, of course, political awakening among the people of Goa, but that

is more easily said than done. Goa has to go a long way in this direction for the simple reason that for the major part of Portuguese domination the people have only known authoritarian rule. There were spasms of liberalism, the most significant being the spell following the advent of the republican form of government but Dr. Salazar's dictatorial regime put the clock back. The result was a complete atrophy of the political faculties of the people. Symptoms of this paralysis naturally continue into the present. The hopes of a popular secular reawakening which had been kindled by the initial reaction to liberation have been somewhat dissipated by the subsequent developments. Nothing has happened to bring about a radical change in the situation—unless, of course, the recent general elections spark such a change.

There has been, no doubt, a revival of political activity. A number of political groups have made their appearance and, with the gags which the Portuguese had imposed no longer in force, public opinion is showing signs of becoming increasingly articulate. Trade union and kisan movements have also been initiated, albeit on a minor scale, but despite all this the mass of people, and even sections of the intelligentsia, remain, by and large, politically short-sighted. The absence of effective leadership and any concerted effort in the direction of mass political education are the main drawbacks which retard the growth of political consciousness.

The hope is expressed that the projected changes in the administrative set-up will provide the much needed stimulant. Under the new set-up envisaged for the Union territories, Goa will enjoy a large measure of autonomy on a level approximating that of the former Part C States of the Union. It will be in the context of the pre-liberation days a revolutionary move but democratic institutions are only a means to an end and the decisive factor is the spirit in which they function. The question therefore is whether in the prevailing circumstances the proposed reforms will prove to be an instrument for the fulfilment of the hopes and aspirations of the people or lead to administrative and political instability and confusion.

There is yet another aspect of this issue. The Portuguese, although they denied fundamental rights to the people, usually pursued a *laissez-faire* approach. But it is now a different story with the socialist pattern of society. The people of Goa can now enjoy the liberties which were denied to them in the past but they have also to adapt themselves to the mechanics of the welfare State which directly or indirectly seeks to influence, if not interfere with, every

aspect of the citizen's life. Another hangover of Dr. Salazar's paternalistic rule is the tendency to expect things to be done from the top, an attitude which is utterly incompatible with the concept of a democratic society and is therefore one more transitional hurdle to be overcome.

There are a few other psychological handicaps. For example, in recent years the Portuguese had embarked on a systematic policy of pampering Goans. Nobody could expect such a state of affairs to continue after liberation but neither did anybody bargain for callousness, indifference and brusqueness which have become the hallmarks of Indian officialdom in Goa. The decline in administrative standards, and the Portuguese were not particularly noted for administrative efficiency, is also a source of bitterness. Then, again, the Portuguese had of late gone out of their way to inflate salaries to levels which had no relation either to the resources of the land or the skills called for. It was a political stunt and was ultimately bound to recoil against its authors, but economic theories are a poor consolation to the average individual who is called upon to reconcile to the prospects of reduced emoluments.

Similarly, the people of Goa had become, during the last few years, accustomed to high quality foreign goods. Canned foods, transistors, superior quality textiles and various luxuries had entered in a big way into the life of the average citizen. Automobiles too had become a common sight and Goa is perhaps one of the few places in the world (like the Congo Republic) where luxurious limousines are still available on hire as taxis. It is true that it was a false facade of prosperity but, even if its artificiality is acknowledged, it is not easy for a people used to living in such conditions to fall in line with the austerity which animates planning-conscious India.

There is also the situation arising out of the position of the Catholic Church. The Portuguese State being professedly Catholic, the Church occupied a highly privileged position in Goa which is no longer the case with the inclusion of the territory into the secular State of India. It is, however, not a question of loss of only prestige and influence but also of the annual subsidy of over Rs. 3 lakhs which used to be received from the Portuguese Government in support of the religious and charitable activities of the Church. While it is realised that the Church now functions in a freer atmosphere and would, perhaps, be able to operate much more vigorously than before, the problem of finding the financial wherewithal tends to overshadow all other considerations.

Coming to the economic aspect, it can be said with full confidence that liberation has open-

ed vast possibilities for Goa's economic advancement. Goa's mineral resources and the fine natural harbour at Marmagao provide a sound base for rapid economic growth and development. Plans have already been drawn and steps to give impetus to agricultural production, the construction of the Dudh-Sagar hydro-electric project, the establishment of small-scale and heavy industries and the improvement of communications, are the salient features of the programme. Goa thus stands on the threshold of a new age of progress and plenty.

That is all for the better but the powers that be appear to have overlooked the fact that Goa's economy has not only to make up for the backlog of two five year plans but also needs to be recast from the purely mercantile into a productive mould. The transformation has necessarily to be gradual but the abrupt shifts in economic policies, the failure to lay down a clear cut import-export programme and, what is worse, even to stick to declared policies have only helped to obstruct the process.

While there is criticism of the Central Government for following a policy of drift in respect of Goa, we should not lose sight of what has been achieved in a very short time. The basic criticism of government centres round the delay in restoring the economy of the territory. Under the Portuguese, Goa basically depended for its prosperity on large imports of consumer articles in short supply in India which were smuggled into the country. It is also true that for 5 years before liberation Goa had the advantage of the iron ore boom.

After liberation India could not allow the *laissez faire* policies of the Portuguese to continue without seriously undermining the country's economy. Therefore imports had to be restricted. Nevertheless, the effort was to make the transition as painless as possible. In the earlier phase there was no coherent plan. Much confusion and dislocation in the lives of the people could have been avoided if there had been coordination among the various ministries. However, the position is now improving.

While one may not agree with government's policies and may accuse it of hurried measures soon after liberation, there is now a certain aliveness to the problems of Goa. The Centre is pledged to establish in these territories, occupied for centuries by the Portuguese, a progressive economy and to make good the back-log of past years. The power is now in the hands of the people of the territory. If Goans, both Hindus and Christians, show a degree of maturity and understanding of different points of view on emotional issues like language and merger, and agree to a moratorium for the settlement of these matters, Goa's future is assured.

Facing the reality

BERTA M. BRAGANZA

THE tumultuous welcome, the cheer and enthusiasm with which the people of Goa received the national liberation army on December 19, 1961, make a contrasting picture with the despondency which seems to have overtaken them since. However, the reasons for it are not far to seek.

For 450 years Goa had languished not only in political fetters but in consequence, in an all-round and undisturbed undevelopment, in isolation and darkness, with its rich resources unknown and untapped, in poverty and backwardness. So precarious was the economic condition of the

people that it made it necessary for 1/3 of the population to emigrate in search of bread.

The bulk of these emigrants remained in India it is true, but tens of thousands went to Africa, the Middle East and wandered on the high seas working on ships as menials, remaining separated from their homes and families for long periods. These emigrants earned for Goans the title of 'cooks and butlers'. However, only a little over a decade ago, and till the mining industry came into existence, initially with non-Goan Indian capital, it was these 'cooks and butlers' who, with their sacri-

ances and their hard-earned remittances to their families in Goa, fed the government treasury and balanced the colonial budget. They were, during the long colonial regime, Goa's link with the rest of the world. It was this contact with the outer, more civilized, world which provided the possibility for Goans to show how they could excel not only as 'cooks and butlers' but in all spheres of activity given the proper opportunities for it.

The other 2/3 of the population who remained in Goa were left to the mercy of the colonialists to be processed into non-resisting, docile colonial slaves, contented like frogs to live in a stagnant pool, blissfully ignorant of the outer world.

The Privileged

There was, of course, throughout the long period of colonial subjection, a privileged section of the population like the feudal landlords, the Catholic clergy and other vested interests such as traders who thrived on servility. Out of this class grew a whole bureaucratic world—ingress into which had become the supreme ideal and aspiration of generations of Goans in Goa.

It was this bureaucratic army and other privileged ones whom Salazar boosted and pampered and for whom freedom, human dignity and national pride had no meaning, who feared liberation and went all out to help preserve the frog's paradise in which they had fattened and flourished. They were Salazar's most loyal allies against the struggle for freedom and Goa's re-integration with India.

They comprised, however, a limited section of the population. For the vast majority, the unprivileged, the long years of the freedom struggle in which theirs had been a dominant and active participation, all the hardships and sacrifices it had entailed, the persistence and the heroic resistance of the Goan patriots, the supreme sacrifice of the numerous martyrs, of all of which the Operation Vijay was the culmination, had a

deeper meaning than the mere excitement of the moment.

For the common people, liberation represented the dawn of a new life, to which the long protracted struggle had awakened them and which they now looked forward to as their legitimate right.

They no longer accepted poverty and hardship, which had been their only lot, as a normal condition. They were awakened and had acquired new concepts of life and human rights. They envisaged a future wherein social and economic injustice, poverty and intransquility would be nightmares of the past. It was this awakening and legitimate expectations which inspired the unbounded joy and enthusiasm with which the people of Goa hailed the victorious liberation.

Of course, knowing that the exit of the colonial regime was final and a matter of no return, many from the anti-liberation camp, like rats leaving a sinking ship, jumped out of the Salazarist colonialist band-wagon and joined the jubilant popular demonstrations. But that did not detract from the genuineness of the joy of the general mass of the people.

Story of Bungling

Unfortunately, the Congress Government with the disastrous policies it has pursued in liberated Goa has turned the mighty hopes of the people into bitter deception. This frustration and resentment of the people has proved a boon for the reactionary, anti-national elements, who have availed of the discontent of the people to whip up animosity against everything and everybody concerned with liberation.

The fact is that right from the beginning of the new regime, it has been a story of continuous bungling. And in the midst of this bungling even the significant changes like the acquirement of full civil liberties, labour rights, wider opportunities for education etc., have fallen into the shade in face of the deteriorating economic

condition, what with the cost of living soaring as a result of unbridled speculation and the agrarian problem and unemployment left untackled.

The New Rulers

Just as during the decade and a half of the freedom struggle, the efforts of the Goan patriots were left at the mercy of bureaucratic careerists innocent of political vision and understanding who consciously or unconsciously made themselves the tools of the enemies of Goa's freedom, so also the mighty task of building a new Goa worthy of the sacrifices of the gallant heroes and martyrs of the great battle, has been abandoned into the hands of elements lacking not only political comprehension but who seem to be unconcerned and even out to wreck India's basic policies of secularism, democracy and socialism.

The same tragedy of liberated Dadra and Nagar Haveli, where self-interested, unscrupulous and disloyal elements who seemed more interested in playing the role of successors of the colonialists and keeping up the regime of exploitation than in creating new conditions of a free and happy life for the people were given a free hand to carry on all their shameful activities while the genuine patriots were humiliated, has been enacted in liberated Goa.

The administration is a veritable chaos. The already superfluous and highly inflated bureaucratic machinery of the colonial regime, which has been left intact, has been further bloated with hundreds and hundreds of officials brought from other States on what is termed 'deputation' and as experts necessary to carry out the change from the old administrative system to the new. And in this huge army of experts on deputation peons also figure.

With the two administrative systems functioning simultaneously, with the old personnel not knowing anything of the new system nor the English language and the new additions on 'deputation' knowing neither the local language nor the old laws and

regulations—still in force—the public instead of being served is driven from pillar to post and to despair.

Red-tape, graft and nepotism were, certainly, not unknown in the old regime, as the friends of colonialism try to insinuate and others blinded by disillusionment and dissatisfaction are inclined to echo. In fact, letters of recommendation, favouritism and bribes were an outstanding feature of the colonial administration. But, undoubtedly, that old feature has been added to, and in generous proportion.

A Wrecking Process

In addition there is the disgraceful inequality and discrimination in salaries and privileges in all ranks of government employees according to whether they are of the old regime or new, local people or others on 'deputation'. Those on deputation get bigger salaries and other privileges, like cars and better houses, according to their rank; those of the old regime continue to get the fat, boosted pre-liberation salaries while those appointed after the liberation to the same posts are paid according to the Indian pay-scale; but there are cases where the salary neither corresponds to the Portuguese scale nor to the Indian scale.

The whole attention of the administration is concentrated on adjusting and re-adjusting the administrative machinery and as before all attention is centred on the interests of the bureaucracy. And in spite of this monster administrative apparatus, the solution to the economic and social problems, which the people had so anxiously looked forward to, is nowhere in sight. In fact, instead of solution, new complications have been created as in the case of agriculture, where, in fear of the just anger of the people, palliatives in the form of arbitrary orders and counter-orders have been doled out, making confusion worse confounded and bringing satisfaction to none.

In short, it is a situation where the people's enthusiasm, hope and

confidence have been recklessly turned into animosity and contempt towards the new regime. This and the government's policy of systematic compromise and appeasement of the elements most hostile to it and to the liberation and Goa's integration with India has been its own undoing as was seen in the spectacular rout of the Congress in the recent and very first elections in Goa.

Astounding is the limit to which the pampering of the anti-national elements and even foreign hostile elements has gone. People who have made no secret of their hostility towards the new regime have been given exceptional privileges, such as not only Goans but no other Indian citizen enjoys, of going abroad and that to Lisbon and returning. In short, local Salazar agents have been not only allowed but given all facilities to pursue their activities. A Portuguese priest of the name of Santos, who was a member of the P.I.D.E., the Portuguese political police, Salazar's Gestapo, has been allowed to remain in Goa. This individual is known to have been very active in the early days of the liberation inciting the old colonial stooges. It was a period when several acts of sabotage took place and the public were never informed of the investigations. He was equally active during the elections.

The Congress Party

On the other hand, the local Congress Committee has remained impassive and inactive. Busy with its internal faction fights it has not been known until now to have done anything to popularise the Congress policy of socialism or of India's basic policies of co-existence and peace. Nor is this surprising, considering who the *gurus* from the High Command who guide it are. When the elections came, the local Congress remained blissfully certain of winning with the name of Nehru and the electioneering done for them by the top Congress bosses.

In the meanwhile, reaction consolidated its forces cashing in on the Congress Government's disastrous

actuation and the people's discontent. And, finally, the monster which had been fostered and fattened by the ruling party swallowed the Goa Pradesh Congress.

Communal Hysteria

Under the camouflage of a political issue like the political status of Goa, by whipping up emotions, the inexperienced electorate was divided into communal factions: the Hindus for merger with Maharashtra and the Catholics for a separate State. The mergerists pointed out that a separate State meant Christian domination. The protagonists of a separate State, on the other hand, stressed that merger with Maharashtra meant Hindu domination. The mergerists made the voters take vows over coconuts in temples, promising to vote for them. The champions of a separate State mobilized the Catholic Church with its powerful weapons of the pulpit and the confessional.

Thus, with communal passions whipped into blinding frenzy, the masses were made to drown the issue of economic and social development so vital to them and are said to have voted on a political issue. How the issue of the future political status of Goa was used as a stunt by the communalists to come to power may be seen from their post-election attitude.

The Maharashtra Gomantak which now forms the government and which fought the elections on the issue of immediate merger, has now decided that it need not be so *immediate*. The United Goans which promised a resolution as its first act in the Assembly, demanding the status of a Separate State, seems now to be suffering from amnesia. So far their main pre-occupation seems to be how to improve positions in the Assembly—one trying to increase its majority and the other to diminish its minority by manoeuvring to capture each others' members.

Perched in the government and in the Assembly, the anti-progress forces are now in a position of vantage to hold back the economic and social development of the

masses. The communal passions which have been once aroused can always be mobilised if the need arises.

In this context, it is worth noting that the Church campaign in favour of the United Goans was concentrated against the Frente Popular which had made the economic and social development the main issue in its electoral campaign, stressing that the manner in which that problem was tackled would help the people to decide at a later date about which political status suited them best. The party was dubbed communist and the Catholics were warned against voting for its candidates under threats of all manner of religious sanctions. In this connection it is also worth noting that all the timely complaints made to the competent authorities against these vile processes fell on deaf ears. The guardians of India's policy of secularism in Goa saw no need to intervene.

However, even if the leaders of the two parties who won the elections on the issue of the future political status of Goa, seem now in no hurry to bring about the realization of their declared aims and find it most convenient to accept the status of Union Territory, at least till the next election, the flames of linguistic antagonisms have been kindled and will not be forgotten so easily.

Merits and Demerits

But who is right and who is wrong?

There is no gainsaying that the party which stands for merger has won the elections. Nevertheless, given the processes used by the mergerists as well as the champions of a Separate State proves that it was the communal aspect which carried the electorate and not the political; that it was the outcome of the exploitation of the backwardness of the people which brought the two parties in question their success at the polls. It was neither a political vote nor can it be considered a verdict of the people on the political status of Goa. At the most, it can be a

verdict on the issue of Hindu raj-versus-Christian raj, which is inadmissible in a secular State. As all States in India are organized on a linguistic basis, the language of Goa must be considered before any change in the present status can be made.

The Linguistic Reality

The fact is that 100 per cent of the people of Goa speak Konkani, whereas only the people on the borders with Maharashtra and those who go to school to learn Marathi know that language. On the other hand, only the Hindu population know Marathi and even in that community the illiterate man who does not live on the border areas contiguous with Maharashtra does not know it.

So, even though the Hindus make up 60 per cent of the population it cannot be said that all Hindus know Marathi. And even if the Christians are not more than 40 per cent, it is a substantial fraction of the population whose interests cannot be brushed aside.

Further, the question in Goa involves other factors such as the peculiarities evolved in the long period of 450 years of segregation which are the historical reality of the present. These are matters which certainly cannot be ignored.

On the other hand, it is undeniable that a large section of the people do stand for merger with Maharashtra. But whether that is the majority or minority is still to be gauged. The present elections are not the affirmation of anything but the backwardness and democratic inexperience in which the people have been left by the 4½ centuries of colonial domination. The true verdict of the people can only come with the social and economic regeneration of the Goan masses, which will make them proof against the fraudulent tactics of the self-interested and reactionary elements. The most important task before the progressive forces is to prevent Goa becoming a Trojan Horse, undermining India's basic policy of secularism, democracy and socialism.

Integration

PETER ALVARES

PRIOR to liberation and in the period soon after, Goa attracted attention because it had posed a challenge to India's complete freedom and also because it offered opportunities which a colonial regime provides to the privileged few. The period after liberation posed an administrative challenge, during which also developed a silent and growing tension between the forces of national integration and religious exclusiveness, with the Government of India actively supporting the latter cause because of a promise once made during the Freedom-movement days to maintain a centre of Portuguese culture in Goa, as of the French in Pondicherry. These promises were made at a time when the Government of India hoped to win over the western powers to the idea of freedom for Goa, forgetting that this promise was rendered irrelevant after the liberation of Goa by the Indian army. History, religion and politics have got mixed up in Goa so that it is attracting more attention than is warranted by actual circumstances.

Political geography has played a considerable part in shaping the thought process of the two major communities. In the central dis-

tricts (Old Conquests) where the Portuguese consolidated their rule almost two centuries earlier, the Christians are in a majority. In the outer districts (on the periphery of the territory, and known as the New Conquests) the Portuguese did not succeed so well in their religious purpose, and the Hindus who are in a majority there remained unaffected by the systematic programme of proselytizing and of the demoralising effects of colonial patronage.

Such of the Christians as were drawn away from their old religious and cultural moorings obtained more favourable treatment, thereby throwing the Hindus into more defensive attitudes that sought expression in the maintenance of political and social contacts in Maharashtra, where both religious (Hindu) and family ties helped continue concourse with the rest of India during an eventful period of our history. Since Catholicism was a State religion the emotional focus of the Christian people was either in Lisbon or Rome, while that of the Hindus towards the seat of the Maratha Empire at first, and later towards the political focus of the Indian freedom movement. This explains

the basic outlook between the two communities.

The settlement of the British in Bombay further accentuated this distinction. Since the Christians were the first to emigrate to Bombay they found preferential employment because of their religious affinity to the British colonialists. If the focus was at first Lisbon and Rome, the declining fortunes of the Portuguese invited a corresponding shift, and the West and Rome now became synonymous with the aspirations of the Christians. That explains to some extent why the entire Goan Christian community kept studiously away from the Indian freedom movement.

Religious Overtones

Another contributory fact was the identification of the Christian religion with the State. Christianity is a State religion in Portugal, and the economic consequence of this was that the entire clergy was paid by the State. Economic and religious interests became interdependent, and when the implication of the secular character of the Indian nation began to be realised, the fear that Goa's freedom would immediately bring about a divorce between religion and the State developed a hostility towards the Goan freedom movement. This explains much of the attitude adopted in the recent elections to the Goan Legislative Assembly.

There is another social complex which cuts laterally across the entire Goan community, dividing it, both among the Christians and the Hindus, on the basis of caste. In the process of conversion of the Hindus to Christianity the old religious community carried the caste system into the new religious community, and the Christians and the Hindus are divided into castes on identical stratifications. The Brahmins who were converted remained Brahmins; the non-Brahmins remained non-Brahmins, the Harijans continued as Harijans, and the Adivasis (Kumbis) as Adivasis. The caste system in both the communities is so embedded that even in the Christian community there is not much social

intercourse between the castes; they are as exclusive as in the Hindu community, and there is a great deal of sympathy and common understanding between the identical castes of the two communities. If they did not coalesce in the recent elections against the privileged it is because the religious issue supervened.

Feeling of Superiority

Before proceeding to a discussion of the political issues which dominate Goan life today it is necessary to refer to a situation where the Christians consider themselves superior to the Hindus, and when referring to this it must be clarified that this attitude exists only among the so-called intelligentsia. By reason of political patronage and the accident of economic advantages in Bombay, the Christians branched out into the various professions with a degree of competence and expertness. Up to the 1920s, the Goan Christian community had a monopoly of the professional services — medicine, law, administrative services, etc. In Bombay this was all the more pronounced.

Naturally, these adventitious advantages created a sense of superiority *vis-a-vis* the Hindus, leading ultimately to a demand generated during the Goan freedom movement, of the slogan 'Goa for Goans', forgetting in their selfishness that quite one fourth of the population of Goa was earning its livelihood in Bombay and India. That this agitation was confined almost entirely to the Christian community bears out the testimony of the statement that the Portuguese had succeeded to an appreciable extent in de-nationalising the Goan Christian community.

It is against this backdrop that recent developments must be assessed.

Liberation brought about a shift in the perspectives between the two communities. Portuguese patronage to the Christian community ended abruptly, leaving them with a sense of guilt for having supported the Portuguese colonialists so far, and reversed the political

fortunes of the Hindu community which had had to bear with an inferior status during all these many long years of colonial rule. This situation cast its shadow earlier during the period of the Goan freedom movement when the Hindu community participated in the movement as a whole unit, and the Christian community by and large kept neutral, although there were outstanding examples of leadership of the freedom movement among the members of this community. After freedom this was again evident when the Hindus enthusiastically welcomed the liberation and the Christians generally felt unhappy at the departure of the Portuguese.

It was, therefore, expected that this feeling among the latter community would manifest itself one day in some concrete form. The language question and the issue of Goa's political future gave the Christians an opportunity to assert their pre-liberation status, or in other words to emphasise their distinctiveness from the rest of the Indian people. This appeal to something distinctive and separate was responded to by the Government of India. And even in this situation, the attitude of the Christians would not have taken on such an accentuated form had the Christian clergy abandoned its colonial tradition of support to the Salazar regime and opposition to the liberation.

Complete Polarisation

The elections completed the polarisation between the forces of national integration and those of religious exclusiveness, and it is unfortunate that it is the two communities which aligned themselves separately on these two issues. This issue was perhaps slightly obscured by the fact that on the election platform the Maharashtra-wadi Gomantak stood for the immediate integration of Goa into Maharashtra, and the United Goans for a full-fledged separate State for Goa. These slogans were only the formal political expressions of the view-points of the two major successful political parties. Their

real purpose reveals deep political bias.

The United Goans

The United Goans party represents all the poignancy, despair and distrust of the Christian community. As a religious community its outlook is influenced very much by the attitudes of the Church. The Church in Goa faithfully reflected the policies of Salazar's adherents, both in Goa and in Portugal. The reasons are not far to seek. At the apex of the leadership of the United Goans is that privileged class of Christians, Brahmins by caste generally, who have always yearned for sovereignty for Goa, guaranteed both by India and Portugal. This class, seizing the last opportunity to entrench itself through the elections, has no sympathy with Indian aspirations and, so far as national sentiment goes, there is not the slightest indication of its consciousness.

The basis of its appeal is religious in character. Goa, i.e. a centre of Christianity, must have a separate haven, or a political guarantee for its existence. Towards India it looks with a certain amount of scorn mixed with fear. There is a general distrust of Maharashtra, partly because of its proximity, and perhaps also because the Maharashtrian people played such a determinate role in its freedom movement. A certain amount of colonial pride also provides confidence in the Goans' ability to manage their own affairs. Politically, they are so much divorced from reality that they feel that whatever Goa may be able to export, the revenues from that source are the exclusive preserve of the Goan people. Viability is talked of in the most casual manner.

During the early months of the liberation, this community staked all its claims on the basis that Konkani is the language of the people, and that since this is a separate language and having nothing to do with the Marathi language, the case of separateness from Maharashtra was proved. The appointment of a Language Commission permitted this issue to be

resolved without much controversy. The Commission declared that any language that the parent of a child declares as his mother tongue would provide a basis for education in that language. A census was undertaken in the various languages that were declared as mother-tongues, and according to this census provision for primary education was made.

It is interesting to note, however, that by June 1963, the number of children who had opted for primary education in Konkani was only 600 for the whole of Goa, whereas those who opted for Marathi was in the neighbourhood of 54,000. Naturally the language issue is not any more relevant, and therefore the United Goans had to seek other rationales for a separate State for Goa.

Balked on the language issue by the verdict of the school-going children, and unable further to exploit the distinctiveness they claimed in this respect, the United Goans looked elsewhere, and readily found justification in Goa's economic viability and cultural dissimilarity with Maharashtra. When the late Prime Minister visited Goa in May '63 he even discovered Kannadi-speaking families and cultural distinctiveness. This naturally encouraged the 'separatists' (the United Goans was not yet then formed). That there is not a single Kannadi-speaking family is evident, and as for cultural distinctiveness there are more Christians in the entire country who do not claim anything exclusive by reason of their religious denomination or some other observances. If some western habits are characteristic of the Christians then it can be said that there are thousands elsewhere aping the West in mannerisms and social expression.

The Congress

Even this situation would not have been so aggravated had the Congress Party not let down the aspirations of the Christians. Many months before the elections a sizable section of the Christians, more than the majority leadership, were Congress oriented. The Congress stood for a separate Goa, and this

satisfied the Christians. But as the momentum of the pro-merger elements became felt, the Congress assessed that it could not win any of the seats in the purely Marathi speaking areas if it did not adopt some compromise move on the issue of merger. What it ultimately accepted satisfied neither the Christians nor the Hindus. The result was that there occurred a complete polarisation between the two forces, one of integration with Maharashtra, and the other of separate statehood for Goa. The Congress fell ignominiously between two extreme positions.

The Maharashtrawadi Gomantak

By contrast, the attitudes of the Maharashtrawadi Gomantak and the Praja Socialist Party are an honest effort in national integration. The fact that the Maharashtrawadi Gomantak has sought the merger of Goa with Maharashtra should not prejudice the main issue of integration. Instead of Maharashtra, it may have been any other State with which there exist linguistic and cultural attachments and geographical contiguity. Similarly, this same organisation seeks the merger of Daman and Diu with Gujarat. The issue, then, is one of national integration.

The Maharashtrawadi Gomantak has been at pains to point out that neither the Christians nor the Goan people will suffer in any way because of a merger. To the Christians it has pointed out that they belonged to that part of Maharashtra which was separated by the colonial rule of the Portuguese, and the fact that they were converted to Christianity does not alter the geographic or cultural alignment of the people. In fact, it would be a dangerous assumption to argue that a change in religion precipitates a corresponding change in geographic or political status.

On the contrary, it has been repeatedly pointed out that the political isolation which the Christians suffered must now end after liberation and that they must return back to their original attachments. These attachments are non-religious in character. Any

attempt to equate these with religious persuasion are fraught with grave danger to the country and to the Christian community in particular. It is in secularism that the Christian community has the greatest safeguards, otherwise if religion can be the basis of statehood then the whole character of the nation will be thrown into jeopardy. The integration of Kashmir, and the dismemberment of Hyderabad (which desired to remain an exclusive centre of Muslim culture) are instances in which the secular character of the State has been emphasised in the country. Any other arrangement will be fraught with danger, to the minorities in particular.

What a theocratic State, or a State with a State religion, can do to the minorities is well illustrated by the events in Pakistan at the moment. Any obstinate attitude of the Goan Christian can only put into jeopardy the fate of other Christians in the country. When India is sheltering over 50,000 Christian refugees from East Pakistan who are fleeing the terror, the Goan Christians should ponder a bit over their attitude of whether they are justified in their aggressive attitudes, and can hope to run against the tide of secularism which is today standing the test of political arrangement.

Linguistic Basis

Apart from the fundamental issue of integration, there is the question of administrative and financial arrangement. It was the policy of the nation, since stated in statutory measures, that the administrative units should be generally co-terminus with linguistic frontiers. The Government of India accepted this principle, and where it experimented with a multi-lingual State it had to give it up for the principle of unilingual States. To depart from this high policy without any over-riding justification would generate serious problems and help revive controversies such as the Punjabi Suba and the demand for separation in Tamilnad.

The fantasy of the late Prime Minister in maintaining multi-

lingual States like Hyderabad, or a 'special personality' area like Bombay city, has had to give way before the hard fact of political reality. Experiments of the type proposed by the late Prime Minister have only created social tensions. The sooner they have been resolved the better it has been for all concerned. If the language of Goa, as now demonstrated by the census of school-going children, is Marathi, and the majority of the people are Maharashtrians, then it is politically desirable that the political administrative unit that is Maharashtra today be extended as far as Goa.

The fears of the Christian community are also without basis. No country in the world has been so generous and no civilisation has shown such a welcome to foreign religions as India and the Hindus. The extent of its tolerance has been almost a weakness. It has been constantly abused. The Goan Christians should have realised by now that anyone in this country can rise to heights of achievement. In India (outside Goa) there are over one and a half lakh of Goans, principally in Bombay, living in security and in circumstances of full opportunity, and no one even bothers about their religious persuasion. In these circumstances to raise the question of religious security will only boomerang upon the minorities.

Economic Viability

There then remains the bogey of economic viability. When all other arguments failed, the Christian group raised the question of the economic development of Goa, and pleaded that only as a separate State could Goa develop speedily and make up for the loss of time. In this issue the United Goans was supported by the big industrialists who naturally see prospects of the control of the government. Nevertheless, this issue is a real one and must be examined in its true perspective. Goa has a natural harbour and one that can serve the hinterland of southern Maharashtra, central Andhra and north Karnatak. Its

iron ore deposits hold prospects of foreign exchange earnings and of one or two steel mills in the area.

Industrial development in other spheres is also possible. But for all this, is it necessary to have a separate State? Is it not realised even now that in a planned economy the criteria of development are local initiative, resources and necessity. All these three circumstances are present in Goa. The pressure of any other criteria would be tantamount to the exercise of political pressure. It is well that this is ruled out, otherwise India's economic development would be characterised by serious imbalances.

Separate State

The main issue with the United Goans, however, is the demand for a separate State co-terminus with their religious population. This fact cannot be hidden. It flows from the period of Portuguese colonialism, and is backed by the Goan Church. All other arguments are subsidiary.

As against this, the Maharashtrawadi Gomantak stands for national integration and sees in the demand of the United Goans a lurking danger to Indian unity. It argues that even though the area and the population of the Christians is small, yet there is always a lurking danger that may grow out of all proportions and may ultimately affect the minorities.

There is one last consideration of which mention must be made and that is the caste complex in Goa. In an earlier para a reference has been made to the caste division which cuts across both political parties and communities. But, by and large, the United Goans seeks to maintain the present status quo and the Maharashtrawadi Gomantak seeks to change the present social and economic balance in favour of the underprivileged. Whether the tensions will grow or not will ultimately depend upon the wisdom of the Central Government. History has shown repeatedly that it is difficult to play with linguistic and cultural homogeneity.

Aftermath of liberation

GEORGE VAZ

THE Indian armed action to integrate the territory of Goa, Daman & Diu did not come a day too soon. Further delay would have been disastrous and would have consolidated the urge for an independent State for Goa, fully backed by western imperialism. Attempts to have a neo-colonialist solution to the problem were well afoot and, surprisingly, important nationalist leaders who had been released by the Portuguese, after years of imprisonment, had gone over for a compromise solution with Salazar. Such a solution would have been a tragedy not only for India but also for the freedom struggles being waged in Angola and Mozambique.

People in India will be surprised to know that, even while the Indian army was knocking on the gates of Goa and when thousands of troops were already amassed on the frontiers of this last stronghold of colonialism in India, important leaders of the Goa Congress presented a Memorandum to the Governor General of Portuguese India asking for autonomy under Portuguese patronage. Embassies were sent to Nehru asking for the calling off of the military action—these representatives how-

ever only reached Belgaum, the headquarters of both the nationalist movement as also the Military Command. They did not have time to reach Delhi.

The Central Cabinet was vacillating and divided on the issue of direct military intervention in Goa. It is reliably learnt that Morarji Desai opposed military action. Precious time was lost, giving the Portuguese expeditionary forces time to dynamite roads and bridges and put into operation their scorched earth policy by which they meant to destroy the port of Marmagoa and Panjim city before they were made to quit.

The Nationalist headquarters, at Belgaum led by Aruna Asaf Ali of the National Campaign Committee were holding mass rallies and demonstrations calling for immediate military action. The Army Command was in full agreement with the nationalists and popular slogans like 'Bharat Mata ki Jai' were responded to by the jawans. The atmosphere was charged for great events. Delhi realised that there was no going back.

History was made on the 19th December, 1961, and a long chapter of foreign rule on Indian soil came to an end. 'Operation Vijaya'

ushered a mass upsurge and everywhere in Goa there were huge rallies of people. Often there were no leaders to address the masses and it was tragic to see the political vacuum and absence of political leadership to channelise and capitalise on the new era which had dawned.

No party came forward to give a real lead and all this time anti-national forces were active and were trying to undermine the confidence of the people in the liberation. There was a concerted attempt for some time to subvert the liberation; bombs were exploding in remote places and there was an attempt on the life of the Military Governor at Vasco. Wild rumours were set afoot about excesses committed by the armed forces and stories of 'Shikras' as the Sikh soldiers were popularly called, breaking into private houses.

In the eyes of the West, India had committed aggression and western intervention was foiled by the Soviet veto. The West was obviously furious that peaceful India had created a precedent for armed intervention to liquidate colonialism and India's new line was to have repercussions in West Irian and Angola where the free African countries openly spoke of intervening in Angola.

The Military Governor of Goa inspired confidence and went about restoring communications, buildings and destroyed bridges and meeting the people. It was however evident that the Centre had no policy for Goa and there was no proper appraisal of the situation. A political adviser to the Military Governor was appointed who was more interested in projecting his personality as the great liberator than trying to understand the complex situation.

New Hopes

It is a tragedy that the nationalist leadership of Goa could not rise to the occasion and build up its forces to defeat the conspiracy of the anti-national forces and the local bureaucratic machinery to retard the growth of the democratic movement. The people had after

centuries won the right to organise their forces, to build up trade unions, kisan sanghs and democratic institutions to shape their own future.

The people were looking forward to an early establishment of a democratic set-up under the Indian Constitution, radical agrarian reforms freeing the tiller of the soil from the grip of landlords and feudal forces which had sapped the energies of the people. The people were expecting widening employment opportunities with a policy of industrialisation, modern health and social services and a wider horizon of educational and cultural development. It was the task of the freedom fighters to champion the cause of the people.

The Failure

The former nationalists were only busy with a vulgar stampede for the leadership of the Goa Pradesh Congress as part of the ruling Indian National Congress. Two groups were in the field angling for patronage of the Congress High Command. The Left was contented in leading trade union struggles and agitating for agrarian reforms and fighting the growing evictions from the land. But only labour and peasant agitations could not balance the political forces for a dynamic new set up for Goa. The most pressing problem of building up the forces of national integration, fighting the anti-national forces which were evident soon after the liberation and building up the democratic striking forces of the masses was absent.

The Government of India failed to realise that the violent overthrow of the former Portuguese regime in Goa through a military action called for a revolutionary solution to the problem of setting up a stable administration. There had been no peaceful transfer of power and the new administration could not be built up on the old colonial structure, the remnant of the anti-people and unpopular former colonial administration.

The machinery set up by the Centre to run the Goa administra-

tion had moved with caution and fear to fulfil the task of national integration. The patriotic forces were not taken into confidence. There was an attempt to placate and compromise with the former comprodore classes whose loyalty to the new regime was in serious doubt. Old Portuguese laws and codes were allowed to operate. There was a long delay in ensuring to the people the democratic rights and liberties which obtained in India and even trade union organisations were regarded as illegal and had to be carried on with a spirit of defiance taking recourse to fundamental rights guaranteed by the Indian Constitution. Important trade union leaders were arrested for leading strike actions and even the Defence of India rules and the emergency powers were used by the administration to curb the growing trade union and kisan movements.

Economic life in Goa was dislocated. The closure of mines by mine owners swelled the ranks of the unemployed. There was mass retrenchment in most of the major mines. The people were faced with soaring prices of essential commodities and there was a scarcity of the daily necessities of life. The landlords apprehending land reforms, began large scale eviction of tenants and the government did nothing to protect them.

Bureaucratic Mistakes

All this arose because the bureaucratic administration, under wrong political advice, sought the support of landlords and mine owners and sought to appease the old reactionary vested interests instead of relying on the new forces, which the liberation of Goa had let loose, of the workers, peasants and common people. The ruling Congress party and their representatives in Goa had to pay heavily for these mistakes.

There was mass frustration at the turn of events and the people were robbed of the fruits of the liberation. The oversized bureau-

cratic machinery was further bloated with unnecessary and often inefficient personnel borrowed from the neighbouring States of Mysore and Maharashtra. Collaborators with the Portuguese colonialists had been retained in the new administration and many of the traitors held key posts in the new set-up. Goan police lackeys of Salazar with a record of sadistic persecution of nationalists in the pre-liberation days continued to be guardians of law and order. To all appearances the old regime continues with corrupt practices, favouritism and nepotism in the services.

In such a situation, the people naturally questioned how the present administration was any better than the former Portuguese rule. This sentiment was fully exploited by the forces of the extreme Right and pro-Portuguese elements to discredit the liberation and retard the process of national integration.

Political Immaturity

It must be observed that politically the Goan people, because of want of democratic rights for a number of years, were immature and even short-sighted. The anti-national propaganda thus had a fertile ground on which to grow. Various forces of opportunism were working to exploit the situation and many of these forces played on the sentiments of the people.

Traditions which have been built up in India during the long constitutional struggle to overthrow British rule were absent in Goa. The absence of a strong political party was also felt in the present situation. The nationalist movement of Goa was mainly confined to the middle classes both inside and outside Goa. The mass of the peasantry and working class, although they sympathised with the national aspiration, were never brought into the freedom struggle. The 15 years struggle in Goa was a struggle of heroes—of satyagrahis or terrorists who came forward as saviours of the masses.

After the liberation, these former satyagrahis or terrorists continued

to act and behave as heroes and saviours with the added quality now of being the natural rulers of the Goan people, the chosen few, destined to rule over the masses. The average Goan resented this bossing from a khadi-clad elite who was moving in newly found jeeps and brand new cars.

Another factor not to be ignored was that the rank and file of the freedom fighters were now just 'political sufferers' who need not be absorbed into national constructive work. We had to re-habilitate these poor relations. The ex-freedom fighters, many of whom had spent years in Portuguese jails or in the underground, resented this patronising attitude of the leaders. It must, however, be noted that there were also adventurers and even anti-social elements who had drafted themselves into the nationalist movement for their own ends, parasites feeding on the freedom struggle. These elements were unfit to do any work leave alone political or social activity. These elements felt let down and were unemployed and spread and increased the general feeling of discontent.

Election Activity

In such a situation, the Government of India announced the Union Territories Bill passed by Parliament in May 1963 and declared the calling of general elections for Goa, Daman and Diu. This gave the signal for the formation of new parties and new platforms which came forward to exploit the gullible Goan masses. New alliances were formed among parties and groups. Programmes and policies were formulated, most of which went over the heads of the people. In the undercurrent it could be seen by any political observer that alliances and groups had social and even communal foundations. Goa's long history and foreign links, the differences of development in the 'Old' and the 'New Conquests' were to be reflected in the political groupings.

The Congress Party which posed as the most important party while embracing most of the nationalist

leaders also took in many opportunists who were banking on Congress emerging as the ruling party in Goa. The Congress was however a divided house and there was a continuous inner party struggle for leadership at first, and then for Assembly seats. The composition of the Congress was upper class and Brahmin. This in itself was no disqualification. No mass work was being done at any level of the Congress and it could be termed an out and out Rightist Congress with no Left group within. The programme issued by the Congress was balanced and was drafted and finalised in consultation with the Congress High Command at Delhi.

Further to the Right was the United Goans Party, the coming together of a number of splinter parties, united on the slogan of a 'Separate State for Goa.' The slogan of separate State had its appeal to wide sections of the catholic masses in the 'Velhas Conquistas' and this was fully exploited. A number of mine-owners and vested interests supported the demand for a separate State and the United Goans platform gathered all these within its fold. The powerful Church organisation was at the disposal of the United Goans and the religious sentiments of the catholic masses including the considerable catholic working class and peasantry voted solidly for the United Goans in spite of the fact that it was dominated by the upper strata of Goan society.

The New Party

A new party with a strong anti-feudal and anti-Brahmin complex and demanding Goa's immediate merger with Maharashtra was now to come into the field. This made deep inroads among the broad Hindu masses of the 'New Conquests' which made up the landless peasantry and which was also the most numerous. Although its main slogan was merger with Maharashtra, the propaganda line laid stress on anti-feudal slogans promising widespread land reforms and distribution of lands to the landless. Merger with Maharashtra was a means to the end of

agrarian reforms. The hegemony in Goa of the Brahmin and landlord class could only be broken by joining forces with the broad masses in Maharashtra for land reforms.

The Maharashtrawadi Gomantak Party thus functioned as a party of the Left—a class party of the workers and peasants and the middle classes and it gave a straight fight to the Congress.

Further to the Left was the 'Frente Popular' with its socio-political programme trying to unify the Hindu and Catholic working class and peasantry on a common platform to introduce immediate reforms and intensify the democratic movement, making a secular approach and trying to wean the people away from chauvinistic slogans like merger or separate State.

The Two Goas

The electorate was however polarised and the election was almost like a referendum on the basis of merger or separate State. It is significant that the separate State seats were won entirely in the 'Velhas Conquistas' areas and the merger seats in the 'Novas Conquistas' areas: two Goas emerged.

The Hindu vote in Goa was split among the Maharashtrawadi Gomantak Party and the Congress. Not so the Catholic vote, which went solidly to the United Goans Party in spite of the fact that it was dominated by vested interests and landlords. The party of the Left could not shake the catholic working class and peasant from voting against the Church dominated party. The Left was banking on getting support in the predominantly labour areas of Vasco da Gama and Cortalim. This went to prove that the Hindu masses were more class conscious and politically more mature.

The formation of the Maharashtrawadi Gomantak Government led to great expectations. It was expected that Chief Minister Dayanand Bandodkar would hasten to introduce sweeping land reforms as most of his supporters came from the landless classes. He has

however opted to hasten slowly and this has created great unrest in the agrarian masses.

Dayanand is obviously placating the opposition, his majority in the Assembly being so precarious. The Central Government by refusing to nominate three members to the Assembly is determined to see that the present instability of the Dayanand Ministry should continue.

Stability

Sensible democratic opinion in Goa wants a stable ministry for the present interim period and wants the Dayanand Ministry to stabilise and continue in power. On the issue of merger the Dayanand Ministry has been realistic and has granted that it will not demand Goa's immediate merger with Maharashtra. This should satisfy the opposition and they should give their active cooperation to the ruling party for bringing in pressing reforms.

The Centre would be acting in a short-sighted manner if it does not strengthen the Dayanand Ministry as the collapse of the ministry and introduction of President's rule will create chaos and confusion. It must be said that the old bureaucratic machinery is not happy with the young and active Minister for Labour and Agriculture, Law and Industries, Tony Fernandes and the Minister for Education and P.W.D., V. S. Karmali, who are doing things vigorously.

The main weakness of the ruling Maharashtrawadi Gomantak Party is that after the elections it is fast losing its mass contact and has not been able to fulfil the expectations of the people.

In the post-election period most people have realised that if we want stability and orderly progress then tension should be reduced. The Goans, both Hindu and Christian, who have lived together for so many centuries have to pull together. Communalism is an imported commodity into the body politic of Goa mainly by politicians who have come from across the border. Dayanand Bandodkar need not try to play to this gallery as

he has done in Sangli and Kolhapur and create unnecessary tension at home.

National Integration

Many of the high and the mighty have been humbled at the last poll. Democracy has come to stay and loosing an election should not defer active service among the people. Goa has still to go a long way to attain political maturity and the present need is for parties to function with definite socio-political programmes and not merely on emotional issues.

Goa is a land where many peoples and races have met and one need not be an anthropologist to see this. For centuries gone by, and long before the Portuguese came, Goa was the emporium of the East, the port of call for traders and merchants from distant Egypt, Rome and Carthage. The Kolar gold went for the building of King Solomon's temple and so did Goan craftsmen and builders. Arab traders came for spices and cargoes of sandalwood from Mysore—ship-building was a flourishing trade.

The Goans have loved the sea and have been a seafaring people for centuries. A Goan seaman showed Vasco da Gama the way to the shores of India not knowing the consequences. Christianity flourished in Goa from the time of the Apostles, Thomas and Bartholomew, and the Portuguese created the myth that they brought Christianity to Goa.

Four hundred years of the Portuguese connections cannot be forgotten in a day and much that is good in Latin culture should be retained. After all, we are working towards a world culture and a new synthesis in this age of space when new planets have come within the orbit of human endeavour.

Goa has much in common with the rest of the Konkan coast although this may not be evident with the Deccan Maharashtra plateau. It is for the Goans to decide their future political status. Too long have we lived in isolation from the great Indian family and the need of the hour is full national integration.

As union territory

RUDOLF D'MELLO

THE issue of the political future of Goa is no longer frictionally controversial. Submerged in it is potential violence which could surface if any change in the status quo is forcibly attempted betimes. Potential violence rooted in fear—fear of losing identity and certain present economic advantages and other future benefits. The Central Parliamentary Board after some deliberation, quite wisely, resolved at Bhubaneshwar to maintain Goa as an Union Territory at least for 10 years from the date of the Goa elections in 1963. Subsequently, the wishes of the people are to be consulted. This resolution was approved on April 7, 1964,

in the presence of Y. D. Chavan, Defence Minister, who is a signatory to it.

By then, four months had elapsed since the first elections were held in Goa within the framework of the Union Territories Act, 1963. Writing to the President of the Goa Pradesh Congress Committee, Purshottam Kakodkar, the late Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, January 2, 1964 stated '... My views in regard to the merger of Goa with Maharashtra remain the same as they were before the election. I have said that merger is not desirable in the near future, in spite of the election. In future this matter

can be considered. It will have to be decided by the people of Goa...'

Since the Central Parliamentary Board resolution was passed, nothing has happened to warrant its alteration except perhaps that the ruling party, the Maharashtrawadi Gomantak, has lost some support from its moderate sections to the Goa Congress ever since it passed an unofficial recommendatory resolution in the Goa Assembly, January 22, 1965, by the barest majority of one vote. No great significance attaches to this resolution, since the ruling party could have adopted it at any time, as a formality, having a majority of two in a 30 member house.

Possible Alternatives

Theoretically, the possible future alternatives for Goa are :

- 1) that it should continue within the present administrative boundaries either as (a) Union Territory or (b) as a full fledged State;
- 2) that it should form part of a larger administrative unit either by (a) forming a new State (KONKAN) by accretion of the surrounding areas of the Konkani region, both north and south of Goa or (b) by merging into the neighbouring State of Maharashtra or Mysore;
- 3) its division into two, half to Maharashtra and the other half going to Mysore (King Solomon's stratagem?).

None of these alternatives should be ruled out in a discussion on the future of Goa; but for practical purposes the dialogue today is between 1. (a) and 2. (b), i.e., whether it should continue as a Union Territory or should merge immediately; and the pace and the tone of this dialogue has been set more by interested parties outside Goa than from the inside.

All the alternatives except the third have varying degrees of political support: United Goans for a full fledged State and some eventually for the Konkani State; the Maharashtrawadi Gomantak for merger of Goa into Maharashtra, the Goa

Congress for the Union Territory. The support for Mysore has not yet taken an organisational form but the gentle and delicate way in which the Mysore State has staked its claim, placing emphasis on the wishes of the people of Goa, has won for it many supporters which may get concretized into an organisation.

The claims of the Mysore State are based first, linguistically, on the size of the Konkani-speaking population in Mysore—over 6,00,000. According to the 1960 census over 90 per cent of the population of Goa stated Konkani to be their mother-tongue—whilst only 2 per cent declared Marathi as their mother-tongue. (Census, reproduced in 1963, Government of Goa publication). Thus it appears that the degree of passion aroused about the merger of Goa is in inverse ratio to the rational strength of the claim. However, there is no doubt that the majority of the people are against merger into any State for economic reasons to be stated later. In the elections, the ostensibly mergerist party gained no more than 40 per cent of the votes polled. Secondly, the claims are based historically on Kadamba Rulers; thirdly, geographically, on greater territorial contiguity; fourthly, economically, on its need for a port and finally, psychologically, on certain temperamental affinity.

The Misconceptions

The fact that Congress suffered reverses in the election does not imply a rejection of the Union Territory policy, simply because the significance of this policy was not explained to the people. The elections were hustled through without sufficient preparation in a territory which for a long period was not accustomed to democratic institutions, (even the municipal elections are yet to be held.) In these circumstances, the ballot box acquired quasi-magical powers in the mind of the virgin electorate. Electors were told, and many believed, that by voting for the M.G. party, they would overnight acquire ownership rights over property in their temporary occupation. (Some who took this election

promise seriously were arrested soon after election for transgressing the property laws).

Voting for the United Goans was understood by many to mean the return to the luxury-goods era of the pre-Liberation days. Voting for Congress meant approval for the much disliked Military Rule after the Liberation and the condoning of the several blunders committed in the earlier days of the Civil Administration. Moreover, the Congress Party suffered from dissidence within the organisation on the future of Goa on the eve of elections creating complete confusion and some degree of internal sabotage. The Congress Party then lost the election, not because the electorate rejected its policy, but because it did not propagate its policy until well after the elections.

The Advantages

The case for the Union Territory status for a period of ten years rests principally on the fact that although this status could continue indefinitely, it can also be transitory, i.e., it allows any of the other alternatives at any desired stage. All the other alternatives have an aspect of finality about them. Secondly, Union Territory status gives the Central Government an opportunity to focus its attention on those spots which for one reason or another need special attention; like Goa or Pondicherry. Again, in the words of the late Prime Minister in another letter to the President of the Goa Congress, '... For the present, it is essential that Goa should remain a Union Territory and settle down. This will be not only advantageous to Goa in many ways, but it will also prove to the Goan people that we are not rushing them into any decision at this early stage. It is clear that the Government of India is not going to agree in the near future to any merger ...'

What are the problems of 'settling down' and what would be the advantages of Union Territory status for Goa? 450 years of colonial rule at least in the 'Old Conquests' of Goa has created certain psychological, legal and economic

problems which require time for their solution. I shall not concern myself with the impact of the overwhelming scenic beauty, or protracted colonial rule upon the individual nor on the differences in the legal or administrative systems, but with some of the economic problems.

Firstly, there is the problem of readjustment of the Goan economy, previously import-export oriented, to fit in with the economic set-up of the rest of the country. At the time of Liberation, there were nearly 1000 importers in Goa, Daman and Diu, who utilized nearly all of the Rs 20 crores foreign exchange earned by the export of mineral ore in importing foreign goods; nearly 6 crores in food-stuffs and 5 crores in other consumer goods. After Liberation, the Red Book put an embargo on 4/5th of these items, depriving about 90 per cent of the importers of their former trade. The remaining 10 per cent have had their average annual imports of Rs. 2 lakhs worth reduced to Rs. 5000 and Rs. 8000. Thus, the trading economy of Goa suddenly thrown out of gear needs time to adapt itself to an agro-industrial pattern.

Central Responsibility

More important still, as Union Territory the Central Government assumes responsibility for the economic development of the territory to fit into the new context. The long-term process of development from scratch will create recurrent investment needs over a period of time, which only the Centre can meet. The Goa Planning Board which works under the aegis of the Central Planning Board envisages an outlay of about 100 crores in the next ten years. The National Council for Applied Economic Research has recommended an investment of 600 crores into the major projects like a steel mill which is expected to raise the income of Goa 10 times.

At the time of Liberation itself the per capita income in Goa was twice as high as in the rest of India and consequently the consumption of essential commodities was of a higher ratio. Paper, tob-

acco and kerosene was twice that of the rest of India and sugar three times. In 1959, per population of 1000, there were 8.6 motor vehicles (including heavy automobiles) whilst in the rest of India there were 1.29. Therefore, the contrast between the higher standards of living in Goa and those in the surrounding area, namely the Konkani region, is highlighted all the more dramatically by the fact that Konkani remains the most underdeveloped region of Maharashtra, even poorer than Marathwada.

Disadvantages of Merger

According to the Techno-Economic survey of this region conducted by the Indian Merchant's Chamber published in 1964, Maharashtra gives the impression of being a highly developed industrial region contributing nearly 20 per cent of India's industrial output, but this impression is misleading.

'Apart from the islands of industrial concentration converging towards the City of Bombay, the entire State of Maharashtra is covered with a large region of underdeveloped areas. In a sense, there are areas which have not had the mark of the effects of economic improvement in the last one century and more. Among such undeveloped areas the prominent regions are Marathwada and the Konkani region. The annual per capita income of this region is rated to be very low. Nearly 60 per cent of the people were having a per capita income between 50 to 75 rupees per annum in 1921. Though no latest figures in this respect are available it is presumed that, on the whole, there has not been any appreciable improvement in the economic standards of the inhabitants. Looking to the rise in prices, even an apparent increase in incomes, if any, of the resident earners, would not contribute really to any improvement in the standard of living.' The percentage of indebted households is highest, and literacy is from 5 to 15 per cent lower than in the rest of Maharashtra.

In these circumstances, the majority of the people of Goa

equate a merger with Maharashtra with lowering their standards of living, an impossible economic somersault. The Modigliani-Dusenberry 'Ratchet' effect theory explains the fear aroused by the contemplation of merger in any rational person, irrespective of his calling or class (even the labour wages are 30 per cent lower in Maharashtra than in Goa).

Then there is also the fear that Goa's development will suffer adversely if it merges with a neighbouring State. The Centre cannot earmark funds separately for the development of a territory which forms a part of a larger unit. Even if the Centre disburses larger amounts, the actual allocation of funds is at the discretion of the State Government, and if Goa is a part of Maharashtra, then the claims of the other more underdeveloped parts of Maharashtra like Konkani and Marathwada, quite rightly, will be considerably greater than those of Goa for additional funds. On the other hand, the development of Goa as a separate unit, as a side effect, assists in the development of the poorer regions of Konkani nearest to it, i.e., the Ratnagiri district of Konkani adjoining Goa, just as the proximity of Thana District of Konkani to Bombay has helped its development more than that of Colaba or Ratnagiri.

Steel Plant Location

The location of a steel plant in Goa, recommended by the Japanese mission, would provide a much needed economic and moral boost to the entire coastal region south of Bombay, as Goa is the midway point between Bombay and Cochin. The ancillary industries would economically tone up debilitated regions north and south of Goa. There are other reasons making for suitability of the Goan site. The bulk of the iron ore is not high-grade but contains less impurities of phosphorus and sulphur than the uniformly higher grade ore of regions like Hospet—the latter could be more advantageously exported.

Then, the Goan mines are located no more than 30 miles inland con-

ned by a generous network of water-ways. Therefore, the transport costs—an important factor—are the lowest in India. Because of the harbour, cheap, high-quality imported coal could be employed in the furnaces. But in the final reckoning, a major project like a steel plant cannot be decided on purely economic grounds. As the Geneva Iron and Steel Symposium, December 1963, declared, 'Since social and economic development are closely related to the growth of iron and steel industry, decisions on new plants in developing nations cannot be taken purely on the basis of "practical" economic considerations.' A steel plant in the Union Territory would neatly overcome the claims of rival States.

Free Trade Zone

With or without the steel plant, there seems to be an excellent case for creating a Free Trade Zone in Goa. All the standard arguments for the choice of Free Trade Zones, pertinent to Kandla, Haldia (W. Bengal), Shewa-Neva (Maharashtra), apply to a Goan site with better justification for additional circumstantial reasons: (a) Goa has virtually been a Free Trade Zone in the past; (b) it has acquired skill and an institutional set-up for commercial relationships in the international market; (c) Marmagao is considered one of the eight best ports in the world; (d) Goa's present earning of Rs. 20 crores foreign exchange per annum could be upped not only by increasing the volume of exports but by installing beneficiating plants to upgrade the quality of exported ore. In the Free Trade Zone the latest machinery could be employed at low costs, free of customs duties. (The estimated deposits of iron ore are 500 to 5000 million tons). Since Maharashtra has the Shewa-Neva scheme, it seems unlikely that two Free Trade Zones would be established in one State if Goa were to be a part of Maharashtra.

Schemes like the Free Trade Zones, development of Marmagao as a major naval base, etc., could proceed less hampered if Goa con-

tinued as a separate unit. But there are other more cogent reasons for keeping it as an Union Territory. Since planned development in the rest of India has invariably fallen short of the desideratum, drawing on the experience of 15 years of planning, Goa, because of the smallness of its size, the existence of a statistical department, abundance of unexploited resources, could be regarded as a laboratory for planning, given a little economic enterprise. The growth processes could be observed more closely and controlled more effectively.

A Necessary Link

Then, Goa having 389 registered doctors, one for every 2000 persons, a start could be made of a State-aided health service. Also, a first-rate residential university that breaks new ground could be started specializing in fields suited to the genius of the people of this territory. It would have to have an Institute of Fine Arts, of Latin Culture, Modern European Languages, a College of Mineralogy and Geology, a Naval College. An institute of Latin Culture would provide a much needed link with the Portuguese-Spanish speaking world of South America and Africa—just as Pondicherry can be a bridge to the French speaking peoples of the world. There was a project to establish an university in Goa, but this project has been shelved by the present Maharashtra Government which considers it to be a political move designed to strengthen the case for a full-fledged State.

As in the case of the shelved university project, because the full economic and other potential of Goa may never be realised as long as there is the threat of merger in the not-too-distant future, and deep-seated fears have been aroused in a large section of the population, Goa must continue as a separate unit at least for ten years as an Union Territory receiving all the attention and funds it can attract from the Union Government during the course of two five-year plans. After that let the future take care of itself.

A recurring pimple

FRANK MORAES

MUST we have another spell of frustration and unrest in Goa which is now very much in the news? Described in Portuguese days as a pimple on the face of India, it now threatens to suppurate and erupt as a sore. There is no reason why it should, if the issue of its future is faced with tolerance and understanding and with no semblance of any attempt to stampede this microscopic territory into a decision. Happily, the right tone and approach were set by Maharashtra's Chief Minister, V. P. Naik, in his recent speech commending the merger resolution to the Maharashtra Legislature. He spoke the language of commonsense and persuasion. If that approach is maintained, the problem of Goa's future can be solved with no unnecessary irritation or frustration.

For 400 years before India's intervention in December 1961, Goa lived a sheltered Shangrila existence, a part of and yet an accident

of history, remote from the rest of India, steeped in a way of life different from that pervading the rest of the sub-continent, a land almost Mediterranean in its look and culture. It is possible to exaggerate this picture. The tendency to draw extravagant parallels should be deprecated. But, none the less, the differences, such as they are, due to prolonged exposure to Portuguese as distinct from British rule, need to be taken into account.

As a coloniser Portugal's principal export has always been religion. It is not unfair to say that her colonial philosophy is based on the concept that it is better to be Christian than to be independent. To be Portuguese is, of course, even better. Although the majority of Goans are Hindus, the overall impress, because of the Portuguese policy and association, is strongly Christian. That the Portuguese rulers quite unfairly favoured the minority of indige-

nous Catholics at the cost of the Hindu majority is also undeniable.

In his book, *The Land of the Great Image*, Maurice Collis gives an absorbing picture of the Portuguese dominion in Asia with its capital at what is now Old Goa but which Collis christens Golden Goa, in those days not only a political and commercial city but the ecclesiastical centre from which the Catholic Church sought to convert the East to Christianity. Collis opens with a vivid description of this city with its Inquisition, slaves and splendid baroque churches.

The Mystique

He summarizes the difference between Portuguese Asia and British India in his opening paragraph. 'Portuguese Asia,' he writes, 'was not a purely mercantile venture like the British settlements in India. The Portuguese who discovered the sea-route to Asia, who established fortresses from the Persian Gulf to the Straits of Malacca and beyond, who built Goa and introduced the Inquisition there, were a totally different class of people from the directors, the shareholders, and the employees of the East India Company. They were romantics, crusaders, conquistadors, as well as traders, while the members of the East India Company, coming on the scene a century later, were modern business men whose whole aim was dividends.'

The so-called Syrian Christians in Southern India are of an older religious lineage, but their Christianity has fortunately not grown in the hot-house atmosphere of a cloistered enclave. It is healthier and more extrovert. The Portuguese were aware of the Syrian Christians whom tradition dates back to the landing of St. Thomas, the Apostle, in South India, though others trace them to the Church founded by Nestorius, Patriarch of Constantinople, after the Council of Ephesus in A.D. 431. It is interesting to note that while the Portuguese destroyed most of the Hindu temples which stood on the territory of Goa, the Inquisition arrested many adherents of the Nestorian faith, tried them for

heresy and burnt them at the stake.

The Catholicism of Portugal has always been intense and inverted.

Portugal was the first European power to make her presence felt in Asia and Africa where she ventured in the 15th century. She is also the last of the western imperial powers to survive in Africa as she was the last to survive in India. A microscopic Portuguese foothold in the Asian continent is the island of Macao. Portugal's overseas rule was exalted into a *mystique* and was governed by three main concepts, all of them based on wishful thinking, with the ideal embodied in each case contradicted by practice. The three concepts were: spread of Christianity, racial tolerance and what the Portuguese would like to call human idealism as expressed in the 'unique' relationship between Portugal and her overseas territories, and the so-called civilising spirit which imbued it.

The Practice

Practice strayed far from theory. Thus the mission to bring to the Africans the benefits of Christian religion and culture is belied by the colonial record of their masters who treated them as primitive children to be whipped from their squalid stupor into civilisation and discipline by the *chichote*, a hide whip and the *palmatoria*, a wooden paddle with holes.

In Goa, due to the ancient and older civilisation of India and of Asia as a whole, the Portuguese proceeded more warily. Their mission in Goa was both to Christianise and westernise it. In his *Study of History* Arnold Toynbee notes how after their long struggle against the Moors in Europe, the Portuguese turned to the Americas and the East.

Toynbee refers to both the Portuguese and the Spaniards but his observations are peculiarly apposite to the former. 'These Iberian pioneers of Western Christendom' he noted 'performed an unparalleled service for the civilization which they represented. They expanded the horizon, and thereby potential-

ly the domain of our Western Society from an obscure corner of the Old World until it came to embrace all the habitable lands and navigable seas on the surface of the planet. It is owing to this Iberian energy and enterprise that Western Christendom has grown, like the grain of mustard seed in the parable, until it has become "the Great Society"; a tree in which all the nations of the world have come and lodged. This latter-day Westernized World is the peculiar achievement of Western Christendom's Iberian pioneers.'

Unfortunate Division

For these reasons mainly, the circumstances following the liberation of Goa from Portuguese rule have intensified the sense of divisiveness. The blame for this at least initially rested primarily on the Congress or more particularly on the Maharashtra Congress whose attitude to Goa was indistinguishable from that of the Maharashtra Gomantak party which is today the ruling party in Goa.

A not dissimilar parallel might be sought in the recent developments in the South where the attitude of the Congress in Tamilnad to the language issue is indistinguishable from that of Ramaswami Naicker's party and even the D.M.K. While the official Congress policy, as then enunciated by Jawaharlal Nehru, was that Goa should be the responsibility of the Government of India until such time as the territory decided on its status by a free vote of the people, the Gomantak party stood for the merger of Goa with Maharashtra. As against this the United Goans whose members are predominantly Christians, opposed merger with Maharashtra.

Goa's first panchayat elections in September 1962 were followed by elections to the Goa Assembly some fifteen months later. These elections were fought on the issue of whether Goa should or should not merge with Maharashtra and though the two opposing parties who stood respectively on a pro-merger and anti-merger platform contained both Hindus and Christians, it is incontestable that the

overwhelming majority among the United Goans were Christians, while the overwhelming majority in the Gomantak were Hindus. Thus political rivalries have unfortunately congealed on religious lines and it is here that the blunderbuss methods employed by the pro-merger groups and the devious role played in the Goa elections by the Maharashtra Congress Committee as distinct from the Congress High Command has unnecessarily intensified cleavages and exacerbated feelings on what threatened to be communal and religious lines.

Broadly, in territory as in terms of population, Goa does not count for much in the face of the vast complex of India. But it would be dangerous on this basis to discount the potentialities for latent irritations and frustrations. Nagaland invokes a similar and unfortunate parallel. To treat the issue of merger as of microscopic importance because of the small numbers involved—Goa's population is only 7 lakhs—is to misread and possibly misjudge the situation. A political upheaval in tiny Zanzibar touched off military mutinies in three African countries on the mainland while the miniscule island of Cyprus has brought Turkey and Greece to the brink of war. The danger of Goa is that it could activate communal passions in a context likely to generate a chain reaction.

The Maharashtra Congress

Because of this, the dubious role played and being played by the Maharashtra Congress carries within itself the seeds of potential conflict, which is unnecessary. The Congress High Command made an initial mistake in the elections since, while aware of the predilections of the Maharashtra Congress, it entrusted it with the election work in Goa and in the result left Congress-inclined Goans confused and demoralised. One heard complaints at that time of Congress posters and jeeps from Bombay arriving unconscionably and unaccountably late in Goa, thereby it would seem deliberately retarding the chances of Congress-sponsored candidates in the elections. Even Nehru's message arrived only on

the eve of the elections when under the rules campaigning had to cease.

Even more surprising was the attitude of the Maharashtra Congress to Bandodkar who headed the rival Gomantak party and whom the Maharashtra Congress, as distinct from the Congress High Command, proceeded to embrace as an ally. As a result the electors in Goa were left asking themselves what the Congress stood for and whether the prevailing dissensions within the Goa Congress and the complete identification of the Maharashtra Congress with the Maharashtrawadi Gomantak was not a reflection of a devious and calculated policy.

Precarious Majority

While the Gomantak could claim a majority vote in the Goa Assembly of 30, it could not pretend that the vote it received in the elections was a decisive vote in favour of merger. Actually the Gomantak members are by themselves in a minority since they constitute 14 members in a House of 30. They are supported by three PSP members which gives them a majority against the 12 United Goans and the single Congress member who was returned from Daman. Bandodkar commands a precarious majority for one of the members is the Speaker leaving him with 16 supporters.

Many sound reasons could be cited why in its own interest Goa which for a long time has been Bombay-oriented should merge with Maharashtra. Its economic lifeline stretches that way but with tactful handling there is no reason why its territorial and political sympathies should not also lie in that direction. What has hardened anti-merger opinion, and hardened it unnecessarily, are the pressurising tactics of the Maharashtra Congress and its supporters in Goa.

Another debilitating factor in this confused situation is the hesitant and uncertain attitude assumed by the Union Government when faced by the unanimous verdict of the two houses of the Maharashtra legislature calling upon Parliament to take immediate steps to make

Goa an integral part of Maharashtra. Prior to this, a similar demand was registered by a majority vote of the Goa Assembly where the voting was 15 to 1, the United Goans having staged a walk-out.

Second Thoughts

As against this the Parliamentary Board, controlled by the Congress High Command, resolved some time ago that Goa should continue as a Union territory for ten years, after which decision would be taken on its future set-up. This resolution was particularly in line with the official Congress policy as first enunciated by Jawaharlal Nehru. The situation has been rendered more difficult by a convention of the Goan organisation in Bombay passing a resolution calling upon the Government and Parliament to maintain the present autonomous set-up and to safeguard its people against the political pressures and agitations sponsored by the pro-merger leaders. Alongside these varied activities and postures are the intermittent noises made off-stage by Mysore which wants Goa merged with it.

The Congress High Command has apparently sought safety by suggesting that its cerebral pressures are to be reactivated. It has decided to think again. Second thoughts are sometimes not only useful but necessary. And in Goa's now somewhat delicate situation second thoughts are no bad thing. In arriving at a decision the Congress High Command should take care not to intensify the suspicion which the Maharashtra Congress's bludgeoning tactics have done. Else there is the possibility which wise men would wish to avoid that Goa, once a pimple on the face of India, might be a pimple on the face of Maharashtra.

Maharashtra's Chief Minister, V. P. Naik, has however behaved with eminent reasonableness and persuasiveness. This is encouraging. Also to be remembered is the tremendous success of the Eucharistic Congress in Bombay which His Holiness the Pope attended and which Naik did much to make successful.

Psychological adjustment

ERIC P.W. DA COSTA

IT is fashionable in journalistic circles to extoll objectivity. The assumption seems to be that journalists are to be judged by a supreme quality of detachment, wherewith they can see a problem without becoming in any way a part of it. I, for one, have always doubted whether objectivity is attainable in the first place; for another, I have often wondered whether its pursuit is as glorious a virtue as is generally supposed. In any case, in the current presentation, I will make no apology for being subjective, that is, for seeing Goa with a deep emotional component.

To all those, like me, whose ancestors had roots in Goa and who, inevitably it seems, carry a loose, but nevertheless deep, loyalty to the little territories described as Goa and Daman, subjectivity is the essence of the problem. No one who is not a part of the stream of emotions which Goa and Daman raise can understand what the Goan problem of adjustment is. Those who pretend to understand it better, merely because they can get a majority in the Indian Union to approve of their assessment, are doing violence to one of the most fundamental elements in a solution of the problems

which arise from duality in the Goan state of mind.

In the first place, there is a mistake in regard to the universe which needs to be considered when one talks about Goa. Too often the assumption is made that it is only the inhabitant of Goa who feels strongly on the subject, and that the views of Goans outside Goa but in the Indian Union are almost irrelevant. In fact, there are two Goans territorially: those who have pinned themselves to the Goan soil and those who have gone into the Indian Union mixing readily in its life, but who still view the Goan atmosphere as part of the air which they breathe.

There is a major psychological difference between the two Goas. There are the large number of Goans inside Goa who still carry, for reasons not easily explicable, a hesitant approach to the Indian way of life on the ground, not that it is democratically defective, but that it has by force of numbers, a massive power of attraction which will eliminate all minor deviations from its central philosophy, Hindu, socialist or otherwise. Practically all Indian Goans outside Goa are unafraid of the Indian political way of life. Part of the subjective problem of Goa is to understand why fear is thus aroused, even

when Goans in the Indian Union have shown that this fear is not warranted.

Discriminating Treatment

One reason for the fear is the historical chip on the shoulder which Goans have borne largely because of their treatment as somewhat inferior, in one way or another, both by the British ruling elite, and by a very large number of Indians, over-anxious in their nationalism to describe Goans, who accepted Portuguese rule, as colonialists. There has also been uneasy social compromise between the European and Indian way of life, symbolised by the fact that a large number of Goan women wear dresses instead of saris, and a very large number of men live in what might be called the western cultural mould, such as the playing of western musical instruments with almost total ignorance of Indian or indigenous music.

No one except a Goan will realise what this kind of inverted fear of non-recognition inside the Indian Union has meant for over two or three generations. And few nationalist Indians realise the extent to which eminence has been achieved for India by a very large number of Goans in every field under conditions which should have received far more recognition than is currently the case. This lack of recognition of the exceptional ability of many Goans, particularly amongst Goan Christians, seems to argue some prejudice either because of the foreign names they bore or their religion or their dual cultural loyalty. In most cases their merit failed to record.

It is necessary to stress this particular point of the intellectual ability of Goans in every field except possibly in organising large industries. Men of the eminence of Valerian Cardinal Gracias may look rare, but, considering the smallness of Goa, the remarkable contribution of its intellectuals to India's professional life must be admitted. I have myself been well in this current for over two generations and may, perhaps, be forgiven for speaking of it with some

little pride. My father happened to be the first Indian to obtain a Fellowship of the Royal College of Surgeons, England, I believe in the year 1879; yet for years this was constantly denied, the plea being that he was not an Indian, having been born in Goa.

Goans have produced in every professional field, but particularly in medicine, surgery, and engineering, men who in their particular fields have been near India's best. And in the area of teaching and in the top hierarchy of the Roman Catholic Church administration they have been a conspicuous success. In the civil services and army, air force and navy, members of ability can be counted in their hundreds. The fact that so many Goans are relegated to the inferior walks of life such as domestic service (cooks and bearers) or the jazz bands in restaurants should not detract from the intellectual vigour of the community in other areas. It is a shame that Goans have for two or three generations felt in the Indian Union that their native ability would not be recognised without political safeguards.

The Fears

This economic fear does not, it seems to me, have justification on the record since Independence but its persistence is a fact, and is undoubtedly related not to the experience of Goans outside Goa, but to the privileged position that a very large number of somewhat mediocre Goans attained inside their native land and at Lisbon as a result of Portuguese patronage. Thus, Goa produced Justices of the Supreme Court in Portugal as well as its own Chief Justices long before an Indian became a Chief Justice of an Indian High Court. All this looks irrelevant, but is part of the feeling that a Goan in the Indian Union fights a less equal fight than he does in his own little country.

There is thus not one Goa but two. Goans inside the Indian Union are already adjusted and are no longer afraid of competition as they were twenty or thirty years ago. Perhaps, liberation has had

much to do with the acceptance of Goan names in the current of Indian lives, but Goans inside Goa are still full of fear of Maharashtrian competition inside what has been a protected or sheltered field. It is natural that the more mediocre people will be the more fearful since it is they who need the protection. Undoubtedly, many of them will fall by the wayside if Goa is merged with Maharashtra. There are chances that Mysore will probably be better but, in any case, the fear of loss of employment or inadequate salaries whilst given employment, has to be met with some particular safeguard. **Most Goans accepted Jawaharlal** Nehru's assurance that, with the Centre, Goa would have ample opportunities for development by a special Plan of its own, particularly directed towards raising opportunities for Goans inside their own State.

This does not deal with politically divided Goa as it has emerged after the first elections. But the problem of the Christian minority in Goa settling with the Maharashtra majority which has always preferred loyalty to Maharashtra is, of course, another deep division inside the Goan mind. Whether a simple majority is or is not the solution to such problems is often brushed aside on the assumption that this is a basic principle in the settlement of all democratic disputes.

The Cure

As an Indian convinced of the process of simple juxtaposition and the opportunities that the Indian Union affords to Goans, I am personally of the opinion that those who are fearful of the larger opportunities can be cured by a process of simple juxtaposition with the facts or by a course of persuasion by Goans whose experience in the Indian Union has been favourable. If both the Goans outside Goa and the Maharashtra Government could undertake this exercise in education and not apply political pressure, the outlook would be more favourable.

Psychology is a creature of the mind but it would be a mistake to

suppose that it is, in the case of a large number of Goans, entirely an illusion that they were better off as an independent unit. The average per capita income in Goa, Daman and Diu at the time of liberation is still a subject of debate. But the Planning Commission of Goa, Daman and Diu, of which I had the honour of being a member, did study the evidence that was available and it is worth quoting a paragraph which appears on page 33 of the Draft Plan :

'Per capita income of Goa, inclusive of Daman and Diu was placed in 1958-59 at Rs. 456 by an unofficial agency (estimates of which were published in *Diploma base da Reforma Tributaria do Estado da India—Diploma Legislativo No. 1761 of 8-2-1958*). Since then, with the additional development of resources consequent upon attention to iron ore output, per capita income has risen rapidly, and in 1961 may be placed at about Rs. 600 at 1958-59 prices. This would be nearly twice the per capita income of the Indian Union, which, in 1961-62, was Rs. 313 at 1958-59 prices.'

Higher Standards

It is not only that the 'average' income of Goa was much higher. Its distribution, obviously unfair by current standards in the Indian Union, was based on the stable recognition of a privileged class, mostly land-owners, civil servants, and a few leading businessmen engaged in the export of ores, whose association with the Portuguese connection gave them a deep vested interest in its continuance. Apart from this particular point of social privilege, the much greater ease with which imports were attainable, since Goa had no serious foreign exchange problem, and the consequently lower price level meant that the real standard of living of the middle classes was higher than is represented by the monetary differentials which have been referred to above.

That is certainly no argument against psychological integration, which must come about following the incorporation of Goa in the

Indian Union; but it is an argument for understanding the somewhat unusual resistance which integration, particularly with Maharashtra, has generated in a large minority. A period of four years is too short to wipe out the memory of privilege associated with an administration which was culturally built into many Goan minds for four centuries.

Need for Time

Time, therefore, emerges as the essence of the piece. No Goan, whether inside or outside Goa, Daman or Diu can now look upon independent existence as a practical proposition for an indefinite period. But just as the transition to Hindi must take place at a retarded and, in the last analysis, indeterminate pace, so the adjustment to the needs of integration, particularly in those of middle age and above in Goa, cannot be expected to be immediate.

One of the great problems of politics arises from the differences in the individual's apparent and reality worlds. If the psychology of an individual's political appreciation and economic realities always marched immediately together, practically all the problems of politics would disappear. Conversely, when the problems do not disappear, a large absence of the psychology of acceptance of unpalatable facts must be assumed.

Nor is it always possible for those of us, who were indirectly associated with privilege in the form of landed or building property, to understand exactly what prompted in Daman the application with indecent haste—and with no compensation currently paid even after three years—of a Presidential Ordinance abolishing landlordism in Daman on terms which have naturally, and inevitably, raised a constitutional dispute before the Supreme Court. Issues of this kind must, of course, be radically approached, but was that any reason for not allowing, as is usual in such cases, the affected parties to be heard before the Ordinance was promulgated? The first reaction was undoubtedly the creation of a

climate of economic uncertainty which, in other respects, was never justified. At a time of political uncertainty, wise policy should be to attempt at least temporary stability.

Preserving Unity

On issues like language and integration and, as we found to our terrible cost in undivided India on much else besides, a powerful minority can triumph over democratic philosophy or even a rational appeal for a fair compromise. Indian unity has been struck so deeply by the tragic lack of understanding of powerful majorities that one is justified in uttering a warning against all those who wield power not by universal consent but by the brute force of numbers. It is always the victors that must beware: for it is they who arouse deep resentment in those defeated. The psychology of defeat remains substantial in many Goan minds.

To us who know Indian citizenship and are proud of our privileges, this is an almost incomprehensible thing. But it is a solid fact to be ignored only at our political peril. In the last analysis, all Goan Christians will side with their co-religionists: secularism, unhappily, will not prevail. Why should we be so thoughtless as to hurry a current which in its own somewhat sluggish way is leading to our desired end, whether that is to Maharashtra or to another Indian entity? And why should we precipitate another quarrel between Mysore and Maharashtra?

Time has its own power of healing; we should in Goa be using it well to bury unhappy memories; to turn from the dead past to the challenging future; to recognise that, while we are politically one in theory, we are not yet bound together by ties of deep affection, or even by cruder hoops of steel. We cannot, like Germany under Bismarck, be forced to combine by blood and iron; but Mahatma Gandhi knew a better way. We need his peaceful bridges to the mind of our people: who will build them while haste and passion grow?

Books

GOA: A NEW DEAL By Rudolf D'Mello.
Chetana Ltd. Bombay, 1963.

It is one of the ironies of life that freedom implies a corresponding measure of restraint. Otherwise it can only lead to confusion. This word which, at first blush, invites romantic visions of unfulfillable utopias has a far greater significance for those who care to probe more deeply. Above all, freedom should mean emancipation, social and political no less than economic, and this requires that the people are fully prepared to shoulder their responsibilities. Today, the people of Goa are a free people, having emerged from their colonial shell three years ago. They are a politically conscious people, having a positive approach to life, and with an active desire to progress as rapidly as possible. With reassuring guidance from the Government of India there was no reason why these hopes should not have been fulfilled.

What have been the reactions of the people of Goa to their liberty? Do they see the fulfilment of their hopes? And most important, how is India, the mother country, helping them along the first steps? D'Mello's collection of speeches and articles gives us a good insight into these and other problems facing Goa. The book is indeed 'an impressionistic account of

the people of Goa'; but more significantly the author brings out an important problem, the scope of which is not confined to Goa alone. This is the problem of a firm and decisive approach, or rather the lack of it. D'Mello gives a number of examples to illustrate this point.

With the liberation of Goa came the desire for an honest participation in the democratic processes of government which would lead to the regeneration not only of society but also of the individual. In the initial flush of liberty, however, popular enthusiasm hurried the government into introducing Panchayati Raj into Goa even before a popular government had been elected. The introduction was much too hasty and lacked adequate preparation. As a result, illiterate panchas and sarpanchas, with no idea as to what their office entailed, were appointed. Popular enthusiasm was assuaged. But the result was a mockery of the institutions of democracy at the hands of 'inexperienced teenagers'.

This complete absence of forward planning and of preparation was also evidenced in the drawing up of the Draft Plan for the economy of Goa. Most of the agricultural problems here, as in the rest of India, arise out of low productivity. It was only

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
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natural to hope that the government, on the basis of its past experience, would draw up a plan which would dynamise the economy as quickly as possible. As previous agricultural data relating to the colonial era was unreliable, a Board was appointed to make a survey of the economy on the basis of which, presumably, a plan would be drawn up. Astonishingly, however, the government finalised the plan even before the survey was concluded. Pertinently D'Mello asks on what data this plan was drawn up. The existing information was quite inaccurate and a plan based on such information would be highly suspect.

Furthermore, the Draft Plan which materialised was 'a shapeless, rather careless and uncoordinated document'. It is a mystery how the data was obtained since the members found little time to visit Goa and study the problems at first hand. More disturbing still were the glaring inconsistencies in the document. Thus, for example, the climate and rainfall differ on different pages as do the doctors and number of hospitals in Goa. There is also a large discrepancy in some of the production figures cited. That any official document should contain such errors, which betray a careless and untidy approach, is disgraceful. What is even more appalling is the fact that these figures were to represent a serious effort at planning the development of the economy.

The first task after liberating Goa was the task of economic reconstruction. 'Freedom' according to D'Mello 'should mean a New Deal; a New Deal which provides more jobs, more production, better education... etc.' But so far, it appears, freedom has only brought economic and financial hardship. D'Mello does not criticise the administration simply for the sake of criticising. His arguments are logical and significant. He gives the impression of a person who has troubled to think sincerely and with deliberation about Goa's problems. Today, the problems of Goa are the problems of India and her failures will be reckoned as India's. The old dictum is still valid: it is relatively easy to reach the promised land. What is infinitely more difficult is to know what to do when one gets there. We arrived some time ago. It is now time we woke up and applied ourselves firmly and seriously to the tasks at hand.

Kamalbir

THE FIRST GENERAL ELECTIONS IN GOA By G. S. Halappa.

Karnatak University, 1964.

This is an observational study of a political phenomenon involved in the introduction of political institutions *de novo* in a territory traditionally subject to foreign and despotic rule. The liberation of Goa followed by the infusion of democratic processes aroused the interest of Indian political scientists to undertake a scrutiny of the voting behaviour of the people in the tiny enclave and thereby draw certain inferences for policy-guidance. The task was certainly challenging as it required the necessary intellectual and scientific equipment on the part of the investigators, and I simply wonder how in 'a

week's stay' they could perform a correct x-ray of a society beset with formidable problems. The booklet is hardly a comprehensive or a critical analysis of politics, but it certainly is a worthy step towards that direction. Quite understandably, the small book could not be a satisfying study of the vast socio-economic-political aspects as it claims to be. Nevertheless, it provides very valuable information on the general election in the territory in so far as the major tendencies in the area are discernible.

The first two chapters are devoted to the historical evolution of Goa since A.D. 119 when a century of Kadamba rule invited prosperity, stability and progress, to 1963 when the first elected government took office. The period in between the two landmarks, i.e., from Malik Kapur's invasion in 1312 to 1961, the year of emancipation from Portuguese hold, is a period characterized by fitful invasions and tragic repressions and suppressions—a long period of 450 years of purely military occupation coupled with the drainage of economic resources. Significantly, there have been 40 revolts against the regime until the end of the 19th century. The Government from Lisbon followed a conscious policy from the 17th century of persecutions, forcible conversions, destruction of temples and mosques, erection of numerous churches and imposition of the Portuguese language and religion on helpless people with a view to alienate them from Indian culture. The history of Goa may well be called 'the proselytizing era' signified by the existence of 30,000 priests and 80 churches. Needless to say that the Portuguese left an ugly legacy of authoritarianism and religious intolerance.

In this context, there was bound to be a radical shake-up in the power pattern after Goa's integration with the Indian Union. The prelude to the complex process of transformation was provided by the opportunity for the people to choose their own government. Yet, the implications of granting the right to franchise were not properly comprehended in New Delhi. A plural society, ethnically mixed up, split into caste and communal groups, the Goans present a different spectacle from the rest of the country, linguistically, socially and culturally. Latinization of culture has produced a hybrid mixture of modernity and tradition. There is little realization in the community of the Indian links and the age-long denationalization of the mass by the Portuguese has virtually wiped out the feelings of patriotism towards India. No wonder the tendency of exclusiveness manifests itself in political life.

The facts about Goa are interestingly arresting. Whereas in India prohibition is the professed policy having a constitutional sanction, in Goa the habits of alcoholism are conspicuous—the per capita consumption of liquor is 5 litres as against the highest average of 3 litres in France. Westernized dress, fox trot and jazz are symbolic of the divergence of life from its counterpart in the motherland. Braganza and Cunha—the two nationalist leaders—complained that they were never taught about the

legendary battle of the Mahabharata. Albuquerque and Salazar assiduously transformed or rather metamorphosed the basically Hindu community into 'the corridor of the convent of Monicas.' With a preponderance of women over men and 31 per cent literacy the Goan society has been sustained by tourism, smuggling, lottery and emigration. The 1960 census revealed the linguistic percentages of the population—Konkani-speaking 84 per cent, Marathi-speaking 1.5 per cent and Hindi-speaking 0.2 per cent suggesting the peculiarity of the situation.

Halappa evaluates a high degree of political awareness during elections, with more than 74 per cent of people voting in an over-all free and fair election. But for minor blemishes on the part of political parties, the machinery of election conducted itself well. Congress suffered a complete rout and a most humiliating defeat: it captured 1 seat out of 30 for the Assembly and 16.55 per cent of the electoral support. The Maharashtrawadi Gomantak swepted the polls by capturing 16 seats and 37.78 per cent votes. The United Goans could not make a mark and the Frente Popular failed miserably. If the success of the Maharashtrawadi Gomantak can be accounted for by the zeal and organizational capacity of its leader, Dayanand Bhandarkar, who had wonderful grass-root contacts, the failure of the Congress can be ascribed to the division in its own ranks especially on the issue of merger into an adjoining State. Congress also blundered by not making last-minute electoral alliances with other parties. On the whole, the party leaders failed to give a clear picture to the electorate on the main issue—merger, status quo, or complete statehood. Mostly, the electorate was fed on the vague fear that merger would mean the loss of Goan identity and loss of Christianity to the people. Nobody could proclaim the secular nature of the Indian Constitution nor the cultural and linguistic autonomy that the Indian political system provided.

In conclusion, the author rejects the M. Gomantak's claim for merger with Maharashtra on linguistic grounds on the obvious plea that the number of Marathi-speaking people is insignificantly small. He maintains that the election was not a referendum on the issue of merger and hence if 38 per cent of votes were cast in favour of merger as against 30 per cent for anti-merger, the vote could not be taken as decisive. This part of the report on the election appears to me to be baffling. If majority decisions are decisive in a majority-based democracy, there seems no reason to suppose that the election did not justifiably show the preference for merger. It may, however, be agreed that there is no unanimity on the question and hence it would be prudent to shelve it for the time being. But, eventually, the issue has to be settled in favour of the majority.

Halappa closes his report with a note of warning. The controversy over the future status of Goa may lead to political instability in the region, culminating in the imposition of the President's rule. If the merger is enforced against the will of the Christians,

agitation is likely. Wisdom lies in not disturbing the status quo of Goa.

M. M. Sankhdher

TECHNO-ECONOMIC SURVEY OF GOA, DAMAN & DIU

Issued by the National Council of Applied Economic Research, New Delhi, Pp. XII+275.

Techno-Economic Survey of Goa, Daman & Diu, released by Dr. P. S. Lokanathan, Director General, National Council of Applied Economic Research, at a well-attended press conference on January 15, 1965, gives encyclopaedic information on the past, present and future outlook of Goa's economy.

As one glances through its pages, one is struck by some characteristic features of Goan economy which stand in sharp contrast to Indian economy as a whole. The population of Portuguese India, comprising Goa, Daman, Diu and Nagar Haveli, for instance, rose during the last half century by 19.8 per cent—about the same as registered by the Indian Union during the last one decade. Goa's agriculture having been stagnant for decades, there has been a constant outmigration of the male population to adjoining States, resulting in an imbalance in the sex ratio at home.

Goa before integration had a higher *per capita* income than that of India. The brisk mining activity in it made for relatively high wage levels. Combined with the easy availability of cheap consumer goods from abroad and large dividends arising from their being smuggled into the neighbouring States of India, created a semblance of plenty.

Goa had excellent transport facilities *vis-a-vis* India. It had 110 vehicles per thousand persons compared to 13.6 in India. Inland waterways too were well-developed, about 90 per cent of ore traffic having been carried to ports by barges.

After the Indian embargo in 1956, Goa stood out as a classic example of an isolated economic island responding to the stimulus of a vigorous export demand. It exported during 1956-61 four million tonnes of iron ore annually as against India's 2.5 million tonnes annually during the same period. Land ownership as well as use of land was to a large extent communal and recognised by law as such.

Strange as it may seem, Goa's integration with the mainland of India threw up problems the net impact of which was rather unfavourable at the local level. The uncertainty hanging over government policy on export of iron ore gave a set-back to mining activity. A variety of industrial units producing articles of daily need such as soap, tiles, textiles, etc., were closed down. While the constraints on agriculture, forests and fisheries were by and large removed, the overall effect of integration on economy and employment was far from satisfactory.

The NCAER's study presents a 13-year developmental strategy with an investment content of Rs. 650

crores. Its proposals, if accepted and implemented by the government, are likely to raise the regional income from Rs. 27.17 crores in 1960 to Rs. 243.5 crores in 1975. The most important proposal is the one relating to the establishment in Goa of an iron and steel complex of 2 million tons capacity. Farm output is proposed to be doubled. All this is likely to bring about a state of full employment, calling for in-migration of manpower from the adjacent regions. There is hardly any sector of Goa's economy for which specific proposals have not been made by the NCAER.

The NCAER's study of Goa being an objective, non-controversial document does not raise any uncomfortable questions, but a critical reader is bound to look for answers to some such questions arising in his mind.

Goa faces not only the problems of development but also of integration. A 'Goa News Letter' appearing in the latest issue of *The Times of India* (14.4.65) at the time of writing, analyses some of the State measures to bring the administration of Goa at par with that in the rest of India in respect of efficiency. The NCAER's study also takes due cognizance of the problems of integration. This being so, why did the Government of India with all its resources and with all its expertise and experience in planning not bestow some thought on planning in Goa much before its liberation in December, 1961?

The NCAER was invited to take up this research project by the then civil administration of Goa in the middle of 1962. The NCAER's study became available to the public after 2½ years, two of which form a part of its 13-year development programme. In the words of Director General Dr. P. S. Lokanathan, the cost estimates embodied in the volume are 'very rough' and 'further work is needed to arrive at precise estimates.' Given the need for further work, which would again take some time, say, a year or so, when after all will Goa embark upon its course of planned development?

The scope of the study is obviously restricted to a techno-economic survey of Goa, but, Goa now being an integral part of the Indian Union, a plan for it cannot be expected to work in a vacuum. What then is the relationship between the long-term perspective of economic development prepared by the Perspective Division of the Planning Commission and the long-term perspective for Goa prepared by the NCAER?

An overwhelming part of the population (64%), according to the study, depends on agriculture, which has been allotted barely one crore of rupees out of a total investment of Rs. 650 crores. How then will the prosperity likely to be ushered in by the development plan envisaged by the NCAER percolate to the cultivator who, according to the study, must have a stake in Goa's economic development? The share of the local population in additional prosperity has,

moreover, not been estimated. How will it be enthused for a plan which imposes burdens but does not hold out a clear vision of the fruit of that plan?

All said and done, *Techno-Economic Survey of Goa, Daman & Diu* is an original work of a pioneering nature. The recognition it has received has been far beyond the expectations of its authors. When the Government of Goa ordered the purchase of one thousand copies of it, the NCAER was rather surprised and so had it confirmed twice whether copies ordered were really so many. The case made out by the NCAER for the location of a steel plant in Goa is convincing. Its suggestion for introducing joint cooperative farming in the lands owned by *comunidades* or village communities and the revival of local *bouco* or collective farming deserves serious note by the Ministry of Agriculture.

Another suggestion regarding the establishment of a Manpower Unit for undertaking studies in manpower is in conformity with the Estimates Committee's thinking in its very recent report on 'Directorate of Manpower and Institute of Applied Manpower Research.' Those interested in the development and growth of Goa's economy can hardly afford to miss this useful work on the subject.

H. S.

GOA'S FREEDOM STRUGGLE (Selected Writings of T. B. Cunha).

Dr. T. B. Cunha Memorial Committee, Bombay, 1961.

Dr. T. B. Cunha was a brave Goan and an Indian patriot who fought for the freedom of Goa and its unity with India. He spent many years in a Portuguese prison, returned to India and, having been exhausted by the endless struggle, died in 1958, three years before the liberation of Goa from Portuguese rule and six years before the visit of the Pope to India, which itself was resented by the Portuguese Government.

India inherited the problem of Goa in 1947 and it remained an international problem for many years, far longer than other foreign pockets of India. Tristao de Braganca Cunha's writings seek to throw much light on why this happened, and this is of special interest to-day when Goa has become a national problem.

Gandhiji is reported to have said that Goa could be taken without firing a shot because he looked upon Goa as an internal problem of India to be settled as a domestic question. Dr. Cunha also wrote that there was no need to resort to any military or police action by India (may be he was thinking of Hyderabad) to solve the Goa problem, as there had been no need for any similar action in the case of Pondicherry. Yet he understood well the nature of fascism, which does not shrink from violence nor believes in giving in to pressure of any other kind. The West itself had to fight to liberate large parts of the world from fascism in World War II, but was

wild with India for finding it necessary to fight similarly.

It was the author's contention that the national leadership of India, with the exception perhaps of Nehru, took little interest in the problem of Goa and realised even less the urgency of solving it immediately after India won its own political freedom, when the problem was relatively simple. The long delay which was fatal and is put down to complacency and blindness made the problem unnecessarily complicated, and was exploited by Portugal and her allies to smear India and mislead the world by false propaganda, without giving India any credit for using civilised methods for so long. India failed to explain her case to the world and was thereby pushed on the defensive by the offending party. All this is past history, but must be understood to avoid dangerous mistakes in the future. Goa is a pressing current problem also and it has to be settled without blindness or complacency on the basis of a clear-cut policy which will be acceptable to the people of Goa.

Britain and France, far more powerful than Portugal, relinquished their rule of India which Portugal refused to do. It lost all sense of proportion and was not made conscious of the entire dependence of its tiny Indian territories on the rest of vast India, and this dependence was not immediately and powerfully pressed home by the Indian Government. It was the author's view that the experience gained from the case of French India should have served as a lesson to speed up the settlement of the problem of Portuguese India, the most important fact being the economic and administrative cordon thrown round the French territories, which proved its worth. It was felt that identical measures, if properly implemented, could also paralyse the Portuguese administration in Goa and speed up the solution of the problem.

These writings emphasise that it was only after the achievement of Indian independence that the Portuguese attained a status of full sovereignty in India, previously denied to them by their British ally. The Portuguese could only then augment their military forces stationed in Goa by several thousands of African and European troops, whereas during British rule in India they were hardly allowed to have a few hundreds. Thanks to smuggling and the free speculation in Indian currency, which were not prevented but could have been, the Goa State revenues doubled within three years after 1947 and helped to provide for the huge expenses incurred in maintaining their disproportionately large army.

What of the future? Some of the facts and figures quoted in these writings are relevant. It is generally believed still that the majority of the inhabitants of Goa are Christian, but in truth the Hindus form the greater number, about 55 per cent. Konkani is the mother-tongue of all Goans, both Hindu and Christian. It is spoken in India over an area of 7000 sq. miles, which extend far beyond Goa. Modern philo-

logists call it Goamantaki, belonging as it does to Goamantak, the ancient name of Goa, the principal home of the language, in order that it might not be mistaken for a dialect of Marathi, as is often wrongly done. The Konkani of the North, the Kudali, which is spoken as far as Malwan and Devgad, is influenced by Marathi, and that of the South, which extends as far as Mangalore, is influenced by Kanarese.

In matters cultural, unlike the inhabitants of Pondicherry who were in touch with a high level of French intellectual achievement, the people of Goa are considered to have hardly any heritage worth preserving as a result of four centuries of contact with the Portuguese, since their own culture was deprived by their existing masters of qualities of universality and humanity, by which any national culture becomes precious to the rest of the world. Less than five per cent of Goans can speak a more or less good Portuguese.

Although Dr. Cunha did not live to see the freedom of Goa, his vision of its future political status is important and pertinent to-day. He wrote that any stress on religion would only lead to communalism, which has already proved to be an obstacle in the way of India's national unity. He also referred to those who raised linguistic slogans in the case of Goa and emphasised that inside Goa the linguistic unity of the Goan people was undeniable. He went on to say that the linguistic relations of Goa with the neighbouring territories could only be settled when Goans were able to make their choice freely and should not aim merely at the future aggrandisement of the neighbouring linguistic regions.

He stood for a democratic solution of the future political status of Goa, which recognised the peculiarities of the problem of Goa derived from a mode of life acquired under a long domination different from the rest of India. This corresponds with Nehru's thinking also when he last expressed himself on this subject, but different pressures are developing to-day and complicating the problem of Goa with the national leadership itself speaking with different voices. For the national minded Goans no assurance was needed, nor any condition imposed in an arbitrary manner, acceptable. This is what this brave and patriotic citizen of Goa and India, Dr. de Cunha, had to say to the critics of Goan freedom, which needs to be highlighted to-day—

'Besides, the critics who express their doubts over the future of the country under the regime of national independence, only display their lack of faith in the virtues of freedom and in our own capacity to redress the wrongs under the system of democratic rights. It is a sign of an inferiority complex acquired during the long period of colonial subjection. This is precisely the case of those who are asking for assurances from the Indian Government before discarding their former masters and bowing to the new ones.'

A. K. Banerjee

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Communication

As usual, the editorial delineation of the subject for discussion in your April issue was excellent. But neither this nor the articles that followed pointed to a vital aspect of it, which is its historicity.

A national language is the product of a definite stage of a country's history, the stage of developing capitalism. India presents an exception to this rule inasmuch as the fact that developing capitalism did not endow her with this asset. The historicity of our current linguistic problem sprang from this phenomenon. Developing capitalism does not conjure up a national language from nowhere. It shapes it out of regional dialects, as was witnessed in almost all the nation States of the West. In India, the main regions were making do not with dialects but with fully developed languages which cannot be either assimilated or reshaped into a new one.

This peculiarity need not have obliged us to opt for English. Although no national language can develop until the stage of developing capitalism, there can be a language enjoying hegemony in a country, as for instance Russian was in Czarist Russia. In India too there was such a language, Sanskrit. But as

Raja Ram Mohan Roy had to point out, it fell short of the role involved.

Even this need not have obliged India to elect English, as she had a few fully developed regional languages to make do with. If her leading sons had bypassed them, it was because they were the intuitive agents of history. Our concern for history and historicity being what it is, we have not yet ascertained when the Indian society conceived the germs of capitalism. But there was one contemporary genius abroad whose alert eyes did not fail to detect its birth. In his famous letters on India, Karl Marx put it on record that this took place when the first few miles of railway lines were laid in the country. The Indians who were agitating for the election of English were only symptomising the birth pangs of India's developing capitalism. Had they voted for regional languages, Indian unity would have received the gravest blow.

Unity of will and action was never India's main national asset. Despite our much vaunted basic unity, our history was always shaped by the forces of diversity. An Alexander could always count on the activities of an Ambhi and a Clive on a Mirjaffar. Yet this shameful aspect of our history was not

traceable to any inherent weakness of our people. The weakness lay in the absence of the necessary material foundation to support vigorous nationalism. When we struck open the path of capitalist development, we also struck the first blow to this perennial weakness. Had we assigned the linguistic role to our regional languages in this revolution, our parochial forces would have deepened their regional roots and might have even broken up the country into numerous nation States.

This does not mean that by playing a momentous role during a vital phase of our history, English came to stay for good. On the contrary, it set in motion that process which alone made it possible for us to think of Hindi as our lingua franca.

Despite Mirabai and Tulsidas, Hindi had never enjoyed political or intellectual hegemony in the country outside the Hindi belt. Even in its Urdu form it was never more than one of the country's numerous languages during any phase of our history, including the thousand-year-long Muslim period whose direct offshoot it was. The cult of ghazals, Khayals, Mushairas and Qawalis might have widened its regional base to an all-India circumference, but the position of political and intellectual hegemony used to be enjoyed by Persian. The position changed only from the twenties when our new nationalism had grown out of the incipient capitalist revolution—a national achievement due to the role played by English—that we threw emotional force behind the position of Hindi/Hindustani by claiming it as our lingua franca.

If the nation is divided today over the position of Hindi, it is not that our nationalism has lost its edge. The fact is that since independence the emotional base of nationalism has changed. It is no more a force of resistance in which meetings, processions and satyagraha were the main tasks. Now it is a renascent force bursting forth in all directions. Hindi cannot cope with the new tasks, as has been pointed out in some of your articles. Those who stand for English as the associate national language represent the logic of history.

While the aspect discussed above was left outside the scope of discussion, there is one more aspect which, though editorially posed, was not adequately (if at all) discussed in the articles, and that is how to give creative expression to the nation's renascent urge and vigour.

Here, too, the process set in motion by the election of English to the position of

linguistic hegemony must be allowed to function, that is, both Hindi and English must be used in the sphere of creative activity. Since a renascent spirit is born only at a renascent period, which does not frequent history, we must not stifle it in the national sphere for want of a full-bloomed national language.

The tasks are not as difficult as they might appear on the surface. There are spheres like the screen, stage and radio, all the most potent media of mass communication, where Hindi's claim is unrivalled. But there are other spheres like the press, platform and the world of letters where English enjoys and must continue to enjoy the dominant role. In fact, there is one genre which must employ English with greater vigour and less of self-consciousness, and this is the genre of creative writing. The derision of the highbrows must not inhibit the talented, who must derive strength and self-confidence from history.

Although English has played such a vital role in our national regeneration, English education has never failed to produce the WOGs and Anglophiles whom Macaulay had in view. In fact, the first products of English education poured scorn on all things Indian. The position changed only when, as a result of the objectively regenerative role of English, our capitalist development clashed with metropolitan interests; then the intelligentsia was made to realise that English education must not be allowed to denationalise it. That was how we began to produce our Tagore, Tilak, Vivekanand and, above all, Gandhiji. What determined this phenomenon was that with the intensification of the conflict between India's developing capitalism and the metropolitan interests, conditions arose for the masses to be drawn into the vortex of the national struggle, and the masses were not going to put up with WOGs. Thus, from the twenties the elite had to make sure that its knowledge of English did not make it appear denationalised.

This position does not hold good today. With freedom won, India's capitalism relies more and more on bureaucracy to fight its battle, and bureaucracy is the main hotbed of WOGism. The scourge is spreading again. In fact it is now one of the features of national reaction. In addition to promoting our renascent spirit in the country's intelligentsia, our talents must also wage a relentless battle against the new WOGism.

Ranchi, April 12, 1965.

D. C. HOME



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THE PROBLEM

An attempt to raise some of the
questions on caste which are
under debate

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COVER

Designed by Chowdhury/Grewal

The problem

THERE are two views on the future of caste in India. Some argue that it is growing stronger instead of weakening. Others hold that forces of modernisation, especially industrial development, are bound to weaken and ultimately destroy the caste system. Protagonists of either view may find support in contemporary socio-economic trends in the country, for the social structure in India is very complex. In a vast country such as ours, contrary trends may gather strength simultaneously.

M. N. Srinivas, the well-known anthropologist, is a major proponent of the view that the caste system in India is not only not declining but growing more powerful. Modern means of communication, the spread of education and an increase in prosperity have contributed to the strengthening of the caste system, especially through the formation of caste associations which cover large areas and utilise the means of communication and organisation made available through technological progress in order to strengthen their hold upon members of the caste and to mould their activities. The question is whether this trend would continue in the future so as to make the forces of modernisation subservient to traditional values as embodied in the caste system.

The other view is that the caste system is declining and disappearing, in a qualitative sense if not absolutely. When a caste group functions as a political body, it loses its traditional meaning. It cannot any longer be considered a caste in the proper sense. The same may be said to hold true when a caste association functions as an educational organisation or as an economic enterprise. In either case, the caste loses its ritualistic and traditional function as a regulator of social behaviour for it becomes a service organisation. We are concerned here to discuss the pattern of transformation which the caste system is undergoing and to examine its significance for the future.

To begin with, it is essential to grasp the fact that social evolution is usually not straightforward or mechanical. When an institution is apparently gaining strength, it might actually be nearing collapse. In Germany, for instance, the feudal values and relations found a new lease of life under the National Socialists. The principle of hierarchy, of unconditional obedi-

ence to the superiors and the cult of blood and soil were raised to sacred and absolute principles. This did not mean, however, that the neo-feudalism had a chance of survival in a Germany which was already highly industrialised. The accentuation of traditional patterns of social life signified that they would soon pass away. The case of National Socialism in Germany is an extreme one, but the principle holds true. Thus, accentuation of caste loyalties or their extension to new areas of life could mean their impending collapse. In any case, this possibility has to be kept in mind in assessing social change in India in so far as it affects the caste system.

Another form of social change, which is equally deceptive, occurs where the form continues as before but the reality changes. An obvious example is the British monarchy. The Queen is the sovereign and all Britons are her subjects. This is the appearance. In reality the British monarch enjoys less political influence than the President of India. A similar development might take place in India: even if the semblance of caste ties continued to persist, the old substance would have vanished.

The argument is that social change in India, as it affects the caste system, is not proceeding mechanically but in a dialectical manner. Appearances may be deceptive. Some social scientists and critics are misled by appearances. They argue as Srinivas does, that the caste system in India is gaining ground. Or they think, as does Selig Harrison, that India is being fragmented into local power centres by the pull of caste, community and language. Both authors take a mechanical view of social and political developments but ignore the fact that social change is an intricate process in which currents and cross-currents tend to confuse the direction of the overall movement. A dialectical approach is required if we are to discern the general direction of change which is hidden beneath the eddies on the surface.

It is part of the dialectical approach to recognise that social tensions and conflicts often serve a purpose contrary to that which is apparent. Conflict does not necessarily drive the parties involved away from one another; it may act as cement which holds the antagonists together. In fact, a political union leavened by a large element of conflict is likely to prove more enduring and more creative than a union in which elements of conflict and tension are weak. This is the significance of parliamentary democracy based on the multi-party system.

For all its internal bickerings, the democratic society has proved more stable than monolithic totalitarian systems based on the principle of 'one people, one country, one leader'. We may add that societies tend to become democratic

when they have attained a certain level of dynamic equilibrium. In some contexts and to a certain degree, conflict is a cohesive and a creative social force. Unless one recognises that, one would despair of the future of India. The country is divided into numerous religious, linguistic and caste groups, which seem to negate her political unity and national integrity. As a matter of fact, the splintering of Indian society is the pre-condition of its social dynamism and political stability.)

For all its iniquity, the caste system has proved useful in India's growth toward a self-governing, democratic community. To begin with, one must recognise that caste, which institutionalises the tradition, plays a useful social role. The tradition is necessary to provide certainty in the midst of natural hazards and social calamities to which man is subject. The human mind cannot bear up with a situation where accidental happenings predominate. In an environment where anything is liable to happen at any time, it would be impossible for a rational being to exist. Reason, both abstract and practical, presupposes that happenings are predictable.

To be sure, if everything were predictable and uniform, the human mind with its faculty of creative imagination would not have evolved. As it is, human life is beset by uncertainty and accident. Civilization is the attempt of man to tame the accidental in his natural and social environment. This is the purpose which tradition serves. Whether it is an abstract belief, such as religious faith, or a philosophical conviction, or a particular way of doing things, tradition enhances predictability. Lest society should become too set, however, the element of accident is often reintroduced artificially, e.g., in sports, lotteries, parliamentary elections, adventures into the unknown. We must bear this in mind if we are to think of the caste system in the perspective of social evolution.

The caste provides an element of predictability to its members. That such a rigid social institution as the caste system should have developed in India, that it should be so pervasive and prove so durable, would indicate that the prevalence of uncertainty in natural happenings and in social life was extremely severe. It may sound an exaggeration but it is not without an element of truth that the rigidity of the caste system is a response to the unpredictability of the monsoon winds, which bring the rains upon which life in India largely depends. The caste system will not disappear until nature is tamed and social security is established.)

But the transition from one social system to another increases the insecurity, even when one is precarious and the other is relatively secure.

In India the transition is from the predominantly agrarian system, which is largely at the mercy of wind and rain, to an industrial system in which the forces of nature are tamed increasingly and natural catastrophes, which seem always to lurk around the corner, are reduced; in the short-run the transition accentuates uncertainty.

People undergoing change from one socio-economic system to another are beset by acute social and psychological insecurity which, paradoxically, tends to intensify the traditional elements in its culture. Germany, Japan and Italy provided examples of this paradox in recent years. But even in those countries where a successful revolution occurred, such as the Soviet Union and China, the intensification of the traditional element was marked in the post-revolutionary period. Revolution has two faces: one progressive and the other retrograde. It brings about a reversion to the patterns of the past in some respects whereas it leaps forward bravely in other matters. The element of conservatism makes it inevitable that a revolution be followed by a 'counter' revolution.

If no violent revolution has taken place in India nor does it seem imminent, the reason is largely the effectiveness of the caste system. Each caste group is a little oasis of security in the prevailing uncertainty. The more insecurity increases, the more the caste unit sticks together, serving to cushion the shocks from the environment. This is why social disintegration, or anomie, which precedes a violent revolution, has not proceeded far in India. Yet the dissolution of some traditional bonds is advancing apace, increasing tensions and insecurity, which is met by the intensification or extension of caste loyalties.

But other factors of social change are in operation. Where new socio-economic patterns emerge, they do not involve the whole of society at once. Rather, some individuals and groups pass into the new system whereas others remain within the old. Some individuals and groups find a new pattern of security. Business entrepreneurs, engineers, scientists, writers or active politicians discover that their success depends upon rejection of traditional bonds. Yet, if they are not to become rootless and insecure, they must maintain relationship with the majority which, in the initial phases of industrial development, remains tied to the traditional patterns of behaviour, for the masses continue to be the clientele.

The relation between the modernist or emancipated social layers on the one side and the masses rooted in tradition on the other tends to be labile; in India, the caste system builds a bridge between them. Those who become emancipated from the traditional bonds often

feel alienated from society and tend to emigrate to countries where the transition has already taken place; caste and family ties in India counteract the tendency.

If caste serves so many purposes, the question is relevant whether one may expect it to retain its sway in the future. To some extent the answer is a matter of terminology. The characteristic features of the caste system are its strict (if ambiguous) hierarchical organisation and that each caste is tied to a particular profession. Whatever else happens, these two features of the caste system are bound to disappear in the course of industrial and commercial growth.

Caste groups are already competing against one another in the political arena on a basis of growing equality. Their relative strength is determined increasingly not by their ritual status but by numbers, organisational strength and quality of leadership. The privileges enjoyed by the lowest castes, and the scramble in some areas by caste groups to be counted as backward, are proofs of the new trends.

Similarly, it is all but impossible that caste would continue to be tied to a particular profession or occupation. Some low castes such as weavers may suddenly acquire prosperity under the impact of economic change. This alters the social status of the caste and enables its members to educate their children and qualify them for other occupations.

The essential features of the caste system are suffering erosion. It is only a question of time before the caste system loses its inherent inequality and occupational exclusiveness. Certain forms of caste behaviour, including the role which caste plays in marriage, may continue. The educational and political role of the caste associations may increase; but would we be justified in saying that the caste system still prevailed?

Srinivas (following Max Weber) has highlighted another aspect of the dynamic of the caste system in India. Social groups which lie beyond the pale of society and therefore outside the caste system proper, e.g., wild tribes, enter into it and, because they are placed at the bottom, try to rise higher by adopting rituals and practices characteristic of the higher castes.

Srinivas has termed this process 'sanskritization' and explained it as follows: 'The caste system is far from a rigid system in which the position of each component is fixed for all time. Movement has always been possible, and especially so in the middle regions of the hierarchy. (A low caste was able, in a generation or two, to rise to a higher position in the hierarchy by adopting vegetarianism and tee-

totalism, and by sanskritising its ritual and pantheon. In short, it took over as far as possible the customs, rights and beliefs of the Brahmins, and the adoption of the Brahminic way of life by a low caste seems to have been frequent, though theoretically forbidden. This process has been called sanskritization...

Westernisation and sanskritization go together, maintains Srinivas: 'The entire life of the top castes seeps down the hierarchy. And as mentioned earlier, the language, cooking, clothing, jewellery and way of life of the Brahmins, spreads eventually to the entire society. And contrary to popular belief, this process has been speeded up in the 150 years of British rule. The development of communications, the introduction of newspapers, cinemas, and radios, the spread of education, and the weakening, if not the disappearance, of certain traditional barriers in the way of the low castes adopting the customs and rites of the higher, have all contributed to the rapid sanskritization of Hindu society. Thus the westernisation of the country has contributed to the quicker and greater sanskritization of the life of the Hindus.'

Srinivas argues that westernisation or modernisation are not necessarily destructive of the caste system. In the past, argues Srinivas, westernisation has proceeded apace while, at the same time, the caste system has grown more pervasive. Even after independence, the caste system has not grown weaker but, if anything, become stronger.

But his analysis fails to distinguish between the different phases of the process of social change. In the initial stages the forces of modernisation in a society which are relatively weak are contained by the traditional institutions, which seem to grow stronger through the very process of modernisation. But a time comes when the forces of modernisation have grown stronger than the bonds of tradition. Then traditional institutions and values subserve the new forces, as for example the monarchy in Britain subserves industrial and commercial interests.

✓ It may be noted that Srinivas has drawn his data from Mysore, particularly Coorg. His observations are not necessarily valid for other parts of India; they do not hold for the Punjab. Moreover, what he discusses is only one aspect of upward social mobility and acculturation, for the processes are much more inclusive. He describes the ascetic path, which calls for self-discipline of a socially mobile group in order to free material resources and psychic energy for 'capital' development—educational advancement and economic enterprise. The ascetic path facilitates mobility by reducing conflict between the mobile group and the others, obviating jealousy and rivalry, neutralising hostility.

This path is characteristic of societies afflicted by material scarcity.

In areas where there is affluence (as there is relatively in the Punjab) the ascetic path is not very highly regarded. To be sure, acquisition of cultural badges through the performance of elaborate rituals or mastery of sanskritic mantras is something which goes with or sometimes precedes material and social advancement. That the rituals in India are sanskritic means no more than that the dominant tradition in India is sanskritic. Srinivas' use of the term 'sanskritization' is therefore circular.

It is no revelation that sanskritization and westernisation proceed simultaneously. Indian society is multidimensional; it often develops marked tendencies in contrary directions at the same time. Even the individual personality is many-layered. But the task of social science is to uncover significant new developments and to map out pervasive trends which lie beneath apparently confusing and contradictory trends.

✓ The caste system serves a useful purpose because, even though its prescriptions are followed in practice, it is not cherished. There are few defenders of the caste system as such. But, at the comparable stage in their industrial development, there were powerful defenders of the feudal way of life in Germany and Japan.

Political and social workers in India are agreed mostly that the caste system should disappear or at least its inequitable features should be removed. This is the social and political consensus on the subject of caste. Yet the very strength of the caste system, no less than the absence of aggressive defenders, makes for peaceful and gradual change. Social progress must have positive goals to strive for but also evils which it seeks to eliminate.

India is lucky that the caste system is regarded as a social evil by an active political majority, which is determined to combat it. The decline of the caste system provides the measure of social progress. Its revival in the transition period, though specious, serves as a warning that progress is not automatic. There is no ground for pessimism that India is fated to be afflicted with the caste system for ever, as some social critics would like to have us believe.

Social change takes place under many forms but its substance is everywhere the same: commerce and industry outpace traditional economic activities such as agriculture and handicrafts. This is bound to happen in India. She will become a predominantly industrial and commercial nation in the coming decades. Some features of the caste system may survive into the new era, but they would be the appearance and not the reality.

Pattern of status groups

ANDRE BETEILLE

THERE is much difference of opinion about the true or essential nature of caste. While it is outside the scope of the present paper to discuss this point, it has to be remembered that one's view of what caste will be in the future will depend on what one considers it to be to-day or to have been in the past.

There are some for whom the organising principle of caste is to be found in the ritual attitudes centering around purity and pollution; for them a weakening of such attitudes would no doubt constitute indubitable evidence that caste is breaking down. Others have argued that relations between castes were essentially relations of cooperation and hence when castes become organised for political conflict they cease to be castes; this position can easily be refuted but I shall not pause to do so here. In fact I shall not consider the changing relations between caste and politics because this subject has received much attention in recent years; instead I shall consider certain aspects of the caste system which are not generally discussed outside the circle of sociologists.

I shall take the view adopted by many since Max Weber that castes can best be understood as status groups. A status group is a collection of individuals who share a distinctive style of life and a certain consciousness of community. Status

groups have to be distinguished from classes. Whereas classes are defined in terms of the relations of production, status groups have to be differentiated according to patterns of consumption. Also, status groups are ranked on a scale of honour which, as in the case of the caste system, may be quite elaborate.

Status groups of course exist in all complex societies and *there is no reason to believe that they cannot coexist with classes*. But perhaps in no society have they been elaborated to such an extent as in traditional India. Ghurye has estimated that each linguistic region contains between 200 and 300 sub-castes; in no part of the world do we encounter such a proliferation of status groups. Not only this: in India these status groups which we refer to as castes were almost entirely closed in traditional society. Their boundaries were sharply defined and were kept intact by ritual and legal sanctions.

The caste system is commonly viewed as an extreme example of an hierarchical system. It also evinces some of the properties of a segmentary system. That is, there are several levels of differentiation and these levels are related to each other in prescribed ways. In any given region the population is first divided into broad groups such as Brahmins, Non-Brahmins and Harijans (as in Madras or Mysore);

each caste group is composed of a number of castes; these are divided into subcastes which may in turn be divided into sub-subcastes. A broad grouping may be referred to as a segment of a lower order and its subdivisions as segments of higher orders.

This can best be illustrated with an example. The population of Tamilnad may be grouped into Brahmins, Non-Brahmins and Harijans. Each of these is a highly differentiated unit. The Brahmins for instance are divided into Smarthas, Shri Vaishnavas and others. The Smarthas are divided into Vadama, Brihacharanam, Astasahasram and Vattiman. The Vadama in their turn are divided into Vadesha and Chozhadesha subdivisions. Mrs. Karve has shown a similar pattern of segmentation in Maharashtra. Such patterns are to be found throughout the country although they are evidently far less elaborate in some parts than in others.

I have said that each status group pursues a particular style of life by which it can be differentiated from the others. In general the style of life of a higher order segment is more homogeneous and distinctive than that of a lower order one. Thus the Shri Vaishnavas share more things in common and have a keener sense of community than the Brahmins as a whole.

Levels of Differentiation

In somewhat different terms, one may say that an individual is a member of an expanding series of group, each of which may be referred to as a caste or *jati*. He is at the same time a Vadama, a Smartha and a Brahmin, and these identities are relevant in different contexts. For instance, the unit which is relevant for marriage is different from that relevant to participation in State politics. What is important however is that these identities constitute elements in a single series and hence the word 'caste' may be applied to all of them. Some have tried to make use of the terms 'caste' and 'sub-caste', but this way of viewing the

system is quite inadequate because generally there are several levels of differentiation rather than merely two or even three.

It is useful to view the relations between the constituent units of the caste system in terms of their structural distance from each other. The structural distance between two subdivisions of the same subcaste is smaller than that between any one of these and a subdivision of a different caste. In the example given earlier, the structural distance between Vadama and Brihacharanam is smaller than that between either of these and a subdivision of the Shri Vaishnavas, and that in turn is smaller than the distance between any of these and a subdivision of a Non-Brahmin caste.

Structural Distance

In the past, structural distance was maintained not only through the pursuit of different styles of life but by interdictions of various kinds, on marriage, commensality and social interchange in general. Between segments which were closest to each other it was generally maintained by the rule of endogamy. In the case of segments further apart, restrictions in addition to that on marriage also played a part. In the extreme case it was kept in force by the obligation to preserve a minimum physical distance between individuals belonging to opposite ends of the caste hierarchy.

The obligation to maintain structural distance was often associated with ideas of superiority and inferiority. This however was not always or necessarily the case. The rule of endogamy served also to maintain structural distance between subdivisions of the same subcaste generally regarded of equal rank. Thus structural distance is to be reckoned horizontally as well as vertically.

Many changes have been taking place in styles of life distinctive of particular castes in the traditional system. In general, there is greater standardisation and increasing freedom to discard old ways of life and to adopt new ones. Srinivas has

shown how even in the past structural distance could be shortened through the process of sanskritization. The removal of many of the traditional legal and ritual sanctions during British rule and after led to an increase in the pace of sanskritization or to a diffusion of styles of life once distinctive of the upper castes among wider sections of society.

Greater standardisation is accompanied by increased social interchange between groups which had in the past retained a degree of separateness. This brings about a redefinition of the boundaries between castes as they previously existed. But the manner in which this comes about shows clearly how concessions have to be made to the traditional principles of organisation. The most general tendency is towards a quasi-permanent aggregation of adjacent segments in the caste system. Barriers tend to be lowered most easily and effectively between groups which had in the past been structurally close to each other.

In the traditional system the unit of commensality was defined fairly rigidly in terms of caste affiliation. In recent decades there has been a gradual expansion of this unit. To return to the earlier example, until thirty or forty years ago Smarthas and Shri Vaishnava Brahmins did not generally interdine. To-day they do so, but—at least in the rural areas—Brahmins still eat separately from Non-Brahmins. In West Bengal, where the erosion of ritual values has gone further, Brahmins may interdine with 'clean' Sudras but not generally with members of the polluting castes.

Marriage

The unit of endogamy has also expanded but to a far smaller extent. This is no doubt because even in the traditional system the unit of endogamy was generally much smaller than the unit of commensality. Thus, among Smartha Brahmins even in the past Vadama and Brihacharanam interdined but did not intermarry. In fact, each of these divisions was further subdivided (the Vadama into Vada-

desha and Chozhadesha, and the Brihacharanam into Mazhanattu, Kandramanickyam, etc.) and marriage was confined within these smaller subdivisions.

To-day, however, marriages frequently take place across structurally adjacent segments such as Vadadesha and Chozhadesha Vadama and even between Vadama and Brihacharanam. Intermarriage between Smarthas and Shri Vaishnavas is still uncommon and generally confined to urban, western-educated people. Far more rare are marriages between Brahmins and Non-Brahmins.

Urban, western-educated Indians often maintain that inter-caste marriages are becoming increasingly common. What one means by an inter-caste marriage will depend no doubt on the meaning one attaches to 'caste'. I have shown that the word caste has not one but several referants: it may refer to a particular unit, to a group of such units or to a subdivision of the unit. Thus the relevant question in examining intermarriages is the amount of structural distance spanned in each particular instance. A marriage between Chozhadesha and Vadadesha Vadama is clearly not an inter-caste marriage in the same sense as one between either of these and a non-Brahmin subcaste.

Expanding Unit

This kind of graduated expansion of the unit of endogamy is common throughout India. In Bengal there are three primary divisions among the Brahmins—Rarhi, Barendra and Baidic—each of which is further subdivided. These subdivisions played an important part in the regulation of marriage until recently but do not appear to do so any longer. Indeed, intermarriage even across these primary divisions is becoming increasingly common although it is probably still exceptional in the rural areas.

One could multiply examples of such extension of boundaries from different parts of the country and for different groups of castes. I

have used mainly a single indicator—marriage—for studying changes in the composition of status groups, although other indicators such as commensality and co-residence could also be employed. In every society an important area of one's social identity is defined by the group within which one marries whether because of prescribed rules of endogamy or as a result of some less articulate process of selection.

Modernisation

The process of horizontal extension sketched above is the consequence of a number of forces which were released during British rule. These include geographical mobility, western education and the creation of new occupations to which recruitment is at least in principle based on factors other than caste. Some of these forces tend in addition to create new cleavages which cut across the traditional ones. As a consequence, one encounters the emergence of new status groups based on a combination of factors, traditional and modern. Before considering the manner in which the two sets of factors are likely to combine, it is well to remember that traditional association plays an important part in the definition of status honour in every society.

Whereas the process of modernisation brings together structurally adjacent castes, it also creates differentiation within each caste. Each caste tends to become increasingly heterogeneous in terms of occupation, income, education and rural-urban residence. All these factors play an important part in defining one's social identity in general and the universe of marriage in particular. It has to be realised, of course, that factors such as occupation, income and education though not entirely determined by caste are not altogether independent of it either. The proportion of salaried and professional people is much higher in some castes than in others.

Thus, the process of horizontal extension is accompanied by one of vertical differentiation. In terms of the earlier example, an urbanis-

ed, professional Vadama Brahmin father may be unprepared to give his daughter in marriage to an uneducated and impoverished member of his own subcaste; at the same time he may be willing to arrange a marriage for her with a member of the closely related Brihacharanam subcaste whose occupation and educational background are similar to his own. But he would normally still be reluctant to accept a non-Brahmin as a son-in-law irrespective of his occupation, income or education. A kind of compromise tends to be reached in which new differences are accommodated by stretching the older meaning of caste which in any case had at no time a fixed or single meaning.

Process of Change

It seems evident that internal differentiation has proceeded much further among some castes than others. Those castes which have been most open to westernisation are probably the ones which have changed most. Such for example are Brahmins, Kayasths, Nairs and in general castes which have taken to western education and middle-class occupations and are predominantly urban in their distribution. Peasant castes in the rural areas have perhaps retained a greater measure of homogeneity and appear on the whole to have undergone less change. However, in their case also political factors are playing an important part in bringing together adjacent segments.

Many changes are taking place in the productive organization as well as in the political system. These changes are not likely to lead to a disappearance of status groups which in any case have to be differentiated from classes. It is quite possible to visualise different patterns of status groups coexisting with a given economic or political system. Status groups derive their distinctive features not only from material elements but also from a variety of irreducible cultural and ideological factors.

In India, the status groups of the future will no doubt carry the marks of the caste system which has played such an important part in the social history of the country.

Frontiers

SURINDAR SURI

✓ THE caste system is the characteristic feature of Indian society. All levels of social and individual behaviour are influenced by it. Yet, there is no agreed definition of a caste or sub-caste any more than there is agreement among scholars on its origin, history or future. Professor D. N. Mazumdar pointed out: 'The complex nature of the caste structure is evident from the fact that, after a century of painstaking and meticulous research in the history and function of the social system, we do not possess yet a valid explanation of the circumstances that might have contributed to the formation and development of this unique system. There are today as many theories of the caste origins as the number of those who have written on it. Yet it must be admitted that no social institution except totemism has been studied from such varied angles as the caste system.'

It is a paradox that the caste system is all-pervasive, yet so

hard to define. The need to define the caste system does not arise for the orthodox Hindu; it is something so traditional as to be self-evident. To approach a tradition intellectually is to criticise it. If one begins to analyse, define and discuss a tradition, it may be weakened; in any case, it will be altered. In India the caste system is accepted without question. The emancipated just discard it without inquiring what it is which they have given up.

There are two poles of the caste system around which it arranges itself like a magnetic field. On the top are the Brahmins and at the bottom the untouchables. Viewed from the top, the Hindu community is divided into Brahmins and Non-Brahmins. The Brahmins are the only pure caste. The ranking of the other castes and sub-castes depends upon the relation in which they stand to the Brahmins.

The major line of division in the caste system is that between

Brahmins and Non-Brahmins. In 1931 there were about fifteen million Brahmins in the whole of India, constituting one-sixteenth of the total Hindu population. Their proportion among the Hindus has been declining steadily over the years. One reason why the upper castes have fewer children is the strong stricture against widow remarriage.

If we examine the geographical distribution of castes it is noticeable that Brahmins are concentrated in North India. Thus, in the State of Jammu and Kashmir they form more than a third of the total Hindu population, the highest proportion anywhere in India. In most of the northern and northwestern States they form over 10 per cent of the Hindu population. However, the proportion declines sharply as we move eastward or southward. The separation between Brahmins and Non-Brahmins is vastly more rigid in South India than in the North. In the South there is only a tiny minority of Brahmins against a huge majority of the lower castes, especially Sudras, who do not belong to the three upper castes, and do not wear the sacred thread.

Mobility

In some areas, the urban concentration of Brahmins is five times greater than that of the rest of the Hindus. The reason is the occupational trend among Brahmins toward office work and other learned professions, which draws them to the cities. Apparently, there are two main trends of social and geographical mobility with caste implications. One of these is the migration of unskilled labourers, mostly to plantation areas of Assam and South India. This may partly be the reason for the high concentration of scheduled castes in Assam where they constitute more than one-third of the total Hindu population, and in the former Travancore State, now part of Kerala, where the proportion is more than fifty per cent.

Even within the same State, caste concentration often varies

strikingly from one district to another. A factor which determines the concentration of castes in a given area is the numerical strength of non-Hindu religious communities. Lower caste members tend to adopt a new religion. Thus, where the proportion of Muslims, Christians, Sikhs and recently of Buddhists is high, that of the lower castes will be smaller.

Untouchables

At the opposite pole of the caste system stand the untouchables or 'scheduled castes'. Although they form the most notorious aspect of the caste system, it is not easy to define who belongs to them and who does not. Theory is not of much avail in this matter. The difficulty is that there are many divisions even among the groups broadly defined as untouchable. Many untouchables treat each other as untouchables. As Mahatma Gandhi pointed out: 'All the various grades of untouchables are untouchable among themselves, each superior grade considering the inferior grade as polluting it in the same manner as the highest class of the caste Hindus regard the worst grade of untouchables.' And of Madras it was stated that there were 'no less than eighty sub-divisions among the Harijans (untouchables), those at the top regarding the less fortunate of their own brethren as untouchable.'

Some sub-castes, which are considered untouchable in one area, are not treated as untouchable in an adjoining area. According to the census of 1931, the last one in which the caste affiliation of the individual was recorded, the depressed castes numbered 50.2 million, i.e., somewhat less than in the census of 1921 when the figure stood at 52.7 million. The reason for this decrease was the disinclination of many individuals to admit that they belonged to an untouchable caste. Even the 1921 figure is considered low and the actual figure for 1931 was estimated at between 55 and 60 million individuals.

In 1921 the percentage of untouchables among the total Hindu

population stood at 25 per cent; but it fell to 21 per cent in 1931. Even so, the number of the outcastes is very high—it is the largest bottom layer of any class structure in the world. The Negroes in the United States, comparable in some respects (though certainly not in all) to the untouchables, constitute less than 10 per cent of the total population, and the Eta caste in Japan was never more than 15 per cent of the total population. The large number of outcastes in India attests to the low material standards, for the lower strata must bear the brunt of the struggle for survival in an over-populated, underdeveloped country. The fact is that the scheduled castes form the largest single caste complex.

Functional Basis

The functional basis of the caste system is the mutual obligation of each caste to render services in which it specialises to all members of the village community, ideally without consideration of status or wealth. Its services are returned in goods or reciprocal services. This is the '*jajmani* system'. Some of the higher caste people, however, refuse to render services to the low castes. A Brahmin who officiates at the ceremonies of princes or very important persons rises in status within the Brahmin community. On the other hand, Brahmins who perform services for the lower castes would slip down in the rank order within their caste.

Hence, Brahmins refuse to officiate at ceremonies and rituals of low caste members. And the latter would have difficulty in procuring a priest for the purpose. Some low caste individuals officiate as priests for members of their own caste and, in the course of time, claim to be Brahmins. Such claims are resisted by the real Brahmins, but the outcome cannot be determined in advance. Some upstart Brahmins are successful in getting their claim accepted, others are not.

An index of the stability of the caste structure is the degree to which castes follow their traditional occupations. Figures com-

piled for twenty four castes in the 1931 census showed that somewhat less than half the members of any caste were engaged in their traditional occupation. But the proportion varied from State to State. A study made in the Punjab in 1931 on the basis of figures for 42 castes showed that almost two-thirds of the caste members were engaged in traditional occupations. Similarly, in Baroda over two-thirds of the people pursued the traditional calling.

Traditional caste occupations still mean something, although it is not certain just what that something is, especially when we remember that the choice of occupations in India is extremely limited. Because employment opportunities are so few, an individual is compelled to take the work which is available and which is likely to be his paternal calling. Comparative figures show that most of those following their traditional occupation are, as is to be expected, concentrated in agriculture.

Social mobility seems to have taken place in menial occupations. But occupational mobility is higher among the upper castes than among the lower, for literacy is the main characteristic of the occupationally mobile. The trend toward the thawing of caste distinctions as reflected in the mobility of occupations reverses a movement which has been in evidence for three millennia.

Inevitable Change

Economic change is decisive in the dissolution of the caste system, whose kernel is the relationship, which depends on the division of labour within the rural community, between the sub-caste and an occupation. As soon as the chain of hereditary occupation is broken or the pattern of the division of labour in the village is disrupted, the system loses its organic character and becomes something ritualistic and formal. The rural division of labour was upset with the introduction of machine industry, which rendered many traditional occupations of the village useless and redundant. The weavers, oil pressers, carpenters, blacksmiths, etc., lost

work and became landless labourers.

The forces which tend to break up the caste system are the same that created it. If the Hindu social order may be summed up as 'the most thorough-going attempt known in human history to introduce absolute inequality as the guiding principle in social relationships', it seems that this very attempt is the reason for the breakdown of the caste system. It is impossible to maintain a totally rigid social structure. On the surface it might appear rather simple to order the castes in a pattern of rank and precedence. In fact it proved impossible.

Max Weber recorded: 'It is perhaps impossible to determine the rank order of the castes; it is contested and subject to change. An attempt was made in 1901 by the British census to settle this rank order once and for all. It was not repeated; the excitement and discontent that resulted was out of all proportion to the intended result. The attempt to classify the castes set off a signal for competitive demands by the castes for social rank and the procurement of historical "proofs" to support their claims. It led to remonstrances and protests of all kinds and called forth a considerable, and partly instructive literature. Castes of questionable rank sought to exploit the census for stabilizing their position and used the census authorities, as one census expert put it, as a kind of herald's office. Amazing claims of new rank were made. The Bengal Chandal, for instance, the lowest caste, alleged to stem from a mixture of Brahmin women with Sudra men (actually a Hinduized guest people from Bengal), rebaptized themselves Namashudra and sought to trace their descent to a pure caste and 'prove' their Brahmin blood.'

Dynamism of Inequality

Apart from these, however, former professional soldier and robber castes which had turned to cultivation took the opportunity to be counted as Kshatriyas. The 'priests' of tribes or low castes

wanted to be recognised as Brahmins. Castes engaged in trade claimed to be Vaishyas. 'Animistic tribes demanded registration as castes and with as high rank as possible. Certain sects sought reintegration into the Hindu community.'

The different castes and groups in India may be compared to an armful of marbles which may be held loosely, but fall apart if held together tightly. This merely reflects the fact, which is known to social scientists, that inequality is a dynamic force. It creates tensions and hostilities which do not allow the social system to become stable. In the last resort, caste precedence was enforced by the secular power. Although each caste is self-regulating and determines who are its members, no caste can unilaterally change its status in relation to others. For this purpose, an appeal had to be made to the adjudicative and coercive power of the secular authority.

The Dilemma

Some castes multiply faster than others. The numerical growth or decline of a caste seems to possess a functional rationale. Larger numbers of low caste people are needed to carry out the duties peculiar to them, whereas priestly functions as well as those typical of the warrior castes do not require large numbers. Thus, ban on widow remarriage prevalent in the higher castes serves economic and social purposes.

If the higher castes proliferated rapidly, their status would be reduced. If a high caste becomes too numerous it would split, some parts tending to decline while the others retaining their status. Such division of an upper caste is bound to weaken it. This means that the upper strata must breed at a slower rate, which is not peculiar to the caste system. On the other hand, if a ruling class becomes too small it would find difficulty in maintaining its position. It is the dilemma of the élite.

The process of religious conversion helps to break the rigidity of caste taboos. It enables victims of caste restrictions, namely, low caste members, to escape into rela-

tively casteless religions such as Islam, Christianity or Sikhism. In fact, these non-Hindu religions hold great attraction to the low castes by offering a softening of social disabilities. Most of the converts to Christianity were untouchables: in some parts of the country 'Christian' signified an untouchable. In Madras State the number of Christians increased by 275,000 between 1921 and 1931 and the number of Muslims by 170,000; these increments were attributed to conversions from the depressed classes. After 1931 there was a move among the untouchables to join Buddhism or Sikhism.

Conversions to Buddhism

Initially, conversions to Buddhism were insignificant but gained momentum suddenly in the decade from 1951 to 1961, when the number of Buddhists rose from 180,823 to 3,250,227. In ten years the Buddhists multiplied almost 17 times! The Census Report of 1961 pointed out: 'This striking increase has been due in part to the neo-Buddhist movement which swept the country during the decade. The movement seems to have taken in its stride all States and Union Territories except Madras, Orissa and Rajasthan.' But the remarkable fact is that the greatest increase took place in Maharashtra, where the number of Buddhists increased from a mere 2,487 in 1951 to an impressive 2,789,501 in 1961.

In 1951 Buddhists made up a mere 0.01 per cent of the total population of Maharashtra but in 1961 a substantial minority of over 7 per cent. In 1951 only 1.4 per cent of the Buddhists in India lived in Maharashtra but over 45 per cent in West Bengal and 66 per cent in the three northeastern States of West Bengal, Assam and Tripura. But the centre of gravity of the Buddhists has shifted: over 85 per cent are now in Maharashtra while the next largest concentration is in the neighbouring State of Andhra.

Dr. Ambedkar, leader of the untouchables, who raised the untouchables to political consciousness, was a Maharashtrian. He propagated conversion to a caste-

less religion. But he excluded two religions which would have helped best: Islam and Christianity; for these would have put the untouchables beyond the pale of Hinduism. Apparently, Ambedkar wanted his community to remain within the orbit of Hinduism, and conversion to Sikhism and Buddhism were the two possibilities.

Another consideration is that under the Constitution of India, if converted to Islam or Christianity, an untouchable loses his special rights and privileges, such as facilities for education and easier entry into government service. He does not lose these rights if he becomes a Sikh or a Buddhist. This provision is based on the consideration that the caste system is repugnant to Islam and Christianity but not to religions which are indigenous to India. In Ambedkar's lifetime the advice to untouchables to join another faith did not find much response. But suddenly, during the decade following Ambedkar's death, the path indicated by him has been taken by many of his followers. With their conversion to Buddhism the untouchables not only are assured of a more egalitarian spiritual home, but they will dominate the Buddhist community in India, especially in Maharashtra and Andhra.

Legal System

Another factor of social change was the new legal system. At first the British authorities wanted to sustain traditional Hindu and Muslim law. After 1864 a new policy was adopted and the law courts began to act as levellers of social distinctions based on caste, which tended to undermine the position of Brahmins. The heart was torn out of the caste system with the passage of the Caste Disabilities Removable Act in 1850, which protected the property rights of Hindus who left the religion or were outcasted.

Caste panchayats lost power. The Census Report of 1931 noted that, with the right to appeal to a court against them, 'the power of the caste panchayats has thus greatly weakened in the last few decades and is now almost extinct.

If a panchayat decreed a fine or penalty in the past, it could enforce its decision. In case that the offender was recalcitrant it could prevent his intercourse with the community without fear of itself getting into trouble. Now such a recalcitrant member can file a suit in the civil court against the members of a panchayat or prosecute them for defaming him.'

The Special Marriage Act of 1872 enabled a couple who declared that they did not accept any caste or religion, to marry by civil procedure. In 1923 the necessity of renunciation was removed but a proviso was added whereby: 'If two Hindus belonging to different castes marry under this act, they are not required to renounce their religion in declaration but they lose certain of their personal rights as Hindus. They cannot adopt. On their marriage they cease to be the members of a joint family to which they previously belonged. Whatever rights in the property of the family would have accrued to them by survivorship under Hindu law cease.'

Spatial Mobility

An inherent contradiction of the system is that, theoretically, castes are not delimited geographically but in fact they are. The caste system is a social and cultural division. Yet the system can function effectively only in a geographically static society. Typically, each village or group of villages is self-sufficient for it contains all the castes needed to perform the essential services. The community must be in a position to persuade or compel individuals not to leave the village unless they are surplus to its needs. Since it cannot do this if there is widespread spatial mobility, the caste system cuts the social structure not only horizontally but vertically; the sub-castes are ordered hierarchically but also localised spatially. Castes develop strong local patriotism.

The retarding effect of the caste system on political or economic progress results from spatial immobility rather than from status rigidity. Conversely, spatial mobility would suffice to disrupt the

caste system. No wonder that the tradition of the Indian village discourages travel, especially to distant areas (except pilgrimage to holy places). Increasing travel tends to upset the caste order.

Other forces, such as education, have also worked against the caste system. As B. B. Misra puts it: 'The new forces which weakened the traditional economic order were those of western education and a capitalist economy, a free judiciary and parliamentary institutions. The contribution of western education lay mainly in three things. First, it broke the intellectual monopoly of the Brahmins by opening the doors of education to all classes. Secondly, it created an educated class of Indians comprising members of the various learned professions who cut across caste and became supporters of liberal reforms. Thirdly, it set in motion an unprecedented degree of occupational mobility which helped to increase social mobility.'

Brahmins were among the first to take advantage of facilities for English education and to tread the new avenues of employment opened by it. Despite measures adopted in many States to encourage lower castes to obtain education, Brahmins are still numerous in the learned professions. A more serious result of occupational mobility has been that the higher social strata has virtually monopolized opportunities for advancement; in some respects disparity between the higher and the lower strata has grown even wider.

Divisive Results

Politically, the main objection to the caste system is that it is divisive. To begin with, it creates a vertical division between the four *varnas* (or five, if we include the Harijans who are *avarnas*). But the sub-caste groups, which regulate marriage and other social relations, stop at the linguistic boundaries. In other words, a Punjabi-speaking Brahmin sub-caste will not be found in an area where Punjabi is not spoken.

Thus, if a Punjabi speaking Brahmin, who happens to live out-

side the language area, wants to marry according to the caste usage, he would have to return to his original home to find a suitable match. He might by chance find a suitable bride in a Punjabi-speaking Brahmin sub-caste in the area where he is resident; in any case he is unlikely to marry into a non-Punjabi-speaking Brahmin sub-caste. But this reluctance is based on convenience. A bride speaking a different language would not fit into the bridegroom's family. In other words, while caste divides Hindu society vertically, it does not produce a corresponding unity cutting across regions or linguistic divisions.

Possible Future

Those who fear that the caste system tends to destroy national unity argue that caste divisions produce economic and political conflict. Selig S. Harrison, author of the well-known work, *India, the Most Dangerous Decades*, is an exponent of this viewpoint. But conflict is not necessarily divisive; it may be a cement which holds a political community together. The castes and sub-castes co-existed until recently in a symbiotic relationship—the *jajmani* system. So long as castes or sub-castes merely co-existed, though cooperatively, they were not cemented together as they are when they enter into mutually competitive relationships where co-existence is replaced by conflict.

A society suffused by competition and conflict acquires a dynamic force whereby it may be wrought into a political community, or nation. In so far as the previously static caste system has become dynamic, it generates a political force, whereas mere co-existence did not fashion political unity. The important point is that the caste system has become charged with an explosive dynamic. This leads to an apparent strengthening of caste and sub-caste ties and increases conflict between them. On the whole, however, social competition promotes equality. As equality among castes increases, the caste system will become superfluous.

Factor in social tensions

R. N. SAKSENA

CASTE in India has served definite functions; it has maintained opportunities for solidarity and mutual support and also served as a status system. The outstanding feature of caste has always been its hierarchical organisation. In the hierarchy of social organisation there are castes of all shades and gradations. Thus, the element of status-prestige is the dominant trait of the system. Within the caste, all the members have supported one another and enabled the needy and the impoverished to tide over their period of difficulty. The hierarchical organisation provided a place to all the castes, which enabled them to live

together.

The institution of caste, however, has changed in significant ways in the last hundred years or so, but scholars differ about the kind of significance which should be attached to these changes. In the opinion of a few social scientists it is on the way out. Many others point out that while the pollution aspect of caste has weakened, and while there is always a loosening of certain other aspects, caste has shown a tremendous capacity for adjustment to new conditions and its continuance is not threatened in any manner.

Caste consciousness is keen and expresses itself in many contexts.

Since Indian social life is mainly articulated through caste, any organisation or association which is formed to further social interests tends to be coloured by caste. Even now it serves as a cementing force for group formation; for within the structure of a caste-oriented society, individual behaviour is largely regulated in terms of the expected and accepted norms of the caste in which the individual is born. His primary loyalties are to his kin and caste members at the local level. Even if he migrates to urban centres, it is essentially along caste lines; if he turns a factory worker he returns to his village for traditional ceremonial occasions and, finally, after retirement.

The Contradiction

In short, caste represents a close clustering of the members on family-kin-caste lines, especially with reference to birth, marriage, death and financial obligations. This restricts the mental outlook of the villagers particularly, which is likely to be traditional and caste-bound. This is so even now. Higher castes dominate over low castes in the rural community despite an intensive drive against this by the Community Development Programme.

On the other hand, the Constitution aims at the establishment of a 'casteless and classless' society, which is a contradiction in itself. Every society has to be stratified along some lines with members occupying some positional rank, either in a caste hierarchy as in a rigidly stratified society or in a class hierarchy as in a comparatively open society. Egalitarianism, therefore, does not mean the absence of various levels of stratification. It has to be understood more in its economic context, in terms of equality of opportunity. If non-discrimination between castes has to be achieved, it is only possible by pulling up different caste-members together within a class where equal opportunity and status prevails for all.

But can caste ever emerge into class? The roots of the caste sys-

tem are too deep. Apart from its symbolic value, caste is 'the functioning unit' in the Hindu social system. There may have been changes in inter-caste or intra-caste relationships, but in its functioning caste is as important a factor as ever in maintaining social distance as well as social solidarity.

In a recent study of Jaunsar Bawar by the present writer it was found that in spite of the keen desire of the government to remove the social and economic handicaps of the Koltas, who form the depressed class and provide free labour to their landlords by tradition, it is not possible to remove their disabilities since the Koltas themselves feel tied down to their landlords by a tradition which is not easy for them to break. So any amount of legislation or governmental effort has not succeeded in removing the disabilities which keep the Koltas in a perpetual state of economic serfdom. This role of caste is inevitable since, in the absence of well-developed interest-groups and voluntary associations, caste has filled an important gap in the life of the people.

Increasing Solidarity

Formerly, the caste provided what Iravati Karve has called the 'cultural *gestalt*'. It practically coincided with linguistic and territorial boundaries. But modern communication and transportation have pushed the boundaries of caste from the traditional village extension of the joint family to what are now regional alliances on kindred local units.

The British anthropologist, Eric J. Miller, has demonstrated in a detailed case study of the Malayalam-speaking region that caste was traditionally 'a "system of territorial segmentation" in which the bedrock unit was either the village (*desam*) or at most the chiefdom (*nad*). With modern social change, the old boundaries dependent on political cleavages, now became porous, ceasing to mark the limits of social relations with individual castes. This has

enabled castes to establish internal bonds of solidarity over wide areas. The last 50 years have seen the growth of a formal regional organisation for practically every caste, with the avowed aim of ... raising the status and prestige of a caste as a whole and free its members from exploitation and victimization by the other castes.'¹

Competition

This increasing solidarity in caste over large geographical distance has led in some way to the strengthening of the caste spirit, which is a new element in it. It has now become *competitive*. Thus the traditional role of caste has now been revised. Formerly, caste minimised competition and promoted the spirit of live-and-let-live. A loyalty to its *biradari* or brotherhood meant strength of the system as a whole. But, for caste to become the basis of economic and political enfranchisement and power politics, as well as increasing economic competition, it is bound to magnify all its worst features. This has raised a vast hue and cry against 'casteism'.

Caste, which once expressed social control at the level of a functionally integrated village, now reinforces economic and political conflict, which occurs for the most part within the same linguistic regional boundaries demarcating the newly extended caste alignment. As D. R. Gadgill has very succinctly pointed out: 'Social and economic gradations (formerly) roughly extended to the gradation of castes. But now that we want equality and have decided to get rid of the caste system, we face the problem of preserving a live-and-let-live philosophy.'² Thus, the associational functions of caste have assumed a greater significance while the institutional functions have receded into the background.

The constitutional provisions guaranteeing specific numbers of

1. Eric J. Miller: 'Caste and Territory in Malabar,' *American Anthropologist*: Vol. 56, No. 3, June 1954, page 418-419.
2. Report of a Seminar on Inter-disciplinary Indian Studies, Poona, 1955, p. 27.

government jobs, legislative seats and school admissions to notified untouchable and low castes, have also sharpened consciousness on an enormous scale. This merits greater detail in the discussion on untouchability.

A Definition

It is difficult to arrive at a clear-cut definition of untouchability. It can better be understood in terms of an ascending scale of social avoidance as given below:—

1. against sitting on a common floor,
2. against inter-dining,
3. against admittance into the kitchen;
4. against touching metal pots,
5. against mixing in social festivals,
6. against admittance into the interior of a house,
7. against any kind of physical contact.

It is a mass phenomenon of group prejudices and discrimination affecting about 60 million people and 429 communities (untouchable caste groups) in India, i.e., nearly 1/6th of the total population according to the 1951 census.

Hutton had divided the disabilities from which the so-called untouchables suffer into two initial categories:—

1. that under which they are barred from public utilities, such as the use of roads, tanks, wells, etc;
2. their religious disabilities which debar them from the use of temples, burning grounds and similar institutions.

In addition to the above, there are the disabilities involved in relations with private individuals, such as the services of barbers, washermen, tailors, etc. Even restrictions on their dress and ornaments are also imposed in certain regions.

The differentiations are generally understood throughout the coun-

try and learnt by the children. Thus, the Chamar learns from his early childhood that he is excluded from the Brahmin's house, while the Dom knows that he should not make any contact whatever. The hierarchical status of the whole system is clear to every one. The scavenging castes are absolutely segregated even by the Chamar group, which itself is avoided by the rest of the community. Naturally, the proximity of living quarters is another very good indicator of the degree of intercaste acceptance. Typically, the lower castes live on the fringe of the out-skirts of the village or, in some cases, at a distance from it. The same sort of problems appear in the cities.

Different Disabilities

The problems of the so-called untouchables are, therefore, different in form and substance from those of the scheduled tribes and other backward classes. While educational and economic backwardness is common to all, untouchability and the disabilities arising out of it are problems peculiar to them. At the beginning of the twentieth century the appalling living and working conditions of the untouchable castes aroused human sympathy and public opinion veered round, particularly under the leadership of Mahatma Gandhi, to realise the degrading effects of untouchability. The impact of Gandhiji's influence and work in this area was felt more strongly perhaps after his martyrdom than it was when he was alive.

Vincent Sheean in his book, *Lead Kindly Light*, writes: 'At that time, extraordinary events were taking place all over India, testifying to the depth with which the departure of the country's father was felt. To most Indians life without Gandhiji was very nearly inconceivable. There were many determined efforts on the part of many thousands of Hindus to get the gates of temples opened to the untouchables. This has been one of Gandhiji's projects, urged upon his compatriots in and out of sea-

son as a means of breaking down untouchability. In various parts of India, Hindus of high caste joined with the untouchables in attempts to penetrate the temples and large numbers of them offered satyagraha, submitted to arrest and imprisonment in this cause. In the result, laws were passed in several provinces opening the temple door to the out-castes, another step was taken towards the abolition of Hinduism's most unlovely excrescence.'

Perhaps the most significant sign of exclusion of the Harijans relates to the use of the water-supply. A scavenger cannot draw water from a common source along with the rest of the upper castes; he must have his own well or stand at a distance for some one to give him water. Not only does this limit the limited water supply for him, whose requirements for personal hygiene may perhaps be the greatest, but he is sometimes compelled to satisfy his water needs from a stagnant pool or even a drain, or may share the filthy and contaminated water with cattle.

Now all these social discriminations and avoidances are prohibited under law. In particular, a special provision under the Fundamental Rights has been laid down in the Constitution for the removal of untouchability. [In addition, while various laws have been passed by the State Governments to punish certain kinds of actions involving its practice, the Centre has passed the Untouchability (Offences) Act, 1955, which has made the offence cognisable and punishable under law, uniformly throughout the territory of India.]

Implementation

[But it is one thing to legislate and another to implement such legislation. It is true that one cannot now legally discriminate against Harijans in employment and other public dealings. However, the fact remains that they live for the most part as they have traditionally lived, carrying out the dirtiest and most menial forms of work, particularly so in rural

areas, since the evil is intricately woven in the social fabric itself.

It is not proposed to go into details of the efforts made by the government to fight untouchability or to render help to the Harijans in this paper. But I would prefer to confine myself to one important aspect of it. The problem of the removal of untouchability belongs more to the sphere of social reform than one to be treated as a matter of administrative and legal measures. It is more a problem of social distance, group prejudice and certain social attitudes and stereotypes.

The Experience

The Renuka Ray Committee was alive to the issue. The Committee was of the view:

'Since Independence, while legislative measures have been introduced and State resources spent on a more extensive scale, the results have not been commensurate with the efforts The Government of India have sanctioned, during the last few years, large grants to non-official organisations for purposes of carrying out publicity and propaganda against practice of untouchability. While some organisations, which have a long standing record and substantial service to the Harijans, have made full and proper use of these grants, it is noticed, however, that some organisations of recent origin are engaged mostly in publicity work with the help of Government grants. It is a matter of common knowledge that the programme of publicity is not a visibly established programme like that of welfare services. Further, since the results of such publicity are intangible, it cannot be stated with certainty that the grants through these organisations are achieving their objectives.'

The Renuka Ray Committee has put it rather mildly. In actual practice, the publicity indulged in is more in the nature of self-publicity rather than any attempt to high-light the evils of untouchability and thus bring about a change in the attitude of the

masses towards the Harijans. Similarly, provision for additional facilities like separate schools, crafts training centres, housing colonies and the like will not by themselves serve to eradicate the evil.

Social Reform

In the first place, this approach will encourage segregation, isolate the Harijans and thereby perpetuate the evil of untouchability. Secondly, unlike the tribals who are mostly concentrated in certain defined areas, the Harijans are spread all over the country. Even on grounds of expediency, it is not feasible to accept this principle of segregation and spread it throughout the length and breadth of the country. The real problem is that so long as the Harijans remain as 'untouchables', their mobility in every field and walk of life is bound to be restricted. Hence the problem of untouchability is primarily a question of social reform; other measures can only serve as palliatives.

In short, it needs a new outlook and a complete change in social attitudes. Perhaps compulsory education at the earlier stages in schools, where students of all castes are fully admitted, and abolition of the system of calling welfare schemes, such as schools or digging of wells as Harijan schools or wells for the use of Harijans, will create a better climate for the integration of scheduled castes with the upper castes. Even the reservation of seats for the scheduled castes in the legislatures and various government services is bound to prove harmful from a broader point of view, since it will perpetuate, more or less, the existence of the so-called depressed classes; for they will always feel insecure if the existing privileges are taken away from them.

Thus, an under-privileged social class with constitutional safeguards and certain benefits guaranteed to it becomes segregated and social distance from other castes remains as great as before, although from a legal and constitutional point of view such a distance may not exist at all.

Use in politics

V. M. SIRSIKAR

IN any realistic assessment of the role of caste in Indian politics now and in the future, it would be necessary to caution oneself against any simplified explanation of this complex and age-old phenomenon. What is attempted here is to focus attention on certain aspects of the problem as highlighted by some of the recent trends in India's social and political life. If a distinction was possible between the form and

the style of our politics, it could be said that the form was no doubt secular but the style was essentially casteist.

From the point of view of social reconstruction, the aspect of the caste-system which assumes significance is that it is a structure of impermeable elitism, with all the force of tradition built over thousands of years behind it. It would

be far from the truth to suppose that caste has ceased to be a determinant of elite status in our country. This traditional factor largely influences the formation of 'modern' 'democratic' elites. In this connection it would be very revealing to find the socio-economic background, not only of the political leaders but that of the top bureaucrats, brass hats, intellectuals and all those who influence political decision-making.

No comprehensive study of the Indian elites has yet been made. But it would not be unreasonable to say that in the formation of various elites, the so-called higher and middle castes have always an extraordinary advantage over the so-called lower castes. This of course does not imply that caste is the sole determinant of social status and an entry-permit to the elite-group. Caste, no doubt, is at present operating in a changing society. This fact may sometimes help a few 'plebian' aspirants to get the 'patrician' status, irrespective of their caste.

The Middle Castes

With independence and the adoption of universal franchise, a new phase has begun in the history of caste in this country. Universal franchise opened the immense possibilities of securing political power for the majority middle castes who were hitherto denied their legitimate share of power, owing to a very restricted franchise based on property and education. The freedom movement had made the Congress the most important political institution and centre of power in the country. The caste-groups which 'captured' the Congress were expected to get the best of the bargain. It is not necessary here to dilate on the historical circumstances and the process which inducted the majority caste-groups in various areas into the Congress; it is interesting to note that, although there were variations in the caste hierarchy, in many regions generally the middle caste-groups occupied the centre of the stage.

What has been said above about the middle castes does not imply

that certain so-called lower castes, with small numerical strength, have been able to improve their socio-economic and political lot. On the other hand, it can be reasonably argued that their position might have worsened due to the competitive character of politics suddenly assuming alarming proportions.

It would be worth while to find out, in this regard, the position of the Scheduled castes and tribes in politics, notwithstanding the personal improvement in the political status of a few individuals belonging to this group. In this connection it is significant that neo-Buddhism is looked upon by the caste-Hindus as a political 'stunt' rather than religious conversion for a social change.

The New Role

Caste is the traditional integrative agency. It has now aligned itself with the modern integrative agency—the political party. In this process the caste gets a new strength. This is owing to the fact that traditional loyalties can be exploited to achieve goals of political power. It is sometimes conveniently assumed that there is nothing wrong in such exploitation so far as the ends are served. The caste-system may have lost some of its ritualistic and traditional function as the regulator of social behaviour. But now it assumes the new role of regulating political behaviour.

The belief that caste has shown signs of decline and withering away arises out of this loss of its ritualistic aspect. A brahmin does not perform any of his traditional priest-hood functions. He adopts the westernised way of living, including non-vegetarian food (and sometimes alcohol). But he remains a 'Brahmin' to his core so far as his personal and political life matters to him. This secularisation of the power of caste does not mean its decline; it means the unobtrusive and inarticulated adjustment of the traditional factor with modern democratic politics.

Sometimes it is argued that the present Indian society has become

a federation of castes, equal in status although not in numbers. The argument implies that the hierarchy and the elitist structure has disappeared and the various castes are like various groups in western society. But it is felt that the above view, although very welcome, is more in the nature of an ideal-construct than a reflection of a reality. It is probably out of sheer politeness that many refuse to face certain unpleasant realities in Indian politics, the most unpleasant being that of caste. What is really necessary is to face the unpleasant and attempt an objective assessment which may eventually facilitate a solution of the problem.

It would not be an exaggeration to say that it is possible in India to change your religion but not your caste.¹ This need not surprise any one. Religion, compared to the caste-groups, is a distant and diffused matter. The individual 'belongs' to a concrete reality—caste, while he merely follows a religion which is an abstract thing.

The Whole Ethos

The caste-system performs roles which could be put down as personal, social, economic and political. So far as the personal role is concerned it may be necessary to focus attention on its impact on the other three roles. It would be too much to expect that a person who is casteist in his personal life would be non-caste in his socio-political life. The personal role of caste may mean, in general one's belief in the traditional structure, the preference for marriage-relations within the caste group and the sense of belonging to a particular caste.

The social role relates to the non-political sphere of activities. Here the factor of caste becomes very important. One finds it operating in a subtle manner through educational, social and charitable institutions, housing and cooperative societies, clubs and community

1. In Maharashtra there are Konkanastha Brahmin Christians, Saraswat Christians, Mahar Christians and these rigidly follow the taboos about inter-caste marriages and inter-dining.

centres. This affects the future of caste in the sense that the individual succumbs to the environment created around him. It creates an in-group psychology in the individual for his own caste, which finds expression through speech and deed. This environment, in a sense, decides the whole ethos of the individual's life.

The occupational exclusiveness—the economic role of caste—may appear to be losing ground in the face of industrialisation and urbanisation. The faith in the modernising processes of industrialisation, urbanisation and western education to do away with caste in a magical way indicates a misplaced romantic enthusiasm rather than an objective understanding of the perplexing phenomenon. Actually, caste is operating in a more disastrous but subtle way. One now requires a 'correct' caste to join State services and industrial employment, not to mention educational institutions.

Economic Power

In an emergent democracy wedded to welfarism, caste assumes a certain significance because political power based on the rural masses is used to distribute economic benefits and economic power to the rural elites at the cost of the urban elites generally belonging to minority upper castes or to caste groups belonging to other regions. In this connection, it would be useful to study the emerging power-structure in Panchayati Raj. There are no built-in checks in Panchayati Raj to prevent the concentration of power, economic, political and social, taking place at the wrong levels.

The business elites in this country present an interesting example of the persistent influence of caste in the socio-economic spheres. Without being dogmatic, it could be said that in an industrial empire belonging to one caste-group, the entry of other castes in senior executive and power-positions is an exception. This does not mean that lower and middle positions are freely available to any one with the necessary qualifications. But the higher echelons of business elites

are maintained religiously 'homogeneous' in composition.

Inroads Into Education

It is necessary to remember that it is not an accident that some of our universities have been 'unofficially' called 'Brahmin', 'Chettinad', 'Lingayat' and 'Kayastha' universities. What needs further to be emphasized is that none of these institutions has been accused of belonging to a 'class', whether bourgeois, middle or proletarian. As a foot note it may be added here that certain universities do not consider it improper to ask the applicant to state his caste. It is reported that where an applicant failed to mention his caste, the Vice-Chancellor thought it necessary to ascertain his caste by asking him direct or indirect questions! Can we be very optimistic in such a situation about the early decline and eventual disappearance of caste?

The role of caste in our educational institutions, specially those of higher learning, cannot be viewed with equanimity. The obvious danger to educational standards and values comes from the surreptitious entry of caste. Sometimes it is naively argued in certain quarters that other things remaining equal, there is no harm in a selection being made on the basis of caste. It is conveniently forgotten that other things do not remain the same because of the weightage given to the factor of caste.

The four roles of caste are not only inter-linked, but are influenced by each other. It requires a highly sophisticated understanding of Indian society and politics and perhaps an impossible degree of abnegation on the part of the political activists to operate two sets of behaviour—casteist in other spheres and non-caste in political life.

The result is not surprising. Under the cross-pressures of caste and political loyalties, there is a verbalised acceptance and a loud expression of secular politics² and at the same time a meek, silent surrender to caste politics.³ This

phenomenon has now been adequately documented in the researches in contemporary politics carried out by both Indian and foreign scholars. The attempt to wish away caste from Indian politics does not appear to have succeeded.

In any realistic evaluation of social change in India it would not be prudent to assume that the present accentuation of caste-loyalties, or their extension to new areas of activities, would mean the impending collapse of the system. On the other hand, it could be argued that the so-called modernisation is at the best skin-deep and the social change has as yet not really affected the hard core of the traditional society both in rural and urban India. It is felt that our cities are not genuinely metropolitan areas with the proper intellectual climate. They are just a conglomeration of villages, with the traditional partitioning of areas on the basis of caste. Verbalised social values of secular democracy expressed by the urban elites have not been internalised even by them, not to speak of the rural masses.

Rival Elites

Social change has remained confined to the elites of all caste groups. The majority of most castes has remained impervious to the winds of change. Thus, in any conflict between rival elites, both find it handy to get the backing of the masses through the traditional channel of caste, using the traditional techniques and symbols.⁴ The more tragic part of the whole story is that no one feels that such use is incongruous with secular, democratic politics. In defence, it is sometimes pointed out that the western societies are not free from such lapses in their political life. But it is felt that in a caste-ridden, traditional society it is all the more necessary to be cautious about the use of techniques which are anti-democratic in character and which strengthen traditional bonds and

3. See *Economic Weekly*, for a series of articles on voting behaviour in the 1962 General Elections; August and September, 1962.

4. V. M. Sirsikar: *Political Behaviour in India*. P. C. Manaktal and Sons, Bombay 1965, pages, 86-89.

2. The denunciation of caste, casteism and casteist politics is done from house tops by all parties and leaders in and out of season.

loyalties rather than democratic values.

The strengthening of caste-loyalties could be ascribed to certain psychological factors. The leader, to be effective and successful, must psychologically belong to the group he attempts to lead. A sharing of the attitudes, beliefs and values of the group makes the leader acceptable. If caste decides the whole ethos of the individual's life, it is but logical that he should have a preference for a leader who belongs to his caste.

Emerging Leadership

Psychologically speaking, leadership is a function of personality structures of the led and the leader. It is not necessary here to dilate upon the impact of caste on the personality structures of the common people in this country. With the efflux of time, the 'all-India' leadership born out of the freedom struggle, having a larger perspective and broader interests, is giving place to the 'new men of power' whose identification with the local, narrow, caste interests is obvious. This new leadership is 'representative' with its mass base and it articulates the aspirations and expectations of the masses.

When Professor Morris-Jones refers to the traditional (caste) idiom in Indian politics, he is referring to an unpleasant reality with a British candidness. But this candidness need not hurt our oversensitive patriotism. The existence of all the three political idioms—the western, traditional and saintly—just as it poses a problem, affords a certain solace. It means that the traditional has to compete with the other two. This may result in weakening the traditional if the other two are consciously strengthened.

It would not be correct to ascribe the absence of a revolution in India to the effectiveness of the caste system. The dialectics of a revolution could not operate in the post-independence period for a variety of reasons. The semblance of a revolutionary creed was with the Congress. The C.P.I. had failed to understand the pulse of the masses and had alienated itself from the mainstream of

Indian nationalism. The 'peaceful transfer' of power contributed in a large measure to make the situation non-revolutionary. The proverbial fatalism of the masses, with a rural conservatism, makes them prefer any status-quo to a hazardous revolutionary change.

In the conflict between castes and political parties, the fight is between a social institution having a standing of thousands of years and political associations with barely a life of a few decades. Moreover, Indian political parties are weak in both organisational structure and ideological fabric. The Congress is the only party which could boast of an all-India organisational structure. But it needs no proof that the party has a weak ideological fabric. The latter permits party-men to stretch it to suit their political expediency. The need for success in the elections has forced the Congress to exploit caste wherever necessary. The other political parties are not without blame in this game. No party seems to be free from the sly caste appeal. Exploitation of the caste appeal to win elections is regarded as permissible.

The Hopes

A word of caution about the approach of the author to this vexed problem. He has full faith that the final outcome of the struggle between the forces of traditionalism and modernity will be in favour of secular democracy. The democratic processes and democratic institutions in this country are to some extent distorted by the factor of caste. But at the same time democratic mechanisms and techniques would gradually affect and undermine in a perceptible manner the influence of caste in politics. The very fact that no party likes to be a one-caste organization and attempts to be a multi-caste organisation, indicates a ray of hope. But the process of making politics secular in the true sense of the term demands heavy sacrifices on the part of the party-in-power, the opposition parties, the press, the intellectuals and the institutions of social change.

The attempt to banish caste by dropping its mention in the cen-

suses, 1951 and 1961, was, to say the least, juvenile. It was a romantic belief in the efficacy of a governmental fiat. It only made sociological research more difficult. What was necessary to adopt was a non-caste approach to election politics. Even at the risk of losing a few seats to the opposition, the Congress could have set a pattern of secular politics, of having candidates who did not belong to the majority castes in the relevant constituencies.

Setting an Example

Even now, if the vicious circle of election politics based on caste is to be broken, it would devolve on the Congress to set the example. There is no automatic guarantee that the example would be followed. But the risk will have to be taken if the professed loyalties to democracy are worth the name. The non-caste behaviour of the Congress, the major centre of political power, would generate a climate of opinion which it would be difficult for the other contending parties to ignore.

If an effort could be made to alter the caste character of educational institutions, by a regular exchange of teachers between universities, it would go a long way. It would not be possible even for a diehard casteist to stick to his behaviour pattern when he would face an entirely new social situation. The universities could play an important part in the 're-education' of our leaders, political workers and citizens.

No prophecy is possible about the date when caste would disappear from the socio-political life of this country. But the strengthening, in a conscious manner, of political parties based on economic programmes, of groups based on economic interests, free and voluntary associations, could be suggested as one way to unloosen caste from its present position. Political loyalties, union loyalties, class-consciousness, the rational and scientific outlook, are factors which, if consciously cultivated, could create the proper intellectual climate for a modernising, secular, democratic society.

Inevitable developments

S. A. H. HAQQI

CASTE and its present-day role in Indian social and political life and the future of the caste system are among the grave problems which are agitating the minds of all thinking Indians and engaging the attention of all serious students of Indian politics. Notwithstanding the differences in their approach and/or conclusions, there is a general agreement among them about caste still being a very obtrusive factor of Indian social organization and an important force in Indian politics.

✓ Caste, says Guy Wint, is 'the grand peculiarity of Hindu society', permeating all Hindu lives, a factor in every situation and a complication in every controversy'; it is according to Professor S. C. Dube, 'perhaps the most important single organizing principle' in village communities. 'Casteism,' says Professor M. N. Srinivas, plays 'a crucial role in the functioning of representative institutions and in the struggle for power', he holds it to be 'a

powerful barrier against the emotional integration of the people of India.'

The problem, however, is not whether one likes or dislikes the caste system or its many and varied manifestations in Indian social and political life (for non-Hindus, too, have developed caste-complexes), but of trying to understand not merely its present-day role in India but also in the India of tomorrow, wherein shall be ensured to 'the people of India' the blessings of justice, social, economic, political; liberty of thought, expression, belief, faith and worship; equality of status and of opportunity; and fraternity, assuring the dignity of the individual and the unity of the Nation.

Since we are concerned with the role and the future of the caste system, it would not be inappropriate to say here a few words about caste and the characteristic features of the Indian caste system. Caste, as defined by Sir

Edward Blunt, is 'an endogamous group or collection of endogamous groups bearing a common name, membership of which is hereditary arising from birth alone, imposing on its members certain restrictions in the matter of social intercourse; either

- (1) following a common traditional occupation,
- (2) claiming a common origin or
- (3) both following such occupation and

claiming such origin, and generally regarded as forming a single homogeneous community.'

But, according to Shama Sastri, caste means 'social exclusiveness with reference to diet and marriage ... birth and rituals are secondary.' The characteristic features of the Indian caste system, as enumerated by Professor G. S. Ghurye, are as follows:—

- (1) segmental division of society,
- (2) hierarchy,
- (3) restrictions on feeding and social intercourse,
- (4) civil and religious disparities and privileges of the different sections,
- (5) lack of unrestricted choice of occupation and
- (6) restrictions on marriage.

Anachronism

The caste system, thus, with its occupational and hierarchical differentiations, is an anachronism in a modern democratic State; it does not, and cannot, square well with the concept of an egalitarian society: 'one man, one vote', equality before law, or of opportunity and status. The system implies not merely stratification but also frustration and bitterness arising out of its principles of hierarchy and invidious discriminations concerning privileges and restrictions as regards marriage, social intercourse, choice of occupation, etc. And it is because of this factor alone, if for no other compelling reason, namely, its incompatibility with the concept and the basic structure of a modern, secular, democratic and industrial society, that caste loyalties have weakened and are steadily weakening at a

pace which it is easy to sense but hard to define.

This affirmation of mine does not mean that I am unmindful of or glossing over the rivalry and struggle for power, which one witnesses to-day (and to which critical references have been made, among others, by M. N. Srinivas, Selig S. Harrison, De Selincourt and Francis L. K. Hsu,) between, for instance, the Kammas and the Reddis in Andhra Pradesh, the Okkaligas and the Lingayats in Mysore, the Marathas, the Brahmins and the Makars in Maharashtra, the Patidars, the Baniyas and the Kolis in Gujarat; 'no account of voting behaviour, the legislative proceedings or even ministerial appointments would be complete unless considerable attention were given to this factor,' says Professor W. H. Morris-Jones, and not without some justification.

But such obtrusive manifestations of caste and casteism as we come across in Indian social and political life are primarily the result of what Myron Weiner has aptly characterised as the politics of scarcity; moreover, centuries-old patterns of thought, behaviour and attitude cannot be discarded or changed overnight or even in the short span of a decade or two. For politics is, as Graham Wallas and Freud pointed out long ago, largely a matter of the subconscious process of habit and instinct, suggestion and imitation.

The Rationale

For a proper understanding of the role of caste to-day and its future in the developing India, we should, therefore, avoid the mistake of taking a rather mechanistic view of the social and political phenomena; they have to be understood and adjudged in the light of, and against the background of, the socio-economic changes which are now taking place in India, and whose pace is sure to be accelerated as and when the Indian economy reaches the 'take-off' stage.

The caste system had its origin and rationale in the unchanging nature of the self-sufficient village community. 'We must not forget', as Marx pointed out, 'that these little (Indian) communities were

contaminated by distinctions of caste and by slavery, that they subjugated man to external circumstances, that they transformed a self-developing social State into never-changing natural destiny, and thus brought about a brutalising worship of nature.' 'Dynasty after dynasty tumbles down', wrote the ardent admirer of the village panchayats, Metcalfe, 'revolution succeeds to revolution. Hindu, Pathan, Mogul, Maratha, Sikh, English are all masters in turn but the village communities remain the same.'

Changing Village

But much water has flown down the Ganges since Marx and Metcalfe wrote; The 'Unchanging East' has begun to change and, during the decade or so since Independence, the Indian social and economic structure has undergone more changes than took place in centuries before it, each and every one of them being, in the Indian context, radical in its character and revolutionary in its effect: the abolition of Zamindari and Jagirdari, legislation concerning marriage, divorce and inheritance among the Hindus, imposition of the Estate Duty, ceiling on landed property, consolidation of land holdings and ancillary land reforms, adoption of a democratic constitution, etc.

Besides, the 'splendid isolation and 'independence' enjoyed by the village communities during the ancient and medieval times is, thanks to development of road transport and the growth in education and mass communication, yielding place to busy and intimate intercourse between the city-dwellers and those living in the rural areas.

The twin processes of industrialisation and urbanisation have brought the towns and villages nearer to each other and shaken the complacency of traditional modes of village life, and, as Professor S. C. Dube says, 'the widening world of the villagers has had a marked influence on raising their level of expectation and aspiration.' For, to quote Robert I. Crane, 'the city acts as a centre of new ideas and of new experiences as well as

of a new freedom from customary controls and beliefs. Going back to the village, the peasant carries elements of an "urban" intellectual ferment and disseminates this ferment among those who have remained tied to the soil.'

There has, thus, occurred a two pronged attack on the environmental setting wherein the caste system had its origin, growth and sway: the villagers, on the one hand, moving or migrating to urban centres and there getting contaminated by new ideas, attitudes and practices, and, on the other, the forces of modernization penetrating the villages and changing the proverbial patience of the Indian into one of unrest and anger. 'People are no longer content to accept their station in life but,' as Professor Humayun Kabir says, 'challenge the position in which they find themselves. In place of the old acceptance of fate and contentment with one's condition, there is a spirit of rebelliousness asfir in the land.'

Social Mobility

The contact of the villagers with the town-dwellers, the growth of industrial towns, and the development of a new civilization centering round the cities could not but affect social mobility and taboos concerning food and social intercourse. As Professor Ghurye pointed out in the thirties, 'the exigencies of office work have forced city people to put aside the old ideas of purity. Caste-Hindus have to eat articles of food prepared by Christians, Musalmans, or Persians, because Hindu restaurants have not been easily or equally accessible during office hours. In Hindu hotels, they have to take their meals in the company of people of almost any caste—as the hotel keeper cannot manage to reserve accommodations for members of different castes. What was originally done under pressure of necessity has become a matter of routine with many in their city life.' (Italics mine). The erosion of rituals and taboos governing the preparation and consumption of food has, with the passage of time, gained further momentum and inter-caste and even inter-com-

munal dining has now become quite common, particularly among the educated and in the towns.

The forces of modernization and westernization have, thus, been in diverse ways instrumental in loosening and weakening the hold of the age old values, traditions and taboos governing and regulating the very basis of Indian social life: the individual's place in society and human relations within the society. The impact of western ideas and institutions on Indian life and thought has been both deep and wide, shaking up the very foundations of our hierarchical and patriarchal society and inspiring and encouraging instead thereof, the growth of secular nationalism and an egalitarian society based on contractual relationships.

It has also fostered among the Indian people the urge and the desire for a better life, not in the hereafter, but in this world, here and now, obliging or inducing them to seek new avenues of economic advancement, to take to new trades or occupations in the hope and desire of greater financial rewards. The industrial revolution, which brought about a complete and radical change in the material conditions of life on the West could not but adversely affect the bases of the Indian economic structure, namely, handicrafts and small-scale farming, giving rise to a new class of proletariat and landless peasantry in search of 'fresh fields and pastures new'.

New Middle Class

The result of all these developments was, as, for instance, noted by Daniel H. Buchanan (*The Development of Capitalist Enterprises in India*), Radha Kamal Mukerjee (*The Indian Working Class*), Bernard S. Cohn and others (*Village India: Studies in the Little Community*), increase in social mobility, decline in craft-exclusiveness and the emergence of a new middle class drawn, as Kingsley Davis (*The Population of India and Pakistan*) says, from all castes, 'some more than others to be sure, but certainly from no particular caste.' The inter-caste tensions

survey conducted by Professor Mukerjee and his associates has shown, for instance, that in the factories of Kanpur, 90 per cent of the unskilled workers, 24 per cent of the semi-skilled and 13 per cent of the skilled workers were drawn from the lower castes.

On the basis of his study of the Indian Census Reports of 1921 and 1941, Kingsley Davis prepared the following table showing the percentages of persons who were still engaged in their traditional occupations, which, also incidentally indicates the pace and the extent of social mobility in India within the period under review:

Traditional Occupations: Per cent	
Agricultural	21
Pastoral	20
Labourers and Village menials	14
Learned Professions	20
Dealers in Food and Drink	37
Boating and Fishing	9
Trade and Industry (unspecified)	70
Trade and Industry (specified)	51

Quickening Pace

This social mobility is not a phenomenon either wholly new or totally unfamiliar in the history of the Indian people. Indian society has not been so static as is commonly believed; in days gone by social mobility took place under the cloak of what has been termed 'sanskritization' but, of course, at a slow and even unsteady pace. What is, therefore, new and significant to-day is that social mobility is taking place at a quickened pace and as a matter of routine; even inter-caste marriages are now taking place without any one making much fuss about the same.

Dr. C. T. Kannan (*Inter-Caste and Inter-Community Marriages in India*) says: 'Just twenty five years ago the instances of inter-caste marriage were very few; and those individuals who dared to marry outside the caste had to undergo truly great hardships. To-day the situation is altogether different. Not only has the prevalence of inter-caste marriage become more considerable, but even the difficulties the inter-caste marriage

couples have to face have become comparatively quite mild. With the spread of higher education both among the males and females, inter-caste and inter-religious marriages find greater favour amongst the younger generation. Indeed, one could safely assert that the graph of inter-caste marriages is steadily rising, never becoming a plateau, much less declining... It would not, therefore, be wrong to conclude that caste barriers are being more and more ignored in Hindu marriages to-day and caste would not be an important consideration in the Hindu marriage of tomorrow.'

The bases of Indian social life and economy are, thus, being gradually but radically altered and the old caste-bound and tradition-ridden India is being slowly transformed into a modern, dynamic nation inspired by the ideals of social justice and a richer life for all its citizens without any distinction of race, caste, creed, sex or place of birth. But the problem of problems is that India has been the melting-pot of races and religions where the absence of cultural homogeneity and lack of enough social mobility tend to perpetuate, and even accentuate, social differences and tensions. We in India have not, therefore, so far had that 'emotional fusion and exaggeration of two very old phenomena—nationality and patriotism,' which, as Professor J. H. Hayes has pointed out, constitute the bed-rock of modern nationalism.

Communal Society

The structure of Indian society has consequently remained, in the words of Jitendra Singh, 'largely "communal" (ascriptive, traditional, feudal). The characteristic of a "communal society" is that it is stratified into closed groups with well-defined (but circumscribed) relationships. They are bound together by a certain standard of behaviour which is conventional and based solely on kinship and community ties. This standard provides them with a sense of belongingness but also keeps them rooted to their segregated groups. They are, consequently, aware of

very few alternatives and their field of choice is limited. *The individual has neither status nor rights apart from his group life.* Authority is highly personal and is exemplified by the subordinate's *deferential attitude* toward his superior. It is a society of *male dominance* in which age is venerated for its own sake.' (Italics mine).

It is because of this 'communal' character of Indian social life, the under-developed economy, and the consequent gap between levels of aspiration and fulfilment that there still exist and prevail, quite obtrusively too, narrow sectional loyalties based on caste, creed and region. The revolution of rising expectations has made people clamour more and more for worldly goods while the adoption of a democratic constitution (with adult franchise and periodic elections) has made the masses aware of their rights and power in a democracy.

Political Force

'Economic grievances' and 'egalitarian movements', as shown by inter-caste tension surveys, have been responsible for converting casteism from a social into a political force, more or less on the pattern of a pressure group, particularly in the case of the lower castes who are no longer prepared to accept or tolerate the age-long dominance and monopoly of higher castes in the social and cultural life of India.

The emergence and growth of political parties and interest groups is, however, but natural and inevitable in a democracy: the political parties constitute as Sigmund Neuman has said, 'the lifeline of modern politics' while the interest groups are the means or instruments employed by the different 'community-minded' groups to safeguard and promote what they regard as their legitimate interests.

Moreover, the caste associations, as pointed out by some foreign observers, 'bring political democracy to Indian villages through the familiar and accepted institutions of caste. In the process it

is changing the meaning of caste. By creating conditions in which a caste's significance and power is beginning to depend on its numbers, rather than its ritual and social status, and by encouraging egalitarian aspirations among its members, the caste association is exerting a liberating influence.' Recent election studies also show that though caste is an important factor at the village and district levels, 'grouping on a caste basis is growing weaker while alignment on a wider political basis is growing stronger.'

Pragmatic Approach

Indian politics is becoming more and more pragmatic with economic and political issues demanding greater attention than had been the case during the first two general elections. The political parties, to go by their programmes and manifestos, are more or less committed to a 'socialist' programme, advocating justice, liberty, equality and fraternity with a view to assure the dignity of the individual, irrespective of his faith or status; moreover, the parties generally cut across the lines dividing people on the bases of caste and creed, inculcating among their members a wider and more catholic outlook.

Inter-caste marriages, co-educational institutions, hostels and social gatherings, the legal abolition of untouchability, and all forms of discrimination based on the accidents of birth, status or sex, the programmes of mass education, and Community Development are all playing an important role in training the citizens of tomorrow for a healthy, normal social relationship and welding the different groups and sections of our people into a modern society providing a more abundant life for all its members wherein would be for every Indian's taking, to borrow a phrase or two from Julian Huxley, 'the daring speculations and aspiring ideals of men long dead, the organized knowledge of science, the hoary wisdom of the ancients, the creative imaginings of all the world's poets and artists.'

Facts and the future

T. N. MADAN

THERE should be no doubt about the contention that many types of modern scholarship were alien to India when they first arrived here through the medium of the English language and as a result of the system of education envisaged and initiated by Macaulay. Sociology certainly was one such scholarly study. But what was given with one hand was often almost taken

away with the other; the sociological understanding of many Indian institutions and groupings has been prejudiced and distorted by the use of English words to designate Indian social phenomena which do not exactly correspond to their supposed English equivalents. The study of village social structure in India has yet to be extricated from this terminological muddle

We are still debating 'What should we mean by Caste?' (E. R. Leach, 1960); 'Is the Brahmanic *gotra* a grouping of kin?' (T. N. Madan, 1962); whether 'the basic terms and concepts for the study of the family in India' are adequate and clearly defined (A. M. Shah, 1964); and so forth.

The Village

The word 'village' itself needs clarification. It does not mean in India exactly the same as it does in England, nor is its historical evolution comparable to that of the English village. English observers of Indian rural life, such as L. S. S. O'Malley, have written that the Indian village corresponds to the English parish in as much as it includes not only 'the inhabited site with its cluster of houses and buildings', but also the surrounding land, whether under cultivation or pasturage, or lying waste.

The Indian village has been traced back to the vedic times, and so has been its communal character (using the word 'communal' in its dictionary meaning). Sir Henry Sumner Maine, the distinguished Victorian historian of village communities in the East and West, described it as 'the least destructible institution of a society which never willingly surrenders any one of its usages to innovation'. (*Ancient Law*, 1891). But he wrongly believed the communal or joint village to be representative of the whole country. B. H. Baden-Powell (of the Boy-Scouts movement fame) pointed out in *The Indian Village Community* (1896) that 'taking the widest possible view of the subject, two types of village must be recognized—one that has, and one that has not, any appearance of joint or common ownership'. The latter he labelled as the *raiyyatwari* and, later, the 'severalty' village; he also distinguished between joint villages of a *tribal character* and those which can be traced back to an individual founder or to *voluntary association*.

For want of space I will not go into greater details about village tenures, which are in any case

very well known, but will only add that: (i) the village *panchayat* seems to have been an institution peculiar to the joint village; and (ii) the *raiyyatwari* village, based upon the principle of separate ownership, is so much more prevalent in the country that it may well be called the representative type of village community.

Our understanding of the nature and functioning of village life in India has not only been prejudiced by the use of certain English terms, but has also been obscured by the romanticism of nationalist historians. Thus many idyllic elegies have been written about the destruction of the self-sufficient 'village republics' as a consequence of British rule. That the Indian villages were more self-sufficient before the onset of industrialization than they are now it would be idle to deny; that the colonial situation must rest upon the bedrock of economic exploitation of the colony's raw materials is a well established historico-economic fact. But the general trend in sociological thinking today is against the applicability of the notion of the self-sufficient 'primitive isolate' to peasant communities—such as the villages of India—which partake of a civilized tradition.

Rural Dimension

Peasant society has been aptly described as the rural dimension of civilization. Unless rural India has changed beyond recognition in the last 200 years or so, it seems extremely unlikely—I would say impossible—that the villages could have been self-contained and self-sufficient. The reasons are many. The political history of the country does not support the theory of little republics; nor do such widespread religious observances as pilgrimages, or social customs as exogamy (i.e. marriage outside one's own kindred), which often drive a family to seek spouses outside its own village, give credence to it.

But the most important argument against the notion of the self-sufficiency and self-containment of the Indian village is the caste system. The caste ethic pre-

cludes the followers of a certain hereditary occupation (say, the priests) from engaging in certain other occupations (such as that of barbers or potters) which are, however, essential for the maintenance of social life. Now it is conceivable in theory that a village may harbour within itself all the essential occupational groups; but an examination of census reports and the many extant village studies reveals that generally a village is unable to provide itself with the services of all the 'specialist' castes and is dependent upon neighbouring villages for the same.

To take a few examples only: Sherupur in the Faizabad District of Uttar Pradesh (studied by the American anthropologist, H. A. Gould), with a population of 228, lacks washermen, potters, carpenters, barbers, etc., Thyagasamuthiram in the Tanjore District of Madras (studied by the Norwegian anthropologist, D. Sivertsen), with a population of 786, lacks washermen, potters, weavers, tailors, etc. And in Ramkheri in the Dewas District of Madhya Pradesh (studied by the British anthropologist, A. C. Mayer), with a population of 912, there are no washermen.

The argument may well be clinched by pointing out that, in the traditional rural society, far more general and socially significant than the village *panchayat* has been the caste *panchayat* with its jurisdiction spread over several adjacent villages.

A Whole Scheme

Caste, the institution of central importance in Indian village social structure, is not specialized in character but represents a whole scheme of life. The caste system is truly a synonym for Hindu society. It has attracted the interest of numerous scholars from India and abroad, and yet we have only just begun, in the last two decades or so, to arrive at an adequate understanding of its working on the basis of intensive fieldwork.

Formerly, many thinkers, some brilliant and others muddled, contributed their theories, but these

were based on inadequate data. Some of these theories, however, have enjoyed a tremendous vogue. Thus caste has been for long held responsible for breaking up Hindu society into small kin groups and precluding the growth of co-operative ways of life in Indian villages. The late K. M. Panikkar, an influential and prolific writer, held this view, but for classic statement of it we may go back to Bougle, a French scholar, who wrote in 1908. 'When we say that the spirit of caste reigns in a society, we mean that the different groups of which that society is composed repel each other rather than attract, that each retires within itself, isolates itself, makes every effort to prevent its members from contracting alliances or even from entering into relations with neighbouring groups...' Well said, one might exclaim, but then how has such a society survived over the centuries?

Jajmani System

A society which denies complete freedom in the choice of occupations to the community as a whole, cannot survive unless there is economic co-operation, howsoever limited, between various occupational groups. Writers—and their number is considerable—who have (over) emphasized the divisions within the Indian village community have failed to take note of the inevitability of economic co-operation. It was an American missionary, William Wiser, who drew attention to the magnitude of such inter-caste ties in his book *The Jajmani System* (1936). Wiser, it seems in retrospect, leaned much too much to the other side, but the importance of what he showed cannot be overestimated.

The latest research on *jajmani* relations has reached a level of sophistication where it is possible to discern between economic and ritual necessity, and to show that the very notion of ritual pollution which divides groups also makes co-operation between them imperative, even when the economic content of such transactions is not the principal consideration. What makes a barber cling to his rich patron, say the Brahman landlord,

is economic necessity; but what makes a Brahman family, even though poor, retain the services of a barber family is ritual necessity; for Brahmans the shaving of hair and beard are, on many occasions, not acts of masculine toilet, but of ritual purification.

Mobility

Another widespread misconception about the caste system is its absolute rigidity and unchangeability. It is undoubtedly true that a person is born into a caste; that he can do nothing to change his caste membership; that (in other words) caste membership is ascribed and not achieved. This does not, however, entail the conclusion that a caste as a whole cannot improve its social status. In fact, castes have been known to do so, and one of the best known mechanisms for achieving this is that of social inclusion—exclusion; that is, the group desirous of improving its status tries, through overt behaviour, to include itself along with those groups whose status is higher and to exclude itself from its actual peers.

Such attempts (described for Mysore by M. N. Srinivas and Orissa by F. G. Bailey) often follow an improvement in the economic position of the concerned caste, and usually succeed unless it tries to move upwards across such an insurmountable barrier as the line of pollution. But even in such cases upward mobility can, and does, find other expressions. Denied the desired social status within the traditional social system, an ambitious group may endeavour to repudiate that system altogether and, as Bailey and others have shown, seek its rights, not as a caste within the Indian caste system, but as citizenry within the Indian nation.

Low caste people try to step out of the traditional social system when it holds no hope for them. But those castes, or sections of castes, which succeed in rising upwards pose a challenge to their superiors. The narrowing of the gap between the high and the low can be hardly expected to appeal to those used to enjoying the pri-

viliges of high status; so they too turn their backs on the old system and go in for modernization in a (vain) bid to maintain the social differentiation within the village community. Gould has shown that, taking percentages, it is the upper castes of the village of Sherupur who send out more migrants into urban areas than the poor and the lowly castes.

What is the significance of the foregoing for the future of Indian village communities? To answer this question we must bear in mind two developments of great consequence which have occurred in India since 1947. These are: (i) widespread land reforms and (ii) the introduction of universal adult franchise by secret ballot. The land reforms have helped to improve the economic condition of a widespread class of peasant proprietors; adult franchise has placed political power, or at least the ability to influence its exercise, in their hands; and the secret ballot, by providing the necessary anonymity, has made it possible that this power will be exercised by this 'new class', and, what is more important, *against the traditional leaders of the countryside.*

New Adaptation

The significance of the foregoing statement is that, since traditional leadership in a region is associated with a certain caste (such as the Thakur in eastern Uttar Pradesh or the Brahman in Kashmir Valley), modern political processes are being employed to settle old scores between castes. It is in this sense that caste may be said to have adapted itself to the new politico-economic situation in the country and not dissolved in it. The emergence of caste associations is to be understood in this context.

Social anthropologists have often been accused by political scientists and other commentators of providing support to a tottering institution—caste in India—by taking a morbid interest in its vitality. This is not quite fair because, firstly, some anthropologists (notably Edmund Leach of Cambridge and Kathleen Gough from the U.S.A.) have maintained

that the competition between castes for political and economic power does amount to a breach of the caste ideology; secondly, even those of us who do not accept the foregoing as implying the dissolution of caste, have made it clear that (i) caste in India today is not the same as it was a hundred years ago, and (ii) caste is one powerful, but by no means the sole, factor in political decision-making in India today.

Srinivas has succinctly stated that although, taking India as a whole, there has been a distinct weakening of the ritual and social functions of caste in recent decades, 'there is indeed a wide gulf between caste as an endogamous and ritual unit, and the caste-like units which are so active in politics and administration in modern India' (*Caste in Modern India and other Essays*).

To put it briefly, the role of caste in rural India needs watching as it has still a lot of life left in it: endogamy (i.e. marriage within one's own caste) is still widely prevalent. May be people today are less likely to follow parental occupations than before; and less keen on observing rules of purity and pollution than before; but so long as endogamy survives, castes survive; and there are old scores to settle. Caste has changed its meaning—and its strategy—but is still very strong in village life.

✓ The Ferment Begins

There is a ferment in rural India today and the government is trying to nourish it and channelize it through its much publicized Community Development and Panchayati Raj programmes. The whole country is now covered by over 5,000 Community Development Blocks, and a lot of work has been and is being done. There has been waste, inefficiency, lack of understanding and co-operation; but there has also been considerable success. People have begun to want things, to *want change*, and this in itself is no mean achievement. As Toynbee, the distinguished British historian has put it, the C. D. programme is one huge effort to wake up the long

asleep Rip Van Winkle—the Indian peasantry. The Panchayati Raj programme, however, has yet not got through its teething troubles.

The Contradiction

I possibly cannot go into the details of these programmes here; much less into an assessment of the same. My comment will be confined to focusing attention on a basic source of frustration—on a kind of contradiction in our objectives. On the one hand we want to change our countryside: the future that beckons is in the minds of the educated city-dwelling elites; the villager has no idea of it other than what percolates down to him through inadequate and clogged channels of communication. (Several years ago I saw a Health Ministry documentary on family planning being shown to a labour colony somewhere in Uttar Pradesh. The use of contraceptives was explained with the help of Venetian blinds letting in sunshine into a room and cutting it out! The Ministry should have first installed these blinds in the slums before wasting the labourers' time.)

We want to change the unchanging villages, and change them quickly. On the other hand, we want to do this with the consent of the people. And the people, if you ask them, may not want what you want to give them; or they may want what you cannot or will not give them. They may want the tea-house or (as Kusum Nair, and the Chittur B.D.O. discovered) an aerodrome. The result is a breakdown.

The complaint that the Indian villager is apathetic has been heard so often that it hardly needs repetition. What is needed is an attempt to find out *why* he is apathetic. And what is needed even more is to ask the fundamental question as to whether we want quick tangible change, or change with the consent of the people of rural India. If the latter (as seems to be the decision), then the path into the future is long and weary and there will be obstacles and frustrations in plenty along the way.

Books

POLITICS AND SOCIAL CHANGE By F. G. Bailey.
Oxford University Press.

TRADITIONAL CULTURE AND THE IMPACT OF TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE By George M. Foster.
Harper.

If the behavioral sciences are a creation of the mid-twentieth century, India is a field for them par excellence; an open society inviting massive investigation, a traditional, peasant society breaking the crusts of caste in the process of industrial and social change. Yet, so vast and varied a human scene, on which Elwin burst like a beam of morning light a generation ago, lies in relative neglect by Indians themselves in the passion for purely economic in-puts and for new institutions of development. The Delhi University, for instance, is exercised with the out-of-dateness of its social science studies. As far as the planners are concerned social anthropologists might as well be Hottentots for all they know or care.

The future top administrators of India in Mussourie are expected to know India's ancient culture, besides other things, but they are innocent of the cultures of the social groups of to-day. The Community Development administration pompously boasts of its objective 'Destination Man', but it is unaware of what Pope said so simply and clearly: 'The study of mankind is man'. But we presume to build corporations, cooperatives, panchayats and parishads like ants building ant-hills, not possessing either the biological instincts of ants for the job, nor seriously applying the social sciences of the age.

On this 'ant-scape' have descended two books for the few literary ants, possibly for the still fewer ones who see the tremendous social significance of such studies. The first, *Politics and Social Change* is the third of Bailey's works on Orissa, although this is a landmark in social anthropology in so far as it is the first in India to study the relationship of village society through its political links with the wider society of constituency and State. It depicts an aggregate of single societies in relatively different stages of change to less traditional political and economic phases. How Kerala cries out for such a study!

The other, Foster's, provides good layman's reading in the importance and methods of social anthropology

in far ranging societies from the Navaho in America to Micronesia in the Pacific. There are many examples from India too quoted from S. C. Dube. His thesis is that there is no such thing as technological change in isolation; it is always socio-technological change; and frustration will be the lot of the technologist who forgets it. Such books should provide some easy insights of the behavioral scientists to the planners, administrators and managers who, beginning to talk more now of the 'inter-disciplinary approach' to the changing world's problems, are not too mindful of the basic disciplines for the purpose. Foster writes, 'In my experience the biggest blind spot of the administrator is inability to understand the principle of scientific capital.'

Few authors provide the best criticism of their own books, and Bailey provides his with engaging candour when he says: 'The three parts of this book appear to be integrated with one another in a far from satisfactory way. The first resembles social anthropology; the second looks like political science, and the third part might have been written by a somewhat hasty historian with sociological leanings.'

But there is a conceptual whole in the three parts or 'arenas' of study: the village, the constituency and the State. This is a singular departure from the usual sociologist's predilection for the 'group'. Foster is able to show how the threads of the traditional and the new political relationships are being woven through the three arenas on the evidence of two villages, Bisipara in the remote hill tracts, cut off from the broad stream of public affairs outside the region; and Mohanpura, close to Cuttack, economically tied to it, but socially and ritually a typical Oriya village. Over the years warp and woof are producing constantly changing cultural patterns, and it is only a matter of time before the Mohanpuras get like Cuttack, or the Bisiparas like Mohanpura.

Until then change is not painless, it is not organic, it is hardly understood. What do these two authors say to help a better understanding, to make the inevitable transition less painful?

Whilst many newspaper readers flatter themselves unctuously that democracy 'has taken roots' in this country, Bailey's studies provide impartial evidence for what a few of us already know, that the root of corruption in peasant politics lies in the fact that parliamentary democracy is a thing of the outside with no 'legitimacy' in the social values of village people; that the vote is 'a little thing'; and that, like public money which is 'sarcari', no great scruples need be practised with either vote or public money. The voters themselves have no direct interest in 'the common weal', and they believe that anyone who offers himself as a candidate is out to make

* Nirad C. Chaudhuri, says something similar in the context of 'Anglicised Hindus and the Hindu way of Life' in the *Statesman*, April 24, 1965 about the 'Nehru Line to-day':—

'The Anglicised Hindus remain unaware of this progression of ideas and attitudes, especially of two of its most significant features: namely, that the revived and rationalised new Hinduism of the late 19th century is completely dead; and that the acceptance of western influences in India has changed from a relative assimilation into the pre-existing or revived Hindu elements to an uncritical or wholesale imitation and imposition without reference to anything existing in the country.'

money for himself. So they are out to get what they can from all candidates, and are only too ready to be corrupted. Is this the worm at the root of Indian democracy? Is this the source of false leaders, of phoney men without substance? Are we deliberately doing unnecessary violence to our society? Indian social anthropology has yet to make a serious study of these problems and bring them forcefully to the attention of public men.

Meanwhile, the introduction of political parties divides, splinters and produces endless dissidence. Foster writes: 'rapid acculturation frequently promotes village factionalism,' and this is what we seem to be witnessing on a national scale.

Since the new countries gained their independence the spectacle of the politician fastening on the economy for private gain is a common one from Ghana to Indonesia, but strangely it has been left to a social anthropologist, Bailey—not an economist, mark,—to point to the hidden cost of electoral machines, and the fact that 'relief monies, development monies and contracts' all go to recoup the costs of party machines. At the constituency level these machines 'belong to individuals rather than parties', and so groups of individuals fatten on the party ticket and the patronage it may bring at the taxpayer's expense. But patronage, vast as it is, is too limited for hungry hordes, and there lie the germs of the commonest disease of party politics in India, dissidence. It is like the Ganges delta; the main stream is lost in a maze of distributaries.

Bailey adds that in Orissa the political parties 'have no moral appeal'; that caste alone provides the politician with 'a ready-made moral element on which he can draw to form associations, without the members of those associations calculating at every step what they are going to get out of it'. In Orissa he finds the socialist parties the only ones organised on western lines; the Ganatantra depends for its support on traditional ties, and the Congress on patronage. Among the clean castes there is 'a connection between a vote for the Congress and economic dependence on Government.' So the more we socialise, the worse will it be for the socialists and the better for Congress?

Not quite, for apart from the fact that the ruling party claims to be socialist too, Bailey finds the ballot box is subject to other influences. He examines why the Congress declined from its pre-eminent position in 1947 to a dominant one in 1952, and to only a senior partnership in a coalition in 1959. What happened in these short twelve years? The first and foremost reason he suggests is that after Independence it found 'no new moral focus', and 'moral action tended to be replaced by expedient action.' Next, the Congress lost the souls of the hill areas because, as one Ganatantra MLA said, they came 'with the mentality of conquerors.' There was high-handedness; protests were treated as subversion. The price of rice multiplied many times, the Raja vanished, and an impersonal bureaucracy moved in. The

local intelligentsia was superseded by imported officers.

But to return to the village arena, who, asks Bailey, are the 'real' leaders? He found the same answers as the Wisers in the U.P. One is first approached in a village by children and curious adults. Others will then take over, escort one to a home or school, bring tea, and ask his business. They seem co-operative and enthusiastic. Any development work done with them fails, for the village knows them as 'touters.' Successful work—a new seed, a different crop pattern, or a compost pit—these can only be done through the 'real' leaders who will never approach; they have to be sought and when sought, they are reluctant and non-committal. But the village will readily follow them.

The problem, however, is that once these real leaders get too involved with the relationships outside, they tend to lose something of their prestige. Foster, quoting Dube, points to the very interesting discovery that group dynamics reveal several levels of leadership in village communities, some for external relationships with government, some for agriculture, some for family matters. So the administrator has to know which to approach for which purpose, for schools, hospitals, agricultural production or family planning. Foster believes the 'prestige-laden' individual is more effective as an agent of change than the 'deviant' dissatisfied with traditional ways.

What do these anthropologists find about that major axiom of Indian policy, that the golden path to a better life lies through cooperatives? Foster relates how beyond the nuclear family, from Italy to India, 'concerted action for the common good' comes very hard. In traditional societies the 'productive pie' of the village and the family does not greatly change. If someone is seen to go ahead, it is presumed he does so at the expense of others. 'Any evidence of change for the better is proof of guilt he has taken advantage of his neighbours.' Again, 'in peasant communities wealth can be displayed only in a ritual context.' He concludes, 'with this mentality, a new technical aid programme which presupposes a high degree of village cooperation is obviously headed for trouble.' All this is borne out by Berreman in the Jamsar Bawar region of the U.P.,* where he finds the absence of an effective tradition of community cooperation. What then is the sociological basis for the glib assumption that cooperatives just have to be established for a 'co-operative commonwealth' to follow?

Foster has some excellent chapters for the administrator and the planner on 'Technical Aid and Social Change' and on 'The Ethics of Social Change', in which the basic lesson is to 'work with not plan for people.' When he says that 'play is an important factor in culture change, but unfortunately it has

* *Hindus of the Himalaya* by Gerald D. Berreman, Oxford University Press.

not been well documented' he will find support for his hypothesis among knowing educationists. It is interesting to speculate how much baseball has Americanised the Japanese, or how much cricket may have Anglicised Indians. But for all the cautions of cultural and social barriers to change, Foster points to two irresistible forces which prevail in the final analysis; they are imitation and economic gain. In the end, in human behaviour they will not be denied; but in the process the distortions of values, the social monstrosities, the human suffering may be alleviated, the awkward age of cultural transition may be shortened if administrators and managers give thought to the best fit, the synthesis between value systems, social forms and economic possibilities. These are the true dimensions of human planning, not money alone, nor ideology.

A. D. Moddie

CASTE AND RITUAL IN A MALWA VILLAGE By K. S. Mathur.

Asia Publishing House.

Malwa in Madhya Pradesh has been a meeting place—sometimes peaceful, generally not—of different societies in our country. The language of the region too is a kind of Hindi, liberally mixed with Gujarati and a bit of Marathi. So, an intensive sociological study of a Malwa village would help to bring out more clearly various cross-currents, proto-historic and historic, running through our society today. Our villages, brashly assumed to be unchanging through the centuries, can no longer isolate themselves from city influences. If this book under review had been a genuine study of caste and ritual in a Malwa village, it would have gone a long way towards telling us about the kind of Indian life that probably won't remain the same way very long. But Mathur has not done so. Instead, in many places, lengthy excerpts from various books on sociology are substituted for original research and even after reading the book, one is none the wiser about caste and ritual in the village of Potlod.

Mathur gives reasons to explain his preference for Potlod over other Malwa villages. Among them are these two. Firstly, it is almost inaccessible during the rains, and, secondly, it has hardly any religious or other minorities. The two together reduce extraneous influences to a minimum. But in spite of these favourable circumstances for an intensive study, the book remains what it is. It has charts and tables, maps and photographs, but it is deficient in original or helpful conclusions about caste and ritual. Mathur has not given any details of the customs of the village, nor has he noted any ritual practices and festivals peculiar to Potlod.

Most of our villages, even those near industrialized areas, still celebrate their own festivals every year, generally in connection with some primitive village cults which throw light on the past and present development of society. But in the Potlod of this study we don't come across such things. One thing

in the book pointing towards the existence of old cults is that temples house the better-known Hindu gods and goddesses, with Brahmin priests, and these deities are worshipped by the higher castes, while the older shrines are out in the open, and have low-caste priests. Mathur mentions this in passing instead of probing the matter intensively. This caste division between the temples and the cult shrines isn't an isolated phenomenon found only in Potlod, but that doesn't relieve the field worker of the job of finding out details.

Mathur rambles on about the importance of Malwa during the Mahabharata period. A long historical account follows, which, however, does not enlighten the reader about the subject matter that is sought to be studied.

In Potlod, as in most villages, the values are sought to be translated into practice. Prayer and worship give precedence to leading what Mathur calls 'a proper life', which means following the rules and regulations laid down for one's caste. But exigencies of life have forced people to change their occupation, and Mathur gives instances where this has happened in Potlod. But these instances aren't studied in detail; they are only mentioned and forgotten.

Considering this research was sponsored by an Australian university, some general information about Hindu ritual may have been necessary as back-ground information. Even so it does not explain the repetitiveness of the book or the meagreness of its findings.

In the introduction, Mathur mentions that, being a Hindu, he too had his place chalked out in the caste hierarchy and was readily accepted by Potlod. He adds that the presence of his wife further helped to establish his bona fides. Yet, these facilities, very difficult to get quite often, haven't resulted in a searching analysis and research.

Kusum Madgavkar

CASTE IN CHANGING INDIA By A. P. Barnabas and Subhash C. Mehta.

The Indian Institute of Public Administration, New Delhi, pp. 84.

This is a brief introduction to the problem of caste in present day India. The Indian Constitution has legislated the termination of caste in India, but caste continues. The most serious aspect of this problem is the existence of caste as an essential feature of the political patterns which have emerged over the last fifteen years.

The importance of caste is evident both in the selection of candidates by political parties at the time of the general elections, and also in the pattern of voting. A number of samples are cited where caste was the determining factor in both these aspects and it has been suggested that this has been the overwhelming pattern in both the elections.

Nevertheless, one would be interested to see a comparative analysis of those elections where caste was not a deciding factor.

The most obvious example which comes to mind is the election in the North Bombay constituency in 1962, where both candidates were foreign to the constituency both caste-wise and region-wise and were personalities in their own right. Perhaps the voting pattern in areas which have been industrialised and urban over a long period would be different from that suggested by our authors. It has also been pointed out that the emergence of caste associations are a positive factor since they bridge over local and regional interests in politics. Here again a more careful analysis of the motivations of such groups may be rewarding, particularly as pointers to political organisation by those who wish to reduce the role of caste in politics.

The problem of the backward castes is discussed in the light of the debate as to whether backward castes should be given privileges or not. The fact that special treatment tends to perpetuate the traditional attitude towards the backward castes is evident. Yet this policy on the part of the government will not come up for revision until 1970. Perhaps the most pernicious effect of casteism comes about in the system of caste-quota for admission to educational institutions which persists in certain areas.

The one basic weakness of this brief study of caste is the lack of emphasis on the relationship between caste and the economic structure. Most studies of caste tend to get carried away by a largely sociological analysis of caste. It may not be possible to relate caste with the economic structure in the historical period, but there is surely no dearth of material for such studies in contemporary India. The association of caste with occupation in itself indicates the importance of this relationship. It is not enough to say (as our authors have said on page 1), that, 'The modern political ideas of democracy and liberty throw a challenge to the basic principles of the caste system'. It takes more than ideas to throw such a challenge. It takes a radical change in the socio-economic structure. One wonders what kind of re-adjustments caste would have to make in the rural areas if the government were to decide on a policy of redistribution of all land holdings and the establishment of co-operative farming.

Seminarist

POLITICS OF A PERI-URBAN COMMUNITY IN INDIA

Edited and with an introduction by A. H. Somjee.

Asia Publishing House, 1964.

This slim volume contains papers on six different villages, the outcome of an experiment conducted by the Department of Political Science, M.S. University of Baroda, in sending post-graduate students to villages and making them write disser-

tations in lieu of two papers at the M.A. level. Its significance stems from the fact that we know little about village politics in India in spite of about fifteen years of universal adult franchise, and that its influence on all-India politics is not likely to shrink but grow.

How do politics work at the grass roots level? The villages discussed here all lie within a nine-mile radius of Baroda city and hence constitute a peripheral urban village community, that is, basically rural and rustic, but at the same time subject to the economic pull and urbanising influence of the town. This helps to produce a mixture of simplicity and cunning, honesty and corruption, naivete and sophistication. The problems covered are those which agitated these villages at various times and centred round political change, temple politics, water-works politics, working-class politics, factional politics and the politics of voluntary organisation--all familiar terms in our democratic set-up. The factors at work are the disparity in the numerical strength of contending social groups, their level of literacy and economic development, availability of a particular type of leadership, outstanding local issues, etc.

The first impression of an observer is that the social structure of the villagers of the peri-urban community no longer rests on a solid foundation of acceptance which it did for all these unchanging centuries. There is too much questioning of positions of inferiority in the social hierarchy and pressing of corresponding claims to higher social origin and status. In the reverse direction, those who are in a socially advantageous position no longer enjoy a sense of security with regard to the permanence of their status and privileges. They have become intensely aware that the climate of thinking, government policy, education, economic advancement and the political assertion of the lower strata of village society will eventually come to erode the very basis on which their position of privilege rests.

These are the trends of a release of forces and urges which will work towards a significant social change. In the initial period, the introduction says, a drive towards a better deal has expressed itself in the need to consolidate one's own social group. That is considered to be one reason why in the post-Independence period, the economic and political consolidation of caste was very much in evidence. It is questioned, however, whether such an expression can exhaust the dynamism which lies behind it, leading in the direction of a progressively greater degree of individualism.

How has the extension of democracy in rural areas worked, particularly the election of panchayats on the basis of adult suffrage? The main result has been the increasing participation of the lower castes in the political life of the peri-urban community, although in varying ways from village to village. For instance, in two villages out of six, the Barias, a lower middle caste of this area, have successfully challenged the monopoly of political power enjoyed

by the Patidars, a higher middle caste. In another village, the Vankars, who are considered to be Harijans, got elected to the general seats in the panchayat and played an important part in its politics. However, their socially disadvantageous position set frustrating limits to their political ambition.

Coming to the significance of specific problems, the first paper illustrates the struggle between the Barias and the Patidars for political power in the village of Manjalpur, and analyses the nature and extent of political change reflected in the panchayat, the cooperative society and leadership of the village. The paper on Bariapur discusses the inability of the village panchayat to tap the sources of revenue within its jurisdiction and authority, and also the interference by important members of the political parties and the administrative machinery in a problem of primary concern to the village and temple. The paper on Gorwa reveals the growing indifference of the working class of the village to its public life, due to its preference for trade union politics and inclination to leave village politics to the agriculturists.

The paper on Kalali tries to show how the ruling political party attempted to win back the support of a village which had a rival candidate in the District Local Board election; the entire manipulation taking place around the construction of a water-works in the village at public expense. The paper on Harni highlights the nature and extent of factionalism in village politics. Finally, a note on Bhaili points out how the presence of a voluntary organisation becomes a source of rivalry to the panchayat in matters of development work in a village where the ruling caste is split by kinship considerations.

This volume is a warning against any hasty generalisation as to the nature and peculiarities of village politics in India in the peri-urban area, leave alone distant areas.

A. K. Banerjee

SOCIAL WELFARE IN INDIA; Mahatma Gandhi's Contributions By A. M. Mazumdar.

Asia Publishing House, 1964.

Voluntary efforts in the field of social welfare and social reconstruction in the modern sense go back in India to approximately two hundred years. In the eighteenth and nineteenth century. Indian social thinkers such as Ram Mohan Roy who came in contact with western thought and culture became conscious of the evils besetting the Indian society and initiated a comprehensive programme of social reforms. Simultaneously, Christian missionaries stressed the urgency of social reform and attacked many customary social practices such as child marriages, female infanticide and *suttee*.

In the twentieth century Mahatma Gandhi integrated the fight for political freedom with a pro-

gramme for social welfare and initiated welfare activities in the fields of Harijan welfare and rural reconstruction. Since partition the concept of 'welfare State' has become the declared objective of India's economic development. In this book Mazumdar sketches the historical background of social welfare in India and assesses the contribution which Mahatma Gandhi made to social welfare and techniques of social work.

The book is divided into three parts. In the first part the author discusses the historical background to social welfare in India and tries to assess the transformation into the ideology of social welfare after Mahatma Gandhi's appearance on the Indian scene in the 1920s. She shows that in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, Indian social thinkers initiated many social reforms. Although these thinkers were influenced by liberal western thought, they were not carried away by it. On the contrary, they became conscious of the challenge which western thought posed to customary Indian practices, and they attempted to show that pure Hinduism did not suffer from the blemishes which were found in current practices. Social reform, thus, was not aimed at welfare but was a defensive reaction against the onslaught of a foreign religion and culture.

The appearance of Mahatma Gandhi made a break from the preceding reform activity. In the first place, since Gandhiji's appearance on the Indian scene, the idea of social reform was replaced by welfare. Mahatma Gandhi said that what was required was not only a reformation of the established practices but a development of an ideology of welfare. Secondly, Mahatma Gandhi converted the idea of social welfare into a mass movement. While the effects of the earlier social reformers reached only the newspaper ranking intelligentsia, Mahatma Gandhi, through his charismatic leadership, carried the welfare movement to the masses. Finally, Mahatma Gandhi integrated the political fight for freedom with the movement for welfare.

The second part of the book discusses the contribution of Mahatma Gandhi's activities in three fields, namely Harijan welfare, women's welfare and rural welfare. Regarding Harijan welfare, the author argues that although the missionaries had frequently taken up the cause of the Harijans, Mahatma Gandhi transferred this cause into a national concern and combined this with the political struggle. When the British wanted to create separate electorates, Gandhiji fought the separation of these communities from the body of Hinduism and led a vigorous movement against untouchability. Similarly, he also imparted a new urgency to women's welfare by involving them in political activities.

Finally, in the third part Mazumdar sums up the contribution made by Gandhiji to social welfare and techniques of social work and discusses his conception of social welfare activity. She points out that

achievement of independence, formation of a Democratic Republic of India, adoption of a constitution guaranteeing freedom of conscience, worship, speech and expression, and publishing, discrimination on grounds of religion, race, caste or sex, political and administrative consolidation of the country and an accentuated pace of progress towards a welfare State, focussing on the problems of social welfare and a thorough-going examination of the issues associated with them are among the tangible effects of Gandhiji's ministrations.

She also tries to deal with the criticism frequently made in India that social work training in India is western oriented and argues that during Gandhiji's lifetime, reform and welfare programmes were developed directly out of the country's needs. The welfare programmes launched after independence by the voluntary government agencies are also clearly consistent with the tradition and value of our nation. Hence the criticism that social work in India is borrowed is invalid.

There is one point which seems untenable in Mazumdar's study. She points out that while the ideology of social welfare of the early social thinkers was essentially religious, the Mahatma gave the ideology a liberal, secular connotation. While it is true that Mahatma Gandhi's political conceptions were secular, it is wrong to say that his radical programme for social reform was also secular. In fact, much of his reform activity was devoted to a consolidation of the Hindu people. His insistence on the abolition of untouchability and the total assimilation of these classes in Hinduism; his campaign for the free entry of the untouchables into Hindu temples which had at all times been denied to them, his historic fast in Poona to prevent the separation of the untouchables from the body of Hinduism, show that he represented in his person a final phase of the Hindu revival.

Also, it must be emphasized that the conception on which he based his movement, *Ahimsa*, *Satyagraha*, etc. were directly related to traditional Hindu ideals. Thus, while Mahatma Gandhi's ideas made a break from the earlier reform movements, they can in no case be regarded as the basis of modern welfare ideology. In fact, the modern concept of a welfare State and modern movement for social welfare is directly descended from the western liberal, secular ideology rather than derived from Mahatma Gandhi's ideology.

Mazumdar's book, nevertheless, is a valuable contribution to the study of social welfare. In the first place, it provides an introduction to the study of the historical background of social welfare in India. Secondly, it also provides a good assessment of Mahatma Gandhi's contribution in the field. Students of social work will find around this a useful cross-cultural source-book of reference in regard to the origin of social work and its motivation in India

Imtiaz Ahmad

DEVELOPMENT OF RELIGION IN SOUTH INDIA

By K. A. Nilakanta Sastri.

Orient Longmans, 1963.

Nilakanta Sastri is a well-known authority on South Indian history. His works have fetched him several laurels, including a Padma Bhushan. From a person like him, one naturally expects scholarship of a high standard, and not a digression of the type made in *Development of Religion in South India*. The title itself is deceptive. What the book contains is not an account of the development of Hinduism, either as a faith or a way of life, but a lengthy record of Hindu legends, gods and goddesses, kings and kingdoms, customs and institutions.

The study is based on a survey of the cultural forms of Hinduism from a sociological or anthropological point of view. The underlying assumption seems to be that religion could best be studied by isolating the forms of worship from worship itself. While this may be valid for understanding the mechanics of a system, it cannot be applied to study the growth of an organic body, least of all a religious faith and its practice.

Any enquiry which follows this method is apt to commit at least two mistakes. Firstly, the symbols being devoid of their inner or true significance would be liable to misinterpretation and, secondly, the forms being deprived of their source-energy could not be expected to grow or develop by themselves. This is exactly the impression which one gathers from a careful reading of the book. The gods and goddesses, the rituals and institutions described appear as still pictures, incapable of showing any movement, religious or otherwise.

Even in the presentation of these still pictures no definite pattern or line of direction has been followed. Each chapter appears to stand on its own without any apparent relation with another. One of the reasons why such abrupt departures are noticeable could be due to the fact that the book is based on a series of lectures which the author delivered at the University of Chicago. The lectures being delivered at different points of time, and probably on an equally varied theme, could not possibly be integrated or compressed into a compact unit. This may also be the reason why no attempt has been made to define either the scope of the enquiry or the terms and concepts under discussion, including religion itself.

Purely as a historical study of the cultural forms and practices, of the rise and fall of Hindu kingdoms in the South, the book makes interesting reading. The review starts with the vedic times and stretches right up to the present. The narration is not restricted to South India alone. On the contrary, the emphasis is to review the historical developments in the North and study their southward spread.

The exploration of this expansion is based on the hypothesis that initially the South and the North

were culturally distinct and separated from each other. They were brought together through 'the fusion of Aryan with non-Aryan cults' which first began in the North, resulting in a series of conflicts, and then in the South in a peaceful manner.

The process of Aryanization in the South was initiated by Agastya, a vedic seer whose abode was first located in the Himalayas and later to the extreme south of India, the Agastyākuta or the Peak of Agastya at the southern end of the Western Ghats. His teachings were 'welcomed and eagerly adopted by the Tamils'. In relatively late Tamil tradition, Agastya was thus recognised not only as the family priest but also 'as the original inventor of Tamil and the author of the earliest grammar of that language'.

Chronologically, the author feels that the process of Aryanization completed by the fourth century (B.C.) when a 'new Hindu Society, marked by certain prominent traits' and embracing the whole of the country came into being. It was 'a pluralistic society which had found in the caste system the most expedient method of accommodating people's professing different faiths and following diverse practices, while ensuring the acceptance by all of a common ideological framework'.

The Indian caste system in its actual working 'was neither so good and perfect as the orthodox advocates of the theory of *varnasrama* think, nor so evil and degrading as its critics, particularly from among Christian missionaries, have been prone to depict.' In the course of time, 'the principle of caste fissiparousness', however became so deep-rooted that, 'even the reformist attempts to abolish caste ended generally in the formation of new castes of such reformers.' The system invaded 'even the Islamic and Christian sections of Indian society.'

On the whole the pattern of Hindu social thought and conduct was, however, 'calculated to ensure a stable society'... a society in which each individual would find his or her place duly defined, a place in which there would be no lack of opportunity for working one's way up both here and hereafter. The emphasis was more on duty than on right, on order and the continuance of ancestral custom than on innovation and change. The social order, particularly the Dharma (duty and function) of the *varnās* and the *asramas* (stage of life) was believed to be divinely ordained, but the code was not inflexible and changes, necessitated by time, place and circumstance, were effected by the example and consent of the elite of society; and this principle applied even to secular matters such as the regulation of industry, trade and the arts by the guilds or groups concerned.'

The State had no legislative power. Its main task was 'to keep the ring and enable the units of society, territorial (village) or social (caste, guild), or institutional (temple, college), and so on to carry on their legitimate functions without hindrance from anti-social elements. The actual multiplication of

caste (*jati*) was reconciled with the four *varnas* of divine ordinance by the theory of mixed castes (*varnasankara*), worked out in much detail in textbooks, but bearing little relation to the facts of life; but the books were consulted at times to decide practical issues, and foreign immigrants were given a place in Hindu society if they desired entry by being regarded as *Kshatriyas* of sorts.'

The historical narration which follows after the vedic period records the rise and impact of the *Bhakti* movement—a phase which lasted from the sixth century to about the end of the eighth century (A.D.). As in the case of Aryanization, the *Bhakti* cult had its origin in the North. 'The southern movement was in some way inspired by the northern example.'

The next chapter deals with 'Gods and Sects'; the origin of the practice of making images and offering worship to them, the description of these images and the holy shrines and the influence of other religious thought on the practice of Hinduism in South India. A chapter is likewise devoted to describe the 'religious institutions', the temple in particular. There are two more chapters, one which deals with 'philosophies in relation to religion' and the other with 'movements after A.D. 1000'. Together, these four chapters provide a detailed account of the outward manifestations of Hinduism, both in the South and in the North, but not its spiritual aspirations.

Ranjit Gupta

SOCIALISM, SARVODAYA AND DEMOCRACY By Jayaprakash Narayan.


Asia Publishing House, Bombay.

Socialism and democracy are much in the air now-a-days. There are as many varieties and brands of them as perhaps the number of persons swearing in their name.

In this merry-go-round of abuse and misuse of noble words which have inspired generations of mankind, thinking, rather, clear thinking has been the first casualty. Dr. Bimlā Prasad, the editor of *Socialism, Sarvodaya and Democracy*, has attempted to needle in this small volume a rosary of J. P.'s thought-beads on these problems scattered over the span of a quarter of a century.

J. P. got the gift of Marxism from his seven-year stay in the USA—the traditional home of capitalism and *laissez faire*. But gradually he strayed away from it until the breach was absolute and final. He abhorred violence associated with Marxism which, he said, 'might conceivably lead to a socialist democracy; but in the only country (Russia) where it has been tried, it has led to something very different, i.e., to a bureaucratic State, in which democracy does not exist.' (p. 51).

In 1957, in a statement on the occasion of his resignation from the PSP, he 'rejected the theory of



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
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the dictatorship of the proletariat, which in effect meant the dictatorship of a bureaucratic oligarchy.' (p. 146). In that statement he also rejected the Marxist philosophy of dialectical materialism. His denunciation of the Soviet economic system for 'centralisation, bureaucratisation, lack of industrial democracy, lack of workers' participation in the management of industry, in short, lack of popular control over the economic process,' (p. 109) would startle any Marxist.

As J. P. travelled from Marxism to socialism, he found even the latter wanting and so turned to Gandhism or *sarvodaya* for light. Comparing socialism with Gandhism, he said: 'Socialism wishes to destroy classes by making one class victorious over the other—which seems to be somewhat illogical. Gandhism wishes to abolish classes by so bringing the classes together that there are no class distinctions left. Socialism ultimately aims at creating a Stateless society, but it wishes to make the State all powerful by making the social revolution itself dependent upon State action. Gandhism, too, like socialism, aims at a Stateless society. But on that account it proceeds more consistently by making the social process as little dependent upon the State as possible.' (p. 121).

While J. P.'s growing faith in *sarvodaya* as the only remedy for human ills is evident enough, it is not clear how he reconciles it with his open advocacy of the use of arms for India's freedom movement before 1947. It is also not clear how *sarvodaya* can condone his pre-independence underground resistance which brought him a blaze of unprecedented fame.

J. P. was one of the founding fathers of the Congress Socialist Party as also one of its leading lights for a couple of decades. But this only created in him a distaste for the party system. Many shared his disillusionment with it when he declared: 'I saw how parties backed by finance, organisation and the means of propaganda could impose themselves on the people; how people's rule became in effect party rule; how party rule in turn became the rule of a caucus or coterie; how democracy was reduced to mere casting of votes; how even this right of vote was restricted severely by the system of powerful parties setting up their candidates from whom alone, for all practical purposes, the voters had to make their choice; how even this limited choice was made unreal by the fact that the issues posed before the electorate were by and large incomprehensible to it.' (p. 158).

J. P. failed, however, to give a workable alternative to the party system. He has not explained how in the absence of elections it is possible to measure the general consensus of opinion for selection of candidates. He has also not explained why like-minded persons should not get together and organise themselves for the materialisation of what they consider to be right and desirable.

The indirect elections, proposed by him, to apex institutions of government, say, the State legislatures

and Parliament, are likely to dilute the direct relationship between the electorate and the elected representatives and to that extent dilute democracy itself. J. P.'s insistence on selection of candidates by 'people' and not by parties is enigmatic, for parties too are composed of 'people'. Shorn of frills and academic hedging in, J. P.'s communitarian or partyless democracy would usher in disintegration, disorder and chaos. It may even give rise to absolutism and rank opportunism.

J. P.'s profession and practice have been at cross-purposes with the passage of time. One would have appreciated had he recanted his past and told the country what he stood for at present. But to the great dismay of the seeker of consistency, he proclaims 'a uniform line of development' in 'the past course of my (his) life.' For consistency and precision, if one takes his latest pronouncements as his considered views in cancellation of what he said or did earlier, they boil down to anarchism *sans* socialism. *sans sarvodaya* and *sans* democracy. There would neither be the need for a government nor a State to govern. The theory of Bhoodan (not its practice!) will reign supreme.

This is not to suggest that J. P. is a wishy washy sentimentalist. His burning passion for the freedom of man which he would not subjugate to any deity, new or old—State, religion, community, caste, tradition or law—deserves reiteration by democrats all the world over. His warnings against the State turning into a Frankenstein, his plea for the limitation of wants and his call for humanising economics are gems of wisdom. His suggestion for the establishment and encouragement of agro-industrial, urban-rural habitats which do not grow into leviathans but are technically superior all the same has received theoretical support in John P. Lewis's *Quiet Crisis* and Robert L. Clark's *Manpower in Economic Development*.

Socialism, Sarvodaya and Democracy brings to bear on the subject a lot of objective questioning and cross-questioning. Though somewhat stale even before publication, its final chapter having been written in 1961, it is refreshingly original in provoking thought on a classless society envisioned by socialism and democracy. To the reviewer, it seems to be the most modern work on *sufism*, preaching the transformation of society from the grass-roots.

H. S.

CLASS, CASTE AND CLUB By Francis L. K. Hsu.

D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., Princeton, New Jersey.

The book is a study of three different societies, two traditional and one modern—Chinese, Hindu and American. The first two societies both claim a hoary past and have had to face similar sociological and psychological problems, but despite seeming similarity between the two cultures, the results have been quite different. Chinese and Hindu societies are markedly different in their responses. The author has adopted a combination of sociological, anthropo-

logical and the psychological approach, but one wonders whether such a study can be definitive without accommodating the historical approach also.

In the author's view, the Chinese class system is more cohesive than the Hindu caste system, '... the cohesive or centripetal tendencies of the Chinese family are clearly reflected in the Chinese way in clan and the centrifugal or divisive tendencies of the Hindu family are clearly reflected in the Hindu way in clan. The Chinese clan has impressive strength and cohesion in contrast to the Hindu clan with its amorphousness and lack of cohesion.'

The author traces this to the Hindu's higher loyalties beyond his family or caste, whereas in the case of the Chinese clan or family, there is no higher loyalty. As he puts it, 'the basic guide for the Hindu's behaviour is his relationship with the gods. His worldly ties with his family and others are often overshadowed, or at least strongly affected, by his ties with men of saintly propensities, namely, priests or holy men. This super-natural orientation dovetails well with diluted human bonds and fosters perpetual searches for non worldly anchorages.'

The Chinese on the other hand has no such higher loyalty. With his 'situation-centred' world and attitude favouring mutual dependence, he tends to seek solution to his life's problems in terms of the human beings of his first social group, the family. The Hindu, with his 'supra-natural' centred world and attitude favouring unilateral dependence, tends to seek solution to his life's problems by leaving himself in the hands of gods or persons who, compared with him, enjoy higher status or possess greater power. The American with his 'self-centred' world and 'militant self-reliance', is conditioned to view his life's problem in terms of what he himself thinks and can do. 'The very definition of growing and manhood in his world means rejection of familial protection, and dependence is a totally undesirable state for all except women and children.'

In analysing why Chinese society took to clan. Hindu to caste and American to club, the author comes to particularly valid conclusions regarding Chinese and American societies, perhaps because of first-hand experience and knowledge. The writer is Chinese and has had his education in China, while for the past twenty years he has lived in the United States. But when he talks about Hindu society he is not as sound or deep. Although he spent about two years in India and has read a large number of important materials on traditional Hindu society, his hypothesis and therefore his conclusions are quite shaky.

For instance, the very premise from which he starts is that Hindu society has not changed very much from that described in the Vedas. He underestimates the role of the Hindu family which helps him to prove his pre-conceived thesis that the status of women in traditional China was higher than that in Hindu society. There is little to choose between

the slavery and oppression of women in the two societies: child marriage, footbinding and concubinage were equally cruel manifestations of the inferior position of women in Chinese society.

He controverts and finds faults with Indian scholars like Srinivas whose ideas on the caste system do not square with his. His main thesis is that 'the caste system is the expression of the contradictions inherent in the supernatural centred world, in which the symbols of hierarchical differentiation may be purity versus impurity, higher occupation versus lower occupations . . . , or any other distinction of a symbolic nature the cultural and historical context can provide. The essence of the Hindu caste system consists of the tendency on the part of the individual, in his search for circles of sociability, security, and status beyond the kinship group, to fortify himself behind self-imposed social and ritual walls, and the conflicting tendency to break through these walls for the purpose of raising himself to a higher status.'

Despite these perhaps inevitable drawbacks in regard to the analysis of Hindu society, the book is a pioneering work and shows great scholarship and painstaking research. It provides many insights into the workings of different societies and is very ably written.

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Communications

Your May issue gave a comprehensive and almost total view of the Goa problem. The symposium on the many facets of the territory's crisis of transition, however, in my opinion, missed a rather vital link. While the analysis of the existing situation as well as the focus on some challenges—political, economic, social, cultural and religious—was quite incisive, the historical aspect of the territory was, more or less, obscured in the face of the preoccupation with the present and the future. What an interested reader would have looked for and missed is the perspective of the Goan past.

Most of the participants belong to the nationalist school of thought, and that seems right also. But a communication from one of the defunct Portuguese regime might well have added some colour to the moving spectrum of study. A view-point or an opinion, well argued, from a spokesman of the old order might have ignited a spark in the hot controversy now being cooled down.

The above, however, is a minor point, although its significance could have been gauged by the provocation it would have aroused by the inclusion of a theory justifying the perpetration and perpetuation of Salazar. In fact, the theory of the civilizing mission of the Lisbon authorities was widely prevalent before the eve of Goa's independence. Many people in Goa still feel nostalgic about the memory of the recent past for all the extravaganza, fun and frolic that was a part and parcel of their lives. Much of the cry for the maintenance of a distinct culture is a reflex action of the demand for alcoholism, twist and beatlemania, these activities now being gradually submerged by a strong dose of the Hindu scheme of values. Lest this contention of mine give a misleading picture of 'the need for the preservation of the distinct culture', I should not obscure, at any rate, the legitimate desire of the Konkani speaking people who, although a majority, nurse a genuine fear of their linguistic autonomy being put to jeopardy in case Gomantak's demand for merger with Maharashtra is conceded.

The Goan mind seems, from all counts, to be acutely in a state of split. Neither will the democratic appeal have a sound response nor will the secular principle be acceptable to the majority of Goans. Is it not too early to read the correct spellings of the

course the Government of India is likely to contemplate? Amalgamation with the adjoining State would raise a storm of protest from the the Christian community; maintenance of the status quo too would enrage the wrath of the pro-Maharashtra solution of the problem immediately in sight. With the inscrutable forces likely to emerge in the future, the fate of Goa hangs in a precarious balance.

If the Goans could in the past be persuaded to fight against the colonial rulers and that phase being over, they can now be persuaded (rather than coerced into a *fait accompli*) to evolve a formula which satisfies the requirements of an emotional integration with the Indian Union and sets to rest the bitter acrimony which divides the people. Nothing can be gained, I believe, by precipitating matters in haste. The process involved in the persuasion is an educative one and it may not take an impatiently long time for the Goans to arrive at a more or less consensus of opinion as to their future. It is an experiment worth undertaking for the successful operations of a democratic polity and the accomplishment of a revolution in men's minds through fostering national convictions.

I agree with the statement of the problem (p. 13) and the Union government seems to be alive to it. Yet I may disagree with your conclusion that the Hindus and Christians of maturity and understanding particularly in the midst of such emotional and sentimental clouds of language and merger. The hope may be lost. Hence, your suggestion for a moratorium on the issues is both prudent and reasonable.

Delhi, April 13, 1965

M. M. SANKHDHER

Please accept my gratitude for your outstanding symposium on Secularism (67, March 1965). The notion of secularism may have originated in the relationship between the State and the religions, but your discussants have rightly enquired into its implications for several other levels of thought and action. The basic question is an old one; 'Will human relations be governed by some accident of birth (membership in religious, linguistic, caste, or racial group) or by individual capabilities disregarding these accidents?'

Your contributors appear to agree on the latter criterion unanimously; in this they

belong to a small, though perhaps significant, minority. The minority could be significant in the Indian context if it could align itself with the compulsions of a modernizing, industrializing society; compulsions that are driving, as Ayyub and others point out, even Pakistan to secularism.

To become significant, it is essential for members of this minority to initiate action which will give direction to these compulsions. In the following paragraphs I outline a variety of actions at the level of the individual, the voluntary group and the State, aimed at the creation of an 'open' society, wherein some of the disabilities of birth have decreasing significance.

From the present standpoint, it is tragic that the diacritical marks indicating an individual's religious group are ubiquitous. One's name is a nearly infallible guide to one's group; even lying about one's name may not help: it is said that during the 1947 riots, if a gang of killers found a man of doubtful origin, they asked him to remove his clothing; Muslims circumcize boys and Hindus do not, and if you had the wrong kind of father, it is your fault. Having been born and bred as a Hindu, early in boyhood I acquired a negative association towards Muslim names and towards circumcisions; this may be a general phenomenon and requires conscious counteraction.

What can an individual do? Each parent chooses or shares in the choosing of names for children, and I propose that the diagnostic value of individual names in India be destroyed. The beginning might be made with names associated with particular religious groups but not in their religious books; Habib and Kabir among the Muslim names ought to be appropriated for use by non-Muslims, and Muslims are welcome to make their own selection.

I propose further that Hindu parents get their sons circumcized at birth: American medical opinion affirms that circumcized men and their wives are less likely to have cancer in the genital regions than uncircumcized men. (There is no reason why newspaper ads for bridegrooms should not specify circumcized men; after all the parents of the bride would not want their daughter to get cancer). Correspondingly, perhaps some Muslim men would risk cancer and not have their children circumcized—this could be rationalized in terms of reluctance to inflict a wound on the sacred human body.

Lastly, I recommend the sacred thread to Muslims: during the hot summer it is of

special value in relieving the itch on one's back. These are simple, one-shot actions; other more complex actions have long been known and practised—I refer to and support friendships and marriages across religious lines.

Let us turn to the possibilities for group action in this field. For voluntary group action to be effective, it appears to be desirable that the actions of particular groups be part of a wider national movement; it must also steer clear of the Front-happy politician always willing to seduce a social movement for his own harem. It will need to choose one or two out of almost limitless possibilities for action. It will need to be prepared for a bloody nose and then to continue. For group actions and a nationwide movement of this sort—when it emerges in the remote future—I propose the following kind of action: groups containing men and women from an assortment of religious and caste groups, based in cities, would go to villages ten or twenty miles away, and insist upon and exercise their joint right to draw water from village public wells commonly used by high castes only. In the early stages, this kind of activity will certainly meet resistance, possibly violence, from high caste villagers; but the government is bound to protect the exercise of this right, and—given the will and the organization—there can be no doubt about the outcome. The long-run consequences of this sort of expedition cannot but be salutary for Indian society.

Finally, I turn to a consideration of a genuinely political problem. Despite Azad, Kidwai, Ibrahim, Kabir, Chagla, and Hussain, the top Indian political leadership has been, is, and will continue to be predominantly Hindu; given the demographic facts, the situation cannot be otherwise. This parallels the British and American cases where the top political leaderships have been, are, and will continue to be White and Protestant. But, if India as a whole is going to secularize, and if this process requires changes in religion-linked personal laws for all religious categories, how can this leadership do this job without exposing itself to the charge of religious domination? From another viewpoint, what structural changes are necessary so that the reformist leaders of minority groups can use the State apparatus to produce changes within minority groups, changes that would facilitate the fuller integration of the minorities in a secular society? Partial referenda may be one answer, but the challenge for the political innovator is clear.

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72

THE PUBLIC SECTOR

a symposium on increasing
the efficiency in a vital
part of our economy

symposium participants

THE PROBLEM

Posed by **Ranjit Gupta**, Director,
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MANAGEMENT AND PERSONNEL

H. K. Paranjape, Professor of Economic
Policy and Administration at the Indian
School of Public Administration

THE FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE

V. V. Ramanadham, Head of the Department
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ACCOUNTABILITY

Indrajit Gupta, communist trade union leader.
Member of Parliament

A VIEW FROM WITHIN

Major General E. Habibullah, worked in the public
sector after retirement from the armed forces

PERSPECTIVES

Ashok Mitra, economist, now working with
the Indian Institute of Management, Calcutta

BOOKS

Reviewed by **Balraj Puri**, **A. K. Banerjee**, **H. S.**,
Hartirath Singh, **Anees Chishti**, **G. C. Beri** and
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FURTHER READING

A select and relevant bibliography
by **Har Parkash Taneja**

COVER

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The problem

NEARLY a decade has elapsed since the Industrial Policy Resolution of 1956, which assigned a key role to the public sector, was passed. During this period, investment in the nationalised industries has grown at a rate faster than investment elsewhere in the economy. From Rs. 1,170 crores in 1961-62, investment in industrial and commercial undertakings of the Central Government rose to Rs. 1,372 crores in 1962-63 or by as much as 18 per cent. The number of public undertakings has also progressively increased—from 49 in 1951 to 65 of which 15 are statutory corporations and 50 government companies.

Investment in the public sector during the Fourth Plan is likely to rise at a still higher rate. The scale of investment by 1975-76 is expected to be large enough to place more than half the country's capital stock under the command of the nationalised industries. This continued expansion of the public sector is being sought on the plea of achieving 'planned and rapid development' and realising the ideals of 'democratic socialism'.

In actual practice, the whole thing has however tended, in a typically Indian manner, to be *ad-hoc*. Industries have been put on the 'shopping list' for public ownership without adequate thought or explanation. Short-term political considerations have often outweighed the long-term public interest. Far too little guidance has been given to the leaders of the nationalised industries on how they should conduct themselves, and what they should aim for. This air of improvisation—lack of any detailed guidance on the role of public undertakings in a mixed economy, centralisation of production and bureaucratisation of power—has done immense harm. It has led to loss of public money, weakened morale and initiative both inside and outside the public sector, and has contributed, among other things, to a lop-sided growth of the economy.

Surprisingly enough, not much thought has been given to how best the problems of the

nationalised industries could be solved. Attitudes to this crucial question have remained polarized mainly on ideological grounds. The debate on public ownership has therefore not moved beyond the stage of two rival groups claiming absolute supremacy for their respective viewpoints. The discussion has been carried on mostly in the abstract and largely without any regard to the long-term public interest.

Looking back and carefully rereading the views expressed on the subject, one can discern the causes which have befogged the issue. Briefly, these are rooted in one or more of the following shortcomings:

- (1) ideological commitment and lethargy or incompetence on the part of those favouring continued expansion of the public sector to formulate a detailed plan showing how exactly they propose to translate their thought into action;
- (2) ignorance of the facts about the existing public sector of the economy;
- (3) failure to spot the nature and dimensions of monopoly interests, private or public, and to comprehend how best the evils of social and economic poverty, including those arising from the existence of a privileged class in the public or private sector, could be eradicated; (Whether genuinely convinced or not, socialists and leftists of all shades reveal an amazing capacity to idealise the sufferings of poverty, hunger and toiling labour, and at the same time make the best effort to ensure for themselves the benefits of good living, privileged status and monopoly interests.)
- (4) cleverly calculated moves to consolidate political gains by confusing the issue;
- (5) lack of conceptual clarity about the forms and substance of social ownership.

On each of the foregoing issues elaborate, objective and dispassionate thinking from diverse viewpoints and on pragmatic grounds is required. It may prolong the debate but would give it a healthy turn. Doubts will be many but, if continued and rigorous efforts are made to clarify them and apply them in the context of problems and conditions prevailing in India, we will soon arrive at a much happier and better solution. Within the limitations of space and time, this *posser* is intended to focus attention on these very issues.

The concept of public ownership of industry, it may be stressed, is not as new as it is made to sound. The silver mines of Laurium from which the Athenian State derived handsome

profits were probably one of the first examples of a State industry run by a public corporation. From the pages of the history of several other countries, many such examples can be traced. The modern belief in public ownership is, however, not related to these events. It owes its origin to the Industrial Revolution and the Protestant movement which was subsequently launched by the mid-nineteenth century socialists against the doctrine of *laissez-faire*.

During the early years the movement was weak and dormant. The revolutionary fervour of the socialists failed to inspire public opinion in the very home of the capitalist. England extended its hospitality to all indigenous and foreign revolutionaries—but, for a long time, kept itself aloof and away from their company. The ice started melting only with the rise of the Fabian Society—towards the beginning of the 1880s. The soil was now somewhat softer. The doctrines of public ownership not only found roots but gradually began to grow in size eventually culminating with the *Gas and Water Socialism* of the Webbs variety and the British electorates' decision in 1951 to dislodge the Labour Party from the seat of power.

Although *Gas and Water Socialism* favoured a gradual and slow approach, the Webbs were quick to realise that there could be a shorter way through which the industry could be nationalised. Hitherto, the capitalist was considered to be an individual endowed with wicked intentions and the *profit-for-the-sake-of-profit* motive. The theory therefore was that he should be expropriated, physically or otherwise, from the field of economic activity. In *Socialism in England* this image was somewhat modified. It was now argued that since the 'purely personal element in business management' was being replaced by the 'salaried officers of large corporations of shareholders', the safer and speedier way would be to expropriate the shareholders. From *Socialism in England* to *Socialism in India*, the argument seems to have acquired greater force. What was once stated as an alternative proposition has now become a popular slogan.

But whereas the Webbs excelled in their ability to plan and set out the plans with great lucidity, their counterparts in India seem completely incapable of doing this. Judging from their writings and speeches, it appears that they are not even concerned with this task. To most of them, public ownership of the economy is its own justification. Hence they do not see any reason why they should base their arguments or explain their convictions on empirical grounds. While this may help them press their demand with greater force, it is not much help to the chairman of a nationalised industry whose immediate task is not

to sell socialism, but the more humdrum one of trying to produce and sell goods in a highly competitive market.

This is the crux of the problem. Public ownership of the means of production or commerce does not replace the functional qualities of a trade or industry. The essential functions and services associated with a particular trade or industry are not rendered redundant by a change in its form and composition regarding ownership, control and management. Whether an industry is nationalised or not, the general principles and laws of production, distribution, exchange and consumption therefore continue to operate and, what is more, have to be taken cognisance of if the unit is to play its role effectively.

It is therefore fallacious to maintain that State trading in foodgrains or any other commodity eliminates the middlemen from the field and hence benefits the producers and consumers by allowing them to retain the share which they would have otherwise paid to the middlemen. Nothing could be more erroneous than a proposition such as this. For, irrespective of the form of ownership and management, the distributive functions will have to be performed, and are in fact performed, by a group of officialised, instead of private, middlemen.

The cost of the operation, therefore, does not diminish. As a matter of fact, per unit of sale it increases substantially. This is a fact which can well be verified by examining the *overhead-turnover* ratios of the public undertakings which are listed in the *Annexure*. From one public enterprise to another, the percentage of overheads to annual turnover or sales varied from 66.7 to 122.6. In other words, to sell goods worth Rs. 100 most public enterprises incurred almost an equivalent amount, and often more, on establishment and sale operations. Apparently, with such a level of operation an enterprise cannot survive except by charging monopoly prices or with the support of government subsidy.

Even if the overheads are subsidised and the 'producers-consumers' are assisted through artificial rates, the services of the new class of middlemen do not become less costly nor does the economy become more productive. The operations take place simply because the funds are transferred from one head to another and the overall deficit balanced through enhanced taxation, borrowing and inflation at some other point of the economy. The repercussions of such a course are much worse than if the higher costs had been realised at the point of actual transaction.

The elimination of middlemen is, however, not the main argument which is advanced in

favour of the continued growth of the public sector. The more important ones are those listed in the following quotation:

'First, the argument of power, the belief that the "commanding heights" of the economy should be controlled by the State. Second, the role of public ownership in planning the economy. Third, the argument of priorities, on the Galbraithian antithesis of private affluence and public squalor. Fourth, the argument that equality of wealth and incomes is furthered by public ownership. Fifth, the argument of efficiency—that where the performance of an industry or firm is demonstrably inadequate, it should be taken over by the State. Sixth and last, the argument that public funds invested in industry should be accompanied by a measure of public control and accountability.'¹

But none of these arguments, as Michael Shanks himself admits and so does the British Labour Party in its *Signposts for the Sixties*, is simply an argument for the mammoth *Morrisonian* type of public corporation. Evidently, if in trying to control monopolies or the 'commanding heights' of the economy, the controlling unit itself is asked or allowed to become a monopoly concern, the whole purpose is lost. Whether private or public, monopolies are monopolies. If one is undesirable the other is equally, if not more, undesirable. Indeed, between the two, State monopoly is much worse. For, while the private monopolist could be called to task and compelled to withdraw from the field, it is far too difficult to cut the size and power of State monopoly once it has taken firm roots. Whatever the form of ownership, one will therefore have to consider seriously whether and how far these giant-sized corporations or public companies fit into a controlled or planned national economy.

The arguments relating to 'planning' and 'priorities' are likewise misconceived, at any rate not justified, by the existing forms and practises of public ownership. The notion that through investment in the nationalised industries the private sector or the rest of the economy could be attuned—that nationalised industries investment plans could be turned on and off like a tap to counter-balance the movement of private investment—is ill-founded and, as the British *White Paper on Public Investment* (1960) recommends, should better be discarded.

The public sector covers mostly the key industries and basic services. A slight mistake,

1. *Lessons of Public Enterprise—A Fabian Society Study* ed. Michael Shanks, p. 11, Jonathan Cape, London, 1963.

mismanagement or inefficiency at any point within this sector therefore severely jeopardises the stability and growth of the entire economy. The statement is not merely a theoretical proposition. Looking back, one can easily discover that the bottlenecks to which the Indian economy has been subjected to since 1951 have occurred mostly due to the inefficient functioning of the public sector.

On this crucial point of efficiency, there is almost total confusion. No agreed *rationale* of how a nationalised industry *should* behave has yet been worked out. Although the idea that nationalised industries should be made to pay their way as competitive enterprises has gained considerable ground, even now economic objectives are blurred by political expediency.

From the point of view of economic or industrial efficiency, we have however a set of well-developed tools with which the performance of industrial and commercial enterprises could be objectively measured. The rate of return on capital, for instance, is one. Other equations which are also considered to be important are productivity per unit of labour, capital-output ratios, cost per unit of production or overheads per unit of sale, and the like. On all these counts, the performance of the nationalised industries in India has been lamentably poor.

A study² based on 37 fully completed industrial and commercial undertakings of the

Central Government shows that the rate of return on capital for these enterprises averaged even less than the rate of interest payable on capital debts or loans floated for raising the required capital. The rate of profit or return on capital for the industrial enterprises averaged 3.4 per cent in 1958-59, 3.5 per cent in 1959-60 and 4.1 per cent in 1960-61. In the case of commercial enterprises, it averaged 2.3 per cent in 1958-59, 3.1 per cent in 1959-60 and 1.5 per cent in 1960-61. 'On the whole, a profit of Rs. 8.13 crores was earned in 1959-60 on a capital outlay of Rs. 258 crores by 37 public enterprises which have passed the stage of gestation, and Rs. 7.01 crores in 1960-61 on a capital outlay of Rs. 294 crores.'³

If the profits earned are compared with capital *plus* reserves, the rate of return is still lower—3.2 per cent in 1958-59, 3.0 per cent in 1959-60 and 3.8 per cent in 1960-61 for the industrial undertakings and 2.1 per cent, 3.1 per cent and 1.5 per cent respectively for the commercial enterprises.

Only such undertakings which enjoyed considerable monopoly power earned a substantial rate of return—10 per cent or more. Most others operated either with negligible returns or else on loss. An exact idea about how each of the 37 fully completed enterprises fared in terms of rate of profit or return on capital earned in 1959-60 can be obtained from the table given below.

CLASSIFICATION OF PUBLIC ENTERPRISES BY RATE OF PROFIT (1959-60)

% of profit on capital	Industrial Undertakings	Commercial, etc. Undertakings
0 or less	Indian Rare Earths, Hindustan Salt Co., Bharat Electronics.	Export Risks Insurance Corporation, Indian Handicrafts Development Corporation, General Warehousing Corporation, National Research Development Corporation, Eastern Shipping Corporation, National Small Industries Corporation, Rehabilitation Industries Corporation, National Industrial Development Corporation.
0 to 1 per cent	Nahan Foundry, National Newsprint & Paper Mills, Orissa Mining Corporation, Hindustan Shipyard.	Air India International, Indian Airlines Corporation, Western Shipping Corporation.

2. *The Finances of Public Enterprises* by V. V. Ramanadham, Asia Publishing House, 1963. (The units studied are 19 industrial undertakings and 18 commercial, financial, general development and miscellaneous undertakings. The analysis is based on data published by the Central Statistical Organisation in its reports entitled, *Principal Public Sector Undertakings in India, 1959-60 and 1960-61*).

3. *Ibid*—p. 7 (In case the figures of the Hindustan Steel Ltd. which is not included in the foregoing 37 public enterprises but listed in the category of 'completed and in full operation' by the C.S.O. in its 1960-61 report, are also computed, 'the percentage of profit on capital falls from 4.1 to 0.82. (If the huge interest-free loan of the Company is also taken account of, the figure falls to 0.46 per cent).')

1 to 3 per cent	Praga Tools Corporation, Sindri Fertilisers & Chemicals, Hindustan Aircrafts, National Coal Development Corporation	National Projects Construction Corporation
3 to 5 per cent	Indian Telephone Industries	Posts & Telegraphs Department, Re-finance Corporation for Industry.
5 to 10 per cent	Hindustan Machine Tools, Hindustan Insecticides, National Instruments, Hindustan Housing Factory.	Ashoka Hotels
10 per cent and above	Travancore Minerals, Hindustan Antibiotics, Hindustan Cables	State Trading Corporation, Orissa Road Transport Co., Industrial Finance Corporation.

'The capital outlay rewarded with 5 per cent or more of return was 16 per cent of the aggregate capital in 1958-59, 7 per cent in 1959-60 and 7.6 per cent in 1960-61; the capital earning no profit or making a loss was respectively 19 per cent, 7 per cent and 5 per cent of the aggregate in the three years. About half the total number of enterprises and more than half the total outlay occur in the lowest profit ranges, below 3 per cent.'⁴

In this context, the performance and progress of the private sector may also be noted. In comparison to public undertakings whose reserves constituted between 3 and 6 per cent of the capital outlay, the free reserves of a sample of 1001 large and medium sized public limited companies, surveyed by the Reserve Bank of India, constituted two-thirds of the paid-up capital. 'During the period 1955-59 there was an increase in their paid-up capital by 25 per cent as against an increase in their free reserves by 39 per cent; and about a third of the profits after tax was ploughed back. The dividend worked out at 11.8 per cent on capital in 1959, and the profit after tax at 10.5 per cent of the net worth, inclusive of capital and free

reserves. Retained profits were 6.5 per cent of the capital in the same year.'⁵

The foregoing analysis is likely to raise many eyebrows. Profit is still a dirty word. Most socialists consider it to be the highest form of exploitation. But profits in nationalised industries are low not because prices are low but because the overheads are high and the operations tardy. Certainly, a nationalised industry should not simply seek to maximise profits to the exclusion of other considerations. But is there any criterion, other than profits, by which the efficiency of its operations could be objectively assessed.

That an unprofitable service, if socially desired, should be undertaken with resources from outside is understandable and, on the merit of the case, may well be imperative. But in such cases, as Michael Shanks so aptly asks, 'is it the responsibility of the nationalised industry to assess the social value of unprofitable services, or should it be the responsibility of the Government? Again, all the nationalised industries have big expansion programmes in hand. How far should these be financed out of internal resources (which means profit), how far by borrowing from the Treasury? (Or, for that matter, why not directly from the public)?'⁶

These issues become much more acute when a nationalised industry is in deficit. Government subsidy at the cost of the taxpayer's hard-earned money is no answer. It creates greater difficulties and complicates matters far beyond redemption. Official control hardens and governmental interference in the day-to-day working of the enterprise becomes frequent. The managerial morale sinks to low depths, corruption escalates and labour relations get infinitely worse.

Yet, whether earning profit or not, most public enterprises are heavily subsidised. The extent and form of subsidies given vary from one enterprise to another. Besides outright grants, there are several methods through which unaccounted and as such *hidden* subsidies are extended. The

*V. V. Ramanadham, op. cit. pp. 133-134 (The appendices have been combined and rearranged).

Note : While the Union Ministry of Finance has worked out the profitability of the public undertakings for the year 1962-63 (see, *Annual Report on the Working of Industrial & Commercial Undertakings of the Central Government for the year 1962-63*, Table VII, p. 45), the reasons why V. V. Ramanadham's estimates for 1959-60 have been preferred are many. He has minutely examined the discrepancies in the official method of accounting, adjusted the inaccuracies, and made them fairly reliable as well as comparable indicators of the rate of profit on capital. Another defect associated with the official estimates in the way they seek to portray a favourable picture about the performance of the public sector. Gross profit, (representing 'the excess of income over expenditure after providing for depreciation but before providing for interest, taxes and allocations to reserves') is thus related with *capital employed*. But net profit, (representing 'the figure arrived at after deducting from the gross profit provision for interest and taxes but before allocation to reserves') is related with *paid-up capital* which is much smaller than *capital employed*. To correct this impression the percentage of net profit on capital employed by the various public undertakings in 1962-63 is in the *annexture*.

4. Ibid—pp. 7-8.

5. Ibid—pp. 10-11.

6. *The Lessons of Public Enterprise*, op. cit. p. 29.

well as the purchaser, prices are set arbitrarily. One ministry buys the product of another. While at the one end public revenue is spent freely in acquiring highly priced and generally defective stocks, at another it is spent with equal carelessness to produce such stocks. The support so extended subsidises the less productive activities and, in the absence of normal market compulsions, prolongs their wasteful life.

Extension of interest-free loans is another popular form of subsidy. Most public undertakings, at one time or the other, have been subsidised through such loans. Take the case of the Hindustan Steel Ltd. It received a loan of Rs. 300 crores from the government, free-of-interest. At 6 per cent per annum on Rs. 300 crores, the amount of annual subsidy comes to Rs. 18 crores. This is by no account a mean sum. If the repayment period is taken full account of, the total amount of subsidy may well work out to be as high as the principal sum.

Even in respect of managerial and technical knowledge, the public enterprises are greatly subsidised by the government. Public officials on the Board are paid from different heads, some accounted for in the budget of the public enterprise, while others not.⁷ Not that this leads to better performance or production at cheaper costs; the reasons being those stated earlier—slower pace of work, higher expenses on other heads, duplication of work, multiplication of officials, lack of initiative and incentive, etc. The point is that had a private undertaking operated with similar norms, its cost of operation would have been much higher as it would have met these hidden subsidies out of its own resources and therefore accounted for them in its budget.

There is a lack of information and enquiry, and we have very little knowledge about this aspect. It is, however, suspected that many more practices are prevalent which conceal rather than reveal the true costs of running a public enterprise. A thorough probe is needed to reveal these tricks of the trade and their effect on the conduct of business. An analysis or assessment of the extent and effect of different forms of subsidy in various public undertakings is long due. The investible funds being limited, needs and requirements urgent, we can hardly afford to wait any longer to know how exactly our resources are being spent.

Plainly, somewhere along the line something is quite seriously wrong. Unless the public sector, or public ownership of the economy, is an end itself, which it is not, public interest has nowhere been so grossly sacrificed as in the

7. In 39 public undertakings of the Central Government, 230 persons held 275 posts of directorship in 1960-61. They included 158 officials, holding 199 posts and 72 non-officials (nominated) holding the remaining 76 posts.

nationalised industries. Public accountability of these industries is a prerogative which seems to be only enjoyed by the ministers and a few officials working under them. The officials nominated on the Boards are usually the persons who, as civil servants, sanction the schemes and projects. Public enterprises are therefore run not only as any other civil service department but also on the assumption that where the *giver* is the *taker*, public interest is best served.

Parliamentary questions, if intelligently raised, are better evaded than debated. The backbenchers, therefore, consider themselves lucky and feel more than contented if they manage to move a motion on the adjournment at the end of the day's debate and raise their voices for about an hour. The Public Accounts Committee and the Estimates Committee, when they go into action, do create some sense of fear in the minds of the administrators. But their scope is limited and accounting generally fragmentary. An enquiry into the type of parliamentary questions asked, answered, evaded or refused, their impact on the working of the undertakings, recommendations of the Public Committees and action taken on them, their effect on the conduct of business and the like will in itself be a revealing document throwing much light on the usefulness and effectiveness of the practices presently followed to preserve the aims of public accountability.

Ignorance of the facts about the public sector of the economy and the urge to defend the existing pattern of growth have indeed created much confusion. One notes the growing tendency amongst the economists to measure the worth of public industrial or commercial undertakings in terms of their social costs and social returns. These are, no doubt, more socialised terms. But what do they really signify? How can their importance be assessed? Can they be measured precisely or objectively? Or, are they merely vague concepts signifying something in general but nothing in particular?

These questions must be answered before the terms are used to justify the proliferation of *giant-sized* public undertakings. While no criterion as yet has been evolved with which social returns or social costs could be measured, it may be noted that these terms arose, and also fit more, in the context of the pattern and direction of industrialisation rather than in the context of two industrial units, almost identical in shape and size, performing similar functions.

Although immeasurable, it may be mentioned that in the Indian context the social costs of a project are generally considered high or expensive if they involve huge investment, a long gestation period, pyramidal build-up, use of foreign exchange and capital intensive equipment. Likewise, social returns from an invest-

ment are considered high if they provide employment and income to a large section of the community, equalise income disparities, lead to dispersal of resources and opportunities, promote a balanced and well coordinated growth of different regions, decentralise the political and economic structure, and produce quicker results—the rise between production and income being such as to match each other without causing inflation.

On all these counts, any analysis will show that social costs of nationalised industries in India are far greater than the returns supposedly accruing from them. Their gestation period runs into several years. The investible surplus therefore remains blocked. By the time the machinery swings into production, it is too late to arrest the spiral of inflation. Being heavily capitalised, fewer employment opportunities are created. Most of the capital equipment, machinery, spare parts and tools needed are imported from outside. Consequently, the drafts on foreign exchange are much too heavy. Whatever the expected life of these equipments is, annual depreciation or replacement costs run into several crores of rupees.

So far as the participation of the community—its power, rights and obligations, control and management—is concerned, it is time we stopped pretending that the public sector, as it exists today, promotes any of these virtues. The pattern of the public sector's growth—investment, priorities and planning, purpose and performance—is such that it de-socialises ownership, centralises control and management and frustrates public interest. *Whether we stick to the present norms or alter them to suit particular political ends, no purpose will be served unless we are able to define what we really mean by public interest or, for that matter, social ownership.*

Is public interest uniform at all layers or levels of public activity? Do we as producers wholly share the interest of the consumers or vice-versa? What about our interest as workers? Is it identical to that of the producers or consumers' interest? Can we really group ourselves into a single unit or do we belong to several groups? How shall we adjust our group interests? Is there a self adjusting machinery? If not, can we devise one and show how exactly it will be implemented? What about social ownership? Does it promote social ends by itself? Can it be separated from management and control?

8. With a total investment of Rs. 1372 crores, the 49 public undertakings listed in Annexure I of the Report on the Working of Industrial and Commercial Undertakings (1962-63) could provide employment to 2,66,620 persons. This means that to create work for a single individual the rate of investment was about Rs. 51,000. Can one seriously claim that a nation surviving at less than a rupee a day can afford to be so callous and spendthrift?

Who will discharge these functions and how? How can the different groups be best represented without checkmating the essential functions of production, distribution, exchange and consumption? Who will govern whom and why and how?

Questions on several other issues will also have to be resolved. Satisfactory and practicable answers will have to be found for a series of questions, such as, how far is it reasonable for the government to interfere in the management of nationalised industries, and how should ministerial control, if any, be properly exercised? What yardstick should nationalised Boards apply when taking commercial decisions? How far should they put the public interest before their own commercial advantage, and how should they measure the public interest? How should they weigh the competitive claims of their workers and their customers? What should be the relations between the nationalised industries themselves? What about their pattern, structure, organisation and frontiers? Must they be uniform or different from one undertaking to another? What about investment policy, price and profits, commercial relations; wages and labour relations; staff, recruitment, training, initiative and entrepreneurship; relations with private industry; administration, management and control: constitution and composition of boards?

In short, there is a serious need to 'unravel the relationships between ministers and nationalised Boards, especially in the field of prices, profits and wages where ministerial intervention has been the most pronounced. At the same time, it is important to consider afresh the role of the public sector in the economy—its expansion programmes, its relations with its workers, with the trade unions and with private industry.'⁹

Let the proposed *Committee on Public Sector Undertakings* examine these issues minutely, assess their importance on pragmatic grounds and resolve them not only in terms of principles and platitudes but also by working out an elaborate and detailed plan of action. Instead of conducting enquiries on ad-hoc bases, let it set up a regular research secretariat for the collection, analysis and evaluation of the various issues posed in the foregoing discussion. If continuously it could keep the public informed through methodological, precise, and comparative studies not only would the public undertakings benefit but also the facts, hitherto unknown, would come to light and, therefore, make our task of assessment and planning easier.

RANJIT GUPTA

⁹. *The Lessons of Public Enterprise*, op. cit. p. 31.

ANNEXTURE

Classification of Public Undertakings by Capital, Cost, Turnover and Profit (1962-63)

Undertaking **	RS. IN LAKHS		IN PER CENT	
	Capital Employed	Turnover (Sales)	Net Profit to Capital Employed	Overheads to Turnover
Engineering :				
1. Hindustan Steel	63175.5	12428	Loss	N.A.
2. Bharat Electronics	789.6	361	5.6	84.1
3. Hindustan Aircraft	2175.9	1089	4.3	89.5
4. Hindustan Cables	373.1	325	2.2	85.2
5. Hindustan Machine Tools	1088.6	708	5.7	67.1
6. Indian Telephone Industries	878.2	788	4.6	84.6
7. Nahan Foundry	48.5	23	Loss	122.6
8. National Instruments	110.6	80	4.8	84.6
9. Praga Tools Corporation	154.7	75	0.2	95.6
Chemicals :				
10. Fertiliser Corporation of India	6436.8	2261	2.3	89.5
11. Hindustan Antibiotics	622.8	407	11.2	65.7
12. Hindustan Insecticides	191.8	161	8.5	72.0
13. Hindustan Salts	160.6	91	7.7	82.2
Mining & Minerals :				
14. Indian Rare Earths	108.9	73	1.0	89.5
15. National Coal Development Corporation	6161.5	1718	1.6	88.2
16. Travancore Minerals	74.7	71	4.8	74.1
Building & Repairing Ships :				
17. Garden Reach Workshops	253.7	195	3.8	91.2
18. Hindustan Shipyard	579.3	553	0.7	99.9
19. Mazagaon Dock	177.8	282	3.6	92.3
Aviation & Shipping :				
20. Air India	3544.3	2453	7.4	88.0
21. Indian Airlines Corporation	1718.4	1697	3.6	96.3
22. Mogul Line	206.2	166	1.3	78.5
23. Shipping Corporation of India	2706.0	1043	4.9	83.8
Miscellaneous :				
24. Ashoka Hotels	199.0	104	6.5	66.7
25. Indian Oil Company	664.1	1983	9.1	96.0
26. Hindustan Housing Factory	95.4	75	2.1	91.5
27. National Building Construction Corporation	175.9	352	Loss	107.6
28. National Newsprint and Paper Mills	554.6	281	10.0	80.2
29. National Projects Construction Corporation	277.8	240	7.5	90.6
30. State Trading Corporation	1046.3	8785	13.5	94.9

* Prepared from the Annual Report on the Working of Industrial and Commercial Undertakings of the Central Government (1962-63), Ministry of Finance, New Delhi, 1964.

** Include only those undertakings which are classified as running concerns of the Central Government.
Note : N, A : means not available.

Forms of organisation

B. G. VERGHESE

THE Plan has been in bad odour during much of the past year with food shortages and the inflationary price rise providing legitimate cause for discontent. Naturally, in such a situation, the public sector has come in for a considerable measure of criticism—as one of the principal villains of the piece.

The public sector in industry, so the argument runs, has appropriated a disproportionate share of Plan investment. The fascination for heavy industry has meant a diversion of resources and attention from agriculture on the one hand and huge, unrequited capital intensive investments over long gestation periods on the other. Reports of delays, inadequate pre-planning, lack of co-ordination, mistakes and the losses incurred or very meagre profits earned by running public concerns have all gone into the making of a somewhat gloomy picture.

The picture is by no means as dark as it is painted: but the performance of the public sector could have been better and will have to be improved if it is to command greater respect and support. This is all the more necessary since the public sector is rapidly growing in size and will soon become the leading sector of the economy. It must be the pacer-

setter. It must also be able to produce high quality goods and services economically and generate large surpluses which feed back into the Plan. The Plan strategy indeed postulates surpluses from public undertakings as an increasing significant means of financing development.

The problems of the public sector, however, must be viewed in two parts: those which are common to Indian industry as a whole and those peculiar to itself. This distinction is not always recognised although it is obviously important.

It might be useful to get out of the way problems falling in the first category, that is, those common to Indian industry. There are of course the general shortages of foreign exchange, materials and selected skills. This apart, there are, first, what might be described as personnel problems. Among India's assets in its efforts at industrialisation is a plentiful supply of what is commonly regarded as cheap labour which is quick to acquire new and sophisticated skills. However, Indian labour is not cheap. A lower average level of productivity than that which obtains in some of the more industrially advanced nations necessitates a certain quantitative increase in

number in order to bridge a qualitative gap. This is quite understandable although it is reasonable to expect that this qualitative gap will steadily narrow with training and experience.

A plant like HMT-Bangalore for example has been able to achieve a ratio of 1.2:1 in terms of the productivity of its workers in relation to norms obtaining in similar plants operated by some of its European collaborators, though this performance has in recent years been diluted on account of a deliberate policy of recruiting and training raw hands to man some of HMT's newer plants.

In HEL, Bhopal, however, the figure would be about 3:1 or even 4:1 in certain shops partly because the work involves less machine supervision and more delicate manual operations. Attitudes to work and industrial discipline are also defective; but allowance must be made for the fact that peasants have overnight been converted into an industrial force and need time to make the adjustment.

Overmanning

What is far more damaging is the very widespread tendency towards overmanning which sometimes results in a plant employing perhaps double or more the working force that it actually requires. This is the result and is still sometimes sought to be justified in terms of 'Indian conditions'. Overmanning follows from excessive job categorisation through a maddening and wholly unnecessary hierarchy of industrial castes: a man tending a machine or at a work bench will not carry his tools, or clean his immediate work place or oil his machine. Someone else has to do this for him. Hence a tribe of 'helpers', *mazdoors*, *khalasis* and sweepers. In Bihar, men will not sweep; so women must be employed. In Hindustan Antibiotics, Pimpri, a modern, automated chemical plant, there are 134 job categories.

The Nangal fertiliser plant employs 2100 workers within the

plant; of these between 600 and 700 are *mazdoors* and 'helpers' and there are 25 sweepers. Overmanning means more jobs and 'rationalisation' is resisted even when technology changes. But more than this, jobs and status go together. In U.P. and Bihar cultivators of certain castes will not touch a plough. In secretariats, peons and clerks are status symbols and at each level the protocol observed is exceedingly strict and complex. All this is equally true of the private sector.

Fortunately, attitudes are changing. In Bhilai, construction workers in the million-ton stage were absorbed in the plant in order to keep them in employment. Here, as elsewhere, efforts are being made to train those who show the aptitude and absorb them in productive employment in the course of expansion.

A more striking example is provided by the Trombay fertiliser plant which is due to be commissioned by the middle of the year. The original project report envisaged an overall work force, including the general manager's office, of 3300 men. A township with as many units was also approved. Fortunately, a new general manager who took over while recruitment was still in progress insisted on a reappraisal. A scientific work study showed that 1800 men would suffice. Accordingly some 900 'helpers' have been eliminated and the wage bill has been reduced from Rs. 110 lakhs to Rs. 70 lakhs, a not inconsiderable saving quite apart from the saving on the township and corresponding welfare amenities; and this after offering the workers a compensatory Rs. 15 per mensem 'dignity of labour' allowance. Other fertiliser plants under construction now hope to do even better.

Absenteeism

A high rate of absenteeism and very generous leave and holiday rules must also be counted among the personnel problems. Absenteeism ranges from 15 per cent in the NCDC collieries and HAL-

Bangalore to 30 per cent at Jessup's Dum Dum factory during the six weeks after the Puja holidays. Workers and supervisory staff may avail of leave as required with the result that a certain number of key personnel may be on leave almost round the year. The European practice is to have an annual shut-down when all personnel get their leave while the plant undergoes repair and maintenance.

Labour Relations

Another category of problems common to Indian industry as a whole is labour relations. This, especially in respect of newer industries and in the more remote or newer developing areas that lack an established industrial tradition, can be chaotic. The country's labour legislation is out of date and defective and lacks uniformity. The intrusion of politics into trade unionism—most unions are appendages of political parties—is a most fruitful source of inter union rivalry.

The crowning absurdity is witnessed when dissident factions of the same party fall out. Congress factionalism in Bihar for instance has split the INTUC unions into two warring groups. Congress political intrigue projected through the unions has resulted in a series of work stoppages in Jamshedpur, Ranchi, Sindri and Barauni. The Communist unions have now similarly split in some areas. Slow moving procedures are responsible for inordinate delays in righting genuine grievances, if they are such, or getting frivolous complaints out of the way. Disputes have been known to drag on for years.

The development of healthy trade unionism and the revision of labour legislation demand high priority. Not enough attention has been paid to these matters either by government, or labour or industry. There is too much politics involved.

A third family of common problems is to some extent a factor of under-development itself. Many plants manufacture most of the

parts and components they need; some even try and manufacture everything under the same roof. The reason for this attempted 'self-sufficiency' is the difficulty of procuring indigenous bought-out items either at all or in the requisite quantities or quality. Ancillary industries in turn have not developed more rapidly because the overall demand, though not insignificant and growing, is fragmented in the absence of standardisation.

Standardisation

Standardisation again has not always been possible on account of dependence on foreign collaboration which implies foreign equipment purchase from a very wide variety of sources, each type built to different specifications and using materials and components related to their respective national technologies, needs and circumstances. Thus, although the Rourkela, Bhilai and Durgapur steel plants were built simultaneously, they cannot use identical overhead travelling cranes because the bays in the three plants are of different sizes. Over 500 varieties of alloy and special steels are being used today because foreign collaboration compels observance of a multiplicity of standards.

The result is that ancillary manufacture has suffered because demand cannot be adequately bulked into economic orders. Since import licensing is also a slow and chancy business industry tends to stockpile enormous quantities of spares, parts and components. Inventory holdings are absurdly high. The Annual Report on the Working of Industrial and Commercial Undertakings of the Central Government for 1963-64 shows that the inventories of raw materials, stores and spares held by 22 running concerns, excluding Hindustan Steel, came to nearly Rs. 141 crores or the equivalent of 14 months consumption. The incidence of this on costs is patent.

These then are problems which afflict Indian industry as a whole, although this is no reason why the public sector should not seek suit-

able solutions as it has indeed done in some cases.

Insufficient Planning

The public sector, however, is plagued with certain other problems more peculiarly its own. These may be taken in time sequence. Public undertakings almost by definition tend to be capital intensive since the list of industries reserved for the public sector or those that have actually been taken up are mostly heavy industries. These necessarily involve large outlays and long gestation periods both in respect of construction as well as of attainment of optimum production. Detailed and careful pre-planning and project engineering are therefore crucially important. This has not always been evident. Some projects like the organic intermediates scheme at Panvel have had to be virtually scrapped and prepared anew. Others like the proposed phytochemical plant in Kerala have had to be altogether abandoned. Still others have undergone considerable changes in scope and concept even while under way.

Many sites have given rise to problems which could well have been anticipated. Getting over them has cost both time and money. The gestation period has been prolonged. In the case of the Heavy Forge and Foundry Project, a constituent unit of the HEC complex at Ranchi, foundation trouble was followed by non-availability of structurals and matching sections necessitating certain design alterations. As things now stand, HFFP is trailing some 18 months behind the Heavy Machine Building Plant which it is meant to feed. The latter will consequently have to import forgings and castings from the Soviet Union for some years until HFFP is able to make deliveries.

The problem here is partly conceptual. There is nothing intrinsically wrong with planning to build giant plants as at Ranchi or the heavy electrical complex elsewhere. These capacities will ultimately be utilised. But it is a mistaken policy to try and build them to such large sizes all at once.

Both at Ranchi and at HEL, Bhopal, two stages have been telescoped into one. This means that large capital investments are committed before the necessary skills and design capability required to utilise them are available.

Non-utilisation of capacity in high investment industries with a low capital output ratio is a very costly business since a small turnover has to carry the entire weight of 'heavy overheads'. It would therefore be more rational to break down the project into suitable techno-economic stages and proceed to the next stage only when the earlier one is well under production. This would not only be cheaper and more productive but perhaps even time-saving in the long run.

At Ranchi, however, not only have the first two stages—45,000 tons of mechanical equipment at HMBP, going up to 80,000 tons, with related capacity in HFFP—been combined, but additional equipment quite outside the original concept is also to be manufactured under the same roof instead of in specialised plants as recommended by the Russians who are aiding this project.

Delusions of Grandeur

Furthermore, the whole complex, including HMBP, HFFP, the Heavy Machine Tool Plant (at Ranchi) and the Coal Mining Machinery Plant (at Durgapur), each a giant in itself, was placed under a single, untried management. The CMMP has recently been hived off sensibly from HEC which is still no chicken. HFFP will make castings and forgings weighing from a few kilograms to over 100 tonnes in weight. This partiality for gigantism is misplaced. A plant may mature into a giant but there is no technical reason why it should necessarily be brought into being as a giant.

Delusions of grandeur in terms of initial size are inconsistent with rational planning. Even so, each project, even if suitably phased, is large and complex enough to require close, full-time management from its very inception. Unfortunately, project initiation and deve-

lopment has been left not to management but to the secretariat and committees of bureaucrats. In some cases, project managements have not come into being until very late. In the case of the Rs. 65 crore Alloy Steel Plant, Durgapur, a general manager was appointed only two years after the inception of the project. This is obviously faulty procedure.

Construction Management

Not enough attention has been paid to construction planning and practices although this is obviously a field where considerable savings are possible in time and money. Project planning remains a distinctly weak link and although time schedules for most projects appear unduly generous, a degree of delay is always assumed and tolerated. This is an extraordinary attitude and it is strange that although HMT built its Pinjore plant in 17 months and its Kalamassery plant in 15, time schedules of double this period are uncritically accepted for comparable projects.

Then, again, although construction techniques are highly specialised, the government has failed to bring into being or keep alive specialised construction agencies. The National Projects Construction Corporation and the National Buildings Construction Corporation are still relatively minor contractors. Valuable construction organisations, skills and equipment built up in certain projects have been allowed to disperse and have later had to be re-created at great cost and effort. The long-term answer here lies in overall project scheduling within the Plan and between plans so that fertiliser or oil refinery or steel construction teams and equipment can move from one project to the next and not have to sit idle for a while and then maybe unlearn their skills in undertaking completely different kinds of construction both in terms of size and skill.

That the lesson has not been learnt is evident in the curious manner in which the Steelworks Construction Corporation has been bravely established and then starved of adequate status, organisation

or finance. Since construction costs account for up to half the total outlay on any heavy project the savings in getting the job done efficiently and soon do not have to be demonstrated. PWD codes will not do. New programme evaluation and review techniques for scheduling progress along a 'critical path' and completing all ancillary and related facilities to mesh with this time scheme require a completely new approach to construction management.

The Parallel Authority

Both during the construction phase and when in operation public undertakings suffer a number of management handicaps. The most important of these are the financial and audit procedures devised in another, more relaxed and relatively uncomplicated time and age for secretariat guidance. The addiction to outworn codes is bad enough within government *per se*. It is infinitely more pernicious when this cumbersome red tape is extended to industry.

The present procedures, financial and audit, are more concerned with propriety than with performance, that is, commercial efficiency and overall results. Management accounting is beginning to be recognised as a useful and necessary concept; but there is a long way to go before it acquires depth and becomes general practice. The financial advisers of plants are nominees of the Finance Ministry, generally from the Audit and Accounts Service, and are appointed by the President. Their tenure is a particular plant or corporation or even in the public sector (as distinct from government) is often temporary, with the result that they are 'aliens' to the job, both by training as well as service allegiance. Their whole background is one of governmental accounting and tends to be bureaucratically negative.

In some corporations the FA even has what amounts to veto powers over the general manager and objections by him cannot be overcome except by reference to the Board. The FAs can in certain circumstances carry their

objections to the Finance Ministry and, even if they have not done so, they constitute a potential if not actual parallel authority. The Annual Report on the Working of Industrial and Commercial Undertakings of the Central Government compiled by the Finance Ministry is itself indicative of the special relationship this Ministry enjoys *vis-a-vis* these undertakings. The fact that the report is prepared by the Department of Expenditure in the Ministry of Finance is its own commentary on the perspective in which performance is viewed.

The danger inherent in this dualism in management is illustrated by the findings of a judicial officer who inquired into a fire which occurred in the HMBP unit of the Heavy Engineering Corporation, Ranchi, early last year. The report charged the management and particularly the Chairman with completely failing to organise the administration on sound lines. The report states that there was indiscipline, lack of teamwork and absence of co-ordination and open conflict between the Chairman and the Director of Finance.

Groupism was rampant in the Corporation with one section owing allegiance to the Chairman and another to the Director of Finance, resulting in 'a pernicious effect on the administration.' This surely is a damning indictment of the system. The fact that individual chairmen or general managers have got on reasonably well with their financial advisers only proves that individuals can often pull on together sensibly or that some people are amenable to following a strong lead. But clashes of personality are not rare.

Inhibiting Rules

The audit requirements imposed on the public sector are no less inhibiting. All public undertakings are subject to normal commercial audit. The role of the Auditor and Comptroller General is different. He is concerned with virtue which is defined in terms of procedural propriety and strict observance of rules. No government agency can function if all the prescribed rules are adhered to as is clear from the

practice of government employees resorting to go-slow in pursuance of grievances by 'working to rule'. Audit compels public undertakings to work to rule and by so doing is responsible for imposing a state of permanent go-slow within the public sector.

In fairness, it must be conceded that the attitude of audit has changed over the years as it has become attuned to the needs of industry; but only partly. Audit is concerned with individual items of detailed expenditure and relentlessly pursues its inquiries over periods going back several years after the event. It is neither competent, by training, nor statutorily concerned with the overall result. It is unable to make allowance for initiative and is often prone to pass judgment on the basis of hindsight.

The then Minister for Steel and Heavy Industry, C. Subramaniam, had this to say in the Lok Sabha of audit activities in the Durgapur steel plant where a special audit cell of five officers was created towards the end of 1963 solely to answer the queries of the resident auditor: "The audit officer's pursuit of details in one month led him to inquire as to why some tiles had been purchased in 1957, some chairs had been rented out, some sanitary materials lay unutilised... The queries in themselves may look innocuous. But it is the psychology they create that is dangerous... We have got to adopt more commercial methods... Let us have respite from the dedicated scrutiny of trivia and leave the public sector plants to handle their production problems.' Rightly spoken.

Fear Complex

The psychology created by audit (and its insidious influence on the FAs) is one of fear. Managers are afraid of initiative since that necessarily implies risk. They prefer to play safe and avoid the 'scandals' recounted in the annual audit reports which have become fair game for politicians and the press.

As it is, there is inadequate delegation from the secretariat to

the corporation and from the latter to their constituent units both in the initial stages of construction and running-in and later. The inhibitions resulting from finance-audit practices means that quite often the purpose of delegation, even where it exists, tends to be defeated because it is not exercised. There is inadequate reward for good work; but trouble comes easily.

Top Management

This is an unhappy state of affairs on any consideration. It is made worse by certain other factors. The placing of oversized projects in the hands of completely new and inexperienced managements and a high rate of turn-over in top management levels can only result in weak managements which are naturally more susceptible to finance-audit and secretariat pressures. The selection of superannuated persons, civil servants and retired engineers for top management posts is a fundamental mistake. These are old and tried men whose careers are behind them and who can only look forward to another few years of service as a favour bestowed on them from above.

They lack specialised knowledge and management experience and do not stay long enough to learn. They cannot have the same stake in the enterprise as younger men whose future depends on whether or not they make a success of their job. These latter will be far more alert and dedicated since their's is not a passing 'affair'. They belong. They can look ahead, build up a team and work for the future. The 'experience' that the older men have for their credentials is generally a liability because it is experience of government and a tradition of bureaucracy and obedience to finance-audit procedures.

The tendency to lump together vast, geographically dispersed enterprises under a single management is no less undesirable. It is one thing for a successfully going concern like HMT to 'mother' new plants elsewhere, although here too certain manage-

ment limitations will begin to operate at a certain stage. It is another for several new and complex projects to be placed under a completely new management as has happened in the case of HEC, HEL, and in the earlier stages, HSL. HEC and HEL have now been broken up. Nevertheless Bharat Heavy Electricals, which is responsible for the heavy electrical plants at Ranipur (near Hardwar) and Ramachandrapuram (near Hyderabad) and the boiler plant at Tiruverumbur (near Tiruchi) has its headquarters in Delhi.

More recently, three separate aircraft projects scattered over five different sites, have been amalgamated in the new Hindustan Aeronautics Limited. The new corporation has its headquarters at Bombay for some curious reason and from there seeks to supervise five plants in various stages of construction and production at Bangalore, Kanpur, Nasik, Koraput and Hyderabad. This does not appear to be a particularly efficient arrangement.

The Secretariat's Grip

The Bokaro steel project has been handed to a new corporation but HSL still looks after the Rourkela, Bhilai and Durgapur steel plants, the alloy steel plant, the Rourkela fertiliser plant, and a number of coal washeries and iron ore mines. A good deal of decentralisation has been affected within HSL with the delegation of powers to the individual steel plants in respect of personnel and finance. The appointment of the general managers and financial advisers and sanctions for all new capital works above Rs. 1 crore vest in the Steel Ministry. This means that HSL is left with a very narrow band of responsibility, without any owned funds or effective management role. What purpose then does HSL serve? Some rethinking appears necessary.

The constitution of the boards of various public undertakings has gradually begun to undergo change with greater representation to management men drawn

from the public sector. But the number of official directors, that is, secretariat officials, is still disconcertingly high. Contrary to existing policy directives, the secretary of the Steel Ministry is also chairman of the Bokaro corporation. This is a most unwholesome practice and can only result in an undue degree of secretariat domination.

The public sector being entirely financed by the State must be publicly accountable. But a line must be drawn between the needs of public accountability and plant autonomy. The tendency hitherto has been to place more stress on the first than on the second. Corrective measures have been proposed and a Parliamentary Committee on Public Undertakings has been constituted. It will be the responsibility of this body to scrutinise the working of selected public undertakings each year and report to Parliament thereon. It is hoped that these reports will become the basis of informed parliamentary debate which will gradually replace the present practice of subjecting the public sector to daily scrutiny on the basis of parliamentary questions and *ad hoc* debates.

Vicious Circle

The audit reports provide a rich source of ammunition for attacking the public sector but do not necessarily result in useful debate since they evaluate observance of procedure rather than performance in terms of real public interest. The public sector cannot function in the glare of daily publicity and criticism. The present practice is most demoralising and a great deal of time is diverted in answering questions. The fact that the information sought has to be collected by the parent ministries and that the minister in charge is held accountable inevitably results in encroachment by the secretariat into plant autonomy thus creating a vicious circle.

There is also an undesirable tendency to equate all public undertakings and to equate the latter with the civil administration except that the secretariat is more equal than the rest. The terms

and conditions of service, emoluments and status of personnel working in the public sector is integrated with those prevailing in government rather than those prevailing in industry. This is unavoidable to some extent, but it has perhaps been pushed to extremes. Similarly, there is tremendous variety within industry itself. It is therefore unwise to try and devise uniform pay scales and undertake common recruitment as is sometimes proposed.

An incidental point, but one worth making, is township costs which are presently estimated at Rs. 256 crores for some 61 undertakings. The upkeep and maintenance of these townships and related services like electricity, water supply, schools and transport which are heavily subsidised are a direct cost on individual units since the residents of these company townships are not liable to any municipal rates and taxes. This is an anomaly that should be corrected.

Research

The public sector needs to devote far more attention to research and development at all levels. Most plants have been built with foreign know-how and technical assistance but the object in every case should be to acquire and promote such skills as will enable each plant to expand and multiply on its own and to design and develop new and better products. Plants like Hindustan Antibiotics, HMT, ITI, FACT and FCI have done this in varying degrees. HMT for example has itself designed all its expansions and new units and commissioned its Kalamassery unit in Kerala in 15 months.

This is indicative of what a dynamic management can achieve even under 'Indian conditions', a phrase that has too often been used as a cloak for inertia and incompetence. Hindustan Antibiotics has developed, produced and marketed new antibiotics some of which have attracted international notice. FACT's process for converting by-product gypsum, recovered in the manufacture of phosphoric acid, into ammonium sulphate has been covered by an

international patent and a well-known British firm has been licensed to exploit it on payment of royalty. ITI has among other things developed co-axial line equipment for direct inter-city dialling. The list can be multiplied. But this whole process needs to be accelerated and given greater recognition, for research and development is the very life-blood of industry.

Pricing

The prices of public sector products are either negotiated or administered and are only seldom left to market forces. Import parity has sometimes been used as a criterion although this includes a protective margin for freight, insurance and customs. The cost-plus formula which is occasionally adopted needs careful watching if it is not to deteriorate into a cover for inefficiency. In all cases, however, even if prices are given, it must be incumbent on public undertakings to lower their costs and maximise their profits through technological improvements. The steel plants have begun to progress in this direction and obviously all the others must do likewise. Industrial engineering, work study, by-product utilisation, strict costing and above all, efficient, decisive and forward-looking management is what is wanted.

The public sector is capable of this. The fine performance of individual units cannot be regarded as exceptional instances and must be treated as the norm. No doubt mistakes have been made; but this is nothing to worry about unduly provided the appropriate lessons are learnt. The slow rise of a new class of professional public sector managers and technocrats, an industrial civil service, is a significant development. As the public sector grows in size and importance so will the influence of these men on government and the economy. This, in time, might help make government more 'practical' and invest it with a new outlook even with regard to civil administration and budgeting. At the moment, however, it is still the other way about. This is the weakness.

Management and personnel

H. K. PARANJAPÉ

WE can safely begin by stating that there is hardly any question about whether we in India need to have public enterprises on a substantial scale. Leaving aside ideological considerations, in the economic conditions prevailing in our country and with the development tasks which we are facing, there is no alternative to large scale expansion of public enterprises. Responsible spokesmen from the private sector do not very much question this. There are a few *laissez faire* ideologists who raise such questions; but we can leave them well alone.

The real question is about how public enterprises should operate. In answering this, the primary fact which needs to be emphasised is that in India, public sector enterprises are not confined to public utility undertakings. The more substantial expansion is taking

place in sectors like steel, mining, machine building, heavy chemicals, etc. These are industries which either had not developed in India in the private sector at all or are being built up on a much larger scale than ever before. They are also of crucial significance to our planned economic development. It automatically follows that they must operate efficiently in terms of the contribution which is expected of them in the process of economic growth.

In the context of the discussion, which sometimes goes on in our country, it is necessary to emphasise the word *enterprise* in respect of 'public enterprises'. In essence, these are economic enterprises and not social welfare agencies. It is true that an enterprise needs to look after the welfare of the personnel operating in them in order

to secure a high level of productivity on a continuing basis. But they are primarily to be judged by their performance on criteria similar to those applied to business enterprise anywhere in the world. It also needs to be noted that whether it is a question of the criteria by which to judge their performance or of the methods for ensuring efficient performance, we are not operating in uncharted territory. Large scale economic enterprises have been organised and operated in many countries for long, and the lessons learnt seem to be in many respects universally applicable. The experience of organising and operating such enterprises seems to suggest much in common, whether we take into account countries like the U.S.S.R. or the U.S.A.

Adaptation of lessons learnt from foreign experience to the particular circumstances in our country is no doubt always necessary whether in the technological or in the management field. But it should be remembered that, in regard to many of these problems, there is already considerable experience elsewhere and this has to be taken into account when we set up and operate our enterprises. It would seem unnecessary to emphasise this; but our experience suggests that lessons from other countries are not being understood and learnt specially in the organisational and management fields.

Inadequate Autonomy

The word *public* in the term 'public enterprise' seems to create considerable difficulties. Politicians, legislators, civil servants and others all seem to think that what would be alright in a private enterprise is not likely to work in the case of a public enterprise. It is well-known that the real owners—that is, the shareholders—have very little say in the actual management of large and complex business enterprises in the private sector. The top management is increasingly professional, largely self-appointed and self-perpetuating. The personal interest in the sense of shareholding of top management is increasingly unimportant and still it is not thought that

this necessarily affects the performance of top-management adversely.

In addition to monetary incentives, top management has a professional interest and a moral commitment which goes far towards inducing it to put in its best for showing a good performance. In spite of this, there has been reluctance in India to permit the top managements of public enterprises adequate autonomy for the purpose of effectively managing the enterprises put in their charge and the reason for this, although not always explicitly stated, is the feeling that the top personnel have no stake in the successful conduct of the enterprises. For this reason, close and detailed control is attempted to be exercised by ministries and departments and even by the legislatures. It is not even now being adequately realised that this kind of attempt defeats its own purpose.

It is true that the autonomy which any enterprise can enjoy in an increasingly planned economy is bound to be limited. In the interests of planned development, the State is bound to regulate certain important aspects of the organisation, growth and functioning of any enterprise whether in the public or the private sector. What we are speaking about is not therefore any abstract concept of autonomy, but operational autonomy within an established framework. What needs to be emphasised is that, within this established framework which would be provided by the overall statutory and other regulations, the articles of association, etc., the management of the enterprise should be free to operate in its own way without being called upon to submit its detailed decisions for approval to government.

A Stake in Success

In this respect, there should basically be no difference between public enterprise and private enterprise. Just as shareholders really trying to run an enterprise in the private sector are likely to ruin its prospects of success and therefore harm their own interests, trying to run a public enter-

prise from Parliament or from the Ministry is almost a sure way of ruining the chances of successful performance.

As we saw earlier, an important reason for this attempt at detailed control is the feeling that the top management of the enterprise has no stake in the enterprise. One may well ask what is the stake that ministers or their officials or, for that matter, Members of the Legislature, have in ensuring the success of the enterprises. The answer very rightly would be that they have a stake to the extent that they have a professional interest, are devoted to public interest and also think that their reputation is at stake in the successful conduct of the business of which they are in charge. Why is it not then possible to place personnel at the top of these enterprises who will have the same kind of stake in their successful conduct?

The Only Sources

This brings us to the question of how we have attempted to build the managerial personnel for these undertakings. In the short run, in the process of establishing new, large and complex undertakings from scratch, there was obviously no alternative to securing the services of persons engaged in other organisations, especially either business organisations or the civil service.

This is what the government tried to do. Personnel from business enterprises with real experience of management could not be brought to the public sector in sufficient numbers, firstly, because there were not enough of such persons; private sector industry was itself rapidly expanding and, with the considerable expansion of the public sector, the numbers required were quite significant. But, secondly, it also needs to be mentioned that the government did not go about the task of attracting personnel from private business in the right way.

The emoluments offered, job for job, were significantly lower especially at the higher echelons of management. The importance of securing the services of technical-

ly experienced and knowledgeable persons to the extent that such personnel were available seems to have been better realised and special steps were taken as in the case of Hindustan Steel and the petroleum undertakings in the public sector to make it worthwhile for personnel from the private sector to join the public sector.

Personnel Recruitment

The professional challenge in the new jobs in the public sector also proved to be a significant factor in attracting some technical expertise, as for example in the petroleum undertakings. But in the case of managerial personnel, the importance of attracting experienced persons from the private sector does not seem to have been sufficiently realised and the attempts to attract such personnel have remained very inadequate.

The one major attempt was made through the Industrial Management Pool Scheme. But this did not prove to be particularly successful.* The scheme itself was not very well conceived and, even more, it was badly administered. The fact that personnel from the private sector who were to be attracted to the public sector were asked to submit their applications through their present employers was bound to deter those who held good jobs and were expecting to go further. While recruitment through the machinery of the Union Public Service Commission could not perhaps avoid this procedure, it made it difficult from the very beginning to draw in really competent personnel even for consideration for recruitment under the scheme.

Moreover, the selection and appointment procedures proved to be dilatory and inefficient and this resulted in a significant number of the selected candidates rejecting the offer. There has been no further attempt at recruitment to the Industrial Management Pool. Some individual enterprises with more

imaginative top management have, however, been able to bring in a few capable middle level managers from the private sector.

The fact that there was not much possibility of attracting experienced persons from the private sector inevitably led to the civil services being used as the major source for obtaining top management personnel for the new public sector enterprises.** Tapping this source was much easier because the scales of remuneration were the same and, for 'generalist' civil servants, it was no innovation to take up entirely new types of jobs as part of a variegated service career.

Civil Service Drawbacks

The civil service was undoubtedly a very important source for securing personnel for these new activities as civil servants were selected on merit, had received good training and had considerable experience of different kinds of work. There was therefore nothing wrong in the fact that quite a large number of the top management personnel in the new undertakings were selected from the civil service. However, the selection of particular individuals does not seem to have been done on any systematic examination of their potentiality for work in an economic enterprise.

It is obvious that a person who has been an efficient civil servant whether in the District or in the Secretariat or as an Accounts and Audit Officer is not necessarily capable of handling management work in an enterprise. It was therefore necessary to select people very carefully, provide them the necessary re-orientation and training appropriate for the individual's age and level, and assign them to the enterprise on a long-term basis. It would not be wrong to say however that none of these

things happened in most cases. There was hardly any attempt at helping the individual to reorient himself for handling the new kind of work. (This of course fits in well with the traditional approach that civil servants, and specially senior ones, do not require any training however different, the job to which they are assigned).

The Time Factor

Moreover, there was no expectation on either side that this was a more or less permanent or at least a long-term assignment.* Many of the civil servants were assigned to these jobs for short periods of about three years. It is obvious that it would be difficult for a person really to feel committed to the new organisation and the new job when he knew that he would not be there for longer than three years or so. This is not to deny that a conscientious civil servant would always try to do his work in a competent manner. But at the top management positions, what is required is not mere competence but deep interest based on a commitment to the building up of the organisation. This was especially important because many of these enterprises were being newly started and were bound to be faced by a number of difficult problems. It was also necessary to create traditions of flexible operation, free from the usual safety orientated and time consuming procedures. For this purpose, the managements of enterprises have to resist attempts at interference and detailed control on the part of controlling ministries, etc.

Such traditions however could not be built up by top management groups which consisted essentially of civil servants. In most cases, such persons accepted traditional civil service procedures and methods as ideally applicable to public enterprises. This was inevitable because many of them did not know of any other methods and procedures: and as they were also looking forward to going back to positions in government, they were not interested in

* See the present author's, *The Industrial Management Pool: An Administrative Experiment* (Indian Institute of Public Administration, New Delhi, 1962).

** The Estimates Committee has noted that out of 800 top posts in 54 public undertakings, over 190 are held by serving or retired officers of the Central Government. In addition there are a number of State Government officers on deputation though their number was not available to the Committee (See Fifty-Second Report: *Personnel Policies of Public Undertakings*, March 1964).

* For information about frequent changes in top personnel in public undertakings, see *ibid.*, p. 13 and Appendix III.

facing the tensions which would have inevitably arisen if they had tried to insist on different methods and procedures.

In many cases, moreover, the civil servants assigned to public enterprises were not the senior-most (the top positions in many public enterprises seem to be equated in status and salary to the rank of Joint Secretary to the Government of India) and, therefore, their tradition as well as the possibility that they would be later posted to higher positions in the Secretariat made it difficult for them to assert their independence *vis-a-vis* the controlling ministries.

In many enterprises, financial management has been handled by persons with a background of experience in Government Finance, Accounts or Audit departments* and personnel management has been left to civil servants with experience of handling establishment work in government. Quite naturally the approach to financial control and personnel management has been dominated by the traditional civil service approach which is not quite suitable even for administrative work in a developing economy and is certainly not suitable to the management of a complex industrial or business enterprise.

Selection From Within

What is surprising is that not only in new enterprises but even in enterprises of some standing, government seems to have found it necessary to obtain personnel from the civil service for filling top management positions as in even old established enterprises like the State Bank of India, Life Insurance Corporation, etc. One wonders whether there were no suitable persons available in these old enterprises for such appointments. Only the Railways seem to have established a tradition that the top management positions in the railway organisation are filled almost wholly from amongst railwaymen.

While one need not exclude the possibility of outsiders being brought in at the top manage-

ment level, or for that matter at any other level, when it is found that suitable personnel are not available within an organisation or when it is specifically decided that a new kind of direction or leadership has to be provided to the organisation, normally one would think that the bulk of the top personnel in an enterprise should come from within its own ranks especially if it is a large enough organisation to provide sufficient scope for choice. Such an approach not only provides the best incentive for personnel working in an enterprise but lessens the likelihood of square pegs being put in round holes.

A Special Service

This brings up the question of suitable technical and managerial higher level personnel for the public undertakings. The solution that has been suggested from time to time, especially by persons not closely connected with the undertakings, has been the creation of a special management service similar to other central or all-India services. The main advantages claimed for such a service are that it will ensure systematic and merit-based recruitment, secure good quality personnel at a reasonable remuneration because of the status such services enjoy and fit in with the tradition in India of setting up a new service for providing personnel for a new function undertaken by government.

It needs to be pointed out that such an approach would be really an innovation because in no other country where a public sector of some magnitude exists has a government service for providing personnel to such enterprises been created. This is certainly not to say that we in India should not create such a service; but it at least suggests that such a proposal needs to be carefully scrutinised before it is accepted.

The first question which arises in this connection is—would such a management service include within its scope personnel for carrying out all the various management functions—line as well as staff—in public enterprises? Would

it, in other words, provide personnel for managing the production as well as managing the personnel, accounting and other functions? Unless we are thinking in terms of following the pattern of the central services and recruiting persons for these functions on a common test irrespective of their educational background and experience, which would really amount to dilettantism running riot, it is obvious that the service will have to have a number of special cadres even for the so-called non-technical functions like personnel, accounts, commerce, etc. Those with a certain educational background would have to be recruited and then perhaps given further specialised training suitable to the functions of the sub-cadre.

Moreover, for the higher positions in the enterprises, we would have to consider not only persons who belong to these special cadres but also various technical personnel who would be performing production, design and other functions in the organisation. It will not therefore be very meaningful to think of a management service because it will not be possible for the bulk of even the top positions in the enterprises to be filled only or mainly from amongst the persons belonging to such a service and at the middle and lower levels the personnel belonging to the service will not really be interchangeable.

A 'Synthetic Personality'

Even a more important objection to a management service for all public enterprises is that this will take away one of the essential functions of the top management of an enterprise, *viz.*, to recruit and develop suitable personnel especially for ultimately occupying key positions in the enterprise, and thus erode the accountability of such management for the successful performance of the enterprise. For the successful operation of an enterprise it is also necessary to build up what Galbraith once called its 'synthetic personality'. This involves 'an intricate problem of cooperation and coordination between its parts' which in turn is

* See *ibid.*, pp. 20-1.

'the fruit of familiarity and confidence as between the participants.'

But, this familiarity and mutual confidence can be built up only if the management cadres belong to the enterprise. If they are looking elsewhere for appreciation of their work and for their promotion they are not likely to have the feeling of identification with the fortunes of the enterprise which is necessary for its success. Moreover, if there is a management service as such which covers all public undertakings, the possibility of effective and purposeful personnel management would get the go-by.

If the experience regarding the management of government services in general is any guide, traditional methods of appraisal and promotions mainly based on seniority are bound to be the rule. The possibility is that in such a service, with quite varied jobs in different enterprises which persons belonging to the service would be doing, in order to ensure equity as amongst different members of the service, seniority if anything may receive more weight in promotion policies.

Flexibility

Flexible policies regarding remuneration and experimentation about incentives, which are very necessary at this stage of our industrial development, would be practically impossible under a government service. We badly need such experimentation and the top management of every enterprise needs to have the freedom to experiment and to operate in a flexible way so as to obtain the maximum results. Attempting to fit the personnel management of the public sector into the rigid pattern of the civil service is likely to have highly undesirable consequences.

The question is not now so much of recruitment by individual plants, in which case objections could justifiably be raised about whether such recruitment could be systematic and merit based. There is an increasing and inevitable tendency towards the creation of large complexes of public undertakings with a common top

management for a number of units in a broad industrial or business sector. There is no reason why it should not be possible for systematic personnel recruitment and management to be undertaken by these large and complex undertakings on their own.

To some extent, this is already being attempted and the managements of undertakings and in some cases the ministries concerned are coming to look with favour upon this approach. All that now needs to be done is to accept finally that there is no necessity of creating a management service as such. As an essential corollary it will have to be accepted that the top positions in these undertakings will be increasingly filled by persons who have grown and developed from within the undertakings and not by appointing civil service officers to these positions.

Any one with some acquaintance with our public enterprises would subscribe to the view that we have in these enterprises quite efficient and potentially capable young and middle level personnel, both on the technical and the managerial sides. Given proper incentives, a propitious atmosphere and an imaginative and systematic personnel development programme, there should be no difficulty in rapidly securing sufficient numbers of top management personnel from amongst them.

Qualitative Change

This approach which leans heavily towards leaving personnel recruitment and management almost entirely to the top managements of the enterprises is sometimes objected to even by the young and middle level officers in the enterprises. This is because of their fear that the top managements of public enterprises, such as they are in most cases, are incapable of handling such powers in a professional and imaginative way, in an equitable manner and with the long-term interests of the enterprise in view. One cannot say that such feelings are entirely groundless. But my contention is that the remedy for this situation

lies not so much in organising a system of checks and balances through the formation of a government service as in bringing about a change in the nature and quality of top management.

Incentives

This can obviously happen only if the ministers and their senior advisers realise that the principal, direct role that the government has to perform *vis-a-vis* these enterprises is to select the best possible persons available for occupying top management positions, provide such personnel with maximum incentives to operate efficiently and leave them free to do the job so long as they keep showing good results. Those found to be eminently suitable should be secured and there should be no inhibition about attracting the best personnel available even if it involves the payment of salaries which are higher than those normally prevalent in the civil service.

Whether they are civil servants or others, the persons so appointed need to be given a long tenure (unless they are found to be unsuitable) and they should expect to secure increasing remuneration and status in the enterprise itself and not have to look for outside avenues to obtain these.

It is also necessary that persons put in charge of new enterprises should be so selected that they have five to ten years of active work ahead of them. This will make it possible for such persons to think of the building up of the enterprises on a long term basis as being their personal responsibility. The acceptance of such an approach would obviously mean giving up the use of public enterprise top positions as jobs to which civil service officers are appointed as part of their normal rotation postings. The government would also have to avoid the temptation to use these positions for providing jobs to retiring civil servants or to politicians forced into temporary or permanent retirement.

The last point I would like to emphasise is about the remunera-

tion of public enterprise personnel.* It should go without saying that, in a mixed economy, the government cannot escape competing in the market for talent if it wants to obtain its appropriate share of this scarce commodity. Especially in our economy, for some time to come, this commodity is bound to be relatively quite scarce and, with the role that the public sector is expected to play, it should obtain more than a fair share of the best talent available.

While public interest, patriotism and professionally challenging work may to some extent make it easier for the public sector to attract good talent, it will be difficult for it to retain such talent in enough numbers if the remuneration provided compares very unfavourably with the private sector. So long as the government does not think it desirable or practicable to control the remuneration paid in private sector industry, adopting remuneration plans in the public sector which are based on a misconceived approach to socialism and therefore provide significantly lower remuneration prospects than those prevalent in the private sector is likely to cause considerable damage to public sector enterprises.

Ultimately, such an approach would go against the objectives of socialism. In well organised and progressive enterprises, it is not now unusual for a qualified and talented person to obtain a starting salary of Rs. 500 at the beginning of his career, reach Rs. 1000 in four or five years and, if the person is found to be of really the top class, Rs. 2000 by the age of 35 or at the latest 40. If the public sector enterprises cannot offer such prospects, it would be difficult for them to attract and retain competent and efficient personnel and to get the maximum results out of them. It is high time our thinkers, parliamentarians, civil servants and ministers realised this.

* For a detailed discussion, see my *Flight of Technical Personnel in Public Undertakings—A Study Report* (Indian Institute of Public Administration, New Delhi, 1964):

The financial performance

V.V. RAMANADHAM

THIS note seeks to highlight some basic issues in the finance area of public enterprises in India. Two assumptions which the note does not seek to expand are that we believe that the public enterprises should succeed financially and that the public enterprises should pursue a policy of raising surpluses.

There has been a debate for some time now on whether the financial performance of the public enterprises has been satisfactory. The profit as percentage of paid-up capital in the case of running concerns, others than Hindustan Steel Ltd., was 4.5 per cent in 1961-62, 7.6 per cent in 1962-63 and 8.1 per cent in 1963-64, as per the Annual Report on the Working of Industrial and Commercial Undertakings of the Central Government, issued by the Ministry of Finance. Many take the view that these results are not sufficient and that the details of the situation—central as well as State—do not represent a very satisfactory state of affairs. They are not adequately instrumental in raising resources either for their own expansions or for general economic development; and many of them cannot attract capital in the open market without government guarantee.

Let us make a fundamental examination of the factors which

underlie the situation. A public enterprise may make low profits, or losses, under three conditions: (a) it may, by plan, make low profits, or losses, (b) it may be in gestation; and (c) it may be inefficient in conception or operations.

No Planning

The familiar reason why a public enterprise or a category of enterprises may be permitted, if not required, to work on low profits, or losses, is that they yield external economies or indirect benefits to the rest of the economy. While this is an admissible ground, we do not have a clear statement by the government as to which of the public enterprises are planned to make low profits or losses. When the resources for the Third Plan were estimated, credit was taken for surpluses from steel plants; while in actual practice these have not been realised. If the financial corporations in the public sector are assumed to be promotional in their role, some make profits while the others do not. It is not clear whether nationalised road transport is a commercial activity or a promotional activity; results show that some organisations make profits while the others make losses. Is electricity planned to make profits or losses? Examples can be multiplied to show that most public enterprises make whatever results they do without a pre-determined financial plan.

It helps everyone in the assessment of the financial performance of the public enterprises to classify them into a few categories such as commercial, mainly but not wholly commercial, and mainly non-commercial. It is in the last category that the enterprises designed as promotional may be placed. One cannot then defend the low profit position, except in the case of enterprises falling in the last category. It is needless to say that such a classification calls for periodical revision, since the promotional or commercial role of an enterprise alters as time passes.

The other requisite of this suggestion is that there should be

some broad indication of the extent of profit or loss that a given enterprise may plan to make, consistent with the indirect-returns expectations of the community. For example, how low can electricity profit go, or within what limits of loss can the Hindustan Shipyard Ltd. work?

It is for effecting the classification and expertly suggesting the permissible profit or loss rates on the part of different public enterprises that a Public Enterprise Commission may be established as an expert, although recommendatory, body—a suggestion which I have made for some time now. Some argue that the Planning Commission can do this work. The point is that some expert body ought to do it and do it well; and there are enough reasons why the Planning Commission itself should find it an advantage to have some other agency to specialise in this work.

We do not reach the end of the problem when the extent of permissible profit or loss is set for a given enterprise. In fact, serious complications arise at this stage. To put it simply, a public enterprise can realise a planned loss of 10 paise per unit of output while working at a cost of 100 paise as against a price of 90 paise, or alternatively working at a cost of 110 paise as against a price of 100 paise.

Costs

In a monopoly situation, which many of the public enterprises enjoy and which is strengthened by restrictions on imports, it is not impossible for the enterprise to manipulate the price so as to satisfy the criterion of planned loss (or performance); and inefficient methods of performance, inflating the costs, can result. What is, therefore, basically necessary is to ensure that the cost structure represents efficient operations. The problem of profitability of public enterprises eventually boils down to one of costs, for it is in relation to costs that the profit has a meaning. I do not raise here the question of who should scrutinise the

cost structure or how this should be done

The one point which, however, has to be emphasised in this context is that the cost computation has to be scientific and consistent with the canons of economics. For example, all inputs relevant to the operations have to be considered; every input has to be evaluated at its market rate; and policy matters such as depreciation and joint cost allocations have to be determined on grounds of commercial prudence.

Gestation Period

The idea of gestation has been frequently employed in explaining the poor performance of certain enterprises. Theoretically, it is correct to argue that an enterprise in a state of gestation cannot make a profit. But let us go deeper into the full implications of the concept of gestation. There can be four senses in which the term may be employed:

- (a) upto the point when the construction of the plant is completed,
- (b) upto the stage when the whole plant is commissioned,
- (c) upto the point when the plant is fully utilised, and
- (d) upto the point when the plant operates at the maximum possible rate of profit.

While the first two versions of gestation can be easily understood and established, it is difficult to be precise as regards the latter two—particularly the last. Full utilisation may be delayed because of supply difficulties or of demand considerations; as regards the latter, demand may take time to materialise to the level of capacity, or it may never be high enough to equal the capacity provided. In the latter case the moral is that a wrong risk has been taken at the time of the investment decision, assuming that a smaller plant is physically possible or economically plausible. Likewise, maximal operations implied in the fourth version of the term gestation, call for appropriate managerial effort, in regulating the product mix and

the demand pattern, subject to physical and other constraints governing the enterprise in question.

Now it can be appreciated that the defence of gestation cannot be availed of in an omnibus manner. Poor financial results on the part of enterprises under the first two versions of gestation ought not to cause us concern; but in the other two situations of gestation, there is no equally easy justification for poor results. And some specific points may be raised in this context.

Although a fairly long gestation is involved in basic and capital-intensive industries, commercially prudent decisions of investment ought to provide for a sequence of construction and outputs which ensures two results: firstly, that some parts of the capacity or plant get completely ready earlier than the others, to the extent physically possible, so that they offer themselves in readiness for whatever outputs can possibly be drawn from them; and, secondly, that investments are not diffused over the entire cross-section of the project, except to the extent physically and technologically necessary, so that the lock-up of capital is minimised so far as possible. These are well-known principles of experienced businessmen. There is no reason why these should not be adopted scrupulously in public enterprise projects.

There is enough of suggestion from the comments and reports that we have on public enterprises that all is not well on these two criteria. It is, therefore, necessary for us to learn from experience, codify the nature of uncommercial sequences in capital expenditure projects that have occurred so far, and devise a fairly effective system of providing against them in the future projects.

Expansion

The other points which requires some emphasis is that many an enterprise has continuously expanded; this feature is likely to continue for a long time to come. This develops the mistaken impression that the enterprise is in gestation

continuously. The truth is that parts of it are in gestation, not the enterprise as a whole. Hence, those parts of the enterprise which are physically ready for producing outputs have to be isolated from those which are still not ready to do so. This enables us to concede the concept of gestation only in respect of those segments of capital outlay which represent physical assets that really deserve to be considered as uncommissioned; and we shall then have a reliable method of assessing the financial performance of the enterprise.

Inefficient Decisions

Let us consider the third reason for poor performance, viz., inefficient or uneconomical investment decisions, organisational techniques, and current operations. As regards the first, we have ample evidence from the reports of the Estimates Committee to support the view that several investment decisions were based on inadequate data and the criterion of financial viability did not constitute the most prominent determinant.

Uneconomical investment decisions have the effects of over-capitalising an undertaking, inflating the capital charges and, worst of all, contributing to operational disadvantages of a permanent nature. To what extent each enterprise, particularly a heavy-capital enterprise, is characterised by these disadvantages is important to estimate at once, so that we know clearly the unavoidable causes of poor performance, distinct from the other reasons.

As regards the organisation provided for a public enterprise, I have in mind, in particular, two aspects of the question, viz., the multi-plant organisations and large sizes. On the former, no clear principle seems to underlie many of the organisational arrangements permitted in the public sector. For example, while the Bokaro steel plant was not placed under the Hindustan Steel Ltd., the fertilizer companies were amalgamated into the Fertilizer Corporation. (Incidentally, it will be interesting to know clearly the economics which

prompted the transfer of the Rourkela fertilizer plant to the Fertilizer Corporation, the economics which prompted the re-transfer of this plant to Hindustan Steel Ltd. after a year and the diseconomies picked up in the whole process.)

Differences in Practice

While the Hindustan Aircraft Ltd., the Avro and the MIG plants were amalgamated into Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd., the Heavy Electricals Ltd. of Hyderabad has been set up separately from the parental organisation at Bhopal. Whereas Hindustan Machine Tools has been permitted to set up plants all over the country, the extended drug manufacture in the public sector has been organised through the medium of a separate company, Indian Drugs and Pharmaceuticals Ltd., as distinct from Hindustan Antibiotics Ltd. of Pimpri, which like HMT, is an efficient organisation, and IDPL is allowed to have a synthetic drug plant at Hyderabad. If the reasons for the differences in practice are supported by economics and management considerations, we can have no ground for criticism; in the absence of such support, the decisions must be characterised as *ad hoc* in nature.

Some of the public enterprises are too big, particularly the Heavy Electricals Ltd. at Bhopal and Heavy Engineering Corporation Ltd. at Ranchi. It is well-known in economic theory that it is not optimal considerations on the technical front which set any rigid limit to the size of a unit, but it is managerial ability which sets the limit to the size of an organisation. Without denying possible technical economies of the large volume of transactions organised in a single premises at Bhopal or Ranchi, we may ask the question whether these are not outweighed by two particular complexities in the Indian scene; our labour problems have been unique, and our managerial abilities, when geared to large scale and relatively new activities, are rather inadequate.

The report of Justice Mukherjee on the Heavy Engineering Corpo-

ration which came a few months back illustrates these points admirably. Add to these the complications raised by the State governments over-exerting themselves in point of recruitment, etc., in central enterprises located in their areas. These difficulties associated with large sizes not only render the operations uneconomical but many positively arrest production activity and productivity in such a way that we never have a chance of the economies of large-sized factories being realised at all. It is time that we examined this aspect of the question with reference to some of our big enterprises.

Turning to the defects in current operations leading to losses, we may suggest that the causes have to be enquired into thoroughly, mainly through the medium of the managements concerned, so that the factors which limit operating efficiency and profitability may be controlled, if not eliminated. Some of the circumstances which matter in this regard are already well known, namely, high inventories, poor debt collection services, rigid and uncommercial practices of purchasing, lack of autonomy and delegation at various levels within the organisation structure, and inadequately trained staff in technical as well as in financial departments.

Incidentally, positive efforts have to be made in the direction of introducing incentives for higher productivity on the shop floor as well as at different levels of management. Fundamentally we must enquire into whether the decisional system within or concerning a public enterprise is geared to efficiency and economy. Space does not permit me to go into these at any length.

In conclusion, it is time that we replaced overall comments on the financial performance of public enterprises with investigations into each public enterprise or each category of public enterprises; for while the overall arithmetic is undoubtedly of significance, the more vital requisite is that no unit of organisation is less efficient or economical than it ought to be.

Accountability

INDRAJIT GUPTA

ON the eve of the Fourth Five Year Plan it is obvious that the public sector has not only come to stay but is going to occupy an increasingly important share, quantitatively and qualitatively, of the Indian economy. I say this despite

the intensified pressure to the contrary by the enemies of the public sector, and the surreptitious erosions of the Industrial Policy Resolution of 1956 which are embodied in certain recent foreign collaboration agreements, particularly in the field of oil.

This article attempts to discuss only a limited aspect of public sector activity, viz., its accountability to the nation. Without stating it in so many words the author of 'The problem ...' has suggested that it is much easier to measure performance in the private than in the public sector and, hence, that accountability is much more real in the former than in the latter. He says, 'Whether private or public, monopolies are monopolies. If one is undesirable the other is equally, if not more, undesirable. Indeed, between the two, State monopoly is much worse. For, while the private monopolist could be called to task and compelled to withdraw from the field, it is far too difficult to cut the size and power of State monopoly once it has taken firm roots.'

No State Monopoly

The implication here that the public sector in India constitutes a 'State monopoly' is of course erroneous. Under the existing dispensation such 'monopolies' can be developed only in railways and air transport, arms and ammunition, and atomic energy. In all other fields, subject to restrictions on establishment of new undertakings in a few, the private sector is free to operate. Even in the case of 'Schedule A' industries of the Industrial Policy Resolution (i.e. those where new units are to be set up exclusively by the State), the 'monopolistic' designs of government are undermined by the proviso that 'this does not preclude the expansion of the existing privately-owned units, or the possibility of the State securing the cooperation of private enterprise in the establishment of new units when the national interests so require.'

These explicit qualifications are important to remember if one is

not to be hoodwinked by the tententious and repetitive propaganda emanating from Big Business circles and their ideologues to the effect that the private sector is being 'elbowed out' by the giant of State monopoly. In fact, no such thing exists save, perhaps, in Life Insurance and Air Transport. Everywhere else the law of the so-called 'mixed economy', peaceful co-existence of the two sectors, prevails.

State Capitalism

Without underestimating for a moment the vitally strategic role which can be played by the State sector in a developing country with an historically inherited underdeveloped economy (this concept is poooh-pooohed as a concession to 'doctrinaire' ideology by some who are at the same time not averse to drawing rigid and mechanical comparisons with British experience of 'Gas and Water' socialism), the fact of the matter is that two types of capitalism now co-exist in this country—the privately-owned and the State-owned. Woolly-headed notions that the public sector in India is a 'socialist' one need to be dispelled. There is nothing socialist about it for the following reasons.

Firstly, the Indian sector, despite its growth and increasing importance, is avowedly not an instrument of policy for curbing, restricting, or gradually eliminating capitalist relations in the economy.

Secondly, the development by it of certain basic, heavy and strategic industries, while essential for strengthening the independence of the national economy, helps provide the private sector with its own sinews (steel, power, machine tools, etc) at enormous capital cost to the State exchequer.

Thirdly, the public sector itself is limited in scope, leaving to private ownership the bulk of even such 'commanding heights' as banking, foreign trade, mining and oil.

Fourthly, the administration and management of public sector enter-

prises are largely entrusted to persons whose background and proclivities are heavily biased in favour of the private sector, including actual representatives of Big Business trained in the administrative practices of the British *raj* and innocent of the slightest 'socialist' ideology or convictions.

Fifthly, in this public, so-called 'socialist', sector, the rawest of raw deals is reserved for the worker, who is relegated to the status of a departmental employee of government, subjected to obnoxious police-State methods, deprived of trade union and, very often, even statutory rights.

It is this State capitalism, with all its defects and limitations, whose accountability has to be weighed in the balance against that of the still dominant private sector.

There are people who maintain that the sole criterion of accountability should be profits, that a public enterprise, like a private one, is a pure and simple business enterprise and that is all. The implied suggestion is that the provisions of the company law are adequate to govern and regulate the accountability of the management towards shareholders and creditors in the private sector, while the statutory corporations or government-owned companies of the public sector are really divested of such strict responsibility due to extraneous advantages such as State subsidies, etc.

The Private Sector

However, as is well known, the Indian Companies Act, despite its voluminous provisions, has been failing to plug the loopholes whereby the accountability of the private corporate sector can be evaded by unscrupulous managements whose sole obsession is with 'profits'. Numerous piece-meal amendments to the Act have been found necessary, but these have only served to highlight the urgency of more comprehensive amendment. It must be remembered that this Act

is virtually the sole instrument that society possesses at present for enforcing the legal and administrative accountability of companies in the private sector.

A former Company Law Administrator, D. L. Mazumdar, has candidly observed:

"The complexities of modern business have rendered company accounts in every country increasingly unintelligible, except to the experts and specialists. To the average investor or creditor . . . who lacks the requisite technical skill, company accounts are cryptograms which he is incapable of solving. To this extent, 'the rendering of accounts to the general body of members', in the traditional sense, has lost much of its efficacy as an instrument of enforcing accountability."

Besides, no law can fully ensure the professional competence or integrity, much less the independence, of company auditors whose role is pivotal in the enforcement of accountability in the corporate sector.

Social Obligations

So far as the concept of social accountability goes, the nature of its precise obligations has yet to be concretely defined in this country. There is a vague and muddled idea abroad that the 'socialist pattern' of society should require the captains of industry to provide for reasonable labour conditions and 'healthy' employer-employee relationships, enlightened policies of recruitment and promotion, consumer-welfare in respect of price, quality and supply of goods and services produced, civic amenities in the locality in which the enterprise is situated, etc. However, such obligations do not ordinarily arise out of law or the internal regulations of a company; at best, some of them are sought to be embodied in voluntarily-accepted 'codes' of conduct and discipline against whose breach there is no enforceable sanction.

It is against this background that we have to view the practice

in this country of subjecting the public sector to parliamentary control. However imperfect or incomplete the latter may still be, it demands a degree of legal, administrative, constitutional and social accountability which is unimaginable in the case of the private sector. It is simply not true to say, as the author of the opening article says, that 'there is a lack of information and enquiry' about the public sector, and that certain 'tricks of the trade' in running public enterprises are concealed from public knowledge and investigation, as though the same, and much worse, is not the case with the world of Big Business! The difference is that the tools for constant and thorough probes can only be tempered, at present, in the democratic crucible of parliamentary control and accountability from which the private sector is happily immune.

Parliamentary Searchlight

The autonomous character of government corporations and companies puts them at once outside the pale of normal government 'departments' and of normal executive accountability to Parliament. Working on commercial lines, which calls for a fair measure of internal autonomy, they have nevertheless to be subjected to the continuous searchlight of the Parliament which votes monies for them, which is the representative, therefore, of the shareholders, and also guardian of the public interest in the broadest national sense.

It is, therefore, worthy of notice that the Companies Act imposes additional obligations on government companies, and enlarges the scope and incidence of their legal accountability as compared with that of privately-owned concerns. Section 619 empowers the Comptroller and Auditor General of India to have considerable say in the manner in which the accounts of government companies shall be audited, and makes it obligatory for the latter, in addition to their balance sheets and profit and loss

accounts, to submit annual reports of their working to Parliament.

The main instruments of what may be called parliamentary pre-audit and post-audit have been the Estimates Committee and the Public Accounts Committee—the two elected financial committees which have been recently supplemented (replaced) in respect of public sector undertakings by a third, specialised body—the Committee on Public Sector Undertakings.

The terms of reference of the Estimates Committee are wide enough to enable it to go in great detail into the working of government concerns, viz :

(a) to report what economies improvements in organisation, efficiency or administrative reform, consistent with the policy underlying the estimates, may be effected;

(b) to suggest alternative policies in order to bring about efficiency and economy in administration;

(c) to examine whether the money is well laid out within the limits of the policy implied in the estimates; and

(d) to suggest the form in which the estimates shall be presented to Parliament.

A Proper Balance

Everyone acquainted with the numerous reports of the Estimates Committee submitted between December, 1950, and April, 1965, cannot fail to be struck by their thoroughness and the outspoken nature of their criticisms and recommendations. Throughout these 15 years, however, controversy has raged over the proper balance between the requirements of autonomy in the working of public sector undertakings and the need to maintain effective Parliamentary control over them.

At the same time, the growing number of public undertakings and the Committee's own accumulating fund of rich experience led to increasing acceptance of the idea (already advocated by the

Krishna Menon Committee) of a separate parliamentary committee to replace the Estimates and Public Account Committees in dealing with public undertakings. The object was to strengthen parliamentary supervision over matters of policy and general administration without unnecessary and crippling interference in day-to-day activities of these concerns.

Bold Experiment

The resultant Committee on Public Sector Undertakings, is, therefore, a bold experiment in the field of parliamentary control. The official motion providing for establishment of the committee stated its functions to be as follows :—

‘It shall examine the reports and accounts of the State undertakings specified in the schedule;

examine whether the affairs of the State undertakings are being managed in accordance with sound business principles and prudent commercial practices having regard to their acceptability and efficiency in management;

And . . . investigate :—

The financial outcome of the operations of the undertakings;

the working of the undertakings with reference to the devolution of authority within them;

the working of the undertakings with reference to techniques of managerial efficiency;

the recruitment and training of technical and managerial staff;

the relations with other undertakings of a similar nature in the private sector;

the relationship with the minister and the government department concerned;

and, finally, consider what economies and improvement in organisation, efficiency or administrative reform, consistent with the general policy of the undertakings, can be effected in them.’

The Committee is specifically precluded from dealing with mat-

ters of ‘major government policy’, and ‘principles and practices of day to day administration’. Its scope is limited to the statutory corporations and the State undertakings governed by the Companies Act.

Would private sector managements agree to be measured and tested by a similar specialised instrument functioning within the forum of Parliament?

That the Committee on Public Sector Undertakings is capable of throwing the powerful searchlight of public opinion on the objects of its inquiry is apparent from some of its recent reports. Where can more trenchant and well-informed exposure be found, for example, of the Rourkela Steel plant’s delays in attaining rated capacity, the repeated upward revisions of its capital cost estimates, or the high cost of production of its steel? Or, by what other means would it have been brought to light that the Shipping Corporation of India is being saddled with the unremunerative routes which the private shipping companies refuse to operate? Or that, contrary to specific agreements, the foreign oil companies with refineries in India have been refusing to employ Indian tankers for transport of their crude oil supplies?

Untenable

As for the private sector’s complaint about the unshakeability of ‘giant’ State monopolies, let it note that the courageous recommendation for decentralisation of the L.I.C. and its splitting up into five separate corporations in the interests of efficiency has been made by the Committee and is now under consideration of the government.

Which private sector concern and, in particular, which of the monopoly houses whose proliferation is so strikingly outlined in the Mahalanobis Committee’s report, would be prepared to stand in the glare of a similar searchlight? The Estimates Committee’s role as a

pre-audit agency is supplemented by that of the Public Accounts Committee which takes as its starting point the audit reports of the Comptroller and Auditor-General and then assisted by the latter’s expert services, proceeds with its own inquiry and examination of the manner in which the executive has handled and accounted for the public funds provided in the budget.

Apart from these parliamentary committees are the regular practices and procedures of parliamentary debates; discussions of various types (e.g. on reports of enquiries, or on annual reports of undertakings); interpellations; notices of adjournment or ‘calling attention’ on matters of urgent public importance; discussions in the informal consultative committees attached to each ministry; and, of course, the annual rendering of accounts by each minister when he seeks the Lok Sabha’s approval for his demands for grants. At the same time, the reports of the Estimates and Public Accounts Committees are immune from debate—a salutary convention which prevents a recalcitrant minister from mobilising political support in his favour.

Constitutional Custodians

By and large, it can be safely asserted that State capitalism, as distinct from socialism, is operating in India within the constitutional framework of parliamentary democracy which has evolved its own mechanism of controls, checks and accountability. The parliamentary committees in particular, which are elected bodies with membership drawn from all parties in Parliament, are better custodians than any other, under the existing conditions, of the public and social interest as defined from time to time by Parliament itself. And, in a planned economy with certain declared national objectives, accountability cannot be restricted to considerations of ‘profit’ alone, although profitability must be a key criterion of any public undertaking which is expected to contribute resources

to the State exchequer for developmental activities.

There is no space in this article to discuss various suggestions for making accountability of the public sector more effective. These deserves serious consideration at the highest level, particularly in view of the admitted dearth in this country of competent administrative and technical personnel with experience of industrial and financial management required for State undertakings.

Priorities

Priority of consideration should be given to the following issues, among others:

- (a) the choice of chairman of the parliamentary committees from among members of the opposition, thereby ensuring what Ursula K. Hicks has called 'extra inquisitiveness';
- (b) the need to ensure more complete and expeditious implementation of the recommendations of these committees by the undertakings and ministries concerned;
- (c) the possibilities of associating more 'expertise' with the Estimates Committee and Committee on Public Sector Undertakings in an advisory capacity;
- (d) the setting up of independent consumers' councils attached to each public enterprise with a definite advisory status in respect of quality and prices of goods; and
- (e) need for a special evaluation unit or 'cell' to keep track of industrial relations policy and practice in each public enterprise and its accountability as a 'model employer'.

Parliamentary control is a process of growth of sound and healthy conventions which will increasingly ensure better accountability. The need for this

has been succinctly brought out by a senior civilian, S. S. Khera, in the following words:

'India is still a comparatively underdeveloped country, marked by a very rapid pace of industrial development where it is necessary even for survival to progress towards a goal of industrialisation. And again this connotes the use of the so far unused and unexploited resources of the country for the common good of the vast population and the simple purpose of raising the living standards of the people. But to contain all this within the democratic method requires indeed the constant and continuous control and vigilance of Parliament and of the State legislatures... Here in India the natural expectations of the people for a better living have to be satisfied by embarking upon these great and truly great five-year plans... Here, particularly, does the parliamentary process have a vital role to play in giving adequate direction; in evolving the pattern of development; the pattern of organisation; in laying down methods; and, in short, so evolving the pattern of management, as to ensure speedy and efficient execution of those policies, projects and objects which are set out in the Constitution.'

Economic Regeneration

Obviously, such an outlook and such a task have little or nothing in common with the profit-hunting mania of the private sector, which is powerful enough in India to have so far eluded its direct accountability to Parliament despite its unsavoury association with 'black money', tax evasions, concealed profits, misappropriation of foreign exchange, speculative practices and the like. The protagonists of 'free enterprise' utilise their own pet theories of accountability as a weapon to discredit the public sector and to undermine nationalisation. They have to be rejected as hostile cross-currents to the broad mainstream of economic regeneration to which this nation is committed.

A view from within

E. HABIBULLAH

WHAT is allegedly said to be wrong with the public sector undertakings is often wild and off the mark. It is often, also, tinged with spite. For it must be remembered that the shareholder and the owner of a private factory or industry can feel the lethality of the growth of publicly owned enterprises. But few industrialists indeed know what goes on in them. They can, however, as 'members of the public' damn them as hard as they can, and brief their representatives in legislatures to keep plugging away at it, right or wrong.

I had the interesting experience of attending the Durgapur Congress. There, in the exhibition, there was a lot of its produce exhibited by the public sector, yet those who spoke in the 'pandal' had missed everything it stood for or meant. There was not one constructive speech, not one person understood its economic significance and where it was to fit in and how it should be patterned. The accusations, congratulations and points stressed missed the real marks completely. One thought that they must have left T. N.

Singh and Lal Bahadur Shastri with a sense of disappointment.

Basically, the ills of the public sector stem from the following factors.

1. no real goals have been set for the country itself, therefore, what industry should produce and for whom in 1965-1966 and so on no one can precisely state;
2. there is to be a socialist pattern of society, but what that socialist pattern is to be is anybody's guess,
3. there are inherent factors in its organisation and control which militate against progress;
4. there are politicians involved on two fronts, firstly, to bestow favour on *their* men by bringing pressure on managements and, secondly, those who are beholden to private industrialists take a hand in confounding the purpose of public industry for their own ends;
5. industry (which has certain positive controls built into it) cannot be executed by inducing into it governmental pat-

terns which are unsuited to it;

6. labour, company and other laws are largely outdated. Often they operate by inhibiting initiative, ambition and the end of production.

It is sad to note that during the Prime Minister's recent visit to Moscow one of the points about which the Russians expressed concern was the lack of utilisation of the installed capacity of the public sector, and another was the inability of our country to utilise the credit loans given to our public sector. What this really means is that we have been planning in theory, but achieving little in fact. In any case, who is going to use what products and when? If we do not know the answer to this, then why are we producing? Surely, not merely to spend the money because it is available.

Socialist Pattern

What, for instance, is meant by a socialist pattern of society? In Durgapur one was left with the impression that it was something odiferous and rather a rude phrase. Is it a socialist society or not? If it is, then what is a mixed economy? It seems to one looking at it objectively, that by 'socialist' some people would like understood an 'anarchist' pattern of society and a mixed economy may then thrive in a mixed-up society with chestnuts (many of them gilded) being pulled out of the fire in all directions. This being the present state, there is not yet a foundation on which we may build a healthy public sector.

But there are also major rocks on which the public sector flounders while the socialist pattern of society floats in a rudderless fashion without the wind strength to blow it forward. There are ministries which virtually shape the size and functions of the public sector. But the ministries themselves are being constantly pushed and pulled into different combinations and permutations under the guise of democracy. Each production ministerial shuffle therefore reflects sharply right down to the shop floor of industry. Then

these ministries are filled with jacks-of-all-trades who have never seen an industrial tradesman. These gentlemen have to be briefed, rebriefed and pampered, for even a chairman of an industrial corporation is somewhere below the high ones in the 'order of precedence', and they know nothing, because, poor people, their lives have been spent as magistrates, running districts or handling office routine and issuing orders.

Central Interference

Because they are experts at procedures, they would be able to state facts lucidly and plan with technical help; but even these assets are lost by the constant round of shuffle and change in the central secretariat. In any case, no proper conclusion can be easily arrived at because a plan or project has to be passed from one office to another in order to be examined by interested ministries and at last reaches as a 'moth eaten' wreck at the 'concerned' ministry which may then issue appropriate orders with sufficient escape phrases.

In spite of C. Subramaniam's recent assertion at a food and agricultural productivity conference in May 1965, that the decision making machinery in industry and the supply of raw material is now well organised, there is neither machinery nor decision and this is one of the basic causes of the Russian complaint referred to above. Even for the most minor matters such as issue of a vehicle, there is so much confusion and delay that the so-called decision making on large issues can well be imagined.

But, the inquirers in Delhi will at once be told that all power lies with the chairman of companies and that de-centralisation is the key note. In fact, all they have done is to shift responsibility so that no blame may come their way. However, everyone in industrial management knows how at every step, delay, queries and ignorance from Delhi enmeshes the industry like a spider's web and urgency is a foreign word.

While government decides what posts at the very top are to be

filled and who will fill them, it has no idea of the duties to be performed by the holders of such posts. Even less does it venture to issue a charter of duties to them. When full time directors were appointed on managing committees of Hindustan Steel and Heavy Engineering, one would have thought the appointing authority would have given them a charter, but no. Instead, the structure is now changed and there is a full time chairman only, but neither system will be any worse or better than the other. In fact, the former is more in keeping with modern large corporation practice.

State Interference

Having somehow faced up to ambiguities and vagaries from above, the top management is then faced with the State governments. This they have to do directly, as the Centre will not risk unpopularity or argument. Moreover, more than possibly, the politicians in authority at the State and central levels frequently have understandings, rivalries and differences with those in authority at State level and seldom does one hesitate to use the industries of the public sector in the game of power politics. In this game there is no room for an absolutely honest top management. It would, for instance, be interesting to follow up the antecedents, blood lines and experience of many of the top personnel and work out how they got where they are and why. A research on this would certainly reveal explosive connections.

Yet, it is a fact that the industries of the public sector in size, technique and demands require that the best talent which India can produce should be prepared and inducted into them. This needs ability, enthusiasm, sound training and the giving of real responsibilities to make the individual and the collective body feel inspired to reach such difficult horizons. It demands an integrated and national approach. But regionalism, which is rife, dare not be

faced by the Central Government ministries. There were, last year, twelve thousand young men in Bihar who passed out from industrial training institutes and were unemployed, largely because they were *unemployable* in industry, but the local politicians would not hear of the industrial concerns located in Bihar employing any one else, however good he might have been.

Untapped Skill

One can, of course, sympathise with the 12000 young men, for many industrial training institutes, notably in Bihar and some other States, are so poorly run that the training said to be imparted is probably less than in a small-town smithy or garage. Yet, it is a fact, also, that suitably trained young men of the eastern and western zones of India can get jobs more easily than those of the North and South, whereas the latter are the more nimble and skilled. This is because Calcutta and Bombay command a larger industrial hinterland than do the cities of the North and South. Therefore, there is a sizeable pool of potential skill which one just does not tap.

With customary 'caution' the directive of the Central Government (in contravention of the Constitution, nevertheless understandably) says 'that special consideration should be given to the people of the locality' especially those whose lands are taken, the *adivasis* and scheduled castes. The next priority is for those who, having worked in the public sector elsewhere, are at the time looking for a job. An earlier directive had said that such consideration should be given to 'people of the locality if not the State itself' but 'if not the State itself' had been eliminated later.

In practice, hundreds with previous public sector experience in construction, electricity and even machinery, have been turned away because they did not belong to the State. As for *adivasis*, scheduled castes and persons displaced, and to a large extent even the people of the immediate locality, they have received the shabbiest and

most unsympathetic treatment of all. Instead, those with potential godfathers have received generosity beyond their merit.

Picture of Inefficiency

So the picture which builds up daily is of dilution, inefficiency and coerced favouritism. It is superimposed by the constant introduction in the top managerial levels of I.A.S. and I.C.S. officers and deputationists. So earnestly do they guard this monopoly that by hoaxing an army Brigadier who (having finished his four year tenure of rank in his forties) volunteered for the industrial management pool, they sent him to the public sector as a superintendent of transport to manage a few score of staff cars and lorries. As it happens this officer had budgeted, seen to and planned the execution of crores of rupees of civil works, organised and commanded the movement and purchase of thousands of items annually and had in army headquarters dealt with crores of rupees every year.

He found himself in an equivalent job to a superintending engineer and with less responsibility. He was well enough off at home; but being young and experienced he had offered his capacities to his country. He could have been a general manager of a plant with much to give to the country. But civil servants in their late fifties and early sixties, senile and past repair are constantly being dug up and reinstated. This is not only one case; it is in fact the fashion.

Nor does it stop with officers. Highly trained and skilled engineers, diesel mechanics, and tradesmen well trained and tested in the services, are not even looked at; if looked at, whatever pension they may be drawing is deducted from their emoluments and they are put in the lowest grades feasible. A large spectrum of skilled workers thus drifts away from where they could be useful and their place is filled by those who could never compare with them; and as is the wont of unworthy people, particularly in the higher echelon, they are constantly afraid of being

found out. Thus they keep 'healthily' aloof from the foreign experts who are actually paid and present in order to teach them. How often I have heard said, 'What can these foreigners teach us?'

So, as one descends this government patterned industrial hierarchy, even excluding the so-called 'administration', one finds that there is resistance; resistance to honest reporting, resistance to merit-rating and even resistance to supervision. Emphasis, as in government, is on seniority alone on which, if not found to be totally unfit, each one learns and floats. Thus, all public sector managements rely heavily on contractors to save themselves the embarrassment of having to absorb the totally unsuitables at later stages. It is natural, then, that contracting for construction is on the P.W.D. system where design and cost are of a nature that no private individual would consider them if they were to be put up for him.

The safety factor is what the contractor is most often quoting into his bid; for he is certain never to be paid in time. He also tries to leave loopholes so that he may squeeze government, if possible, at a later date. The award to the contractor at Rourkela must still be fresh in our minds. The work having been begun there is always escalation in costs for one reason or another until a point is reached where government says 'so much and no more'. Thus, the township and other areas are left in an incomplete state betwixt and between town and village and without services.

Industrial Budgeting

This could be avoided if we had a system of industrial budgeting and industrial control but as all officers with a few exceptions are taken from that rigid body, the Indian Finance and Audit Service, the entire financing, budgeting and contracting is according to laid down government procedures. In fact, the old and new testaments of the public sector also are F.R. (Financial Regulations) and S.R. (Service Rules) and however much

freedom industries may have they cannot depart from these.

Although the public sector cannot by nature grow from small beginnings like private industry, but should develop according to plan, it is plagued with private sector practices which inhibit growth. For instance, the question of profits is always brought up in Parliament and elsewhere. But is this sector to be profit oriented or growth oriented? Indeed, by charging and paying fabulous sums for what it markets and buys respectively it will most certainly become more and more inhibited. Indeed, a number of public sector products have actually been taken off the market because of the high cost of production!

The question will be asked—was this not planned? Were the products not to fill any planned need? Regrettably the answer is that the public sector has to look for its markets the same as any one else. Here is the crux of the whole muddle. So, as a corollary, no worker knows what ultimate end he is working towards and why. Naturally he turns to his pay packet and makes that his ultimate end; the ensurance of his security. It is this attitude which the so called trade unions exploit.

The Trade Unions

The trade unions of India, broadly speaking, do not stem from the workers. They have their roots in political parties and compete for the following of workers. The I.N.T.U.C. in particular has political pulls working within it, the strings of which go back to ministers and others in powerful places. Their incarnate, visible followers in the field therefore are usually men without morality or scruple. I have known managers of firms say that they would rather deal with any union than the I.N.T.U.C. My generalisation does not apply to all individuals. I do know of at least two fine, though somewhat reticent, I.N.T.U.C. leaders. But, the bitterness of the individual all-in fighting is frightful.

I can best give the effect these 'leaders' have on industry by

quoting a Russian who was one of the leading specialists at Ranchi. When I introduced him to a man who claimed to be a high office holder, the Russian said 'I see you keep putting the workers off their work. In my country the trade union tries to inspire the workers to exceed their norms.' That the trade unions can do this sort of thing is because the laws governing the private and public sectors are identical; the management in the latter is as much public servant as in the former. The result is that they can only 'bargain' with workers. On whose behalf, no one can define. But it does give the so-called trade union leader the chance to be the intermediary. This in itself is a complete negation of proper motivation which could only exist when from top management to workers they felt that they could pull, sink or swim as one.

The Motivation

The perverted manner in which some trade union leaders agitate and even blackmail, has to be seen to be believed. No one seems to ask them how they earn their livelihood. Without a complete overhaul and reapplication of existing labour laws, motivation is out of the question; even satisfactory survival is doubtful.

Therefore, any man with real feeling, self respect or skill will find it not only more lucrative but more honourable to keep clear of the public sector. The spirit of it is reflected in the words of a certain foreman whose shop did in 1000 hours of work what should have been done in 250 hours, after making allowances for 'Indian workers', and only 150 hours worth of work was finally of acceptable standard. He said, 'If you want to make money, go to the private sector. If you want your pay and permanency then join the public sector—for people like us it is a steady job and no work.'

Herein lies the root of the mentality which reflects the whole problem of the public sector.

Perspectives

ASHOK MITRA

THE Perspective Planning Division of the Planning Commission has presented a prognosis in a quantitative frame, of the structural characteristics of the Indian economy for 1975-76. This framework also includes an appraisal of the role of public enterprises in the economy ten years from today. The total fixed capital stock in public enterprises in 1975-76 is expected to be of the order of Rs. 22,350 crores, including investments in the railways, posts and telegraphs, power, road transport, steel, fertilisers, machine building, oil, mining and other miscellaneous industries. National income in

that year is postulated to reach the level of Rs. 37,300 crores.

Assuming that the aggregate capital stock of the community would be roughly three times as much as the level of national income, almost one-fifth of the nation's assets would thus belong to the public sector by 1975-76. The Perspective Planning Division is hopeful that the net profits from public undertakings which could be made available in that year for investment elsewhere would be around Rs. 1630 crores; this would be nearly one-third of the postulated aggregate of public invest-

ment, and again almost 20 per cent of the total investment in the economy.

The projections need not be taken too literally; some of them are bound to go wrong. But in case we succeed in maintaining a rate of growth of national output equivalent to 6 or 7 per cent per annum and if we also stipulate that from now on the breakdown of total investment between the public and private sectors must conform to the ratio of 2:1, a position very close to what the figures quoted above would reflect is likely to emerge by 1975-76.

The sheer magnitude of the problem compels careful thinking. As of today the capital stock in the public sector hardly exceeds Rs. 7000 crores. The Perspective Planning Division projections call for a three-fold increase in this stock. This can only be the result of a self-generating process, for this order of increase in the asset position of the public sector will hinge to a large extent upon whether, in the intervening period, the public enterprises are able annually to produce a sizeable surplus which could be ploughed back for further internal expansion.

Efficiency

The key problem is therefore the efficient management of these enterprises. There can be hundreds of ways of defining efficiency, but for our purpose we will take two broad criteria: (a) the fulfilment of production targets according to norm and the time schedule; (b) the ability to obtain surplus of the indicated quantum every year. In most cases, once these two criteria are satisfied, the other subsidiary notions generally held about efficient management will also be satisfied.

On the other hand, while fulfilling the conditions under (a) may often automatically ensure the compliance of (b), this need not always be the case. Deficiencies in costing and price policies may choke the flow of surplus even where the output-and-time norms are being maintained. The other

danger too exists, namely, that the latter norms may be fixed from above without adequate consultations with the enterprise managers and in complete disregard of the objective factors which influence the process of production of a particular unit.

Boundary Conditions

It is a delicate area of decision-making, namely, how far to allow enterprises in the public sector in a 'socialistically' inclined economy to carry on their operations without political guidance from above. Interference from political quarters can have various motivations. In the first place, there is the rather crude, almost rustic notion, which usually expresses itself in the first flush of national resurgence, that public enterprises belong to the people, and therefore they could be always made to serve 'the interests of the people', however parochial or sectarian these interests might appear to outsiders.

In certain instances, the working of public enterprises is sought to be controlled because the political authorities think it necessary to lay down strict guidelines of behaviour to check deviations from the broad socio-political objectives of the nation. Acts of price subsidy, unnecessary expansion of product lines or capacity, maintaining an excessive supply of labour on the payroll, etc., often stem from this attitude.

In addition, there is the perennial problem of departmental interference, for example, the problem of deciding upon the limits of the treasury control over the financial operations of these enterprises. Even where statutory regulations clearly preclude the government departments from meddling in the affairs of the enterprises, indirect pressures can always be mounted in an economy where industrial capacity and location, fresh issue of capital, and imports are subject to government approval.

Many amongst us may devoutly believe in socialism and may be anxious to ensure that public enterprises are made to observe

the rules of the socialist game. But it is for the sake of socialism that too frequent and too detailed interference with the activities of these enterprises should be discouraged. It is hardly possible to run industrial and commercial operations at remote control: without delegation of responsibilities, little can be achieved. In case the working of a State enterprise impinges upon an area where certain social objectives are involved, the authorities should be content to lay down the 'boundary conditions' of the enterprises' operations, but leave the internal functioning to the judgment and ability of the managerial personnel.

Once the guidelines of operation are handed down, the units ought to be allowed to operate on a one hundred per cent commercial basis. From that point onwards, the management must be given sufficient latitude and freedom from bureaucratic controls and procedures. A great deal of authority must vest in the plant managers, and the principle of delegation will have to be carried very far afield in such matters as the employment, promotion and discharge of personnel, the planning of production, the procurement of raw material supplies and the marketing of products.

If, for example, the guide-line is for subsidising the price of the finished product, or for the payment of a minimum wage to specific categories of workers, these should be communicated to the plant managers in advance, and all further interference called off for a given period. Management must be allowed a certain span of time to prove itself within the limits of the boundary conditions. And there should be provision for periodic reviews of the economic cost which observing these conditions involve.

Needs of Socialism

The point I am trying to make is fairly straightforward. A socialist programme calls for a progressive expansion of the State sector and therefore an enlargement of the size of operations of the public enterprises. But even when the

political hurdles have been crossed, this expansion will depend upon the quantum of resources available in the public sector, which itself is linked with the feasibility of obtaining higher levels of surplus from the already existing State units. It is thus necessary that attention is given to the efficient running of these units so that they might be able to provide the wherewithal for the further expansion of the socialist unit.

From the point of view of political strategy too, any flabbiness in the management of public enterprises will provide a point of penetration to the enemies of the socialist point of view, who would be glad to exploit such evidence of inefficiency to alienate the electorate from the principles of collective endeavour.

Ideological Education

Nonetheless, in the day-to-day running of the State enterprises, frictions may arise in the event of too great an autonomy being accorded to the individual units. There is a twilight region where autonomy might shade off into autarky. If political guidance is to be given only between fixed intervals of time, a manager who is not ideologically motivated may in some cases very well run a particular unit along altogether wrong lines. There is especially the danger that, in the determination of pricing and production policies, a State unit may, under the stress of personalities and situations, become over-solicitous for a constellation of private interests and at the cost of the general welfare.

Dictation from above can impair efficiency; but unfettered freedom of decision-making at the operational level too can be made vicious use of by opportunist managers whose social attitudes leave much to be desired. The managers in the State units will very soon be responsible for the largest chunks of capital stock in the country, and will also be handling enormous sums of working capital. The risk of misuse of funds and misdirection of resources could therefore be very real,

especially since the public sector will be expanding at a very fast pace and thousands of new managerial personnel will be taken in, between now and the next few years.

Given our existing lack of resources and as yet limited size of the market, we would often be prevented from allowing the forces of competition to come into play for checking the consequences of faulty management operations. After all, in many instances, units have been—and will be—brought in the State sector to prevent the evils of competition. Threat of retrospective punitive action can have only a marginal effect, especially in a context where the issues of socialism are still very much open.

It thus appears essential that ideological education be imparted to the managers of public enterprises. There have been any number of instances in Latin America where the State gradually took over new units, so that in course of time the public sector had come to constitute between 20 to 25 per cent of the total economy. In practice, however, political power in these countries has usually been concentrated in the hands of a military junta or small family circle; an expansion of the State sector has only meant the further accretion of wealth and resources to this hegemony.

The Dangers

One cannot straightaway say that such things cannot happen in India. If the people who will be running the routine of the government, namely, the huge army of civil servants and industrial managers, are not attuned with the spirit of socialism, it is then possible that at a certain stage they might thwart the pace of advance, or lower the level of efficiency, of public enterprises. This can of course be done through calculated acts of sabotage. But even when there are no malafides, it is given to a bureaucrat or a manager of a State unit, whose political education is minimal and whose social values are somewhat different, to take a lukewarm attitude to the

question of the successful operation of public enterprises.

An individual entrepreneur gives his best in the cause of his enterprises; with the profit motive as his thrust, he tries to maximise efficiency and minimise cost. An industrial manager in the public sector, if he personally does not believe in socialism, will pursue and further the interests of his unit only under the lure of aggrandisement. However, the rewards which the State can offer in this country to public sector managers will have to be of a very modest type. If egalitarianism is to be taken seriously, it has to be started in the State sector in the first place.

A possible substitute for pecuniary gains is the availability of opportunities for the exercise of power and authority. These opportunities however would come to those few who are able to battle their way to the very top. The brighter ones, who still fail to go up, might, after a time, leave the State sector and join private enterprise. Those who cannot leave might get frustrated and, in the process, harm the activities of the enterprise with which they continue.

Common Backgrounds

This is a danger which is already becoming evident in some sectors of our economy. Most managers of our public enterprises and the top civil servants are drawn from the same strata of society from which the industrialists spring. It is often found that their ideological sympathies are with the private sector. The political leadership of the country, starting from Jawaharlal Nehru, took it for granted that, once the goal of socialism was adopted, the standing army of bureaucrats would immediately convert themselves into loyal servants of socialism. But, human nature being what it is, no such overnight transformation has taken place.

In these circumstances, our entire programme for public sector expansion can run into jeopardy if the recruitments to managerial

positions are made without proper examination of the ideological beliefs and social attitudes of the aspirants. This, I realise, is a controversial suggestion to make, but, with the amount of drift that has already taken place, it is now necessary that some hard decisions are made and adhered to. After recruitment, these individuals should be given intensive training so that the economic, philosophical and programmatic aspects of the socialistic goal could be learned by them in detail. The specific professional education could then be continued on this base.

I will now pass on to another point which is of considerable importance. A beginning has already been made in the country of extending the sphere of the public sector to trading. The State Trading Corporation has made some progress in recent years, and the Food Corporation of India is about to start operations in a big way. There is no question that, especially in the field of procurement, storing and marketing of agricultural products, the State will have to play an increasingly prominent role. Agriculture is going to be the mainstay of the nation for quite a long time, and the State can hardly exercise adequate influence over the structural realignment of the economy unless it controls food and agriculture.

Trading in Foodgrains

One way of influencing developments in agriculture can of course be through controlling the supply of farm inputs and through surveillance of such agencies as the community development committees and the cooperative societies. But, to be genuinely effective, the main emphasis very soon will have to fall on the procurement and marketing of farm output. If we want to advance the cause of socialism, the wholesale trade for foodgrains has to be taken over by the State for in this half-starved country, the distribution of foodgrains constitutes the main lever of power.

China succeeded in eliminating private enterprise from the wholesale trade of foodgrains as early as in 1954. That China could with-

stand the strain of the debacle of the Great Leap Forward and the successive bad harvest of the early 1960's is largely explained by the State's ability to control the distribution of food. The type of situation which arose in India last year, when food output failed to rise and marketable surplus declined, is bound to recur in an economy such as ours which is given to cyclical fluctuations in grain output. The only solution to such types of repeated crises is to build up a sizeable buffer stock and to control, through the public enterprise mechanism, the distribution of grains across the nation.

Agricultural Taxes

But there is another basic reason why it is necessary to extend the operations of public enterprise to the field of agricultural marketing. One major potential source of financing public projects, which the Perspective Planning Division has surprisingly not stressed, is the yield from turnover taxes in agriculture. For institutional and constitutional reasons, it is likely that the burden of direct taxation on Indian agriculture will be maintained at the existing low levels at least for some more years. Agricultural output, one hopes, will soon show a secular upward trend. It is crucial that a significant proportion of the rising agricultural incomes is taken away by the State as investible surplus which could be used for capital-building purposes elsewhere in the economy, or for further expansion of agriculture itself.

Where direct taxes fail to expand, obviously, we must resort to indirect forms of revenue raising. The feasibility of imposing turnover taxes on agricultural output has to be considered in this connection. But if private trade continues to hold sway in the countryside, the yield from turnover taxes is bound to be disproportionately low: the scope for evasion and fudging of accounts would be extremely wide. This, in my view, is the weightiest reason why appropriate advance action must be taken immediately for the nationalisation of the agricultural trade.

Books

THE EFFICACY OF PUBLIC ENTERPRISE Edited by V. V. Ramanadham.

Allied Publishers.

The controversy which once raged about the respective merits and demerits of public and private enterprises has, for all practical purposes and at serious levels of discussion, been almost dated. More relevant issues, in the current context, relate to the precise roles of the enterprises and the institutional reforms they might need. Some of the problems in fact seem common to both the sectors, e.g., problems of increasing productivity and efficiency, managerial responsibilities, industrial relations and so on.

Professor Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr., a known American historian, explodes the myth, in the book under review, that the development in his country was the result of unfettered and uncontrolled private enterprise. He emphasizes that in the 'pre-take-off period' public enterprise played a critical role. He reminds us that even now 'India which calls itself a socialist country has a smaller share of its gross national product requisitioned by the State in goods and purchases than the United States which is so often styled a capitalist country.'

The role of the public sector in initiating a process of growth, particularly in a country with as unfavourable population-resources ratio as India, and in achieving distributional objectives is acknowledged even on non-ideological grounds.

The seminar on public enterprises, organised by the Department of Commerce, Osmania University, Hyderabad, in February, 1962, the proceedings of which comprise this volume, thus deals with the 'subject of growing importance in India' at an academic and pragmatic level. The three topics discussed at the seminar were: public enterprise and regional development, social and economic returns of public enterprises and management boards of public enterprises.

Only one delegate seriously questioned the importance currently attached to the objective of regional development. The first stage of the building up of an underdeveloped country, according to Professor M. H. Gopal, is characterised by the attempt to maximise the overall or national socio-economic

returns from the limited investment, relegating reduction of inter-regional disparities to a secondary place. The 'spilling over' theory has its familiar arguments. The example of the United States is often cited to show how the original, wide regional disparities were narrowed through 'natural forces.'

Conceding the operation of 'natural forces', Professor Arnold C. Harberger has pointed out, in his summing up, the role of public policy in providing the infra structure in the backward regions of America. In India, he doubts whether public policy is performing even the limited facilitating role which it had in the United States. Professor Ramanadham has further cited factual evidence to show that regional development itself has not been a concrete aspect of planned development yet in India.

However, from short term as well as long term points of view, there are compelling economic, sociological and political reasons to give greater importance to the objective of regional development and to reconcile it with the overall objectives of maximisation of the national income.

Big cities do offer some obvious economies to the new enterprises. But the solution of the problems which face Calcutta are estimated to cost around four hundred crores of rupees. If other cities are to be spared from a similar fate, the diseconomies of concentration should also be taken into full account. Likewise, a timely investment in a backward region is a better use of the limited resources of the country than the 'distress spending' of the same money, in the form of famine relief, movement of foodgrains and fighting epidemics.

Some of the studies on cost-benefit analysis, covered under the second topic of the seminar, further help in resolving the controversy. Harberger has challenged the 'investment only' view as a description of the growth process in the Indian economy and as a basis for setting cost-benefit norms. Some case studies included in the volume suggest as high a cost-benefit ratio of certain projects as 20 to 30 per cent whereas financial returns were around 3 per cent. Besides the indirect and secondary benefits, there are chains of unmeasurable and intangible benefits also.

There are obvious difficulties of measuring all types of costs and benefits of a project. But with

all the imperfections of cost-benefit approach, this alone indicates a reasonable guideline for the location of projects on economic grounds. Ramanadham makes a useful suggestion for public enterprises to incorporate, in their annual reports, statements of the indirect and secondary returns traceable to their activities.

If the overall impact of a public enterprise is considered an important economic criterion, more backward regions would be entitled to its location rather than if the criterion was mere financial returns which most of the private enterprises aim at. But economic criteria alone should not be decisive in all policy matters; social and political considerations should further strengthen the case of less developed regions.

The efficacy of a public enterprise depends to a large extent on its structure; the type of management authority and its relations with the government. Mere change of ownership from the private to the public sector does not necessarily make a project more useful economically and socially. Few workers and consumers are concerned about who the owner is although once transferred to the public sector the project comes into a far severer popular gaze.

Various suggestions have been made to reconcile the objectives of accountability and autonomy, commercial interests of the project and national goals of the economy, economic and non-economic considerations. The pros and cons of part-time and whole-time, inside and outside, official and non-official, professional and non-professional directors on the management board have been debated in the present volume.

The consensus of opinion of the delegates to the seminar, however, appears to be that the statutes and compositions of public enterprises in India, on the whole, leave far less room for initiative and risk taking to the management board than is necessary or is the case, for instance, in England. The effects of the system from the point of view of economic efficiency have been discussed. The system should, however, also be viewed in the context of our political objectives and the present political system. With an overwhelming majority of a single party at the States and the Centre, excessive government control over public enterprise could lead to a dangerous regimentation and jeopardise our basic values.

It is difficult to generalise the precise pattern which would suit each and every type of enterprise in the public sector. But an institutional system which provides for the selection of members of the board, balances its composition with various interests while retaining its composite nature without much direct interference from political leaders and which also provides for a consultative machinery with labour and consumers has much to commend it. Further studies and discussions on these problems are needed

at a theoretical as well as pragmatic level, keeping in view the peculiarities of India's socio-political-economic situation while learning appropriate lessons from experiences in other countries.

Balraj Puri

MANAGEMENT AND CONTROL IN PUBLIC ENTERPRISE By S. S. Khera.

Asia Publishing House, 1964.

This is mainly an abbreviated version of the larger book on the same subject, *Government in Business*, published a year earlier. As our progress in management and control has not kept pace with our progress in planning, a study of its problems and working in public enterprise is in the public interest.

The central issue is not one of public versus private sector, which is often wrongly posed to draw a red herring across its trail, but one of good versus bad management, examples of both of which can be found in both sectors. If the goal of a planned programme of rapid economic development on a broad base commands universal acceptance, management and control must become implementation-oriented, which means regarding getting things done as being more important than how to get them done, provided the balance between ends and means, gains and costs, is not disproportionately disturbed.

We hear cries of alarm from interested quarters that India is on the verge of bankruptcy so far as its foreign debt is concerned but no one says with equal emphasis that the only way out of the crisis at heavy cost in return for long-term gain, is to turn from reliance on foreign aid to self-reliance. Other countries in a similar situation have made the hard choice and are stronger, not weaker, for it. The problems of management and control in public enterprise will have to be seen in this light.

What does a study of some of the more technical problems of such management tend to show? An important problem which confronts management often is the engagement of consultants and technical services. We know what happened over the projected Bokaro steel plant. The Americans argued that to safeguard their reputation they must have control of, and responsibility for, management for some years. But this would have meant going back on the experience gained at Bhilai, Rourkela and Durgapur. It took our government a long time to realise the need to associate Indian consultancy for such of the engineering and design work as would not require Soviet expertise. About 35 per cent of the equipment, apart from civil construction and procurement, is expected to be domestic, and it could not have been the intention that this too should be handled by Soviet experts. Yet Dasturco's responsibilities as government consultants have still to be clearly spelt out.

The author rightly emphasizes that we now have established cadres in India from which we can draw

and often obtain valuable advice and criticism. Apart from the advantage conferred by a greater identity and less conflict of interest, an Indian group has the tremendous advantage also of knowing the local combination of conditions, of being able to feed in, often sub-consciously without having to make a deliberate effort, many parameters, any one of which could be missed by a foreign adviser. Hindustan Machine Tools, a successful and prestige-loaded example of a public enterprise, did not get going until its management started applying its own independent judgment and initiative in expanding and diversifying production. This first meant breaking away from the foreign collaborators. It is a question of self-confidence, and that is what is most needed in to-day's crisis. Similarly, Khera gives another example by mentioning that during the early days when Bhilai was being planned, some of the advice we got regarding the items to be produced and on which decisions had to be taken by quite inexperienced administrators who had no experience of the steel industry would, if adopted, have undoubtedly crippled the economics of the steel plant. It is extremely important to remember its valuable lessons against the current tendency to welcome foreign collaboration as a status symbol.

How does one measure management? We must know first what is sought to be measured, and this has been defined as: (a) adherence to a given policy—sometimes this could come in the way of better management, (b) achievement of defined targets and objectives, (c) adoption of certain methods of management functioning—means cannot be ignored, but the primacy of goals must be recognised, (d) economic use of resources, particularly scarce resources and (e) maintenance of standards of quality in the product manufactured. The last-named is particularly important as upon it depends the confidence of the consumer and our good name in a highly competitive international market. India does not have too good a reputation in this respect, in spite of Hindustan Machine Tools and Usha Sewing Machines more than holding their own.

Khera has gone out of his way to emphasise, and rightly so, the importance of sales, not production alone. Whether it is service, goods or power, the product has to be sold, and it is most improper for the management of a State enterprise to imagine that its duty is confined to production and that its responsibility ends with its efficient execution. Managements of State undertakings must make it their business, and be made to make it their business, to attend to the sale of their product and this should be subject to performance measurement.

One way of measuring management at work is cost accounting, an intricate technique which is not merely an accountant's job, as much depends on the process employed and here policy can infiltrate. A classic example of this is given in a book entitled *The Empire of Oil* and has been quoted by the author. During the war, British warships were loading oil

at Abadan in the Persian Gulf at a price known as the Gulf price, only this time the Gulf had shifted to Mexico. They were paying in the Persian Gulf a price for oil fixed for the Mexican Gulf, plus cost of transportation to New York, plus cost of transportation to Abadan. They were paying this price for oil which was produced at Abadan, refined at Abadan and sold at Abadan. They were paying it to a company on which the British Government had two directors and these two directors were directly responsible to the Prime Minister, Winston Churchill. Winston Churchill confessed that he was never able to discover what went into the cost of the price of the oil loaded on British warships at Abadan from a company on which there were two British directors, during a war which their country was fighting and when the Americans were their best friends. This shows how difficult costing can be.

A. K. Banerjee

PERSONNEL POLICIES OF PUBLIC UNDERTAKINGS

—Fifty Second Report (Third Lok Sabha) of Estimates Committee.

Lok Sabha Secretariat, New Delhi, March 1964.

The public sector in India has witnessed a rapid expansion since the inauguration of the Second Five Year Plan. The ratio of investment in the public sector to investment in the private sector rose from 15:16 in the First Plan to 25:16 in the Second Plan and the ratio of paid-up capital in the public sector to that in the private sector rose from 7:93 on April 1, 1956 to 40:93 on March 31, 1960. At the end of 1962-63, investment in 52 of the public sector undertakings, none of which was a financial institution such as the Reserve Bank of India, State Bank of India and the LIC, totalled over Rs. 1,400 crores, their wage bill alone for 1962-63 being as high as Rs. 103.05 crores.

With the increasing national involvement in the public sector during the Third Plan and the national commitment to expand it absolutely as well as relatively during the subsequent plans, a penetrating enquiry into the personnel policies of our public sector undertakings had been due since long. The report of the Estimates Committee under review is thus a timely document on the subject.

The report throws lurid light on the various weaknesses of the personnel policies of public sector undertakings. It deplores the heavy dependence of these undertakings on the civil service to man their top posts, 190 out of about 800 top posts having been held by serving or retired officers of the central services in addition to those been held by officers of the State services. Very aptly it says: '...it (deployment of administrative services) has the effect of diluting the administrative services as well. The more basic objection to such an arrangement is that the officers are a little casual in their approach to work because, if they are not successful, they can always go back to their parent departments. The arrangement also militates against the development

of a sense of loyalty to the undertaking concerned.' (p. 19). It is also open to objection because 'administrators have judgment and executive ability but hardly any business acumen or experience.' (p. 20).

The report deplores time and again the fact that the decisions taken by the government are not being implemented. The government's decision in November 1961 that 'no Secretary of a Ministry/Department shall be a member of any Board' was not implemented by six public undertakings. The government's decision in November 1961 that 'no officer who is assigned ordinary secretariat duties should be appointed in more than three or four companies at the maximum' was negated by certain officers who served on the Boards of as many as five to eight undertakings.

The government's decision about pay scales contained in a letter dated February 28, 1962, was not implemented. Another decision announced in Parliament in 1961 that 'Government should give broad indication of the principles to be followed by public undertakings in the employment of retired personnel' was found to be merely a paper decision even two years afterwards. The administration in our country is not known for quick decisions, but if the decisions taken after all the delays of file work and red tape are to be watered down in implementation, it is most unfortunate.

The Committee was unhappy at the recruitment policies of the public undertakings. In 28 of them—some established as far back as 1948 and 1950—it found a total absence of any recruitment rules whatsoever. It noted with regret that for posts including non-technical secretarial ones, the public undertakings employed over 1,000 retired personnel. The Committee report has confirmed the lurking suspicion that our public sector enterprises are berths for those of the non-technical retired officers in administration whose market value after retirement is zero but who are influential enough to manoeuvre things to their advantage.

The swarms of deputationists too irked the Committee. It is indeed surprising that while the private sector undertakings can manage to function efficiently without the assistance of our top administrative personnel, retired non-technical staff and deputationists, the public sector undertakings should lean so heavily on these categories of personnel. The near failure of the Industrial Management Pool speaks loud of the failures of not only the conception and execution of the IMP but also of the recruitment policies of public undertakings.

No less worse is the situation in respect of service rules. The Committee found that 23 public undertakings had not even framed their service rules. The public undertakings registered under the Companies Act, unlike statutory corporations, were moreover free to frame these rules without reference to the government.

The most important finding of the Committee is in regard to the overstaffing of public undertakings.

Whether it was Ashoka Hotel or the Fertiliser Corporation of India (Sindri), Heavy Electricals or the LIC, National Coal Development Corporation or National Newsprint & Paper Mills, Neyveli Lignite Corporation or Praga Tools Corporation, Heavy Engineering Corporation or Indian Refineries Ltd., Air-India or Indian Airlines Corporation—the Committee found it 'invariably overstaffed.' Bhilai, Rourkela and Durgapur presented classic examples of overstaffing. They employed on December 30, 1963, 50,814 persons as against 18,666 envisaged in the Project reports.

The work under review is an authoritative and objective probe into the personnel policies of public undertakings in India. The strongest supporter of the public sector as also its worst critic will find it interesting and useful. While it arms the former with an armada of measures to fortify the public sector, it provides the latter with a powder-keg to blow it up.

The work is undoubtedly useful for a variety of classes, i.e., politicians, business managers, administrators, economists, planners, etc. It would have been more so if it had taken into account the psychic responses of personnel in public undertakings. One would have, for instance, liked to know whether the personnel in public undertakings felt better off than their counterparts in government service and private service or otherwise. Referring to the scheme of the Industrial Management Pool, Dr. H. K. Paranjape says that it suffered from most of the rigidities and other defects of government service without providing any of its advantages. It is suspected that this is also true of service in public undertakings. One would have liked to hear the verdict of the Estimates Committee on this.

H. S.

PATTERNS OF PUBLIC SECTOR IN UNDERDEVELOPED ECONOMIES By Ignacy Sachs.

Asia Publishing House, Bombay.

Patterns of Public Sector in Underdeveloped Economies was originally written as a thesis for which the author, Ignacy Sachs, was awarded the degree of Ph.D. by Delhi University in 1961. Its publication in India in English in the wake of its publication in Poland in Polish so soon after the award of a doctorate to the writer on its basis is in itself a tribute to his scholarship and deep insight into the subject under study.

The study proceeds systematically and scientifically from a definition of underdevelopment and its historical origin. After examining a variety of definitions of underdevelopment it traces this phenomenon to 'the emergence of a colonial system at a particular stage of the development of capitalism,' coupled with 'the maintenance of an anachronistic social structure' in the colonies. (p. 13). While economic analysis is recognised as

an imperative for development, the bonds of underdevelopment, it maintains, can be broken only by a change in the outmoded institutions of the society.

An instance of this is provided by a parallel between the development of Brazil and the USA. The former was more developed than the latter by the end of the eighteenth century but now lags far behind because of the perpetuation there of a quasi feudal agricultural structure.

The second chapter examines whether underdeveloped countries can repeat the classical development pattern of European capitalism. The have-nots among the States today have a much lower base of economic development in terms of per capita income than the haves among them prior to their industrial take-off. The Industrial Revolution was preceded and spurred by stupendous changes in the agrarian scene, but the underdeveloped countries are not yet out of the vortex of a feudalistic agrarian set-up. The limitation of external markets at present as opposed to the availability of them in the past is another hindrance.

Capitalism got its sinews of strength from the drain of wealth from colonies. Sachs here quotes Marx: 'The discovery of gold and silver in America, the extirpation, enslavement and entombment in mines of the aboriginal population, the beginning of the conquest and looting of the East Indies, the turning of Africa into a warren for the commercial hunting of black skins, signalled the rosy dawn of the era of capitalist production.' (p. 21). Jawaharlal Nehru too stated in his *Discovery of India* that the plunder of India by the East India Company coincided with the acceleration of capital formation in Britain.

The currently adverse terms of trade for underdeveloped countries and the burden of their heavy debt servicing charges during the post-war period stand in sharp contrast to the steady inflow of capital for the then colonial powers. The privations of the English working classes and the sufferings of the Japanese peasants are utterly unacceptable to the millions in underdeveloped countries who are now the masters of their fate in their respective States. All such reasoning leads to the conclusion that there is no possibility of underdeveloped economies repeating the classical model of development. This leaves them with no choice but State participation for a big push to development.

The fourth chapter stresses the crucial role of the State in shaping economic activity since the days of Adam Smith. The narration of the part played by the State in the development of the US—the traditional home of *laissez faire*—makes interesting reading. The study sees for the public sector new vistas and opportunities in underdeveloped countries but recognises that nationalisation as such is not necessarily anti-capitalistic nor progressive.

The subsequent chapter introduces two new terms to the lexicon of economic terminology—'Indian

Pattern' and 'Japanese Pattern.' The Indian Pattern stands for a permanent and predominant place to the public sector in the economy, resulting in comprehensive planning—financial as well as physical. The Japanese Pattern, on the other hand, symbolises the growth of the private sector with all possible assistance by the State under a financial plan. These patterns may not be found in their pure form in any underdeveloped country, but 'their elements and intermediate solutions, more or less approximating one or the other, are present in all the underdeveloped countries.' (p. 80).

The chapters which follow give a historical and institutional assessment of the Japanese Pattern in Pakistan, a review of the currents and cross-currents of thought on the public sector in India and, lastly, an evaluation of the working of the Japanese Pattern in Brazil and Mexico. The author concludes that '(with very few exceptions perhaps) no underdeveloped country will manage to overcome fully its backwardness by following the "Japanese Pattern," while the progress achieved under the "Indian Pattern" will not make for socialist development, though it may bring it nearer, and in some respects facilitate the acceptance of this really effective solution.' (p. 181).

Sachs' approach to the subject is scholarly and sophisticated. Though he holds strong views about the desirability and efficacy of a certain specific pattern of the public sector for underdeveloped countries, he gives due credit to a large number of diverse view-points. In a volume of 181 pages, he has given liberal representation to the views of about 250 economists, sociologists and public leaders. The treatment of the subject is not confined to any particular country; the world itself is the laboratory for the author's experimentation and observation.

Indian readers will nevertheless find this work relatively more interesting, a part of it being a brilliant treatise on Indian economy and planning. The author never deflects from the path of serene objectivity and scientific analysis and the result is a significant contribution to the advancement of knowledge which may be of immense benefit to underdeveloped countries. The observations which follow do not, therefore, detract from its intrinsic merit as a research study.

Pointing to some of the deficiencies of Mexican economy, the author brusquely concludes (p. 179) that 'some of these evils could have been prevented and others made less acute, had Mexico not shifted to the "Japanese Pattern,"' but he adduces no argument nor statistical data to prove that this could be so.

While a quotation by Jawaharlal Nehru on p. 127 raises the question of individual freedom under socialism, the author ignores it altogether. This question, we believe, is of cardinal importance in a decision on the adoption of the Japanese Pattern

or the Indian Pattern of public sector and as such deserved a small but separate chapter in the work.

The author takes little note of the inefficiencies of the public sector. If he had only glanced through the various reports of parliamentary committees on public undertakings in India, he would have had a better perspective of the actual pros and cons of public sector undertakings in an underdeveloped economy.

The superiority of the Indian Pattern over the Japanese Pattern could be empirically established by a positive proof of better performance by the economies of the Indian Pattern than those of the Japanese Pattern. A comparison of the growth rates of underdeveloped economies during the last decade or so does not substantiate Sachs' thesis.

Hartirath Singh

DESIGN FOR TOMORROW By B. G. Verghese.

The Times of India Press, 1965

There is a hazy mess on India's contemporary journalistic scene, at least, in so far as interpretative reporting is concerned. The special correspondents, hovering round the political and economic centres of governmental activity and the dark and low roofed corridors of the Press Information Bureau have established a highbrow society of their own. In the name of specialisation they have locked themselves into news-tight compartments; and a Special covering food and industry refuses to attend Robbin's press conference for he has never heard of the distinguished educationist and journalist.

Reporters like B. G. Verghese, therefore, assume tremendous importance for their ability to see things in their totality, making even the spot coverages analytical by an argus-eyed observation of events, be they political, economic, agricultural or those pertaining to advanced scientific research.

Innumerable comments as well as scientific studies on India's economic development under planning have been on record. Mrs. Kusum Nair thought that planning had failed in India for it was based on the false assumption that the Indian masses wanted to raise their standard of living and join the band of nations having had the revolution of rising expectations. 'The upper level they are prepared to strive for is limited and it is the floor generally that is bottomless', she had complained. Ronald Segal took his cue from Mrs. Nair and went back from India with an array of statistics and data from learned sources to prove that India was on the lip of a precipice.

After these jaundiced evaluations of India's progress in various directions, the objective presentation of the country's achievements by Verghese is immensely relieving. After a tour of the country to assess the development of India after years of planning, Verghese wrote a series of articles for *The Times of India* which have been collected in

the book under review. To him neither the statistics nor the attitude to the planned development seemed so dismal as to bring India to the verge of collapse. He has ably narrated the endearing positive achievements of planning. He is aware of the facts of rising prices, corruption, unemployment and a host of demoralising factors hindering the gigantic efforts of the country, but, to him 'this is a superficial view which ignores the iceberg-like quality of India's real strength and progress,' and 'after setting off the debits against the credits there remains the positive balance of hope.'

In the complex process of planning where a matrix of forces working in coordination with each other to attain marvellous results, from a rising agricultural productivity to improving the organisational structure and vigorous technical development to family planning, the country has shown remarkable capacity to attain them.

The effort of Ahmednagar, in Gujarat, to develop the sugar industry in all its totality has changed the face of the city. Owing to an enviable combination of the people's urge to work, the end product of modern irrigation and an appropriate use of scientific know-how has raised sugar productivity in the factory farms.

In the days when at the upper echelons of power in India the belief is rampant that foreign experts alone are 'experts' and foreign scientific knowledge alone is 'scientific', the achievements of certain scientific research institutes are eye openers. The achievements of the Central Design Organisation in designing the Gujarat refinery project has helped to free it from dependence on foreign expertise. The Salt Research Institute at Bombay is another case of the development of indigenous technical know-how.

The Kaira District Cooperative Milk Producers' Union which started with a handful of members of two village milk producing societies of Gujarat has now developed into an exemplary monument of the people's organisational efforts. In Rajasthan, the basic problems of 'lethargy' and 'inertia' are not innate qualities of the people; they are in fact the results of foreign exploitation.

In the industrial sector the country has made vast strides. The Nangal Fertilizers is making progress to meet the ever-increasing demand for fertilizers; oil explorations have added greatly to the wealth of the country. To meet the challenge of an exploding population, the efforts of the research centre for family planning at Bombay are highly commendable.

Verghese, in his attempt to see the real strength of the country's potentialities, has not been carried away by the currents of optimism. He has carefully described the various factors responsible for the drawbacks in the process of the implementation of development programmes. His darts have been well thrown and are successful in pointing out why at several places anomalies and delays have taxed the

country considerably, something the analysis of economic aggregates can never achieve. He has not hesitated in bringing to the notice of his readers, for instance, the petty legal fight over a few acres of land costing only a few lakhs of rupees which held up the project of forty crores of rupees of the Gujarat refinery. Bureaucratic delays and certain other factors are undoubtedly hampering the country's development programmes but they never form the basis for the generalised croakings that there are no economic incentives or that the country is on the verge of collapse.

Anees Chisht

STRUCTURE AND PROCESS OF ORGANISATION

By H. C. Ganguli.

Asia Publishing House, Bombay, 1964

Structure and Process of Organisation is primarily a study of industrial organisation, although some examples of other types of organisation too find a place in it. The title of the book thus seems to be a misnomer.

The book is divided into two parts: the theoretical discussion in Part I is lucid and useful inasmuch as it raises certain issues relating to industrial organisation and attempts to provide their answers. The type of organisation and manner in which it is run have an impact on productivity as well as worker satisfaction. Ordinarily, the job satisfaction to workers would be greater where the organisation is either of *laissez faire* or democratic type. The author discusses these issues confidently on the basis of scholarly researches conducted abroad. Part I provides thus a good introduction to the important issues involved in a study of industrial organisation from the psychological viewpoint. Even the beginners, unfamiliar with psychological studies of this type, would find it interesting.

Part II is based on a survey of an engineering factory in the public sector. One is surprised here by the absence of the schedules or questionnaires used by the author for this survey. The author says that '(these) interviews were held on the basis of carefully constructed schedules or questionnaires' (p. 69). While one trusts the accuracy of this statement, at least for those who may like to know more about the design of the questionnaire and the type of questions which were put to the workers and supervisors, the questionnaire should have been given in an appendix.

Although the study relates to only one engineering factory in the public sector, the chapter on 'Employee Adjustment To Work' covers more ground by using the data given in some previous studies conducted by the author and some other researchers. Here, the author poses the problem as to what percentage of Indian industrial workers can be regarded as satisfied with the jobs. He provides a quantitative answer with the help of factual data which is very interesting. In the case of the government engineering factory, about two-thirds of the workers are placed in the 'central satisfaction' group as against two-fifths

in the private factories. The author is of the view that a good private factory can be better than a government factory, while a backward private factory can be worse, for a government factory usually gives satisfaction to the largest number of its employees.

The device of sociograms, never used in any Indian study earlier, has been skilfully used by the author with a view to revealing the significance of informal work groups inside the factory and their impact on productivity. Sociograms relating to the lathe and foundry shops of the government engineering factory are thus most interesting. The method followed by the author in gauging organisational climate on the basis of responses of workers, supervisors as well as managers of the factory, is an improvement on earlier studies, which took into consideration only one category of personnel, i.e., the supervisors.

The study poses an important problem for further investigation. This is in regard to the workers' participation in Indian industries. According to some experiments, such a participation has not been very successful. This is an important issue and must, therefore, be probed into thoroughly from the points of view of motivation and human relations in industry.

The study examines the statistical relationship between job satisfaction and productivity. 'It is a common belief among managers,' it says, 'that productivity of industrial workers has fallen much in the post-war years and they ascribe this fall largely to a decline in worker satisfaction and their generally poor attitude toward production' (p. 163). The production data of organised industries do not support this view. They clearly indicate that there has been an increase in the productivity of labour—more so in the case of the engineering industry. Maybe productivity fell in the specific plant under survey, but it is not rational to generalise on the basis of a solitary case.

The study finds a correlation between job satisfaction and productivity. High producing workers are ordinarily more satisfied with their jobs than low producing workers. It is quite possible that the workers who are satisfied with their jobs have more productivity in a causative manner. The author admits that the analysis in his study does not give an answer to the exact nature of relations between the two variables. The need for further research on this problem is thus obvious.

Apart from some misprints, there are certain minor mistakes in the presentation itself. For example, at some places, 'is' or 'has' has been used with 'data' (p. 69) and 'ideas' (p. 52). Similarly, 'have' is used with 'analysis' (p. 70). It is hoped that in a subsequent edition of this book, these and other minor mistakes would be avoided.

The work under review is an important study on a hitherto neglected subject. The discussion of workers' attitude and its impact on productivity and

related matters has thrown up a mass of hitherto unknown information. It has also underlined the areas of uncertainty where further investigations are likely to be fruitful for researchers in the field.

G. C. Beri

STUDIES IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF CAPITALISM IN INDIA By Shiva Chandra Jha.

Firma K. L. Mukhopadhyay.

The author has given us a painstaking study of the development of capitalism in India from the beginning of the sixteenth century until the end of the Second Five Year Plan. The outstanding characteristic of the book is copious documentation. There are an enormous number of quotations from a great variety of sources. Indeed, the reader can often legitimately complain that whole pages of quotations to make a single point is a mark of ill-digested scholarship. It can, perhaps, indicate a certain lack of self confidence and of incomplete sorting out which often enough mars even the best of analytical studies in our country.

The aim of the book is to attempt to apply the Marxist theory of capitalist development to the reality of Indian development over the past five centuries. The author has taken up the common hypothesis that emerged from the famous controversy in the early 1950s between Maurice Dobb, Paul Sweezy, Takahashi and Lefebvre. This centred around the role of merchant capital *per se* in the development of capitalism as a system and mode of production. The learned disputants, of course, relied heavily on the seminal analysis advanced by Marx in *Capital*, especially volume three. Eventually, the consensus seemed to be that there were two paths of capitalist development—the revolutionary way and the botched way. The former consisted in the rise of the capitalists directly from urban and rural producers, the latter in the turn of merchant-cum-usurious-capital to control actual production.

Jha's view is that there is ample evidence to show that in India, in the centuries prior to the western invasion the trend towards capitalist development in the revolutionary way was gaining the upper hand. That it could not triumph in time he puts down to the greater rigidity and staying power of Indian feudalism. Here he relies heavily on K. S. Shelvankar's theory backed with some sparse quotations from Radha Kumud Mukherji and D. D. Kosambi. India, in other words, was on the brink of making the leap to capitalism when British imperialism intervened.

Depending on the works of R. P. Dutt, Asoka Mehta and D. R. Gadgil, the author advances the hypothesis that the British imperialists smashed to smithereens this nascent Indian capitalism. There was, so to say, a reimposition of feudalism of the West European variety and a drying up of the sources of capitalist accumulation in the really revolutionary way. This was followed by a growth of indigenous capitalism, more or less sponsored by the British imperialists both in industry and agriculture, but this

time the process of development was more akin to the second botched way of capitalist genesis about which reference has been made earlier in the review.

In the fifteen years of independence, Jha states, this process has been enormously speeded up. Using official statistics and the studies of Ajit Roy and others, he concludes that Indian capitalism is being fostered by the Congress government and is displaying all the decadent features of monopoly and super exploitation of the toiling people which are common to the final parasitic stage of capitalism. The last chapter, in fact, is a powerful and sustained polemic against the official claims that socialism is being constructed in India 'without tears' and by the 'cooperation' of all.

One can only congratulate the author for the immense pains he has taken. It is true that he relies exclusively on secondary sources but in a work of this nature this is only natural. Jha's book is not a monograph but the study of a comparatively extended period of history. One must also congratulate him for boldly stating his central hypothesis and attempting to weave a pattern out of multitudinous facts. He has happily escaped the pitfall of so many so-called scholars who pretend to believe in the supremacy of the 'brutal fact' and prefer not to come to any significant generalisations. One only wishes that our students, at least in the graduate and post-graduate courses, of economics and history were made to read books like the one under review and not be fobbed off with the pallid 'academic' writings, heavily influenced by the ideology of British imperialism.

The author, however, has not made out anything like a final case. While there is irrefutable evidence to show that capitalism had some place in the complex of relations which made up pre-British India, one can legitimately doubt if it was nearly as powerful as he believes. The basic question as to why capitalism in the East grew more slowly and eventually succumbed to its rival from the West has not been answered—one is taken no further than Shelvankar's study. How far the elements of a really revolutionary way of capitalist development were present is even more a matter of conjecture.

Again, the author has presented a far too simplified picture of the way Indian capitalism developed during the period of imperialist domination. The antagonism between the imperialists and the Indian capitalists has been more or less overlooked. Similarly, the specific features of capitalist development after independence, the growing conflict between the monopoly and non-monopoly sections, the material basis for the possibility of non-capitalist development through the public sector and planning, are completely missed. A really detailed analysis of the new features in the agrarian sector has also not been attempted. One hopes that in future revised editions the author will attempt to overcome these weaknesses.

Mohit Sen

Towards Self-sufficiency In Steel

Hindustan Steel, the largest industrial enterprise of the nation has the hardest of the tasks. On it rests the most ambitious hope of independent India—self-sufficiency in steel. Three steel plants with million-tonne capacity were built all at once during the Second Plan. With its goal of 6 million tonnes capacity in the Third Plan and 9 million tonnes in the Fourth Plan, HSL has to grow at a pace "unprecedented anytime anywhere."

Not steel plants alone—a string of washeries and mechanised mines, a fertilizer plant and a pipe plant were also taken in its stride by HSL. An Alloy Steels Plant, one of the largest in Asia, was also added to an unrivalled record of building on this part of the globe.

Pioneers in introducing LD process and sophisticated flat products, slag granulation plants and sintering plants, HSL looks forward to introducing ever new techniques, such as,

continuous casting or vacuum degassing to keep abreast of world steel technology. Its Engineering and Design Bureaus took the full responsibility for the Third Plan expansion of Durgapur and Rourkela and Fourth Plan expansion of Durgapur and the Sixth Blast Furnace complex of Bhilai are their new tasks.

Today Hindustan Steel's annual outturn of over Rs. 200 crores is equivalent to the imported price of two million-tonne steel plants — HSL accounts now for half of the country's indigenous steel products. It is the largest supplier to Indian Railways and the mainstay of the foundries and rerollers for billets and pig iron. Its products have also found their way abroad.

But there is no time for Hindustan Steel to rest on its laurels; it must grow fast, faster than any to bring the nation nearer to self-sufficiency in steel.



HINDUSTAN STEEL


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
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
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


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


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74

MONEY IN POLITICS

a symposium on the
growing threat to the
democratic will

symposium participants

WEALTH AND ITS POWER

Surindar Suri, social scientist, visiting professor at Heidelberg University

PARTY FINANCE

A. H. Somjee, visiting professor of politics at the Durham University

CHANGE THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM

K. D. Malaviya, former Union Minister for Mines and fuel

VIGILANT PUBLIC OPINION

H. M. Patel, former secretary, Union Ministry of Defence and member of the Indian Civil Service

LOBBIES

A. Raghavan, Delhi correspondent of 'Blitz' newsweekly

IN OTHER COUNTRIES

Gerard Braunthal, associate professor of government at the Massachusetts University, now visiting Fulbright lecturer at Visva-Bharati

BOOKS

Reviewed by Anees Chishti, Ranjit Gupta, Kusum Madgavkar and S. Krishnamurthy

FURTHER READING

A select and relevant bibliography prepared by Subir Goswami

COVER

Designed by T. A. Balakrishnan

The problem

No longer is the mere act of voting in secret considered the sole test of democratic politics. A wide range of judgments have to be made to assess the degree to which the democratic will expresses itself. In this context, money has come to play a powerful role, hidden, subtle and open, in determining which political trend will prevail. It is possible in all societies — developed, developing and under-developed — to locate the role of money in politics. Experience teaches that the more energetic the remedial action, the greater the chance of sustaining the healthy growth of democratic institutions. This is particularly true of transitional societies such as India. Indeed, the institutions themselves must be modified to enable them to resist the erosion of money. This issue of SEMINAR attempts a tentative probe of this problem.

Wealth and its power

SURINDAR SURI

THE growth of political corruption in India is a testament to the success of parliamentary democracy. Ministers and members of legislative bodies are men of influence: they can get things done. This is the way that it should be. That the political leadership plays a crucial role in the problem of corruption is admitted in its report by the Committee on Prevention of Corruption appointed by the Minister of Home Affairs in June 1962 and headed by K. Santhanam.

ISC
127

In Section 11 of its report, entitled 'Social Climate,' the Santhanam Committee dealt with problems of political corruption. The Committee hit the nail on the head in pointing out that 'There is a large consensus of opinion that a new tradition of integrity can be established only if the example is set by those who have the ultimate responsibility for the governance of India, namely, the ministers of the Central and State governments.' But it added: 'There is widespread impression that failure of integrity is not uncommon among ministers and that some ministers who have held office during the last 16 years have enriched themselves illegitimately, obtained good jobs for their sons and relations through nepotism, and have reaped other advantages inconsistent with any notion of purity in public life.'

Next to the integrity of ministers, in the opinion of the Committee, is the integrity of members of legislatures. As the Committee points out, 'The integrity of Members of Parliament and of legislatures in the States will be a great factor in creating a favourable climate against corruption.' Hopefully the Committee records that 'the vast

majority of members maintain the high standards of integrity expected of them. Still it has been talked about that some members use their good offices to obtain permits, licences and easier access to ministers and officials for industrialists and businessmen.'

The allegations bandied around in private conversations about ministers and members are more serious. But some of the allegations do not constitute corruption. It was said of one prominent leader, who was also a businessman, that he did not obtain undue advantage from his position in Parliament but that his legitimate interests were safeguarded. He did not need to bribe officials to get his legitimate work done. Can one say that he enjoyed an unfair advantage against his competitors? In any case, the fact that politicians or members of legislatures are considered *worth bribing* is a good sign, but it would be symptomatic of political decay if they accepted bribes and allowed their judgment to be deflected.

Indeed, it is a testimonial to the success of parliamentary institutions in India when the Santhanam Committee reported that 'the opposition can also support private vested interests', for opposition parties are also considered worth the financial support of businessmen. Let no one say that, because the opposition groups in Parliament and the legislatures are too small and too splintered, their voice does not count. If hard-headed businessmen are ready to pay tribute to opposition parties, as the Santhanam Committee would seem to indicate, these are not ineffective. And businessmen

are not anti-democratic. Businessmen may be better judges of the realities of politics in the country than political scientists or analysts.

In parliamentary democracy, it is not merely the brute act that counts but the spoken word. Conversely, parliamentary democracy is possible only where words are respected as well as actions, for decisions, even those which reconcile conflicting interests, may be made without the help of a parliament. Many important decisions, even in the best-developed of parliamentary and democratic societies are made outside the legislative process. What is important to parliamentary democracies is the respect paid to talking things out. The system of parliamentary privilege, which protects members against prosecution or persecution for what they say in Parliament, is the key to the system. 'Vested interests' know apparently what this privilege is worth.

Changed Character

A fundamental question is whether politics without corruption is possible in India. The issue is not merely that politicians, being of the people, are no more squeamish than everyone else. The issue is created by the relatively rapid growth of wealth in the country. We have been told that it rose by 42 per cent during the first two plan-periods (1951 to 1961). Increase in corruption is a symptom of the expanding economy: business is able to spare increasing amounts to pay to political parties and influential individuals. But it should be noted that to most (though by no means to all) businessmen, payments to political parties or to politicians are a well-calculated investment, which bears interest. This again is something for which we may congratulate ourselves: corruption has changed its character.

In the bad old times, one bribed an official to ward off something unpleasant from happening. When the bribe was extorted the victim did not expect any return. Now-a-days bribes are given not to avoid punishment but to gain an advantage. Bribery therefore is

not so much personal as institutional. It passes from one organised body to another: from corporate business to political party or group. The exchange is formalised and systematic. The receiver is aware how much the giver is worth. The donor knows how much the receiver is worth to him.

At this level of politico-economic sophistication, the impersonal law of demand and supply, or of diminishing returns, comes into play. The sum to be paid is settled by the point where the two curves intersect, even though the time-honoured tradition of haggling serves to romanticise a strictly business transaction.

Developed Societies

Politics by corruption (although known by different names) is not unknown to other 'developed' societies. The mature parliaments, such as the British, take the financial interests of their members with philosophic calm. No other attitude would be possible in face of the close integration of economic and political interests. Maturity lies in the recognition that the politician cannot be a disinterested judge of rights, duties, and interests of various sections of the population. One takes it for granted that one is organically connected with some interests. The German Parliament, which expects its members to be guided by their conscience and nothing else, is naive in contrast.

The British trade unions not only nominate and elect their members to Parliament but support them financially. The trade unionist M.P., who is not as well off privately as a businessman in Parliament, needs the assistance of his sponsoring body; but the assistance serves to bind him to the trade union and saves him from becoming dependent upon somebody else. During India's struggle for freedom, some members of the British Parliament, who were supporters of the Indian cause, were accused of being in the pay of 'Hindu' financial interests. And lately the *Times* objected to the hospitality accepted by British MPs from foreign governments which invited them for visits at their expense.

Would such hospitality to MPs not be a form of corruption? wondered the prim cockney sheet.

An angry MP, who pointed out that the *Times* may have committed a breach of privilege of Parliament, explained that only by accepting the hospitality of foreign governments could members of Parliament obtain knowledge of other countries at first hand. In other words, MPs who accepted such hospitality should be thanked, not criticised. By implication, the hospitable foreign governments should be thanked too.

Here is a difference between India and the maturer democracies, where the intermeshing of the political and the economic interests has proceeded far and come to be accepted. Business interests provide finance for the Conservative and Liberal parties, while trade unions under-write the socialists. The conservative parties have much greater financial resources but their advantage is to some extent neutralised by the organisational strength of the trade unions and the romantic appeal to loyalty which the cause of socialism still evokes in youthful hearts.

In the older democracies, moreover, the capitalist system has come to stay with whatever admixture of 'planification' and social welfare policies. The revolutionary movements have been tamed and socialist parties have come to play the minor role in political life: they accept the capitalist structure and attempt to whittle it by bits but this often renovates and strengthens it. The radical overhaul of the socio-economic system is rejected by virtually all parties; the communists are an exception but they are becoming less powerful or less militant. The distribution of financial patronage by business interests in the western world reflects the distribution of politico-economic power. One is reconciled to it because there is no practicable alternative.

Growing Maturity

There are signs of growing maturity in India. The Santhanam Committee recognised that 'some

legislators are in the employment of private undertakings for legitimate work.' It suggested: "In such cases it is desirable that such employment should be open and well known and should be declared by the legislators concerned. It should be a positive rule of conduct that such legislators should not approach ministers or officials in connection with the work of their employers and they should refrain from participating in the discussion or voting on demands or proposals in which their firms or undertakings are interested.'

But the Santhanam Committee made a distinction between these and the 'Other legislators, who are not such *bona fide* employees, [and who] should on no account undertake, for any valuable consideration or other personal advantage, to promote the interests of or obtain favours for any private party either in the legislature or with government.'

These proposals would not eliminate the promotion of business interests by members of Parliament or legislative bodies, but regulate it. The members should not promote interests underhand but openly. The need to do so would lead to the enhancement of the status of the MP in the business organisation, for an MP or MLA as a *bona fide* employee of a private undertaking could not be given a minor position.

But the higher the employment status of the MP or MLA, the better for parliamentary democracy. If it is no longer necessary for politicians and legislators to conceal their business connections, if the public accepts them for what they are, the better for every body concerned. But it would mean acceptance of the capitalist system and of partnership between business and politics. That is where the rub comes.

The Prospect

The prospect before us is that the capitalist system will mould the political system in its own image by means of the financial patronage it dispenses. One can hardly criticise business organisa-

tions for investing their political contributions to the best advantage. This is obvious and inevitable. The shock results from the fact that a political party, claiming to be socialist but dependent upon business houses for its finances, finds itself manoeuvred imperceptibly into the contrary direction.

G. D. Birla stated that the freedom struggle in India was financed by businessmen. Obviously, free India owes them a debt other than that of gratitude. They may not be denied their kilogramme of flesh. Until recently we thought that business was the horse and the political party was the rider. It turns out to be the other way around. In wanting to establish socialism with the help of political finance from private undertakings, the Congress was trying to sail against the wind. At one time it did seem to be sailing that way. Perhaps the wind has become stronger now, or the helmsman less skilful, or we have become clear-sighted.

Power and Wealth

It is not a simple issue, for the problem of political exploitation of business is no less urgent, as the cases of Kairon and others have shown. Must the ministers be kept away from partaking in the growing wealth in the country? The answer cannot be a simple one. An ascetic minister is likely to be ineffective: a poor man is liable to be more weak-kneed in dealing with business interests than someone who knows and partakes of their game.

No amount of legislation, no codes of conduct, inquiry committees, exposures in the press will succeed in separating power and wealth. Legitimately or illegitimately, openly or covertly, power will acquire wealth or cease to be power and wealth will acquire power or disappear. If we could persuade or force the political leaders to keep away from the flesh pots, we would soon reduce them to impotence and perhaps expose them to the contempt of the very people who today chastise them for their corruption. And if we could convince or compel businessmen to have nothing to do with politics,

the latter would wither away and business would not prosper.

The Santhanam Committee proposed: 'We consider that, in Indian conditions, companies should not be allowed to participate in politics through their donations. It is true that this matter was debated at length during the discussion on the Companies (Amendment) Act of 1960 and it was decided to permit such donations subject to restrictions of amount and conditions of publication. We do not think that this is sufficient and feel that nothing but a total ban on all donations by incorporated bodies to political parties and purposes will clear the atmosphere.'

Its own utopian solution to the problem of party financing was to suggest that 'If even one family in three pays one rupee a year to a political party, the total annual contribution will be more than what is needed for all legitimate purposes of all political parties in India. It is the reluctance and inability of these parties to make small collections on a wide basis and the desire to resort to short cuts through large donations that constitutes the major source of corruption and even more of suspicion of corruption.'

Final Destruction

Even if political parties could finance themselves by collecting small donations, business interests would force their contributions. Just as you can do anything with bayonets except sit upon them, so too one can do anything with wealth except not use it. Political leaders are in positions to do favours to businessmen (as to every one else); this is the essence of democracy. Businessmen can turn the power to their advantage.

The point of departure for the role of money in politics is the statement of a well-known political scientist that money can more easily corrupt politics than the other way around. The fifteen years of parliamentary democracy in India seem to verify the statement. Let us be clear about it: the power of wealth must be destroyed or political power, whether democratic or not, will be the servant of wealth.

Party finance

A. H. SOMJEE

IN recent years, a great concern has been expressed by thinking men and women over the future of democracy in India. They have repeatedly identified the forces which are inimical to democracy under the headings of the low rate of economic development, price and food situation, corruption, the lack of effective opposition to the ruling party, political apathy, illiteracy, regionalism, linguism, casteism, etc. While these factors, individually or collectively, can seriously jeopardise the future of democracy in India, what seems to have received little or no attention at their hands is the manner in which political parties finance their electoral and day-to-day activities. Even if the Indian polity successfully meets the challenge posed by the above-mentioned list of prob-

lems, to which all of us have been sensitized, the latter, namely, the way in which political parties finance themselves, can completely vitiate the spirit of democracy. While the former has received our attention all along the post-independence period, the latter has been discussed briefly, but not effectively dealt with, in press and Parliament only twice since independence.

Difficulties involved in knowing anything about the way in which political parties finance their organization and foot their election bill are indeed very great.¹ Not all of them publish statements relating

1. Material used in this paper is largely based on a survey carried out by me and my wife in early 1963. Our findings were published in JOURNAL OF POLITICS (Florida, U.S.A.), 1963, Vol. 25.

to members' dues, donations, cost of running the administrative machinery, party assets, etc. Only two out of five national political parties publish statements relating to these, one of which is meant for private circulation only. The central offices of all the political parties hardly have any idea of the financial position of their units in the States. The darkest and the least accessible area is the expenditure on elections. In this the law governing the elections is itself not very helpful. It neither restricts the amount which political parties spend on their candidates nor compels them to publicise it. The following account relating to the sources of party income and expenditure has a very slim documentary evidence to it. It is largely based on interviews and interpretations of the versions of respondents.

Members' Dues

Let us, first of all, examine the sources of income of the five national political parties and then go on to their expenditure. By way of its members' dues, the Congress, for instance, receives a substantial amount of money. According to its constitution, its central organization is entitled to one-eighth of this income and the rest is distributed to different units. The central organization of the Congress thus received Rs. 361,526, Rs. 22,391 and Rs. 145,808 during the years of 1959, 1960 and 1961, respectively. The PSP central organization receives 25 per cent of members' dues. It received Rs. 34,759 and Rs. 386 in 1959 and 1960, respectively. The central organization of the CPI receives 10 per cent, the Jana Sangh 10 per cent and the Swatantra Party 5 per cent of members' dues. Practically all the political parties experience fluctuations in their membership and therefore in their income from this source. Their membership is invariably higher during the election year due to their intensified electioneering activity.

The contributions of the candidate to his party and vice versa do not follow a uniform pattern. They differ from party to party and

candidate to candidate. The matter is usually decided with reference to the financial background of the candidate. In prestige seats particularly, the party invariably comes to the rescue of the candidate.

Other Sources

Levies on members of Parliament and Assemblies are a common source of income for most parties. The Congress MPs contribute Rs. 40 per month which is 10 per cent of their income as MPs. The PSP MPs pay Rs. 20 per month for running their parliamentary office and together contribute, over and above this amount, Rs. 5,000 per year to the party. Their capacity to pay is considerably reduced as most of the successful candidates from among the opposition parties are involved in election tribunal cases. The average Communist MP surrenders Rs. 100 per month to his party. The Jana Sangh levies Rs. 40 per month on MPs and the Swatantra Party until recently had not made any provision for a levy on MP's parliamentary income.

The main sources of income of the national political parties are donations, purses and fund drives. From its very inception the Congress, for instance, has been maintaining itself on these sources. During the period of struggle for independence, it was rarely accused of living on 'big money'. After independence, such accusations were levelled against it in no uncertain terms. Consequently, its General Secretary's report of 1960 strongly advised the party workers to collect funds in small amounts from the many.²

There is however no way of knowing the exact proportion of big and small contributions which come into party funds. The documentary evidence as to the former as contained in the profit and loss account of companies is very misleading. The rest, based on political gossips, accusations and counter-accusations, remains a matter of guess-work only. For instance, on the eve of the third

general election in 1962, the organizers of the Swatantra Party were accused of depending exclusively on 'big money'. On their part they retorted that giant corporations gave the Congress ten times of what they gave the Swatantra Party.³ Much to their annoyance the organizers of the Congress found it difficult to refute this.

A year before the third general election, a number of profit and loss accounts of big companies revealed that the Congress had received two-thirds and the Swatantra Party one-third of the political contributions made by them. Big business houses, ideologically speaking, may be in sympathy with the Swatantra Party but the Congress still has the power to reprimand by not approving their expansion programmes, and the power to please by giving them import licenses. The strongly entrenched position of the ruling party in a society with a highly controlled economy, hardly makes the donations of business houses voluntary.

Business Houses

Twice during the last few years donations by business houses became a subject of public controversy and in one case of judicial and legislative action. The Indian Iron and Steel Company sought to amend its memorandum and articles of association for contributing money to the funds of a political party. The court ruled that it should be given fullest publicity. It also expressed grave concern over the health of Indian democratic politics if the large companies secretly donated funds to political parties. The ruling of the court resulted in the establishment of a parliamentary committee. The committee recommended that every company should be asked to disclose the amount of its political contribution in its profit and loss account, that the total amount should not exceed Rs. 25,000 or 5 per cent of its net profit, whichever was greater. The recommendations of the committee were accepted by Parliament on the assumption that companies in the

2. See Indian National Congress, Report of the General Secretaries, (1960), p. 26.

3. See *The Times of India*, February 7 and 12 1962.

public sector will not make any political contributions.⁴

The second and the more recent controversy was over what is popularly known as the Sirajuddin Affair. A Union Minister was accused of having received a sum of money from Messrs Sirajuddin & Co. of Calcutta towards the election of a colleague of his. In adopting such a procedure the accused minister was not the only minister involved. There were others as well but their names were not officially declared. While he appeared before a committee of the ruling party and subsequently tendered his resignation, others did nothing of the kind. The whole affair became a first rate political scandal. Instead of building up institutional safeguards against the recurrence of such an incident, the various factions within the ruling party exploited the incident to beat the other.⁵

Indirect Methods

Then there can be more indirect ways of receiving subsidies. An example of this is to be found in an instance narrated by an MP in the Rajya Sabha. He asked the house whether the following was a subsidy or not: 'In 1957-58, the Century Books House, which is a subsidiary of the Communist Party, gave accounts to the Madras Government, under the Sales Tax Act, that they received Rs. 30,000 worth of books from Russia and China and sold them for Rs. 120,000. Now, Sir, what is this Rs. 90,000? Is it not subsidy?'⁶

Political parties also receive financial support in the form of purses given to party leaders. Party workers in order to register their enthusiasm collect them from the public and present them to their leaders. The drive for presenting purses is intensified on the eve of elections. The former leader of the PSP, Asoka Mehta, for instance, was able to get for his party by means of

purses presented to him, nearly four times the amount of the party's members' dues. In rural areas, the PSP leaders often received donations in kind which were then converted into cash.

The CPI

The sources of income of the CPI have been a mystery ever since Gandhiji was alleged to have credited the theory of 'Moscow Gold'. The organizers of the party are invariably reluctant to discuss the financial problems of the party with outsiders. They generally claim that the toiling masses contribute their small money towards its expenses. In spite of an army of highly dedicated workers, the amount which the party is able to spend at the time of elections gives rise to conjectures of all kinds in political circles. Its political opponents accuse it of secretly receiving money from the industrialists in return for an alleged promise of industrial truce. Others claim that the rupee payment by foreign countries, particularly communist ones, has facilitated the task of foreign assistance to the party. Whatever may be the truth, it is widely believed in political circles that its capacity to spend on elections is second only to the Congress.

The General Secretary of the Swatantra Party in his report of 1961, on the eve of the third general elections, complained that due to the lack of funds, 'the party has to function on a shoe string.' The reasons given by him for the lack of financial support ranged from 'fear of reprisals from those in office in a controlled economy to shortsightedness and inadequate awareness of the necessity of making sacrifices for the way of life in which one believes.'⁷ As the elections came nearer, its worries disappeared. Sophisticated businessmen, industrialists, and persons in key positions in banks and insurance companies were able to collect all the money that the party needed.

The Jana Sangh receives its financial assistance from petty

shopkeepers, refugees, government servants in Delhi, feudal chiefs and ex-zamindars, mostly on the eve of elections.

Of the five national political parties, the Congress gets the maximum assistance by way of labour, goods and facilities in between and during elections. Its annual sessions receive generous assistance from businessmen, contractors and industrialists. During the election period, cars, jeeps, petrol, publicity material, etc., are freely made available to it by those who wish to receive favours in return. Even some of the government servants feel compelled to work for it during elections.

Party Expenditure

Much less is known about party expenditure. While one can get some idea of the administrative expenses of a party's central office, and very little about its state units, the amount spent by it on electoral campaigns largely remains a matter of guess. The central administrative machinery of the Congress costs the party annually little less than one million rupees,⁸ major heads of expenditure being salary of the staff, travelling and running various departments. For the same the PSP spends little over one hundred and fifty thousand rupees. The CPI, with all its devoted workers, spends Rs. 36,000 a year on its central administrative machinery. The Swatantra Party spends about one hundred thousand rupees a year. In this connection it will be interesting to note the remark of its General Secretary: 'the absurdity of the situation would be obvious if it were to be suggested that a political party functioning over an area and with the population of the whole of western Europe, from Scandinavia to Greece and Spain, were to spend for its secretariat every month a sum of £425!'⁸

When we come to election expenses we have to remain content with the tissue of lies,

4. See Lok Sabha Debates, 1960.

5. See in this connection, Romesh Thapar's illuminating analysis in *Economic Weekly*, April 13 and 27, 1963.

6. See *Raj Sabha Debates*, Companies Amendment Bill, 1960.

7. General Secretary's Report, Swatantra Party Second National Convention (1961) p. 6.

8. Ibid. 7.

distortions, accusations and counter-accusations. In this connection, the law governing election expenses is quite misleading. While it restricts the amount which candidates for parliamentary and assembly seats can spend, it completely leaves out expenses, however large, incurred on behalf of the candidate 'as long as such expenses are not authorised by him or his agent.'⁹ The Election Commissioner's report on the second general elections says, 'too many loop-holes have been left in the law with the result a candidate can easily evade the objectives of the law if he is so inclined.'¹⁰

Consequently, it is impossible to state with any certainty the amount actually spent by various political parties on elections. When the organisers of the parties were interviewed in this connection, they grossly understated their own expenses but gave bloated figures about their opponents.

For the third general elections, the Congress organisers claimed that they spent about three million rupees. A leader of one of the opposition parties put it down to fifty million rupees.¹¹ The leaders of the PSP claimed that the central fund made available to the party for the elections was about a million rupees. While the organisers of the CPI remained reluctant to discuss the subject, competent political observers thought that it had spent nearly ten million rupees on the third general elections. The leaders of the Swatantra Party put down their expenses in the vicinity of five million rupees. The leaders of the Jana Sangh could not even vaguely state what their election expenses were.

Needless to say that like so many other problems threatening our democratic institutions, this too calls for urgent, adequate action and statutory safeguards. In the absence of them we might unceremoniously drift in the direction of a one-party State under the ruling party.

9. Report on the Second General Elections in India, 1957, Vol I. P. 183.

10. *Ibid.* 187.

Change the electoral system

K. D. MALAVIYA

THE need for money in political work is always there. This goes without saying. Ever since 1923 I have been watching several patterns of relations between money and politics. As volunteers of the Indian National Congress,

we used to collect door to door subscriptions and also collective donations from markets. Along with this, the 4-anna fee for Congress membership was also a great source of income to help manage the affairs of a growing Congress organisation. There was an office to be run and I definitely remember that its monthly expenditure during the '30s was something like Rs. 800.

Apart from this, there was a volunteer organisation which required about a couple of thousand rupees. These expenditures were all met from petty collections or occasional incomes which we used to get from some rich Congressmen who had inherited wealth from their family or were earning large sums of money. But this source of income was practically negligible. Those were the good old days where the fire-eating idealism to achieve independence made everything pious and worth while and the response from the poor was ready and meaningful.

The Pioneers

Before this phase in our politics, the activities of young revolutionaries has also to be noted. This period was roughly between 1912 and 1940. These great patriots and heroes of the nation were the pioneers of our freedom movement. They led the country and inspired millions later on by their bold actions and great sacrifices. Vital to all their activities was the question of funds.

In the beginning, there was very little help from the rich citizens who were afraid of these young patriots so ready to sacrifice their lives to drive out the foreigners from our sacred soil. Their needs were large. They therefore decided upon a programme of collecting money by force in order to continue their political activity. Government treasuries were raided and so were individual treasuries. Occasionally, some killings were also resorted to on both sides.

The Kakori Railway Train Dacoity in the middle of the '40s

was the climax when several daring young men stopped a railway train and looted the government treasury. They were subsequently caught; some of them were hanged; others were imprisoned for long periods. Incidents like the Kakori Train Dacoity enhanced the prestige of the young revolutionaries; they were not dubbed dacoits or irresponsible people, as was proved later by the financial and legal help which they received. Money was so vital for these activities that the revolutionary movements made it their strategy to get money from whatever source available.

Gandhiji was always condemning their methods because arson and murder were involved; but his denunciations used to be received with mixed feelings. There was warm appreciation and admiration for the noble objectives of these young revolutionaries and I distinctly have the impression that the country as a whole was with them rather than with those who criticised them.

Some of the great philanthropists who used to contribute large sums of money to these young patriots were Chittaranjan Das, Sarkar, Sen and Sarat Bose from Bengal and Motilal Nehru from U.P. and several others whose names I am not able to recollect without referring to books. I know that my elder brother, Pandit Kapil Deva Malaviya, during the latter years while he had a lucrative practice at the bar, used to help Sachin Sanyal's group of revolutionaries who had spread to all corners of the country.

General Sympathy

Of course, great leaders like Lokamanya Tilak, Madan Mohan Malaviya and Lajpat Rai were also in great sympathy with the terrorist leaders. I am only referring to one of the patterns of collecting money for political parties during an important phase of our independence struggle. The point that I wish to make is that whenever money was needed in greater

proportion than what could be collected legitimately there was resort to means which, although controversial, were not condemned on moral grounds.

All this, however, was mainly confined to the pre-independence period. During the last ten years of the freedom struggle, from 1937 to 1947, public donations to political organisations became more open, and that old-time hesitation and fear was less in evidence in the programme of collecting funds for political work. To cut the story short, money was collected by open as well as violent methods to run the political movement of India whose main purpose was to win freedom from foreign rulers. At times, indirect intimidation of a 'non-violent character' was also adopted by political workers of pragmatic thinking.

New Environment

The Communist Party however continued, for some time, to use coercive methods to collect funds for its purposes, but soon after independence the whole character of the fund-raising movement for political work was changed. This change, naturally, was brought about by a change in the new environment of a changing social condition.

A qualitative change occurred in our social conditions after freedom wherein people's attention was drawn to constructive activities and the struggle for power politics began. The democratic constitution gave an entirely new orientation to political activities. The party system started functioning in right earnest. There were no national traditions from which politicians could draw experience. Naturally, therefore, the ruling party, which was the Congress, had to shoulder the responsibility of constructing the mechanics by which the political set-up of various parties was to run and the method of collecting funds which was to be initiated by them.

For some years no notice was taken by any party as to how funds were being raised to further

the cause of political work. Slowly, however, a new pattern was visible, which consisted of some sort of a 'mutual help system' under which the beneficiary and the ministers of the ruling party developed a detached and yet purposeful understanding.

While the Congress Government was very strong and its leadership influential all round, the opposition parties did not show much concern about the way the funds were made available to the Congress organisation, either for its day-to-day activities or for its general elections. They tried to copy the Congress method wherever they could. Methods for collecting funds were, therefore, more or less the same in all parties; but as the problems of administration grew in complexity and the perpetuation of the same political party became oppressive, the attention of other political parties was drawn to the methods of the collection of funds.

No Traditions Built

Let it be remembered that by this time Congress governments had all along been gaining in strength and so, flushed with power and the so-called desire to step up constructive activities on the economic front, they forgot that, as a ruling party, it fell upon them to build traditions suited to our genius and ideals which would take care of clean social standards side by side with building the economic activities of the nation.

The ruling party was hemmed in from all sides and in its haste it forgot to take lessons from other capitalist democracies where, during the course of a nation's economic activities, evil habits had grown, becoming part and parcel of their developing society. Many of them felt that in the process of arranging for funds to carry on political work, it was inevitable to rely upon the rich who alone could conveniently part with their resources to help the ruling party to maintain its existence.

Many complicated problems have grown along with the party

system under which our democracy is evolving today. Let us go to the very root or the basis on which the capitalist democracy functions. This is: 1) the party system, 2) the organisation of periodical elections to defeat the ruling party, 3) the recognition of the right of the individual to organise activities and talents and control the administrative system with a view to corner as much surplus wealth of the society as possible. (I am not questioning the fundamentals of the four freedoms here). All these have become one whole in the political functioning of a capitalist democracy. How?

The ruling party of a parliament must have a special relation with the new class of capitalists which is being created in a developing country. The ruling class inevitably relies on the support of the profit-maker, industrialist and trader, and the more this class becomes powerful and the more monopolistic in its character, the more does the relation between the ruling party and this class become stronger. This class controls the composition of the legislature. A stage then arrives when the ruling party no more cares for the condemnation by other political parties because all of them have agreed to accept the consequences of functioning under a capitalist democracy based on a party system.

Increasing Corruption

I therefore believe that so long as the party system in our democracy will run elections for political democracy, the funds to run political life will always come from those who organise and accumulate profits. This class of men develops the wisdom of helping parties other than the ruling one also. It does so in anticipation of changes at times when administrative weaknesses in the ruling party become visible.

These are some hard truths on which much criticism can be expected; but the situation has to be faced boldly. What is this situation? Corruption has been grow-

ing at an alarming speed in our country during the post-independence period. This is not merely petty corruption but much more than that. It appears that besides the politicians, the judiciary system which looks at things from an ivory tower also is responsible for the increase in corruption. Justice is not administered in India today because it is sold. The difference between corruption in the judiciary system and the politico-economic system is that the former is customarily recognised and the latter is not.

Social Democracy

Further, it is also a fact that lack of education and the inability to remove our poverty and unemployment have created an atmosphere in which the evil of corruption has taken deep roots. Such an atmosphere cannot be divorced from the behaviour of a political party in the discharge of its functions in our democracy. And what are its functions? Firstly, to run an organisation; secondly, to maintain its popularity among the masses and, thirdly, to win an election. These functions obviously require a lot of funds.

For the accumulation of these funds one has to approach either the small contributor or the big ones. The former is not interested because the parties and the people in our system are getting cut off from each other. The new class from the richer community has butted in and is replacing the large masses of people and establishing its relations with the government and the political parties.

To me it appears, therefore, that the present system of party elections and general elections must be radically changed. The details of functioning of our political democracy must give way to a new system of social democracy wherein political parties become really subordinate to the wishes of the people through powerful and politically conscious workers of the society, rather than the small class which is being created by our political system of capitalist democracy.

Vigilant public opinion

H. M. PATEL

DEMOCRACY means the rule of the people expressing their sovereign will by their votes. Acceptance of a democratic form of government, therefore, implies, above all, faith in the people, and faith in the people means faith in the whole people and not in classes of people. And Abraham Lincoln gave expression to this faith in his famous and oft-quoted saying, 'You can fool all the people some of the time, and some of the people all the time, but you can't fool all the people all the time.'

In an ideal democracy, the large majority of the people will be moved by a sense of public duty and a spirit of altruism. There would be no bribery or corruption among public servants, constituencies or public men. Power will be sought because it gives opportunity for useful service.

In the world we live, however, no people have yet approached these ideal conditions and in our country, for a variety of reasons, the quality of the spirit that moves politicians and public men today not only falls far below the ideal level—that would be understandable—but has even moved awfully below the level of the highly patriotic and selfless variety achieved during the freedom struggle, particularly under the leadership of Gandhiji. Power has corrupted that spirit, and because power enjoyed since

independence has been all but absolute, corrupted greatly.

A party organisation can be saved from being misused only if it continues to be under the control or influence of men whose own actions are governed by a high sense of patriotism and public duty. We have, fortunately for us, in the country a large number of persons who value high standards in personal and public conduct. And the ruling party, too, contains men of high ideals and a high sense of personal duty. Unfortunately, these men are either powerless or are no longer able sufficiently to influence their colleagues or their organisation, for there can be little doubt that party, group and private interest rather than public or national interest determines policy. Certain consequences have, therefore, inevitably followed. Money, for one thing, has begun to play a big role in politics, in elections, or otherwise.

Why is it that the Congress Party, which even today claims to have the largest number of adherents and is undoubtedly the richest and most powerful of all political parties, so reluctant to give up donations from joint stock companies? Why does it not place its reliance on the more usual and straightforward methods? The answer is obvious. To fight a contested election whether to the

Parliament or the State legislature, large sums of money have to be spent, far larger than what a candidate is permitted legally to spend. The balance has to be found either from his political party chest or from his personal friends and supporters.

Unaccounted Money

A parliamentary constituency may have as many as half a million voters while many a State legislature constituency has voters numbering not far short of a hundred thousand. Quite apart from the expenditure which has to be incurred during the few hectic weeks preceding the election itself, it is now being increasingly realised that constituencies have to be nursed over a period of time and that mere last-minute campaigns cannot make any impression. All this means much expenditure. It is indeed an expensive undertaking to enter politics, and because candidates for election are required under the law to limit their expenditure, and file statements of expenditure, the greater part of the expenditure must necessarily come under the category of 'unaccounted money'.

Varied are the ways in which funds are obtained. One of the ways, for instance, in which the Communist Party of India, raises the funds it requires, is ingenious. It is the largest single owner of a newspapers' chain in the country. Even though it is a fact that the total circulation of all their newspapers is far too small for the party to run them as business undertakings, nevertheless, they find it pays them to run a business of that nature: it is one of the ways of channeling money from sources which need not be divulged. Whatever the attitude similarly in public of ministers and leading Congress politicians, none of them has been averse at election time and for election purposes to draw upon 'unaccounted money' in the possession of their supporters.

While this is what is obvious to anyone who chooses to cast even a superficial glance at the political scene, closer scrutiny makes it only too clear why the position cannot be otherwise. Where con-

stituencies consist of several lakhs of voters, it is easy to see how much money would be needed to canvas even a small percentage of them. The usual process requires a team of political workers to verify the electoral lists which are not always prepared with very great accuracy, to organise public and group meetings, to send out cards and other promotion and propaganda material, and to carry house-to-house visits and canvas for votes. Apart from postage, printing and transport—and transport cost tends to be very large, for a constituency besides having the voters in such large numbers also usually stretches over a wide area,—the workers themselves have to be remunerated and looked after.

Candidate's Resources

It is not unusual for candidates themselves having to be nursed by the party or parties concerned lest they succumb to many temptations which are offered to them by the rival parties. Even the Congress has been known to find it worth its while to avoid awkward situations, and to secure an uncontested election rather than face a closely fought election. In its choice of candidates, even a rich party like the Congress is influenced by the ability of the candidate to contribute towards the expenses involved.

For other parties, the candidate's ability to contribute is very often the most important factor determining his choice as a candidate. As elections to State legislatures take place usually along with parliamentary elections, the would-be Member of Parliament is, not infrequently, called upon to meet the expenditure of the half a dozen State legislators of his party contesting the election along with him. On the other hand, there may be occasions when the candidate for the State legislature has to carry financially the parliamentary candidate!

But the expenditure at the time of the election is not necessarily the only expense that a political careerist has to find. He may be called upon to defend his seat if his election is challenged. I myself

know of a case where the elected Member of Parliament was approached by his defeated rival for a private settlement to avoid a challenge which even though it was hopeless would nevertheless have involved the successful Member of Parliament in considerable expenditure besides taking up a great deal of his time and energy.

Everyone is equally aware of instances where to secure a reversal of bad decisions involves one in a great deal of expenditure of time, energy and money. One unfortunate individual had hardly succeeded in fighting and winning his case, when it was time for him to contest another general election. It is scarcely necessary to say that in challenging or defending the result of an election, no limit is placed on expenditure, just as no question is asked about how much is spent in securing an uncontested return!

Since there are no restrictions placed upon the amounts that 'friends of a candidate' may spend, and none on the expenditure of a political party, it is a fair inference that as a rule the bulk of election financing is done by these two sources. The limits set to candidates' expenses, Rs. 8,000 for the Assembly and Rs. 25,000 for Parliament, virtually ensure their dependence on the party and on indirect outside support.

Party Collections

Since parties are also groupings of individuals not associated for pursuit of profit, they, too, are forced to collect funds. In the nature of things, it is not possible to obtain exact information of the monies secured for elections either by the parties or by the outside individual supporters.

It has been mentioned in some recent studies of voting patterns that the Congress was by far the most favoured by the business community, a result of the close economy obtaining in India where reciprocal benefits are shared by the party in power and business. It is because business funds are so essential for fighting elections that political parties and individual politicians in India are so prone to making compromises with indivi-

duals and groups who possess the funds.

Even individual ministers in charge of certain portfolios have been known to have collected quite sizeable sums of money for fighting their own elections. It is not surprising that political realists should be tempted to propound the thesis that to be independent of the monied classes, politicians who have the opportunity should apply themselves to enrich themselves and their families!

It is obvious that such an attitude is largely detrimental to the public interest. Let me hasten to remark that I do not for a moment suggest that the other parties or opposition candidates would not be equally ready to exploit a favourable situation under similar circumstances. What I am concerned with at the moment is only to emphasise that the people generally have come to accept the position that an effective political career calls for lavish expenditure and that few individuals are in a position to find the money necessary to meet such expenditure out of their own pockets.

Lack of Faith

The Congress, had it so desired, could have given a lead in the right direction in many ways. It could have kept down election costs. It chose instead to set an example in the opposite direction because basically it lacked faith in the electorate. A candidate of an opposition party has to face two difficulties: he has less to offer than a member of the ruling party and he has less resources to draw upon. He has also to face two electoral disabilities from which the ordinary voter suffers. The ordinary voter has not yet realised that it is in his power in co-operation with his fellow voters to effect a change in the government, a psychological fact which makes for preservation of the status quo.

In contrast to the large numbers of Congress leaders who used before political independence to maintain constant contact with the people, there are only very few who have chosen to maintain such close contact after freedom had been achieved. If the ordinary

Congress Member of Parliament or legislator is rarely to be seen in his constituency between elections, how much more remote is the Congress minister?

The consequences of this big gap between the people and the leaders of the ruling party are that the people no longer feel that it is their government which is ruling and that at the same time they are very conscious of their ability to secure minor benefits from it. In other words, their self-reliance and their independence have been sapped.

The After-effects

It is, secondly, difficult to persuade voters that for all the assurance given to them of the secrecy of the ballot, the ruling party would have any difficulty in finding out how they had voted. This is not due wholly to ignorance and illiteracy. When there are a number of votes, the counting of votes wardwise gives some broad indications. One has to remember that intimidation invariably takes its course. It is not altogether unconnected with the political climate of the country that public opinion when it has asserted itself has invariably done so in between elections. It has never done so, so far, in an election and certainly never in a general election.

The election system and the manner in which we have allowed it to develop have made politics an expensive business. An inevitable consequence has been that those who have to spend these large sums tend thereafter to try to recoup all the expenditure incurred by undesirable deals on the side. This is naturally much more possible for members of the ruling party who moreover have also 'legitimate' financial rewards to look forward to—the area for patronage of the ruling party having been enlarged steadily to such an extent that it is able to reward those who are successful as also to compensate those who have lost.

All this has led to attitudes which make possible the kind of behaviour to which a Commission of Inquiry in Nigeria had occasion recently to draw attention:

'A political party is alleged systematically to have transferred

large sums of public money to its own use through the device of a so-called Investment & Properties Corporation. Between 1958 (when it was incorporated) and 1962, over £4 million passed into the coffers of the party concerned, a large part of which was spent on electioneering. Other sums, running into seven figures, were, by such devices as the jugglery of bank accounts or the purchase of properties with public money at prices far higher than valuation, diverted to public or private use. Considerable personal benefits were obtained by highly placed individuals, who were able to obtain the money with little or no regard for the normal controls over public expenditure. Apart from those allegedly criminal acts, huge sums of money were spent on legitimate objects, but with incredible recklessness, extravagance and disregard of accounting procedures.'

Revivified Leadership

I do not think that we have reached the stage when by more expenditure of vast amounts the machinery of government can be captured by anti-national or anti-social forces because, if and when the attempt is made, public opinion may well assert itself. But I do think that short of that, considerable damage can be done and in fact has actually been done. Public opinion in our country as yet forms itself slowly, and then too, only in respect of truly major issues. It has, therefore, saved the country from a major disaster, but has not prevented much else that is undesirable.

Improvements in the election system and insistence on more scrupulous observance of the regulations will no doubt help, but the main remedy is, of course, a sustained effort to educate public opinion. Such an effort will have to be made at all levels—from the electorate to the party workers and the candidates. A vigilant public opinion alone can safeguard our democratic institutions for us, and this means a revivified and purified leadership, with faith in the people and in sound moral principles.

Lobbies

A. RAGHAVAN

EITHER in the promotion of good or the cultivation of vice on modern lines, India is a beginner. As the cow dung and atomic ages telescope into the present day with the age of bicycles extremely reluctant to bow out, we cannot but be novices in many matters. This qualification should, among other things, apply to the problem of money in politics, which is comparatively a new development in India. But once the money has made its debut the evil is spreading like an epidemic. Otherwise, how is it possible, for instance, to account for the sudden halt to recent police raids for black money? How, again, is it possible to

explain the recent report that one out of every five Punjabis is a Congressman this year. And the Punjab is no exception. It is only in recent years that we are hearing about bogus membership and I was personally witness to intermittent discussions at Congress sessions on ways and means of exorcising the ghost. In other words, more recently more millionaires have been pressed into service in the recruitment of millions of primary members, four a rupee. It is only since 1958 that we have been facing the ugly and embarrassing problem of ministerial corruption but since then it has grown to such proportions as

to deserve a separate ministry at the Centre, what with so many chief ministers and ministers being arraigned before one tribunal or another.

When money enters politics, it must have its return. And it must have an institution to operate—to influence, to bargain, to pressurise the powers that be, the officials, ministers and legislators. The traditional institution is the lobby and having originated in the United States, it turned out to be of considerable export potential.

Businessmen

It is futile to discuss whether or not lobbies operate in India; they do, though they may not be as sleek and aggressive as their counterparts in America and elsewhere. It is difficult to put down a point of time for the origin of these lobbies. There is an apocryphal story that in the early twenties when Gandhiji asked a prominent Indian industrialist for a donation to the Congress, he was handed over a blank cheque to be filled in as he liked.

Would it be presumptuous to infer that the seeds were thrown in those days of the national struggle for an organised assertion of the influence of those who opened up their purses. And when S. K. Patil says, as he did on April 4, on the concluding day of the golden jubilee of the Marwadi Relief Society in Calcutta, that the Congress has received about 90 per cent of the money spent during the last 150 years which amounts to 10 crores, from businessmen and industrialists, we get some idea of how the foundation was laid for a lobby of industrialists and businessmen in India.

Their's is the main lobby which has been fairly active and extremely noisy since the Avadi Congress and the formulation of the second five year plan with a bias for heavy industries and with an accent on the public sector acquiring the commanding heights of the developing economy. Over the war years, this class of people in India had accumulated a lot of fat and dirt. Kautilya in his *Arthashastra* mentioned only 40 ways in which

State revenues were embezzled by the unscrupulous. Justice Vivian Bose in his monumental report of 1963 discovered 41 frauds committed by one single business house in this country.

Was it not a proprietor of this category who volunteered a statement before the Press Commission in the early fifties that he had committed every crime short of murder. The august personalities who sat on the Commission were flabbergasted and this is how they described their shocking experience in their report published in 1954: 'Not knowing whether to take it as an attempt at humour, we put to him the question whether he had committed dacoity. His answer was more or less to the effect that the spirit was willing but the flesh was weak.'

Organized Racket

One would normally presume that such abnormal people can have no access to our policy makers. But unfortunately this is not true. Did not Jawaharlal Nehru send out instructions time and again that ministers on tour should not enjoy the hospitality of industrialists. But just before he died, he had the mortifying experience of being informed of the demise of one of his chief ministers in the palatial house of an industrialist in Calcutta.

No wonder, to quote the Santanam Committee on Prevention of Corruption, "The tendency to subvert integrity in public services instead of being isolated and aberrative is growing into an organised, well planned racket." It is very revealing that immediately prior to making such a weighty observation, the Committee recorded 'with regret that, while a number of trade associations and chambers of commerce readily accepted our invitation to help us with their views and advice, the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce (& Industry) which could have given powerful support to the fight against corruption would not even accept our invitation to meet us.'

The FICCI is the most powerful and influential organisation of

Indian big business and it was at its annual session this year that we heard bitter complaints that the legislators whom its members financed were ungrateful wretches and the complaint was followed by the suggestion that their own men should enter Parliament.

Ramakrishna Bajaj, who resigned from the Congress in 1962 protesting against Krishna Menon's nomination as the Congress candidate in North Bombay, obviously spoke for many of his colleagues when he said at its annual session that 'The business community has reached a stage when it should try to put 50 to 60 men in Parliament. A prerequisite for this was the stopping of contributions to political parties, and backing of candidates' who would represent their point of view. At present the parties took their contributions and sent up members who delighted in abusing industrialists and businessmen in season and out of season.' (The *Indian Express*, Delhi, March 22).

A month later, in Calcutta, at the golden jubilee celebration of the Marwadi Relief Society, a top industrialist followed this up with his famous 'heads-will-roll' speech. Heads would roll, he threatened, if the government's policy of humiliating businessmen continued.

Sources of Finance

The foregoing must give us some rough idea about the sources which finance the lobbies. This is a subject on which there is very little quotable material. I think the Home Minister, Gulzarilal Nanda, came to the point when he recalled at Lucknow in June last year the boast of an unnamed industrialist that he had 45 Members of Parliament under his control. But when his revelation appeared in cold print, understandably enough, Nanda made a small correction to his earlier observation. What he had said, according to the corrected version, was that the industrialist had told him (Nanda) that he had helped 45 MPs in their election.

Indeed, both the versions are illuminating. The Santanam Com-

mittee was not that inhibited in pronouncing itself on the subject. 'It has been talked about that some MPs use their good offices to obtain permits and licenses and have easier access to ministers and officials for industrialists and businessmen.' So the Committee suggested the formulation of a code for them.

Government Officials

Law-makers are not the only people under pressure. Government officials are no less important; they constitute a very important lobby. 'In the present context of planning,' noted the Santanam Committee, 'the goodwill of any highly placed government servant is valuable to every private undertaking.' Not only showing favours, they have also been dabbling in policy-making.

In the present instance I am not referring to their role in making or modifying the industrial policy but to two other matters. Firstly, it is too well known that a bunch of officials of the government of India, in 1963, exploiting the weakness of the Nehru government in the aftermath of the Chinese aggression, almost succeeded in converting All India Radio to a satellite of the Voice of America. Literally from the brink had Nehru to swerve back to position.

Secondly, in the same year, a committee consisting mostly of officials appointed to survey and report on India's requirements of military aircraft and ancillary services came to the staggering conclusion that the Russian Mig was of no use. Unless the Soviet Union was prepared to modify the proposed model thoroughly to suit every convenience of ours, the agreement to manufacture Migs in India, the committee pronounced imperiously, should be kept in abeyance. Nehru refused to accept the advice.

It is highly interesting that in December, 1963, soon after the report was submitted to the government, Indian correspondents based at Washington wrote that India had informed General Taylor (then visiting New Delhi) that the project for building Mig factories

with Soviet aid was practically abandoned. Even though it has not been able to stop it, American lobbying has certainly delayed the Mig project for two years. Top officials get cushy jobs even as company directors in private enterprises, both Indian and foreign, when they retire, and while in service, they feather the nests for their sons and daughters. It is these bright and unfailing employment prospects, more than anything else, that lubricate and keep in trim the lobby of officials.

Oil

Let us now examine the role of some of the lobbies in influencing policy, to begin with the oil lobby, run by foreign cartels in co-operation with Indian vested interests. With the setting up of a State-owned distribution agency by the middle of 1959, known as the Indian Oil Company, the public sector in oil had come of age in India with its exploration, refining and marketing. The oil cartels were up in arms and apparently chose Lord Mountbatten to lobby in New Delhi. The *Hindustan Times* reported in August 1959, that Mountbatten had written a personal letter to Prime Minister Nehru pleading the cause of the oil companies. It added that the 'Union Government are understood to be considering certain proposals to enlist the active cooperation of all sources to implement their huge oil exploration and production plans... This is believed to have been prompted by the advice reportedly given to the Prime Minister by Lord Mountbatten and John D. Rockefeller.'

Earlier, the World Bank had chimed in: 'The government's insistence that refineries must be in the public sector and its reluctance to grant new exploratory concessions to the oil companies inhibited the participation of foreign private capital in the development of India's oil resources.'

The lobby won the day. On November 25, 1959, the government of India published the revised 'Petroleum and Natural Gas Rules' to clear the way for participation of foreign oil companies in the field

of exploration. All the time a powerful section of the Indian press was playing second fiddle to the foreign oil monopolies.

The Small Car

The still abortive small car project in the public sector is the most telling example of how a lobby can kill or paralyse a project. We are not entering here into a discussion of whether or not a small, cheap car is desirable at the present stage of our development. However, on September 6, 1960, the Government of India passed a resolution saying that in case the experts committee considered a low cost car feasible, the project would be taken up in the public sector.

In June, 1961, the experts known as the Pande Committee submitted its report recommending that the public sector undertake the manufacture of a small Renault model. A collaboration agreement was drawn up with the Renault Corporation of France. The requirement of foreign exchange was estimated at Rs. 6 crores by the Pande Committee, and the French agreed to put up that much foreign money *outside* the French contribution under the Aid India Consortium for India's third plan. The auto-barons were in jitters; they took their sleek, imported limousines out for lobbying.

By that time, the third general elections were in the offing. The Congress was sufficiently softened up. And as expected after the elections, the government announced in Parliament in August, 1962, the abandonment of the project 'for the time being', of course. And the project is continuously being shelved since then, in spite of Parliament, as revealed in several of its debates almost unanimously demanding a public sector passenger car unit.

The government has always been pleading paucity of foreign exchange. How facile the plea is in the light of the French undertaking! But the absurdity of it all is that the same government has been doling out at least 10 crores in foreign exchange annually to the three existing private sector

units, one among them, as S. M. Bannerjee put it in the Lok Sabha debate last year, produces a sort of car 'every part of which makes noise except the horn!'

Take another instance—the Bokaro scuffle, which was a joint venture of an Indo-American lobby. The Indian end of the lobby was made up of a leading business house which had been hankering after a steel mill since 1950 with no success. In June 1963, the then Steel Minister, C. Subramanyam, made angry references to unnamed Indian and American interests lobbying for the scrapping of Bokaro. Both the interests conspired to wrest Bokaro from the public sector.

This conspiracy came to surface when the American Senator, Broomfield, disclosed the receipt of a letter from a 'distinguished' Indian industrialist pleading with the American Congress not to aid Bokaro unless the public sector was prepared to share with Indo-American entrepreneurs in its equity capital and management control. India was badly let down at the last minute despite the tall promise of the then US Ambassador in India, Galbraith.

The writer was present at the Bhubaneswar session of the Congress. It was with great jubilation that the resolution on democracy and socialism was adopted. Among other things, the resolution recommended the take-over of rice mills. 'Processing of agricultural produce, especially paddy, should not remain in private hands' was the pompous declaration. Within a month after the passing of the resolution, the new Congress Working Committee held its first meeting in New Delhi and annulled that part of the resolution and decreed that only rice mills to be set up in the future should be in the public or co-operative sector. In between, the rice mill owners who constitute the backbone of the Congress in the country-side, had done their homework and the august Congress Working Committee bowed and retired. If such a leading body could be made to bite the dust, one should imagine that there is no authority in India which can be beyond the reach of lobbyists.

In other countries

GERARD BRAUNTHAL

FEW will deny the fact that money is an important weapon in the arsenal of political parties throughout the world. In this brief survey of the systems of political finance in a few selected countries, a tentative assessment will be made of the nature of these systems, with primary emphasis on the ways parties raise and spend funds. Only then will it be possible to venture into a comparative analysis of similarities and contrasts. A word of caution. Since the intrepid researchers into comparative party finance still have to surmount roadblocks of secrecy on financial matters among most national parties, any figures cited here often tend to be only estimates and must be used with the greatest of caution.

In the United States, the nature of the party system determines the rate of flow of money. A system in which the organized parties are nearly dormant except for frenetic activities during frequent election campaigns (e.g. every two years for the House of Representatives) does not result in a steady flow of contributions into party coffers. Rather, the parties require relatively modest funds for their all-year staff and organizational activities, but generous amounts for their electoral campaigns.

The protracted length of the campaigns, the high number of elective offices to be filled and the maximum use of expensive mass communications media signify that the parties cannot shirk their fund-raising activities. The price of television and radio time, newspaper advertisements and the printing of leaflets has risen inex-

orably, so that in a recent national election the rumour that the campaign had cost the major parties \$80 million (presumably only for the presidential campaign) seemed credible. However, in the 1956 presidential election the figures cited were more modest. The Republicans claimed to have spent about \$20.7 million and the Democrats \$11 million.

In order to lower expenditures to less exorbitant amounts, and to prevent any one interest group from capturing a party, the Congress enacted the Corrupt Practices Act in 1925, the Hatch Act in 1939 with amendments in 1940, limiting the expenditures of any party committee (on the national, State or local level) to \$3 million in one campaign, and putting a \$5,000 ceiling on individual contributions to any one political committee, which might be, say, the New York Women's Committee for Goldwater. Indeed, there is a provision that the national political committees must report all their financial transactions, and must identify by name and address all those contributing more than \$100.

Evasions

The results have not matched the expectations of the supporters of the acts, because of loopholes and the ease of evasions. For instance, costly pre-election primaries (in which the final selection of the party candidate takes place) are excluded, as well as the reporting of expenditures by a committee if it operates only in one State. Moreover, the publicity given to those who give \$100 or more has not frightened them away. Rather, one outcome has been the necessity for the parties to proliferate their 'apparatus' since the maximum of \$3 million for one committee is much too low. Thus the parties have established a host of new and ad-hoc political committees and auxiliary organs, such as 'Businessmen for Johnson' in the various States, which can spend \$3 million each. If costs run high, more committees can always be created.

Wealthy individuals can evade a \$5,000 ceiling by donating maximum amounts of \$5,000 each to

more than one committee, or by having other members of their family make similar contributions. Obviously, the number of such contributors is limited, but their total donations, especially to the Republican Party, is an important source of funds.

Other Avenues

Let us look more systematically at the sources of party funds. Since there are no mass parties with dues-paying members, the parties must look elsewhere for financial support. The Republicans receive the bulk of their income indirectly from large corporations and directly from wealthy individuals. Since corporations are forbidden by law to give funds directly, their officials may give as private individuals and are then at times compensated through financial bonuses or corporate expense accounts. Thus, in one election 7 executives of the powerful Du Pont chemical company and 34 Du Pont family members (including children) gave nearly \$100,000 to the Republican Party coffers. On occasion, the Party will also stage fund-raising dinners and other affairs.

The Democrats receive money from trade union members, from fund-raising dinners, in which the guests usually pay \$100 for a meal, and from a few wealthy and many less wealthy individuals. While the trade unions since 1943, and more specifically since the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947, are forbidden by law to contribute funds directly to political parties, these restrictions are not applicable to voluntary contributions which union members may make. Therefore, the unions have traditionally appealed to their members to contribute at least \$1 to the party of their choice, which usually happens to be the Democratic Party.

The AFL-CIO (the largest labour federation) has set up a special political department for this purpose, which also scrutinizes the voting behaviour of Congressmen to see whether labour blessing ought to be bestowed upon their re-election. When the AFL-CIO issues a call for voluntary contributions it realises that a majority

of members of the affiliated national unions will be reluctant to support any party financially, and it will not expect to raise much more than \$1 million from its more than 12 million members.

Although there are other sources of funds for both parties, these are the most important. They reveal the pattern of support for each party based on different social classes. While the parties may not present a different ideological package to the voters, their electoral support still reflects a traditional split along ethnic, religious, and economic or class lines.

In recent years, proposals have been made to let the government help subsidize the parties by offering tax rebates to all donors, but it appears doubtful that the Treasury Department will be too pleased by this potential revenue loss. Moreover, there has been no tradition in the United States for the masses to support the parties of their choice financially; not to speak of the millions of independent and uncommitted voters who constitute the 'floating' vote. Thus, we may expect the present pattern of financing to continue, including the sophisticated bypassing of government controls.

West Germany

Since the political party system in the Federal Republic of Germany differs from that of the United States in some major aspects, a different system of party financing might be expected.¹ To some extent this is true, although there are some similarities too. German parties tend to be more centralized and to maintain more party discipline than American parties. The former can count on financial aid from their members, in the latter membership is nearly unknown. Moreover, in West Germany the parties must main-

1. The author owes a debt of gratitude to Richard Rose and Arnold J. Heidenheimer who have edited an issue of the *Journal of Politics* (Vol. xxv, No. 4, Nov. 1963) devoted solely to Comparative Studies in Political Finance. Much of the following appears more fully in that issue.

For Germany, see the article by Ulrich Duebber and Gerard Braunthal, pp. 774-89.

tain organizational networks all year at federal, State and local levels.

At the lowest level, membership dues cover some of the needs, but these have to be supplemented by funds from federal headquarters, especially at election time. Then, as in the United States, there is a need for money for election rallies, the printing of posters, motorcades, television and radio time. However, some of the work is performed by non-salaried personnel so that costs can be cut.

Varied Patterns

Party income varies considerably. Only the Social Democratic Party enjoys a high membership (about 650,000 members), while the Christian Democratic Union and the minor Free Democratic Party can only rely on about 250,000 and 75,000 members respectively. Thus the SPD has an income of about 10 million Deutsch Marks from its membership, which the other parties of course cannot match. Therefore, the CDU and FDP have had to rely on donations from the business community, to which they do have an ideological affinity, for the bulk of their income.

Until recently, most of this money has been channeled through sponsors' associations launched by organized industry at the federal and State levels. Large industrial, trade, banking, and insurance firms were tapped for funds which would then be distributed to the conservative parties on a basis somewhat proportionate to their parliamentary strength. For the corporations the advantage was that they were not approached continuously for funds from the various parties. Also, the sponsors' associations would have a greater voice in party councils when the time came to nominate candidates. However, as a result of a constitutional court ruling in 1958 the tax-exempt status of the associations has been revoked so that less funds flow through them to the parties.

Other sources of revenue for the CDU and SPD are their own publishing firms and newspapers, economic information bulletins,

special donations for campaign purposes by members of parliament and party members. Since these sources did not produce enough revenue for spiraling expenditures, the parties have turned to the government for direct assistance. State and federal governments obliged and initially gave them subsidies for their 'political education' work, but eventually for all purposes.

While the federal legislature authorized in 1959 an allocation of 5 million DM per year to be distributed to the parties on the basis of their strength in the lower house, in 1962 this sum was boosted to 20 million DM per year. Moreover, the parties receive about 8 million DM from some of the States. Minor parties are unhappy about public financing since their chances of receiving any, or increasing their, parliamentary representation are slim. They cannot expect a monetary 'windfall' from the government unless their electoral fortunes were to change as a result of other circumstances.

Party expenditures vary considerably between campaign years and non-campaign years. The SPD spends large sums each year to build up its own image, and to pay a large staff. Campaign costs have risen sharply so that the 1961 campaign may have led to an outlay of 70 to 80 million DM for all parties. Of this sum, the CDU may have spent from 30 to 35 million DM, and the SPD from 28 to 30 million DM. It can be surmised that the recent 1965 campaign cost as much as its predecessor.

How much of an impact financial strength has had on the fortunes of the parties is hard to judge. The CDU undoubtedly has had electoral successes not because of its comparative wealth but because of non-related factors such as the popularity of former Chancellor Adenauer, its espousal of the social market economy and the country's position in the international community.

Great Britain

In Great Britain—where there is some secrecy surrounding party finances—the Labour Party re-

ceives the bulk (92 per cent) of its funds, which amount to £325,000 since 1963, from yearly fees given it by its affiliated trade unions, socialist and cooperative societies, and the Constituency Labour Parties.^{1a} Of this sum, the comparatively wealthy trade unions provide the greatest percentage.

The Conservative Party secures generous donations from wealthy individuals and industry (through the United Industrialists Association) to the tune of perhaps £2.5 to £3 million per year. To supplement the more generous donations, the party also relies on modest membership dues, bingo, whist drives, bazaars and garden fetes.

The smaller British parties cannot raise similar sums since their membership and electoral clientele are much smaller than the two giants. But even the Labour Party does complain of insufficient funds and an inability to maintain an adequate organization between election campaigns.

The campaigns are proportionately less costly than in the United States because the Corrupt and Illegal Practices Prevention Act of 1883 effectively fixes a maximum on the expenditures of each candidate.

Italy

In Italy only calculated guesses can be made as to the contributions made to the parties. Membership dues may average up to 20 per cent of party expenditures. An additional source of funds is indirect contributions from party-affiliated or party-sponsored organizations and enterprises, ranging from sports clubs to publishing plants. That the industrial association, Confindustria, has supported the leading Christian Democratic Party is no secret. But how much support the Italian Communist Party has received from the USSR is not known. In any case, the Party's large membership assures it basic support.

While the better-financed parties can afford to maintain national, regional, and local headquarters, staffs, and agents, the less well-

^{1a} For Great Britain, see the article by Martin Harrison, *op. cit.*, pp. 664-685.

endowed parties must spend most of their income on electoral campaigns. An electoral law of 1953 is of some benefit to the latter since it limits the duration of the campaign, the number of posters, etc. However, as one writer maintains, it is not merely the magnitude of resources which are important but the way in which resources are used.²

Israel and Japan

In Israel, the many mass membership parties are centralized and disciplined, and are a testimony to the intensity of political feelings among the populace.³ Money is raised at the local level but is transmitted to the national headquarters of the parties. Thus, the Mapai Party, the largest in Israel, receives half of its income from its dues-paying members scattered throughout the country. Additional funds are raised from wealthy donors, from commercial services such as building societies and banks and from special fund-raising drives.

As to campaign expenditures, the amounts spent have remained secret, although it is known that they have been extremely high due to a highly charged political atmosphere. Since there is no television, a high proportion of the outlays is spent on the more traditional campaign techniques, such as rallies, printed materials, election posters and pamphlets.

Again, it is difficult to assess the impact which money has on elections in Israel. One author maintains that 'it would be true to say generally that the larger the party, that is to say the more numerous its usual supporters, its election expenditures rise by geometric progression, and so does the cost per successful candidate.'⁴ But again it is obvious that many other factors in addition to money enter into a voting decision.

In Japan, two major parties, the Liberal-Democrats and the Socialists, are competing for electoral

support, although both have difficulty in attracting a mass membership.⁵ Thus, the income of the Liberal-Democrats from members is only 1 per cent (in 1960). However the primary support for that party comes from the business community—the economic associations and the corporations, and for the Socialists from the powerful 3.5 million member Sohyo trade union federation. But in both instances the members of these interest associations do not identify closely with the parties.

For business, such donations were painless since generous tax laws allowed them to be tax deductible as business expenses. But in 1963, a Tokyo District Court ruled that the political contributions of a company were not in accord with its by-laws. Whether this decision will be sustained or reversed remains to be seen. However, a Political Contribution Control Law and corporation tax laws implicitly acknowledge the legitimacy of political contributions.

Soaring Expenditures

This necessarily cursory survey of political finance activities in selected countries demonstrates a pattern of similarities and differences. Parties in all countries seem in constant need for more funds, and are perpetually making declarations of imminent bankruptcy unless financial angels appear on the horizon to bail them out of their predicament. But detached observers are beginning to wonder whether financial expenditures could not be trimmed, especially during election campaigns, without seriously affecting the 'competitive and democratic spirit in each country.

It seems to be a fact that campaign expenditures are rising astronomically, especially when there is more and more reliance on television as a prime medium for propaganda. Some countries have effectively decreed that campaigns must be shorter and that other restrictions must be introduced. But it seems doubtful that parties in other countries are willing to observe such restrictions,

although in West Germany recently the party treasurers themselves arrived at such an agreement. What makes any forecast difficult is that the style of campaigning differs from country to country, although in this instance too there are many basic, similar practices.

Membership Dues

As to party income, obviously mass membership parties can rely more heavily on their members for financial sustenance, while cadre parties must rely heavily on outside sources. But apparently no party can rely only on membership dues. Thus, the German Socialists in recent elections have even sought the support of businessmen. When parties enjoy the support of affiliated, mass member organizations then their financial woes may be solved, as is true of socialist parties linked to trade unions.

Similarly, conservative parties, with a limited membership base, must seek support from the business community, which in turn gives this support as an anti-socialist weapon. The German and Japanese practice of business firms channeling funds through sponsors' associations has aroused the curiosity of some observers, but the practice may be dying out, especially if State subsidies in one form or other will supplant some of the more traditional forms of aid.

To the question of the effectiveness of money in politics, only hypothetical answers can be given. Undoubtedly a party with ample financial resources at the outset has a better chance of making an impact than a party with few resources. But money alone does not count as too many elections have shown. The Republican Party in the United States with Goldwater as its presidential candidate in the last election had ample funds supplied by wealthy conservative donors, yet Goldwater suffered a crushing defeat. Obviously, the party philosophy or programme, the appeal of its candidates, the image it presents to the nation, its past record—these are but some of the other factors which will make the difference between victory and defeat.

2. Stefano Passigli in *Journal of Politics* op. cit., p. 735.

3. See the article on Israel by Emanuel Gutmann, op. cit., pp. 703-717.

4. *Ibid.*, p. 716.

5. See the article on Japan by James R. Soukup, op. cit., pp. 737-756.

Books

THE COSTS OF DEMOCRACY By Alexander Heard.
The University of North Carolina Press, 1960.

It is no longer possible to carry out one's election campaign with the help of street fights, as the great Abraham Lincoln is said to have done for his American presidential campaign. Nor can the free election system of a modern State operate on the lines of the early Greek democracies which, owing to their inherent narrowness of sphere, managed to decide vital matters without much ado.

Due to the widespread enlightenment in politics and an increasing interest in participation in the management of political institutions, the whole game has attracted enough resources in its ambit, money inclusive. After the acceptance of the democratic system of government in a large number of States, queries have been raised regarding the cost of the system's operation. Generalisations are often made about the beneficial (or detrimental) effects of the dependence of democratic systems of election on money. There are attempts to analyse the impact of money on the campaign and the consequent behaviour of the elected government in the implementation of

its policies. It is investigated whether big money holds the trump card in free elections.

There prevails a type of skepticism in this branch of political finance regarding the fruitfulness of analytical and scientific studies of the above type restricting their number to almost a negligible quantity. According to some, adequate data are not available for any scientific enquiry and whatever investigations are undertaken according to the information at hand may not lead to correct policy formulations. Others believe that these enquiries at least provide a basis for legislation to curb unfair monetary practices. Alexander Heard belongs to the second school of thought and has tried to study the role of money in United States politics.

The rise in expenditure in political campaigning in the United States is indicated as only due to the rise in the absolute national expenditure; the relative national income is thus balanced by the overall spurt in price level and the total expenditure. Legal attempts to check foul play by the money involved in politics have not always been unsuccessful in their objective; they have often restricted the role of money if not completely abolished it. Involvement of

money is inevitable in politics if the principles of democratic government have to survive and the expenditure by itself does not much affect the subsequent political implications.

Basing his enquiry on these main premises, Heard has analysed the processes as well as the outcomes of campaigns and the impact of money on them. Does money win elections? This seems to be the first question that requires a proper answer. The general notion that the winning party spends more money than the losing party is not always correct. The success of the Democratic Party in the American elections of 1932, 1936, 1940, 1944, and 1948 did not follow the ratio of expenditure. But the author, who believes that money is a necessary condition for winning an election, infers that the party would have had more successes if it had spent more.

Even if money is a necessary condition, the same cannot be said about its sufficiency. For apart from this, a candidate's success depends on a large number of other factors such as the voters' pre-disposition, the context of issues involved, the personality and the political record of the candidate and the character of the informal and formal political organisations initially at the disposal of the opponents.

Political and other vested interests apart, the financial contributions are also a result of motivation on the part of the givers. Heard says that these motivations are complex phenomena and does not explain them in the political context. According to his enquiry, the contributions come mainly from concern for government policy, personal identification with a group or an individual, feelings of duty and responsibility to be politically active, desire for governmental privileges and the urge to enter the game of politics by whatever means possible. There are certain individuals and organisations which can be termed habitual contributors. But behind all these philanthropic offers works a profit-motive theory due to some highly simplified incentives, mainly economic.

A significant contribution of the book is the statistical mapping out of the relative positions of various groups in the U.S. campaigns of the Presidential and States' elections of 1952. The various forms money acquired in the process are well described. Big industrial groups and rich families are the main contributors for the campaigns. Despite an increasing share of the proletariat in the elections, the vested groups play a vital role in the campaigns; their importance has been no less in modern times.

The table of known campaign contributors belonging to selected organised groups shows that reputed business houses have contributed huge sums of money apart from the influence they wield through their employees and dependents. This is in contrast to the generalised homily offered by Heard that the major contribution comes from a large number of donors.

The author has been objective while discussing the role of labour as well as other sources of money.

It is revealing that the underground world and other unsocial elements have a major part to play in the election campaigns; the underground controls 10 per cent of the American national income and influences elected representatives in more ways than one.

Amidst the array of statistics one finds an attempt to enquire whether expenditure on campaigns has increased in recent years and to evaluate the cost of democracy in monetary terms. But the more fundamental question of a free society's cost in terms of power, individual influence and the role of big money in electing representatives remains unanswered. Whether valid data, to this effect, are available is to be explored by the present and future researchers on political finance.

Anees Chishti

COMPARATIVE PARTY FINANCE: Notes on Practices And Toward A Theory By A. H. Heidenheimer.

The Journal of Politics, Nov. 1963, Vol. 25.

Political theorists interested in the study of the functioning of political parties in a democracy have so far given very little attention to the problem of political finance and its impact on political participation and party structure. To promote studies of this type, the *Journal of Politics* conducted a symposium on 'comparative party finance'. The article under review forms the concluding part of this symposium. It is based on the observations made by a group of specialists on the structure and complex of party finance in nine major democracies of the world, namely, Australia, Britain, Germany, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Philippines and the United States. Besides Heidenheimer's article, the symposium includes contributions from the participating specialists—an article on each of these countries excluding the United States.


Heidenheimer's note is mainly concerned with the problem of evolving a comparative model for measuring the scale of expenditure on electioneering in democratic countries undergoing varying phases of development, and locating the factors responsible for fluctuations in such expenditure from one country to another. The model which he has worked out for this purpose is simple in construction. It is solely based on an index of expenditure showing the average cost of collecting a vote in terms of the average hourly wage of male industrial workers.

To illustrate how the index is calculated, an example may be given. Supposing that expenditure on electioneering of all political parties in a country is estimated to be Rs. 1 per vote cast and if the average hourly wage of male industrial workers in the same country is Re. 0.50, the index of expenditure would then be 2, or twice as much as the average hourly wage.

The index which he has worked out on this basis shows some interesting results. Israel figures as the



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


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costliest country, where a vote seems to cost the equivalent of 20.5 industrial wage hours, and Australia the cheapest—0.45 or less than that paid for half an hour's work to the Australian wage-earners. Philippines, with an index of 16, figures as the second costliest country, followed by Italy (4.5), Japan (1.36), India (1.25), United States (1.12), Germany (0.95) and Britain (0.64).

These estimates being mainly based on guess work are only crude indicators showing the probable amount of man-hours spent in collecting a vote. Their usefulness is further limited by the fact that they do not take into account, nor distinguish, the position of different political parties in a country, which is more important than finding out how a group of countries which are neither facing each other nor competing for comparable results are situated.

After all, what matters is not how much of the industrial wage is being spent by the Indian political parties on electioneering in contrast to that being spent by their counter-parts in the United States, but how much of such resources are handled within a country by the different political parties—their individual share, sources of income and mode of expenditure, impact on the functioning of the party system, and the like. An analysis of this type can only lead to an understanding of the role and impact of political finance on political participation and party structure. A world-wide comparison of combined party expenditure on electioneering tells us nothing, except that it varies from one country to another.

The model looks all the more redundant when one examines the inferences which the author has drawn from it. These inferences are very general in nature. They could have been drawn even without calculating the 'hourly industrial wage index'. The fact that a rigid loyalty on the part of the voters to the contesting parties lessens the latter's burden and therefore their cost on electioneering needs no explanation, at least not in terms of a rigorously worked out world index. The inferences drawn are also not always convincing. In such cases, one notes an attempt on the part of the author to reconcile the facts with the model rather than modify the model to fit in with the facts.

For instance, the statement that: 'Voters in the U.S. and Israel are both very politically literate, but the per-capita cost of reaching each voter through the available means of communication is immensely greater in the smaller country' is neither convincing nor logical. One fails to see why in a situation where the means of communication are essentially the same—television, radio, newspapers, posters, public speeches, etc.—the cost should be 'immensely greater' in a smaller area of operation. If in Israel the comparative cost of collecting a vote is far greater than that in the United States, there can be a simpler and, incidentally, much more logical ex-

planation, namely, that the socio-political tradition and party funds in Israel demand as well as permit a higher level of expenditure on electioneering.

The author is at his best when he explores, without the aid of his model, the relation between 'political expenditures and socio-political changes'. He outlines four phases of development in the pattern of political finance. These follow from the advances made by a country in the fields of industrialisation and democratization. *Phase A* is characterised 'by a very limited politicisation of the electorate, the continued shaping of behaviour by largely traditional modes and established centres of authority.' The level of economic development is also low, 'but the voters relationship to the political contestants is so remote that the idea of viewing elections as sources of personal benefit does not occur to the vast majority.' Effort and funds can be concentrated 'on swaying the relatively small number of local influentials, techniques of mass persuasion are barely existent, with the result that campaign "inputs" in general and political expenses in particular are quite low on a per capita basis.'

In *Phase B* the political experience of a generation or so leads to an electorate which, though 'still poor' and 'relatively uneducated', is 'wise to the game'. The voter still perceives his interest 'mainly in immediate and personal terms', but all the same craves for 'expensive entertainments, family advantages, or open or disguised cash payments.' The demand for expensive techniques of persuasion therefore 'far exceed the supply of additional—direct, personal or institutional—supports', resulting in higher 'cash costs of running elections'

In *Phase C* there is a greater political mobilization. The electorate is now expected to have grown rich and divided into specific social class groups. 'In the West, this phase has usually been roughly coincident with the achievement of the mature capitalist industrial society.' The intensity of conflict between 'opposing class and ideology based parties' now calls for much more intensive campaign struggles. But compared to the preceding phase, campaign expenditures are lower, 'partly because the per capita propaganda expenditure through the mass media is likely to be less and partly because much of the effort will be of a volunteer or institutional kind.'

In *Phase D* there is again a tendency for political and campaign expenditures to rise, 'reflecting an enlarged gap between material resources needed for political persuasion and the supports available in terms of voluntary efforts and institutionalised support organs.' To meet the challenge, parties and candidates are compelled to make relatively greater efforts to engage and activate the voters. 'The supports which may have helped to make campaigning less expensive earlier... lose their self-sustaining capacity or marginal utility.' To the extent this is true, rapid changes in campaign styles necessitating

higher expenditure on electioneering become imperative.

Ranjit Gupta

DEMOCRACY AND THE COST OF POLITICS By

William B. Gwyn.

Athlone Press, 1962.

The name of this book is rather misleading. Firstly, legally speaking, England is not a democracy: it is a constitutional monarchy. Secondly, as long as the electorate remained restricted, which it did for the earlier period covered by the book, there could be nothing like democracy. The first democratic influences in Parliament came with Cromwell, through the levellers, the Luddites, the Chartists, to the 1892 general election when working class members first entered Parliament. But even today, the British Parliament is not all that democratically constituted, with its House of Lords, which is by any test an undemocratic body.

The book deals strictly with the cost of Parliament in England. Election expenses, like charges of returning officers, polling booths, payment of those working for candidates, their transport and entertainment, payment of members, and election petitions to unseat members, form the scope of this book. Only indirect inferences can be drawn regarding the democratic content of Parliament. An index at the end showing the difference in the value of the pound then and now gives a clearer idea of costs.

The old proverb that he who pays the piper calls the tune applied to prospective M.P.s in England too. Gwyn shows how sometimes it was the powerful county interests, sometimes the Court through various paying jobs that influenced MPs until, after a grim struggle, trade unions showed their strength too. Ability of the candidate to bear all the costs was the criterion of choice until the Irish Nationalist Movement showed the power of broad-based small donations to help democracy along. Until the Irish and trade unions showed the way, it was taken for granted that only the rich and powerful or those willing to bow to their wishes could enter Parliament.

Gwyn discusses how the two political parties, the Whigs and the Tories and their successors, the Liberals and Conservatives chose their candidates and financed elections. He gives figures to show that £1545 was the average cost to ensure a Liberal and £1884 the average for a Conservative success. Any change towards more democratic views like Gladstone's conversion to Home Rule cost the Liberals their richer supporters. Yet how all this comes under the cost of democracy, one does not know, especially when Gwyn quotes another study of England which says that 'The constituencies in 1874 and 1880 elected as their representatives the richest assemblages in the world.'

The Irish Nationalist Movement was the first to break away from this tradition by running political

activity on mass subscriptions among the poorer elements of society, paying as little as a penny a month. This also had to cover election expenses to unseat members, which were incurred fairly frequently at that time. The Irish Nationalist Movement differed from English parties in that subscriptions were collected from those striving for the repeal of the Act of Union, and during the Home Rule days, funds came from the Irish in America.

But the really democratic element came in with the trade unions financing election expenses of their chosen representatives. Experience had shown them how little they could depend on Liberal funds. It was not smooth sailing. Gwyn discusses the Osborne judgement which sought to curtail the financing of elections by trade unions. Osborne was the Liberal secretary of a branch of the Railwaymen's Union, and he sought an injunction to prevent the union funds being raised by his society to return and maintain Labour Party members. This happened around 1909 and set the clock back for democracy in England.

Payment to MPs was another measure which was very much opposed by older, entrenched parties. Gwyn discusses the experiences of working class members who had only their very inadequate maintenance allowance granted them by their unions. He goes into the history of payment to MPs since Elizabethan times, but brings out the difficulties in getting it sanctioned in the twentieth century. The scare in the ranks of vested interests and the more conservative parties shows how democratic the actual practises have been.

This book is a barren study of dry as dust expenses, useful only for the indirect inferences which can be drawn regarding the lack of democracy prevalent in the British Parliament in what has been miscalled the oldest democracy. When it is money that wins elections, there is little 'demos' and less 'cracy'.

Kusum Madgavkar

REPORT ON THE FIRST GENERAL ELECTIONS IN INDIA 1951-1952.

Election Commission, Government of India Press, New Delhi, 1955.

REPORT ON THE SECOND GENERAL ELECTIONS IN INDIA 1957.

Election Commission, Government of India Press, New Delhi, 1958.

India is the largest democracy in the world today. With the transfer of power came adult suffrage and an early decision to hold a general election in 1951-1952 and since then elections have been regularly held. With every general election successfully held, the fact that democratic institutions could be worked in the country gained ground. But the record is not entirely without blemish and there are pitfalls and

perhaps the most alarming is the possibility of corrupt practices creeping in increasingly.

Political corruption is not a new phenomenon. In the Greek City States, with increased economic activity of the Greek government, corruption crept in. Later, the Romans were not entirely free from such practices and in many respects they foreshadowed later developments in political life in Europe. Bribery of voters and of the legislature largely disappeared from the Roman Empire with the growing power of the Emperor (who believed 'that one does not bribe where he can browbeat'). But corruption reappeared again with the rise of representative assemblies to power. With more control of the legislature over finances, new corrupt practices were evolved and thus political corruption was 'modernised.'

The framers of the Indian Constitution were aware of the dangers of political corruption and the need to adopt proper measures to ensure that democracy in India works really successfully. The Representation of the People Act lists several corrupt practices and states that if it were proved that a candidate had indulged in these practices he would be disqualified. But apparently such a list can never be an exhaustive one and every election brings to light the loopholes in the Act.

In his report on the second general election, the Election Commissioner clearly explains how these are taken advantage of. Thus, the law relating to submission of the correct account of all expenses in connection with the election incurred 'between the date of publication of notification calling the election and the date of declaration of the result, both dates inclusive.' The law has fixed a legal maximum that a candidate can spend. But this is easily flouted.

Thus, for example, an unscrupulous candidate may 'buy up and pay for all the petrol needed by him for his election campaign before the date of notification or he may pay large sums of money to his party and to his friends before that date on the understanding that they will spend the amounts on his behalf before and during the election without any further specific reference to him in respect of each individual item of expenditure.' There are apparently other ingenious schemes worked out to dodge the legal requirements. The Election Commissioner correctly points out that there is ample scope under the present law to enable him to keep the portion of his expenses well below the permissible maximum.

The Representation of the People (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1956, laid down the maximum expenditure which a candidate is entitled to incur: 'Rs. 35,000 if it is a two-member constituency in any State; Rs. 25,000 if it is a single-member constituency in any State; Rs. 15,000 if it is a two-member constituency in a Union territory and Rs. 10,000 if it is a single-member constituency in a Union territory.' In the case of State assemblies, the maximum fixed

differs from State to State. The law, as the Report points out, requires drastic amendments. There were cases of incorrect returns after the first and the second general elections.

During the first general elections 27,915 candidates took part and their expenses along with their 3,187 election agents' expenses had to be scrutinised. The task was stupendous and during the first election the Commission took a lenient view in many cases. The Report on the second election states that the number of candidates disqualified were as many as 2,829. Again, the task of scrutinising the election expenses of a large number of candidates was stupendous. The second report also recommended that the legal maxima of election expenses should be revised liberally to higher figures and all expenditure incurred on behalf of a candidate by his party or well-wishers with his constructive consent may be made accountable.

One other field where money plays a prominent role in the elections is in the case of independent candidates who 'rushed into the arena of electoral contest either without any intention of going through the contest seriously or without any reasonable prospect of securing even the minimum of one-sixth of the vote.' While the Report does not specifically say so, apparently money does play some part in the contesting or withdrawal of such candidates. One method was seriously considered to overcome this difficulty. It was perhaps pointed out that if the sum required as deposit is raised it may discourage many. But as the Report itself points out, this may result in hardships even to genuine candidates.

The Report on the third general elections has not yet been published and obviously it will reveal interesting developments in recent times. From the reports that appeared in the press, money played a prominent role in the elections and ingenious methods have been adopted to side step the carefully prepared regulations. The accusations lodged by the rival candidates, while in some cases might be exaggerated, are likely to be partially true. This does not however deter the merits of the Indian elections. As the Report rightly points out that in spite of some avoidable defects, the system that 'has been evolved and developed in the country has proved a complete success and it has indeed proved to be a model which has been largely adopted in many other countries.' The Indian electorate has on the whole acted intelligently.

What about the electoral machinery itself? The Election Commission itself had acted extremely efficiently under the prevailing circumstances. Undoubtedly, there were delays but these perhaps were inevitable. But the Commission has acted in an impartial way and the popularity of the Commission was well expressed by a Madras voter who refused to exercise his franchise in favour of any person other than the Chief Election Commissioner who 'was the only one who did not harass him.'

S. Krishnamurthy

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
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
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symposium participants

THE ESSENCE OF IT

Sailen Ghosh, journalist and researcher, at present
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A BATTLE OF PRINCIPLES

Rasheeduddin Khan, Head of the Department of
Political Science, Osmania University

NOW IS THE TIME

P. N. Dhar, Director of the Institute of Economic
Growth, Delhi

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Mohan Kumaramangalam, prominent lawyer, member
of the National Council of the Communist Party of
India

SELF RELIANCE

Frank Moraes, Editor-in-Chief of 'The Indian Express'

THE ECONOMIC FRONT

T. N. Srinivasan, Professor of Economics, Indian
Statistical Institute (Planning Unit, Delhi)

FOREIGN POLICY CONTINUUM

V. K. Krishna Menon, former Union Minister for
Defence

COVER

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The essence of it

SAILEN GHOSH

THAT the present war was the result of aggression by Pakistan is not denied by anybody except the Pakistani fanatics and those who have reasons to be blind to facts. The U.N. Secretary General has put out enough facts to prove it conclusively. The way in which aggression was planned is also interesting. Pakistan's sudden thrust earlier this year had, as one

of the objectives, the testing of India's determination.

The agreement on Kutch had convinced Pakistan that pacifist India would not be prepared to go to war even if war was forced on her, particularly if the big powers stepped in as peace-makers; and the softness of the U.K. and the U.S.A. towards the Kashmir question was well known. Therefore,

even on the day President Ayub's representative was signing the Kutch agreement in New Delhi, Pakistan was quite confidently preparing for large-scale armed infiltration into Kashmir.

To say that Pakistan has been committing aggression repeatedly (aggression in 1947, aggression earlier this year and aggression, again, in August and September) is not enough. It is necessary to see why Pakistan could commit aggression. No impartial observer of the Indo-Pak scene can escape the conclusion that if Britain had not been blinded by its acquired prejudices (acquired during the period of its divide-and-rule in this sub-continent) and the Americans misled by Pakistan's talk of anti-communism, there would have been no incitement to Pakistan and consequently no war.

Britain's Role

Of these two, the role of Britain particularly was one of deliberate mischief. It was not only prompted by prejudice; Britain wanted to pursue a policy of divide and hold the balance even after the transfer of power; this has been the policy followed in relation to India and Pakistan since 1947. The British papers that talk of this or that country's moral claim to Kashmir should first think of the morality of this policy represented by their own successive governments.

The British Government had definitely expected the ruler of Jammu and Kashmir to join Pakistan, primarily because the ruler was against the State people's movement and the Indian National Congress (from which it received great inspiration) and had even imprisoned Jawaharlal Nehru, while the Muslim League leaders who were at the helm of Pakistan had condemned the State's people's movement. When, due to the folly of Pakistani raids, the Maharaja expedited his decision to accede to India, it came as a disappointment to Britain. When India, misled by advice emanating from British sources, stopped the Indian army's triumphal march, Britain found an opportunity to manoeuvre. Since then, Britain

has been acting in bad faith against India.

The U.K. Prime Minister's role in recent months, from Pakistan's probing action in Kutch to the large-scale war—his throwing about the U.K. Government's full weight to stop the fighting in Kutch when India was just launching the counter-offensive; his over-readiness to condemn India, his silence over Pakistan's repeated crossings of international frontiers—has caused many to wonder whether the infiltration of disguised armed troops of Pakistan had the blessings of Britain, too!

The very fact that this is not considered improbable shows Britain's despicable role in the entire episode and its major responsibility for the present war, however innocent-looking its anguish and sense of horror at the 'suicide of sub-continent.' The way the BBC and the British Press put out false stories and gloated gleefully by imagining 'India's not so much a bloody nose as a nose put out of joint' (*Economist*, September 18) needs no comment.

The U.S.A.

The U.S.A. signed a Military Assistance Pact with Pakistan in 1953. India was quick to realise the adverse consequences which this new development would have on Indo-Pak relations and described it as a 'most unfortunate intervention.' India did not doubt the genuineness of the U.S. assurance that the pact was not aimed at India and that it was intended to fight communism in Asia. India, however, knew fully well that Pakistan's motives were totally different and that its only aim in signing the Military Assistance Pact was to strengthen itself militarily and politically against India—politically because U.S. support in the U.N. on the Kashmir issue might bring many votes in Pakistan's favour.

The U.S.A. cannot simply say that it had been misled by Pakistan's false talk. It was only too prone to be misled. Referring to President Eisenhower's assurance in March 1954 that the U.S.A.

would take action if any one misused American arms, Prime Minister Nehru had made a blunt statement which was not heeded:

'I have no doubt the President is opposed to aggression. But we know from past experience that aggression takes place and nothing is done about it. Aggression took place in Kashmir six and a half years ago and thus far the United States has not only not condemned it, but we have been asked not to press it in the interest of peace. Aggression may well follow in spite of the best intentions of the President and then a long argument will ensue on what exactly is aggression.'

The U.S.A. must have been eager to get the facility of certain air and espionage bases in the northern part of West Pakistan which were at that time—that is, before the development of the most modern missiles and satellites—useful to its concept of security. That was the temptation.

The U.S. policy of appeasement to Pakistan and the U.K.'s bias for Pakistan in questions concerning Indo-Pak relations are basically responsible for the present war. It is they who have all along equated the aggressor with the victim of aggression and have thus emboldened Pakistan in the view that aggression pays.

The U.N.

Then, it is by now clear that if the U.N. Secretary General had not permitted Pakistan to twist his arm over his original statement and had identified the aggressor early enough, the escalation of the conflict would have been prevented. When the statement eventually came, it was too late to have any impact. The Secretary General cannot, therefore, completely escape responsibility for the escalation.

Did not India have any responsibility? Yes, it had and that was generosity to a fault. It imagined that the job of maintaining peace in the world devolved only on its shoulders and, therefore, each time it went to the furthest limit to accommodate the adversary's

claims, its acts were misread by Pakistan as a sign of weakness and incompetence, an unwillingness to fight. If the performance of the Indian forces on the ground and in the air in damaging the superior armour and artillery and jets of Pakistan has become a puzzle to many, it is only a measure of their exasperation with the Pakistani rulers' unrelenting acts of perfidy over the last 18 years, a measure of our people's righteous indignation and determination for retributive justice.

On the Pakistani side, it is only fanaticism which inspires militant action, and it must be remembered that fanaticism also can inspire great self-sacrifice. A comparison of the programmes of the All India Radio and Pakistan Radio could convince anybody that a hate campaign is the mainspring of Pakistani action. None, except the jaundiced eyes of the *Economist* (London), can discern any upsurge of communalism or fanaticism in India. Any hate campaign against the Pakistani people as such is totally absent in this country.

Breached Agreements

The exhaustion of the Indian people's patience with Pakistan was caused by an unbroken series of breached agreements. The aggression on Kashmir in 1947 and all the brutalities in its wake, the violation of the Nehru-Liaquat Pact and a series of such other agreements, the almost bi-annual incitement to large-scale communal massacres in Pakistan (which causes repercussions, though far less violent, in India), the hundreds of violations of the cease-fire line followed by headhunting of Kashmir's civil population, the invasion of Kutch and the launching of armed infiltration even before the ink of the Kutch agreement was dry, showed that here was a species of rulers who did not care even for a semblance of civilised behaviour and to which all moral and ethical codes were taboo. (The irony is that it swears in the name of a great world religion!)

Past experience in this Indo-Pakistan subcontinent should

clearly show that appeals addressed only to the reasonable parties for accommodation, for sacrifice in the larger interest of international peace, do not ultimately succeed in keeping the peace; rather, they prepare the ground when ultimately the eruption of a far more destructive war takes place, as it is bound to do.

When questions regarding ethical and moral codes are raised, our British friends refer us to the need for ascertaining the wishes of the people of Kashmir. Is it not proper to ascertain whether the people would like to be under the sovereignty of the Indian State, we are asked. *The Economist* (London) goes a step further and says: 'A lot of people feel that morally Pakistan ought to have Kashmir, though it was wrong to use violence to try to get it.' The *New Statesman* echoes the same sentiment: 'What distresses us most over here is not so much the feeling that Pakistan has, on the whole, a better moral case in Kashmir, but that India, by refusing to negotiate the issue, allowed Pakistani extremists to provoke a war which must damage India's economy and could even undermine her democracy.' The latter statement means, in effect, that although Pakistan has committed aggression, India has invited or provoked it. And that is the yardstick of morality? Britain feels it so.

Religion Again

Behind the assumption that Pakistan ought to have Kashmir is the belief that the majority of the people of Kashmir are in favour of joining Pakistan and the basis of this belief is the fact that the majority of the Kashmiri population is Muslim. We might refer the above two papers to the first-hand report of Donald Chesworth who said that during his tour of Kashmir, he found little enthusiasm expressed for Pakistan. (*Guardian*, London, September 18).

Originally, Pakistan itself was opposed to any reference to the

popular will in Kashmir. Two leaders of Kashmir, G. M. Sadiq and Bakshi Gulam Mohammed, had gone to Lahore in October 1947 in order precisely to persuade the leaders of Pakistan that the people of Kashmir should decide their own future. G. M. Sadiq revealed on December 10, 1947: 'Before the invasion, the National Conference deputed me to approach the Pakistan Government at the highest level to recognize the democratic rights of the Kashmiri people for self-determination and abide by the sovereign will of a free people on the question of free association with either of the Dominions. I met Pakistan's Prime Minister and other Ministers but it was of no use.'

Secondly, there was a standstill agreement between the Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir and the Government of Pakistan, and certainly the Maharaja had no particular affection for the Government of India. As has been stated already, the ruler was rather sore against the Congress leaders for their support to the State people's movement. If still the Pakistani troops had found it necessary to invade Kashmir, was it not proof that Pakistan had sensed that the people's verdict would go against it? Kashmir was a State where there was a strong tradition of communal amity and the appeal to religion simply would not have cut any ice.

To India's satisfaction, the Maharaja's transfer of sovereignty was supported by the national organization of Jammu and Kashmir and later ratified by the Constituent Assembly of the State. This ratification was really not necessary except as a demonstration of the people's moral support to the ruler's act of accession to India. If that does not reflect popular will, certainly, Pakistan's 'basic democracy' has no popular support at all.

Moral Question

Relevant to this is the more fundamental moral question whether any rulers have the right to

govern the people without a mandate from them. India certainly felt that it would have been better if the representatives of the people of Pak-held Kashmir also could have participated in the decision of the Constituent Assembly. But India could not withhold the final acceptance of accession, *ad infinitum*, at Pakistan's pleasure. Nor could the fate of the Kashmiris be kept hanging in the balance for an indefinite period.

Besides, the people of Kashmir have participated in direct elections held in Jammu and Kashmir thrice during the last 18 years, very unlike the people in Pakistan. What does it show? If 'change of sovereignty' was their will, would not the people's attitude towards elections have been different? And what does the popular participation in the cleaning up of infiltrators show?

Even then, let us assume for the sake of argument, that the Kashmiris are not happy with India. Then, the move of secession should come from the people themselves. What gives Pakistan the right to demand a plebiscite on the Kashmiri people's behalf and to send its saboteurs and launch massive invasions with its troops? Why has this self-appointed custodian of Indian Muslims' interest been taking the law into its hands again and again? Pakistan's status in Jammu and Kashmir is as an aggressor. Its only job was to withdraw its troops. It should have done that before talking about anything else. That is what was asked for in the U.N. Resolution of 1948 and 1949.

Plebiscite

Undoubtedly, it would have been ideal if the people's wishes could have been ascertained before the accession, when the troops of both India and Pakistan did not come into the picture. But two things happened before that, and for both, Pakistan and its mentor, the Political Department of His Majesty's Government, were responsible. Plebiscite had fallen into disrepute by the way in which it was arranged in the North Western Frontier Province

in the presence of 15,000 troops moved in for the occasion.

Secondly, Pakistani troops impatiently invaded Kashmir. Kashmir and India had every reason to believe that they would be prowling around and move in, if Indian troops were withdrawn. It was natural for Kashmir not to like the idea of being undefended, nor could India, to which accession had already been accorded by the Maharaja and supported by Kashmir's national organization, abdicate its responsibilities and leave the Kashmiris to the wolves. Pakistan today asks for plebiscite and that, too, after the withdrawal of Indian—as also Pakistani—troops. The facts of aggression and of accession to India and the consequences that have flowed therefrom over nearly two decades cannot be written off. Past history cannot be called back to today's date to begin the chapter anew on a clean slate.

The People's Wishes

If after all this, Pakistan is allowed the option to reopen the question of plebiscite as and when it chooses and to ignore that it itself was responsible for the absence of ideal conditions for the best manner of ascertaining the Kashmiri people's wishes—and if some powers also sing to the tune of Pakistan alleging India's unfulfilled commitment to a plebiscite—then it must be concluded that the United Nations exists to placate Pakistan and to revolve round Pakistan's moods.

There is yet another point. Pakistan pretends not to understand why the U.N. had asked it, in 1948 and 1949, to withdraw its troops as a pre-condition to any ascertainment of the people's wishes. In international law as also in commonsense, the change of sovereignty takes place with the Instrument of Accession, and the sovereignty of the new State to which accession is made cannot be challenged if its jurisdiction is effective. Both the factors—Instrument of Accession and Effective Jurisdiction—were in India's favour. There was no accession to Pakistan and it could not, therefore, claim any right to keeping its

troops within Jammu and Kashmir and equate its status with that of India.

As explained already, the question of ascertaining the popular will concerning a change of State arises only when there is a very determined move from the people themselves for secession. Until then, nobody need bother about this problem. In this case, none has so far wanted secession. Even Sheikh Abdullah who had declared Kashmir's accession to India irrevocable and who, even when he tried to undo what he had done earlier—possibly for bargaining for concessions for some kind of a special status for Kashmir within the Indian Union—did not spell out, and has not spelt out even today that he would like secession. If this is ground enough for a plebiscite, why does not the U.N. order a plebiscite in the land of the Pakhtoons and the Baluchis and East Bengalis where there is a strong demand for secession from the people themselves? What India resents is this flexible interpretation, these inconsistent promptings of 'democratic conscience', this discrimination particularly against a country which is known to be peaceful. India cannot permit this unique treatment.

Dangerous Precedent

Let us see what can happen if India agrees to such a procedure in Kashmir. Apart from the humiliation of being singled out for discriminatory treatment to please an aggressor, India will have to expect other crops all of which will be poison. If any State of India—in the North, South, or East—comes for a time to feel that it is not getting full justice and, therefore, wants a plebiscite, on what ground will it be denied? (After all, assuaging the feelings of our own countrymen is more important.) And, with this precedent, will not the denial mean greater trouble? Would the denial in that case be justified simply because there would be no aggressor from outside?

Suppose, a few years hence, in the border State of Assam, the

Muslim population grows to be numerically larger—the Muslim population generally grows faster—will it not give legal sanction for Pakistan to claim that province and to send armed saboteurs and ask for a plebiscite? Let us not dismiss this question as merely hypothetical. Those who know the extent of infiltration already into Assam, and Pakistan's bitter complaint against the efforts at any expulsion know that the problem is real. Real or not, the U.N. cannot and must not act in a manner which sets a dangerous precedent and encourages certain countries to unlawful action.

In secular India, nobody grudges the faster growth of this or that religious community, and this secular tendency is getting strengthened at present by the sacrifice of all communities in the joint defence of the nation. But if the demand for plebiscite is accepted, that will be the beginning of an evil process in which the growth of one religious community will cause raised eyebrows from the others, particularly so long as Pakistan claims the guardianship of the Muslims in India.

If India is opposed to a plebiscite in Kashmir, it is not because of a fear of loss of Kashmir. It is to uphold a principle and to disallow an exceptional treatment to India. And in fighting for the principle, it is safeguarding its own integrity against future threats and also the integrity of many other States.

Pan Islamism

The U.K. and the U.S.A. and some other western nations do not realise India's particular problem because they have no experience of Pan-Islamism or the cry for an Islamic State. In the countries of the West the separation of religion and the church from the State had been effected some centuries ago. The Soviet Union is in a better position to appreciate the problem.

The basic fight is between the forces of secularism and its enemies. That it has taken the particular form of a war over Kashmir

in the sub-continent is because of the complications introduced by the cry of an Islamic State which is totally alien to the original spirit of Islam, as we shall see later. Therefore, in this fight India deserves the support of all, including the Muslims of the world, who do not want to see religion exploited for political purposes.

Perversion

Pakistan's cry for an Islamic State is an example of how a lofty principle can be perverted to subserve just the opposite end, how a noble teaching can be emptied of its original meaning to suit the needs of temporal power. The State of Islam was conceived not in the sense it is being used now but as the Kingdom of God on earth. Of course, Islam has a concept of polity. 'The State, from the Islamic standpoint, is an endeavour to transform the principles into space-time forces, an aspiration to realize in definite human organization.' This meant that the State had to be subordinated to the laws of the Almighty, the rule of Divinity, and that the believers must adjust their relations and loyalties with worldly authorities accordingly.

In a society where life is compartmentalised and where the worship of God is reserved only for certain hours in a day of the week, and God's worship is not reflected every hour in pious acts, the teaching to integrate religious life with social and political life was certainly an advancement. But in course of time, when only the formalism of religion came to be stressed, it became an instrument in the hands of the reactionaries. What was an instruction to supersede loyalty to the State by loyalty to God came to be interpreted as a sermon for overriding allegiance to some communal State at the expense of one's own country.

The politicians, even if nominally Muslims, claimed that all those who profess faith in Islam, should be brought under Muslim States. (We say 'nominally Muslims' because, to quote Wilfred Cantwell

Smith, 'The facts today are so different from what they have ever been, that to be a Muslim—or Christian—in fact is so different from being a Muslim and Christian in name, that to preserve the name is either meaningless or contradictory.') And what is a Muslim State? The answer will be a State controlled by the Muslims. And who are the Muslims? 'Muslims' means believers in God. Are the nominal Muslims all real Muslims? Are those, who do not observe the formalisms of Islam but make submission, believers or not? It might seem incredible but it is true that no two Muslim divines could agree on the definition of a Muslim during an enquiry by Chief Justice Munir of Pakistan after the Lahore riot in 1953 between the Islamic sects (vide Justice Munir's Report).¹ And what is the difference between a State controlled by the Muslims and an Islamic State? An Islamic State is governed by the *Shariat*. And how in modern conditions is it ultimately different from other States? How will the institution of *Zaka*, *mirath* and *riba* be worked in a way different from what the modern States are doing?

Integrative Force

Since there is a widespread feeling that it is not only as the Kingdom of God on earth but also as a political community that the Islamic State was conceived in the Prophets' time, a clarification is in order. Then the political structure known was the tribe. The large and powerful tribe was a sovereign body politic, giving security only to its members.

1. This is not to be taken lightly because it reflects divisions in the fundamental understanding of the religion. Among the followers of every religion, the Hindus included, there are such divisions. The religious are not necessarily the pious—so marked has been the distinction. But in Islam, which wanted full integration of the political and the social and the religious life of the individual, the division has been much deeper. The confusion has arisen because with the passage of time and with the quick spread of the religion to distant parts of the world which increased the quantity without great regard for quality, the cardinal teachings have been neglected and the outer forms have predominated.

When the inter-tribal feuds were sought to be eliminated, the tribal affiliation needed to be transcended by some higher loyalty and only religion could provide that loyalty and that binding force.² In those days, the means of communication were not so developed; therefore, no other integrative force was present.

Moreover, the religion of Islam was in its pure form at that time and could bind men together. With the decline of moral and spiritual values, both the words 'Islam' and 'Muslims' have lost their original meaning. To-day one can claim to belong to the Islamic community without being given to *aslama* (submission to God). The inner springs of the heart could bind all men together but mere formalism cannot. Besides, in modern times alternative forces—material and cultural—are available that can bind whole nations. What was, therefore, the most advanced integrative force in the earlier centuries might at best play an integrative role for communities that call themselves Muslims while causing deep divisions in the greater collective, namely, mankind, if a senseless attachment to the nomenclature of the Islamic State or even a State of Muslims is insisted upon. It will also defeat the ultimate ideal of Islam.

The Ideal

"The ideal of a State in Islam is a universal federation, a confederation of autonomous States, associated together for upholding freedom of conscience and for the maintenance of peace and cooperation in promoting human welfare throughout the world" (Muhammad Zafrulla Khan). Can

this ideal be ever achieved by narrow and soulless interpretation of the words, 'Islam' or 'Muslims'?

That fanatics can only serve to increase the distance between the ideal and its realisation can be illustrated by a simple example. In the Prophet's time, the religious minorities in the Islamic State had the status of 'protected groups'. At a time when protection was the most important question, this system served very well. But at a time when the guarantee of personal safety to all has become the basic obligation of the State, and equal political rights have become more important, these concepts of 'protected groups' will certainly create friction. On the other hand, any departure from it will be in conflict with a tradition-bound Islamic attitude.

Thus, an understanding of the fundamentals of the concept of an Islamic State, a recapturing of the original spirit for application in today's changed conditions, is necessary for shaping correct attitudes to the Kashmir dispute and the Indo-Pak conflict.

Islam stood against exploitation, against racial or social injustice. Islam championed the cause of a State that in the modern context may be called a welfare State. The elective principle in running the State was also emphasized. Pakistan is certainly remote from such concepts. The children born in the fifties and sixties of this century who are growing up with their experience of Pakistan will not be inclined to believe that Islam meant 'entering into peace by submission to God', and that a Muslim is one 'who makes his peace with God and man'. This, unfortunately, is Pakistan's contribution to Islam.

The Partition

The basic cause of the Indo-Pakistan conflict is the partition of India and the creation of the geographically absurd and politically unstable State of Pakistan. The fantasy of the Indian Muslims constituting a nation separate from the rest of India gave rise to the demand for Pakistan. In the concept of the Muslim League

leaders, the Muslims alone constituted one sovereign nation, and the rest of India consisting of all other religious communities constituted another sovereign nation.

All serious students of the history of India's freedom struggle know that Jinnah had not really wanted partition. The Muslim League had worked out an ingenious formula, contrary to its own concept of the Muslim nation, that all the Muslim majority provinces would be included, undivided, in the State of Pakistan (i.e., the whole of Punjab and Bengal would be in Pakistan, apart from Sindh and N.W.F.P.) and the rest would form what they called the 'Hindu State' and the two nations would co-exist in a loose confederation. Since the status of each sovereign nation has to be equal, the parity of status between 25 per cent Muslims and the rest of India would thus be achieved.

Parity

This clever formula did not work. When the Viceroy confronted the Muslim League leaders with the statement that either they agree to the partition of Bengal and Punjab or there would be no Pakistan, they had to agree. Thus, what they tried to use as a bargaining counter led them to a State which does not give them parity of status with the rest of India. Pakistan is one of the bigger nations of the world. Yet, it is very much smaller than India.

The idea of sharing power with the non-Muslim population of undivided India on a democratic basis was unpalatable to the Muslim Leaguers. Had not the Muslims ruled for centuries in this country? How could they share power equally with other communities? Moreover, how could they accept an Independence which was attended with the risk of the Hindu majority forcing its views on the Assembly?

Thus, the Muslim Leaguers could not accept democracy in undivided India nor can they now reconcile themselves to the status of a smaller State in relation to India. This is their dilemma

2. There is another reason why the Islamic religious community could not be at that time separated from its existence as a political community. The Byzantine and Abyssinian empires and also the Persian empire, which had all fallen into disrepute, were linked with some religion, the former two with Christianity and the latter with Judaism. The Prophet sought to avoid involvement with these that had earned the hatred of the Arabs, and, therefore, dissociated the Muslims even as a political community. Today, the conditions are different: the advanced States are all secular.

which is the source of all conflict. This inferiority complex has impelled the Pakistani rulers to adopt a posture opposite to India's at each point of time. The grimacing postures of Pakistan are a measure of its unsatiated hunger for status. It suffers from its own abnormality of the past, and nothing other than chaos and instability in India and humiliation of India can give it satisfaction.

Seeking Solutions

Pakistan sought to solve its status problem by trying to lead the Muslim world. It claimed as its objective the setting up of an Islamic Republic which no other Muslim country has done. But the international Islamic Conferences convened by Pakistan showed less and less enthusiasm. Many Arab countries felt that Pakistan's objective was to make them pull the Pakistani chestnuts out of the fire (there were intense feuds within Pakistan). Hence, this also did not work.

As corruption and maladministration led to dismissals of one government after another, the appeal of an Islamic State to the people of Pakistan became increasingly weak. The complete rout of the Muslim Leaguers in East Pakistan elections and the tendency of the East Bengalis to break away from any relationship with West Pakistan made it imperative to strengthen the cry of Islam for that was the only common bond.

If the Muslims of East Bengal cannot live in a political system with West Pakistan the whole justification of carving out Pakistan as a separate country gets lost! Meanwhile, attempts to define the attributes of an Islamic State led to riots between the Muslims themselves, in a pogrom-like fashion. One may be permitted to say that such violence is inherent in any attempt to establish what is called an Islamic State. If immediately after the death of the Prophet, there could have been great violence on this very question—out of four caliphs succeeding the Prophet, three were done violently to death—any attempt

today, when the scope of variable interpretation is much larger, is bound to invite this disaster. Yet, there was no going back. None had the courage to drop the Islamic State idea for that would lead to the conclusion that the new nation was not worth while.

In this situation, only the threat of an external enemy, the challenge of an external issue (like Kashmir) could help keep the people together. A nation was sought to be created artificially, based only on religion, and brushing aside the bonds of race, composite culture and common living over thousands of years. It is bound to be unstable, and the more unstable it becomes, the more violent becomes the tirade against India in a bid to channelise all the wrath against the unfortunate neighbour!

Since the appeal of an Islamic State within Pakistan alone is not sufficient (for this is a time when the Pakistani youth are being exposed more and more to modernising western influences: it is a period of growing cynicism about religion), the need is for an issue which can rouse great passions; and the cry for Kashmir, which satisfied a blend of national chauvinism and religious fanaticism, suggests itself to be the only way to survival. The problem of status in relation to India is now being sought to be solved by a sense of belonging to a larger group in alliance with China and Indonesia which, it is claimed, will bleed India to death.

Thus, Pakistan wants to solve its problem at the expense of India.

The creation of a politically unstable Pakistan affected the stability of South Asia as a whole. This instability cannot be solved simply by re-integrating India and Pakistan. As the late Prime Minister Nehru had once said, that would add to India's problem and bring back the kind of politics in the subcontinent which had led to mass violence and communal killings before Independence.

The Choice

What is on trial in this subcontinent is democracy and secularism

versus chauvinism and fanaticism. It is for the West to see which forces they would strengthen. They must pause to think whether in the name of solving Pakistan's problem—a problem which in any case would not be solved within the frame of Pakistani rulers' thinking—they would like to endanger the stability of India. If the West has any sense of realism left, it should note that it is India and not its alleged ally in SEATO or CENTO which is the bulwark of democracy in Asia against China's expansionism.

Indiscreet aid will help no containment of expansion. Rather, it will create instability. By wanton aggression, Pakistan will dissipate its own and others' energy and strength so that both get weakened to the delight of the very power which it wanted to contain. Setting the forces of disintegration in motion in India just to oblige a wayward favourite will not be pardoned by history. The West's sincerity to the ideals of democracy and secularism, too, is on trial.

Unique Situation

Undivided India was a country whose Muslim population was the largest in the world. India, again, was perhaps the only country in the world where the Muslims were the largest among the minority communities. In other countries, the Muslims have either formed the overwhelming majority, if not the entirety, of the population or they have been an insignificant minority. Thus, India's situation was unique.

What lent complexity to the situation was a tradition which developed within the Muslim community over the centuries; it never shared power with any other community. It has either ruled over others or has been defeated and ruled, but has never shared power. India in the forties presented it with the prospect of sharing power with other communities. The tradition which developed through the rule of many a dynasty has nothing to do with the religion of Islam. (Rather, so far as one can see, the growth of dynasty rule was against the

spirit of Islam. Refer to Umar's attempts to prevent the rise of a permanent governing class.)

Living in the modern world requires getting over this tradition which was a superimposition on religion. What is more, in the process of breaking through this outmoded tradition, the Muslims would be re-discovering the original spirit of Islam.

The Opportunity

Now, it is the privilege of Indian Muslims to break through the accretions which have obscured the transcendent truths of Islam. It is their privilege to preach anew the significance of revelation, truth and brotherhood with the people of other faiths. As Wilfred Cantwell Smith points out, this restoration to the pristine purity of Islam, this creativity of Indian Muslims will solve the problems which the Muslims face in modern life in a minority, yet free, group. Thereby, the Indian Muslims will be more creative in showing the Muslims in other countries how to live together with the people of other faiths. For is this not a basic problem for the Muslim world as a whole?

The world is shrinking; and all Muslims taken together are in the same situation within mankind as the Indian Muslims are within India, that is, the largest among the religious minorities. Islam must prove creative at this point (in compatibility and collaboration), and perhaps it will learn this in India.

Indian Muslims would not disappoint. India's Hamid Khans and Major Sheikhs and Salim Calebs are giving their lives in defence of their country together with India's Hindus, Christians, Sikhs, Parsis and Buddhists. An ideal brotherhood in this land of India, which is a mosaic of many faiths, is emerging. The example of how to hold the people of other faiths in a common brotherhood and how to be true Muslims, will break through the curtain hung by Pakistani rulers. When that comes about, a confederation may be possible, if Pakistan is willing. That will be the way to peace.

That will be the solution of the Indo-Pak problem.

The world powers owe it to civilization that this process is not retarded.

Perhaps it needs to be spelt out even more clearly. There is a very close relationship between the steps taken regarding the so-called Kashmir dispute and the growth of democracy and secularism in India, a fact which is not often understood in the West. *The Times*, (London) has recently suggested that the absence of any communal violence in India during the Indo-Pak war proves that India can apply the principle of self-determination in Kashmir without any fear of disturbance.

These papers seem to have been under the impression that India was opposing a plebiscite in Kashmir only for fear that if the Kashmiri Muslims decided to join Pakistan, it would lead to terrible communal passions in India and the loyalty of every Muslim would be suspect. This is a restricted view. A very correct and full view of the problem has been given in Wilfred Cantwell Smith's book *Islam in Modern History*. I can do no better than state a few of the main points of his chapter on Islam in India.

Minority Fears

The minorities in any country have a tendency to cower in fear of being overwhelmed by the majority. It is in the nature of human society that a member of a racial or religious or linguistic minority would find it difficult to feel fully at home, particularly if the minority had earlier shown emotion for a separate State in which they were not to be included. Even the idea of reducing a minority to a still smaller minority serves to increase the sense of uncertainty and is, in this particular context, against the interest of the Indian Muslims.

Immediately after partition, the Indian Muslims thought of themselves and, by their behaviour and attitudes, allowed both the Pakistani Muslims and the Indian Hindus to think of them not as

Indian Muslims but as Pakistani Muslim expatriates. They could describe themselves only by what they were not rather than by what they were. In spite of the liberal spirit of the government and the society of India, it was difficult to persuade the Muslims to enter into constructive cooperation. And a modern society cannot attempt the best possible standard if one of its limbs, the largest among the minority communities, remains paralysed.

Fortunately, this shyness has been and is being gradually overcome. The Muslims' suspicion that the secularism of Indian States might be a hypocrisy, 'a facade for international exhibition behind which they would be discriminated against,' has now been removed and the gathering knowledge that for the Muslims, India was not so bad and Pakistan, after all, was not so good has helped the process.

Pak Psychology

The process of Indian Muslims adjusting themselves to the new conditions after partition could have been much easier and quicker but for the Islamic nation's subsequent activities. 'The Pakistani Muslims have a psychological investment in the conviction that Indian Muslims are mistreated, and at times one cannot but detect a morbid welcoming of all adverse news and resistance to recognising any achievement in regard to Indian Muslims' welfare. There is a strand in Pak psychology not very far below the surface that does not want to hear well of the Indian Muslims.'

Nothing is more unbearable to Pakistan than the idea that it has lost or is fast losing the allegiance of Indian Muslims. Today, even Kashmir is of small moment in comparison. In fact the Kashmir issue is important to Pakistan as a test of this loyalty, as a means to keep alive the hope that the Kashmiri Muslims and the Muslims of the rest of India still owe allegiance to it.

This being the case, Pakistan's appeals to Indian Muslims were

intended to unsettle the psychological adjustment which the Indian Muslims have already attained. In the past, the desertion of a few Muslims enjoying positions of confidence in the Indian society and Indian Government—some of them having access to secret information—caused a great setback to mutual trust, which was bound to have a cumulative effect as a result of both sides developing complaints. It is to the glory of the broad-mindedness of people who preside over India's destiny as also India's deep tradition of tolerance and acceptance that inter-communal confidence now is something to be proud of. But the process of secularisation, embedded in deep piety and free from communal narrowness, is by no means a straight or a continually ascending curve. Any slide-back from one side will have its effect on the other. If Pakistan's appeal to Indian Muslims for sabotage in India succeeds by even one-hundredth of the measure of its expectations, that may again cause setbacks, though temporarily.

Fighting Fanaticism

If the world powers are in any way secular, they have to tell Pakistan that this cannot be countenanced. And this would mean the world powers discarding their own unimaginative policy of indulgence to a regime of fanatics. It is for the Muslims of the world to realize the problem.

India is a country against which the world's two most unyielding fanaticisms—the fanaticism of the *mujaddid* brand of Islam, based on hatred (as distinct from the Islam based on love preached by Prophet Mohammed) which swept over this sub-continent after Mughal Emperor Akbar; and the fanaticism of China's expansionists, unaware of anything like Karl Marx's humanism, and the inheritors of Han arrogance—have joined forces to destroy its ways of living.

While India does not seek anybody's support simply because it

is a democracy, it expected support in a fight which is really for the preservation of democracy and secularism. But it finds the countries that talk the loudest about democracy not only looking on, but sometimes aiding and abetting the forces of obscurantism in the naive belief that Kashmir is the basic issue and not a mere manifestation of a deeper issue which is secular democracy versus separatism and fanaticism, over which the Indo-Pak war is being fought. It is not too late to realise the mistake.

The Responsibilities

Whatever the attitude of other countries, we must know our strength—and our obligations. India's great contribution to world civilization was her success in building a commonwealth of religions within her frontiers. When the universalism of her religion was sought to be defeated by denial of social democracy (exclusivism on the social plane), the eternal spirit of *Sanatan Dharma* welcomed the social democracy of Islam as a necessary corrective. If blind hatred and fanaticism eclipsed the positive aspects of Islam in the erstwhile undivided India and plagues our neighbour to-day, the social practices of the majority community has also to share the blame.

Today, the whole world is gradually moving, as it has to, to the ideal of the commonwealth of religion. If provocations, however grave, succeed in deflecting us from the ideal which is ours, we shall lose our heritage and be a pauper. The majority community has a great responsibility not only to ensure the safety of the minority but also to integrate the psyche. In spite of Vivekananda and Gandhi, social separatism still lingers; its death-knell must now be sounded. The Muslims of India have given a telling reply to Pakistan's expectations for disloyalty to India. They must also give up their rigidities, see there is no slide-back from the process of the union of hearts, which is the fundamental solution.

A battle of principles

RASHEEDUDDIN KHAN

IN terms of political policy, the undeclared Indo-Pakistan war of twenty two days has been the single biggest cathartic event in the national history of free India. It has shaken us to our roots and created an atmosphere in which the very fundamentals of our cohesive multi-communal national existence, the dominating assumptions of our domestic policy and the guide-lines of our international commitments are called in question. There is, therefore, an urgent need to review, reassess, revalue and remodel them in the dual context of the continuing belligerent postures of our two 'dear' neighbours—Pakistan and China—and the new emergent power-position in the contemporary world, in order to redefine the vital national interests and thereby determine the policy-orientation needed to protect, pursue and promote those interests.

States in modern times derive their legitimacy avowedly from the doctrine of the consent of the governed, or at least from the

principle of the acquiescence of the dominating bulk of the people. Any State which vitiates this norm is, by common logic, to that extent not modern. Substance is given to this foundation of the State by the political elite in their enunciation of certain cardinal concepts of national validity and basic assumptions governing the infra-structure of the State, in conformity with their ideological moorings.

Secondly, all States in modern times, particularly those striving for speedier relevance to modernisation (in the functional sense of the word) promote multiple transactions and establish communication—political, technological, commercial, cultural, etc.—with other States, as an inevitable consequence of international interdependence without which internal growth is an impossibility. But by doing so they create a power-relationship whose ramifications are far and wide and therefore whose repercussions are varied

and complex both in times of peace and non-peace.

Never was the world so inter-linked in 'power-groupings', bound together by many ties of common concern, which lap and overlap each other in a perilously criss-cross manner like the electric wires of a compact machine which might burn it to ashes if the live wires are not properly insulated. Because of these two characteristics, the modern State is 'total' in the internal relevance of its sovereignty and 'global' in the external manifestations of its national policies.

Limiting Factors

This was the changed theoretical situation of statecraft in the mid-twentieth century in which, after decades of heroic struggle—conducted violently and non-violently, in myriad forms and variant styles by generations of patriots, heroes and martyrs—this ancient land with the heavy load of tradition and the weight of much obscurantist heritage, woke up to life and freedom. The form of national independence in India was predetermined at least by two limiting factors: the manner of the transfer of power by the British and the consequences of the Muslim League demand for Pakistan. The final stratagem of the withdrawing British imperial masters, anxious to establish a balance of power in their erstwhile sub-continental empire by the transmutation of the principle of *divide et impera*, was made conveniently possible by their acceptance of the partition of the country.

It seems, in the retrospective wisdom gained by experience of British diplomacy in this part of the world, that probably the British sought to leave behind a relationship of hostility between the two States whose basic approach to politics and statecraft was mutually irreconcilable, thereby providing them an opportunity to play a mediatory role and thus retain a power-lien in the affairs of the sub-continent.

Secondly, there was the communal gusto of the pampered Muslim League whose demand for a sepa-

rate State for the Muslims, based on the otherwise untenable 'Two Nation' theory—that Hindus and Muslims by all canons of nationhood constitute horizontally and vertically, two separate nations—was accepted by the British Government.

Due to a combination of factors, the national leadership of India was powerless in resisting the bifurcation of the country. Partition indeed became the price of liberty, yet the longing for liberty naturally was so powerful and supreme that despite that high price, it was considered risky to postpone its attainment in the faint hope of delayed independence with the unity of the country. There were open threats of fratricide and there was the fear of Britain's reversal of the decolonization policy if partition was not accepted. This fatality of the political situation obtaining in 1947 is to be clearly remembered today.

The Genesis

The genesis and substance of the so-called Kashmir problem is enmeshed not only in the faulty (and what turned out to be, also mischievous) procedure prescribed for the lapse of paramountcy as envisaged in the British constitutional documents,¹ but also in the obstinacy of Pakistan (supported so assiduously by the British)² in emphasising the religious basis for the partition of India.

In the whole range of international law and indeed in the bulky corpus of British constitutional jurisprudence, no concept is so vague—despite its effective utility for the Crown—as the concept of paramountcy. When pressed to define the concept by the Nizam of Hyderabad in a famous controversy, Lord Reading, the then Viceroy and Governor-General of India, borrowing as it were biblical mysticism contained

in the famous aphorism, 'I am that I am', said 'Paramountcy is paramount'. And so it was that with the lapse of the Paramount, paramountcy lapsed and what remained was chaos, anarchy and conflict of claims.

But, probably Britain could not have done otherwise. Its rule in all its colonial grandeur was based on the creation and sustenance of local feudal principalities, expected to play an intermediate role between the dominant foreign power and the mass of the indigenous dominated people. That was the imperial mechanics. And it must be conceded rightaway that the Empire was not created with a view to its liquidation and handing over of its assets one fine morning to its inveterate enemies, the leaders of the liberation movement. What happened on 15 August, 1947, was certainly not the logical fulfilment of British rule but the inevitable culmination of the freedom struggle.

Therefore, the best the British could do in so far as the Indian States were concerned was to leave them to their own fate, and this precisely they did. While almost all the 565 States acceded (mostly to India and some to Pakistan) in one way or another within a year of Independence without much trouble, the accession of Kashmir to India however generated an acrimonious controversy between the two States, whose ugliest expression was seen in Pakistan's recent belligerency.

Pakistan's Contention

Pakistan's contention on Kashmir has many nuances, but basically it rests on three propositions which may be stated as follows. First: India was partitioned on a religious basis. Kashmir is a Muslim majority area. Therefore, Kashmir should go to Pakistan. Second: The Hindu Maharaja of Kashmir had no right to accede a predominantly Muslim area having contiguity with Pakistan to India. Therefore his accession was fraudulent. Third: Accession was done in haste and under duress, and was dependent on ascertaining the wish of the people. Therefore India should hold an

1. Cabinet Mission Memorandum of 12 May, 1946, and Section 7 (1) (b) of Indian Independence Act, 1947.

2. See for instance Mr. Attlee's remarks quoted by Nehru cited in G. O. I., *Kashmir* (Krislma Menon's Speeches in the Security Council), New Delhi, 1958, 69.

internationally supervised plebiscite. In brief, Pakistan questions not only the legality of accession but also the political basis of Kashmir's integration with India. What are the facts?

With the lapse of paramountcy, sovereignty of the States reverted to their respective rulers. In law they were entitled to proclaim and maintain independence, but the Agent to the Crown advised them to join one or the other dominion, by executing the Instrument of Accession as provided in the Government of India Act, 1935.³ Using this prerogative, the Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir, driven by the anarchy unleashed by the invasion of tribesmen from (and, as later revealed, also by the armed forces of) Pakistan, signed the Instrument of Accession to India on October 26, 1947.

The Legality

No jurist can question the validity of this act strictly in terms of the existing legal provisions. And accession was purely and simply a legal act. The religion of the ruler, or other personal facts are inconsequential in law, and in any case that position was never challenged by the founding-fathers of Pakistan. Neither did it prevent Pakistan from signing the 'Standstill Agreement' only a few months earlier, not that it would have inhibited them from accepting accession, if it was offered. Then the suggestion that accession was done in haste is irrelevant because that possibility existed for a long time—almost a year—even if the final signature was affixed in somewhat abnormal circumstances.

Regarding the contention of situational duress, it can be asserted that, for one, Pakistan itself, as became evident in the findings of the UNCIP, was responsible wholly and solely for those compulsive circumstances and, for another, a sovereign was sovereign after the lapse of paramountcy, and possessed the alternative not to accede. It was his choice and discretion and, what is more, it had the unanimous backing of,

what Nehru called, 'the most numerous representative popular organisation in the State which is predominantly Muslim'.⁴ Accession was not a contract but something more than a compact and by its terms it was final, complete and irrevocable. That is the rightful legal position.⁵

Political Aspect

But even if this was not so, nobody with a knowledge of the political situation in Kashmir at that time could ever hazard a guess that the National Conference would have preferred to accede to Pakistan.⁶ The Maharaja might have, and indeed he was inclined to, because of his misgiving about the implications of democratic rule in India to his status and position. But he was frustrated by Pakistan's tactless move to sabotage his authority and thereby Pakistan lost its only chance of getting Kashmir.

The impression that is sometimes sought to be created by Pakistan that had Kashmir not acceded to India, it would have naturally acceded to Pakistan is not only wishfully hypothetical but also contrary to the available evidence of the Kashmir political situation in 1947. No statement has ever been made by any responsible leader of Kashmir at the time or before partition, demanding its accession to Pakistan. The alternative which was usually posed was that of some sort of independence.

There has never been any collaboration, close contact or affiliation between the political movement in Kashmir and the progenitors of the Muslim League demand for Pakistan. Kashmir's history and politics, particularly in its modern phase, has been closely knit to the fortunes of what today constitutes the Republic of India. The Muslim League could never strike roots there. On the contrary, the political elite of the State had

intimate, personal and ideological relations with the composite national leadership of the Congress. It was Nehru and not Jinnah who was arrested by the Maharaja's Government. And the National Conference drew its direct inspiration from the nationalist leadership of India. Therefore, the logic of its political development and the choice of its articulate elite precluded Kashmir's accession to Pakistan. This in any case is a more factually-based conjecture than Pakistan's.

Conceptual Fallacy

The assertion made in an unqualified manner that India was partitioned only on the religious basis, is misleading and tendentious.⁷ While it is true that that was what the Muslim League demanded, and what the British Government in effect conceded, precisely that was not accepted unreservedly by the Congress leaders representing India. It is on record that they refuted the 'two nation' theory and the religious basis of division, but accepted partition as the necessary evil, because otherwise the prospects of independence would have been in jeopardy. The conclusion to draw is that while the theory that Hindus and Muslims formed separate nations was repudiated in principle, partition was accepted because of political expediency. Therefore, the acceptance of partition need not be quoted as a simultaneous and *ipso facto* acceptance of the religious basis of partition.⁸

Then even facts do not substantiate that assertion. What actually took place was the reconstitution of the 11 provinces of British India in order to group together such of the contiguous areas in the North-West, West and Eastern part of India where the Muslims constituted a clear majority. This division in the concerned areas was not made (as originally demanded by the Muslim League) province-wise,

4. G. O. I., *White Paper on Jammu & Kashmir*, New Delhi, 1948, 51.

5. n. 2, 40—41.

6. See for instance speeches by Sheikh Abdullah in the Security Council cited in *Kashmir* n. 2, 53—55.

7. Yet this is the theme harped upon by British and U.S. papers, see for instance the write-up in *Time Magazine*, September 1965.

8. *Kashmir*, n. 2, 39—40 and 158.

but (as insisted by the Congress) district-wise, thereby restricting the application of the religious formula to larger areas. Further, while by this process about 60 per cent of the Muslims in undivided India constituted Pakistan, the remaining 40 per cent continued to stay in India, thus in fact demonstrating the practical inadequacy and conceptual fallacy of the partition based on religion.

Myth of Protection

By the same token it can also be argued that if the demand for partition was initiated, as the Muslim League maintained, to 'protect' the Muslim minority from the domination of the Hindu majority, then it has miserably failed to serve this very purpose because it has only been able to 'protect' those Muslims who by the fact of living in a Muslim majority area were anyhow 'protected', but by depleting further the population-proportion of the Muslims living in a Muslim-minority area (as a consequence of partition) the 'protectors' of the Muslims have made, according to their own reasoning, the fate of the remaining Indian Muslim minority, constituting 40 per cent of the total Muslim population of the sub-continent, still more precarious. But logic has been scrupulously avoided by the Muslim League leaders. It was probably too disenchanting.

Then it is to be realised that even this 'truncated partition' as Jinnah called it with obvious scorn, was accepted only in respect of the British Indian provinces but was neither accepted by the Congress and the nationalist leaders of India nor demanded by the Muslim League, nor even extended by the British constitutional provisions to the 565 Indian princely States. Therefore, there is no validity in the oft repeated assertion that religion alone formed the basis of partition.

The major political assertion of Pakistan is that by the fact of being a Muslim majority area, Kashmir should become part of

Pakistan.⁹ That, it claims, flows from the logic of partition. Its acceptance for purposes of political expediency does not establish its validity in terms of theoretical principles of political sociology. Further, its extension today in India would lead to dangerous practical consequences, particularly detrimental to the Muslim minority. It would make them in the eye of law (as indeed is the position of the Hindus and other non-Muslims in Pakistan) second-grade citizens. That will never come to pass, despite Pakistan's intransigence, because of the democratic nature of modern Indian polity having roots in the ideals evolved in the long history of the freedom struggle.

The growth of a composite, multi-communal, multi-regional, multi-lingual and multi-racial federal polity of India is a decisive refutation of the 'two nation' theory at least in so far as India is concerned. For Pakistan, however, that theory remains the sheet-anchor of their political behaviour. Therefore, they can justify the elimination and suppression of minorities, and live down the shame without the least compunction of their much advertised Islamic conscience, that today in the expanses of Lahore, the city towards the construction of whose beauty and culture, Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs gave generously of their very best, with love, toil and devotion, today in that very city no Sikh and no Hindu can find shelter and call it his very own! The pathetic words of the Urdu poet Meer come to mind:

*Dil dhai ke jo kaaba banaya,
to kya kiya!*

(What if even if you have built the kaaba (house of God) on the ruins of the human heart!)

Immodest Presumptions

In brief, therefore, except by bringing in the religious consideration Pakistan has no claim in seeking Kashmir. And the religious consideration is absurd in many ways. Apart from the obscurantist and mediaeval basis of

this claim which militates against the modern norms of the basis of State, it also reflects the immodest presumption on the part of Pakistan that it should be recognised as the authentic spokesman of Muslim demands in the region.

With about 40 per cent of the Muslims of the sub-continent living in India, and thus constituting the third largest Muslim population of the world and living as co-sharers of secular democratic sovereignty, with what rational justification can Pakistan claim the right to be the sole arbiter of Muslim political destiny in this part of the world? How is a Pakistani Muslim more authentic in his Islam than an Indian Muslim? And why should the world, particularly India, concede that Pakistan is the custodian of Islam and of Muslim interests in the sub-continent? By what canon can this preposterous claim be maintained?

The Islamic State

The contrary seems to be true. Doctrinally, Pakistan is *not* an Islamic State, as it is not based on *Shariat*. Functionally, it is not Islamic as it flouts the cardinal principles of Islamic polity and socio-economic pattern of living. Politically, it has done nothing. Islamic worth the name, not even established the traditional (even if nominal) Caliphate to command the ecclesiastical allegiance of the Muslims of at least this part of the world. Its rulers are as profane as rulers could be. Its civil and criminal laws are based on Anglo-Saxon and therefore Roman and Christian jurisprudence. Its educational structure is non-Islamic. Even in terms of the amelioration of the lot of the common man—who happens to be the follower of Islam—Pakistan's achievement is far from creditable. Therefore, it cannot even be called a benefactor of its own Muslim people.

But the moot point is that had Pakistan been at least interested in Muslims of this part of the world, even if not in Islam, then it should have acted in a way as to promote Muslim interests in

9. *ibid*, 154-155.

India and not jeopardise them by continuous irritation which on one extreme leads to war and destruction (affecting also the Muslims) and on the other to communal troubles as a consequence of its hate-India and hate-Hindu propaganda. Then, in terms of numbers it may be asked whether the fate of 1.8 million Kashmir Muslims is more important to Pakistan than the fate of 60 million in the rest of India?

If any how the 60 million Muslims are to remain in India, then even from the pet Pakistan logic, is it not more justifiable to allow the compact Kashmir Muslims to live in India and thereby increase the Muslim power-position in India? If such be the Islamic-cum-Muslim character of Pakistan, then with what righteousness can it claim Kashmir even on a religious basis. Actually, in terms of pure religious consideration, Kashmir should either accede say to Saudi Arabia—which approximates to the ideal of a puritanical theocracy, and also contains the two holiest cities of Islam, or it must remain with India and its Muslims who on no account are inferior in their Islamic impulse to the Pakistani Muslims, and where even today the number of *ulema* and Muslim seminaries is larger.

Finally, even if for argument's sake it is conceded that Pakistan was created on the religious basis, even then it does not follow logically that India was also created on the religious basis. As a matter of fact the demand for Pakistan as a 'homeland for the Muslims' was not countered by the Indian leaders by the counter-demand for India as the 'homeland of the Hindus', or of 'non-Muslims'. Those who are not part of Pakistan are not necessarily non-Muslims, much less Hindus, aside from the fact that despite genocide even Pakistan contains a sizable non-Muslim population.

The Fact

The cessation of the majority of the Muslims from undivided India to form a separate State of Pakistan on the uni-religious basis does not alter in fact, logic or law, the multi-communal,

multi-religious, multi-racial and multi-cultural character of India's federal polity. Therefore, it is ridiculous to assert that India was partitioned on the religious basis. What may be maintained, albeit superficially, is that Pakistan was formed on the political slogan of separate Muslim nationalism.

As an apostrophe to Pakistan's clamour for 'plebiscite' on Kashmir (supported by sheer disregard of the essential nature of the situation, by certain countries of the world) it may be pointed out that the voluntary offer by India to 'ascertain the wishes of the people' (later called 'plebiscite' by other interested parties and the U.N.) did not make the accession either conditional, incomplete or imperfect. The offer was not a legal undertaking but a political wish, a political engagement. It was not part of the Instrument of Accession, and in no way modified its terms. And the Instrument alone is the legal document binding Kashmir with India.

Moral Sanctions

The concession for reference to the people was contained in a communication of the Governor-General. It originated in the desire of the democratic-minded government presided over by Jawaharlal Nehru that, in keeping with our policy of 'consent of the governed', and taking into consideration the 'special circumstances' attending the accession we would like at a later date, under peaceful circumstances, to elicit popular opinion on the fact of accession. This aspect was played up out of all proportions and out of context by interested parties and also reiterated off and on by the morally-sensitive Nehru.

It is well-known that subjective predilections of statesmen sometimes cloud issues and lead to avoidable confusion. The primary motive of India was to make a firm legal act also politically valid and morally defensible. It implied essentially an attempt by India to obtain the concurrence of the political movement in Kashmir (the National Conference, which was the only organised representative body) because to a

democratic India, the Maharaja's otherwise unassailable constitutional right for accession alone was not enough to satisfy popular opinion here or elsewhere.

That concurrence was obtained in more than one form through the active support of the National Conference,¹⁰ through three State-wise elections and through the unanimous resolution of the Kashmir Constituent Assembly. The later division in the National Conference and the growth of discordant voices of some of the leaders including Abdullah, are the result of influences exerted by external and/or interested forces who, taking advantage of the situation created by Pakistan's illegal occupation of about half of Kashmir, the uneasy cease-fire, the reference to the United Nations and active big-power manoeuvres, wanted to unsettle the situation for a variety of motives. This in no way vitiates the legitimacy, legal and political, of Kashmir's accession to India.

Further, the offer of reference to the people entailed the legal possibility that if such a reference revealed a negative response, then, in accordance with constitutional procedure of India which does not confer on the acceding State or federating unit the right to secede, but which nevertheless sanctions the power to the central federal authority to cede any part of its territory, the Government of India exercising this prerogative could, if it so desired, terminate accession and thereby eject a federating unit. This was contemplated not because it was binding by law, not even because the reference to the people could prevail over the clear constitutional provision of the federation, but because the sovereign federal authority has the mandate to undo what it can do.¹¹

Concertina Resolution

This brings up the question as to why plebiscite as proposed by the United Nations and accepted by India and Pakistan was not and, as India now maintains, need

10. *ibid*, see Abdullah's speeches, 53-55.

11. *ibid*, 127 ff.

not be held. To appreciate the reasons why it could not be held, one has to remember not only the fact of Pakistan's systematic violation of its commitments to the United Nations, and indeed also of its international obligations, but also the changing spectrum of fast-moving events which gave a new and different setting to the Kashmir problem.

This is all so very well-known that repetition is avoidable. Nevertheless, two fundamental factors inhibiting India's will to conduct an internationally supervised reference to the people, despite its earlier reservations on this needless procedure, may be mentioned. One was Pakistan's failure to comply with the accepted proposals of UNCIP dated August 13, 1948, and January 25, 1949—what are usually referred to as the two agreed international engagements between India and Pakistan. Another was the changed international context in which Kashmir did not remain a question between two States but became a factor in regional and global big-power politics. Beyond doubt, India's submission is unsailable that the two proposals of the UNCIP jointly constitute what in law is called 'concertina resolution'.¹²

Since the plebiscite proposal is only contained in Part III, whose implementation is dependent on the previous consecutive operation of Part I and Part II (dealing respectively with the 'cease-fire' and 'truce arrangement') therefore unless the proposals contained in these parts are fulfilled then (even according to the UNCIP resolution) it is not possible to implement the recommendations contained in Part III.

Altered Situation

We maintain that not only did Pakistan flout the proposals contained in the agreed UNCIP resolutions, but did many things which militate against the spirit and the letter of those resolutions. Two significant instances of flagrant violation in this regard are: (i) the strengthening of the so-

called 'Azad' Kashmir forces and (ii) the acceptance of the U.S. Arms Deal of May 1949. As pointed out time and again by Nehru and the representative of India to the U.N., all this had radically altered the military balance, not only as between the two countries but, in a sense, in the region.¹³

The second basic factor contributing to the radical alteration in the situation was the emergence of the new international power-relationship in which, much to India's embarrassment, Kashmir was dragged into the cold-war arena. The inevitability of this phenomenon does not in the least either make its occurrence irrelevant or its importance insignificant. Therefore, for a proper appreciation of this factor it is necessary to recapitulate the salient features of the history of the Kashmir problem.

For purposes of analysis, the development of the Kashmir problem may be studied in three chronological phases: 1947-53, 1953-60, 1960-65. Briefly, the major events may be tabulated as follows. Phase I: 1947-53—lapse of paramountcy; invasion by tribesmen supported by Pakistan; accession to India; India's complaint of Pakistani aggression to the U.N. Security Council; joint acceptance by India and Pakistan of UNCIP resolution of August 13, 1948, and January 25, 1949.

Turning Point

In this phase, India did its very best even to fulfil its extra-legal commitments but Pakistan's intractable attitude precluded the possibility of their fulfilment. The situation began to get complicated by the U.N. Memorandum of 26 August, 1949, in which the proposal for arbitration was made, and Admiral Chester Nimitz, appointed as arbitrator. This was supported in a joint message from President Truman and Attlee. Nehru was prompt in criticising what he termed 'Anglo-American intervention' in Kashmir. This was a turning point, and India from then on felt alarmed that in the newly laid chess-board of cold-war poli-

tics, Kashmir might be made a pawn in the big power game.

Phase II: 1953-60. Increasing interest was shown by U.K. and U.S.A. in Kashmir which began to figure prominently in their calculations of global strategy, focused on the 'containment of communism' objective. Kashmir's proximity to Russia and China, in the wake of India's pronouncement of non-alignment, appeared dangerous to the western powers. Abdullah's dubious contacts with visiting U.S. officials, especially Adlai Stevenson, and signs of his increasing ambivalence caused dismay and anxiety in New Delhi, leading up to his arrest in August 1953. By February 1954, the Kashmir Constituent Assembly had passed a declaration reiterating the fact of the State's irrevocable accession to India. Soon after came the U.S. Arms deal to Pakistan in May 1954.

Decisive Shift

The quick succession of these events led to a decisive shift in the Government of India's stand on Kashmir in the U.N. parleys. The offer of 'plebiscite' was virtually withdrawn and throughout 1955 the trend of India's position on Kashmir was summed up by Khrushchov in December when he said on his visit to Srinagar that 'the question of Kashmir as one of the States of the Republic of India has already been decided by the people of Kashmir.' This also epitomized the Soviet position on Kashmir which ever since then has remained consistently in agreement with India on this issue.

By 1956 India came to the position that a plebiscite would not only unsettle the domestic peace of the sub-continent, but might also be exploited by the antagonistic super-powers who were locked in a global contest for supremacy. In 1957, Krishna Menon in his marathon speeches in the Security Council stated cogently the valid reasons for India's difficulties in fulfilling its commitment to hold a plebiscite, chiefly because of the continuing and threatening aggression of Pakistan and its defiant, illegal occupation

12. *ibid*, 29-38, 135-146.

13. *ibid*, 80-81, 217-218

of a considerable part of Kashmir. 'Vacation of aggression', said Menon, is the main issue and responsibility of the U.N., and that nothing could be done until that situation subsists.

By 1958 a significant change of regime took place in Pakistan bringing General Ayub Khan to power. In the initial phases of this regime, it appeared as if there was a fair chance of an equitable solution. Indeed, that impression was heightened by the mutually satisfactory conclusion of the Indus Water Treaty in September 1960. But when an attempt was made to propose mediation on Kashmir, Nehru rejected the ideas as an interference in the sovereignty of the State. In the continuing stalemate Pakistan concentrated on building up its war machine ostensibly for the eventuality of settling the issue by the use of force.

Phase III: 1960-65. The Ayub regime, after consolidating its position in the western military alliance, turned towards China whose newly revealed bellicosity towards India gave it an opportunity to find areas of agreement with Pakistan. In Peking's new world strategy consequent upon its ideological rupture with Moscow and a reversal of its earlier tactics of befriending the non-aligned in Asia, it was necessary to make overtures to Pindi, in order to maintain its dominating position in South Asia by simultaneously checkmating Soviet and Indian positions in the region, its only two big rivals. China's invasion of India in 1962 was a decisive step in this direction to proclaim by force its supremacy in the power-position. This further strengthened the Peking-Pindi axis.

The Battlefield

After the Sino-Indian war, in-fertile attempts were made to settle the Kashmir problem. Abdullah's release in 1964 raised new hopes but Nehru's death closed that chapter. Abdullah's perambulations in West Asia and North Africa, and his contacts with Chinese diplomats including Chou En-lai there through the

good offices of Pakistani envoys, further aggravated the situation. Abdullah was detained on his return to India. Pakistan was on the war path. Kutch was a sordid reminder of Pakistan's motives. With the massive infiltration into Kashmir on August 5, followed soon by the Pakistani army crossing the international boundary in the Chhamb-Akhnoor region on September 1, the Kashmir question was finally dragged to the battlefield, involving powerful retaliation by the Indian defence forces.

Even a glimpse at the events cited above would show that in a fast changing sequence of world politics today, whose equipoise of power position rests ultimately with the two ideologically antagonistic nuclear super-powers though modified in actuality by the multi-polar regional balance of power, it is not possible to abstract a bilateral 'dispute', 'engagement', 'conflict' or even 'tension' and 'situation', and solve it in insulation without reference to what might be called seemingly extraneous circumstances.

Static Virtue

The dialectics of contemporary international politics is such that isolation of events and exclusiveness of problems cannot, even if necessary or desirable, be maintained. Most of the local or regional problems in the mid-twentieth century tend to acquire a global dimension if they are capable of upsetting the precarious equilibrium of forces maintaining peace in the world.

In this dynamic situation the static virtue of 'consistency' in the sense of conforming to the letter when the spirit has changed, or adherence to a proposition when vital changes in circumstances have taken place, is certainly an anachronistic attitude reflective of political irrelevance. India's contention that many of the UN proposals on Kashmir are inoperative, even as some of her own pronouncements and pledges, does not stem, as tendentious detractors from Pakistan and elsewhere allege, from India's desire to dishonour her commitments, but

from the changed reality of the situation that has basically and virtually altered those very circumstances within which alone those commitments had relevance and meaning.¹⁴

Our Plural Society

It is not opportunism but sober reappraisal which prompts some jurists to suggest that India should invoke the doctrine of *rebus sic stantibus* to absolve itself of international obligations once accepted under different circumstances.¹⁵ But, legality of the question apart, politically the time has now come for India to state unequivocally and make it known to the world that, notwithstanding what was said previously under a different situation which therefore by the lapse of time has become null and void, India considers Kashmir the test of its secular democracy whose preservation is a vital national interest. Therefore any interference by outside powers would tantamount to the infringement of the domestic jurisdiction of our State.

While India's claim on Kashmir has been secular in content and political in form, on the contrary Pakistan's has been religious in content and belligerent in form. In this sense Kashmir is the nucleus of the battle of principles, the conflict of ideas and social values and the encounter between two types of political cultures. Its integration in India strengthens the foundation of secularism and enhances the prospects of the harmonious growth of our plural society. In a world darkened by the rivalries of uni-racial, uni-religious, and uni-lingual congeries promoting narrow allegiances and vitiating the growth of a broader humanism, it is probably desirable to permit some experiment that is bold enough to cut-across the chains of narrowness. By defending Kashmir against the combined onslaught of obscurantism, chauvinism and power-politics India would have achieved, like Lincoln, a historic task of preserving a noble principle.

14. *ibid*, 151, see UNCIP (S/1430, Supp. No. 7) para 249.

15. *ibid*, 147-152.

Now is the time

P. N. DHAR

WITH the declaration of the cease-fire after recent hostilities with Pakistan, the conflict has entered another phase which may last for quite some time. Unfortunately, the fighting with Pakistan is not, like the problem of Indians in Ceylon, a minor episode between two countries. It represents a problem of many dimensions which is going to keep us occupied at several levels. A careful and objective appraisal of the situation in which we find ourselves after the cease-fire is necessary in

order to explore the lines of action open to us in the near future. This article is, therefore, in two parts.

In the first part the present situation is briefly assessed; in the second, an attempt is made to work out an outline of action which follows from this assessment. In the circumstances, there can be no single and uniquely determinate policy. It is possible to work out sets of alternative policies based on different hypotheses which must be evaluated before

final conclusions are drawn. Since it is not possible in the course of a brief article to work out a set of policies, much less a set of *alternative* policies, the second part is devoted to what appears obvious to the present writer in the light of the earlier assessment.

The Military Balance

The results of the military conflict with Pakistan are gradually becoming clearer and better understood, although there are still some aspects which will take a long time to come to light. Our military objectives were limited, and our performance on the battlefield was so conditioned. Although we did not seek a decisive military victory, we have at best fought well and pushed the enemy back; at worst we have been locked in a stalemate. Quite apart from the fact that we lack sufficient high-calibre military hardware, we have not succeeded in proving that our strategy and tactics were spectacular or demonstrably superior to those of Pakistan.

Furthermore, it has become clear that India is not an independent military entity, although Pakistan is even less so. Our ability to sustain a military campaign until positive results are achieved seems to be limited and largely vulnerable to direct or indirect foreign interference. To say this about our military performance is not to fall victim to the vicious comments of the foreign press, especially those of the UK, nor to forget the bravery and skill which our soldiers and airmen so often displayed, but to accept the realities of the situation as it exists. There have, of course, been other great gains, mostly psychological; we have regained our confidence in our armed forces which had been badly shaken by the NEFA reverses; and our national morale has received a tremendous boost. This is all very good. But for a true assessment of the situation we cannot avoid a dispassionate analysis.

Pakistan's military substance has been reduced but by no means annihilated. Its bomber force is, by and large, intact and its

armour, though depleted, is still capable of offensive action. If the United States replenishes the losses Pakistan has suffered, as it can under its obligations to a member of its military alliances, then Pakistan's military strength will come back to what it was on the 1st of September, 1965. This, however, does not seem likely in the immediate future.

The losses suffered by us can be made good only if we acquire military equipment on a commercial basis, but it is doubtful whether such purchases would be possible in the course of the next three or four months. The difficulty in arranging these transactions arises both on account of our limited ability to buy and the apparent reluctance of our traditional suppliers, particularly the UK, to sell arms to us in the near future. Indeed, it looks as though the UK intends to take advantage of this situation to pressurise us into a speedier settlement of the Kashmir problem. In the long run, the position may ease but at the moment we have to think of the present and the immediate future when a massive effort to change our position and posture in Kashmir is under way and likely to be intensified further.

Pakistan's Image

From what one can see, Pakistan has not received the psychological shock that was expected to be administered to it by a demonstration of its vulnerability vis-a-vis India in the military sense. Furthermore, the 'judgment' of the foreign press, particularly of the British dailies and the American weeklies, is being used effectively by the rulers of Pakistan to show to their people that militarily they have done better than India. Pakistanis can also take psychological comfort from the fact that when the chips are really down, substantial support from China comes forth, even though negatively, by her managing to pin down a considerable portion of Indian armed strength along the northern frontiers.

Pakistan has succeeded in making the world at large realise that

its supreme national objective is to get Kashmir. The world has also been given proof that to achieve this objective Pakistan is prepared to stake everything. Long before its present military conflict with India, Pakistan pressed the US for a recasting of her military alliance with that country in order to accept the objective of a military balance of power with India. The U.S. was never able to decide on this issue and just drifted along. Marshal Ayub, however, managed to manoeuvre President Kennedy into accepting the position that Pakistan could use U.S. military aid to maintain its 'security'. This is not all. Pakistan has been able to blackmail the western powers not only into bolstering its military power vis-a-vis India but also into allowing it to exercise some kind of veiled veto on the type and magnitude of Indian armed strength. For example, Pakistan placed an embargo on Washington supplying India with supersonic aircraft; and when India turned to Moscow as an alternative source, it only gave Pakistan an opportunity to demand further aid from Washington. Lord Chesterfield once said that princes yield to importunity what they fail to give to justice. Pakistan's importunities have so far prevailed over justice at the hands of the western powers.

How long the U.S. will take to accept the inherent differences in the economic, military and political potentials of these two countries and recognise their differential roles in the security and stability of this region is anybody's guess. In any case, it is unwise for India to await U.S. reappraisal of policies on a more realistic understanding of India's role in this part of the world. It is obvious that the U.S. cannot keep India cribbed and cabined for long within the constraints of an arbitrarily determined power parity with Pakistan.

The Soviet Position

Similarly, Indians can no longer hope, as some still fondly do, that

we should have the Soviet Union all to ourselves. The Soviet Union, for its own reasons, is recasting its policies in the sub-continent and these policies are becoming more and more parallel with those of the U.S., and for very good reasons. The Soviet Union is interested in maintaining peace and stability in this region. It does not want situations to arise where China can make trouble. Besides, the Soviet Union perhaps regards Marshal Ayub as a little De Gaulle, expected to play the same role in CENTO and SEATO which De Gaulle is playing in NATO. Secondly, India is no longer for the Soviet Union the only channel through which it can communicate with the uncommitted world; and, thirdly, the uncommitted world itself is no longer a block, if it ever was one.

The big powers, including the U.S.S.R., have now greater room for manoeuvre than they had some time back. It may, therefore, prove to be an unwarranted assumption to take the Soviet Union's aid and support for granted under all circumstances.

The National Interest

All these developments suggest that we are back to the old familiar (though not to us) world of balance of power. Very little remains of our old policy which can still serve as strict guidelines. We have, therefore, to readjust our interests in the context of Chinese and Pakistani ambitions and of the super powers, and shape our policies accordingly. The only sensible framework we can have in this difficult period of readjustment is to recall the exhortation of the late Prime Minister in his address to the Constituent Assembly in December 1947. Jawaharlal Nehru said: 'Whatever policy we may lay down, the art of conducting the foreign affairs of a country lies in finding out what is most advantageous to the country. We may talk about international goodwill and mean what we say, we may talk about peace and freedom and

earnestly mean what we say, but in the ultimate analysis, a government functions for the good of the country it governs.' It has by now become quite clear that diplomatically we have not been very successful in defining—far less in defending—our interests.

Reassertion

In this article it is not possible to work out the new pattern of international relationships for which we should strive, but one thing which follows as a logical corollary of the balance of power situation is that whatever the new pattern may be, it should have a realistic correspondence with the actual power position of India. Not only has Jawaharlal Nehru passed away, but also the bipolar world of the cold war in which he wielded great influence and made India play a role disproportionately larger than her economic and military strength warranted. India's dimmed image in recent years, following the twilight of the NEFA reverses, the state of low morale in the country and economic difficulties (some of which are inherent in the development process) made many doubt whether India could survive as a united and independent country.

India has now to reassert itself as a focal point of power and influence in this part of the world. A weak India is not only a source of trouble for itself but also a source of anxiety for South and South-east Asia. The more percipient students of this region have begun to see this. Months before the Indo-Pakistan armed conflict began, Selig Harrison wrote 'India compels attention not because it is a great power, but precisely because it is so far from being one.'

The recent armed conflict with Pakistan has raised the national morale and stiffened the national will to resist aggression. It is possible to believe that this new mood can be moulded into a firm resolution if appropriate policies in foreign affairs, economic development and national defence are pursued. As has been pointed out earlier, Pakistan has succeeded in making the world believe that

Kashmir is the supreme national objective to which it is prepared to subordinate everything. Somehow we have not succeeded in convincing the world that we are equally determined to maintain the basic character of our State, namely, that of a secular socialist democracy, in which Kashmir comes in not as a piece of territory but as a vital political concept integral to the entire edifice.

The world will take note of our firmness of purpose only if we indicate vigorously and unambiguously that we are prepared to accept the implications of a strenuous struggle to maintain this secular socialist democracy and to play our legitimate role in stabilising this part of the world. This will imply that we reject the forced military and political parity between India and Pakistan. It may also signify readiness on our part to rearrange the present status of Kashmir within the Indian constitutional set-up. I think we should recognise that an internal Kashmir problem exists (as does the problem of Punjabi Suba) and this we should try to solve unilaterally. It is not necessary for the present relationship between the Centre and the State of Jammu and Kashmir to be inflexible. This is an obligation the Government of India owes to the people of Kashmir, and to this the wishes of Pakistan or the pieties of other countries are totally irrelevant. But Kashmir as a part of India is vital to the functioning of this country as a socialist secular democracy. This is a fact that we must make known fully and effectively through our policies and programmes.

Over-all Strategy

There are three levels at which we should do some rethinking so as to make our policies mutually consistent and operationally relevant. First, the overall strategy; second, the supporting economic logistics; and third, arrangements for operational activity to realise the first two.

If our national objective is to make an all-out effort to maintain and strengthen the secular socia-

list democracy in this country, and to play a stabilising role in this part of the world, then our thinking has to encompass the range of politico-military alternatives open to us over a period of time. In the immediate future, existing economic realities are certainly going to operate as a constraint—in the sense of limiting the extent of our self-reliance to our present capabilities—but with the passage of time, this difficulty should ease.

Having defined the range of the politico-military strategies open to us, we should arrange them in terms of their suitability and relevance. In doing so, we have to identify the things we should do or should have done in any case, whether in terms of the defence or the development plan. We must then look at other elements needed to implement the overall strategy. This can be done only after the objectives in the relevant military, economic and diplomatic spheres have been reconciled and found capable of simultaneous implementation. This is a job to which the government must address itself soon. Indeed, it may be forced to do so if the aid-giving powers begin to use their aid to us as a diplomatic weapon.

Inconsistency

It is necessary for us to reduce, if not eliminate altogether, the present inconsistency between our economic dependence and our aspiration for an independent foreign policy. The United States may not cut off our food imports from that country entirely, for that would amount to imposing something like a hunger blockade on this country. Nor need other forms of economic aid be drastically cut. But growing economic independence does imply a preparedness for doing with much less aid than we are accustomed to.

This does not by any means suggest that we have to cut ourselves adrift from the rest of the world and prepare for a siege economy. Absolute economic independence is a fiction. However, in the short-run it demands that the country learns to live within available supplies. And there are

also certain shifts in emphasis and policies which can be effected without waiting for the unfolding of a grand strategy.

Food Grains

It is not possible here to go into the details of the required readjustments in economic planning. However, two major areas of economic policy may be highlighted. The most outstanding weakness of our economy today is the shortage of food grains in relation to their demand. This problem is essentially the problem of shortage of wheat in India. The volume of wheat imports at present is around 4.5 million tons per annum, which is roughly equivalent to the marketed surplus of wheat from domestic output. Given the magnitude of the problem and the difficulties in making good the food deficit in the short-run, a marginal reduction in the current level of per capita consumption of food grains has to be considered, accepted, and the country prepared for. Partial substitution of wheat by inferior cereals may be feasible, but not to any significant extent because the difficulties inherent in raising the output of wheat also apply to other cereals. However it is possible to substitute part of the food grains consumption by that of vegetables rich in starch and protein content, such as potatoes, peas, etc.

Again, some of the existing land resources may have to be diverted from the production of non-food grains to the production of food grains because a marginal reduction in the per capita intake of cereals and increased consumption of vegetables is unlikely to solve the entire problem. Such a diversion will very likely reduce the output of cotton and sugarcane. This, in turn, will involve regulation in the consumption of cotton cloth and sugar. Since regulation and distribution of textiles and sugar is easier to enforce than that of food grains, it may be practicable in the short-run. These are, of course, emergency measures that will not carry us very far.

Alongside these emergency measures, attention should be given

to the basic problem of increasing the productivity of Indian agriculture with a greater sense of urgency than has been evident so far. There has, in the past, been a lot of discussion about action in this field but very little implementation. The first step is to make use of hitherto unutilised and under-utilised potentials by undertaking the necessary complementary investments. About 20 per cent of the irrigation potential created under major and medium irrigation schemes is at present unutilised. Immediate steps should be taken to construct feed channels and provide credit to the farmers to enable them to turn over to irrigated farms.

Again, considerable scope seems to exist in irrigated areas for double cropping. Some incentives may be provided to bring more area under the second crop. Remission of land revenue or of water rates for areas cropped more than once should be considered. Areas suited for minor irrigation, e.g., those where the water table is high and electricity is available, offer scope for increasing output if provision is made for lifting water. Government tubewells, which have been grossly under-utilised especially in a food deficit and populous State like Uttar Pradesh, should be activated in the spirit of the defence effort.

Second Weakness

The second main source of weakness in the Indian economy today is an inadequate machine-building sector. Despite our emphasis on heavy industry in the second and third five year plans, the machine-building sector in India has not done as well as it should have. It is, therefore, necessary to fill in the known gaps in this sector, particularly in the area of special and alloy steels and machine-building capacity.

The creation of new capacity and the expansion of the present capacity in these fields will certainly require more foreign exchange. It may, therefore, be argued that such expansion is not possible, given the balance of

payments position. In view of the situation that the country is facing, added to the difficulties in the way of our increasing foreign exchange earnings in the near future, it is necessary to examine the prospects of reducing our foreign exchange expenditure on relatively less important imports.

The general impression in India is that non-essential imports have been cut to the bone. This is perhaps true, but a closer look at our imports would reveal that we could at a pinch do without a substantial part of our long-staple cotton imports. India does not export much fine and super-fine cloth for which this variety of cotton is required. Its import largely feeds upper class demand. A reduction of this consumption will not impair the economy. Similarly, the import bill on account of mineral oil products can be cut, for example, by the substitution of coal for fuel oil and less consumption of kerosene. This, too, is not going to hit the economy adversely. Indeed, some of these measures like the expansion in the machine-building capacity, will accelerate the growth of the economy in the future.

A major difficulty in reorienting our economy to suit the altered circumstances will be to make it acceptable to the representatives of the upper classes who, it must be frankly admitted, are politically very powerful in this country. A lot of their fat will have to go into the fire but this will toughen the nation in the long run. If the Congress Party had a really powerful socialist base such a programme would be politically practicable. It is not easy to make people accept austerity without giving them a worthwhile goal to look forward to. But it is certain that if socialism and secular democracy are to be pushed forward at all, now is the time to do it. And if we show our firm resolve to do so, much of the scepticism about India will vanish and we will not have to oversell the obvious idea to the regional and world powers that India means business and that this business is likely to be useful to them.

International relations

S. MOHAN KUMARAMANGALAM

MANY years hence, when historians look back and analyse the events of this period, perhaps the months of August and September 1965 will stand out as the most important in the post-independence history of our country.

The ruthless despatch of armed infiltrators by Pakistan across the cease-fire line and the international boundary began in early August. India hit back immediately to block those weaknesses in the cease-fire line and prevent easy entry into Kashmir. Pakistan, with its prestige too fully involved in the initial stage, extended the area of armed conflict by launching across the international border in the Chhamb sector. This was followed by what perhaps was inevitable from the

military point of view, the Indian assault in the Lahore-Sialkot sectors. Thus, in one short month we moved over from an uneasy peace which was established after the Kutch agreement into what was virtually a state of open war between the two countries.

The sharpness of this phase of the Indo-Pakistan conflict has served the purpose of throwing into bold relief the weaknesses of India's foreign policy; so much so, that on all sides the demand is rising for what has been called the need for a reappraisal of India's foreign policy. M. C. Chagla speaking recently in the Lok Sabha echoed this feeling which is widespread throughout our country and nobody can deny that the events of the last 8 weeks demand, if not a reappraisal, at least a sober consideration of the essentials of India's foreign policy.

The Aims

Perhaps, it would be best to attempt a reappraisal by laying down what exactly must be the aim of our foreign policy. Clearly, the aim of a democratic foreign policy of any country, a foreign policy which has nothing to do with opportunist power politics, must be the preservation of the independence of that country and the creation of such conditions as will enable that country to develop economically.

India is passing through a phase when the task before the Indian people is the uprooting of the old colonial social order and the creation of a new democratic State, whether it be called a national democratic State or a socialist welfare State of by any other name. For the achievement of this aim, it is accepted on all sides in our country that our foreign policy has to ensure, firstly, the maintenance of world peace and in particular peace in the region in which we live, South-east Asia; and, secondly, the development of friendly independent nations in this area who have broken away from colonial domination and, like India, are attempting to place their feet firmly on the high road of independent economic development. Such, I think,

must be the aim of India's foreign policy and in judging who are our friends and who are our enemies, we have to examine which country's foreign policy is similar to India's and which countries have aims that run counter to ours.

Britain's Attitude

There has been in the last two months considerable discussion and even expressions of surprise at what has been termed by many the 'treacherous' role of the British; the dishonesty of the Americans whose arms principally have been used by Pakistan to inflict losses of material and of life on the people of our country; and in contrast the consistently friendly attitude adopted by the Soviet Union towards India. These complaints of 'treachery' on the one hand and welcome for 'the consistent support' to India on the other arise out of the failure to understand the fundamental policies being pursued by the great powers in this region.

The British attitude of unabashed support to Pakistan was revealed in Harold Wilson's tolerance of Pakistan's aggression in early August 1965 which stood in sharp contrast to his immediate denunciation of India's crossing of the international frontier in the Lahore region, a course dictated by military needs. This support of Pakistan is nothing new. The creation of Pakistan was the climax of the British policy of divide and rule pursued over the last 100 years. Their aim was to bring into being two States on the sub-continent of India which would be locked in perpetual conflict. They calculated that such a situation would enable them to act always as the arbiter of the destinies of the people of the Indian sub-continent. Consequently, they have always supported Pakistan.

In 1947, through the person of Lord Mountbatten, they prevented the Indian army from completely wiping out the raiders in Kashmir after the people of Kashmir, through national revolt, compelled their Maharaja to accede to India. It was the Bri-

tish who in 1957 put forward the dangerous idea of a U.N. force to keep the peace in Kashmir. Their aim continues to be the same, namely, that of keeping India and Pakistan at loggerheads with each other and therefore weak and easily susceptible to foreign influence and domination.

Together with this goes the British aim of preservation of their influence in Asia. The whole concept of Malaysia emerged really from London as an attempt to keep the Malayan peoples in the different areas of South East Asia under British Imperial control. This analysis therefore shows that India cannot depend on Britain to achieve its aims of foreign policy; on the contrary, it will have to take Britain as an opponent, as a force whose policies in Asia run counter to the interests of the Indian people and therefore to be fought. And, looked at from this angle, our continued membership of the Commonwealth has to cease.

The U.S.A.

American policies in this area are equally hostile and opposed to Indian aims. The United States wants to create satellite States which will 'contain' China. South Korea is a U.S. satellite ruled by a feudal-militarist regime which brooks no opposition whatsoever. South Vietnam is entirely in American hands and the struggle of the South Vietnamese people for independence is sought to be drowned in blood, using every ounce of military force possessed by the United States.

Thailand and the Philippines remain firmly within this orbit; millions of dollars are poured into the former to keep it so. In all these areas American capital pushes itself forward to achieve in Asia a position of dominance and power so that the U.S. will become the real ruler of Asia, although formal independence will continue, a situation not very different from what prevails in Latin America today. Politically also this line of policy serves the basic anti-Soviet aims of the U.S. It enables them in the name of defence of democracy to turn these

satellite States into U.S. military bases.

Following this policy, it is naturally inclined to be far more friendly to Pakistan than to India. Ayub's dictatorship is very similar in shape to the dictatorships in South Korea, Formosa, South Vietnam and Thailand. The establishment of a militarist, feudal, theocratic State, ruled by some 20 families, with feudal landlordism intact, ruthlessly suppressing all opposition parties naturally found favour in Wall Street and Washington. Hence it is from the early 1950s that the U.S. has fully backed Pakistan. They brought it within SEATO and CENTO and sent millions of dollars worth of the most modern armed weapons: Patton tanks, F86 and F104 fighters and so on. U.S. arms aid to Pakistan from 1953 is in the region of 1.2 to 2 billion dollars (London, *Economist*, 11.9.65) whereas aid to India is about 200 million, less than one-sixth at the most. A powerful American Military Advisory Group is stationed in Pakistan. The technically best-developed radar base in Asia is at Gilgit to watch the USSR and China. A set of first class aerodromes has been built throughout Pakistan.

This line of developing Pakistan as a U.S. satellite also helps to pressurise India; building up Pakistan is one way of compelling India also to subordinate itself to U.S. aims. It is impossible to believe that in the present crisis the powerful intelligence service of the United States was ignorant of the sending of infiltrators into Kashmir.

Mistaken Calculations

On the contrary, events indicate that the rulers of the United States were perfectly conscious of this plan of Pakistan's. But their calculation was that the sending of these infiltrators would ignite a revolt among the people of Kashmir whose support for Sheikh Abdullah was supposed to have shown how dissatisfied they were with the Sadiq government and Indian rule.

They hoped that a successful revolt in Kashmir on the heels of

thousands of Pakistani troops infiltrating would lead to a shattering fall in the prestige of the Shastri government and its collapse and replacement by a government of the extreme right. Such a government would, of course, be openly pro-American, and consequently the United States would emerge as the suzerain power over Pakistan and India. Such were the calculations of the United States in the present crisis.

These calculations flow from the U.S. attempt to achieve its aim in Asia, namely, the bringing to power of anti-democratic governments which are willing to serve as its tool for enforcing its political and economic domination and for serving its strategic anti-Soviet aims in this area. If these aims of the British and Americans are understood, then there is no room for expression of surprise at their policy towards India and Pakistan during the last two months. And, equally, if this was all that we had to meet in Asia, the working out of a correct policy might not be difficult.

China

But, in addition to these dangers, we have the complications created by China and her policy also needs a frank and clear analysis. At the time of Chinese aggression in 1962, although it was obvious that this aggression was wrong and had to be condemned, many progressives, particularly outside India, felt that this was the outcome of a mistake, an error, committed by China in relation to our country, India, and that mistake might be set right later by the settlement of the Sino-Indian border question.

China's attitude in the present crisis however has bared the real face of Chinese policy. Pakistan is a feudal-militarist theocratic State, closely linked to the U.S. Yet, this Pakistan which began the present conflict by sending infiltrators into Kashmir has received the most whole-hearted and consistent support from China. If the British took the Pakistan side after India crossed the international border and the Americans tried to keep

up formally an attitude of impartiality between the two countries, the Chinese did not have time for such attempts at looking 'fair'. On the contrary, from the start they wedged in with every type of support for Pakistan and when Pakistan appeared to be in military difficulties towards the end of the second week of September, China came in with its threats regarding the dismantling of military installations on the Sikkim border. It is obvious that these threats had nothing to do with the installations in Sikkim but were delivered only to help its 'ally', Pakistan.

The Contradiction

How can China, which claims to be a socialist State, ally with Pakistan which itself is so closely associated with the British and Americans who are denounced by Peking Radio day in and day out as the most ruthless enemies of the Chinese people and all the other people striving for independence and social advance? The answer, I think, lies in an understanding that the present policy of the Chinese rulers has nothing to do with democracy. Firstly, they aim at Chinese hegemony in Asia. Secondly, they aim at bringing about a world war in which, according to the calculation of Mao, hundreds of millions may die but China with its vast population and area will survive to lead (dominate?) the world towards communism.

Such an approach necessarily involves hostility towards those countries which want to preserve peace on the one hand and concentrate on their economic development. In particular, it necessarily involves hostility to India because India alone on the continent of Asia is a big enough power to stand in the way of the achievement of Chinese aims. Ever since relations deteriorated between India and China, one of China's aims has been to blacken India's image before the anti-imperialist world and to create such difficulties for India as will retard its development.

China's understanding of Pakistan aggression in Kashmir thus

became not different from that of the United States. If Kashmir blows up as a result of the armed infiltrators and the Shastri Government falls, then a government of the extreme right would come into power—such was the U.S. calculation. But such also was the calculation of China. The Americans welcomed it because they expected that the new government would be subservient to them. The Chinese welcomed this development because the new government would be a pro-American government and in consequence India would lose all its influence in the non-aligned world; a force working for peace and reduction of international tension would be enormously weakened.

Approaching it from different ends, the Americans and Chinese in a sense had similar aims on the Indian sub-continent. China wants to establish its hegemony over Asia by isolating India and to do this is only too ready to adopt any tactic which will isolate India and bring it down.

Identity of Aims

If these are the forces opposing India, what are the forces which stand with India? To my mind, the most important force is the Soviet Union. The support given to India during the last period is not fortuitous or transient; on the contrary it arises from the fact that the aim of the Soviet Union in Asia is similar to our own aims. The Soviet Union is anxious to maintain peace in Asia. To this end it opposes U.S. expansionism; and the Indo-Pakistan crisis showed its opposition to Chinese incendiarity. Thus, the Soviet Union equally understands that if peace is to be maintained in Asia, the best guarantee for that is the establishment of powerful independent States which have broken away from colonial domination. Hence, consistently it will bend its every effort to support speedy economic development in all countries which have broken away from the imperialist hold. The Soviet Union has afforded the most generous economic assistance to countries that wish to take the road of independent development,

the road of building up their own independent economy to stand solidly on their own legs. Thus, close relations between India and the Soviet Union arise not out of any transient feelings of friendship between the two countries but out of the identity of fundamental aims of the foreign policies of both.

In 1957 only the Soviet opposition to the British for sending a U.N. force to Kashmir prevented the adoption of that proposal. In 1960 Soviet assistance to India with military supplies became more than significant. And it is known that in this present crisis, diplomatically the Soviet Union fought against any move that would harm India's interests. Militarily it continued to send aid and other aid to India. Hence, looked at from the point of view of similarity of aims of foreign policy as well as genuineness in friendship, India has to develop the closest relations with the Soviet Union.

The socialist countries of Eastern Europe including Yugoslavia have aims similar to those of the Soviet Union. Peace is essential for them in order to ensure the conditions which will enable them to concentrate on their economic development. And to block the American imperialist offensive in Asia as well as Chinese hegemonistic aims, these countries also put their weight behind the newly-independent countries, affording them every assistance in defending their sovereignty and achieving economic progress.

Other Friends

Next naturally comes the development of close relations with States which have the same aims as that of India for peace and development. The United Arab Republic, despite the fact that it is a Muslim State, has shown how the fundamental aims of foreign policy do over-ride even these sentimental religious associations. Burma, Ceylon, Cambodia and other countries of the Asiatic region also wish to stand for peace and independent development. The attitude of Indonesia flows directly from the enormous Chin-

ese influence which is dominant in that area. The unfortunate hostility with which the government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam has viewed India in this crisis arises also from the decisive influence which the Chinese have in that area at the present time. This however should not deter India from appreciating the nature of the struggle in countries like Vietnam which are fighting for their independence. We must refrain from taking up a position which objectively would play the U.S. game and harm the independence struggle of those peoples.

Opposition to Imperialism

On the contrary, consistent support for the independence struggle of the Vietnamese people is also the only way to push back Chinese influence in this area. The ruthless U.S. attacks in Vietnam have created a deep resentment and fear among the peoples of South-east Asia, who are striving for peace and independent development. If India weakens her opposition to the aggressive acts of the U.S. it is the Chinese who will gain in influence and position. Hence the need for consistent opposition to aggressively imperialist policies. This will also help to halt the Chinese advance.

This analysis of the position, in Asia as it stands in the light of the Indo-Pakistan conflict shows us also where we have to re-appraise our foreign policy of the last 15 years. Such an appraisal in my opinion has to be principally in three directions; firstly, a clear-cut understanding of the aims and policies of Britain and the United States which are in sharp conflict with India's aims and interests; secondly, a clear understanding of the hostile character of China's foreign policy which aims at the weakening and disruption of India; thirdly, a clear understanding of the fact that the corner-stone of India's foreign policy must be the closest relation with the Soviet Union and the Eastern European socialist countries and with countries like the U.A.R. which have broken away from colonial domination and are taking the road of independent economic development.

Self-reliance

FRANK MORAES

I THINK we should be quite clear in our minds and hearts what the cease-fire signifies. It does not mean the dawn of peace, as the Prime Minister warned. Certainly it does not mean the end of all trouble. It means the beginning of much trouble, trouble which may bring with it a great weariness of the heart and mind. But this is inevitable with individuals and countries that are confronted with a challenge which signifies the difference between life and death, between living vibrantly or merely existing, and which we can only surmount if we are aware of what is before us and if we try to know how we can meet and overcome it.

Both militarily and politically I think we can claim to have emerged from our hostilities with Pakistan with a cleansing of the mind and heart, and with uplifted spirit. But grimmer, perhaps grimly long days, weeks and years lie ahead of us. The end of the road is not yet, and the signposts point in bewilderingly different directions. Yet for us they can only point in one direction—to the end of the road where all roads meet, where India having accepted the fact of partition had hoped that her people would live in dignity and peace, her boundaries accepted by

her neighbours and by the world around.

It is not India but Pakistan that has never got over the fact of partition for in attempting to partition India Pakistan partitioned herself. This is important and explains much of her frustrations today for, with its creation, Pakistan had to be content with a divided Bengal in the East and a divided Punjab in the West, which for the new State was again divided into the two segments of East and West Pakistan, each separated from the other by about a thousand miles of Indian territory. Jinnah was the victim of his own logic and politics because though Bengal and the Punjab were in British days both so-called Muslim majority provinces, they contained large non-Muslim populations, and on the basic principle of partition these in turn had to be divided territorially.

India did not seek the partition of India. It was sought by the Muslim League and Jinnah who were both hoist with their own petard for, at the end, Pakistan demanding to be divided from India found itself divided by India. This is the fact which has frustrated Pakistan ever since partition and which governs her

policies towards India today. In agreeing to partition India, Nehru and other Congress leaders never accepted the Muslim League's contention that the partition of India was governed by the acceptance of the theory that because of religious differences, Hindus and Muslims constituted different peoples, and should stay apart.

If our acceptance of partition was based on the acceptance of that theory, we would have insisted on every one of our then 40 million Muslims leaving India and migrating to Pakistan. We did nothing of the sort. Today we have over 50 million Muslims residing in India, while Pakistan which when partition came 18 years ago should have had some 20 million Hindus has today only 10 million.

The symbol of our secularism is Kashmir, with its overwhelming Muslim majority, and to that symbol and reality we shall cling. It is not difficult to see why the British, who as the rulers of India worked on the principle of divide and rule, should now actively aid and abet Pakistan into getting Kashmir, for the presence of Kashmir within India is a proud testimony to our secularism which is contrary to the doctrine of Islamic hegemony preached by Pakistan, and a challenge to the very basis of British imperialism, founded on the principle of divide and rule.

Sanctimonious Attitudes

Much is heard these days of the sanctity of self-determination and of the overwhelming necessity for a plebiscite in Kashmir. On what is the unity of the United States founded? Lincoln fought the Southern States in the American Civil War not to *establish* the principle of self-determination but to *defeat* it and thereby prevented the secession of the Southern States who stood for the principle of self-determination. Yet some Americans insist that to deny a plebiscite or the right of self-determination to Kashmir is a sin against the Holy Covenant.

In Cyprus, the Greek Cypriots, who are in a majority today, de-

mand the right of self-determination. Does Britain, wedded to truth or justice, concede it? She doesn't. No more than she does in Aden where a U.N. resolution of 1963, which the Arabs demand should be implemented, provides for a referendum and free polls.

Have either the Americans or the British, now crying hypocritically to Heaven, sponsored self-determination for the tribal people of Pakhtoonistan? Or for that matter has Pakistan, which shouts loudly for self-determination in Kashmir, conceded it to the people of Pakhtoonistan? The time has come when India should treat these political Pharisees with the contempt they deserve. They stand for nothing but the furtherance of their own national aggrandisement, with Pakistan willing to play the role of stooge simultaneously to the West and China, both of whom are interested in preventing the emergence of India as a strong and influential country in Asia.

No Guilt Complex

There is, therefore, no reason why anyone in India should be haunted by a guilt complex over Kashmir, generally the product of western proddings which today have neither meaning nor relevance. If we are to face the future with confidence and clear minds we must be quite clear in our own minds on Kashmir. So far as the U.N. is concerned, two things must be realised and remembered: (1) The Kashmir question is not a dispute about territory but a complaint of aggression by India against Pakistan; (2) The question at issue is not the principle of self-determination but the right of cessation. It is not whether Kashmir has a right to a plebiscite to determine whether she would belong to India or not, but whether as an integral part of India she has the right to secede from it.

One of the latest answers to this query has been given by Ethiopia where in his joint communique with our President the Emperor, Haile Selassie, has extended com-

plete support to India on Kashmir, rejecting the demand for a plebiscite, and pointing out that the principal of self-determination should apply only to colonial territories which have not attained their independence, and not to parts of sovereign or independent States.

Part of India

In any case Pakistan does not enter into the picture and has really no *locus standi* in the matter, as Jayaprakash Narayan, of all people, a man who has leaned far backward to conciliate Pakistan, has only recently pointed out. 'The world' he writes 'takes it for granted that Pakistan has a right to interfere in Kashmir because she is a party to the dispute. This is not so,' he says and goes on to explain that originally neither India nor Pakistan had any rights in Kashmir though both had their undoubted interest in the future of that State. According to the law the future of the State was in the hands of the late Maharaja Hari Singh and his people. Pakistan, however, says J.P., lost her patience and attacked the defenceless State with no other intent than to attach the territory. The Maharaja, Jayaprakash points out, with the full support of Sheikh Abdullah and the people of Kashmir acceded to the Indian Union.

'Since that day' J.P. points out 'India became a party to the issue in Kashmir. Pakistan had still nothing to do with Kashmir in terms of the settlement between the British Government, the Indian National Congress and the Muslim League. In fact it was India itself that made Pakistan a party in the naive hope that the Security Council would name the aggressor and discipline him. But let it be clear' concludes Jayaprakash 'that even then the only sense in which Pakistan was made a party was in the capacity of an aggressor with no other responsibility or hand in the matter than to vacate the aggression.'

This is how Jayaprakash Narayan explains it. Keeping in mind his very lucid explanation let us not repeat our mistakes and

thereby intensify the tragedy of Kashmir. Kashmir is a part of India and will remain so—notwithstanding the pressures of Pakistan her friends, allies and accomplices.

Having firmly made up its mind on Kashmir, New Delhi is now in the process of rethinking its internal and external policies. Oddly enough Pakistan is also beginning to rethink, but its rethinking takes the form of back-tracking to its former position. Cynically discarding China, once the tide of battle turned against her, Pakistan has begun to re-woo the West. The brief honeymoon with China looks like being over, and unceremoniously discarding his ancient bride, Ayub has begun to mend his matrimonial fences with Washington.

Thinking Anew

If Pakistan has begun rethinking on old lines, India will have to do her rethinking on new. Shastri has emerged from the latest ordeal with his reputation greatly enhanced, a firm man not easily ruffled. Capitalising on this for the good of the country he should assert the authority and confidence he now enjoys to bold, constructive purpose, and start rethinking on new lines.

This does not mean necessarily that we should scuttle old values. The need is more for adjustment with the modern world and modern values than for a wholesale scraping of the old. One reason why India is out of step with the greater part of the world is because, cherishing many old values and clinging stubbornly to old ways of life and thinking, she has never really succeeded in coming to terms with the contemporary world.

Without worshipping force we must realise the value of strength. Whatever moral dogmas on peace, brotherhood and love men may preach, the world basically respects only one thing—strength. India must first be strong—economically and militarily. Only then can she be self-reliant. But in achieving the objective of self-reliance she must go through the arduous process of making herself

increasingly self-reliant, always remembering what self-reliance ultimately means. Self-reliance means self-respect.

Need for Ideas

The first step in self-reliance is to think out what idea, plan or project is best designed to promote the country's interest and here the approach must necessarily be pragmatic, conditioned largely by our own needs and resources. What India needs are ideas, not ideologies.

America's abrupt pruning down of PL-480 aid could be a blessing in disguise and should increase our determination to be self-reliant. The best definition of the concept of self-reliance which the Prime Minister has rightly described as India's need of the hour, comes from Shastri himself. 'Self-reliance' he said in a recent broadcast 'does not mean that we have everything we need. No country is self-sufficient in all respects. Self-reliance is an attitude of mind. A poor man can be self-reliant, while a wealthy person may be dependent on others. Self-reliance means making do with what we have and cutting out what we do not or cannot have.'

This stress on self-reliance applies not only to the domestic front but to our policies and actions abroad. Like any other country, India cannot do without friends. Yet on the international as on the individual plane, there is no compulsion to choose one's friends en bloc. Friendship is a selective business in personal as in national life. The world does not consist, as we were brought up to believe, of the USA or Britain or China or Russia alone. The world is much larger than any of these countries and an intelligent foreign policy, based on national interests, while conscious of the importance of each of these countries, would avoid hitching one's own country exclusively to any one of them. Similarly in the matter of trade and commerce the over-riding need today is to diversify and diffuse our trade and purchases abroad and of not putting most of our economic eggs in one single basket.

The economic front

T. N. SRINIVASAN

WE may usefully separate the short run from the long run aspects of the economic problems thrown up by the recent conflict. Discussion of either aspect will necessarily have to be based on some politico-economic assumptions. In what follows, we shall identify a set of alternative assumptions and discuss the nature of the economic challenge and measures to meet it, under each of these assumptions.

Let us first take the short run aspect which concerns mainly with the economic policies to be followed in the coming year or two. To start the argument, let us assume that the present uneasy cease-fire will continue and that external economic assistance will not be cut off. This is perhaps an extreme assumption. In such a case, no radical change in our economic policies will be called for. Our present military strength is presumably sufficient to repulse any Pakistani violations of the cease-fire. Our ordnance factories with their present production capacity can supply enough arms and ammunition for use in these skirmishes. It is un-

likely that these skirmishes will involve any substantial diversion of goods and services from non-defence sectors. No serious problem of public finance will arise either, since no substantial addition to the defence budget will be called for.

However, the expectation of a prolongation of the uneasy cease-fire for the next few months is quite consistent with the expectation that hostilities are bound to be resumed later. In order to meet this future challenge, we may have to take some advance action in the present. We shall return to this question later on.

An alternative assumption is that hostilities will be resumed within a few weeks or months. The policies to be followed in such a case will depend upon: whether we will have to fight only Pakis-

1. This article was prepared in a very short time. This as well as lack of precise data on defence needs have unfortunately resulted in a discussion without an empirical analysis to support or to assess the significance of some of the arguments presented. Dr. C. Rangarajan's comments on the draft led to a number of improvements.

tan or the unholy alliance of Pakistan and China; whether external economic assistance will continue from both western and eastern powers or the western powers alone will withhold aid; whether the official western arms embargo will be lifted or whether it will be extended to include other strategic materials as well; whether the western powers will go to the extreme of boycotting our exports as well.

Let us assume that China will not enter militarily in any resumed conflict with Pakistan. The western powers may choose to withhold any economic assistance and may well continue their official arms embargo. The extent of our dependence of external assistance (including P.L. 480 food loans) can be seen from the fact that while our export earnings in 1964-65 were a round Rs. 825 crores, our import bill was of the order of Rs. 1,255 crores. This trade deficit (together with debt service obligations) was in large part financed by external assistance to the tune of Rs. 500 crores.

Renewed hostilities if continued for a time are likely to generate some additional pressures on our foreign exchange resources. The production capacities in our ordnance factories are likely to prove inadequate to meet the needs of a prolonged shooting war and these capacities cannot be increased to any significant extent in the short run. Thus, in order to keep the forces supplied with arms and ammunition, we would have to import them. Such imports will be costly for two reasons: first, because of the arms embargo, we may have to approach sources which either are not bound by the embargo or are prepared to risk violating it, and these sources will charge what the traffic will bear; second, because we may lose some of these imports through enemy action and these losses will add to our costs. As regards heavy armour, aircraft etc., it is unlikely that we shall be able to procure any in the short run. To a limited extent, conversion of existing

capacities in our transport equipment and heavy engineering manufacture may be of some help in this regard. To keep these going, we may have to import base metals, components and spares.

Thus, not only may we have to do without economic assistance (of Rs. 450 crores) from countries other than Russia and Eastern Europe but we may also have to spend more on armaments imports. This will mean that we must (a) curtail drastically imports not related to defence or development, (b) push our exports to the maximum extent, if necessary by curtailing domestic consumption of exportables (assuming that no boycott of our exports is imposed by the western powers) and (c) try to obtain additional assistance from Soviet

bloc nations. In the short run, the possibility of pushing up exports is limited. Nor can we expect substantial boost in Soviet aid.

Let us see to what extent we can curtail imports. Table 1 gives the composition of our imports for the year 1964-65.

Naturally those imports which feed directly to consumer demand will have to be stopped. This will cut out almost entirely import under the heads of food, drink and tobacco. Then, imports of inputs into consumer industries will have to go. This will mean doing without imports of raw cotton, raw wool, base metals which go into construction, consumer durables, etc. However, in imposing such cuts, we have to see to it that imports of inputs for manufacture of exportables and/or de-

TABLE I: *Composition of India's Imports: 1964-65*

<i>Items</i>	<i>Value (Rs. crores)</i>	
1. Food, Drink and Tobacco of which:		249
Wheat	176	
Rice	26	
2. Crude Materials, Inedible except fuels of which:		125
Raw cotton	58	
Raw wool	10	
Raw jute	7	
3. Minerals, Fuel, Lubricants etc. of which:		69
Crude and partly refined petroleum	27	
Kerosene	16	
4. Animal and Vegetable oils		6
5. Chemicals of which:		91
Fertilizers	25	
6. Manufactured goods of which:		222
Iron and steel	107	
Non-ferrous metals	58	
Metal manufactures	16	
7. Machinery and Transport equipment		473
8. Miscellaneous manufactured articles		22
Total		1,257

Source: *Reserve Bank of India Bulletin*, July 1965, Table 45A, page 1105.

fence supplies are not curtailed. As Table 1 indicates, machinery and transport equipment, account for a sizeable chunk of our imports. Here again imports of components and parts for the manufacture of items of domestic consumption have to be drastically curtailed. Though it is somewhat difficult to estimate precisely the extent of savings in imports that can be achieved by these measures, it may be fair to say that the savings will enable us to meet our short run import requirements without external assistance.

Strict Discipline

The effect of such cuts on economy can be qualitatively sketched.² First, let us take the effect of stoppage of food imports. At present import of food grains account for roughly 10 per cent of domestic supply, though in the case of wheat this percentage is somewhat higher. Although a reduction of 10 per cent in consumption may not be a hardship in an aggregate sense, it is clear that unless strict distributional discipline is enforced through rationing or otherwise, the reduction will fall almost entirely on relatively poorer sections of the society. In fact, the reduction in civilian consumption may have to be more than 10 per cent if defence supplies are not to be cut.

Similarly, the reduction in the output of other consumer items like textiles, kerosene etc., following the import cut will have to be equitably shared. There may be a further reduction in supplies available for civilian consumption because of additional defence requirements. However, even in the short run it may not be altogether impossible to find domestically available substitutes for some imported inputs, in which case the reduction will not be as large as it would otherwise be.

It is widely believed that there is widespread excess capacity in engineering and other industries.

There is very little reliable information as to the extent of this excess capacity or the reasons for it. In so far as utilisation of this excess capacity does not require imported inputs or leads to a net addition to foreign exchange earnings, such utilisation ought to be encouraged. The reduction in employment that will follow a reduction in output must be anticipated and alternative opportunities created for those who lose their jobs. Of course, the defence effort itself will create jobs.

A third alternative possibility, namely a two-front war with China and Pakistan simultaneously, can be dismissed without much discussion. Such an eventuality will mean the involvement of the big powers in the conflict. It is hard to say whether such an enlarged conflict may escalate into a thermo nuclear war. In any case, our economic policies will have little effect in influencing the conduct of such a war.

Our discussion of the short run aspects leads to the conclusion that with a properly organized and honest rationing of essential consumer articles and raw materials, efficient operation of our production facilities, we can face the economic challenge of a renewed conflict with Pakistan even without western economic assistance. Developmental efforts need not be sacrificed in the short run. But they may get a reorientation as we shall see from our discussion of the long run aspects.

Long Term Aspects

The long run aspects of the economic challenge naturally relate to our strategy of economic development. To what extent and in what respects do we need to alter the investment magnitudes and priorities in the Fourth Plan? To what extent have additional financial resources to be mobilised? The answers to these questions will depend crucially on the sort of assumptions one makes regarding external assistance, size and composition of defence forces to be built up, etc. For an outsider it is hard to find out what the programme for defence under

the Fourth Plan includes. Modifications, if any, that are needed in that plan can be worked out only by those who have access to defence information. Apart from providing a sum of Rs. 500 crores for additional investment for defence production, we shall not assume any other change in the defence plan.

External Assistance

Let us now turn to the question of external economic assistance. Let us make the somewhat extreme assumption that no *fresh* commitment of aid will be forthcoming from consortium and other western powers during the Fourth Plan while the already committed but unutilized aid will be available. The committed aid available for utilization during the Fourth Plan will be of the order, of Rs. 1200-1300 crores. Let us add about Rs. 500 crores of *new* aid for the Fourth Plan from the eastern bloc. Out of the gross aid available of about Rs. 1800 crores, interest and repayment obligations together with the spill over into the Fifth Plan may absorb about Rs. 1150 crores leaving about Rs. 650 crores of net aid to be utilized during the Fourth Plan. Part of this sum may be in the form of foreign loans directly advanced to private firms and organizations like Industrial Credit and the Investment Corporation of India. Such sums will not add to budgetary receipts. We shall ignore this and other similar details and take credit for the entire Rs. 650 crores as budgetary receipts.

For the sake of argument, let us assume that the Fourth Plan investment of Rs. 19,000 crores will not be changed. We add about Rs. 500 crores additional investment to be undertaken in order to set up a capacity of defence production in excess of what has already been provided for. Out of the total investment of Rs. 19,500³ crores Rs. 12,500 crores will be in the public sector and Rs. 7000 crores in the private sector. Add-

2. Only an input output study coupled with a break-up of imports by their destination (i. e. industries they feed) can reveal the complete picture in all its quantitative details.

3. Investment totals and resources data are taken from *Fourth Five Year Plan, Resources Outlays and Programmes* put out by the Planning Commission.

ing Rs. 2500 crores of current outlay, the public sector will have to find Rs. 15,000 crores of resources.

Let us now add up the financial resources. Taking into account our assumptions regarding foreign aid the following picture emerges:

Source	Rs. crores
1. Balance from current revenues at the existing rates of taxation	2000 ⁴
2. Surplus of public enterprises	1375
3. Capital receipts	4600
4. Budgetary receipts corresponding to external assistance	650
TOTAL (without additional taxation)	8625

Compared to the public sector outlay of Rs. 15,000 crores, the total available resources without additional taxation amount to Rs. 8625 crores leaving a resource gap of about Rs. 6375 crores. This will mean additional resource mobilisation through taxation or other means of about Rs. 2725 crores over and above Rs. 3650 crores of additional resources contemplated to be raised during the Fourth Plan. Assuming national income will grow to Rs. 28,000 crores in 1970-71 as planned, the additional resource effort (because of non-availability of aid) will be about Rs. 700 crores or about 2.5 per cent of national income in the final year of the plan.

A more serious problem than internal resource mobilization is

the problem of imports, for external assistance not only enabled us to invest more than our savings, but it has played a crucial role in providing the imports needed for development, such as machinery and essential raw materials. Given our assumption of no fresh aid, it

is this question of developmental and maintenance imports that will prove a serious bottleneck.

This is seen from the following. The Planning Commission has estimated maintenance and project imports to be of the order of Rs. 5300 crores and more than Rs. 2450 crores respectively.⁵ The export earnings are assumed to be Rs. 5100 crores and the invisible account is assumed to be in the balance. With our assumption of Rs. 650 crores net aid availability, we have a gap of more than Rs. 2000 crores between foreign exchange requirements and earnings. In other words, if we wish to carry out the programme implied in the Fourth Plan proposals without fresh aid from western sources, we have to cut down our exchange requirements to the extent of Rs. 2000 crores.

Import saving of this order is difficult to realise unless maintenance imports are reduced. Pro-

ject imports corresponding to investment (if any) devoted to the production of consumer goods can be reduced. One must also remember that the sum of Rs. 2000 crores represents needed saving in exchange and not in imports. Our assumption of no fresh western aid implies that there will not be any PL 480 type imports either. Thus, saving on imports must include a complete cut in PL 480 shipments. The short run implication of this has already been discussed. In the long run, there is no reason why we should depend on imported food provided inputs into agriculture like fertilizers and water are made available and institutional bottlenecks are removed.

The bulk of the saving on maintenance imports has to come from accelerated import substitution,⁶ though some saving is possible by cutting down the consumer goods oriented uses of these. We have to produce more steel, more aluminium, more copper, more petroleum, more fertilizers, more machinery, etc., than the targets of the Fourth Plan proposals. To this extent there will have to be some re-orientation in the plan, for we will require additional investment in these and other related sectors creating a further internal resource problem if no other part of plan investment is to be cut. These will also require additional project imports as well.

Even if we can find the resources, there is still the question of feasibility of carrying out such a programme in the next five years. It is not merely a question of gestation lags in investment—it also involves the availability of indigenous designing talent, technical know how, administrative and managerial capacities, skilled manpowers etc., etc. But, emergency or not, these problems have to be faced any way, and we may as well as start thinking about them now.

4. We have reduced the Planning Commission figures of Rs. 2755 crores to Rs. 2000 crores to account for (i) a transfer of Rs. 650 crores to States on the recommendations of Fourth Finance Commission. This sum is not likely to be made available for development expenditure by the States and (ii) to provide for additional expenditure of about Rs. 100 crores for additional defence production (in our scheme) as compared to what is assumed in the plan.

5. In fact we must add to the maintenance imports additional defence imports. These will be needed for replacing our losses in the recent conflict as well as for meeting any renewed aggression.

6. I have elsewhere discussed the question of import substitution. See my article in *Yojana*, October 10, 1965.



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
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Foreign policy continuum

V. K. KRISHNA MENON

CRISES breed and feed slogans. Escapisms and the search for scape-goats often co-exist in crisis periods. Crises have also a tendency to nurture themselves. As in war, a mentality that fears the 'outbreak of peace' develops!

In India, in all the attendant circumstances, the present crisis has also bred unity within the nation. It has made self-reliance better known and 'respectable'. The crisis has indicated, more than ever before, both the inherent quality and the appropriateness of non-alignment as a posture and policy. It has demonstrated that foreign interventions and foreign dependence cannot help to resolve either the external or the internal difficulties of India. The country

will need external co-operation. This, however, must be found in ways consistent with India's national independence, the dignity of her people and the real needs of her economic and technological development.

Crises also breed panaceas and short-cut remedies. In a crisis arising from foreign aggression a crop of remedies and admonitions breed and flourish. A 'new policy' is talked about by some. Others speak of the need for flexibility and of reciprocity, as though these have been absent hitherto. Still others call for the reversal of past policies and their replacement by alignment. They are a minority.

What all these indicate is that the crisis has alerted the nation.

It has aroused the nation. It has forged unities and its capacity to work together. These were to be expected. It has come as a surprise to many, especially abroad, that India has exhibited a great degree of maturity. Maturity and unity do not spring out of a vacuum or slogan or an admonition. They have grown out of our remote and our more recent past.

Foreign policy naturally figures in all these prominently. It is essential that we give the best of our thoughts and not only our sentiment to the development of its future. Foreign policy cannot be separated from domestic policies and events, from defence, economic orientation and development or the need and urges for the solidarity of this nation. Nationalism is the most powerful single force in the world today. It has brought about the liberation of millions of peoples and extended the area of freedom in the world to an extent unknown before.

The Basis

Jawaharlal Nehru and the policies he nurtured have a three-fold basis:

1. The unity of the nation, under which comes removal of discriminations and Secularism;
2. Social justice. This is the application of democracy in the social and economic sphere and alone can eradicate poverty. This nation cannot survive in independence without the eradication of poverty;
3. Foreign policy, the objective of which is world peace, co-existence and co-operation. In this is included the maintenance of national sovereignty, non-alignment, reciprocity in international relations, promotion of mutual respect and interest. It also calls for the eradication of fear and the enrichment of confidence.

This three-fold basis is still the foundation on which our nation must grow. That growth, how-

ever, is rendered speedier and the changes more purposeful and peaceful by the informed judgment of the people.¹ In this paper, these three, their various implications and the controversies about them will be discussed. It is a process of 'thinking aloud' rather than a didactic exercise!

Foreign policy, with but brief references to certain economic and fiscal aspects of our national life where relevant, is discussed in this first instalment. The other two aspects, which too require full treatment, and the examination of the crop of slogans, panaceas and the pleas for total revisions can only be set out in a subsequent instalment.

Historic Treatment

Issues and problems, whether they be those of economic structure and development of national solidarity, world peace or the nation's foreign policy can be understood adequately only in the context of India's democracy. The foreign policy of India is not a compartment by itself either in the world or in the domestic context. It calls for historic treatment.

The foreign policy of a country is not mainly the enunciation of a 'principle'.¹ Such a 'principle' would not exhaust all that foreign policy implies. The complexity or the conduct of foreign policy or the dynamism of it involve within it positive and substantial change. These are not effected and achieved nor would some or most of them even be in contemplation when the 'principle' was enunciated. If a 'principle' is thus not synonymous with foreign policy, a slogan or an aphorism would be even less so.

Yet, there are principles involved which may be the basis of foreign

policy at any given time or until abandoned. They are the bases and the basic orientations. These do not necessarily undergo fundamental change because a country in the pursuit of its national policy makes adjustments or even changes in them.

In this context, 'principles' themselves are of greater ambit, flexibility and dynamism than the lay mind ascribes to what it regards as 'principles'. It was Abraham Lincoln who said:

'Important principles may and must be flexible.'²

'Foreign policy' is however spoken of as though it has a greater fixity of content than it actually possesses. Foreign policy is also spoken of as though it is something 'self-contained' and beyond the ambit and quality of other national decisions and policy.

The term 'foreign policy' itself is somewhat of a misnomer. The dictionary meaning of the word 'foreign' is: 'Belonging to another country; from abroad; alien; extraneous; not belonging; uncommitted; not appropriate.'

National Policy

What is denoted by 'foreign policy' as we use the term is none of these! Foreign policy is not foreign. It is national policy.³ It is the policy of a State, the approaches, decisions and actions in respect of the relation of the State concerned to other States or another State. Its origins, its sponsorship, its control and the determination of its objectives are all national. It is quite true that foreign events or extraneous circumstances often would influence all these.

It is also true that the 'foreign policy' of any country⁴ is affected

1. There are no great principles which are not flexible. Principles in politics are not geometrical points without magnitude or dimension. Principles must enable to meet on them and reconcile differences. It is no denigration of principle if divergent points of view can be honestly reconciled without it. (44th Plenary Meeting of the General Assembly of the United Nations. September 28, 1953 P. 199).

2. Abraham Lincoln's last public address in Washington, April 11, 1865.

3. If a country adopts the policy which it derives from abroad, such policy has either been made its own by the country concerned, by adoption or it cannot be claimed to be or regarded as the foreign policy of that country.

4. State and country are used here as though they are synonymous.

by that of other countries, both consciously and deliberately and otherwise. This is in a smaller measure true of domestic policies and of all spheres of national administration. In matters of foreign policy considerable sectors of it, however, are actively conditioned by the events in or the conduct of other countries. This occurs at least in three ways. Pressures may come from another country—political, military, or even sentimental. These are the more obvious. Secondly, the concerned country may be obliged to modify her line of conduct or orientation because of the gravitational pulls, or because the events and circumstances in another country project economic, military or other consequences beyond its borders into the concerned country and to its affairs.

Thirdly, independent countries invariably follow the rule of reciprocity, unless they deliberately decide not to follow it, in their own national interest. Reciprocity is a dignified and legitimate exercise of national judgment and function. Reciprocity reflects independence. Reciprocity also may prove to have a corrective impact to the advantage of the country practising it.

No nation State, old or new, can write on a clean slate. It is conditioned by its own historical antecedents and inheritance as well as by world developments. Thus, a State stands conditioned by international custom, tactics and the law and practice that have developed in respect of them.

Nationalism

Self interest is integral to a State's foreign policy.* Nationalism whatever disguise it may oftentimes assume is the central factor of foreign policy. National self-interest cannot, however, disregard the interest of others. Such disregard tends to lead to conflict or the fear of it, and destroys the very interests sought to be pursued: a nation has to live with

*Said Lord Palmerston that England has no eternal allies and no perpetual enemies, only 'our interests are eternal, these, it is our duty to follow.'

other nations. Where powerful nations have sought to subordinate the interest of the less powerful ones to advance their own, the suppressed or the exploited have in the short or long run asserted themselves in the pursuit of their interests. The 'foreign policy' of the powerful State undergoes change, under pressures of factors internal or external, to find a new equilibrium with the interests with which it is in conflict. Here, again, it is easily seen that the change also is in 'self-interest' for it is in the interest of all concerned to find a new equilibrium.

Geography

Geography is still another factor which enters into the 'making' of foreign policies. Here again self interest is the motivation. But self interest may come into conflict with other self interests and a new equilibrium emerges. Change occurs but the purpose is national interest.

Geographical factors condition foreign policy. They remain unchanged. Their impact is persistent. Britain for many hundreds of years has resisted attempts of any European State at the unification of the coast territories opposite to her own coast. France has regarded the Rhine as her boundary. When Britain ruled India, British policy was mainly conditioned by the fact of the route to India. Modern conditions have no doubt changed nations' ideas or capacities about pursuing the dictates of geography. But, nevertheless, it remains very much of a determining element in foreign policy.

The objectives of foreign policy, as of diplomacy which is the instrument of its implementation, is to strengthen friendships, to neutralise those less friendly and to prevent the combining of enemies. Forging and strengthening of friendships is in the last analysis a matter of mutual interest and the recognition of it. Neutralisation is also in the same category but, perhaps, it is the counsel of reducing prospective foes to lesser evils. This aim compels flexibility in policy, negotiations, compromises and concessions. It

also concedes not infrequently to bluff, miscalculation and conflict. These are dangers mainly engendered by opportunism and disregard of the legitimate interest of others.

The foreign policy of India is more often spoken of as 'non-alignment' than by any other appellation. The 'Five Principles'—'*Pancha Shila*'—is also, though to a lesser extent, spoken of as India's foreign policy. Neither of these labels help to explain or truly connote the foreign policy of India or the conduct of it.

The foreign policy of India cannot be fully understood either by us or by the foreigner except in the context of the events that led up to her independence. It is the policy and conduct of her international relations and her approach to world affairs after her independence, which we mean when we speak of Indian foreign policy. Nor is Indian foreign policy less affected or conditioned by the quick changes which have come about in the world in the last half century.

Content

As I have already stated, the two labels placed on India's foreign policy, neither separately nor jointly describe the content of our international relations nor the factors which motivate or condition them. The main bases of it are (a) non-alignment, (b) support of the freedom of colonial peoples and (c) opposition to racism. The enunciation of these bases again do not fully explain either the motivations or the content of the policy as a whole or on each occasion. All three of them have, on the face of it, a negative or 'agin it' ring by themselves; they do not fully explain the conduct or contribution of India in world affairs.

World peace and co-existence as goals or motivating factors more fully explain a great part of it. It would be somewhat superficial and unhistoric to contend that even these truly explain our motivations.

Ours is a world of nation States. The dream or hope of 'One World'

does not belie this stubborn fact. Ours is also a world in which strife, war and conflict are inherent in the relations between nations. The foreign policy of India does not exclude the use of force or the threats of it, or the preparedness against these. The avoidance of conflict and policies directed to such an end are not excluded by this fact.

From what I have said above, as well as from the fact of the birth-roots of our independence, it follows that nationalism plays both a key and conclusive role in our motivations and conduct. Nor is Indian policy less conditioned by the general factors affecting world foreign policies which I have set out in the previous section.

India's foreign policy like that of all or most States is directed to:

- (a) the strengthening of relationships with friendly countries;
- (b) the neutralisation of hostile forces;
- (c) the maintenance and promotion of national independence; and
- (d) the furtherance of world peace.

Balance of Power

Although the label has to the best of my knowledge never been placed on it, India's foreign policy of non-alignment like that of other States, is necessarily one of balance of power. This statement would perhaps shock most of your readers. The stubborn facts of history and politics are often hidden from public gaze.⁵

Balance of power in the context of Indian policy means utilising her position in the world of power

5. Jawaharlal Nehru lifted the curtain a little on this in some of his statements of which I cite two examples:

- (a) '... It is very well to talk about foreign policy. But you will appreciate that no person charged with a country's foreign policy can really say very much about it. He can sometimes say something general about it; he can say something specific about it when occasion arises. But there are many things connected with it

balances, rather than the joining of one side or another as a power, which is the traditional course. Non-alignment is thus both a historic⁶ and realistic policy. It is deliberate, positive, flexible and has proved itself gainful to India and the world by results.⁷

Policy of Independence

Non-alignment is not primarily a balance of power policy. It is the policy of independence. It reserves and stoutly maintains that India will make its own decisions in her national interests and in conformity with her ideas of what is good in world interests. A policy of alignment with foreign States on the other hand, especial-

which are supposed to lie as what are called 'Top Secret Files.'

- (b) In an interview to the *Ceylon Daily News* on the 31st March, 1954 just prior to the opening of the first Colombo Conference, Nehru observed that the two power blocs were evenly balanced and this had given India the opportunity associated with other Asian countries to make her weight felt in the balance in favour of peace.
6. (a) '... I wish to point out that for a country that has newly attained freedom and Independence this is a correct policy to pursue.' (Nehru's speech in Parliament 17th, March, 1950).
- (b) Kautilya's *Arthashastra* advises a policy of peace and development and non-involvement in quarrels and alliances.
7. (a) Pandit Nehru and other Indian spokesmen have forcefully repudiated the charges of 'neutrality' and the 'negative character' of Indian policy. Indeed, the word non-alignment sprung into existence in such repudiation. It is doubtful if the first use of it as a characterisation will be found in the files of the External Affairs Ministry. The present writer would leave it to the research student to discover it where it is. He will find it difficult, but not impossible! However, the value of such discovery is academic in the context of 'non-alignment', is inherent and basic to Indian policy.
- (b) 'I have often ventured to point out in this House that the policy we were pursuing was not merely neutral, passive or negative but that it was a policy which flowed from our historical as well as our recent past.' (Please note that there is no mention of non-alignment here). (Nehru's speeches 1949-53; March 17, 1950; page 143).

ly when the partner to the alignment is economically and militarily much weaker perforce places the decision in foreign hands. It is also a policy based on self-reliance and national dignity.⁸

Just as it is nothing to apologise for to say that 'non-alignment' is a form of balance of power, there is equally no need for timidity in saying that our foreign policy is based on our national interests.

The Five Principles

The 'Five Principles' are 'self-interest' formulations. They are mutual respect, mutual interests, non-interference in others' internal affairs and reciprocity. The very idea of 'mutuality' is based on self-respect and self-interest. Not only does respect which is not 'mutual' become subservience, but it fails to insure the respect for oneself in which mutuality rests. It is a self-interest. Mutual interests require no explanation. It is plain, realistic, down to earth self-respect. Reciprocity which has always been, and even before the enunciation of the five principles, integral to our policy is again self respect and self-interest. When we negotiated Commonwealth relations and discussed the bases on which such relations could rest, 'reciprocity' was one of them. We practise it in our relations with South Africa, in tariff policies and in the closeness or

- (c) Compare this with Pakistan's position as stated almost contemporarily. 'I am not a neutral, personally or politically. The neutral has no mind of his own. God gave us a mind and we should use it to come to conclusions.'
8. 'I am told, sometimes, that I have some kind of bee in my bonnet; that I forget the trouble in India... and that I think only of sending Ambassadors from Timbuktu to Peru. If we do not go out and have our foreign establishments, somebody else will have to look after our interests. Who is that somebody. Are we going to England to look after our foreign interests in other countries as Pakistan has done in many countries. Is that the type of Independence that we imagine? What does Independence consist of? It consists fundamentally and basically of foreign relations. That is the test of independence.' (Italics mine)—Jawaharlal Nehru in a speech in the Constituent Assembly—*Speeches of Jawaharlal Nehru, 1946-49; page 237*).

otherwise of our relations with countries in the world and in the United Nations.

India's foreign policy, again, while seeking (a) no great power status; (b) no leadership of any group of nations, has as a matter of fact resulted in the elevation of India to the status and functional position of one of the great nations of the world. These are consistent with her size, her economic development (comparatively) and her strategic position.⁹

Aims

The aims of India's foreign policy were stated in Parliament for

9. (a) 'I feel very happy that the attitude of Mr. Nehru together with the assiduous efforts of his representative at the United Nations has had a great effect in keeping things steady and teaching the West that it is important to understand the East.' (Mr. Ernest Bevin in the British House of Commons on the 12th december, 1950).
- (b) 'I may tell you frankly that there is a good deal of understanding of India's attitude in our foreign policy. Nowhere have I come across any kind of criticism fundamental or deep about the way in which we are acting. I say that having spoken to the Foreign Ministers I have met. They know our anxiety for peace and our horror for Atomic War'. (Dr. Radhakrishnan, then Vice President, on the 23rd November, 1952).
- (c) 'Mr. Nehru has sometimes been accused of aiming at the leadership of South-East Asia. He has always disclaimed such ambitions. Yet simple observations show that leadership, however unsought it may be by Indians themselves, is now a factor to be reckoned with in international affairs. In the United Nations the representatives of Burma, Ceylon, Indonesia and sometimes Siam keep in close touch with their Indian colleagues. The growing tendency of India to speak not for herself alone, but as a representative of an Asian group has lately been illustrated by the part she has played in the formation of the Arab-Asian bloc. In past, no doubt, India's presence as spokesman of the Asian point of view is due to the vigour with which she has taken up the claims of the new Asian movements in their dealings with the western world. But it is significant that the Asian countries which are most closely associated with her are precisely those which owe to the foundations of their civilisation to the culture which they learnt

the first time on September 26th, 1946, twenty four days after Nehru assumed the office of the Vice President of the Viceroy's Executive Council and leader of the House of the Peoples.

He stated them as the promotion of international peace and security, friendliness with all nations, more particularly with neighbouring countries in Asia, co-operation with the United Nations, freedom for dependent peoples and opposition to racial discriminations. 'Non-alignment' as such was not even mentioned. It has been part of the essential means to the achievement of the goals of our policy. Let Nehru speak for himself: 'By aligning ourselves with any one power, you surrender your opinion, give up the policy you would normally pursue because somebody else wants you to pursue another policy. I do not think that it would be a right policy to adopt. If we did align ourselves we would only fall between two stools. We will neither be following the policy based on our ideals inherited from our past or the one indicated by our present, nor will we be able easily to adapt ourselves to the new policy consequent on such alignment.' (*Jawaharlal Nehru's Speeches 1949-53*, pp 192-93).

Preservation of Peace

He said, 'purely from the point of view of opportunism, if you like, a straightforward policy, an honest policy, is the best.' 'I think that

from her.' (*The Times*, London, 27th June, 1953).

- (d) Mendes-France, then Prime Minister of France, speaking in the French National Assembly on July 22, 1964 acknowledged the 'contribution which it (India) had made to the success of the conference.' (Geneva Conference on Indo-China, 1954).

Similar observations have been made on relevant occasions in the British House of Commons by Anthony Eden as he then was in relation to India's contributions at the United Nations on Korea and by Harold Macmillan. In the troubled controversies of Algeria and the back-out of France. India played a significant role at the United Nations to which a generous tribute was paid of Senor Jose Maza, that year's President of the General Assembly.

not only in the long run, but also in the short run, independence of opinion and independence of action will count... We want the help of other countries, we are going to have it and we are going to get it too in a large measure—I am not aware of this having been denied to us to any large extent. Even in accepting economic help or in getting political help, it is not a wise policy to put all your eggs in one basket, nor should one get help at the cost of one's self-respect. Then you are not respected by any party; you may get some petty benefits, but ultimately even these may be denied to you.' (*Jawaharlal Nehru's Speeches 1949-53*, pp. 216-217.). Speaking on the radio in the United States in 1956, Jawaharlal Nehru said: 'The preservation of peace forms the central aim of India's policy. It is in the pursuit of this policy that we have chosen the path of non-alignment in any military or like pact or alliance. Non-alignment does not mean passivity of mind or action, lack of faith or of conviction. It does not mean submission to what we consider evil. It is a positive and dynamic approach to such problems as confront us.'

This has remained India's policy and continues to be so. The crisis as I have mentioned has midwived panaceas as was to be expected! There are those who urge 'rethinking' and 'a new policy'. There are those who seek 'révision' and 'flexibility'. Before I deal with the various prescriptions, it is appropriate to make a brief if sketchy assessment of the results of our policy.

Results

Foreign policy must yield results. What produces adverse results is poor policy. The latter must stand or fall by the results it yields. This is not to be cynical about ideals or the ethical content of policies. It must stand justified by implementations which fulfil the aim of policy. The aim of foreign policy and of the diplomacy which should implement it is the safeguarding of national interests; that is to say, safeguarding territorial, political and economic integrity of the concerned States.

Policy must secure the country not only against military aggression but economic penetration and domination and against strategic offensives or intrusions from neighbouring areas or locations.

It is not my purpose to catalogue Indian achievements which at best in international affairs can only be partly India's in any event, but to help to examine the new crisis prescriptions in the light of the record of our policies and their successes. We are too near events perhaps to assess it in sound perspective. India's contribution in world affairs is not easy to be isolated for another reason. Her deliberate approach and technique has been to work quietly, to put forward proposals, along with other States, often to obtain results by amendments to resolutions of opponents and induce them to accept them and to avoid allocation of blames, particularly condemnations.

In regard to Korea, Vietnam, the Congo, Palestine, Cyprus, the Suez affair etc., India had taken a leading part. The results are well known. Subsequent events, particularly to policies of the United States, Britain and China, have marred some of these results.

Colonialism and Racism

In regard to Colonialism and Racism, India as one of the earliest liberated countries pioneered these moves. Today, thanks to the accession of strength to this cause by the joining up of each successive liberated country, the virility of the new African States, the consistent support of the U.S.S.R. and the Eastern European countries and the disintegration of the former empires of France and Britain, the ending of Colonialism is accepted as a principal objective of the United Nations. In regard to Racism, India was the pioneer at the United Nations against the Racist policies of the Union of South Africa. Today all nations, bar two or three, do not vote against the Afro-Asian countries on Racist issues: only a small few abstain. Portugal and South Africa alone vote against. This is a different story from 1946 when,

in the discussions on 'people of Indian origin in South Africa' and in 1955 when the *apartheid* issue was hotly contested by the western countries, these issues were 'saved' for further consideration only by a dexterous procedural handling at the United Nations!

On world issues, mainly disarmament and the prohibition of nuclear arms, India has been in the forefront and been more than once responsible for resolving deadlocks as between the blocs. Indian initiative played a considerable part in bringing about the Eighteen Nation Conference on disarmament at Geneva when the Disarmament Commission had been stultified. It prevented the disarmament issue from being killed.

Misconception

It comes as ridicule in certain quarters that India has no friends in the world on account of non-alignment and the conduct of her foreign affairs. This arises from a misconception both of non-alignment and friendship. Non-alignment is essentially based upon national independence. A non-aligned country is not part of a bloc and should be expected to take an independent though not necessarily hostile attitude.

It is surprising, if not amusing, that this particular criticism, more often than otherwise, comes from persons and quarters who over the years have argued that India should become aligned to the West! With West-made arms and western diplomacy so increasingly and massively ranged against India and now in action on our frontiers, this 'plaintiveness' is, to say the least, misconceived.

A realistic and 'non-aligned' view of this matter will portray a very different picture. First of all, 'friends' in international relations on issues where a country is directly involved in military conflicts, cannot mean their military involvement as if they were allies! Being non-aligned also does not mean that any one of the non-aligned group can be expected to be familiar with the problems and

our attitudes, in a developing situation, on their own initiative. That is what an ally can be expected to do. Moreover, to expect automatic involvement, military or diplomatic, from another country is to expect the behaviour of an ally, in the matters in which we are involved, (viz., China and Pakistan). Our close contacts with these countries have been limited. Even with those whom we are in little contact we have sought no partnership. There is no evidence that they are lacking in friendship unless we interpret friendship in our present terms! We may now look at the more positive side of our foreign policy.

What sticks out a mile is that the allies of our foes are not militarily allied against us. The western countries are diplomatically ranged against us on Kashmir—Britain from the beginning and the rest from 1949. The allies of China, the U.S.S.R. and the Eastern European allies, have not lifted a finger to help China. They have been on our side in respect of Pakistan despite our less close relations with them than with the West. They have not yet placed embargoes on arms against us. The Soviet Union has consistently sought to understand and assist India.

Substantial Victory

Large numbers of countries have adopted non-alignment as their policy since 1952. Then India and U Nu's Burma were the only non-aligned countries. Today all the former colonial countries except Pakistan are non-aligned. They do not support our foes.

It is one of the recognised elements of a successful foreign policy that a country obtains the neutrality of others, isolates foes, and prevents combinations against her. This has happened in respect of us.

It is not sufficiently and widely known that all the countries of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) are committed by the constitution of that body to be non-aligned. This is a substantial victory for the policy of non-

alignment which is thus not only India's but a world policy.

Furthermore, our 'non-alignment' is understood and welcomed by members of one of the power blocs. The countries of the West have begun to understand it, shifted from their earlier attitudes of ridicule and hostility. They have utilised our non-aligned position in the steps to resolve world problems as in Korea or Indo-China. They have also found it of value in problems where co-operation between the two bloc countries has been essential and in the lowering of world tensions. The United States is not today pronounced in its hostility to non-alignment.* Non-alignment has thus provided an 'area' (not geographical) of peace in a world where the two blocs are poised against each other.

No Self-denial

The second criticism, ill-informed, is that not only are we without, but we have on account of our foreign policy denied ourselves resources, economic and military, which should be otherwise available to us. This is totally untrue. We have ever since Independence procured military equipment from the countries of the western bloc and later from those of the East as well. At no time have we taken the position that non-alignment is a self-denying ordinance in this respect. In fact, it is the leaders of the western bloc who have now succeeded somewhat in imposing this on us: in the past, by being unwilling or unable to release goods to us for so-called security reasons which we have manufactured ourselves in many cases. So far as economic aid is concerned, India has received from both the blocs substantial aid. At the height of the non-alignment controversy, all aid from the West to India was totally devoid of conditions—no strings.

On the contrary, we had ever regarded even the talk of military aid as inconsistent with our policy and contrary to our interests.

*A few years ago Northampton, American philosopher, declared seriously that non-alignment was immoral!

India abandoned this inhibition under the impact of the betrayal of her by China. The aid which has come to India since then has been limited in quantum and severely conditioned by the military alliance of the donor countries with Pakistan. Furthermore, the goods of these donors have been available to Pakistan in sizable quantities as against the small dose we received and even after the latter had joined up with China against India. We even permitted our independence and dignity to be denigrated by accepting conditions which have not been imposed by the West on their SEATO ally.

Departure

The other instance of our departure from our basic policy has been in regard to PL-480 grain. This is a case by itself. It is an error to call it aid, inasmuch as we pay for the grain, which is surplus in the supplying country. The PL-480 agreement has been proved to be a political weapon. The Prime Minister announced this week (16th October, 1965) in Bombay that we shall not avail ourselves of PL-480 supplies. The recent developments in this matter have demonstrated to our people and government that the critics of PL-480 have been right all along. The consignment has humiliated us, made grave inroads into our fiscal and economic structure and enabled ominous economic penetration. Furthermore, it will be found and soon enough, that it has affected our agriculture adversely. Thanks to the decision of the United States, this calamity which we brought on ourselves will now come to an end!

But along with PL-480 and the post-China oppression of 1962, military aid and as a consequence of it our economy and economic policies, have suffered denigration. Economic imperialism threatens us and will engulf us unless we extricate ourselves soon enough. Recent policies in the economic and financial spheres and in respect of our industrial and technical development projects have been large-scale surrenders to foreign economic power and to its domination. The recent policy statement of the Sec-

retary to the Finance Ministry amply proves this to our humiliation. Even our surrenders and the proclamations of it did not, however, help us. We are still being prodded along this line by big business interests and by political pulls. Our talk of 'self-reliance' would be a mockery and further subject us to the scepticism about our integrity if we do not turn sharply away from this reversal of our policy of independence and non-alignment in relation to economic aid and collaboration.

It will thus be seen that it is not non-alignment, but the departure from it that has been prejudicial to our interests. We first gradually and later steeply, succumbed to the pitfall of conditioned aid. Our finance administration in recent times has gone headlong into industrial and economic collaboration terms which are onerous economically, prejudicial in respect of self-sufficiency and self-reliance and politically inimical to our interests and national independence. Politically the effect of the considerable shift in our economic and developmental alignment, has been to cast long shadows on the image of our independence. Our foes like China have exploited it. Internally, it has aided the forces of monopoly, large profits, foreign control and the denigration of our confidence and personality.

No one can read the statement made by the Secretary of the Ministry of Finance recently in the United States in which he was not expressing his personal opinion but that of his Ministry, without feeling that we have slipped a long way down the precipice to the abyss of economic dependence and national subservience. The best way to alert ourselves in this regard is to read this speech and then read the resolution of the Planning Commission at its meeting in March 1950 presided over by Jawaharlal Nehru, wherein was set out the basis of foreign collaboration which we could pursue.

The Pro-changers

We now turn to the crisis revolutionaries, reformers and sloganists. The cases they advance call

for examination if only to clear our own minds. There are those who want a 'new policy'. This is in reference to foreign policy. If by a 'new policy' is meant shifts in tempo, the taking into account of newly emerging factors, or profiting by errors, their own or that of others, it is a welcome outlook. But, quite obviously, what the 'pro-changers' want is the abandonment of non-alignment. Some of them go to the extent of talking about living down the past, of rescuing the country from the errors of the Nehru era, etc. 'New policy'! This is another name for 'alignment,' dependence and seeking and hoping for strength from others. Alignment in the present context means joining the West, curtailing relations with the Afro-Asian world, turning our back on Indo-Arab friendship. They would like to call it to 'negotiate' from strength. Whose strength? Negotiate with whom?

They expect the people to forget that western arms are pointing at our chest, the policy of the western alliance is basically unchanged and furthermore that the price of even a modicum of western co-operation is the surrender of Kashmir and the professed goals of our internal economic policy.

Facing the Facts

Where has even the limited degree of shift in this direction taken us? They must face the answer provided by recent facts. We face an arms embargo, while Pakistan has arms conduited to it through the CENTO powers. We have the PL-480 weapon pointed at us. We also see that the Sino-Pakistan combination has not brought the Pakistan-West alliances to an end! On the contrary, Pakistan used CENTO, SEATO and NATO and Chinese resources against us and for all we know continues to do so.

Here is something for the pro-changers to think about. To be aligned, even if the U.S. were prepared to buy our submission, it can only be at the price of (a) isolation from Afro-Asia; (b) total dependence on the West, in effect the United States; (c) abandonment of

our social goals; (d) abandonment of the reality of self-reliance; (e) strengthening of the Sino-Pakistan axis. They cannot fail to note that the military ally of the West, whom they seek to join, Pakistan, while still condoned and cajoled, had to face the fact that the western alliances and weapons have not taken her to her goal of conclusive military value!

Flexibility

Next come those who in a more moderate vein ask for 'flexibility'. What is non-alignment if it is not flexible? It is flexible because it is a policy of independence and, therefore, nationally determinable. It is flexible because it is based on mutuality of interest. It is flexible because it does not involve ideological commitments to capitalism or communism. It is flexible because it is pragmatic and takes into account the dynamism of change.

It may not be sufficient to answer these critics in the abstract. We must face their challenge and answer in terms of India's record. Reciprocity means flexibility, though it does not mean opportunism. Concretely, our policies have changed, i.e., been flexible, in respect of South Africa and Portugal. They changed from the position in 1950 to something different in 1952 in regard to Korea. They have changed in the degree and dimensions of our relationship with the United Kingdom and the United States, not perhaps always to our strength or advantage. Who would have thought in 1949 or 1955 that we would submit to PL 480? Who would have contemplated even in 1960 or 1961 the acceptance of the humiliating conditions in regard to arms aid after the Chinese invasion, including the supervisory measures, in the arrangements made with Britain and America.

China has forced a change in our relationship not only with her, but with other nations. She has also brought India closer to the Soviet Union! Indo-Soviet relations have changed in dimension and content, not only in relation to our two countries but in respect of our assessment of and attitude to the U.S.S.R. in the context of world

politics. When Nehru returned from Moscow in 1955 he told the British statesmen that there had been fundamental changes in Russia and that the rest of the world, including the West, should take this into account. I will not go into the responses to this advice.

Our relations with the Afro-Asian world made a great forward leap at Bandung in 1955. Since then, changes and shifts in our policy have occurred in respect of Africa and Asia. We took into account Chinese policy in the Far East, particularly in Indonesia. There may be difference of views about the particulars of the changes or some of them. But the charge of non-flexibility cannot be brought against India's foreign policy or its conduct.

In our economic and cultural relations, our flexibility as I have pointed out has been fully used by vested interests and by reaction. At the same time, relationships of sizable dimensions have developed with the U.S.S.R., Yugoslavia, Japan and other countries. Some of these have taken place in the face of heavy pressures against them by vested interests at home and certain governments and monopoly interests abroad. Flexibility has a ring of reasonableness, practicability, self-interest and shrewdness about it. It is 'saleable' for that reason! But we should not buy reversals under the garb of flexibility or subservience in the name of strength. Flexibility merchants must be told that they have no goods to sell.

Plural Alignments

Then there are the advocates of dual or plural alignments. But the latter is what non-alignment is! Peaceful co-existence, mutual interest, reciprocity, all these are elements of what the group of reformers or revolutionaries choose to regard as dual or plural alignment.*

It does not do, either to rest on one's oars, to chant 'non-alignment'

*As early as 1947 Jawaharlal Nehru declared: 'We intend co-operating with the United States of America and we intend co-operating fully with the Soviet Union.'

or even merely to answer critics. All these have a somewhat defensive, complacent and 'stand as you were' tone. This is not the tone we need. Our interests do not lie that way. Furthermore, events pass us by if we disregard them or are blissfully ignorant of them. Ours is a changing world. Our policies have to be dynamic. We are engaged by forces of reaction as well as of progress. Foes threaten our sovereignty. To many a question posed by the dynamism of change, there may be no simple or straight answer. Yet our postures, our dynamism, must provide answers. They are not eternal in validity. Our interests are. Our duty to them is also eternal. Assessments must take place continuously.

Rethinking

There is no need to be allergic even to the word 'rethinking' provided we know what is meant by it. In a sense, all thinking is rethinking. Foreign policy is not separate from defence policy, nor can it be concerned or pursued except in terms of the will and welfare of our people.* The defence of India's sovereignty, advance in the standards of life of our people, and the concern for world peace (prevention of world war) are still our objectives. They are today even more urgent concerns than ever before.

In that context, our 'rethinking' should help us to benefit by some of our errors and profit by experience, however limited. Reorientation may not be dramatic but its consequences have to be telling. India has not only to reiterate 'non-alignment' but pursue it with integrity and vigour. She has to have a realistic assessment of her neighbours and of the world.

First of all, we should shed fear. We must not leave to Pakistan or

China the determining of our policies. This is what would happen if we do not pursue policies which are moved by our interest, conditioned by our history and uninhibited by prejudices. We have to recognise that our defence against Pakistan is not only against her armies, but against pressures from her allies. We should have no delusions that Pakistan will not continue at least for a measurable time as a western client, despite her courtship with China. Britain, the United States, West Germany, the CENTO should be left in no doubt that our policies cannot be determined by their pressures. We should tell them frankly that Pakistan's military supporters are pointing their guns at us.

But more, the dependence on P.L. 480 was a blunder of the first magnitude. We should undo it. The consequent steps, in relation to our agriculture and reconstruction belong to a different section of this already long article. It will have to wait for a future number of the *Seminar*. We should put an end to all collaboration agreements that are not primarily and in the long run in India's interests. We need to reassess this doctrine of 'attracting foreign capital.' We need to banish the superstition that we gain strength by denying its acquisition for ourselves.

Realistic View

In taking a more realistic view about less dependence on foreign capital, we should avoid the mistake of believing that denial is the route to progress or strength. What is foreign capital for? Foreign capital is not dollars, pounds or Marks. It is the goods and services which they represent. We should obtain these from wherever we can in return for our goods and services. This is the essence of rupee purchase. This does not mean that we should confine ourselves to the present rupee accommodating countries.

The time has come for us to tell all prospective vendors that we pay for goods in rupees; it may sound fantastic to some when so stated. Strange as it may seem, even the United States will under-

stand it after the first shock and come to accept it. She acclimatised herself to non-alignment over a few years even though she ridiculed and rebuked. The vendor country must buy our goods. Of all the vendor countries, the United States is more likely to do it after the first burst of anger, ridicule and threat. This may sound a drastic change in policy. It may shock the pundits of the Reserve Bank and the Finance Ministry. The idea of the indigenous manufacture of arms did the same. They thwarted it. But necessity has now educated them.

We may also no longer permit the greater part of our currency to be held by foreigners. Rupee purchase will make them disburse some of it to buy our goods.

In the field of foreign policy, India should not remain inhibited by the shock of Chinese invasion. Her concern about nuclear peril, about disarmament and co-existence must be reactivated. It is not in our interest to permit doubts to be engendered in regard to our declared policy and integrity in respect of the nuclear weapon.

Today, a country is effective in international affairs only to the extent that she is potent in world politics. The world or the United Nations should not become in our minds or in our policies a point of reference for complaints and appeals alone. We are partners in them. The cause of world peace must find in India a strenuous worker and champion.

Indo-Arab Relations

Indo-Arab relations are pivotal to India's foreign policy. Arab-Indian solidarity is a necessary constituent in the stability of both our continents. The West should be inhibited from playing at power politics in our areas. In Africa, our earlier relationships arising from our identification with their fight for liberation must now be replaced by our sharing with them the struggle for the liberation of the rest of the colonial world. The erasing of racial inequality must be felt by Africa and by us with equal concern. The Organisation of

*We may talk about peace and freedom and earnestly mean what we say. But in the ultimate analysis a government functions for the good of the country it governs. No government dare do anything which in the short or the long run, is manifestly to the disadvantage of that country.' (*Jawaharlal Nehru's Speeches*, page 205).

African Unity has surprised all the world by its emergence as also by its cohesion.

In the development of African countries, we should not encourage or create problems which will leave legacies of hatred. Africa is being sought after by our would-be-emigre industrialists. We should not as a country become part of the profiteering and the exploitation. Let us co-operate by all means, but let not Indian capital and 'partnership' seek to take a place of leadership in Africa. That way lies the way to strife.

The Soviet Union

The role of the Soviet Union as a great Asian and world power is of primary and overwhelming significance to us. She does not seek to make us aligned, and has never done so. The U.A.R. has drawn closer to the U.S.S.R. This should be a lesson. There is no attempt at domination of us by the U.S.S.R. We should have no fear of it. Our relations with the U.S.S.R. have to assume a more normal and different pattern, and be of richer content. In any large scale industrial advance of India, the Soviet Union has to play a conclusive role many times larger and more diverse than at present. Indo-Soviet relations must reflect dynamism on both sides. This should be on a more permanent basis. This will help the West to understand us better and help towards a world of greater equality.

China's relations with us will undergo change with greater Indo-Soviet solidarity. The U.S.S.R. must feel that we are common Asian nations and that our attraction to her is not only because she is a rupee area. China's willingness to be a good neighbour to India is to a certain extent dependent upon her learning this, if need be, the hard way. If the U.S.S.R. and India adopt the outlook of world States devoid of the desire to dominate, bound by ties of mutual respect and interest, the forces of world co-operation will be on the way to winning.

The idea that the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. have come closer together

and that the relation of the latter with India will be shared by her with the United States in a two party arrangement is an error. The Soviet Union's interest in India and her relations with India will not be channelled through the United States or conditioned by her. Our friendship with the Soviet Union need not detract from our developing and maintaining good relations with the U.S.A. Indeed, this will become more possible with greater normality in Indo-Soviet relations. The United States will then take her place in the world as one of the great powers whose function is dependent on the trust and goodwill of the developing countries. It is in her long term interest to let Soviet relations with the Asian and African countries grow so that they become active partners in the endeavour for world peace.

New Dimensions

Today, China and Pakistan quite naturally condition a disproportionate share of our thinking. Greater strength, arising from self-reliance, a higher standard of life and growth of technology to which the U.S.S.R. can contribute more than any other State will help towards a Sino-Indian equilibrium. The normalisation of relations with China which must come can only happen when Indo-Soviet relations disable China from holding up India as an imperial puppet or a field for expansionism.

In these and other ways rethinking is required. We need courage not only to defend our territorial frontier, but to dare to think in new dimensions. We need to be potent to help in building the bridges that will lead to a greater unity in the world. Our internal strength and our external relations have to develop further. Our nationalism must venture on its next long leap. It shall not be in the dark but, illumined by our experience of the recent past, the wisdom that was Nehru's and the imaginativeness and the courage that must be ours alone.



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
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
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


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
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76

THE POLITICS OF LANGUAGE

a symposium on the
background
to the war over words

symposium participants

THE PROBLEM

An attempt to analyse some of the questions arising from the present language controversy

THE PAST

Romila Thapar, Reader in Ancient Indian History,
Delhi University

REMOVE THE FRICTION

Punya Sloka Ray, Assistant Professor of Linguistics,
Chicago University

ROLE OF THE MOTHER TONGUE

✓ Mohit Sen, member of the National Council of the
Communist Party of India

THE MISSING LINK

V.K.R.V. Rao, Member, Planning Commission

SANSKRITIZATION

Indar Nath Madan, Professor of Hindi at the Punjab
University, Chandigarh

BOOKS

Reviewed by Ranjit Gupta, S. Krishnamurthy, A. K.
Banerjee, Kusum Madgavkar, Imtiaz Ahmad and Anees
Chishti

FURTHER READING

A select and relevant bibliography prepared by Nishi
Kant Verma and Krishna Kant

COMMUNICATION

From D. C. Home, Ranchi

COVER

Designed by Chowdhury/Grewal

The problem

NO war over words could have produced the seething anger which spilled over in all directions causing men to burn themselves to death, forcing the country into a painful awareness of the whole problem. It is to our shame that such a violent shock was necessary to reveal the depths of resentment against the adoption of Hindi as the link language. It is also a measure of our failure to enable Hindi to answer the needs of communication and administration in this sub-continent. We had eighteen years to do this in. And we started with a fund of goodwill, now soured into suspicion and bitterness.

To be aware is to try and understand the basis of the present controversy, and a few points stand out clearly. Language is not merely a question of legislation. It is not just a tabulation of words but of concepts. It can grow only through usage and not through the artificial insemination of words which have conflicting concepts behind them. And usage implies the necessity, the need of people to use the language. Against this backdrop it would be interesting to review the growth of Hindi as the link language.

At the time of independence, the regional cultures of India had united against the common oppression of an alien elite. The national struggle was a reflection of this emerging unity. It was expressed in the desire for a link language. The link language would embody the common needs of the people for modernity, for

advance, and for communication which is so vital to our desire to catch up with the rational scientific concepts of our world. Only then would we be equipped to fight the language of imperialism, English.

This feeling was genuine, valid. English had not only been the language of alien rulers but a status symbol of those through whom the British had manipulated the levers of power. It had sought to create a sharp division between the ruling elite and the mass of our people. Even at that time, a dichotomy in the role of English was discernible. It had also opened the doors to new thought, to the ideas and experiences of growing societies at a time when we were static in large measure. It appeared with two faces, but the face of oppression had to be obliterated. The other face could be absorbed through translations into a language of our own which answered all our needs. Why not Hindustani which had played the role of a link language to some extent before the British appeared on the scene? Nationalism would bind it, the force of immediate usage would give it genuine currency and also imbue it with our present concepts, modern and forward looking.

But this was not to be. A time limit was placed on the adoption of Hindi (from Gandhiji's original Hindustani it had been regionalised into Hindi) and that time factor has turned out to be crucial. Instead of letting it grow through usage, through answering the real needs of the people, it was artificially pre-

pared, worked upon by the pundits, infused with words which held behind them concepts and value systems which belonged to an age long past. It was not fertilised in the mainstream of life. It was incubated as no language should be and thereby failed to fulfil the fervent hope of 1947.

India has since grown as a nation and one of the demands of this maturity has been the resurgence of our regional cultures. Regional languages have been struggling for their rightful place as the genuine expression of their peoples. They have grown in content—even though they have emulated the damaging practises of the Hindi pundits—and many of them are today more developed than Hindi. They have been resisting what they consider is the imposition of Hindi as the link language when it, in actual fact, has never assumed that role fully. For, it is generally recognised not as the link language but as the regional language of a greater part of the Gangetic plain. A fear has developed, a fear of another domination perhaps, a fear of unjust distribution of effort because those whose mother tongue and link language coincide have one less script and one less language to learn.

It is not only a battle of the languages but of patterns of culture, of thought finally. If Hindi had become the unifier and medium of modern thought through immediate usage as it was meant to, this conflict might never have developed. Unfortunately, the concepts which support it today look to the past, revivalist in

thought, seemingly unable to cater to the needs of a modern link language. English, meanwhile, has continued as the language of an all-India elite, shorn of its imperialist politics, through the universities and the administration. Jobs are difficult to come by without a knowledge of English, however inadequate, and this will remain so long as it is the medium of higher education.

How is this tangle to be unravelled? Would one script for all our languages break the barriers, allowing the different regions to acquaint themselves with each other and recognise their commonness? Or would this unleash other hidden resentments? Would the adoption of the Roman script at least in the link language not cut down the extra effort of those who are at the moment forced to learn three scripts and three languages? Do we need to change the name of the link language to demarcate it from the regional language of a particular area? How can Hindi or Hindustani or Bharati be helped (it is clear that a language cannot be made to order) to take up its role once again as the means of communication between our different regions, freely taking and absorbing common words, words with living concepts behind them and not dead ones? And, finally, who will head the assault on the entrenched positions of the linguistic chauvinists? We must nurture a language which will express the unity of many cultures and many communities, which will move forward and not backward. This issue of SEMINAR is one such probe.

The past

ROMILA THAPAR

NATIONALISM has fostered many myths: among them the frequently accepted one that language is the articulation of the thoughts of a particular race or a particular culture. Yet language did not evolve as the mechanism of expression of either of these two categories and certainly in the twentieth century the distribution of a language does not coincide with the distribution of a particular race. It is true that language is one of the channels through which the content of a culture is expressed; through the use of words (which are its tools) and of concepts (which are its crystalised experiences). But precisely because language communicates experience, it can transcend the boundaries of a particular culture or race.

In periods of physical communication between cultures, the range of experience which a language can articulate is often wider than the actual experience of its culture. There are moments of growth in a language. The vocabulary may remain in closer contact with the narrower culture, but the concepts have a larger range, leading

to the enrichment of the language.

Borrowing is one of the results of contacts between cultures and in language it leads to the introduction of new words and new concepts. The degree of borrowing is often conditioned by the means through which borrowing occurs. The migration of a people or a culture can be an unostentatious way in which words and concepts are borrowed and lent. But conquest is the more usual form where one group conquers another. But this has the disadvantage of making the borrowing a very self-conscious process with a variety of political and social undertones. The dominant language is that of the conquerors who become the elite and the language of the conquered becomes the lower language which tends to borrow more from the dominant language than vice versa.

Yet in normal circumstances where there is no migration or conquest, the pattern of development in a language is often different. The spoken language is the more dynamic form of a language (in the social context) than its written form. Consequently, the

spoken form is continually moulding and changing the written style. This is a process against which 'purists' and the literatti are constantly fighting; the result on occasion being the stultification of a literary style.

At Different Levels

Language is a powerful symbol of solidarity among those who speak the same language: hence its legitimate association with national movements. At this level language acts as a unifying factor. But language, with particular forms, can also be the symbol of a subgroup where it is expressive of a primary emotional need of belonging to a small group which 'talks the same language': a need which becomes intensified as social institutions and therefore social associations change. The need there for adjusting two varieties of language within the same nation has to be recognised. To impose a uniform language at every level and expect it to function in an unchanging manner is untenable.

Language is the articulation of the experience of a culture. Even within this limited definition it will reflect the growth and attitudes of the culture. Experiences cannot be amputated even if they have been undesirable. They become a part of the texture of a culture and are inevitably reflected in the language of that culture.

The above formulations may appear to be self-evident and their spelling out irrelevant to an article on language in Indian history, yet it is necessary to do so since one often forgets that they apply as much to Indian languages as anywhere in the world. Languages in India underwent the same general processes of change, development and stagnation, as most languages do elsewhere.

The exact nature of the earliest languages of India are difficult to define. There were the languages spoken by the Negroid population of which traces are believed to survive in the Munda-speaking group. The next linguistic layer emerged from the proto-Australoid migration to India and was to provide the base for the Dravidian group of languages. The coming of the Indo-European or Aryan

speaking tribes in 1500 B.C. introduced yet another distinctive language structure which was to dominate the evolution of languages in the Indo-Gangetic plains. On the northern fringes, in the sub-Himalayan regions, the matrix was Sino-Tibetan. The configuration of language groups tended to follow this geographical pattern almost throughout the course of Indian history.

Geographical configuration and historical continuity in language groups occurs fairly frequently in India. One of the more remarkable cases is that of the distribution of various Hindi dialects such as Bangaru, Mewari, Khariboli, Kanaui and Braj-bhasha, which follow very closely the geographical boundaries of the early Vedic tribal States—the Kuru kingdom, Maurya, the northern Panchala kingdom, the southern Panchala and Shurasena—States which by the middle of the first millennium B.C. had their own distinctive differences in dialect. Of these four groups, the two which were to provide the main structure of Indian languages throughout Indian history were the Dravidian and Indo-Aryan group. The content in terms of vocabulary and concepts came from these and other sources such as Arabic, Persian, central Asian languages and finally European languages.

The earliest evidence of a developed language and a script is that of Harappa, but the fact of its not having been deciphered does not allow of much generalisation. The language has clearly to be related to the urban background of the Harappa culture, which in turn explains the need for a script. If the language evolved out of the overseas trade, then a relationship with Sumerian can be postulated. But it may well have been of a largely indigenous growth. (Recent attempts to describe it as a kind of proto-Sanskrit stem largely from a desire to provide a Hindu ethos to all aspects of the Indian past, even pre-history and proto-history).

Sanskrit

The most important language of the Indo-European group or the

Indo-Aryan group is Sanskrit. Its oldest form was Vedic Sanskrit which gradually gave way to what is called Middle Sanskrit current from about 600 B.C. to 800 A.D. This term covers classical Sanskrit and other language systems derived from Sanskrit such as Pali and Prakrit. Somewhat later, a degeneration in sound and form led to the creation of Apabrahmsa. The Sanskrit used in northern India at this time was not a uniform, standardised language, but one which registered regional variations. The early centuries A.D. saw an acceleration in the spread of Sanskrit south of the Vindhyas. The Mauryan imperial system, by bringing almost the entire sub-continent under a single political control in the third century B.C., assisted in the migration and settlement of Aryan speaking peoples to various parts of the sub-continent.

Sanskrit became the language of higher learning and its spread throughout the sub-continent was carried out at this level only. It became the vehicle of the brahmanical tradition and essentially the repository of Hindu life and thought. By extension it was the language of the court circles and upper castes. The social exclusiveness of Sanskrit was firmly maintained in brahmanical seminaries and schools which were the main centres of formal education. The brahmanical control was maintained by their appropriation of the religious, administrative and educational functions over large areas of Indian life, particularly in the centuries A.D.

Prakrit

The more commonly used language with a larger distribution in terms of social groups was Prakrit with its various regional modifications. Those who were opposed to the brahmanical tradition used Prakrit, hence the Buddha preached in the Magadhi brands of Prakrit. Dramas written in classical Sanskrit used the literary convention. Men of high social status used Sanskrit whereas the women and the lesser persons spoke in Prakrit. Clearly Sanskrit had the status of an offi-

cial language, whereas the use of Prakrit came more readily.

Inscriptional evidence tends to support this view.* The earliest inscriptions found so far, dating to the Mauryan period, are in Prakrit. The inscriptions of Ashoka clearly intended for the public at large are in Prakrit registering regional variations. That Prakrit was the commonly used language in India is further corroborated by the fact that the inscriptions of Ashoka found in Afghanistan are in Greek and Aramaic, clearly meant for the large Greek and Persian populations of cities such as Kandahar.

Elite Status

Prakritic forms continued to be used in inscriptions until the early centuries A.D. The earliest Sanskrit inscription is of the second century B.C. at Beonagar (near Ujjain) in which a Hinduised Greek declares his adherence to the Vishnu cult. But this is an early and isolated example. The next important group of Sanskrit inscriptions came from Scythian, Parthian and Kushana sources: the Junagadh inscription of the Shaka satrap, Rudradaman, of about A.D. 150 being a fine composition in classical Sanskrit. The consistent use of Sanskrit by dynasties which were non-Indian in origin would support the contention that Sanskrit was an elite language and was not used as the common language. Significantly, many of the early grammarians and dramatists using Sanskrit came from northern and western India, suggesting that perhaps Sanskrit was patronised to a greater degree in these areas and only gradually came to be accepted in other parts of the country.

The inscriptions of the Gupta period show evidence of the frequent use of classical Sanskrit. In eastern India there is a gradual transition from Prakrit to Sanskrit during these centuries. In southern India the mixture of the two continued until the sixth century A.D. when in the Pallava inscriptions,

the tendency to use Sanskrit alone, increases.

In some parts of South-east Asia, Sanskrit was super-imposed over the existing linguistic systems, where the latter borrowed words from Sanskrit, probably because it came to be used as the court language. Again, Sanskrit was essentially a language of the upper classes.

Regional Growth

The more frequent use of Sanskrit in royal inscriptions and as a means of intellectual expression from the fifth century A.D. onwards did not in any way stultify the development of Prakrit. In fact, from the eighth century, the development of language reflects the overall tendency in the sub-continent of regional growth and loyalties. The regional Prakrits begin to assume separate identities and gradually take on the characteristics of what came to be called Apabrahmsas (crooked or broken language). It is from the Apabrahmsas in turn that there evolved the modern regional languages from about the thirteenth century onwards.

South Indian inscriptions of the sixth and subsequent centuries are commonly found in Sanskrit and Tamil (Tamil inscriptions were originally written in Brahmi, the script commonly used for all the Indo-Aryan group of languages, though later a Tamil Grantha script was evolved which came to be used more extensively in south India). The combination of Sanskrit and Tamil is also reflected in creative literature. But Sanskrit again remained the language of the court, the Aryanised elite and centres of higher education.

Popular movements such as the Tamil devotional cult were exclusively Tamil using. The inter-relationship of Tamil and Sanskrit was one where the more Aryanised Tamil sources used a larger vocabulary of Sanskrit words. The differentiation exists to this day where the more Sanskritised forms of the south Indian languages—Tamil, Telugu, Kannada and Malayalam—are spoken by the upper castes. The minor dynasties of Tamilnad also tended to use

Tamil more frequently than Sanskrit. Royal grants inscribed in Kannada and Telugu point to the growing importance of these languages before the end of the first millennium A.D. The verse composition, *Amuktamalyada*, of the King of Vijayanagara in the sixteenth century is indicative of the full respectability of Telugu. Malayalam is of later growth, since a thirteenth century inscription provides evidence of a groping movement towards Malayalam.

The growth of regional languages in the northern and western part of the sub-continent emerged from a variety of factors. On the eve of the establishment of the Sultanate (in 1206) regional loyalties were beginning to crystallise into regional cultures, and the languages which were spoken in these areas were deeply intertwined with this development. The interest in local history and the recording of this history in chronicles was largely in the local language which made it easier to recite before large audiences. In the confines of the courts, however, historical biographies continued to be composed in a rather stilted Sanskrit.

The Feudal Pattern

In a feudalistic pattern it was inevitable that a number of social movements would arise. The Turkish conquest disturbed society and in the processes of change which followed, both through upheaval and through invasion, the caste-class pattern underwent a change and a number of non-Sanskrit speaking people moved up the social scale, taking their language with them. Land grants, so essential a document in a feudal system, had to be recorded both in Sanskrit and the local language. In areas where the Turks were politically powerful, Sanskrit as the language of administration was gradually replaced by Persian. The recognition of the grant was necessary both in court circles and at the level of local administrative records.

The Tamil-Sanskrit relationship makes a good comparison. In most matters of largely local interest the regional language was used, as for example the eulogies on memo-

*The evidence from inscriptions tends to be more precise than literary evidence from documentary sources, since inscriptions on the basis of epigraphical and palaeographical analysis can be dated.

rials to the deeds of heroes and in connection with Sati, were in Marathi, Gujarati, etc. Private records, unconnected with official administration, were also in these languages.

In subsequent centuries the extensive use of Persian for official purposes encouraged the use of regional languages in other fields. The Bhakti movement, drawing on an audience of lower castes—artisans and cultivators—in its earlier phases gave a further impetus to the wide-spread use of local languages. The frequent pilgrimages and fairs have always been a factor of cohesion in local communities, and the association of some aspects of the Bhakti movement with such gatherings (e.g. the cult of Vithoba in Maharashtra) strengthened the relationship between the local community and the language. The popularisation of the regional language via the Bhakti movement also resulted in the use of the same language for creative literature. The latter began as an off-shoot of religious literature but, as it became more and more secular, it slowly tended to move further away from Sanskritic forms.

Urdu

One of the most significant developments in the growth of languages during the medieval period was the creation of a new language—Urdu—the camp language, whose structure was mainly of the Indo-Aryan type, but the vocabulary was largely borrowed from Persian and the regional languages of the area directly under Turkish control—briefly a proto-Hindi with an admixture of Marathi and Kannada. Dakhni as it was first called grew in the region of Hyderabad and the north-western Deccan and eventually spread over many areas of the sub-continent.

Urdu now became the link language and its association with urban centres where it was most widely used gave it its vitality and liberal character which led to its rapid maturity. Not surprisingly, until recent years, most major urban centres anywhere in the sub-continent from Peshawar to Mysore had a large body of Urdu

speaking people. In the Hindi speaking areas the relationship between Hindi and Urdu became closely intertwined largely through the use of both by the socio-religious teachings of the Sufis and members of the Bhakti movement. Urdu has continued to maintain its urban roots, which were strengthened by the adoption of Urdu as the language of the law courts in many parts of northern India. Much of the literature of social reform movements in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century in the Punjab was in Urdu because of its urban appeal.

The period of maturity in Marathi was during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, when the rise and establishment of Maratha power provided a firm foundation for the language. The emergence of Bengali took a rather different turn since the social relationships between the Turks and the local people was reasonably close and the impress of Persian at all levels was not so obvious. Urdu spread eastwards through the Sufis and soldiers of fortune and Bengali was enriched with new words and concepts (as also was Panjabi in a different context). The use of Tamil and Malayalam by Muslims settled in those areas was similar to the situation in Bengal, where the existing regional language was preferred to any other.

English

With the declaration of English as the official language in the early nineteenth century the pattern seemed to repeat itself. The elite were non-English educated and there was again a gulf between the English speaking and those who spoke the regional language. Once again a camp language—Hindustani—began to emerge. Possibly in another hundred years it might have developed into a functional link language.

That the Persian and Sanskrit tradition was by now close to static seems clear from the fact that the cultural matrix of which English was the communication channel, made no impact on either

of these two languages in India. Its impact both direct and indirect was on the regional languages. Indirectly, missionary activity and educational activity led to the translation of new ideas into these languages. The battling of theological concepts and the conflict over new and traditional ideas marked a further phase in their growth. Those who had access to English became bi-lingual and this was a further source of new experiences which were articulated in translation from one language to another.

The Middle Class

The birth of a completely new social factor in the Indian scene—the middle class—weighed the balance somewhat in favour of using English, partly because it was the elite language and partly because it was an effective link language. The national movement, particularly its later phase in the twentieth century, righted the balance. In an effort to draw in a mass following, the middle-class dominated urban national movement had to reach out to the rural masses. This necessitated the use of the regional languages and in turn acted as a revitalising factor in the growth of the regional languages.

The orthodox religious tradition in India whether Hindu, Buddhist or Jaina was preserved in Sanskrit. The official language during the period of Hindu dominance, i.e., from the 2nd to the 8th A.D. was Sanskrit. The legal literature and administrative literature of the pre-thirteenth century was documented by the brahmins and the records carefully preserved: these were all in Sanskrit. Sanskrit therefore became a symbol of upper caste status. The heterodox sects such as the Buddhists and the Jains began by using Prakrits but when they lost their strain of protest and moved towards conformity, they adopted Sanskrit. Similarly, when lower caste groups moved up the social scale, within the confines of Hindu society, they tried to adopt Sanskrit.

The establishment of the Delhi Sultanate and later the Mughal

empire introduced important changes. Persian and Arabic became the languages of upper caste status. But since these were foreign languages, and took a while to come to terms with, it was inevitable that the regional languages and the link language, Urdu, would in effect be more important. Centres of Sanskrit learning continued to flourish, but the use of Sanskrit became marginal and ceremonial. With the introduction of English, Persian was also given the status which Sanskrit now had.

The real continuity and evolution of language in India has therefore to be traced through the regional languages and the link languages, and not through Sanskrit alone. Sanskrit served a particular, specialised purpose and as long as it was a living language, it contributed vitality to the Prakrits. But as it slowly stultified it ceased to make any significant contribution to the growth of the regional languages. Arbitrary Sanskritization of the regional languages merely introduces moribund concepts and does not vitalise these languages.

To try and eliminate any concept which is of Persian or English origin, is to try and erase an experience and this, whether in human or social psychology, results in nightmares and warped attitudes. The vitalisation must come from the very roots of the actual life of the people born out of the tensions and harmonies within which we live. To inject words into a language is not a difficult process but the same cannot be done with concepts. Concepts cannot even be grafted; they have to grow out of the total ethos of a society. To try and provide India with a well-tailored, ready-made national language overnight is to attempt not only the impossible but the undesirable. The language will grow out of the society which we shall build in the next few decades. Let us turn our attention to making something worthwhile of our people and our nation and in the process we shall also acquire a viable, worthwhile language.

Remove the friction

PUNYA SLOKA RAY

THERE are certain realities in the Indian situation which should fence in all discussion on language politics. Some of these concern the facts of economic statistics. In the life of the nation today, international commerce and science are steadily becoming more indispensable than ever, so that we are inevitably moving away from the concept of an isolated and self-sufficient State. And, the rapidly increasing numbers and expectations of the masses cannot be ignored, so that we cannot really think of going back to any impenetrable group of masters, however enlightened.

Other realities concern the mind of our people. Indian unity has become something of a burning passion, so that any leadership which threatens to divide India into significant zones soon becomes an ineffective extremist minuscule. And, the entire idea of a

ruling race, of a group advantaged by birth, has become an anathema.

The future of any solution to the linguistic problems of India is tied up with these realities. Hindi will never make much progress if it does not become an ally to these forces. Yet, Hindi has until now been championed in such a manner that it has run against each of them in some aspect or other. It is not preferable over English for international commerce and science. It is not preferable over the regional languages in their respective regions for mass communication. It threatens to divide India into two zones, one Hindi and the other non-Hindi. And it grants a demonstrable, even though only statistical and not absolute, privilege by birth to the people of a certain geographical area. The essence of the task ahead of us is to modify the status of Hindi so as to remove these frictions.

Commerce and science are not enemies of Hindi, in spite of the clear preference in the higher ranks of both for English. The same economic forces which insist on English for operations in the international sphere would also vastly prefer Hindi to all the regional languages in their inter-State pan-Indian sphere. They are the strongest forces towards national unification through a common set of simple forms. Hindi may be only a second choice on their part, but it is not a third or a fourth choice, such as a linguistic quota or a zone system would be.

Democracy and socialism are not enemies of Hindi either, in spite of the patent inability of Hindi to reach more than three-fifths of the population. Hindi is much easier to learn for most Indians than English is and can ever be. I shall not repeat the arguments here, since they are well-known. Most of the accomplished modifications of Hindi have been along this direction, including the sometimes regretted process of Sanskritization.

National unity and the rise of Hindi need not be incompatible, but only if considerable wisdom is exercised. They are not compati-

ble automatically. The suggestion of Ram Manohar Lohia to divide India into two parts, one for Hindi and the other for English, has been a danger signal. Another has been the willingness on the part of the State leaderships to recommend a quota system for the union services. There are more Hindi champions than one would have expected, to partition India for the sake of exclusive dominance in a little corner, on the principle of Milton's Satan: better rule in hell than serve in heaven.

Abolition of hereditary privileges would be compromised by any elevation of Hindi to the sole medium of administration. But the sting can be taken out of such a compromise if three much neglected facts are better publicised. The economically powerful Hindi-speaking castes, such as the Marwaris, are anglicising very fast, and would in another generation become much more interested in English than in Hindi. And, the privilege by language would benefit most of all people from the Awadhi, the Bhojpuri and the Maithili lands, areas incapable of economic subsistence for a long time to come without some kind of subsidy from the other regions. Slowest to progress of all Indian areas, they deserve help of a kind which would preserve their self-respect and advance their education. What they claim on grounds of an illusory strength may be granted on grounds of a brotherly solidarity.

The deadlock can be broken if the popular fears are seen to be what they are, with very little basis in the realities. Hindi never had the strength that Russian has in the USSR. What political power it had has been counteracted by the division into five and a half States, the largest of which is so ill-balanced as to be perpetually divided against itself and each of which has its own variety of pronunciation, of vocabulary and even of Sanskritization.

What economic power it had is being counteracted by the rapid anglicisation of the richer business castes, as well as by the earlier and faster urbanization of the non-

Hindi areas; most of the major industrial and commercial cities are outside the Hindi area, and while even Orissa increased its domestic radio receivers 333 per cent between 1952 and 1961, Uttar Pradesh managed only 152 per cent. Thus, a special advantage for Hindi is necessary only in the same way as a special advantage for Harijans.

The unity of India is not like that of the United Kingdom or of West Pakistan. It does not have a single, dominant class homogeneous in actual or potential family relationships. Neither the current dominance of English nor the proposed dominance of Hindi can be compared to the dominance which English has in the United Kingdom or even Urdu in West Pakistan. Essentially, this is due to the fact that we do not have an aristocracy, even in the vague form in which about two hundred frequently intermarrying families are running West Pakistan.

Indeed, the evil of many castes, religions and languages has in India the good effect of preventing the very few people who must take most of the major decisions from interlinking their families into an aristocracy. The unity of India is not through a homage to the strong, but through a care for the weak. India is held together less like a wheel with spokes than like a hoop with strands.

The adoption of Hindi as the sole official medium of the union government will not therefore create any social problem, and yet it will be far preferable for the economical conduct of public affairs than an even so informal partition or balkanization. Opposition to it should not, however, be trampled under, but conciliated by publicity for the above facts as well as by concrete steps to modify Hindi. The script should be of use here, also a vigorous acceptance of the international scientific terms, a compulsion to study translations from the other national languages as part of the Hindi curriculum, and recruitment to the union services through all the national languages. Hindi should join the forces it cannot beat.

Role of the mother tongue

MOHIT SEN

'LANGUAGE is the direct reality of thought'—this is the basic idea which must guide any consideration of the language problem in India. The development of thought and language have a dialectical relationship, nourishing each other through fruitful conflict. History has never known an example of a people developed intellectually

who have an undeveloped language or vice versa. India, obviously, cannot be an exception to this general historical law.

This does not mean that a certain small section in any country cannot reach the highest intellectual level prevailing in the world while the rest of the country lies sunk in

backwardness. To a limited extent and for a limited period this is possible. India is itself a case in point. The English-knowing elite has produced some historians, economists, scientists and civil servants who can be regarded as the equals of their counterparts in the USSR, USA or western Europe. But they are a microscopic minority. And, generally speaking, their talent, its expression, has been more derivative than original, almost always half a generation behind the times. They have totally failed to raise the level of modern Indian thought as a whole, remaining aliens in their own country and somewhat in the nature of *parvenus* abroad.

The Barrier

Rajaji once said that the tragedy in India is that the students have to learn the language through the subjects taught rather than the subjects through the language in which they are taught. In reality, he was underestimating the damage done. What happened and what continues to happen is that the students in Indian universities, in the mass, neither learn the language nor the subjects. They are deprived of thought because of the language barrier.

It is quite wrong to imagine that the students, generally speaking, know the subjects but are not able to express what they know. It is true that they may know somewhat more than what they are able to express but what they know is tragically little. Very often it will be found that most of what the average university student knows has been learnt not in the class room but through guide books or private tuition, both made available in the mother tongue of the students concerned.

It was quite an interesting experience to look at some of the 'notes' taken by different students of different faculties at the Osmania University. A good half were quite unintelligible not only to the investigator but even to the students who had taken them down. The position was somewhat better in the science courses as many of the students had gone through English medium schools, their

general intellectual level was higher and the language of science is more symbolic, using more of its own notations, especially so far as mathematics is concerned. In short, science and technical courses are easier to memorise without the hurdle of language coming in so decisively. It should be remembered that this also means that it will be easier to start more quickly the teaching of science subjects in the different mother tongues of India. It is unlikely that the experience of other Indian universities would be much different.

What this amounts to is the terrible intellectual waste which is going on in India. No wonder Gandhiji and Jawaharlal Nehru were deeply concerned that India should emerge from the bondage of English almost as much as that it should free itself from British imperialist tutelage. Even today the passionate writings on the subject in *Young India* in the 1920s or one of the last pieces written a few days before assassination by Gandhiji would repay the most earnest consideration. Nehru's essay on language penned in 1937 also forcibly makes the same point.

Level of Development

One objection to this supreme role of the mother tongue in the entire process of education and administration in India, is that these languages are relatively undeveloped. It can be admitted at once that compared to the development reached *today* by English, Russian, French, Japanese, German, etc., even our major languages lag far behind. But the comparison itself is unhistorical as the lag is the fault not of the language but of the general backwardness in which the country is still sunk. We should compare the state of our major languages with those of leading world languages when they were the vehicles of pre-industrial civilisations. It will then be found that the basic word stock, grammar, idiom of our languages today is by no means inferior. The potential for development is fully present.

Besides, this objection has been given a knock-out blow by deve-

lopments in the past five decades. After all, the present elder generation in India has itself been a witness to the striking development of Japan and its language. Today no field of scientific or technical endeavour is beyond the capacity of the Japanese language. An even more striking example is the way in which the Uzbek, Turkman, Kirghiz and Tajik languages have been made adequate to rear millions of cadres essential for the modernisation of these long depressed nations.

And, let us not forget, that Chinese scientists have been able to make the atomic bomb while using their own rather difficult and even anachronistic language. Scientists from Britain have been highly impressed by the scientific development of China and not so favourably by that of India—funds and priorities obviously decided, despite the facility with which our leading scientists speak English. And it can be said without fear of contradiction that through the use of Chinese a far sounder scientific base has been laid in that country than in ours, precisely because we have refused to free ourselves from the yoke of a foreign language as our supreme vehicle for intellectual growth.

Quick Application

It is quite obvious that languages do not develop in a vacuum. It would be ludicrous to wait until our languages develop and then make the switch over to their use. It is as if somebody were to wait until he is strong before exercising! It is quite true that phased programmes have to be drawn up and special funds and cadres used for the purpose but the essence of the further development of our languages will be through their increasing use and application as quickly as possible and in as many fields as possible.

It should also be borne in mind that a great deal of the development will be through assimilation from the already developed languages and the international termi-

nology, i.e., through a process of transliteration rather than translation. Certainly, many of our translators or terms framers are making clowns of themselves and a joke of their languages by the laborious effort to coin equivalent words.

At the same time, there should not be a swing to the other extreme. We should not litter our languages with so many foreign terms that the whole point in using them gets lost. For example, the Russians have transliterated 'imperialism' to read 'imperialisms' but certainly in the sanskrit-based Indian languages we can stick to 'samrajyabad'. The ridicule that is being poured on some Hindi pundits who will not allow words like 'bicycle', 'station', 'railway', etc., to enter their language should not be extended to genuine efforts that must be made to extend all the power and use all the resources of our undoubtedly rich languages.

We must beware of the easy way out and endeavour as far as possible to stick to the rule that the words coined, either through translation or transliteration, should make the objects they describe as easily comprehensible to the people as possible. Obviously, the efforts of the linguistic experts will have to be supplemented by those of the representatives of the common people as well as the experts in the relevant fields.

Plurality

A rather stronger objection to the supremacy of the mother tongues in India is precisely their plurality. It is often rhetorically asked—which is the Indian mother-tongue? Surely, it is not unpatriotic to answer—there is no Indian mother-tongue. One is faced here with the tangled question of whether there is such a thing as the Indian nation. It is not an easy question to answer. There is no Soviet nation as such nor a Yugoslav nation, nor a Chinese nation. Nations have, one feels, to be equated to unilinguism. But this does not mean that there is no such thing as a distinct and unique Soviet Union or Yugoslavia or China. So also India. A combina-

tion of historical circumstances has produced this entity and it has come to acquire almost the same strength as unilingual and genuine nations, though with much greater effort and much more conscious endeavour. It simply will not do to point to the Hindu heritage as Europe was, after all, Catholic for centuries and Christian for even longer.

Besides, the common fact of Hinduism does not prevent violent conflicts between linguistic units or, rather, nationalities in India. What has made possible the emergence of India is the national movement, resting on the development of a growing market and other economic relations. Without this historical changes brought about by British colonial rule it could well have been that Indian nationalism would not have emerged at all, all tall talk of unity in diversity notwithstanding.

Multi-nationality

What has happened in India is that the process of total growth of a number of nationalities proceeded faster than the individual growth of each one of these nationalities. As it happened, even this is not a complete picture. Before India could emerge, a peculiar combination of mediaevalism (religion) and modernism (the rise of nationalities) cut across her, leading to the birth of Pakistan. It may well be that, given the balance of forces prevailing at the time, Pakistan and the partition of India could not be avoided. One gets less sure about this as 1947 recedes. But it is certainly true to say that the fact that Pakistan could come into being emphatically demonstrated that India had not fully emerged.

The years since independence have done much to consolidate and to extend the basis of Indian patriotism. But the full mansion is far from ready. It can still be blown up by any foolhardy attempts to force India into the procrustean bed of unilingual nationalism. The only hope for the full emergence of India is the equal emergence of all her nationa-

lities, essentially based on language and, hence, a common history. If any of the nationalities that are a part of India has an objective reason to feel that some other nationality is going to get an edge over it, then one might as well say goodbye to India and all that. Economic imbalances apart, the development of the mother tongues is of crucial significance. There has to be a sense of homeliness for every Indian nationality in India.

Democratisation

One has to mention one final clinching argument. India has come into being on a multilingual basis in modern times, the chief characteristic of which is the fact and the potential of mass participation at all levels of human endeavour. Today, the age of hierarchy and of caste is past and we are beginning the transition to the day when mental and manual labour will no longer confront each other across unbridgeable social gulfs. At such a moment the talk of elite cultures is anachronistic in quite the same way as socialism was a utopian dream, say, in the days of the Buddha. A mass culture, a democratic intelligentsia cannot be the product of the supremacy of an alien language.

In Indian conditions this would mean that both Hindi and English cannot, if they try to usurp the place of the mother tongues, move India into the modern age. Apart from creating unbearable tension, such an attempt at imposition would have the most dangerous consequences for the modernisation of India which is quite indistinguishable from democratisation. Neither westernisation nor any attempt at Hindu revivalism through Hindi would eventually aid the making of modern India. It is only after the masses have come into the heart of the contemporary Indian scene that one can think of the linking that will be permanent. In any event, the problem of a link language is not the focus of this article. One has to underline here only the fact that India will survive as a multinational union, or not at all.

The missing link

V. K. R. V. RAO

IT is somewhat surprising that in all the discussions now going on with such abandon in the country, no one has thought of inter-communication between the different Indian languages. This is the missing link in the current thinking on India's language problem; it is to the identification of this missing link and the filling up of this lacunae that I propose to devote this article.

India has fourteen official languages. With the exception of Kashmiri, each of the other languages is spoken by more than ten million people. In addition, several million people possess a smattering of English and a few lakhs real proficiency in that language. The language of the elite has been and continues to be English. The language of politics

is Hindi and the other Indian languages. The language of the masses is their own individual mother tongue. Hindi is now the official language of the Central Government and several State Governments.

Other Indian languages have already become or are in the process of becoming the official languages of their respective States. In addition, English continues as an associate official language in the Centre and in most of the States. All this is very confusing to any outsider who takes India seriously as a nation; in fact, it is also a matter of puzzlement to many of us who since 1947 have acquired the status of members of an independent nation.

The way in which we have tried to restore some order from this

babel of tongues is to have an official language which will be taught in all schools and thereby establish inter-communication between literate Indians with different mother tongues. But, unfortunately, there is no agreement in having one official language. The duality which plagues this country in so many fields has also taken root in that of the Indian official language. The remedy which has been suggested is the three language formula. There is no agreement even on this, as different interpretations are being placed on the content of this formula.

Emotional Integration

Broadly speaking, the idea behind the formula seems to be to bring about equality of sacrifice between the Hindi speaking people of India and other Indians who speak other Indian languages. Thus, as a kind of *quid pro quo* for South Indians learning Hindi, North Indians are expected to learn a South Indian language. And this is expected to bring about emotional integration and smoothen the path for the learning of Hindi, which is now our official language, by all Indians.

In all this, I miss something fundamental. A multi-lingual country like ours which is at the same time one united nation cannot be satisfied with having one official language as its instrument for emotional integration. This is quite apart from the fact that what we are having is not one official language but two, and that this is leading to a dichotomy between the classes and the masses, the elite and the rest.

Even if the whole country accepts and goes in for Hindi as its link language, this cannot lead to that full and comprehensive emotional integration which should characterise a genuine nation. At best, it can lead to inter-communication and therefore understanding at the political level. But it does not lead either to inter-communication or to mutual appreciation at the cultural and intellectual

level between the different linguistic groups of India.

The link language establishes contact among the Indian people whose mother tongues are different but it does not make for contact or inter-communication between the different Indian languages. After all, the best thoughts as well as cultural contributions in the form of poetry, drama, fiction and the like are to be found in the writings in the mother tongues of the different languages of India. Translations provide for acquaintance but not for inter-communication, while the three language formula deals only with a small sector of the rich and variegated field which constitutes India's cultural heritage. And the difficulty of inter-communication will grow and extend also to future cultural contributions in the different Indian languages as, with the extension of the mother tongue as the medium of instruction at the higher stages of instruction and also as the official language of their respective linguistic States, more and more of Indian writing will be in Indian languages.

Inter-communication

What is essential for the growth of a real emotional integration therefore is the establishment not only of a link language among the Indians but also of a link mechanism between the Indian languages. It is not enough to have inter-communication between Indians with different mother tongues. It is also necessary to have among them mutual esteem and appreciation not only in political terms but also in cultural and literary terms. This is possible only if there is inter-communication among the Indian languages. This is the missing link that one finds in the current thinking of India's language problem.

The missing link to which I have made such repeated reference is a common script. Nothing inhibits a person so much from learning another language as its script. Among the fourteen languages listed as national languages in our Constitution, there are thirteen or at best twelve scripts. It is not

practical politics to think of many Indians being either willing or even able to learn twelve or thirteen scripts even in answer to the call of patriotism and common Indian nationality. If, on the other hand, it became possible for an Indian to learn other Indian languages through a common script, it becomes much easier for him to do so.

Measure of Identity

The advantage of having one script in which all Indian languages could be written is not merely the ease of learning Indian languages other than one's own mother tongue. In fact it will also demonstrate, more vividly than any argument can, the existence of a measure of identity among all Indian languages which does not exist as between Indian, and European or other Asian languages. The myth that Hindi is as foreign to the Tamilian or Kannadiga as English or, that Tamil or Kannada is as foreign to a Hindi-speaking man as English, will stand finally exploded if through a common script it became possible for all Indians to get some acquaintance with each other's language.

What some people do not realise is that Indians have lived in one country though speaking different languages, that there has been a considerable measure of internal mobility among them, and that all their languages have been largely influenced by Sanskrit and to a smaller extent by Persian and Arabic, and now English. This long historical process has given a degree of commonness and intimacy among Indian languages that can be appreciated only if inter-communication is established among them by a common script.

In fact, with a common script, basic vocabularies in the different Indian languages on the lines of basic English, basic Italian, basic German, etc., and bi-lingual or multi-lingual dictionaries, it should not be difficult for Indians to get direct contact with and appreciate the writings in other Indian languages, provided of course there is transliteration of selected books in the common script. To

establish inter-communication between Indian languages, it is necessary not only to have a common script but also transliteration.

I must hasten to add that I am not advocating the abolition of the existing scripts of Indian languages or their replacement by a common script. What I am pleading for is an *additional common script* with transliteration of selected Indian books and periodicals in this additional common script. That the idea of an additional common script existed even in ancient India is shown by the recent discovery of a Tamil inscription in the Brahmi script along with the Tamil script in a cavern in Madurai district in Madras State. Similarly, and actually in current usage, is the regional script for Sanskrit writings in many parts of non-Hindi speaking India. The army has also had experience of teaching Hindi in the Roman script. Altogether, it is clear that the use of another script to learn an Indian language is found in Indian history and has also current practice behind it.

The Roman Script

Whether this additional script should be the Roman script or the Nagari script is a question which has both technical implications and emotional undertones. But the need for a mass link language as well as for easy inter-communication between the different Indian languages is so imperative that given technical feasibility if not necessarily superiority, I for one would be prepared to accept the Roman script as the additional script. Those the script of whose language is *nagari* have no reason to complain, as their script will remain intact and continue to be used by them.

Those whose script is not *Nagari* also have no reason to complain either, as their own scripts will also remain intact and in use; and at the same time the additional script through which they will learn the national link language as well as other national languages will not have the psychological inhibition that the *nagari* script

seems to have for important minorities like Muslims and Christians and important language groups like the Tamils and the Bengalis.

Rational Solution

At the same time, it will facilitate the learning of English which we all value so much, as the Roman script is common to that language as well. In addition, there will be no question of additional burden on non-Hindi groups that the adoption of Hindi as the official link language will impose; nor will there be the additional burden imposed on the Hindi group by the adoption of the three language formula with its three scripts. Every one will have only two scripts and three languages instead of three scripts and three languages. The rational solution I recommend for the Indian language problem is a two-script and three languages formula. I suggest that this will avoid passion, ensure economy, and secure the speedy implementation of the three language formula.

The only unfavourable feature is that it would be more expensive than if the country had only one language or only one script. But since the country cannot have one language and will not have one common script, and at the same time, the country must have a link language for the masses and ease of inter-communication between the different languages, we must accept the additional expenditure involved as an unavoidable incidence of national development.

After all, we are spending hundreds of crores of rupees on national defence and heavy industries. Spending a few crores more on establishing communication between the different Indian languages should not be frowned upon, for it is not only for achieving an objective good in itself but also one which is basic both to defence and development. Incidentally, it would provide the missing link in our multi-lingual structure and give the country a variegated but integrated building for housing its many languages in harmony and mutual esteem and understanding.

Sanskritization

INDAR NATH MADAN

AFTER a good deal of debate and discussion the Constituent Assembly of India decided in favour of Hindi as a link language for the whole country for purposes of administration, law, commerce, and communication with the Centre and accepted fourteen national languages to serve these and other purposes in the States of the Indian Union. Hindi was meant to replace English and not the Indian languages for the simple reason that a foreign language could not strike roots in the soil, especially in the democratic set-up in which people's participation is bound to grow with the passage of time. Persian had been the language

of administration for a few hundred years in this country; but it could not strike roots in a foreign soil. English also, however rich and universal, cannot be expected to become the language of the people.

It has no doubt brought a political cohesion at the top and opened the doors to western science and thought which have liberalised the educated section of society. As the pros and cons in favour of an Indian language to serve the purpose of a link language are numerous, Hindi was selected not on the basis of quality but quantity, because it had the widest range. It is as rich or as poor as any

other modern Indian language, but the number of people who can speak and understand it is proportionately very large as compared to speakers of other national languages.

New Words

The problem of enriching and developing a link language as of other languages is not an isolated one but a complicated problem which has got to be viewed not only in its narrow political context but also in the larger context of the socio-economic changes which have taken place during the last eighteen years in this country and also in the light of the revolution which has taken place in the realm of science and technology in the whole world.

It is estimated that the number of technical terms which have been coined and evolved for communicating modern knowledge is about twenty lacs; this may not be the problem of a link language, but it certainly is the problem of Hindi and other national languages for purposes of higher education and research in this country. It is a stupendous task and perhaps the only way to face it is to escape it. And those who advocate a whole-scale adoption of foreign words as the only means for equipping these languages, so as to make them fit vehicles for expressing modern thought, are escaping the problem. A language which is likely to evolve by adopting this method will be a queer mixture of foreign nouns and Indian verbs, neither English nor Hindi or any other Indian language.

Even Jawaharlal Nehru was not in favour of this policy and he wrote even in 1937 while discussing the intricate question of language—'We should fix upon scientific, technical, political and commercial words to be used in Hindustani as well as, if possible, in other Indian languages. *Where necessary*, these words should be taken from foreign languages and bodily lifted. Lists of other words from our own languages should be made; so that in all technical and such like matters we might have

precise and uniform vocabulary.'¹ Before independence, Hindustani and not Hindi was discussed as the link language of India.

As a matter of fact, there are three or four ways of evolving a technical vocabulary for lower and higher purposes and the problem of evolving a vocabulary for the link language, i.e., Hindi is of a lower order, as it is confined to a few subjects such as administration, law, commerce etc. Among the three or four methods for developing a language are—borrowing, adaptation, coinage and selection of words. The vocabulary for higher education is bound to be more technical and precise; but the vocabulary for administration will be more current and popular. This is because it is going to be used by a much larger number of people than the one for the highly specialised fields of knowledge.

The Arguments

It has been laid down in the Constitution that in order to develop the official language for the Indian Union, which now is being called a link language to assuage the feelings of the non-Hindi speaking people, words would be taken from all languages and preferably from Sanskrit which had been a source language in the past for enriching the vocabulary of almost all the Indian languages. Some of the arguments which have been advanced in favour of this preference are—(i) most of the modern Indian languages are dominated by Sanskrit vocabulary, (ii) a large number of new words can be coined more easily by adding prefixes and suffixes to the roots in Sanskrit, and such words are capable of expressing finer and precise shades of meaning, (iii) the Sanskrit language like Latin is very rich in roots, (iv) it is by adopting and coining words from the same classical source that uniformity in technical vocabulary can be maintained which is highly desirable and essential for mutual dialogue.

It is argued that current words which are more easily under-

1. *The Unity of India*, Lindsay and Drummond, London, 1948.

stood by the people and which have been absorbed in the Indian languages should be adopted instead of coining new words. It is possible, for instance, to accept the current word 'judge' in Hindi; but it will be irksome to adopt words like 'judiciary', 'judicial', 'judgment', etc., which are derived from it. Hence another word for the current word 'judge' is considered essential from which other words for judiciary, etc., can be derived in the same uniform way.

Dictionary Approach

There seems to be a method in this madness. The various expert committees appointed by the Central Ministry of Education have, however, struck a compromise by adopting current words and coining new words from Sanskrit, the source language. Alternatives have been given in the *Collection of Technical Words* published by the Central Hindi Directorate for trial and experiment—after which they will be finalised by a central committee of experts. The bias is in favour of Sanskritization of the vocabulary and therefore the percentage of current words from Indian and foreign languages cannot be high. It is because of the directive given in the Constitution that this dictionary approach has been adopted in preparing the lists of words.

At the same time, dictionaries of technical words of common usage in different languages were not available at that time and the expert committees, therefore, could not liberally draw upon them. It is possible that in course of time a number of unpalatable words will automatically drop out and they will be replaced by foreign words which have been absorbed in Indian languages and current words which have been evolved in them.

As Jawaharlal Nehru has rightly pointed out in his well-known essay on the question of a language—'A living language is a throbbing vital thing, ever changing, ever growing and mirroring the people who speak and write it. It has its roots in the masses,

though its super-structure may represent the culture of a few'. It is therefore not possible to shape or evolve a language by a dictionary approach from above; it cannot be forced to behave in a particular manner.

After the partition of the country, the development of Hindi and Urdu on either side of the sub-continent fell into the hands of the purists and there was a marked tendency to Sanskritize Hindi and Persianize Urdu both of which had been coming closer to each other as a link language before the partition. The film has been able to resist this tendency because of its commercial approach; but the radio surrendered to it on account of its official policy.

Two Identities

Again, there is a swing of the pendulum on the radio. Hindi writers try to link Hindi with the people so that it does not lose its vitality and become artificial and lifeless. This is relevant to Hindi as a link language and not as a medium of higher education and research, where it is bound to be more technical and precise. In order to attain this status, it is bound to draw more and more upon the source language and it will be obliged also to lift bodily a large number of technical words from English and other foreign languages. It will have to adopt, adapt and translate the ever-growing scientific terminology in order to keep pace with the rapidly developing world of science and technology. As a medium of higher education and research it will sound like a hybrid language until by the process of elimination and absorption it regains its genius and naturalness.

As a matter of fact, all the great Indian languages which are no longer called dialects, vernaculars or native tongues will have to pass through this process, until they become suitable media of higher education and all-India examinations. As Hindi has to play an additional role of a link language for purposes of commerce, administration, inter-State and inter-people communication, it will be different from Hindi as

a medium of higher education and research. Two styles of Hindi will automatically develop in the course of time.

So long as the non-Hindi areas are not in a mood to accept Hindi as the common all-India medium of communication, English will be retained as an associate language. Those who imagine and even argue that English will continue as such do not realise that it is manifestly impossible in terms of the masses, even though it is feasible in the context of the upper classes. No government can educate millions of people in a totally foreign language. It also cannot afford to stop the process of education, even though it can arrest its growth.

It has been repeated *ad nauseum* that English will remain the principal medium for maintaining contacts with the outside world. Other foreign languages like French, German and Russian will also come into play for this purpose. A clearer picture is gradually emerging in regard to the language policy but at heavy cost. This is because language occasionally becomes a tool in achieving political ends. Perhaps, also, it is a part of the process of arriving at 'objective' conclusions in a democratic State.

Approach to Life

Sanskritization is not only a method but also an approach to life. It is discernible not only in enriching the vocabulary of the link language but also in its spelling, pronunciation, grammar, script etc. The problem of simplification of the language is ultimately linked with this approach. It has been argued, for instance, that the spellings of Sanskrit words should be retained in their original form, however irksome, for the sake of uniformity. A number of words in Sanskrit like *Shrīman*, *Bhagwan* which are 'hālant' are obsolete; but the purists insist on the purity of the spelling of source words.

Some of the well-known writers like Premchand have not adopted the original spellings of Sanskrit words; but in books of grammar

these are given as spelling mistakes. It is like putting the cart before the horse, arresting the natural growth of the language. This conservative approach has not been given up even by the English people in spite of the large funds which were donated by G.B.S. for reforming the spellings of the English language. The Americans who have introduced these reforms are by no means less grammatical or worse off than the English.

It is essentially a conflict between the orthodox and the modern approach to the problems of life, including that of the language. At a time when new vistas of knowledge, new horizons of experience are opened up demanding expression or communication, writers are compelled to experiment with the language in order to make it a fit vehicle for these purposes. A state of chaos is likely to arise.

This has happened in the case of Hindi in the past when Mahavirprasad Dwivedi had to warn those writers who began to flout the rules of grammar. This situation has again arisen and an old grammarian in his new garb is at large to sound a note of warning to writers. He has now worn the garb of Sanskritization and adopted an approach which flows from it. He stands more for convention than for change whether this change be in the sphere of vocabulary, grammar, spelling or script.

Script Reform

If it is not possible to adopt the Roman script for the link language in spite of its obvious advantages, the next alternative is to reform the script so that it can suit the exigencies of the machine age, i.e., the typewriter, teleprinter and the press. If the process of simplification in spellings is resisted, it will further complicate the problem and make the Nagari script and also the other Indian scripts unsuitable in this modern age. No script in the world is perfect and scientific as is sometimes claimed out of ignorance. All scripts are conventional with their pros and

cons, but they have to be reformed to suit the needs of the age.

Jawaharlal Nehru also dismissed the idea of adopting the Roman script not only on account of the wall of sentiment round Nagari and other Indian scripts but also on more solid grounds. If the Roman script is adopted, it will result in alienation from the inheritance of the past and this will be a great loss. Moreover, there will be a big difference between the Roman script for the English language and the Roman script for the Indian languages including the link language. The changes which will have to be made to express the new sounds of the Indian languages will be so many that there will be two separate Roman scripts.

The adoption of the Roman script will be like uprooting a fruit-giving tree and sowing a seed in its place. It is possible to introduce reforms for modernising the Nagari script, provided the Sanskritization approach does not stand in the way of this process, the conservative way of life does not resist this change. It is not feasible to retain the old and induct the new, to preserve the purity of spelling and keep pace with the rapidly changing world.

Conflicting Attitudes

So long as these two attitudes, i.e., Sanskritization and Modernization persist, it will be difficult to introduce radical reforms both in the script and spellings of the link language. The Government of Uttar Pradesh convened a conference in 1953 for reforming the Nagari script and some decisions were taken and also implemented in books for school children; but the whole experiment ended in a fiasco and it was abandoned simply because the school children learnt incorrect Hindi which they could not unlearn when they grew up.

The Central Ministry of Education convened another conference in 1959 for reforming the Nagari script in order to make it less unsuitable for the typewriter and teleprinter and a key-board for both was, after all, finalised by

striking a compromise between the two contending schools of thought. Even in Sanskrit which is a highly meticulous language in the grammatical sense, it is difficult to decide what is correct and what is not correct.

A critic has counted one hundred grammatical errors in Magha's works, three hundred in the works of Bharavi and countless in the works of Kalidasa who was a great poet. It is a Dhananjaya's work that there is not a single grammatical mistake and he is not known as a writer of significance. The attitude of the purist, of Dhananjaya, can be described as the '*tatsam*' approach to the language and the attitude of the creative writer, of Kalidasa, as the '*tadbhava*' approach which allows the language to grow, to change by making grammatical mistakes.

Hinder Growth

To my mind, Sanskritization is the '*tatsam*' approach to the development of Hindi even as a literary language, much less as a link language. To illustrate my point, the word which has been coined for the telephone is '*durbhasha*' which is a literal translation of tele and phone. It may not be a difficult word to pronounce and also may gain currency in course of time; but it was difficult for my peon to begin with and later on for the mechanic when it went out of order. The words '*telephone*' or even '*phone*' have become current among the people. The Sanskritization of Hindi for building up a link language in such cases is likely to hinder its growth and isolate it from the people for whom it is meant. Whether it may or may not apply to Hindi as a literary language is entirely the choice of the writer and depends on his individual sensibility. Jaishankar Prasad and Premchand are bound to develop their individual styles and both have achievements to their credit. This is not a truism in the case of Hindi but in all the national languages.

The problem of 'standard Hindi' is equally controversial, especially

in the form of a link language. Even in the Hindi speaking areas it is a matter of dispute. It is not possible to name the President's Hindi like the King's English. It is rather difficult to say whether the western part of the Hindi speaking area speaks standard or the eastern part of it. It is a dispute which they can decide between themselves. As a matter of fact, the mother tongues of the Hindi speaking areas are Avadhi, Brajbhasha, Bhojpuri, Rajasthani, Bihari, etc., and they are as much different from Khariboli as is Panjabi from it.

Modern Approach

If Hindi is to be spoken and used by the non-Hindi speaking peoples, it is bound to have a much larger variety. It is possible to imagine a Panjabi Hindi, a Tamil Hindi, a Bengali Hindi like the Indian and the American English. I do not know if there is an African English. It is for the sake of rigid uniformity that Sanskritization of Hindi has been recommended and adopted as an approach and policy for developing the link language. As already pointed out, the Hindi films, which on account of their commercial approach aim at covering the widest possible range of film-goers, are building up the link language by a liberal policy and modern approach. It is a gradual process and therefore more natural and stable than the artificial and dictionary way of developing the language.

It is also true that the approach to the people is not merely a question of simple words and phrases, it is also a matter of communicating new ideas through Hindi and other modern Indian languages. Culture will have a wider basis in a democratic policy. In this way Hindi cannot remain confined in narrow circles, but it will reach out to the people who speak or understand it. Sanskritization of Hindi as a link language in its different aspects and forms is likely to do more harm than good to its development. Instead, a modern approach is needed to build up this role of the Hindi language.

Books

THE LANGUAGE CONTROVERSY IN INDIA: A historical study By Gostha Behari Kanungo.

Comparative Education Centre, University of Chicago, 1962.

'The forces which give rise to Multilingualism', wrote Michael West in his report on *Bilingualism*, 'are mainly political in their nature, whereas the forces which work in the opposite direction, which tend to produce uniformity of language, are mainly educational'. This is a quotation which Kanungo gives to conclude his enquiry. In reality, it however constitutes the central theme of his study. He develops it through a skilful review of the educational policies followed in India during the last 200 years and the controversies which they generated—their origin and causes, nature and import, effect and impact on the development of multilingualism and the use of English in India.

The review is based on a careful reading of official papers and speeches, minutes and documents, reports and monographs. Most of these lie buried in the dusty shelves of the archives. Those who are passionately devoted to unearthing the records of history will find it a useful shovel to dig with. Others who are not so disposed, temperamentally or otherwise, and yet curious to know how English as a language developed in this country and with what results will find it equally useful. In less than

80 pages it brings out the essential features of a controversy which still keeps us worried and divided.

The seeds of this controversy, as Kanungo reveals, were sown nearly 300 years ago when English was first introduced as a vehicle for the spread of Christianity in this country. During the initial years there was no resistance to this move. The East India Company readily accepted the object and, under the direction of the British Parliament, inserted a 'missionary clause' in its Charter when it was renewed in 1698. The clause provided for the establishment of schools 'for the instruction of the Hindus under the direct supervision of the Chaplains of the Company.' The intention was to reach through the medium of English education the 'influential upper classes', find 'native converts' from among them and thus induce them to propagate 'the Christian faith to the masses.'

For about 70 years the missionaries were allowed to function without any let or hindrance. The contemporary England including the East India Company lent them every support. The first opposition to their activities, ironically enough, came from the Court of Directors of the Company itself. In 1765 when the Company emerged 'as a political power filled with immense possibilities and fired with new visions of an empire, it began to discourage missionary enterprises... became more and more careful to

maintain strict religious neutrality and severed all connection with missionary enterprises of any kind.'

In 1793 when a resolution in support of the missionaries was moved in the House of Commons by the Foreign Secretary, Lord Castlereagh, the Court of Directors went even as far as to declare:

'...that the Hindus had as good a system of faith and of morals as most people and that it would be madness to attempt their conversion or to give any more learning or any other description of learning than what they already possessed.'

This was the beginning of a controversy which divided the British educationists and politicians into two opposing groups: the *Anglicists* favouring the continuation and strengthening of missionary activities and dissemination of European knowledge 'through the medium of the English language', and the *Orientalists* pleading for the development of the 'traditional system of education' by the Indian people 'according to their own genius'.

The Anglo-Orientalist controversy led to the inclusion of one of the most confusing sections (43rd) in the East India Company Act of 1813. The Act authorised the Governor-General in Council to spend 'a sum of not less than one lac of rupees in each year...to the revival and improvement of literature and the encouragement of the learned natives of India, and for the introduction and promotion of a knowledge of the sciences among the inhabitants of the British territories in India'.

Since the clause did not specify as to who the learned natives were—whether the English educated or the Pandits and Maulvis—the executors of the Act made their own interpretations, some setting up *pathasalas* and *madrasas* and others missionary and public schools.

In Bombay, Elphinstone started setting up vernacular schools for elementary education. 'He suggested the teaching of English "classically" and did not insist on its use as the sole medium of instruction.'

In Madras, Thomas Munroe strongly pleaded for the promotion of indigenous education. He proposed that 'Government should establish, in each collectorate, two principal schools, one for Hindoos and the other for Mahomedans.' But soon after his death the policy changed in favour of the 'downward filtration theory' and 'its underlying principle of diffusion of European knowledge through the medium of English.'

In Bengal, the orientalist policy was enforced for some time. But not long enough to reap results, except a stiff resistance from the Court of Directors. How strong this resistance was could be seen from a dispatch which they submitted to the Governor-General in 1824. Their dispatch said:

'The great end should not have been to teach Hindoo learning, but useful learning...you bound yourself to teach what was frivolous, not a little

of what was purely mischievous and a small remainder indeed in which utility was in any way concerned.'

Since then there has been many a debate on the question of language and its role in education. In general, the educational policies were however shaped and guided by two outstanding theories. The first was the theory of 'downward filtration'—'the theory that, once the influential classes had been educated, their learning and culture would seek a downward course and permeate the masses'. The second was the 'theory of engrafting'—'the theory which advocated the engrafting of European knowledge on that of India.'

The influence of these theories in Indian education and the development of various regional languages including English are studied and recorded by the author under four separate sections: the first dealing with the 'beginnings of English education'; the second, third and fourth with 'language and educational policy' under the rule of the East India Company, the British Crown and after the attainment of independence.

The conclusions of this enquiry are summed up at the close of the study. They reveal the complexities of the problem of language in Indian education and the complications of enforcing any ready-made solution. There are forces working in opposite directions. They can neither be ignored nor brought together.

At the one end there is a language which has been used as the official language for the past 200 years. Its continued usage has yielded several benefits and made it possible to assimilate knowledge on a wider scale. At the same time, it has led to the emergence of a middle-class which is strongly entrenched in power but not rooted in the soil. Apish in its looks, though progressive in its ideas, the middle-class is deeply committed to the retention of English as the official language of the country for reasons which are both personal (power, status and material well-being) and impersonal (English as a window to absorb fresh air, light and knowledge, as a means to eliminate waste and inefficiency, which might follow from the adoption of more than one official language or a less developed language).

At the other end the scale is equally heavy. There is the question of the welfare of linguistic minorities, the recognition of the strong national sentiments aroused during the days of struggle for freedom and the accompanying loss of national prestige in the continuation of a language gifted by or borrowed from the British rulers. Added to this, there is the fact that the regional languages including Hindi have considerably developed since English was first introduced. Their claims on education and administration and through them on matters relating to international affairs, therefore, merit serious and careful consideration. Finally, there is the democratic structure which demands the introduction of a language capable of bridging the existing gulf between the

elite and the mass, and not its widening through 'downward filtration'.

This is indeed, as Kanungo concludes, 'a challenging situation for educators of the country; but they are helpless in the face of the contemporary political situation of the country, and have to adjust their curriculum according to the political demands of the country.'

Ranjit Gupta

THE LANGUAGES OF INDIA—a kaleidoscopic survey.

Edited by V. K. Narasimhan, A. G. Venkatachary and V.K.N. Chary.

Our India Directories and Publications Private Ltd., Madras, 1958.

Twice during the last three years we witnessed a remarkable exhibition of unity and sense of purpose among the people of India. During the Chinese aggression in November 1962 and during the Pakistani aggression in August this year the nation rose as one man to meet the challenges. Yet, the nation which could thus rise to great heights has frequently been vulnerable to disruptive tendencies in the past and such tendencies would assert themselves if they are not arrested in time. One such issue which nearly split the country in recent times is the issue of the official language. Perhaps no other issue threatened the unity of the country as much as this one.

When it became apparent that the Government of India would proceed to implement the constitutional provision of adopting Hindi as the official language of India the issue became explosive. It sparked off violence in several parts of the country and the usually tranquil State of Madras convulsed with the worst riots ever which took a heavy toll of life and property. The riots were suppressed and assurances for the suspicious sections were given by the Central Government and the crisis of course was overcome. Yet, a suitable policy, designed to dispel the suspicion and fears that the adoption of Hindi would hamper the development of regional languages, is still to be evolved.

The editors of this small book have brought together eminent men of letters and linguistics who in brief articles trace the origin, growth, reverses and the progress of the languages over the centuries in our country. The book emphasises one important factor which was so apparent on the two occasions when the nation rose to meet the challenges from China and Pakistan. In spite of the diversity there is a basic unity and this cuts across the language barriers. Over the centuries a racial miscegenation has taken place and an 'Indian man' as Dr. Suniti Kumar Chatterji points out in his weighty, incisive article, has emerged. This Indian man speaks one of the languages descended from one of the four families into which the languages of India are classified.

The languages of India have been classified under four families: (1) The Indo-Aryan branch from

which nine languages of northern India are directly derived; (2) The Dravidian or South Indian family comprising Tamil, Telugu, Kannada and Malayalam and Brahui in Baluchistan; (3) the Austro-Asiatic group represented by the tribal and the Adivasi languages in Central India and (4) the Sino-Tibetan, mainly prevalent as dialects in the Assam area. The Linguistic Survey of India recorded the number of languages and dialects as 179 and 544 respectively.

Much has been made of this number and unkind critics have harped on this repeatedly and argued that our numerous languages are impediments to national integration. We are told frequently that since race, language and culture are the three most important factors which weld diverse people together into a strong nation, the presence of linguistic diversity in India would stand in the way of such integration. But, as Dr. Bishwa Nath Prasad in his article, 'The Languages in India', points out, of these 179 languages 116 are merely small tribal speeches 'belonging to the Tibeto-Chinese speech family which are found in the northern and north-eastern territories of India and form less than even one per cent of the entire population of the country.'

The languages of India are all intimately connected with each other and they go back to the Vedic speech as their ultimate source. It is not necessary to go into a detailed study of these languages and their literature. Most of these have some literature in them. As Dr. Suniti Kumar Chatterji points out 'there has not been in India any sense of exclusiveness or intolerance in the domain of language and literature. A work or a series of poems composed in a particular language, if it had merit, if it could move men and women, was quickly adopted into the other languages, or its ideas quickly adopted into the other languages, or its ideas were transmitted to the remotest parts of the country.'

Among the languages of India it is Tamil that has resisted the influence of Sanskrit or Prakrit for a long time. As Subbaiah points out in his article on Tamil language and literature, the earliest of Tamil works, *Tholkappiam*, shows little traces of Prakrit. This is not surprising since for a long time the Telugu and Kannada regions were acting as buffers, receiving and softening the impact of the Indo-Aryan languages, thus allowing Tamil to retain its original form in a more or less pure state. However, Tamil also came under the pervading influence of the Sanskrit language and during the times of the Pallava rulers in the South the influence of Sanskrit on Tamil was considerable. Yet 'its borrowing from Sanskrit was mainly restricted to the field of religion and philosophy.'

Perhaps what is pointed at by Appuswamy in his article on the Tamil language, that while the writing of novels, short stories and plays became very popular in due course, the writers did not approach the field of science, is true of all the Indian languages. An attempt was made in the case of Tamil to have the scientific literature translated into Tamil. But 'the

public was apathetic and so the venture did not catch on and succeed and today very few know about it.' Perhaps, in the case of most of the languages they have lagged behind in this field.

Dr. Suniti Kumar states that the question of languages suddenly took on a controversial turn particularly after the acceptance by the Constituent Assembly of India, 'through one-vote majority, of Hindi as the pan-Indian official language to replace English...' The elevation of one of the languages of India to the position of official language immediately caused apprehension in several parts of the country. There it was feared that 'Hindi will dominate the scene and give special advantages to the Hindi using group.' Dr. Suniti Kumar Chatterji himself has forcefully argued that English will have to continue for the present.

The question of an official language is inevitably linked closely with the status of English. There is no one who in recent times has more forcefully argued in favour of the retention of English than Rajaji. His position in 1958 was not far different from the position which he has been taking in recent times. The editors have included a brief article by him in this book. Dr. Rajagopalachari says, 'What Sanskrit did in India during her long and silent centuries in the past, what Latin did in Europe though it was divided into many States and nationalities, English is doing now in India. It may not be spoken in India except by a small group, but it is the language that in modern progressive life unites all the different regions of India into one and India itself with the rest of the world.' He has advanced his argument that 'the selection of any of them (the languages of India) to hold a pre-eminent official position on the strength of its inherent quality or on the strength of the numbers speaking it would lead to undesirable though natural jealousy. Official position carries with it secular power in modern life.' This is a stand which he has repeatedly urged since then.

On the other hand, in an equally forceful article Dr. Bishwa Nath Prasad argues how Hindi has evolved as a symbol of unity; the northern languages are closely related to Hindi which is acquirable by the speakers of Marathi, Gujarati, Oriya and Bengali. It is argued that 'Hindi has very largely approximated itself to the syntactic speech-habits of the speakers of the Dravidian languages as well, who find its Sanskritic and Prakrit elements serving as a common bond of unity for themselves.'

Some of the articles in the book are not entirely free from polemical overtones. Yet, the collection of the various articles serves an important purpose of emphasising the basic unity which prevails in India. While a hasty step in resolving this rather emotional problem may lead to a disaster, it need not necessarily lead one to rule out the emergence of a united India. India may face the dangerous decades ahead as a result of fissiparous tendencies like linguistic differences and other such seemingly insuperable divergences; at the same time

the feeling of despondency may be overcome by the realisation of the fact that 'India has always been a polyglot country. It was a perfectly natural development but such differences as have crystallised themselves, as we scaled the centuries, have helped rather than hindered all that was best in our evolution in spreading and getting assimilated in the lives and thoughts of the entire populace.'

S. Krishnamurthy

EDUCATIONAL PLANNING AND NATIONAL INTEGRATION By G. Ramanathan.

Asia Publishing House. 1965.

The problem is national integration, and education is considered to be the most potent instrument for achieving the emotional integration of the people of India. The author is a retired Principal of Training Colleges affiliated to the University of Kerala, formerly Basic Education Officer, etc., Kerala State Service. Four chapters out of fourteen have been devoted to the language question. Why?

Because he feels that the language question is the most serious internal problem that India has to tackle today, and that a wrong step taken now in regard to this question may, in a decade or two, throw us back two centuries and land us in the situation in which Clive and Dupleix discovered us. But the author also says that, when he started this book, national integration was the most important problem before us, but that by the time he approached the end of his task, the crisis precipitated by the Chinese aggression in India had radically altered the situation. Must the safety of national integration depend for its protection on a perpetual state of emergency based on external danger?

The most important problem today is how to protect the secular character of our democracy, and it is tied up with national integration and the language question. Secularism may mean different things to different people, but it does mean the separation of State and Religion, without being indifferent to either and without mixing up the two. Religion is concerned with the personal life of man, and thus religious ritual should have no place in State functions where the public image of man is involved. It also means tolerance for and support of all religions and no special patronage of any.

The politics of language has injected more heat than light into this question, and it is argued that inaction or drift is far less harmful than wrong action, that time is not an essential factor. The problem has two aspects in India, the question of a common language and the question of the medium of instruction. The concept of a common language does not ignite controversy, but an attempt to implement it has led to self-immolation as there is a fear that disabilities will neither be eliminated nor equated.

What is the concept itself based on? It is based

on three propositions—

- (a) there should be a common language for India,
- (b) the common language must be indigenous in origin,
- (c) Hindi can become the common language more easily than any other language.

If these propositions are acceptable, we must now examine why Hindi is not yet ready to fulfil the job, nor will be for a long time, because the natural process has to work; it cannot be created by artificial means. The author takes us back to Gandhiji's pronouncements on language for this purpose, and says that nobody, except sometimes the late Prime Minister Nehru, seems to be aware that the language we now call Hindi is not the language which Gandhiji wanted the people to adopt as their national language. Gandhiji wished that the ordinary language spoken and understood by the common people in North India, both Hindus and Muslims, should develop into the national language.

The important words in this statement are 'ordinary' and 'develop'. On the one side he exhorted the Hindu protagonists of Hindi to give up their leaning on Sanskrit to the exclusion of Urdu, and to learn the Urdu script in addition to their own Devanagari script. On the other side he exhorted the Muslim protagonists of Urdu to give up their exclusive leaning on Persian and Arabic, and to learn the Devanagari script in addition to their Urdu script. This was a secular approach to the problem as well as a correct linguistic one, and to the extent that it has not happened, it represents a failing in our secular democracy as well as in our national integration.

The next point for consideration is—how does a language grow? Although the process has to be natural, it cannot be unconditional, a living organism has to be fed to grow, although growth itself is natural. Ideas are the nutriment on which a language grows beyond its use as a mother tongue for other purposes also such as science, literature, mathematics, philosophy, etc. There are two sources from which a language is said to draw original ideas, —not only originality of thought, but also originality of form, method, presentation, etc. Men who are gifted with the power to conceive original ideas and who express themselves through that language, constitute the primary source, while the secondary source springs from other languages which are rich in the particular deficiencies of the language in question. Thus English has led to the growth of the Indian languages, and this process should be allowed to continue until the deficiencies are made up.

What do we find when we examine the question of a common language without passion and without heat? Using effective tools of analysis in a scholarly manner, Ramanathan concludes that any language must fulfil one condition before it can become the common language of the country, and another condition before it can be inducted as the official language. Note the distinction made between the two func-

tions—the term 'national language' is not used in this context.

The first criterion, which is called the criterion of universality, is that the language must be understood by the majority of every linguistic group, and that it is not enough if it is understood by a majority of the people of the country taken as a whole. This is often lost sight of. Now, it will be found that no language in India has as yet fulfilled this criterion. It is true that it is felt that under the sponsorship of Gandhiji, Hindi has achieved some substantial success in penetrating into non-Hindi areas, but its record still falls far short of the criterion that it should be understood by a majority of every linguistic group. The Official Languages Commission is quoted as saying—'Although languages are grouped together by philologists into linguistic families under two heads, the Indo-Aryan and the Dravidian language groups, within each group equally the languages are mutually unintelligible, being entirely separate and distant languages.'

The second criterion for an official language is that in every linguistic group there must be sub-groups of individuals who have attained varying levels of proficiency in the proposed official language. This is described as the criterion of universal effectiveness, which is fulfilled by English but not by Hindi. Hindi is feared for the disadvantage it will confer in non-Hindi speaking areas, and this applies equally to any other Indian language. A third criterion is one of depth, namely that the language must have developed to the extent required for serving the whole range of the needs of the people, including the highest possible intellectual and aesthetic expression. We can encourage the growth of a common language by deliberate measures, but we cannot wholly create it by artificial means.

The chapter on the medium of instruction is an interesting one and there is a pertinent conclusion in it. The fundamental proposition that from the point of view of the students' comprehension, the mother tongue is the ideal medium of instruction, stands undisputed and irrefutable. At the same time, the facts that the regional languages have not developed to serve as media of instruction and that the standard of attainment in English is too low to make English a satisfactory medium, are undeniable too. The answer to the dilemma is to develop in both directions simultaneously, as thus alone can the mother tongue come to be installed in its proper place as the supreme medium of instruction. The most effective way to lead to this outcome is to begin at the post-graduate level by providing that the thesis should be written both in English as well as the regional language through collaboration between teacher and student.

If the politics of language can be freed from the language of politics, progress can be made on healthy but unhurried lines. In February this year it came close to disrupting national unity between north and south. This is a grim warning against going about it the wrong way. As Indira Gandhi said

in Madras at the time, Hindi was meant to promote national unity, but if it comes in the way of this very unity itself, there must be serious rethinking, and not unthinking obstinacy. The common need for a common Indian language must be allowed to outgrow the fear of it in large areas which are equally Indian in character and history.

A. K. Banerjee

OUR LANGUAGE PROBLEM By M.P. Desai.
Navajivan Publishing House. 1956. pp. 216.

INDIA'S LANGUAGE CRISIS By S. Mohan Kumaramangalam.

New Century Book House (P) Ltd. 1965. pp. 122.

More than ten years divide the two books under review. The difference in their approach is much wider. Kumaramangalam argues his case and pleads for the development of regional languages in the interests of democracy. M.P. Desai's is reactionary and illogical. He is not in favour of linguistic 'provinces', but pleads for greater use of the mother tongue and of Hindi. Neither is in favour of retaining English as the official language, but while Kumaramangalam wants it introduced in standard III at school, early enough to be able to know it well, Desai thinks that starting on English in standard VII should do. Beyond this the two books share no common ground. Kumaramangalam's approach to the language problem is rational, while Desai's is sentimental—and stale sentiment at that.

Kumaramangalam criticises the government for what he regards as its lukewarm support for regional languages, and gives the experience of the USSR in solving a similar problem. There is no doubt that we could learn a lot from the USSR, a multi-lingual State like ours. At the same time we must remember that the problems Russia faced and solved in the matter of language have some important differences from the ones that we face now, e.g., Russia did not have a foreign language imposed on it as it was on us for over a century and, then, Russia could solve her problems under conditions of socialist construction, and we are nowhere near any such thing.

Kumaramangalam makes a special study of Tamilnad for two reasons; it is the State Kumaramangalam knows best and it is also the place where the language problem reached a critical stage.

During the freedom struggle, approaching the people in their own language broadened popular participation, and politics no longer remained the preserve of a small English knowing elite. Forming linguistic provinces and switching over from English to Hindi and the regional languages was part of the Congress manifesto, but paper schemes do not always turn out the way they are meant to. The policy regarding the development of regional languages was neither consistent nor uniform. That, together with the unwarranted enthusiasm for bringing in Hindi, led to riots in Tamilnad and ended up by giving a new

lease of life to English. Kumaramangalam discusses all these questions in his book, and also the findings of the Official Languages Commission, and the 1961 Census Report to expose the hollowness of the demand for English. The main issue, as he sees it, is the role of language as a means to democracy and not an end in itself, however hard zealots try to make it out to be.

In the earlier stages, English did play a positive role in the political life of the country. The old liberals felt that a study of English would open the doors of science and technology to our countrymen, and would enable them to understand the functioning of democratic institutions. But the role of English in our political life was over long ago. Gandhiji was among the earliest to reverse this trend and give importance to our own languages. The next big step was taken in 1937 when Nehru said that '...without infringing in the least on the domain of the provincial languages we must have a language for a common all-India medium of communication.' This line was not scrupulously followed, and Kumaramangalam feels that because of the uneven development of regional languages and the vacillating attitude of the Central and State governments, there could be nothing but trouble.

In Madras State, the language controversy became an English vs. Hindi tussle. When dealing with the language agitation in Tamilnad with its slogan of 'Hindi Never, English Ever', Kumaramangalam shows how this demand can at best postpone the introduction of Hindi. The demand for English is baseless and the 1961 Census shows why. In the urban areas of Madras State, only 6.46 per cent know English, in the rural areas, only 0.808 per cent. Standard VIII level of English is taken as the criterion, and the Census gives 2.84 per cent for the whole of India.

Apart from States where Hindi is widely spoken, regional languages have not developed the way they should have. The knowledge that some day Hindi would be the official language, Kumaramangalam feels, was what gave it an impetus. In Madras State, though the government probably thought they had done their best to help Tamil come into its own, it did not become the medium of education, or the language of the administration or the law courts. Where colleges had switched over to a Tamil medium, difficulties over books made them go back to English. Experience had taught people in the rural areas that petitions to the Secretariat, if drafted in English, were attended to much quicker than those drafted in Tamil.

Most anti-Hindi and pro-English supporters in Madras State are either industrialists, or were pillars of the British in India, and neither are known for their progressive views. To gain easy popularity, political parties too cash in on the language issue. Kumaramangalam gives the instance of Annadurai of the DMK, who was all for making the fourteen Indian languages equally official, a solution impractic-

coal enough to allow English to wedge itself through. When students went on strike on January 25th after the DMK call to observe the 26th as a day of mourning, their action was based on a deep seated fear. The students and their parents also had the future to think of. In an English-speaking India they could be fairly confident of a place in the sun. Not so if Hindi became the official language, where northerners could easily score over them. At least as regards English, they would have an equal chance with the other States.

After the disturbances in Madras State, it was conceded that English should be retained as an associate official language for as long as non-Hindi-speaking peoples wanted it, but Kumaramangalam feels that the vacillating policy of the government concealed the real trouble—the imbalance between Hindi and the regional languages was the basic cause of the crisis.

Kumaramangalam's attitude to the language problem is both critical and constructive—critical of the way it's being mishandled and allowed to exaggerate differences; constructive in the suggestions he makes for the use of the regional language in universities, law courts and the UPSC examinations. The most difficult period would be the transitional stage from English to Hindi and the regional languages, during which text books could be in English, and lectures in the regional languages. Law courts could take evidence and deliver judgments in the regional language, as used to be the case in Pudukottai and Baroda State, and the UPSC could hold examinations in the regional languages.

In dealing with an issue charged with emotion, Kumaramangalam thinks coolly about the problem, its causes, trends and solutions. But he does not go into its socio-economic roots, which alone would help towards a lasting solution. The problem should be tackled radically, because if fanatics of one extreme or the other are allowed to take the bit in their mouth, goodbye to national integration.

In contrast, M.P. Desai never argues his case—i.e., if he has one. He gives the old Bhakti cults credit for the revival of the mother tongue, and dismisses the language agitation in Madras as 'bad manners' on the part of the 'Dravidian Federation'. The book is full of hot air—and as enervating.

Kusum Madgavkar

**THE FAILURE OF MODERN LINGUISTICS IN THE
FACE OF LINGUISTIC PROBLEMS OF THE
TWENTIETH CENTURY** By S. Takdir Alisjahbana.
University of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur, 1965.

**THE NATIONAL LANGUAGE QUESTION: Linguistic
Problems of Newly Independent States** By R. B.
Le Page.

Oxford University Press, London, 1964.

The choice of a national language is one of the major problems facing the newly independent States

of Asia and Africa. In the past, these nation-States owed their political frontiers to the old colonial regimes which, for motives of their own—administrative convenience, or geography of white exploration and settlement—gave sometimes a spurious sense of unity to regions which had little otherwise to commend themselves as national entities. Since the achievement of independence the leaders of these nation-States have been facing the problem of choosing a national language which may become the channel of communication between often very disparate groups, and also induce a sense of belonging to a single nation among them. The two books reviewed here discuss the linguistic, political, educational and social problems which the national language question poses in the emerging Asian and African countries.

The two books deal with different aspects of the national language question. Alisjahbana discusses the academic problem of whether linguistics can resolve the problems arising from the solution of the national language question and the kind of contribution they can make. Le Page, on the other hand, is concerned with the socio-political considerations which enter the choice of a national language and implications of choosing any one particular language. Thus these studies together constitute a very useful introduction to the national language question in the emerging Asian and African nations.

In the past, linguists have submitted to a kind of academic snobbery which exists among some physical scientists who assume that work directed toward application or toward the technical development and large-scale use of an idea, is unscholarly. Under the influence of the sociological school founded by Durkheim and Simmel, they have concentrated their attention primarily to the creation of an autonomous science of linguistics concerned with the investigation and description of the characteristics and relationships of the phonemes of a language as its very essence. They have paid relatively little attention to the content of the language—be it the communicated meaning of words and sentences or the related cultural concepts and ways of thought—under the pretext that these belong to the field of psychology, logic, etc.

Although such an academic exercise has produced significant results, it has tended to isolate the science of linguistics from the very life-blood of society and culture. Alisjahbana suggests that in order to be useful from a social point of view (like economics, sociology, political science, etc.) modern linguistics should increasingly become interested in national and international developments and rapid social change currently under way in Asian and African countries as a result of world-wide developments in transportation and communication.

The leaders of the Asian and African countries are trying to change and mould the morphology, the phonology and the vocabulary of their languages so

that the national language becomes not only an integrative factor in society but also an adequate vehicle for communication and progress in the modern world. What is striking in the process of language engineering characterising the new States is the role of conscious or purposeful individual or group intervention in the development of national languages. The modern linguist, suggests Alisjahbana, should use his knowledge in the processing of the problems involved in language engineering. Further, he should try to verify the validity and usefulness of his own concepts, propositions and methods and also reassess their cultural involvement in these States.

Alisjahbana believes that the problem of language engineering can be succinctly formulated in terms of two main concepts, namely, standardization and modernization. Standardization refers to the efforts to create a standard of correct usage of a language in an area where social and local variations exist while modernization means the attempt to adjust the traditional concepts, ideas and ways of thinking to the concepts, ideas and ways of thought of the modern through the coining of new words and terms. Structural linguistics and phonology which are primarily concerned with the study of micro-language phenomena are however incapable of dealing with these problems of language engineering. 'A more comprehensive linguistics' insists Alisjahbana 'has to arise to cope with the broad and complex problems of language engineering in the new nations of Asia and Africa.'

Le Page's book provides an example of the kind of contribution which the linguist can make to the understanding and solution of the national language problem. Le Page shows that choice of a national language cannot be made in isolation from the historical experience, existing proportions of different linguistic groups and the degree of level of development of the new language itself. In fact, all these factors have a bearing upon the choice of the official language.

In India, Hindi has been adopted as the national language of the country and it was thought that it would be possible to shift completely to Hindi within fifteen years. But, faced with the fantastic magnitude of the task of implementing the national language problem, India has had second thoughts; and has extended the use of English as a subsidiary language indefinitely. Similarly, in Burma, after the order given by the present government that all teaching should be in Burmese had led to the resignation of a number of English-medium professors, the practical considerations such as shortage of text books and teachers have compelled the reintroduction of English medium teaching for at least two years of the university course.

The choice of the national language question has implications for the educative process of society and it needs to be made with the greatest caution. In the context of the newly independent States, education is expected to fulfill two tasks. In the first

place, it has to establish cultural homogeneity and a common sense of identity among the members of diverse races and cultures who find themselves members of one State as a result of a series of historical accidents. Secondly, education has to equip every individual to acquire a living for himself. In the process of education the medium of instruction is a matter of vital consideration.

Education of the child in a language which is not his or that of his parents, will alienate him from his parents. On the other hand, the provision of education in the vernacular rather than in an international language often arouses fierce resentment among the students themselves because, having received their education in the vernacular, they find that the best they can hope for is to become school masters in a vernacular school. The choice of the national language should be made in view of these implications.

Le Page points out that no easy solution can be found to the problem of which language to choose as the national language in a multi-lingual society. There are three different choices open to the new Asian and African States and their leaders may choose from amongst them. In the first place, they can use one or more of the indigenous languages for all purposes. In choosing this alternative, they can preserve the local culture, prevent the alienation of students from their parents and from the local culture. But the provision of higher education is likely to present some difficulties unless enormous economic resources can be devoted to teacher training and to translation. There is, however, a danger in adopting this alternative, of the country becoming socially and culturally isolated from the international scene. Also, if one of a number of local languages is chosen, the privileged position given to that language group will arouse violent hostility from other groups, thereby threatening national unity.

The second alternative is to give equal status to one or more local languages and an international language. Such a choice may provide for rapid expansion of primary education in the local language, and of higher learning through the international language, thus providing for the economic development of the country by keeping it in touch with the outside world. But the choice often tends to create an elite, uniting the educated of all language groups but accentuating their separateness as a social class from those with only primary education: the older people, the ruler people and the poor. Moreover, if the choice is open to them and the more ambitious people will for economic reasons choose education in the international language, the impetus to improve the local languages will be weakened.

The third alternative may be to adopt an international language. Education from the lowest grade to the highest for all language groups in an international language can unify all the younger members of a multi-lingual society within a period of fifteen to twenty years, provided the resources of trained

teachers are adequate. But this third solution will inevitably divorce the younger generation from the culture of their parents, and may provoke popular resistance, nationalistic or ideological.

Decisions about a national language policy are made by politicians for political reasons, not by linguists on the basis of a critical appraisal of the problems which may arise from a particular linguistic policy. Given the opportunity, however, the linguist can make his contribution to resolving the problems which may arise from whatever decision has been reached by the politician. He can carry out the basic research, describe the various languages involved in a given situation, prepare contrasting studies, forecast the difficulties which speakers of one language are likely to have in learning another, and guide the preparation of teaching materials which pay special attention to these difficulties. He can thus help the country to make the most effective use of its teachers, and so reduce the damage to the educational system which might result from a mistaken decision.

Imtiaz Ahmad

LANGUAGE STANDARDIZATION By Punya Sloka Ray.

Mouton & Co., The Hague, 1963.

Punya Sloka Ray, who had his basic grounding in philosophy which was the subject of his doctoral dissertation in Germany, has in him all the inherent qualities of a don: he is calm, inquisitive about anything enlightening and adequately logical in his arguments. Linguistics, which entered his intellectual repertoire fairly recently as just-another-diversion, has now ceased to remain so; instead, it is now his primary preoccupation and he is so much devoted to his subject that no wonder he visualises his sub-conscious in terms of vowels and consonants.

Linguistics has not been among the favourite catches of Indian scholars. Less than two decades ago, the country had practically no linguist with adequate training from any of the renowned centres of learning. Batches of Indian researchers started going abroad only in the very late forties and early fifties, led by Suniti Babu. Ray is among the very few with us whose work in the subject has got recognition by all circles of linguistic eminence. And, so, whatever he says deserves patient listening.

Ray conceives standardization in language as others see it in respect of any other instrument. He draws the analogy of standardized tools for his vision of a standardized language which, of course, is a tool for verbal rapport. The usual tests of statistical quality control, according to him, usually employed to examine the 'cheapness', 'dependability' and 'uniformity' of a lot of tools should also be extended to the tests of what he calls 'efficiency', 'rationality' and 'commonality' of the various linguistic practices.

The concept of linguistic efficiency, according to the formulations of Ray, is established in respect of

maximal adaptation at the cost of an arbitrarily estimated level of human resources. Rationality involves a rather highly advanced notion of mathematical correspondence (Ray calls it a 'maximal correspondence') with the matrix of accepted knowledge defined according to contemporary linguistic standards. This correspondence can hardly be the usual one-to-one, one-to-two or one-to-many as defined by a pure exponent of mathematical analysis; but, applying the same logic as Ray does when he comes to his definition of formalization, this entire process can be explained in terms of statistics and probability.

Linguistic commonality, the equivalent of an instrument's uniformity in quality, has to be explained in terms of maximal use of a language by all groups of a particular society. Here again the absolute rigidity in the commonality concept is desirable, yet not possible. Two ways have been suggested in which the maximal use can be determined. One is in the case of a single parent language but several unidentifiable dialects. The other is a situation where even though there are no dialects (or a minimum of dialects that can be easily identifiable, as there can seldom be a widely scattered language without practically no dialects), but certain sections of the language users are obliged to use another (or even many) language at least for some purposes.

While the example of the first way suggested can be found in any territory with a certain following of some particular language, for the second, reference is often made of the case of a country like the United States, where, until recently, most of the text books in chemistry and some other sciences were available only in German and the researchers were expected to learn the language for regular references. One has not to go to the United States to find such a state of affairs. Even in our own country, although it is necessary to have a thorough knowledge of English for carrying out any scientific enquiry, the use of languages like German and Russian, at least in some branches of physics and mathematical statistics, is not only an asset but an absolute necessity for conscious researchers in these fields.

The technological and methodological arguments of Ray, in an attempt to devise a universally accepted, efficient, rational and common plan for implementing the standardization of language, are highly technical and beyond the modest leap of a layman's brain like that of the present reviewer's. However, a detailed analysis of the merits and demerits of the various alternatives so far suggested by practising linguists has been undertaken with enough pains to demonstrate the mathematical and scientific bases of his generalised inferences.

Implementation of a linguistic policy after sufficient thought to the principles of standardization which follow a set of statistical, if not rigidly mathematical, laws remains the greatest difficulty before a government. Ray argues that the job of language planning

Communication

While expressing high appreciation of your 'War and After' number, which is undoubtedly the most instructive and illuminating contribution to the subject so far, may I point out certain points where I felt the need for new departures.

(1) The first one occurs in Sainen Ghosh's article when it says the following: 'No impartial observer of the Indo-Pak scene can escape the conclusion that if Britain had not been blinded by its acquired prejudices...and

Americans misled by Pakistan's talk of anti-Communism, there would have been no incitement to Pakistan and consequently no war.' Does it mean that British and American roles in the Indian subcontinent are governed by merely subjective factors? Prejudice and gullibility can sway national attitudes in matters of peripheral importance. Can they shape policies that encourage or lead to aggression?

(2) A few paragraphs below Sainen Ghosh says in reference to U.S. military assistance

to Pakistan: 'India did not doubt the genuineness of the U.S. assurance that the pact was not aimed at India and that it was intended to fight communism in Asia. India, however, knew fully well that Pakistan's motives were totally different and that its only aim in signing the Military Assistance Pact was to strengthen itself militarily and politically against India...'

This leaves one wondering about two things. First, is India acquiescent to the strategy of containing communism in Asia? Or does it mean that her adherence to parliamentary democracy *ipso facto* means her being spiritually akin to anti-communism?

The question is of key importance today. We have been proclaiming to the world through the voice of the President himself, as well as the spokesmen of the ruling party, that if democracy fails in India the light will be put out in Asia. Now what is the content of this democracy?

This we have to be very clear about because experience has shown that democracy of the type we are building up here has not been an unalloyed blessing to mankind, nationally and internationally. It was this, that is, parliamentary democracy, which was the framework within which imperialism subjugated vast regions to ruthless slavery and exploitation. Does our taking to this path mean our aspiring to be a part of the master nations of the world? Or does it mean our trying to rescue the system from the clutches of its abusers and making use of it for what it is meant, namely, freeing civilisation from the curses of inequity, inequality and the exploitation of man by man?

Secondly, what is the character of the State of Pakistan that it uninhibitedly aligns with anyone with the sole purpose of weakening, if not dismembering, India?

Lest anyone should think that this is arguing for the sake of argument, let it be remembered that before partition the people of India was a single anti-imperialist entity. What is the political strength and position of the section of this people which constitutes the Pakistani nation?

If the ruling classes of Pakistan are indulging in unashamed display of opportunism in their relations with the socialist and the imperialist blocs, their counterparts in India are not above oscillating between the two. Yet the two countries present a glaring contrast. Pakistan's opportunism is based on military dictatorship and religious fanaticism, while India's oscillations are subject to the control of the forces of democracy, secularism,

socialism. Now, how do we explain this contrast when the people on both sides of the border are co-heirs to the same tradition of anti-imperialism? And unless we ourselves are clear about it, can we carry the people of the world with us? Is not the growing tendency towards neutralism noticed in the attitudes of the progressive camp of the world an offshoot of this confusion?

(3) The time-tested theory that diplomacy is the promotion of national interests in the international sphere finds pivotal importance in almost all the articles, and is stressed the most by P. N. Dhar, Mohan Kumaramangalam, and V. K. Krishna Menon, all towering authorities on the subject. But has not the time come to take a new look at it? Are there no developments to suggest that experiences which led to the theory and practice of this type of diplomacy belonged to an era that has ceased to exist? What else is indicated by the phenomenon that although the countries of the have-not world had long been struggling to be free, their freedom had to wait until the victory of the anti-fascist war?

History bears out that there was no dearth of fighting nationalism in the have-not world before the second world war. On the contrary, there are records of the most militant and long-drawn out struggles in some of these countries. India, China and Indonesia are three examples in point. Yet their freedom had to wait the completion of an international task, namely, the defeat of fascism, which brought freedom to all irrespective of the length and the militancy of their national struggles.

Yet, the history of national struggles here has not proved meaningless. It has determined the framework of consolidating freedom in these countries. Thus, we have, for instance, China a communist State, India a democratic republic wedded to secularism and social justice, and Indonesia a guided democracy (it is to be hoped that it remains so) pledged to fight for 'Necolism'. Does this not mean that the time has come to redraw the boundary between nationalism and internationalism, and also to decide if they are distinguishable all along the line?

Here it has to be borne in mind that the era that dawned on the morrow of the V-Day was not marked out by only the march of freedom in the have-not world; its other fruit was the atom bomb, which is a respecter of neither national freedom nor national boundaries. Can diplomacy be only nation-based in this era, and if not so, to what extent?

Ranchi, November 17.

D. C. HOME

may not be the concern of the government necessarily. If can be done as it was done in other fields: in the German Church, as was done by Luther, in art, as was done by Pramatha Chaudhury in Bengal, or in scientific nomenclature as was planned by Linnaeus and others. Language reform may also occur to a single individual at first. It did not require a committee of experts to discover the theory of relativity, Ray points out.

True, autonomy should be granted to expert linguists to think out suitable plans for the society. But even where reforms have taken place almost overnight, as was done in Turkey by Kemal Ataturk, or by a slow and steady process of inevitability in view of certain other factors, the decision, perhaps, has been taken more with intuition than with the help of certain theories suggested by Ray. He, for instance, puts forward a mathematical representation of the strategy that a government may like to implement.

He introduces three matrices: (a) for a measure of positive degree above a threshold of indifference for each course of action; and (b) for the measures of negative degree within a threshold of tolerance for each course of action, and (c) for the various alternative courses of action that may be selected, in view of the people's demands and the like. Ray suggests that the three matrices be combined into one by 'any ordered series of mathematical operations that gives the best fit.' Then he likes the negative values to be subtracted from the corresponding positive values in each column and the column with the highest remaining numerical value taken to be the wisest course of action.

Now, unless we are told about the actual operations which may be done in various circumstances, the theory of the matrices of Ray would remain a mystery and considered impracticable in actual practice. What would be the factors deciding the actual operations? And, one wonders if Kemal Ataturk knew anything about the mathematical laws of pre-factors and post-factors in matrices when he implemented his reform.

The need for a common language for our country is of vital importance. Compromise about a common language for the entire country would be difficult to achieve. The best that can be done is to have a common script for all the languages which would minimise the inconveniences at present, if not put an end to them. The purposes of a unified script need hardly be enumerated. Ray considers three in order of importance: (i) unity of the nation through a maximally shared system of writing, (ii) unity of a scientific civilization through maximal conformity to the actual practice of the leading languages of science, and (iii) maximal ease in acquisition and maintenance of reading and writing skills.

Apart from the Devanagari and the Roman, three other alternatives are at once considered and rejected by Ray. Selection of one of the minor scripts in use in the country, Malayalam, for instance, will

not have the prestige value of being accepted by all. Inventing a composite script with signs borrowed from all Indian languages would be ridiculous, as it would be a completely new script with not even a direct inspiration from any other language of the world. Reviving the old Brahmi script too would be equally expensive and new to the people.

The concern for having a unified script as soon as possible is right. For, as Ray points out, and we are sure he must be doing so on the strength of some valuable arithmetic with him, if Devanagari would be twice as costly to have as Roman, a newly revived script would be twenty times so. The entire literature in all Indian languages, in that case, would have to be re-written.

Ray prefers Roman to Devanagari for he thinks that a large proportion of primary and secondary teachers in India are quite familiar with the script. Over and above this, Roman is the best choice for what he calls promoting unity in science. True, even Russian uses certain Roman styles to denote its formulae of science. Another reason why Roman should be chosen is that there may be a widespread hesitation for owning the Devanagari by the non-Hindi speaking people as they may think that it is being imposed upon them.

Apart from the technical model propounded by Ray for four Indian languages as a case study, as it should be adopted if Roman becomes the choice, one finds no reason why the Devanagari should be taken with contempt by the non-Hindi speaking population. After all, all have taken much of their inspiration from Sanskrit and, therefore, it should not be as alien to them as, say, Roman which even an Indo-Anglian writer of considerable repute would definitely find difficult to use for his mother tongue. All Indian languages except Urdu and Tamil are said to have an almost identical sound structure, whereas introduction of innumerable diacritical signs and other innovations to make the Roman suitable for adoption adds to the complication and creates what may be termed as almost a new script.

All Dravidian languages except Tamil have 53 (that is two more than in Sanskrit) sounds. Hence the suggestion of Professor Humayun Kabir to abolish the use of capital letters for names and starting of sentences and retain them in the Roman set-up to represent aspirates, or, in other words, using G in capital to sound as gh, K as kh and the like, would also create more confusion than can be brought in by the use of Devanagari.

The Turkish and Indonesian experiences should not necessarily be linked with the case of India. It may be worth considering what may be the relative worth in quality as well as in quantity of the literature already existing in Devanagari (that would require re-writing) in comparison with what was in Indonesia and Turkey.

Anees Chishti

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
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


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


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
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


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


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


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